Postponing the legal retirement age
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31474Metadatos
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemEditorial
Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Materia
Legal retirement age Pension benefits Redistribution level
Fecha
2005Referencia bibliográfica
Lacomba, J.A.; Lagos, F. Postponing the legal retirement age. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2005). (The Papers; 05/13). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31474]
Resumen
This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to
the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, firstly, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system, and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. Our results suggest that an increase in the re-distributive character of the system could lead to a larger social consensus
to postpone the legal retirement age. Surprisingly, it could be the case
that the richest people would support more redistribution if that implies to
postpone the pensionable age.