Economic Threats, Political and National Identification Predict Affective Polarization: Longitudinal Evidence From Spain
Metadatos
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García Sánchez, Efraín; Turner-Zwinkels, Felicity M.; Kesberg, Rebekka; Marot, Medhi; Rodríguez Bailón, Rosa María; Willis Sánchez, Guillermo Byrd; Kuppens, ToonEditorial
International Review of Social Psychology
Materia
Affective polarization; economic threats Economic inequality
Fecha
2024-03-21Referencia bibliográfica
García-Sánchez et al. 37(1): 5, 1–17. [https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.838]
Patrocinador
NORFACE Joint Research Program on Democratic Governance in a Turbulent Age; Spain Research Agency; European Commission through Horizon 2020 under grant agreement no. 822166; Spain Research Agency (grant nos. AEI, PCI2020-112285, 10.13039/501100011033; PID2022-140252NB-I00; PID2019105643GB-I00); PID2022-140252NB-I00 funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033; ERDF/EUResumen
Economic threats, along with political identities and ideologies, are associated
with affective polarization. However, there is still a need to learn more about the
consequences of different economic threats and identities fueling polarization.
We take a longitudinal perspective in testing the influence of these phenomena on
affective polarization. Specifically, we tested the effect of subjective personal and
collective economic threats and political, national, regional, and European identities
on affective polarization towards politicians and partisans in Spain. We use four waves
of the E-DEM panel study from Spain (N = 2,501) collected between 2018 and 2019.
We conducted longitudinal multilevel analyses to determine the growth in affective
polarization and included predictors at the between- and within-person levels.
Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that collective economic threats, such as
perceiving more unfairness in the distribution of wealth and being dissatisfied with the
Spanish economy, positively predict affective polarization. Contrary to our expectations,
personal economic threats did not predict affective polarization. Furthermore, political
and national identities positively predicted affective polarization towards politicians
and partisans. Interestingly, exploratory analyses suggested that the associations
between economic threats, identities, and affective polarization are moderated by
political ideology. We discuss how economic threats and identities may exacerbate
animosities toward political actors.