The museum pass problem with consortia Gonçalves-Dosantos, Juan Carlos Martínez Rico, Ricardo Sánchez Soriano, Joaquín Museum pass Consortia Allocation rule In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. Each mechanism satisfies a distinct set of reasonable properties related to fairness and stability, which serve to axiomatically characterize them. 2026-03-23T12:30:34Z 2026-03-23T12:30:34Z 2026-03-17 journal article Gonçalves-Dosantos, J.C., Martínez, R. & Sánchez-Soriano, J. The museum pass problem with consortia. Int J Game Theory 55, 17 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00989-z https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112396 10.1007/s00182-026-00989-z eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ open access Atribución 4.0 Internacional Springer Nature