Instinctive response in the ultimatum game

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31517
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Auteur
Brañas Garza, Pablo; Meloso, Debrah; Miller, Luis
Editorial
Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Materia
Economic experiments
 
Ultimatum game
 
Yes-or-no game
 
Median response time
 
Date
2008
Referencia bibliográfica
Brañas-Garza, P.; Meloso, D.; Miller, L. Instinctive response in the ultimatum game. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2008). (The Papers; 08/08). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31517]
Patrocinador
Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grants ECO2012-30626, CSD2010-00034, and ECO2010-17049), the Government of Andalusia Project for Excellence in Research (grant P07.SEJ.02547), the Fundación Ramón Areces R+D 2011, and the European Research Council (advanced grant BRSCDP-TEA).
Résumé
In a series of recent papers, Ariel Rubinstein claims that the study of response time sheds light on the process of reasoning involved in classical economic decision problems. In particular, he considers that a distinction can be drawn between instinc- tive and cognitive reasoning. This paper complements and expands upon Rubinstein's study on time responses. We show that strategic risk is the key element in explaining differences in median response time in ultimatum behavior.
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