Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582
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Autor
Staffiero, Gianandrea; Exadaktylos, Filippos; Espín Martín, Antonio Manuel
Editorial
Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Materia
Ultimatum game
 
Dictator game
 
Altruism
 
Social welfare
 
Selfishness
 
Other-regarding preferences
 
Fecha
2013
Referencia bibliográfica
Staffiero, G.; Exadaktylos, F.; Espín, A.M. Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2013). (The Papers; 13/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582]
Resumen
The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind.
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