Normatividad en filosofía de la ciencia: el caso de la ciencia reguladora

Abstract

Se discuten varias concepciones con respecto al carácter normativo de la filosofía de la ciencia. De entre éstas, se aboga por una forma de naturalismo comprometido con la necesidad de discutir los valores (epistémicos o no) de la ciencia. El ejemplo de la “ciencia reguladora” ilustra esa necesidad.

This article examines the traditional characterization of the philosophy of science as a normative discipline. Several under-standings of this discipline are discussed; each of them offering a different answer to the question whether, and how, a genuinely normative philosophy of science might be possible. Among these views, I choose one variety of naturalism that differs from others in its commitment with the discussion of science’s aims and values, either epistemic or non-epistemic. Finally, the need for this inclusion is illustrated with the example of the so-called “regulatory science”.