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Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences

dc.contributor.authorStaffiero, Gianandrea
dc.contributor.authorExadaktylos, Filippos
dc.contributor.authorEspín Martín, Antonio Manuel 
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-06T09:05:38Z
dc.date.available2014-05-06T09:05:38Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationStaffiero, G.; Exadaktylos, F.; Espín, A.M. Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2013). (The Papers; 13/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582]es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582
dc.descriptionFirst Version (“Accepting Zero in the Ulti matum Game: Selfish Nash Response?”): January 2013.es_ES
dc.description.abstractThe study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherUniversidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económicaes_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Papers;13/01
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Licensees_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es_ES
dc.subjectUltimatum gamees_ES
dc.subjectDictator gamees_ES
dc.subjectAltruismes_ES
dc.subjectSocial welfarees_ES
dc.subjectSelfishnesses_ES
dc.subjectOther-regarding preferenceses_ES
dc.titleAccepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferenceses_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/reportes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES


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