Why gender based game theory?

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31491
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Author
Brañas Garza, Pablo
Editorial
Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Materia
Gender bias
 
Dominated strategies
 
Nash equilibrium
 
Learning
 
Date
2006
Referencia bibliográfica
Brañas-Garza, P. Why gender based game theory?. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2006). (The Papers; 06/08). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31491]
Sponsorship
The financial support from DGICYT(SEJ2004-07554/ECON).
Abstract
The behavior of men and women in a number of games free of social issues is explored. The analysis is conducted for simple (2x2) and complex (guessing) games and in static and repeated settings. No gender effect is observed either in static nor in repeated games. It is concluded that gender bias vanishes in the absence of social issues.
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License