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Semantic content and compositional context-sensitivity
dc.contributor.author | Romero González, María Esther | |
dc.contributor.author | Soria Clivilles, María Belén | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-02-21T09:41:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-02-21T09:41:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Romero, Esther; Soria, Belén. (2019). «Semantic content and compositional context-sensitivity»; Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34(1), 51-71. | es_ES |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10481/59803 | |
dc.description.abstract | A variety of theorists have recently argued against the explanation of the semantic content of a sentence as a minimal proposition claiming that intentional aspects of the context are often needed to obtain a minimal proposition. Minimalists such as Borg, however, still defend intention-insensitive minimal propositions for sentences in a narrow context and provide solutions or dissolutions against incompleteness objections. In this paper, we show that these putative defences of propositionalism do not serve to avoid some additional genuine objections which arise from compositional context-sensitivity. We aim to show that there are complex expressions which compositionally demand intention-sensitive pragmatic effects in a mandatory way and, for that reason, they provide us with evidence against the type of propositionalism that substantiates the defence of semantic minimalism. | es_ES |
dc.description.abstract | Algunos teóricos han rechazado recientemente la concepción del contenido semántico de una oración como proposición mínima afirmando que para conseguir una proposición mínima a menudo se necesitan aspectos intencionales del contexto. Sin embargo, minimalistas como Borg siguen defendiendo que las oraciones en un contexto estrecho expresan proposiciones mínimas sin tener en cuenta las intenciones y lo defienden resolviendo o disolviendo las objeciones de incompletitud. En este artículo mostramos que esas supuestas defensas del proposicionalismo no sirven para evitar otras objeciones genuinas que dependen de la sensibilidad contextual composicional. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que hay expresiones complejas que demandan composicionalmente de modo obligatorio efectos pragmáticos cuya recuperación depende de las intenciones y, por ello, proporcionan evidencia contra el tipo de proposicionalismo que fundamenta la defensa del minimismo semántico. | es_ES |
dc.description.sponsorship | Research for this paper was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, EXCELENCIA program, project FFI2016-79317-P. | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Universidad del País Vasco | es_ES |
dc.rights | Atribución 3.0 España | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.subject | Minimal proposition | es_ES |
dc.subject | Incompleteness | es_ES |
dc.subject | Propositionalism | es_ES |
dc.subject | Minimalism | es_ES |
dc.subject | Mandatory demand of contextual information | es_ES |
dc.title | Semantic content and compositional context-sensitivity | es_ES |
dc.title.alternative | Contenido semántico y sensibilidad composicional al contexto | es_ES |
dc.type | journal article | es_ES |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | es_ES |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1387/theoria.17683 |