Would you exchange your soul for immortality?—existential meaning and afterlife beliefs predict mind upload approval
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Laakasuo, Michael; Sundvall, Jukka; Francis, Kathryn; Drosinou, Marianna; Rodríguez Hannikainen, Ivar Allan; Kunnari, Anton; Palomäki, JussiEditorial
Frontiers Media
Materia
Mind upload Moral psychology of AI Moral judgment
Date
2023-12-14Referencia bibliográfica
Laakasuo M, Sundvall J, Francis K, Drosinou M, Hannikainen I, Kunnari A and Palomäki J (2023) Would you exchange your soul for immortality?—existential meaning and afterlife beliefs predict mind upload approval. Front. Psychol. 14:1254846. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1254846
Sponsorship
Jane and Aatos Erkko Foundation (grant number: 170112); Academy of Finland (grant number: 323207); NetResilience consortium funded by the Strategic Research Council within the Academy of Finland (grant numbers 345186 and 345183)Abstract
Mind upload, or the digital copying of an individual brain and mind, could
theoretically allow one to “live forever.” If such a technology became available,
who would be most likely to approve of it or condemn it? Research has shown
that fear of death positively predicts the moral approval of hypothetical mind
upload technology, while religiosity may have the opposite effect. We build on
these findings, drawing also from work on religiosity and existential mattering as
predictors of perceived meaning in one’s life. In a cross-sectional study (N = 1,007),
we show that existential mattering and afterlife beliefs are negatively associated
with moral approval of mind upload technology: people who believe there is
a soul or some form of afterlife and who also report a high level of existential
mattering, are least likely to morally approve of mind upload technology. Indeed,
mind uploading—if it ever becomes feasible—is a form of technology that would
fundamentally redraw the existential boundaries of what it means to be human.