The museum pass problem with consortia

Gonçalves-Dosantos, Juan Carlos; Martínez Rico, Ricardo; Sánchez Soriano, Joaquín

doi:10.1007/s00182-026-00989-z

s00182-026-00989-z.pdf (6.524Mb)

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112396

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-026-00989-z

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Editorial

Springer Nature

Materia

Museum pass

Consortia

Allocation rule

Date

2026-03-17

Referencia bibliográfica

Gonçalves-Dosantos, J.C., Martínez, R. & Sánchez-Soriano, J. The museum pass problem with consortia. Int J Game Theory 55, 17 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00989-z

Abstract

In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. Each mechanism satisfies a distinct set of reasonable properties related to fairness and stability, which serve to axiomatically characterize them.

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