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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31467

Title: Moral framing in dictator games by short
Authors: Brañas-Garza, Pablo
Morales, Antonio J.
Issue Date: 2005
Abstract: Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding recipient is provided. But the lack of information disincentives other-regarding behavior and then, the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game-theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper conducted four treatment of dictator games. We used one-room design, between-subjects anonymity and extra-credit point as rewards. Two treatments were used as baseline whereas the other two were aimed at reinforcing the recipient powerlessness and positive reciprocity. To promote these environments we include a “non—neutral” sentence to the instructions. Our baseline and modified DG are statistically different from each other, indicating that the additional sentences promote other—regarding behaviour. In fact, pure-selfish behavior vanishes.
Sponsorship: Antonio J. Morales acknowledges financial support from MCYT and FEDER grant number BEC 2002-02852.
Publisher: Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Series/Report no.: The Papers;05/06
Keywords: Dictator game
Framing effect
Social issues
Fairness
Reciprocity
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31467
Rights : Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Citation: Brañas-Garza, P.; Morales, A.J. Moral framing in dictator games by short. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2005). (The Papers; 05/06). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31467]
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