Unraveling public good games
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31510Metadata
Show full item recordEditorial
Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Materia
Public good game End game effect Beliefs
Date
2008Referencia bibliográfica
Brañas-Garza, P.; Espinosa, M.P. Unraveling public good games. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2008). (The Papers; 08/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31510]
Sponsorship
María Paz Espinosa acknowledges financial aid from MEC (SEJ2006-06309/ECON) and Gobierno Vasco, DEUI (IT-313-07); Pablo Brañas-Garza from DGCYT (SEJ2007-62081/ECON).Abstract
This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs and let us conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and they do very little updating of beliefs.