Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences Staffiero, Gianandrea Exadaktylos, Filippos Espín Martín, Antonio Manuel Ultimatum game Dictator game Altruism Social welfare Selfishness Other-regarding preferences First Version (“Accepting Zero in the Ulti matum Game: Selfish Nash Response?”): January 2013. The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind. 2014-05-06T09:05:38Z 2014-05-06T09:05:38Z 2013 report Staffiero, G.; Exadaktylos, F.; Espín, A.M. Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2013). (The Papers; 13/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582] http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582 eng The Papers;13/01 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ open access Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica