El contextualismo y P. Grice
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/32622DOI: 10.1387/theoria.586
ISSN: 0495-4548
ISSN: 2171-679X
Metadatos
Afficher la notice complèteAuteur
Chaves, José E.Editorial
Universidad del País Vasco
Materia
Vaguedad Minimismo Contextualismo Literalismo Vagueness Minimalism Contextualism Literalism
Date
2004Referencia bibliográfica
Chaves, J.E. El contextualismo y P. Grice. Theoria, 19(3): 339-354 (2004). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/32622]
Résumé
Según Recanati, hay un argumento anticontextualista que tiene su origen en Grice. En este artículo demuestro que ese argumento no puede estar en Grice si tenemos en cuenta la explicación que ofrece de ciertos ejemplos y su teoría de las implicaturas. Grice se muestra como un contextualista. Recanati holds that, in the contextualism vs. anti-contextualism debate, the latter view has received more support than the former thanks to an argument that can be placed in some of Grice’s writings. Such argument has the Parallelism Principle as a premise, a principle that, Recanati argues, makes the argument circular and the contextualist position unjustified. Although I consider this anticontextualist argument unjustified, I will show that it cannot be attributed to Grice. By considering his ex-planation of certain examples and his theory of implicatura, I will show that Grice does not admit the Parallelism principle. This reveals Grice to be a contextualist.