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dc.contributor.authorBrañas-Garza, Pablo
dc.contributor.authorMorales, Antonio J.
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-30T06:27:45Z
dc.date.available2014-04-30T06:27:45Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.citationBrañas-Garza, P.; Morales, A.J. Moral framing in dictator games by short. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2005). (The Papers; 05/06). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31467]es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10481/31467
dc.description.abstractRecent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding recipient is provided. But the lack of information disincentives other-regarding behavior and then, the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game-theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper conducted four treatment of dictator games. We used one-room design, between-subjects anonymity and extra-credit point as rewards. Two treatments were used as baseline whereas the other two were aimed at reinforcing the recipient powerlessness and positive reciprocity. To promote these environments we include a “non—neutral” sentence to the instructions. Our baseline and modified DG are statistically different from each other, indicating that the additional sentences promote other—regarding behaviour. In fact, pure-selfish behavior vanishes.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipAntonio J. Morales acknowledges financial support from MCYT and FEDER grant number BEC 2002-02852.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherUniversidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económicaes_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Papers;05/06
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Licensees_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es_ES
dc.subjectDictator gamees_ES
dc.subjectFraming effectes_ES
dc.subjectSocial issueses_ES
dc.subjectFairnesses_ES
dc.subjectReciprocityes_ES
dc.titleMoral framing in dictator games by shortes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/reportes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES


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