Versioning goods and joint purchase: substitution and complementary strategies
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31502Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemEditorial
Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Materia
Versioning goods Joint purchase option Substitutes Complementary Price discrimination Market segmentation
Fecha
2007Referencia bibliográfica
Martínez-Sánchez, F. Versioning goods and joint purchase: substitution and complementary strategies. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2007). (The Papers; 07/06). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31502]
Patrocinador
Financial support from Spanish MCYT under the Project SEJ2007-62081/ECON.Resumen
We analyze the monopolist’s decision about how to design different versions of a good, i.e. whether to make them substitutes or complements, when consumers can buy them simultaneously. In this context, we find that versioning goods as substitutes or complements may be optimal for the monopolist, and the final result depends on the degree of concavity and convexity of the cost function.