dc.contributor.author | Staffiero, Gianandrea | |
dc.contributor.author | Exadaktylos, Filippos | |
dc.contributor.author | Espín Martín, Antonio Manuel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-05-06T09:05:38Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-05-06T09:05:38Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Staffiero, G.; Exadaktylos, F.; Espín, A.M. Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2013). (The Papers; 13/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582] | es_ES |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582 | |
dc.description | First Version (“Accepting Zero in the Ulti
matum Game: Selfish Nash Response?”):
January 2013. | es_ES |
dc.description.abstract | The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind. | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica | es_ES |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | The Papers;13/01 | |
dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License | es_ES |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ | es_ES |
dc.subject | Ultimatum game | es_ES |
dc.subject | Dictator game | es_ES |
dc.subject | Altruism | es_ES |
dc.subject | Social welfare | es_ES |
dc.subject | Selfishness | es_ES |
dc.subject | Other-regarding preferences | es_ES |
dc.title | Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences | es_ES |
dc.type | report | es_ES |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | es_ES |