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dc.contributor.authorCobo-Reyes, Ramón
dc.contributor.authorJiménez, Natalia
dc.contributor.authorSolano-García, Ángel
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-06T08:52:13Z
dc.date.available2014-05-06T08:52:13Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationCobo-Reyes, R.; Jiménez, N.; Solano-García, A. The effect of elections on third-party punishment: an experimental analysis. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2012). (The Papers; 12/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31581]es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10481/31581
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the behavior of an official who is elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously. To this aim, we conduct an economic experiment in which officials are third party punishers in a public goods game. We consider two different scenarios which differ in the degree of cooperation within the society. We find that officials increase their punishment when they face elections in both scenarios. The increase in punishment is larger in the more cooperative scenario although differences are not statistically significant. Contrary to candidates’ expectations, voters always vote for the least severe candidate.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherUniversidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económicaes_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Papers;12/01
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Licensees_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es_ES
dc.subjectOpportunismes_ES
dc.subjectIdeology es_ES
dc.subjectPunishmentes_ES
dc.subjectPublic good gameses_ES
dc.subjectVoting es_ES
dc.titleThe effect of elections on third-party punishment: an experimental analysises_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/reportes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES


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