Tesis Doctoral

La Ontología de las Versiones y Transcripciones Musicales.
Un Paraíso de los Filósofos al Encuentro de Nuestras Prácticas Musicales.

The Ontology of Musical Versions and Transcriptions.
A Philosophers' Paradise Meeting our Musical Practices.

Doctorando
Nemesio García-Carril Puy

Directores
Dr. Juan José Acero Fernández
Dr. Neftalí Villanueva Fernández

Programa de Doctorado en Filosofía

Departamento de Filosofía I

Universidad de Granada

A mis padres.

Agradecimientos

Publicaciones

Puy, N. (2016) "Review of *La belleza en Charles S. Peirce: Origen y alcance de sus ideas estéticas* by Sara Barrena". *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*. Vol. 52. No. 4. Pp. 652-658. DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.52.4.fm. ISSN: 0009-1774. Scopus: Q2.

Puy, N. (2017) "On the ontological category of computer-generated music scores". *Journal of Creative Music Systems*. Vol. 1. Issue 2. DOI: 10.5920/JCMS.2017.06. ISSN 2399-7656

Puy, N. (2017) "Musical versions and transcriptions. Disputing Stephen Davies Account". *Debates in Aesthetics*. Vol. 13. Issue 1. ISSN 2514-6637. Pp. 33-51.

Puy, N. (2018) "Platonismo musical y composición de obras musicales por ordenador", in Carmen Rodríguez Martín (Ed.), *Arte y Naturaleza*. Editorial Comares: Granada. (Forthcoming).

Summary

This inquiry is devoted to the study of the nature of musical versions and transcriptions. It is intended to palliate the lack in the ontological debate concerning this sort of musical products. Ontological accounts have been traditionally focused on cases of musical works that have never been revised or transcribed, disregarding a broad sphere of creative practices that come after the composer's process of composition of a work. These creative practices concern musical versions and transcriptions, but also issues regarding the authenticity of a work's performances in terms of interpretative authenticity and fidelity to the work. I will show in chapter 1 that, in spite of the significant proliferation of accounts in the domain of the ontology of music, none of them offers a satisfactory explanation of the products and practices of this creative sphere in two respects: firstly, the views regarding versions and transcriptions as different works from the work versioned or transcribed face problems to distinguish these musical products from works inspired or based on previous ones; secondly, the views considering versions and transcriptions as the same work as the work versioned or transcribed face problems concerning the individuation of versions and transcriptions, and of musical works in general.

The main goal of this inquiry is not to offer an *ad hoc* position to explain the nature of versions and transcriptions, but to determine their ontological status within the framework of an overall theory about the ontology of works of music. The general strategy to be adopted is that refocusing the ontology of music on these musical products –versions and transcriptions– will provide us with a new insight that will offer a wider explanatory scope than the traditionally available views. Accordingly, an ulterior goal of this inquiry will be to provide a superior account to the available ones that overcomes the apparent impasse in the ontology of music in light of the proliferation of a great plurality of views in recent years. Thus, the ontological proposal that will be defended here will not be only intended to apply to musical versions and transcriptions, but to all sorts of musical works.

The thesis that I defend in this essay is that the hypothesis of nested types is the best answer to the categorial question in the ontology of music. According to this hypothesis, musical works are higher order types that are instantiated in lower order types –a work's versions, transcriptions, and interpretations–, which are instantiated in musical performances. Concerning the individuation question, I argue that musical works are individuated according to pure sonicism and a sort of non-indexical contextualism that modulates the scope of the variables of a work's sound structure attending, in first instance, to the context of composition of its versions and transcriptions, and in second instance, to the context of its performances. In addition,

non-indexical contextualism will be complemented by indexical contextualism and timbral sonicism for the individuation of a work's versions and transcriptions.

The view introduced in the previous paragraph will be defended here as the best explanation of musical works' nature on the basis of the methodology proposed in chapter 2. Recent research has pointed to a metaontological realm as the sphere where the impasse in the ontology of music is to be solved. In this chapter, it will be shown that the two main views in the metaontology of music –descriptivism and revisionism– face different sorts of problems. Descriptivist accounts are bound to the problem of triviality –i.e. the problem that ontological claims do not provide relevant cognitive content about the nature of musical works. The descriptivist accounts that overcome this worry will be revealed as eliminativists or fictionalists about musical works, which will lead them to a problem of inconsistency to the extent that they betray their basic principle of not revising fundamental beliefs of our musical practices. On the other hand, metaontological revisionism puts no constraints to the revisions that may be operated over our pre-theoretical intuitions, facing thus the problem of solipsism –it may validate a concept of musical work that has no applicability in our musical practices and other related domains. This circumstance would invalidate the main goal of revisionism, namely, to produce a better structure of though concerning a particular domain. The identification of the problems of triviality, inconsistency and solipsism will entail two desiderata to be satisfied by any suitable ontological account of musical works: 1) minimal descriptivism, according to which ontological accounts of musical works, within a given context, should be able to accommodate widespread musical intuitions; 2) minimal revisionism, according to which ontological accounts of musical works should be able to revise our practical intuitions whenever they clash with sound theoretical principles.

It will be argued that the methodology that best satisfies both desiderata is a renewed view of reflective equilibrium based on Goodman's original notion, which can be summarized as follows: an intuition of our musical practices about musical works' nature is valid if it is compatible with the results obtained in the ontology of music following the theoretical principles of simplicity, explanatory power and compatibility with our best theories in other domains; in turn, the results in ontology are valid if they can accommodate most of our widely shared intuitions about musical works' nature. The mechanism that reflective equilibrium offers to satisfy the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism is the distinction between familiar intuitions – those that are widely shared and used in our musical practices for different practical purposes– and entrenched ones –those that constitute projectible hypothesis. It will be defended that, to avoid the ontologist's prejudices, a combination of the methods of experimental philosophy with the results and procedures employed in empirical disciplines studying music provides us with the best way to account for our familiar intuitions. By contrast, it will be shown that the entrenched character of an intuition cannot be determined by empirical methods. We can only determine negatively which familiar intuitions are not entrenched by means of reflection and conceptual analysis.

Consequently, the role that empirical methods will play in this ontological approach is to be understood under the positive program of experimental philosophy, i.e. as a complement of the traditional philosophical ones. The result that will be achieved is that ontology must preserve entrenched intuitions but it is entitled to revise those ones that are merely familiar.

Empirical methods are applied in Chapter 3 to determine what intuitions are familiar to our practices regarding the ontological status of musical versions and transcriptions. Firstly, it will be shown that musicologists tendency to classify versions and transcriptions as works non-numerically different from the work versioned or transcribed, and composers' motivations for writing versions and transcriptions, are coherent with, and support, the intuition that versions and transcriptions are not different musical works from the works versioned or transcribed. In addition, this inquiry will reveal a sense of authenticity according to which versions and transcriptions may be faithful to a musical work's content, in a similar sense in which musical performances are. Finally, an empirical study following the method of cases will be carried out to check the listeners' intuitions when confronted with performances of versions, transcriptions and works based on previous ones. The results achieved will be that listeners' broadly share the intuition that in hearing a performance of a version or transcription they are hearing, not only that version or transcription, but also the work versioned or transcribed. It will be labelled the *standard view on versions and transcriptions*. The results will also reinforce the idea that musical work's repeatability is a familiar intuition to the extent that listeners regard that a same work can be repeated in the performances of its different versions and transcriptions.

The results obtained in chapter 3 will be used in chapter 4 to show that Stephen Davies' account on transcriptions –which takes them to be musical works different from the work transcribed– is revisionary and cannot be presented as the default position. The rest of the chapter will explore whether Davies provides an account showing that the familiar intuition that transcriptions are not different works from the work transcribed is a non-entrenched one, justifying its revision. Three possible reasons will be identified, all of them trying to support the idea that a change of instrumentation entails a change in a work's identity: firstly, that the context of composition determines that instrumentation is a normative property of medium-specific musical works; secondly, that colour (or timbre) is a necessary condition of the structure and content of a musical work; and thirdly, that certain aesthetic properties constitutive of the identity of musical works depend on the specific instrumental medium prescribed by the composer, taking 'virtuosic' as a paradigmatic case of this phenomenon. It will be shown that none of these three reasons is strong enough to reveal the intuition that transcriptions do not constitute different works from the work transcribed is as a non-entrenched one. Consequently, according to minimal descriptivism and reflective equilibrium, this belief is to be regarded as one that must be accommodated by an ontological account of musical works.

In chapter 5, the hypothesis of nested types will be introduced as the best ontological account of musical versions and transcriptions regarding the categorial question. On the side of our musical practices, it can accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions, explaining it by means of iterative instantiations between three levels of objects: firstly, between the work as a higher order type and its versions or transcriptions –lower order types that are tokens of the higher order type–, and secondly, between versions and transcriptions as lower order types and musical performances –sound sequence events that are tokens of lower order types. Given the transmission of properties between types and their tokens, the hypothesis of nested types guarantees that in hearing a performance of a version or transcription we are hearing, not only that performance, but also the version or transcription performed. In addition, since versions and transcriptions are tokens of the work versioned or transcribed, when we accede to a version or transcription by means of its tokens (musical performances), we also accede to the work versioned or transcribed. On the side of the theoretical virtues, it preserves the theoretical advantages of a type/token theory –regarded as the best explanation of musical works' repeatability. In addition, it is able to accommodate structural monism –the best explanation for the individuation of musical works– with the association of different sound structures with the same musical work assumed by the standard view on versions and transcriptions. It will be shown that different attempts to replace structural monism by a view compatible with structural pluralism –the continuants view, the performance theory and resemblance nominalism– either clash with sound theoretical principles or are not able to accommodate in a satisfactory way the standard view. Alternatively, the hypothesis of nested types will be regarded as free of those problems. A musical work as a higher order type is individuated by a sound structure that has different variable places that are filled by its versions and transcriptions, in first instance, and by musical performances, in second instance. These variable places correspond to different parameters as instrumentation, structural features, composer, and time of composition (or indication). Accordingly, the sound structure that individuates a musical work as a higher order type is a more indeterminate one that can be instantiated in more determinate and different sound structures, the ones individuating its versions and transcriptions. The scope of the variable places of the sound structure individuating a work depends on the context of composition of its versions and transcriptions and on a context of performance, which determine the performances in which that work is repeatable.

Consequently, regarding the individuation question, musical works *qua* higher order types are individuated according to pure sonicism –to admit different instrumentations– and non-indexical contextualism –to determine the instantiation conditions of musical works in more specific sound structures and in performances. In this last respect, two conditions will be identified: 1) a certain degree of similarity holding between the sound structures of a work's versions and transcriptions, which is determined by the kinematics of the common ground of the context of composition of such versions and transcriptions; 2) the different sound structures corresponding to a work's versions and transcriptions must be indicated by acts of indication that are parts

of the same process of composition, understood as a continuant. To belong to the same process of composition, the acts of indication must be similar enough in different respects (aims, scope, musical technique, style) –modulated by the context of composition– and must be causally related. These two instantiation conditions of musical works *qua* higher order types in versions and transcriptions *qua* lower order types will lead us to the conclusion that versions and transcriptions are individuated by a sound structure, by a specific instrumentation (timbral properties) and by reference to the composer and time of composition, in spite of some of these aspects not to be clearly backed by the empirical study of chapter 3.

The conclusions achieved in chapter 5 require a type-ontology to be compatible with different views on the individuation question, which will be shown in chapter 6. This chapter faces the received view on Platonism and Aristotelianism, according to which Platonism entails that musical works are individuated according to sonicism and non-contextualism, and that Aristotelianism implies that musical works are individuated by instrumentalism and contextualism. It will be introduced an argument that shows that Platonism and Aristotelianism disagree about the existence conditions for types via their different views about the existence conditions of properties, but not necessarily about the identity conditions of types. Consequently, both platonic and aristotelian types will be revealed as compatible with all the views about the individuation of musical works – indexical contextualism, non-contextualism, non-indexical contextualism, pure sonicism timbral sonicism and instrumentalism. The different views on the individuation question only concern the degree of exigency demanded by the property that individuates a type for something to be a properly formed token of that type. The conclusions of this chapter will provide two important consequences for the hypothesis of nested types. The first one is that the fact that musical works *qua* higher order types are individuated by pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism, and that versions and transcriptions *qua* lower order types are individuated by timbral sonicism, indexical contextualism and non-indexical contextualism, does not imply that musical works, on the one hand, and versions and transcriptions, on the other, are associated with different kinds of types. The difference in the individuation of a work and its versions and transcriptions will not affect its ontological category, resting merely on the degree of exigency of the properties that individuate the types with which these musical products are identified. The second consequence is that the conclusions of chapter 6 will solve the problem of creatability for the hypothesis of nested types, offering two ways in which the hypothesis of nested types is compatible with the intuition that musical works are created: a) by the creation of a work's first version; b) by the possibility of being instantiated.

The final chapter will be devoted to address different worries concerning the hypothesis of nested types. The more pressing of them is the one that regards this hypothesis as an *ad hoc* position to account for the particular cases of works with transcriptions and more than one version. It will be argued that applying the hypothesis of nested types to the domain of all musical works –including the normal cases of works

that have been neither revised nor transcribed– is theoretically profitable and also intuitive from the perspective of our musical practices. From the point of view theoretical desiderata, given that the possibility of being revised or transcribed is open for all musical works, the hypothesis of nested types will be revealed as the most simple and powerful explanation of musical works' nature. From the point of view of practical desiderata, the ontology of multiple levels –higher order types, lower order types and events– posited by the hypothesis of nested types is intuitive to account for the nature of all musical works. In particular, it offers a simple explanation of performances' interpretative authenticity, and especially of those cases in which interpretative authenticity conflicts with score compliance authenticity, overcoming the difficulties faced by a traditional two-levels type/token theory. In addition, the hypothesis of nested types also accommodates in a simple way types of performance interpretations, regarding them as lower order types that instantiate a work's version and that are instantiated in musical performances. Once the hypothesis of nested types is justified by this way as an overall account of musical works' nature, recent criticisms addressed against the general idea that musical works are types will be considered and rejected, in particular, those addressed by Hazlett, Bertinetto, Rossberg and Kania.

Resumen

La presente investigación se centra en el estudio de la naturaleza de las versiones y transcripciones musicales. Su principal motivación es paliar la laguna existente en el debate ontológico acerca de esta clase de productos musicales. Las propuestas ontológicas previas se han ocupado habitualmente de los casos de obras musicales que no han sido nunca revisadas o transcritas, prestando una atención residual a una amplia esfera de prácticas creativas que tienen lugar después del proceso llevado a cabo por un compositor para la composición de una obra. Dichas prácticas creativas atañen al fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones musicales, pero también a ciertos aspectos relacionados con la autenticidad de las ejecuciones de una obra en términos de autenticidad interpretativa y fidelidad a la obra. Se mostrará en el capítulo 1 que, a pesar de la significativa proliferación de perspectivas en el ámbito de la ontología de la música, ninguna de ellas ofrece una explicación satisfactoria de los productos y las prácticas de esta esfera creativa en dos aspectos: en primer lugar, las posiciones que consideran a las versiones y transcripciones como obras diferentes de la obra versionada o transcrita se encuentran con problemas a la hora de distinguir estos productos musicales de obras inspiradas o basadas en otras obras; en segundo lugar, las perspectivas que entienden que las versiones y transcripciones de una obra son la misma obra que la obra versionada o transcrita se enfrentan a problemas relativos a la individuación de versiones y transcripciones, así como de las obras musicales en general.

El principal objetivo de esta investigación no consiste en ofrecer una explicación *ad hoc* de la naturaleza de las versiones y transcripciones musicales, sino en determinar su estatuto ontológico en el marco de una teoría general acerca de la ontología de las obras musicales. La estrategia general que se adoptará aquí se compromete con la idea de que redireccionar la atención de la ontología de la música hacia estos productos musicales posibilitará la obtención de una nueva perspectiva con un mayor alcance explicativo que las propuestas actualmente vigentes. En consecuencia, un objetivo ulterior de esta investigación será proporcionar una propuesta más robusta que contribuya a superar el punto muerto en el que parece encontrarse la ontología de la música a la vista de la gran proliferación de posiciones durante los años recientes. Por tanto, la propuesta ontológica que se defenderá aquí no pretende concernir solamente a versiones y transcripciones musicales, sino a toda clase de obras musicales.

La tesis que se defenderá en este ensayo es que la *hipótesis de los tipos anidados* es la mejor respuesta a la cuestión categorial en ontología de la música. Según dicha hipótesis, las obras musicales son tipos de orden superior que se instancian en tipos de orden inferior –las versiones, transcripciones e interpretaciones de una obra–, los cuales se instancian a su vez en ejecuciones musicales. En lo relativo a la cuestión por la individuación, se defenderá que las obras musicales se individúan según las tesis del

sonicismo tímbrico y de una clase de contextualismo no-deíctico que modula el alcance de las variables de la estructura de sonidos de una obra atendiendo, en primera instancia, al contexto de composición de sus versiones y transcripciones, y en segunda instancia, al contexto de sus ejecuciones. Además, el contextualismo no-deíctico se complementará con el contextualismo deíctico y el sonicismo tímbrico para la individuación de las versiones y transcripciones de una obra.

La perspectiva presentada en el párrafo anterior se defenderá aquí como la mejor explicación de la naturaleza de las obras musicales sobre la base de la metodología propuesta en el capítulo 2. Los desarrollos recientes en esta área han apuntado al ámbito metaontológico como la esfera en la que puede alcanzarse una disolución del bloqueo en el que parece encontrarse actualmente el debate en ontología de la música. En dicho capítulo, se mostrará que las dos tesis principales en metaontología de la música –el descriptivismo y el revisionismo– se enfrentan a diversos problemas. Las posiciones descriptivistas están vinculadas con el problema de la trivialidad –i.e. el problema de que las afirmaciones ontológicas no proporcionan un contenido cognitivamente relevante acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales. Se verá que las propuestas descriptivistas que son capaces de superar el problema de la trivialidad son aquellas que adquieren compromisos eliminativistas o ficcionalistas acerca de las obras musicales. Esta circunstancia las conduce al problema de la inconsistencia, pues son propuestas que traicionan su principio fundamental de no revisar creencias básicas de nuestras prácticas musicales. Por otra parte, el revisionismo metaontológico no pone trabas a las revisiones que puedan llevarse a cabo sobre nuestras intuiciones pre-teóricas, enfrentándose así al problema del solipsismo –i.e. se trata de una metodología que puede validar un concepto de obra musical que no tenga aplicabilidad en las prácticas musicales o en otros dominios asociados. Esta circunstancia haría inviable el principal objetivo del revisionismo, a saber, producir una mejor estructura de pensamiento en lo referente a un ámbito específico, en este caso, el musical. La identificación de los problemas de la trivialidad, inconsistencia y solipsismo implicarán que hay dos desiderata que tienen que satisfacerse por cualquier propuesta metodológicamente aceptable en el ámbito de la ontología de la música: 1) el descriptivismo mínimo, según el cual las propuestas ontológicas sobre las obras musicales, en un contexto dado, deberían ser capaces de acomodar las intuiciones ampliamente extendidas en nuestras prácticas musicales; 2) el revisionismo mínimo, según el cual las propuestas ontológicas sobre las obras musicales deberían poder revisar nuestras intuiciones prácticas dondequiera que estas colisionen con principios teóricos firmes.

Se argumentará que la metodología que mejor satisface ambos desiderata es una perspectiva renovada de la noción original de Goodman del *equilibrio reflexivo*, la cual se puede sintetizar de la siguiente manera: una intuición de nuestras prácticas musicales acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales es válida si es compatible con los resultados obtenidos en ontología de la música siguiendo los principios teóricos de simplicidad, poder explicativo y compatibilidad con nuestras mejores teorías en otros dominios; a su vez, los resultados en ontología de la música son aceptables si son

capaces de acomodar la mayor parte de nuestras intuiciones más ampliamente compartidas acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales. El mecanismo que el equilibrio reflexivo ofrece para satisfacer los desiderata del descriptivismo y el revisionismo mínimos es la distinción entre intuiciones familiares –aquellas que son ampliamente compartidas y empleadas en nuestras prácticas musicales para distintos propósitos prácticos– e intuiciones arraigadas –aquellas que constituyen hipótesis proyectables. Con vistas a evitar los prejuicios del ontólogo, se defenderá que la mejor manera de dar cuenta de nuestras intuiciones familiares reside en una combinación de los métodos de la filosofía con la consideración de los resultados y procedimientos empleados en las disciplinas que estudian el fenómeno musical. Por el contrario, se mostrará que el carácter arraigado de una intuición no es determinable mediante el uso de métodos empíricos. Solamente se pueden determinar de manera negativa, por medio de la reflexión y el análisis conceptual, qué intuiciones familiares no son arraigadas. En consecuencia, el papel que los métodos empíricos jugarán en el presente enfoque ontológico ha de ser entendido según el programa positivo de la filosofía experimental, i.e. como un complemento de los métodos tradicionales de la filosofía. El resultado que se alcanzará en este capítulo es que una ontología metodológicamente aceptable tiene que preservar las intuiciones arraigadas, estando autorizada, no obstante, a revisar aquellas intuiciones que sean meramente familiares.

Los métodos empíricos se aplicarán en el capítulo 3 para determinar cuáles son las intuiciones familiares a nuestras prácticas en lo concerniente al estatuto ontológico de versiones y transcripciones musicales. En primer lugar, se mostrará que la tendencia musicológica de clasificar a versiones y transcripciones como obras no-numéricamente distintas de la obra versionada o transcrita, así como las motivaciones de los compositores para componer versiones y transcripciones, son coherentes con, y apoyan, la intuición de que versiones y transcripciones no son obras diferentes de las obras versionadas o transcritas. Además, esta investigación empírica pondrá de manifiesto un sentido de autenticidad según el cual versiones y transcripciones pueden ser fieles al contenido de una obra musical, de manera semejante a lo que acontece con las ejecuciones musicales. Finalmente, se presentará un estudio empírico siguiendo el método de casos diseñado para determinar cuáles son las intuiciones de los oyentes cuando se enfrentan a la audición de ejecuciones de versiones, transcripciones u obras basadas en otras previas. Los resultados alcanzados serán que los oyentes asumen ampliamente la intuición de que, al escuchar una ejecución de una versión o transcripción, están escuchando, no solamente esa versión o transcripción, sino también la obra versionada o transcrita. Esta intuición recibirá el nombre de la *perspectiva estándar* de versiones y transcripciones. Asimismo, los resultados reforzarán la idea de que la *repetibilidad* de las obras musicales es una intuición familiar en la medida en que los oyentes consideran que la misma obra puede manifestarse (repetirse) en las ejecuciones de sus distintas versiones y transcripciones.

Los resultados obtenidos en el capítulo 3 se emplearán en el capítulo 4 para mostrar que la posición de Stephen Davies acerca de las transcripciones –que las

considera como obras musicales diferentes de la obra transcrita– es revisionista y no puede ser presentada como la posición por defecto. El resto del capítulo se dedicará a explorar si Davies ofrece alguna razón consistente que muestre que la intuición familiar de que las transcripciones no son obras distintas de la obra transcrita es una intuición no arraigada, lo cual justificaría su revisión. Tres posibles razones se identificarán, todas ellas intentado avalar la idea de que un cambio de instrumentación implica un cambio en la identidad de la obra: en primer lugar, que el contexto de composición determina que la instrumentación es una propiedad normativa de aquellas obras que tienen su instrumentación especificada por el compositor; en segundo lugar, que el color (o timbre) es una condición necesaria de la estructura y el contenido de una obra musical; y en tercer lugar, que ciertas propiedades estéticas que constituyen la identidad de las obras musicales dependen de la instrumentación específica prescrita por el compositor, considerándose a 'virtuosismo' como un caso paradigmático de este fenómeno. Se mostrará que ninguna de estas tres razones es lo suficientemente sólida para determinar que la intuición de que las transcripciones no constituyen obras diferentes de la obra transcrita es una intuición no arraigada. En consecuencia, según el descriptivismo mínimo y la metodología del equilibrio reflexivo, esta creencia ha de ser considerada como una que tiene que ser acomodada por cualquier propuesta ontológica acerca de las obras musicales.

En el capítulo 5, se introducirá la hipótesis de los tipos anidados como el mejor enfoque ontológico acerca de las versiones y transcripciones atendiendo a la cuestión categorial. Desde el punto de vista de nuestras prácticas musicales, puede acomodar la perspectiva estándar sobre versiones y transcripciones, explicándola por medio de instanciaciones sucesivas entre tres niveles de objetos: en primer lugar, entre la obra como un tipo de orden superior y sus versiones o transcripciones –tipos de orden inferior que son ejemplares del tipo de orden superior–, y en segundo lugar, entre las versiones y transcripciones en cuanto tipos de orden inferior y las ejecuciones musicales –eventos de secuencias de sonido que son ejemplares de los tipos de orden inferior. Dada la transmisión de propiedades entre los tipos y sus ejemplares, la hipótesis de los tipos anidados garantiza que al escuchar una ejecución de una versión o transcripción, estamos escuchando, no solamente esa ejecución, sino también la versión o transcripción ejecutada. Además, puesto que versiones y transcripciones son ejemplares de la obra versionada o transcrita, cuando accedemos a una versión o transcripción por medio de sus ejemplares (ejecuciones musicales) también estamos accediendo a la obra versionada o transcrita. Desde el punto de vista de las virtudes teóricas, la hipótesis de los tipos anidados preserva las ventajas teóricas de una teoría tipo/ejemplar – considerada como la mejor explicación de la repetibilidad de las obras musicales. Además, es capaz de acomodar la tesis del monismo estructural –entendida como la mejor explicación de la individuación de las obras musicales– con la idea de asociar distintas estructuras de sonidos con la misma obra musical que asume la perspectiva estándar sobre versiones y transcripciones musicales. Se mostrará que distintos intentos de reemplazar la tesis del monismo estructural por un enfoque compatible con un pluralismo estructural –la teoría de los continuantes, la teoría de la ejecución y el

nominalismo de parecido–, o bien colisionan con principios teóricos firmes, o bien no son capaces de acomodar de una manera satisfactoria la perspectiva estándar. La hipótesis de los tipos anidados emergerá aquí como una posición que se encuentra exenta de estas dificultades. Una obra musical en cuanto tipo de orden superior se individúa por una estructura de sonidos con distintitas variables que se rellenan en sus versiones y transcripciones, en primera instancia, y en ejecuciones musicales, en segunda instancia. Dichas variables corresponden a diferentes parámetros tales como instrumentación, ciertos rasgos estructurales, el compositor y el momento de composición (o indicación). Por consiguiente, la estructura de sonidos que individúa a una obra musical en tanto que tipo de orden superior es más indeterminada que las estructuras de sonidos que individúan a sus versiones y transcripciones en las que se instancia. El alcance de las variables de la estructura de sonidos que individúa a la obra depende del contexto de composición de sus versiones y transcripciones y del contexto de ejecución, el cual determina las ejecuciones en las que esa obra es repetible.

En consecuencia, en lo que atañe a la cuestión por la individuación, las obras musicales como tipos de orden superior se individúan de acuerdo con las tesis del sonicismo puro –para poder así admitir diferentes instrumentaciones– y del contextualismo no-deíctico –para determinar las condiciones de instanciación de las obras musicales en estructuras de sonidos más específicas y en ejecuciones musicales. A este respecto, se identificarán dos condiciones: 1) un cierto grado de similitud entre las estructuras de sonidos de las versiones y transcripciones de una obra, el cual se determina por la cinemática del trasfondo común del contexto de composición de tales versiones y transcripciones; 2) las distintas estructuras de sonidos correspondientes a las versiones y transcripciones de una obra tienen que ser indicadas mediante actos de indicación que sean partes del mismo proceso de composición, entendido como un continuante. Para pertenecer al mismo proceso de composición, los actos de indicación han de ser lo suficientemente similares en múltiples aspectos (objetivos, ámbito, técnica musical, estilo) –modulados por el contexto de composición– y han de estar causalmente vinculados. Estas dos condiciones de instanciación de las obras musicales en cuanto tipos de orden superior en versiones y transcripciones en cuanto tipos de orden inferior conducirá a la conclusión de que versiones y transcripciones son individuadas por una estructura de sonido, una instrumentación específica (propiedades tímbricas) y por la referencia a su compositor y momento de composición, a pesar de que alguno de estos aspectos no esté claramente avalado por el estudio empírico presentado en el capítulo 3.

Las conclusiones alcanzadas en el capítulo 5 requerirán que una ontología de tipos sea compatible con diferentes perspectivas respecto a la individuación de las obras musicales. Dicha compatibilidad se mostrará en el capítulo 6. Este capítulo se enfrenta a la concepción heredada del platonismo y el aristotelismo, según la cual el platonismo implica que las obras musicales se individúan de acuerdo con las tesis del sonicismo y el no-contextualismo, y que el aristotelismo implica que las obras musicales se individúan según el instrumentalismo y el contextualismo. Se ofrecerá un argumento

que muestra que el platonismo y el aristotelismo están en desacuerdo con respecto a las condiciones de existencia de los tipos debido a sus perspectivas diferentes acerca de la existencia de las propiedades, pero no necesariamente acerca de las condiciones de identidad de los tipos. En consecuencia, tanto los tipos platónicos como los aristotélicos se revelarán como compatibles con las distintas perspectivas acerca de la individuación de las obras musicales – no-contextualismo, contextualismo deíctico, contextualismo no-deíctico, sonicismo puro, sonicismo tímbrico e instrumentalismo. Los diferentes enfoques acerca de la cuestión por la individuación atañen únicamente al grado de exigencia requerido por la propiedad asociada a un tipo para que algo sea un ejemplar adecuadamente formado de ese tipo. Las conclusiones de este capítulo proporcionarán dos importantes consecuencias para la hipótesis de los tipos anidados. La primera es que el hecho de que las obras musicales en cuanto tipos de orden superior sean individuadas según el sonicismo puro y el contextualismo no-deíctico, y que las versiones y transcripciones en cuanto tipos de orden inferior sean individuadas según el sonicismo tímbrico, el contextualismo deíctico y el contextualismo no-deíctico, no implica que las obras musicales, por una parte, y versiones y transcripciones, por otra, se asocien con distintas clases de tipos. La diferencia en la individuación de una obra y de sus versiones y transcripciones no afecta a la categoría ontológica de estos productos, correspondiendo únicamente al grado de exigencia de las propiedades que individúan a los tipos con los que dichos productos se identifican. La segunda consecuencia es que las conclusiones del capítulo 6 solucionarán el problema de la creabilidad para la hipótesis de los tipos anidados, ofreciendo dos alternativas en las que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados es compatible con la intuición de que las obras musicales son creadas: se entenderá que una obra musical es creada, bien por la creación de la primera versión de una obra, o bien por la posibilidad de que la obra sea instanciada.

El capítulo final se dedicará a considerar distintas preocupaciones concernientes a la hipótesis de los tipos anidados. La más acuciante de ellas es la que entiende que esta hipótesis es una posición *ad hoc* para dar cuenta de los casos particulares de obras con transcripciones y con más de una versión. Se argumentará que la aplicación de la hipótesis de los tipos anidados al dominio de todas las obras musicales –incluyendo a aquellas que no han sido ni revisadas ni transcritas– es teóricamente beneficioso, así como intuitivo desde el punto de vista de nuestras prácticas musicales. Desde la perspectiva de los desiderata teóricos, puesto que la posibilidad de ser revisada o transcrita está abierta para todas las obras musicales, la hipótesis de los tipos anidados se revelará como la explicación más simple y potente de la naturaleza de las obras musicales. Desde el punto de vista de los desiderata prácticos, la ontología de múltiples niveles –tipos de orden superior, tipos de orden inferior y eventos– postulada por la hipótesis de los tipos anidados es intuitiva para dar cuenta de la naturaleza de todas las obras musicales. En particular, ofrece una explicación de la autenticidad interpretativa de las ejecuciones musicales, y especialmente de aquellos casos en los que la autenticidad interpretativa entra en conflicto con la autenticidad de conformidad con la partitura, superando las dificultades a las que se enfrenta una teoría tipo/ejemplar tradicional de dos niveles. Además, la hipótesis de los tipos anidados también acomoda

de una manera sencilla tipos de interpretaciones de ejecuciones, considerándolas como tipos de orden inferior que instancian la versión de una obra y que son instanciados en ejecuciones musicales. Una vez que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados se muestra así justificada como un enfoque integral acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales, se considerarán y se rechazarán distintas críticas dirigidas recientemente contra la idea general de que las obras musicales son tipos, en particular, aquellas elaboradas por Hazlett, Bertinetto, Rossberg y Kania.

Índice
Contents

Capítulo 1

Introducción y objetivos

1. Motivaciones del problema y objetivo general

En el año 2016, el sello discográfico Harmonia Mundi publicó un disco con la versión del *Requiem* de W. A. Mozart realizada por Pierre-Henri Dutron, dirigida por René Jacobs e interpretada por la Orquesta Barroca de Friburgo. Como es sabido, Mozart no tuvo tiempo de finalizar esta obra antes de su muerte. Tras el fallecimiento del genio vienés, diversos compositores han realizado distintas versiones con la finalidad de completar esta obra, siendo la de su discípulo Sussmayer la más célebre de todas ellas. Según Dutron, Sussmayer respetó fielmente las líneas melódicas halladas en los borradores originales del *Réquiem*, pero se limitó a desarrollar un acompañamiento mecánico que distaba notablemente de la destreza de Mozart de hacer interesante el acompañamiento orquestal para realzar la expresividad de la melodía. Tomando por base el manuscrito incompleto de Mozart y la versión de Sussmayer, Dutron ha realizado su propia versión de esta obra en un intento de mejorar esos aspectos. Tanto en el disco como en la partitura, la versión se presenta como el *Requiem* de Mozart completado por Sussmayer y Dutron, en un trabajo que ha involucrado la labor creativa de compositores, directores, instrumentistas, ingenieros de sonido y editores.[1]

El ejemplo anterior muestra que, en nuestras prácticas musicales, se desarrollan un gran número de procesos creativos que involucran a las obras musicales pero que van más allá de la acción creadora de sus compositores. Podría pensarse que el caso de Dutron es un caso aislado en la medida en que Mozart no finalizó la composición del *Réquiem*, siendo esta una obra incompleta. Sin embargo, una vez terminada la labor del compositor, las obras musicales también dan lugar a un gran número de prácticas creativas, de entre las cuales la más relevante es la práctica de la interpretación o ejecución. Mediante las ejecuciones, accedemos, escuchamos y apreciamos las obras musicales que son resultado de la actividad de los compositores. La manera de conocer y apreciar la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven es escuchando una ejecución adecuadamente formada de esta obra. Cada una de las ejecuciones de la *Quinta Sinfonía*

---

[1] Para más información, puede consultarse el video promocional de Harmonia Mundi en https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojw7sWrzo70.

presenta sus propias peculiaridades, ofreciéndonos una perspectiva más o menos original de esta obra. Junto a esta práctica, se destacan también las prácticas de las revisiones y arreglos, que dan lugar a distintas versiones y transcripciones de una obra. Jean Sibelius revisó dos veces su *Quinta Sinfonía* una vez estrenada, generando así tres versiones de la misma obra en las que se aprecian diferencias a nivel estructural, melódico y armónico. A su vez, Hector Berlioz transcribió para orquesta *La Belle Voyageuse*, una balada que era originalmente para voz y piano, ofreciendo de esta manera una nueva presentación tímbrica de esta obra. Las versiones y transcripciones de una obra no son siempre realizadas por el compositor original. Ejemplo de ello es la transcripción de Liszt para piano de la *Sinfonía Fantástica* de Berlioz, así como las versiones de Sussmayer y Dutron del *Réquiem* de Mozart mencionadas en el párrafo anterior.

Las obras musicales han constituido el principal objeto de estudio de la ontología de la música durante las últimas cinco décadas. Tras la publicación hace ahora cincuenta años de las monografías *Languages of Art* de Nelson Goodman y *Art and its Objects* de Richard Wollheim, se originó lo que algunos autores han denominado como la época dorada de la ontología del arte y, más específicamente, de la ontología de la música (cf. Rohrbaugh, 2012: 29; Giombini, 2017: 135). El ámbito musical, por la riqueza y peculiaridad de los problemas filosóficos que suscita, ha supuesto un terreno idóneo para testar los principales modelos vigentes en ontología general. Las propuestas iniciales de Goodman y Wollheim han generado un prolijo debate que tiene a las obras musicales como su foco de atención primordial y que bien podría ser calificado como *un paraíso de los filósofos*, en el que la confrontación de las principales posiciones en ontología involucra consideraciones acerca de cuestiones fundamentales de la metaontología, la epistemología y la filosofía del lenguaje.

La ubicación central que las obras musicales han merecido en este debate estriba en el papel axial que la categoría 'obra musical' juega en las prácticas apreciativas y críticas de la tradición musical de occidente. No obstante, puede constatarse que en dichas prácticas hacemos referencia, no solamente a obras musicales, sino también a una notable diversidad de subproductos musicales que, al igual que las primeras, son resultado de acciones creativas llevadas a cabo por compositores e intérpretes. Sin ánimo de ofrecer una taxonomía exhaustiva, algunos de estos subproductos son las versiones, transcripciones y arreglos de obras musicales, las grabaciones de ejecuciones musicales, las improvisaciones y las obras inspiradas en otras previas. El análisis de estas prácticas y objetos musicales, que involucran a obras musicales pero que van más allá de ellas, ha sido generalmente puesto en un segundo plano. El primer intento de desarrollar un estudio sistemático sobre la diversidad de estos subproductos musicales fue llevado a cabo por Stephen Davies (2001). A partir de ese momento se observa un interés creciente en la discusión filosófica en intentar precisar el estatuto ontológico de grabaciones e improvisaciones, como queda patente en las investigaciones llevadas a cabo por Andrew Kania (2009, 2011), Christy Mag Uidhir (2007), David Davies (2011) o Alessandro Bertinetto (2012, 2016). Sin embargo, el estudio ontológico de versiones,

transcripciones y arreglos de obras musicales ha quedado relegado a un segundo plano a pesar de las aproximaciones preliminares de Roger Scruton (1997), Stephen Davies (2003, 2007), Guy Rohrbaugh (2003) y Julian Dodd (2007) en esta materia.

El objetivo general de esta tesis consiste en paliar la laguna existente en el debate en ontología de la música acerca de la naturaleza de versiones y transcripciones de obras musicales, ofreciéndose aquí una propuesta acerca de cuál es su estatuto ontológico. La tesis que se defenderá es que la *hipótesis de los tipos anidados* constituye la mejor explicación de la naturaleza de versiones y transcripciones en lo que concierne a la *cuestión categorial* en ontología de la música, es decir, en la determinación de qué clase de cosa son estos subproductos musicales. Según esta hipótesis, las versiones y transcripciones de una obra son tipos de orden inferior que instancian tipos de orden superior –la obra musical versionada o transcrita– y que, a su vez, se instancian en ejecuciones musicales. Con respecto a la *cuestión por la individuación*, se defenderá que una obra musical se individúa por una estructura de sonidos sin color con distintas variables cuantificadas que se satura, en primera instancia, por sus versiones y transcripciones y, en segunda instancia, por sus ejecuciones. El alcance de las variables de la estructura de sonidos de la obra es a su vez variable, dependiente del contexto de composición de sus versiones y transcripciones así como del contexto de ejecución de estas. El momento de composición, la instrumentación (timbre) y la referencia al compositor serán rasgos que individúen a versiones y transcripciones, pero no así a la obra versionada o transcrita, pues son rasgos que caen bajo el alcance de sus variables.

La combinación de estas respuestas a la cuestión categorial y a la cuestión por la individuación requerirá, en primer lugar, que una ontología de tipos (objetos abstractos) sea compatible con distintas tesis acerca de la individuación, tales como el sonicismo puro, el sonicismo tímbrico o el contextualismo referencial. En segundo lugar, nos ofrecerá una perspectiva de las versiones y transcripciones según la cual estas no constituyen obras musicales distintas de la obra original versionada o transcrita. En este sentido, las ejecuciones de versiones y transcripciones de una obra son eventos de secuencias de sonidos en los que la obra musical versionada o transcrita se repite, i.e. eventos en los que escuchamos, experimentamos y apreciamos esa obra. Como se verá, la hipótesis de los tipos anidados asociada a esta tesis contextualista sobre la individuación permite acomodar un mayor número de intuiciones ampliamente compartidas en nuestras prácticas musicales que otras propuestas previas sin que ello suponga una merma en el potencial explicativo de la teoría. Se revelará como la propuesta que mejor satisface la metodología del equilibrio reflexivo –una tesis metaontológica que se defenderá aquí como la perspectiva adecuada acerca de la metodología a seguir en ontología de la música– no solo con respecto a versiones y transcripciones sino también con respecto al fenómeno general de las obras musicales. En particular, permitirá explicar ciertos aspectos de relacionados con el carácter creativo de las ejecuciones de obras musicales y de autenticidad interpretativa que no eran adecuadamente caracterizados por las posiciones previas. El seguimiento de esta

metodología garantiza que la propuesta ofrecida sea ajustada a nuestras practicas musicales a la vez que satisface las virtudes teóricas clásicas de simplicidad, elegancia y capacidad explicativa.

Antes de desgranar en más detalle esta propuesta, han de especificarse algunas aclaraciones terminológicas relevantes. Pueden identificarse dos rasgos comunes a versiones y transcripciones. En primer lugar, la manera en cómo nos referimos a ellas depende de la referencia a una obra musical. En segundo lugar, su existencia depende ontológicamente de la existencia de un trabajo musical previamente finalizado por el compositor; o dicho con una mayor precisión, depende de que una estructura de sonidos haya sido previamente indicada por un compositor. En lo concerniente al primer rasgo, solemos hablar de la primera, segunda o tercera versión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius, donde 'la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius' hace referencia a una obra musical. *Similiter*, hablamos habitualmente de la transcripción de Ravel de *Cuadros de una Exposición* de Musorgsky, donde '*Cuadros de una Exposición* de Musorgsky' hace referencia a una obra musical. Relativamente al segundo rasgo, la segunda versión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius es usualmente considerada como una *revisión* de la primera versión, y la tercera versión como una revisión de la segunda. Ambas revisiones consisten en modificaciones que Sibelius llevó a cabo sobre las estructuras de sonidos correspondientes a las versiones que él previamente había indicado. No es este el caso de la primera versión –o la versión original–, que no puede ser considerada como revisión de ninguna versión previa. De manera semejante, la orquestación llevada a cabo por Ravel de *Cuadros de una Exposición* de Musorgsky es normalmente considerada como una transcripción para orquesta de la partitura correspondiente a la instrumentación original de esta obra. La transcripción de Ravel consiste en escribir para orquesta la estructura de sonidos de *Cuadros de una Exposición* de Musorgsky, una instrumentación distinta de la original (piano). Sin embargo, la instrumentación original de esta obra llevada a cabo por Mussorgsky no puede ser considerada como la transcripción de ninguna partitura previa de esta obra.

'Versión' y 'revisión' son términos que suelen tener usos correferenciales en nuestras prácticas musicales. Las descripciones definidas 'la segunda versión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius' y 'la primera revisión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius' hacen referencia al mismo objeto, a saber, la estructura de sonidos que Sibelius indicó en 1916 y que guarda un alto grado de semejanza con la estructura de sonidos que indicó en 1915. Sin embargo, 'versión' y 'revisión' no tienen un uso coextensional en el sentido de que hay cosas a las que nos referimos con el término 'versión' a las que no nos referiríamos con el término 'revisión'. Como se señaló en el párrafo anterior, jamás consideramos la primera versión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius como una revisión, pues no hay ningún material previo correspondiente a la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius que pudiera haber sido revisado.[2] En consecuencia, puesto que la extensión del uso que

---

[2] El lector podría sentirse perplejo ante esta afirmación, pues una práctica tradicional de los compositores consiste en proceder mediante borradores hasta obtener la partitura final de una obra. Podría pensarse que la partitura de la primera versión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius es resultado de la revisión de

damos al término 'revisión' en nuestras prácticas musicales es un subconjunto de la extensión del uso de 'versión', en lo sucesivo se prescindirá generalmente del término 'revisión' y se adoptará únicamente el término 'versión' para aludir a este tipo de casos. Asimismo, para el propósito de esta tesis, resulta más apropiado hablar de versiones que de revisiones, pues mientras que el término 'revisión' tiene más que ver con las acciones llevadas a cabo por un compositor, el término 'versión' alude principalmente a los productos que resultan de las acciones de un compositor.

De manera semejante, 'versión' y 'transcripción' también acostumbran a tener usos correferenciales en nuestras prácticas musicales. Las descripciones definidas 'la versión de Ravel de *Cuadros de una Exposición* de Musorgsky' y 'la transcripción de Ravel de *Cuadros de una Exposición* de Musorgsky' refieren al mismo objeto, a saber, al cambio de instrumentación llevado a cabo por Ravel sobre la estructura de sonidos de *Cuadros de una Exposición* de Musorgsky. Sin embargo, 'versión' y 'transcripción' no son términos coextensionales en nuestras prácticas musicales. Jamás nos referimos a la segunda versión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius como 'la segunda transcripción de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius'. Tampoco nos referimos a la versión original de Musorgsky de *Cuadros de una Exposición* como 'la transcripción original de Musorgsky de *Cuadros de una Exposición*'. Este fenómeno parece sugerir la aplicación del mismo criterio seguido en el párrafo anterior respecto al término 'revisión'. Sin embargo, debido a ciertas peculiaridades de las transcripciones que son altamente relevantes desde el punto de vista de la ontología de la música, no se substituirá el término 'transcripción' por el de 'versión' en el curso de la presente investigación. Por el contrario, se mantendrá la distinción entre versiones y transcripciones para remarcar las diferencias entre ambas clases de productos musicales.

Pese a que la diferencia entre versiones y transcripciones se analizará con profundidad en el capítulo 3, a efectos de clarificación se tomarán como punto de partida las siguientes definiciones:

> **Versión:** una estructura de sonidos e instrumentación, generalmente indicada por un compositor, que junto con otras estructuras de sonidos e instrumentaciones similares en un cierto grado asociamos con una misma obra musical.

> **Versión original:** la estructura de sonidos e instrumentación correspondientes al primer acto de indicación de una obra por parte de un compositor y que posibilita sus ulteriores versiones (revisiones) y transcripciones.

---

borradores previos. Esta interpretación es lícita. Sin embargo, no es habitual entender la primera versión de esta sinfonía como una revisión. La razón de ello estriba en que los borradores previos no han sido validados por el compositor para ser interpretados públicamente. En este sentido, los borradores no autorizados por el compositor no cuentan como el material que un compositor pueda revisar para dar lugar a una revisión de un trabajo previo. Esta última perspectiva, por ser la más ampliamente compartida en nuestras prácticas apreciativas y críticas, es la que se adopta en este capítulo introductorio.

Revisión: la modificación de un trabajo musical previo involucrando alteraciones parciales en la estructura de sonidos original. Dichas revisiones son consideradas como *nuevas versiones* de la obra musical en cuestión.

Transcripción: la escritura de una obra musical para instrumentos diferentes de aquellos para los que fue originalmente escrita en su versión original.

De acuerdo con estas definiciones, distintas versiones de una obra musical presentan necesariamente estructuras de sonidos diferentes. En efecto, la estructura de sonidos de la segunda versión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius es ligeramente diferente a la de la versión original (o primera versión). Mientras que la versión original presenta cuatro movimientos, Sibelius fusiona el primer y segundo movimiento en la segunda versión, añadiendo una coda al final del antiguo segundo movimiento para conferir un mejor balance al nuevo movimiento fusionado. Las distintas versiones de una obra pueden presentar ocasionalmente diferencias de instrumentación, pero estas vienen principalmente motivadas por los cambios formales operados en la estructura de sonidos. En contraposición, las transcripciones involucran necesariamente diferencias de instrumentación con respecto a la versión original de una obra. Mientras que la versión original de *Cuadros de una Exposición* es para piano, la transcripción de Ravel es para orquesta. O mientras que la versión original de *Escualo* de Ástor Piazzolla es para bandoneón, violín, bajo, piano y guitarra eléctrica, la transcripción de Luis Otero de esta obra para quinteto de metales es para dos trompetas, trompa, trombón y tuba. No obstante, una transcripción puede presentar ocasionalmente modificaciones con respecto a la estructura de sonidos de la versión original. Dichas modificaciones son motivadas por la necesidad de adaptar la estructura de sonidos original a las limitaciones y peculiaridades técnicas de los instrumentos que integran la nueva instrumentación de la obra.

El objetivo específico de esta tesis consiste en determinar desde el punto de vista de la ontología de la música si las versiones y transcripciones que asociamos a una misma obra musical constituyen obras musicales distintas de la obra musical versionada o transcrita. La respuesta a esta cuestión es relevante con respecto a problemas relacionados con los derechos de autor y propiedad intelectual, pues contribuye a determinar los límites de cuándo se puede atribuir a un compositor la autoría de una nueva obra musical. Sin embargo, dicha respuesta no es sencilla de obtener. La cuestión de si versiones y transcripciones constituyen obras diferentes de la obra versionada o transcrita plantea algunos retos y dificultades que vienen motivados por las características específicas de versiones y transcripciones así como por la escasa atención que han recibido estos subproductos dentro de la discusión ontológica.

El análisis ontológico que tomará aquí por objeto de estudio a versiones y transcripciones pretende evitar ofrecer una posición *ad hoc* para estos subproductos musicales. Por el contrario, se intentará determinar su estatuto ontológico dentro del marco de una teoría general sobre la ontología de las obras musicales. Esta estrategia

pretende evitar el riesgo de ofrecer una explicación adecuada de la naturaleza de versiones y transcripciones que sea incompatible con una explicación adecuada del producto central de nuestras prácticas musicales, a saber, las obras musicales. Sin embargo, como se verá a lo largo de esta tesis, cuando nos aproximamos a versiones y transcripciones desde la perspectiva de las distintas propuestas en ontología de la música en su estado actual, problemas de distinta índole comienzan a aparecer. Por una parte, aquellas teorías que consideran a versiones y transcripciones como obras musicales distintas de la obra versionada o transcrita tienden a asimilarlas dentro de las subcategorías de 'obra basada en' u 'obra derivada de'. Si estas perspectivas fuesen correctas, las subcategorías de 'versión' y 'transcripción' serían redundantes y superfluas en nuestras prácticas musicales. Sin embargo, estas subcategorías poseen un papel específico en nuestras prácticas que no puede ser reducido al jugado por las subcategorías de 'obra basada en', 'obra derivada de' o 'obra inspirada en' otra(s) obra(s) previa(s). [3] Por otra parte, las teorías que consideran que versiones y transcripciones no constituyen obras musicales distintas de la obra versionada o transcrita encuentran problemas para explicar la persistencia e la identidad de una obra musical a lo largo tiempo, en particular, la posibilidad de que la misma obra musical pueda ser múltiplemente interpretada y pueda ocurrir múltiples veces.

Pese a que el objetivo principal de las propuestas vigentes en ontología de la música no haya sido explicar el fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones, de ellas se siguen consecuencias para el estatuto ontológico de estos subproductos musicales. El objetivo de la siguiente sección es precisamente ofrecer una panorámica general de estas consecuencias para atender con más detalle a los problemas expuestos en el párrafo anterior. Las dificultades para acomodar el fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones a las que estas propuestas se enfrentan constituirán la motivación para la propuesta de la tesis que aquí se defiende.

2. Ontología de la música, versiones y transcripciones: un estado de la cuestión

La pregunta básica de la ontología general es la pregunta acerca de qué cosas hay o qué cosas existen (cf. Bennett, 2009; Chalmers, 2009). La ontología de la música es una subdisciplina filosófica dentro de la ontología general y, como tal, se ocupa de un subconjunto de los objetos sobre los que esta trata. No se pregunta por la existencia de las cosas en general, sino por la existencia de una clase particular de cosas. La pregunta básica de la ontología de la música es, pues, la pregunta acerca de qué tipos de cosas musicales hay y cuáles son las relaciones se establecen entre ellas (cf. Kania, 2012). No

---

[3] Estos aspectos de nuestras prácticas musicales se verán con más detalle en el capítulo 3, en el que se analizan clasificaciones y estudios musicológicos, además de llevar a cabo un experimento empírico para testar las intuiciones de los oyentes en este asunto.

obstante, pese a la diversidad de productos musicales señalados en la sección anterior –
obras musicales, versiones, transcripciones y arreglos de obras musicales, ejecuciones
musicales, improvisaciones, grabaciones de ejecuciones, etc.–, el objetivo principal de
la ontología de la música ha consistido tradicionalmente en determinar qué es una obra
musical.

Se asume generalmente en el debate en ontología de la música que hay tres
cuestiones fundamentales que tienen que ser abordadas para ofrecer una caracterización
adecuada y completa de la naturaleza de las obras musicales: la cuestión categorial, la
cuestión por la individuación y la cuestión por la existencia y persistencia de las obras
musicales (cf. Dodd, 2007, 2008; Davies, 2004, 2009; Thomasson, 2009, 2010). La
cuestión categorial es la pregunta acerca de qué clase de entidad son las obras
musicales. Responder a esta pregunta consiste en determinar bajo qué categoría
ontológica caen las obras musicales. Por ejemplo, como se verá en este capítulo, hay
propuestas que defienden que las obras musicales son tipos platónicos, otras que son
tipos iniciados, otras que identifican las obras musicales con ideas, otras con conjuntos
de ejecuciones, otras con fusiones de ejecuciones, etc. La cuestión por la individuación
es la pregunta acerca de cuáles son las condiciones de identidad de las obras musicales.
Resolver esta cuestión consiste en determinar el conjunto de condiciones o parámetros
que fijan la identidad de una obra. Dos temas principales han suscitado un gran interés
en la bibliografía contemporánea dentro de este ámbito. El primer debate gira en torno a
la elucidación de si la referencia al compositor y al contexto de composición de una
obra configuran la identidad de esa pieza. El segundo debate es aquel que pretende
aclarar si ejecutar una pieza con los instrumentos musicales especificados por el
compositor es un rasgo constitutivo de la identidad de esa obra. Finalmente, la cuestión
por la persistencia es la pregunta por las condiciones de existencia de las obras
musicales a lo largo del tiempo. La resolución de esta pregunta involucra
consideraciones respecto a la creabilidad y la destructibilidad de las obras musicales.

Esta sección tiene por objeto ofrecer un estado de la cuestión de los principales
debates en ontología de la música respecto a las tres cuestiones anteriormente citadas
atendiendo a las consecuencias que se siguen para la caracterización de versiones y
transcripciones. A efectos de facilitar la claridad expositiva, se atenderá a la cuestión
categorial y a la cuestión por la individuación de manera separada, con el fin de
identificar más fácilmente los distintos problemas involucrados en la discusión. Por
contra, la referencia a los aspectos relacionados con la existencia y persistencia de las
obras musicales resulta imposible desligarla de la respuesta que los distintos autores
ofrecen a las dos cuestiones anteriores. Las consideraciones sobre existencia y
persistencia suelen ser utilizadas por los distintos autores como apoyo de sus tesis sobre
la categoría ontológica y la individuación de las obras musicales. En virtud de ello, esta
sección se divide en dos apartados: en el primero se abordará la cuestión categorial,
mientras que el segundo estará dedicado a la cuestión acerca de la individuación de las
obras musicales.

2.1 La cuestión categorial en ontología de la música

La época dorada de la ontología de la música que se generó a partir de las investigaciones de Goodman y Wollheim ha dejado un rico legado en lo que a la cuestión categorial concierne. Una amplia variedad de propuestas acerca de qué clase de cosa son las obras musicales puede identificarse. Cada una de estas posiciones identifica a las obras musicales con alguna categoría ontológica. La asignación de una categoría ontológica a las obras musicales involucra consideraciones acerca de cuáles son sus condiciones de existencia, de cuál es la relación entre una obra musical y sus ejecuciones y de en qué consiste componer una obra musical. La principal motivación del debate en torno a la cuestión categorial radica en ofrecer una explicación adecuada de la *repetibilidad* de las obras musicales, a saber, el fenómeno por el cual una obra musical puede hacerse presente a través de sus ejecuciones apropiadas en distintos lugares y múltiples veces. La explicación de la relación uno-a-muchos que *prima facie* se da entre una obra musical y sus ejecuciones –según la cual podemos escuchar, experimentar, apreciar y tener acceso a una obra musical por medio de sus ejecuciones– ha constituido el principal reto en debate acerca de la cuestión categorial. Desde el punto de vista ontológico, la repetibilidad de las obras musicales es una aplicación específica del clásico problema de los universales, a saber, del problema de cómo pueden ser del mismo tipo cosas que son diferentes. En el siguiente cuadro se sintetizan las posiciones que han tenido una mayor repercusión en este debate, destacándose sus tesis fundamentales respecto a la categoría ontológica que asignan a las obras musicales y las consecuencias que de ello se siguen para la relación entre una obra y sus ejecuciones y para la caracterización de en qué consiste componer una obra musical.

Nombre de la Teoría	Obra musical				Ejecuciones	Componer una obra musical
	Tipo de entidad	Características relevantes de esa entidad				
		Entidad genérica	Existencia independiente de los seres humanos	Tipo de existencia		
Nominalismo	Clase de ejecuciones	Sí, concreta	Sí	Con origen	Elementos de la obra musical	Crear la partitura
Perdurantismo	Fusión de ejecuciones	Sí, concreta	Sí	Perdurar	Partes temporales de la obra musical	(no se compromete)
Platonismo	Tipo	Sí, abstracta	Sí	Atemporal (sin origen)	Ejemplares de la obra musical	Descubrimiento creativo-evaluativo de un tipo
Aristotelismo	Tipo indicado	Sí, abstracta	Sí, a partir del momento de indicación	Temporal (con origen)	Ejemplares de la obra musical	Crear (dar origen a) un tipo indicado
Idealismo	Objeto mental	Sí, mental	No	Temporal (con origen)	Vehículos de transmisión inter-mentales de la obra musical	Concebir y ordenar sonidos de un modo sistemático
Nihilismo	–	–	–	–	Ejemplares de una estructura de sonidos que hace el papel de una obra musical	Hacer que una estructura abstracta de sonidos juegue el papel de una obra musical
Particularismo histórico	Objetos reales	Sí, de nivel superior	No	Temporal, ontológicamente dependiente de sus ejecuciones	Instancias (subconjunto de las encarnaciones de la obra)	Producir la primera encarnación de la obra
Teoría de la acción-tipo	Eventos (acciones) tipo	Sí, abstracta	Sí	Atemporal (sin origen)	Instanciar el evento tipo *tocar la estructura de sonidos* φ	Ejecutar (instanciar) el evento tipo *descubrir* φ *vía H*
Teoría de la ejecución	Ejecuciones (eventos) ejemplares	No, particular concreto.	No	Temporal, ontológicamente dependiente de las ejecuciones del compositor	Acciones intencionales para producir un evento sonoro a partir de la interpretación de las restricciones previamente establecidas por el compositor	Acciones intencionales para especificar un foco de apreciación

Determinar qué clase de cosa son las obras musicales ha presentado un reto considerable para la filosofía. Parce que no podemos identificar una obra musical con su

partitura, pues alguien puede conocer la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven sin haber tenido jamás contacto con su partitura (cf. Levinson, 1980: 5). De igual manera, no podemos identificar a la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven con ninguna de sus ejecuciones particulares, pues la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven continúa existiendo una vez que los sonidos de una determinada ejecución dejan de sonar, y por tanto, de existir. Asimismo, tampoco parece viable la idea de identificar a las obras musicales con una idea del compositor, como hace el idealismo (cf. Cox, 1986). En efecto, la posición idealista da lugar a una consecuencia problemática: las obras musicales serían experiencias intuitivas privadas en las mentes de los compositores. Esta consecuencia es problemática porque las experiencias privadas no pueden ser ejecutadas, leídas o escuchadas, en virtud de lo cual las obras musicales serían entidades inaccesibles y de índole exclusivamente subjetiva (cf. Levinson, 1980: 5). Además, el valor de las ejecuciones de una obra quedaría reducido a su éxito en transmitir la idea musical entre la mente del compositor y la del público. Sin embargo, parece que nuestro interés en las ejecuciones musicales va más allá de este valor simplemente funcional, involucrando aspectos creativos que son fundamentales en la apreciación de ellas y en su relación con la obra ejecutada.

La explicación de la relación uno-a-muchos entre una obra musical y sus ejecuciones que ofrece la teoría tipo/ejemplar ha sido considerada como la posición por defecto en ontología de la música (cf. Wollheim, 1980; Wolterstorff, 1980; Scruton, 1997; Kivy, 2002; Dodd, 2007; Levinson, 1980; Davies, 2003). Un notable número de autores coinciden en señalar que la teoría tipo ejemplar es la que ofrece una explicación más sencilla y elegante de la repetibilidad de las obras musicales en sus ejecuciones. En este sentido, la teoría tipo/ejemplar ha constituido la posición dominante en el debate acerca de la cuestión categorial. Esta teoría defiende la tesis de que una obra musical es un tipo, es decir, un objeto abstracto que no es ni físico ni mental y que puede ser ejemplificado en ejecuciones particulares. Se trata de una posición realista acerca de las obras musicales, afirmando la existencia de estas como objetos abstractos. La *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven es un tipo de eventos de secuencias sonoras, sus ejecuciones apropiadas, cuya existencia no depende de la existencia de estas. Las ejecuciones de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven son particulares concretos, eventos sonoros ubicados espacio-temporalmente. La relación que se obtiene entre una obra musical y sus múltiples ejecuciones es la relación de ejemplificación: las ejecuciones son ejemplares del tipo abstracto en el que consiste la obra musical, haciéndolo epistémicamente disponible para ser escuchado y experimentado.

La defensa de la teoría tipo/ejemplar como la posición por defecto en ontología de la música se ha llevado a cabo desde distintos ángulos. Esta circunstancia ha dado lugar a distintas variantes de esta propuesta que se pueden sintetizar en dos grandes perspectivas: el platonismo y el aristotelismo musical.

a) Platonismo musical

La principal diferencia entre el platonismo y el aristotelismo musical se ubica al nivel de las condiciones de existencia de los tipos. Según Julian Dodd –el principal defensor de esta perspectiva–, las obras musicales existen desde la eternidad, ya que los tipos no tienen origen y, por tanto, no pueden ser creados.[4] Dodd defiende esta idea a partir de lo que él denomina 'el argumento de las propiedades eternas' (Dodd, 2002: 381-382).

(1) La identidad de un tipo K está determinada por la condición que un ejemplar satisface para ser un ejemplar de ese tipo.
(2) Esa condición es una propiedad asociada al tipo K, a saber: 'ser un k'.
(3) Luego, la identidad de K está determinada por 'ser un k'.
(4) Luego, K existe syss 'ser un k' existe.
(5) 'Ser un k' existe desde la eternidad.
(6) Luego, K existe desde la eternidad también.

(5) es la premisa que lleva a inferir la afirmación de que los tipos son eternos. Dodd justifica la premisa de que las propiedades son eternas suscribiendo la idea de que las propiedades existen aunque no se puedan satisfacer. Esta afirmación se basa, según Dodd, en la intuición de que una propiedad existe sí y solo sí es satisfecha ahora, fue satisfecha en el pasado o será satisfecha en el futuro (Dodd, 2000: 435-436). Es decir, el platónico rechaza lo que en el capítulo 6 se ha denominará el *principio de instanciación de las propiedades*, la tesis de que una propiedad necesita haber sido instanciada para existir. Puesto que las propiedades individúan a los tipos y son eternas, el platónico concluye que estas también lo son.

Ahora bien, si las obras musicales no pueden ser creadas, entonces ¿en qué consiste componer una obra musical? Según Dodd, componer una obra musical es llevar a cabo un *descubrimiento creativo-evaluativo*. En primer lugar, se trata de una clase de descubrimiento en el que la investigación llevada a cabo por el individuo no está guiada por criterios de éxito y, en consecuencia, no existe la posibilidad de equivocarse. En ella no se busca ningún fin determinado conceptualmente, de manera que no hay ningún elemento que pueda determinar criterio de éxito alguno. Cuando Beethoven compuso el *Trío del archiduque* no cabía la posibilidad de que se equivocase. El tipo de esta obra ya existía, pero Beethoven no tenía formada una representación clara de dicha obra y fue entonces cuando comenzó a componerla. Beethoven solamente empezó a tener clara una representación de esta obra conforme iba avanzando en el proceso de composición de la misma. Así, Beethoven no podía tener ningún fin determinado con anterioridad a

---

[4] La teoría de la acción-tipo defendida por Gregory Currie (1989) comparte esta misma intuición. En la medida en que para Currie las obras musicales son tipos, y estos no tienen origen, en esta breve exposición se considerará como una variante dentro de la perspectiva platónica. El análisis de las diferencias entre las propuestas de Currie y Dodd se pospondrá hasta el capítulo 5, donde se aborde en detalle cómo estas propuestas podrían dar cuenta de los casos de versiones y transcripciones.

llevar a cabo el acto de composición del *Trío del archiduque* (cf. Dodd, 2002: 387). En segundo lugar, componer una obra musical es llevar a cabo un descubrimiento de carácter creativo, pero la creatividad es entendida aquí desde un punto de vista epistemológico, no ontológico. Desde el punto de vista ontológico, el acto de composición no es creativo, ya que los tipos existen desde la eternidad y, por tanto, los compositores no añaden ninguna entidad al mundo mediante sus acciones. Sin embargo, desde la perspectiva epistemológica, el acto de composición sí es creativo, pues el compositor, mediante el descubrimiento de un tipo, nos da a conocer una entidad que antes ignorábamos. El acto de composición añade, por tanto, algo nuevo a nuestro acervo cultural (Dodd, 2000: 430). Finalmente, el acto de composición musical es también un descubrimiento evaluativo. Según Dodd, el compositor evalúa qué estructura de sonidos tipo, una vez ejecutada, logrará el efecto que el compositor quiere alcanzar, y el resultado de esa evaluación es la indicación de esa estructura en una partitura por parte del compositor (Dodd: 2000: 431). Así, esa estructura es algo que ya existe anteriormente, pero que ha sido seleccionada evaluativamente.

La posición platónica, al igual que el resto de propuestas en ontología de la música, no ha sido diseñada para explicar el fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones, sino de las obras musicales *simpliciter*. Sin embargo, de la posición platónica se siguen algunas consecuencias para el fenómeno de versiones y transcripciones. Puesto que las obras musicales existen desde la eternidad, los casos de versiones que consisten en la revisión de una versión previa encontrarían difícil acomodo desde esta perspectiva. Y, en caso de que lo encontrasen, la conclusión más plausible sería considerarlas como obras diferentes aunque con estrechos vínculos de parecido. Esta idea se ve reforzada si se considera que los tipos son individuados por la condición que deben satisfacer sus ejemplares –ejecuciones musicales–, pues las distintas versiones o transcripciones de una obra establecen distintas condiciones para que algo sea una ejecución correcta de ellas y serían, por tanto, obras diferentes. Esta consecuencia resulta problemática a tenor de lo expuesto en la sección anterior, pues el platonismo se quedaría sin recursos para diferenciar dos fenómenos que parecen ser distintos según nuestras prácticas musicales: el de las obras musicales inspiradas en otras previas, por una parte, y el de las versiones y transcripciones, por otra.

b) Aristotelismo musical

El aspecto más relevante que distingue al aristotelismo musical del platonismo es la intuición de que las obras musicales tienen origen, es decir, que son creadas por sus compositores y no simplemente descubiertas por ellos. El autor de mayor repercusión en el debate actual que defiende una posición aristotélica en ontología de la música es Jerrold Levinson, cuya perspectiva ha sido acogida por un número considerable autores (cf. Howell, 2002; Trivedi, 2002; Sharpe, 2001). Levinson pretende desmarcarse claramente del platonismo afirmando que una obra musical es algo más que una simple estructura de sonidos (Levinson, 1980: 78). Levinson admite

que, si una obra musical fuese una simple estructura de sonidos, sería un universal platónico. Pero las obras musicales no son universales platónicos, sino 'una especie de universal bajado a la tierra', es decir, un objeto abstracto contextualmente situado, con indicación de persona y tiempo (Levinson, 2011: 216). Estas consideraciones conducen a Levinson a defender una tesis aristotélica, según la cual las obras musicales no son simples estructuras tipo sino tipos indicados:

> Una obra musical es una estructura de sonidos y medios de ejecución indicada por un compositor en un momento determinado (Levinson, 1980: 84).

De acuerdo con esta definición, las obras musicales son tipos de la forma φ-indicada-por-X-en-t, donde φ es una estructura de sonidos, X un compositor y *t* el momento en el que la estructura φ ha sido indicada. Los tipos indicados son *iniciados* en el sentido de que tienen origen, el momento en el que fueron indicados. Según Levinson las estructuras puras de sonidos son preexistentes porque son objetos matemáticos, integrados por secuencias de conjuntos de elementos sonoros, tales como tonos, timbres, duraciones, etc. (Levinson, 1980: 79). Si se admite la preexistencia de estos elementos sonoros simples, entonces ha de admitirse también la preexistencia de las estructuras complejas que se componen de ellos. Así, si las obras musicales fuesen simplemente estructuras de sonidos, entonces no podrían ser creadas sino descubiertas, ya que existirían con anterioridad a la actividad de sus compositores. Por lo tanto, si los compositores crean verdaderamente sus obras, entonces las obras musicales no pueden ser simples estructuras de sonidos.

Levinson defiende que la idea de que los artistas crean cosas (las obras de arte) es una de nuestras más firmes intuiciones respecto al arte (Levinson, 1980: 79). Señala que la noción de 'creación' es central en nuestras prácticas artísticas habituales. De esta manera, se ve a los compositores como individuos que mediante su actividad añaden realmente cosas nuevas a nuestra cultura, y no como simples descubridores que desvelan posibilidades preexistentes de combinaciones musicales (Levinson, 2011: 219). Levinson afirma, además, que parte del valor y significado que atribuimos a las obras musicales deriva de la creencia de que son creadas por sus compositores. Incluso aunque algunos descubrimientos reciban por nuestra parte una altísima consideración y estima, de ello no se sigue, según Levinson, que gran parte del modo especial en el que valoramos a las obras musicales no dependa de verlas como creaciones en sentido estricto (Levinson, 2011: 217). En virtud de estas dos razones, Levinson establece un requisito en su ontología, denominado requisito de creabilidad:

> (CREABILIDAD) Las obras musicales tienen que ser de tal manera que no existen antes de la actividad compositiva del compositor, sino que son traídas a la existencia mediante esta actividad (Levinson, 1980: 80).

Las obras musicales son, de acuerdo con el aristotelismo, entidades creadas por los compositores. Pero si las obras musicales son tipos, entonces los tipos tienen que ser

entidades que puedan ser creadas, lo cual supone rechazar el argumento de las propiedades eternas de Dodd y aceptar el principio de instanciación de las propiedades.[5]

Ahora bien, si las obras musicales tienen origen y son creadas, los compositores no son descubridores sino creadores. El acto de componer una obra musical, en consecuencia, no puede consistir en un descubrimiento creativo-evaluativo como defendía el platonismo. Según Levinson, componer una obra musical es poner cosas juntas –notas, acordes, timbres, etc.– en un contexto particular (Levinson, 2011: 218). Los compositores no crean patrones sonoros, sino que crean obras musicales, es decir, patrones en un contexto. De esta manera, los compositores confieren a las obras musicales significados de los que carecen los simples patrones. Howell afirma que Beethoven, al componer la *Quinta sinfonía*, ejecuta un acto total de indicación en el que hace sonar –realmente o en su imaginación– secuencias de notas y escribe varios bosquejos de temas y pasajes musicales. Ese acto es ejecutado en un contexto cultural en el que Beethoven establece una práctica específica de producir y reconocer instancias concretas del patrón de la *Quinta sinfonía*, y de esta manera hace que ese patrón se convierta en un tipo. Por tanto, al indicar el patrón de la *Quinta sinfonía* Beethoven está creando el tipo que es esa obra (Howell, 2002: 121). Desde esta misma perspectiva, Levinson considera que hay cuatro aspectos involucrados en el acto de indicación de una obra musical, como podría ser la *Mazurka en La menor* de Chopin: a) Chopin elige de un conjunto de notas, ritmos, timbres y dinámicas; b) dirige la atención del espectador hacia este conjunto de elementos sónicos; c) tiene una actitud de aprobación y apropiación de esos sonidos –no dice meramente 'aquí hay unos sonidos' sino 'aquí hay unos sonidos, ellos son ahora específicamente míos y yo los acepto'–; d) establece una regla o norma para reproducir sonidos de una determinada manera (cf. Levinson, 2012: 53-54).

El aristotelismo, al considerar que las obras musicales son creadas en lugar de descubiertas, parece ofrecer una propuesta más apta para acomodar el fenómeno de las revisiones de obras musicales y, de un modo más general, los casos de versiones y transcripciones. No obstante, si bien la idea de descubrimiento *per se* no es incompatible con la acomodación las intuiciones de las prácticas musicales acerca de estos casos, tampoco la idea de creación parece ser compatible de un modo directo. En efecto, las condiciones *a-d* sugeridas por Levinson mencionadas en el párrafo anterior parecen ser satisfechas tanto por composiciones de obras musicales diferentes como por versiones y transcripciones supuestamente de la misma obra. Además, la concepción de Levinson de los tipos como estructuras indicadas acomodaría los casos de versiones compuestas por distintos compositores y en distintos momentos como obras musicales diferentes, con independencia de que en nuestras prácticas musicales se considerasen

---

[5] Respecto a esta cuestión, Howell y Trivedi presentan dos notables críticas a la posición platónica de Dodd. Howell afirma que la existencia de la propiedad puede no ser una condición suficiente para que el tipo asociado a dicha propiedad exista. Según Howell, la existencia de la propiedad solamente garantiza la existencia de un patrón. La existencia de un tipo viene dada cuando se dan culturalmente las condiciones de instanciación de un patrón (cf. Howell, 2002: 115-19). Por su parte, Trivedi objeta a Dodd que confunde los tipos con universales platónicos (cf. Trivedi, 2002: 74).

como versiones de la misma obra.[6] Esta circunstancia muestra, una vez más, que el aristotelismo ha sido introducido como una propuesta en ontología de la música sin tomar en consideración el fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones. Las consecuencias que se siguen de esta posición para este fenómeno no son sencillas de extraer y parecen contravenir las intuiciones de nuestras prácticas musicales que diferencian entre obras inspiradas en otras previas, por una parte, y versiones y transcripciones de la misma obra musical, por otra.

c) Alternativas a la teoría tipo/ejemplar

La teoría tipo/ejemplar ha constituido la posición dominante en el debate ontológico por sus virtudes teóricas para explicar la repetibilidad de las obras musicales. No obstante, otras propuestas alternativas han surgido en el debate con el interés de evitar algunas consecuencias tanto contraintuitivas como no económicas –ontológicamente hablando– de la teoría tipo/ejemplar. Sin embargo, ninguna de ellas está exenta de la generación de otros problemas, relacionados principalmente con una explicación adecuada de la repetibilidad.

Una de estas propuestas es el nominalismo. El nominalismo identifica a una obra musical con objetos concretos, más específicamente, con conjuntos de ejecuciones musicales. La posición de mayor repercusión dentro del nominalismo musical es la defendida por Goodman (1968), según el cual una obra musical es una clase de ejecuciones cuyos miembros son los cumplientes de los caracteres de tono y ritmo de una partitura (Goodman, 1968: 117-118). La función primaria que debe llevar a cabo una partitura consiste en identificar una obra musical de una ejecución a otra, función que es denominada por Goodman como 'authoritative identification' (identificación autorizada). Para llevar a cabo esta función, las partituras han de satisfacer dos condiciones:

(1) Una partitura tiene que definir la obra, señalando las ejecuciones que pertenecen a la obra de las que no (Goodman, 1968: 129).
(2) La partitura tiene que ser determinada de manera única (sin ambigüedad), por lo que dada una ejecución de la obra y el sistema notacional, una y solo una partitura tiene que ser recuperable (Goodman, 1968: 130).

De acuerdo con la función primaria que asigna Goodman a las partituras, las propiedades constitutivas de la obra musical *x* se obtienen a partir del análisis previo de la partitura de *x*. Goodman considera que las únicas indicaciones de una partitura que sirven para la función de identificar a *x* de una ejecución a otra son las indicaciones de

---

altura y duración. Steffano Predelli (1998), con algunos matices, asume en líneas generales la propuesta de Goodman.

La principal ventaja del nominalismo es que es ontológicamente económico, ya que únicamente se compromete con la existencia de ejecuciones musicales, i.e. objetos concretos. En este sentido, no postula una clase adicional de entidades con las que identificar a las obras musicales aparte de las ejecuciones. Sin embargo, esta propuesta no está exenta de inconvenientes. Por ejemplo, el nominalismo no ofrece una explicación adecuada de las condiciones de existencia e identidad de las obras musicales que no han sido nunca ejecutadas. Si el nominalista es reduccionista respecto a los conjuntos –admitiendo su existencia únicamente cuando existe alguno de sus miembros– las obras no ejecutadas no existirían. Sin embargo, parece que tenemos la intuición de que una obra existe una vez finalizada por su compositor, con independencia de que sea o no ejecutada. Si el nominalista no es reduccionista, y puesto que los conjuntos se individúan extensionalmente por sus miembros, todas las obras que no hayan sido ejecutadas serían la misma obra. Se identificarían con el conjunto vacío de ejecuciones (cf. Giombini, 2017: 87). Además, la función de 'identificación autorizada' que Goodman confiere a la partitura conduce a la paradoja de que una ejecución plana sin ninguna nota fallida se considere como una ejecución adecuada de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven, mientras que una ejecución rica de matices pero con solo una nota fallida, no forme parte del conjunto de ejecuciones en el que consiste esta obra.

Pese a que el nominalismo se presenta como una posición indiferente respecto al fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones, el peso que Goodman confiere a la partitura tiene consecuencias problemáticas con respecto a este asunto. De acuerdo con la función primaria que asigna Goodman a las partituras, las propiedades constitutivas de la obra musical *x* se obtienen a partir del análisis previo de la partitura de *x*. Cualquier cambio que se introduzca en una partitura –bien en la estructura de sonidos (versiones) o bien en el timbre (transcripciones)– determinaría una clase distinta de ejecuciones cumplientes de esa partitura y, por tanto, una obra musical distinta. Al igual que el platonismo, el nominalismo parece no tener recursos para distinguir las obras basadas o inspiradas en otras previas de los casos de versiones y transcripciones supuestamente de una misma obra.

De inspiración nominalista, el perdurantismo musical es otra alternativa a la teoría tipo/ejemplar que identifica a las obras musicales con objetos concretos. El perdurantismo defiende que una obra musical es una fusión de sus ejecuciones (Caplan y Matheson, 2006: 60). Caplan y Matheson parten de la tesis de que las obras musicales persisten, en el sentido de que existen en más de una ocasión. La manera según la cual persisten las obras musicales a lo largo del tiempo es perdurando, i.e. las obras musicales persisten en virtud de tener diferentes partes temporales en los distintos momentos en los que la obra existe. Una parte temporal de una obra musical *x* en un momento *t* es:

(1) algo que existe solo en *t*,

(2) algo que es una parte de *x* en *t*,

(3) algo que se solapa en *t* a todo aquello que sea una parte de *x* en *t*.

Las ejecuciones de una obra musical son partes temporales de esa obra. Las distintas ejecuciones de una obra están relacionadas, a través de la relación de continuidad apropiada para las obras musicales –relación análoga a la que se da entre las distintas etapas temporales de una persona permitiéndole perdurar en el tiempo– con otras ejecuciones de la misma obra.

No obstante, algunos autores han argumentado que el perdurantismo no ofrece una explicación adecuada de la relación uno-a-muchos entre una obra musical y sus ejecuciones. Según estos autores, cuando decimos que la *Quinta Sinfonía* es repetible, decimos que la *Quinta Sinfonía* ocurre múltiplemente en sus ejecuciones, en las que podemos escuchar y experimental la obra completa que Beethoven compuso. El perdurantismo no puede explicar esta intuición, ya que por medio de las ejecuciones de una obra no podemos acceder a la obra en su totalidad, sino a la parte temporal de la obra a la que corresponden esas ejecuciones (cf. Dodd, 2007).[7] Asimismo, el perdurantismo se enfrenta al problema de la constancia modal. Las fusiones son objetos mereológicos modalmente constantes, tales que no podrían haber tenido más partes temporales de las que realmente tienen. Sin embargo, parece intuitivo pensar que la *Quinta Sinfonía* podría haber tenido más o menos ejecuciones de las que actualmente tiene. En este sentido, ciertos autores han afirmado que no podemos identificar a la *Quinta Sinfonía* con una fusión de sus ejecuciones (cf. Dodd, 2007), a lo que los perdurantistas han ofrecido diferentes respuestas (cf. Caplan y Bright, 2005: 66; Caplan y Matheson, 2006: 67).

Asimismo, el perdurantismo tampoco ha sido concebido para dar cuenta del fenómeno de versiones y transcripciones. Al igual que las anteriores propuestas, su foco de atención está en la explicación de la naturaleza de las obras musicales. Cuál sea la aplicación de esta perspectiva a los casos de versiones y transcripciones es algo que ha de obtenerse tratando de extraer las consecuencias que se siguen de ella. En este sentido, podría pensarse que las ejecuciones de las tres versiones de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius son todas ellas partes temporales de esa obra musical. La *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius sería la fusión de todas esas ejecuciones. El problema de esta opción es que, si las ejecuciones de todas las versiones y transcripciones de esta obra son partes temporales de la misma fusión, entonces parece que el perdurantismo se encuentra sin recursos para individuar a esas versiones y transcripciones. No habría diferencia ontológica entre la primera, segunda y tercera versión que Sibelius compuso de esta obra, ya que todas ellas serían el mismo objeto –la misma fusión– desde un punto de vista ontológico. La otra alternativa al alcance del perdurantismo, y dado que versiones y transcripciones de una obra existen ontológicamente a la par –las versiones y transcripciones más antiguas de una obra pueden ser igualmente ejecutables que las

---

[7] Para una respuesta a esta objeción, véase Caplan y Matheson (2008).

versiones y transcripciones más recientes siempre y cuando dispongamos de sus partituras–, consiste en explicar estos fenómenos como casos de fisión (cf. Lewis, 1983: 61 y ss.). Sin embargo, si bien esta opción permite determinar la identidad de una versión en aquello que la distingue de otras así como su origen común, el perdurantismo se encuentra con el mismo problema que surge para la teoría tipo/ejemplar: no tendría recursos para distinguir el fenómeno de versiones y transcripciones de los casos de obras inspiradas en otras previas, el cual parece ser un fenómeno distinto si atendemos a nuestras prácticas musicales.[8]

El nihilismo, por su parte, es la perspectiva que defiende que a un nivel ontológico no hay entidades que sean obras musicales, sino que lo único que hay son estructuras de sonidos que hacen el papel de obras musicales (cf. Cameron, 2008). El objetivo del nihilismo en filosofía de la música consiste en desarrollar una posición ontológica que permita salvar la intuición de que las obras musicales son creadas pero sin tener que adoptar una posición ontológica que identifique las obras musicales con entidades abstractas creadas o con entidades concretas (Cameron, 2008: 295). Así, el nihilismo se define desde el comienzo como una posición externa al debate entre realismo y nominalismo. Puesto que tanto el nominalismo como el realismo afirman que una obra musical es una entidad genérica, el nihilismo evita comprometerse con esa tesis y desarrolla una metaontología que posibilita que oraciones del lenguaje natural tales como 'hay obras musicales' sean verdaderas sin que ello comprometa a afirmar la existencia de obras musicales.[9]

Nuevamente, la atención de esta propuesta se centra en los casos habituales de obras musicales sin considerar el fenómeno de versiones ni transcripciones. Desde esta posición, más aún que de las anteriores, resulta difícil extraer cuáles serían las consecuencias que se siguen de ella con respecto a la naturaleza de esos subproductos musicales. La opción más factible sería considerar a versiones y transcripciones como

---

[8] Aunque por motivos de espacio no se analizará en detalle, los mismo problemas parecen seguirse para la propuesta recientemente defendida por Caterina Moruzzi, quien sostiene que una obra musical es una ejecución-etapa que se relaciona de manera privilegiada con otras ejecuciones-etapa (Moruzzi, 2018: 342).

[9] Para ello, el nihilismo distingue entre dos niveles de lenguaje. Por una parte, está el nivel del lenguaje natural. Respecto a las oraciones de este lenguaje, Cameron (2008: 300) adopta un criterio de verdad tipo Tarski, según el cual "p" es verdadero syss p (siendo "p" una oración del lenguaje natural). Es decir, que para que la oración "p" sea verdadera, el mundo tiene que ser tal que p sea el caso. Por ejemplo, "la nieve es blanca" es verdadera syss la nieve es blanca, o "hay estatuas" es verdadero syss hay estatuas. Pero nótese que la verdad de estas oraciones no requiere adquirir ningún compromiso ni con qué son las estatuas ni con qué es la blancura de la nieve. En el nivel del lenguaje natural no adquirimos ningún compromiso con cómo es el mundo a nivel ontológico. Junto a este nivel, Cameron distingue otro nivel del lenguaje, el de la ontología (Ontologese). El lenguaje de la ontología es aquel que describe el mundo en su nivel fundamental, es decir, se compromete con qué son las cosas (Cameron, 2008, 301). En este sentido, Cameron afirma que es trivialmente verdadero que "p" es verdadero syss p en el plano del lenguaje natural, pero no es trivialmente verdadero que "p" es verdadero syss p si p es una oración del lenguaje de la ontología que nos dice cómo es el mundo en su nivel fundamental. La aplicación de esta distinción entre niveles de lenguaje al ámbito de la ontología de la música tiene como resultado que la verdad de la oración en castellano "hay obras musicales" es compatible con la afirmación de que a un nivel fundamental no hay obras musicales. Esta compatibilidad permite a Cameron rechazar la etiqueta de "eliminativista" con la que ha sido caracterizada su propuesta por parte de otros autores (Kania, 2012).

estructuras de sonidos que hacen el papel de versiones y transcripciones respectivamente. Sin embargo, esta propuesta parece poco ilustrativa acerca de cuál es la naturaleza de estos subproductos musicales en relación con las obras musicales supuestamente versionadas o transcritas.

Finalmente, la teoría de la acción de David Davies (2004) y el particularismo histórico de Guy Rohrbaugh (2003) se presentan como propuestas más flexibles que, aunque diseñadas para dar cuenta de los casos centrales de nuestras prácticas musicales, parecen ser las que de una manera más sencilla podrían ofrecer una explicación de la naturaleza de versiones y transcripciones. Según la teoría de la ejecución, una obra musical es una acción-ejemplar, una ejecución en la que se especifica un foco de apreciación (una estructura de sonidos) que completa a dicha ejecución (cf. Davies, 2004: 146, 151). Parece que la acción llevada a cabo por un compositor podría comprender las ulteriores revisiones y transcripciones que llevase a cabo sobre una misma obra. Sin embargo, la principal objeción a esta propuesta es su incapacidad para explicar la repetibilidad de las obras musicales, ya que las acciones-ejemplares son eventos y los eventos no son repetibles. Por su parte, según el particularismo histórico, una obra musical es un particular histórico, un objeto real de alto nivel que es ontológicamente dependiente de sus encarnaciones (Rohrbaugh, 2003, pp. 198–199). Este objeto real es un continuante que puede sufrir distintas modificaciones a lo largo del tiempo. Algunas de esas modificaciones podrían ser las distintas revisiones y transcripciones que un compositor realice de su obra. Al igual que el perdurantismo, esta propuesta parece presentar *prima facie* el problema de individuar las distintas versiones de una misma obra, ya que desde el punto de vista ontológico serían el mismo objeto, i.e. el mismo continuante. No obstante, por su mayor plausibilidad para abordar los casos de versiones y transcripciones, estas propuestas se analizarán con mayor detalle en el capítulo 5 de esta tesis.

Como ha podido constatarse, de las distintas propuestas acerca de qué clase de entidad es una obra musical se siguen consecuencias para el fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones. Llegados a este punto, surgen distintas cuestiones relevantes. En primer lugar, ¿cuál es la perspectiva más apropiada para dar cuenta de este fenómeno? Por una parte, que aquellas propuestas que consideran que versiones y transcripciones son obras distintas de la obra versionada o transcrita se encuentran con problemas para diferenciar a estos subproductos musicales de obras inspiradas o basadas en otras previas. Por otra, las perspectivas que consideran que versiones y transcripciones no son obras distintas presentan dificultades para explicar la individuación de estos subproductos y de las obras musicales en general. Ante esta situación, y dado que ninguna de ellas aborda de manera central el fenómeno de versiones y transcripciones, ¿convendría repensar la ontología de la música prestando más atención a los casos de versiones y transcripciones? Asimismo, todas las propuestas se presentan como soluciones a conflictos con las intuiciones de nuestras prácticas musicales suscitados por las otras perspectivas respecto a la explicación del fenómeno general de las obras musicales, pero ninguna de ellas parece estar exenta de problemas. ¿Qué criterio debe

adoptarse para ponderar estos problemas y elegir una de estas posiciones ontológicas en detrimento de las otras acerca de la cuestión categorial? A lo largo de esta tesis se intentará responder a estas cuestiones. En el debate reciente se ha apuntado que la solución a estas cuestiones pasa por el ámbito metaontológico, y más específicamente, por un replanteamiento de cuál es la metodología que es adecuada emplear en ontología de la música. Este aspecto se será analizando en detalle en el próximo capítulo.

2.2 La cuestión por la individuación en ontología de la música

La pregunta por la individuación en ontología de la música es aquella que pretende determinar cuáles son los rasgos que fijan la identidad de los objetos de apreciación en nuestras prácticas musicales. Al igual que ocurre con la cuestión categorial, el debate acerca de la individuación en ontología de la música ha estado centrado en una clase de estos objetos: las obras musicales. En este sentido, las distintas propuestas involucradas identifican distintos conjuntos de rasgos o condiciones como aquellos que, a su juicio, determinan la identidad de una obra musical. La cuestión principal a dilucidar en este debate es cuáles son las condiciones bajo las cuales dos objetos musicales W y W* son considerados como la misma obra musical o como obras musicales distintas. Así, las condiciones de individuación de la *Quinta sinfonía* de Beethoven son los rasgos que hacen que la *Quinta sinfonía* sea la obra que es y que la distinguen de cualquier otra obra musical.

A diferencia de lo que ocurría con la cuestión categorial, de las distintas propuestas acerca de la individuación de las obras musicales se siguen consecuencias directas para el estatuto ontológico de versiones y transcripciones. Individuar a las obras musicales a partir un conjunto de condiciones tal y como aparecen caracterizadas en el debate actual implica que versiones y transcripciones sean la misma obra u obras diferentes de la obra versionada o transcrita. A lo largo de esta tesis, no obstante, se mostrará que este vínculo no es tan fuerte, y que solamente se puede sostener en un análisis superficial del fenómeno en cuestión. Se verá que de algunas de las propuestas en discusión no se sigue, al contrario de lo que generalmente se asume, que versiones y transcripciones sean obras musicales diferentes de la obra versionada o transcrita (cf. Capítulo 5). Este aspecto será fundamental para compatibilizar las intuiciones habituales acerca de la individuación de versiones y transcripciones con propuestas en la cuestión por la individuación que satisfacen en mayor medida que otras las virtudes teóricas. En este sentido, estas propuestas se revelarán como metodológicamente adecuadas a según la perspectiva del equilibrio reflexivo.

Asimismo, un notable número de autores defienden que hay una relación conceptual entre la cuestión categorial y la cuestión por la individuación. Es decir, asumen que de la categoría ontológica con la que identifiquemos a las obras musicales se siguen consecuencias para la determinación del conjunto de rasgos que individúan a estas. Conversamente, también se asume ampliamente que de la identificación de un

determinado conjunto de rasgos como condiciones de individuación de las obras musicales se sigue la categoría ontológica que debe adscribirse a estas. Nuevamente, a lo largo de esta tesis se mostrará que esta asunción –que podría denominarse como el vínculo fuerte entre las cuestiones categorial y por la individuación– no está suficientemente fundamentada y que debe ser cuestionada. Aquí no se mostrará directamente que ambas cuestiones sean lógicamente independientes, pero sí que la misma categoría ontológica es compatible con distintos conjuntos de condiciones de individuación, por una parte, y que el mismo conjunto de condiciones de individuación es compatible con distintas categorías ontológicas (cf. Capítulos 5 y 6). En consecuencia, una tesis más débil acerca del vínculo entre las cuestiones categorial y por la individuación resulta más plausible, a saber, que cualquier conjunto de rasgos de condiciones de individuación no se puede acomodar de la misma manera por cualquier tesis acerca de la cuestión categorial. En este sentido, se asumirá aquí un conjunto de condiciones de individuación es más fácil de acomodar si asignamos a las obras musicales una categoría ontológica en lugar de otra. Como se verá, este aspecto tendrá una importancia fundamental para la aplicación de la hipótesis de los tipos anidados al fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones.

A pesar de estas matizaciones, a continuación se ofrecerá con finalidad introductoria un mapa de las posiciones que han adquirido una mayor relevancia en el debate acerca de la individuación de las obras musicales, señalando los rasgos distintivos de las mismas así como las consecuencias que parecen seguirse de manera directa para la individuación de versiones y transcripciones musicales:

Posición Filosófica	Factores en la individuación				Productos musicales		
	Estructura de sonidos	Identidad del compositor	Momento de composición	Instrumentos prescritos por el compositor	Obras con estructura idéntica y distinto compositor	Versiones	Transcripciones
Contextualismo referencial (Levinson, Currie)	Sí, una (asunción)	Sí, siempre	Sí, siempre	-	Obras distintas	Obras distintas	Obras distintas
No-contextualismo (Dodd, Kivy)	Sí, una (asunción)	No, nunca	No, nunca	-	La misma obra	-	-
Contextualismo no-referencial (S. Davies)	Sí, una (asunción)	Sí, a veces	Sí, a veces	Sí, a veces	Depende del contexto de composición	Depende del contexto de composición	Depende del contexto de composición
Contextualismo modal (D. Davies)	-	Sí, a veces	Sí, a veces	Sí, a veces	Depende de nuestras intuiciones modales sobre la obra	Depende de nuestras intuiciones modales sobre la obra	Depende de nuestras intuiciones modales sobre la obra
Sonicismo puro (Kivy, Scruton)	Sí, una	-	-	No, nunca	La misma obra	Obras distintas	La misma obra
Sonicismo tímbrico (Dodd, Hanslick)	Sí, una	-	-	Sí, siempre	La misma obra	Obras distintas	Obras distintas
Instrumentalismo (Levinson, Predelli, S. Davies)	-	-	-	Sí, siempre (Predelli-Levinson), dependiendo del contexto (S. Davies)	-	-	Obras distintas
Formalismo puro (no-contextualismo + sonicismo puro)	Sí, una (asunción)	No, nunca	No. nunca	No, nunca	La misma obra	Obras distintas	La misma obra

El debate contemporáneo acerca de las condiciones de individuación de una obra musical viene motivado por la posición defendida por Levinson (1980). Como se constató en la sección anterior, Levinson defiende la tesis de que una obra musical es algo más que una simple estructura de sonidos. Según esta perspectiva, lo que determina la identidad de la *Quinta sinfonía* de Beethoven no es simplemente una sucesión de tonos de diferente altura y duración, sino también el haber sido compuesta por Beethoven en un momento histórico determinado y para unos instrumentos musicales específicos. A partir de la propuesta de Levinson se han desarrollado dos discusiones principales en lo que concierne a la cuestión por la individuación. Por una parte, se encuentra la discusión entre contextualistas y no-contextualistas, cuya tesis en disputa es si la referencia al contexto de composición y al compositor son parámetros que determinan la identidad de una obra musical. Por otra parte, tiene lugar la discusión entre sonicistas e instrumentalistas, que cuestiona si la ejecución con los instrumentos prescritos por el compositor y el timbre de estos es constitutivo de la identidad de una obra. Dicho con otras palabras, la tesis en discusión es si el timbre y la producción causal del sonido por los instrumentos prescritos por el compositor de la obra son parámetros que fijan la identidad de esa obra.

a) El debate entre contextualismo y no-contextualismo

El debate entre contextualistas y no-contextualistas tiene por objeto determinar el impacto que el contexto de composición y el compositor tienen en la identidad de una obra musical. Pueden distinguirse cuatro posiciones a tal efecto:

> **No-contextualismo:** el contexto de composición y el compositor no juegan ningún papel en la identidad de una obra musical (cf. Kivy, 1988; Wolterstorff, 1980; Dodd, 2007; Goodman, 1968).

> **Contextualismo referencial:** la referencia al contexto de composición y al compositor son parámetros que determinan la identidad de una obra musical (cf. Levinson, 1980; 2011; Howell, 2002; Sharpe, 2001; Predelli, 1999).

> **Contextualismo no-referencial:** el contexto de composición de una obra determina cuáles son los parámetros que fijan la identidad de esta (cf. S. Davies, 2001; 2003).

> **Contextualismo modal:** nuestras intuiciones modales acerca de la relación entre una obra y sus circunstancias de producción en su contexto de composición determinan los parámetros que fijan la identidad de esta (cf. D. Davies, 2004)

Considérese, por ejemplo, la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven. Según la perspectiva no-contextualista, el haber sido compuesta por Beethoven en 1808 no tiene ninguna incidencia en la identidad de esta obra. El aspecto fundamental en la individuación de las obras musicales para esta posición son las estructuras de sonidos. Si dos compositores distanciados espacio-temporalmente indican la misma estructura de sonidos, entonces esos dos compositores no han compuesto dos obras musicales diferentes, sino que han compuesto la misma obra. En consecuencia, si Messiaen hubiese indicado en 1950 la misma estructura de sonidos de la *Quinta Sinfonía* desconociendo todos los hechos relativos a Beethoven y a su producción musical, el no-contextualista afirmaría que Messiaen no compuso una nueva obra musical distinta de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven.

El contextualista referencial, por el contrario, negaría esta conclusión. La identidad de cada obra musical viene determinada, según esta perspectiva, por estructuras de sonidos indicadas de la forma φ-indicada-por-*P*-en-*t*, donde φ es una estructura de sonidos, *P* un compositor y *t* el momento de composición (cf. Levinson, 1980: 20). La referencia al compositor y al momento de composición fija un determinado contexto histórico-musical con el que la estructura de sonidos entra en relación.[10] En el caso anterior, Messiaen habría compuesto una obra musical distinta de

---

[10] Levinson distingue entre dos tipos de contexto: el contexto histórico-musical general y el contexto-histórico musical individual (Levinson, 1980: 10-11). El contexto histórico-musical general en un momento t incluye los factores relevantes para componer una obra musical en t. Esos factores son: a) la historia completa cultural, social y política anterior a t; b) el desarrollo completo de la música hasta t; c) los estilos musicales vigentes en t; d) las influencias musicales dominantes en t. Por su parte, el contexto histórico-musical individual en un momento t es el conjunto de factores relevantes específicos para un compositor P componiendo en t. Esos factores son: e) las actividades musicales de los contemporáneos de

la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven, llamémosla *O*, pese a que las estructuras de sonidos de *O* y *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven sean idénticas. La diferencia en la identidad del compositor así como en el contexto de composición determinarían la diferencia entre ambas obras.

La cuestión en juego entre no-contextualistas y contextualistas referenciales consiste en identificar qué determina el contenido estético o artístico de las obras musicales. El contenido estético de una obra es el conjunto de sus propiedades estéticas (Levinson, 2011: 107). Tradicionalmente, se ha entendido que las propiedades estéticas son aquellas que conducen a la apreciación correcta de una obra, en la medida en que pueden ser citadas como razones para justificar nuestros juicios estéticos sobre esa obra (Currie, 1989:19). Se suele asumir que, a diferencia de lo que ocurre con las propiedades no-estéticas, la captación de las propiedades estéticas requiere el ejercicio del gusto por parte del espectador (Sibley, 1959; Levinson, 1980; Scruton, 1997; Dodd, 2007). Asimismo, la tesis de que las propiedades estéticas que una obra posee dependen de sus propiedades no-estéticas es una idea ampliamente compartida en la bibliografía (Kivy, 1973; Beardsley, 1974; Currie, 1990; Levinson, 2005, 2006, 2011; Dodd, 2007; Matravers, 2005 y 1996; Budd, 2007 y 2005, Benovsky, 2012; Hudson Hick, 2012; Sibley, 1959). El asunto relevante para la cuestión por la individuación es que si dos estructuras de sonidos se asocian con distintos contenidos estéticos, son dos obras musicales diferentes. En la medida en que el contenido estético de una obra depende de los rasgos no-estéticos de esta, cuáles sean los rasgos no estéticos de una obra de los que depende su contenido estético es el objeto de disputa entre contextualistas referenciales y no contextualistas. Aunque no existe un consenso respecto a cuál es la relación de dependencia entre las propiedades estéticas y las no estéticas, la opinión mayoritaria afirma que es una relación de sobreveniencia (Currie, 1989; Levinson, 2011; Dodd, 2007; Hudson Hick, 2012). Se afirma que las propiedades estéticas sobrevienen en las propiedades no-estéticas en el sentido de que no puede haber una diferencia en las propiedades estéticas sin que haya diferencia en las propiedades no-estéticas. Por tanto, lo que está en disputa entre contextualistas es cuáles son los rasgos no-estéticos que conforman la base de sobreveniencia del contenido estético de las obras musicales.

En este sentido, el contextualista referencial defiende que la base de sobreveniencia para las propiedades estéticas está constituida no solamente por propiedades estructurales –aquellas que son relativas a la estructura de sonidos– sino también por propiedades contextuales que relacionan aspectos de la estructura de sonidos de una obra con aspectos de su contexto de composición. Así, *O* y la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven son obras musicales distintas pese a tener la misma estructura de sonidos. Ambas poseen un contenido estético distinto, ya que la última sería considerada como original y excitante mientras que la primera como aburrida y

---

P en t; f) el estilo de P en t; g) el repertorio de P en t; h) la obra completa de P en t; i) las influencias musicales que operan en P en el momento t. La unión de ambos conjuntos de factores contextuales constituye el contexto músico-histórico total de un compositor P en un momento t.

anacrónica. Esas diferencias a nivel estético estriban en las diferencias en las propiedades relativas al contexto de composición de *O* y la *Quinta Sinfonía* y, por tanto, en la base no-estética de propiedades en la que sobrevienen sus propiedades estéticas. El no-contextualista, por su parte, rechaza que las propiedades contextuales formen parte de la base de sobreveniencia de las propiedades estéticas. Aquellos rasgos que el contextualista referencial considera que sobrevienen en propiedades contextuales no forman parte del contenido estético de una obra musical según el no-contextualista, sino simplemente constituyen propiedades de valor histórico-artístico que nada tienen que ver con el contenido estético de esta. El no-contextualista suele fundamentar esta perspectiva en el carácter intuitivo del empirismo musical, la tesis de que los límites de la apreciación musical vienen dados por lo que se puede escuchar en una obra, o lo que puede derivarse de escucharla (Dodd, 2007: 205). Según el empirismo musical en su versión simple, la propiedades estéticas de una obra musical sobrevienen exclusivamente a sus propiedades manifiestas en la percepción auditiva, esto es, a su estructura de sonidos.[11]

Frente al *impasse* en la discusión entre contextualismo referencial y no-contextualismo, dos propuestas de carácter contextualista se han propuesto como alternativas. Stephen Davies acepta dos tesis del contextualismo referencial de Levinson: primero, que la identidad de una obra depende de propiedades que son relativas al contexto de composición; segundo, que el marco histórico-musical en el que la obra ha sido compuesta contribuye a su identidad. Sin embargo, Davies argumenta contra la idea de Levinson de que la referencia al momento de composición y al compositor son rasgos que determinan la identidad de cualquier pieza. Respecto a la primera cuestión, advierte que se siguen consecuencias altamente contraintuitivas si se adopta una interpretación literal de la propuesta de Levinson. En la medida en que, según la propuesta de Levinson, la referencia al momento exacto de composición determina la identidad de las obras musicales, Davies aduce que en un mundo posible en el que Beethoven se hubiese detenido para tomar una taza de té antes de escribir la última nota de su *Quinta Sinfonía*, la pieza resultante sería una obra distinta de lo que conocemos como su *Quinta Sinfonía* en el mundo actual, ya que su acto de indicación tuvo lugar quince minutos más tarde. En ese mundo posible no se habría compuesto la *Quinta Sinfonía*, sino una obra distinta con la misma estructura de sonidos, lo cual resulta contraintuitivo e inaceptable para Davies. En este sentido, Davies propone un contextualismo no-referencial, cuya idea básica es que las convenciones sociales involucradas en las prácticas musicales del contexto de composición determinan las propiedades de una obra que son normativas para una ejecución correcta de ella y que, en consecuencia, determinan la identidad de dicha pieza. La identidad de una obra depende de su localización histórico-musical, no de quién sea su compositor ni del

---

[11] No obstante, las posiciones no-contextualistas más sofisticadas se decantan por un *empirismo musical moderado*, según el cual las propiedades estéticas de una obra sobrevienen a su estructura de sonidos y a la categoría artística a la que esta pertenece (sonata, sinfonía, fuga, cuarteto de cámara, concertó, etc.) (ver Dodd, 2007: 211). Esta perspectiva viene motivada por las intuiciones suscitadas por los experimentos mentales de Kendall Walton (1970).

momento específico en el que se compuso (cf. Davies, 2001: 76). Según Davies, las convenciones vigentes que gobiernan las prácticas musicales del contexto de composición de una pieza determinan el significado de las notaciones escritas por la partitura por parte del compositor y, de esta manera, ponen límites a las intenciones y prescripciones del compositor (cf. Davies, 2001: 68-69). En nuestro caso anterior, *O* sería una obra distinta de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven, no por haber sido compuesta por una persona distinta en un momento diferente, sino porque las convenciones del contexto musical de Messiaen determinan un significado distinto de las notaciones escritas en la partitura, pese a que esta sea notacionalmente indiscernible de la escrita en 1808 por Beethoven.

David Davies adopta también una perspectiva contextualista que, a semejanza de S. Davies, rechaza que la referencia al compositor y al momento de composición sean parámetros que determinan la identidad de cualquier obra musical. Sin embargo, la propuesta de D. Davies difiere de la de S. Davies en que su perspectiva está basada en un análisis modal de las obras musicales. D. Davies considera que las intuiciones modales acerca de las obras de arte sirven como indicación de los principios que nos guían en nuestras prácticas críticas y apreciativas (Davies, 2004: 103). Uno de estos principios es el que él denomina como *el principio de la modalidad* ('the modality principle'), el cual establece un vínculo entre las propiedades constitutivas y esenciales de una obra (Davies, 2004: 104). Las propiedades constitutivas de una obra son, según Davies, aquellas propiedades en virtud de las cuales un evento sonoro *k* es una instancia del tipo que es (Davies, 2004: 104). Es decir, las propiedades constitutivas de una obra *K* serían las propiedades que un evento sonoro *k* debe satisfacer para ser una instancia apropiada de *K*. Estas propiedades determinan el tipo de cosa que es *k* y, en consecuencia, las condiciones de individuación en virtud de las cuales *k* es una cosa particular del tipo *K* (Davies, 2004: 105). El principio de la modalidad[12] establece que las propiedades esenciales de una obra son todas y solamente sus propiedades constitutivas (Davies, 2004: 105). Por tanto, las propiedades esenciales de una obra son las propiedades que debe satisfacer un evento sonoro para ser una instancia de esa obra en cualquier mundo posible. En virtud de ello, Davies defiende un contextualismo modal que se sintetiza en lo que el denomina la *tesis de la relatividad a la obra* (work-relativity thesis), y que se formula de la siguiente manera:

> Los aspectos de origen afectan nuestros juicios modales con una fuerza variable que refleja nuestro sentido general de lo que se debe apreciar en una obra determinada (Davies, 2004: 112).

De acuerdo con esta tesis, no hay rasgos del contexto de composición de las obras musicales que, de manera sistemática, determinen su identidad. El fundamento de

---

[12] La defensa del principio de la modalidad es el principal factor que diferencia la concepción de las propiedades constitutivas de Davies respecto a la de los otros autores mencionados. Por ejemplo, para Dodd es irrelevante saber cuáles son las propiedades esenciales de una obra, es decir, las propiedades que esta tendría en cualquier mundo posible. De esta manera, Dodd desestima el vínculo entre propiedades constitutivas y propiedades esenciales de una obra musical.

la tesis radica en las intuiciones modales que tenemos hacia cada obra en particular. Estas dictaminan qué rasgos del contexto de composición son esenciales a una obra y cuáles no lo son. Este es el caso del momento de composición de una obra: en unos casos es un componente que configura la identidad de una pieza mientras que en otros no. La *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven es una obra tonal y que estructuralmente sigue la forma de las sinfonías clásicas en rasgos generales. En este caso, parece indiferente que esta obra se hubiese compuesto diez años antes. En un mundo posible en el que la misma estructura de sonidos hubiese sido indicada en 1798 no diríamos que el resultado de ese acto de indicación sería una obra distinta a la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven. El momento en el que obra fue compuesta no es una propiedad esencial a ella y, por tanto, no es constitutivo de su identidad. Por el contrario, una obra como *Illiac Suite* de Lejaren Hiller y Leonard Isaacson sí que parece mucho más vinculada al momento en el que fue compuesta, el año 1956. Se trata de la primera pieza completamente generada por un ordenador, una obra que no podría haber sido compuesta diez años antes debido que su composición es dependiente de los desarrollos en la computación algorítmica de la primera mitad del siglo XX (cf. Nierhaus, 2009: 63). Por lo tanto, de acuerdo con Davies, no hay parámetros del contexto que de manera sistemática determinen la identidad de una obra musical. Los rasgos del contexto que determinan la identidad de las obras musicales dependen de nuestras intuiciones modales acerca de la obra en cuestión que estemos analizando. En consecuencia, el papel del contexto no consiste en aportar la referencia del momento de composición ni de la identidad del compositor, como ocurría en el contextualismo de Levinson.

De estas cuatro perspectivas, tal y como han sido presentadas en la bibliografía, se siguen consecuencias directas para el estatuto ontológico de versiones y transcripciones. En la medida en que el no-contextualismo, el contextualismo referencial y el contextualismo no-referencial asumen que uno de los parámetros que individúan a una obra musical es una estructura de sonidos, las versiones serían obras musicales diferentes de la obra versionada. Puesto que las distintas versiones de una obra exhiben distintas estructuras de sonidos, esas diferencias serían suficientes para dar lugar a obras musicales distintas. Además, dado que las distintas versiones de una obra se componen en momentos distintos, las diferencias en este parámetro también serían suficientes para que el contextualista referencial las considerase como obras diferentes. Asimismo, las versiones compuestas por autores distintos al compositor de la versión original, serían siempre obras musicales diferentes para el contextualista referencial, pues este considera que la referencia al compositor es un parámetro que determina la identidad de una obra. Por su parte, cualquier transcripción que involucre un cambio en la estructura de sonidos de la obra transcrita será considerada como una obra musical diferente por parte del no-contextualismo, del contextualismo referencial y del contextualismo no-referencial. Además, todas aquellas transcripciones que sean compuestas por un compositor diferente y en un momento distinto de la obra transcrita constituyen obras diferentes para el contextualista referencial. Por su parte, si una transcripción es compuesta en un contexto con diferentes convenciones a las vigentes en el contexto de composición de la versión original, o si las convenciones del contexto de

la versión original consideran a la instrumentación como un parámetro de la identidad de la obra, esa transcripción es una obra diferente de la obra transcrita para el contextualista no-referencial. Finalmente, para el contextualismo modal de Davies no se sigue ninguna consecuencia directa acerca del estatuto de versiones y transcripciones. El considerar a una versión o una transcripción como una obra musical diferente de la obra versionada o transcrita dependerá de cuáles sean nuestras intuiciones modales con respecto a esta última.

En esta tesis se verá que algunas de estas posiciones son acertadas en diversos aspectos acerca de la cuestión por la individuación. Se mostrará que, tras las modificaciones pertinentes, no son excluyentes sí y que encuentran acomodo en una perspectiva adecuada acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales, en general, y de versiones y transcripciones, en particular. Se verá que el contextualismo no-referencial apunta en la dirección cierta sobre la individuación de las obras musicales. El papel que juega el contexto de composición de una obra consiste en determinar el alcance de las variables de la estructura de sonidos de una obra. Esta función la comparte con el contexto de ejecución. La conjunción de ambos determina el grado de variabilidad de ejecuciones de una obra y, en consecuencia, permite decidir cuándo una ejecución cuenta como una ejecución de una obra W o de una obra distinta a W. A su vez, el contextualismo referencial encuentra su aplicación en la individuación de las versiones y transcripciones de una obra. Se verá que el momento de composición y la persona que ha compuesto una versión o transcripción son factores que determinan la identidad de estos subproductos musicales. Cómo se compatibilizan estas posiciones constituirá una parte importante del desarrollo del capítulo 5.

b) El debate entre sonicismo e instrumentalismo

El debate entre sonicistas e instrumentalistas es aquel que tiene por objeto determinar si el timbre y la producción causal del sonido con los instrumentos especificados por el compositor son parámetros que fijan la identidad de una obra musical. En esta discusión se destacan tres perspectivas:

Sonicismo puro: las obras musicales son puras estructuras de sonidos sin color (cf. Kivy, 1988/1993; Scruton, 1997).

Sonicismo tímbrico: el timbre de los instrumentos prescritos por el compositor es un factor que determina la identidad de una obra musical (cf. Dodd, 2007; Hanslick, 1891/1943).

Instrumentalismo: el timbre y la producción causal del sonido a partir de los instrumentos prescritos por el compositor es constitutivo de la identidad de una obra musical (cf. Davies, 2008; Levinson, 2011; Predelli, 1999).

Desde la perspectiva del sonicismo puro, la instrumentación original de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven no es constitutiva de la identidad de esta obra. Una

ejecución correcta de la estructura de sonidos de la *Quinta Sinfonía* llevada a cabo por una banda de instrumentos de viento, por un piano, por un octeto de clarinetes, por un conjunto de chirimías o por un coro de voces mixtas contaría como una ejecución de la *Quinta Sinfonía*. Ninguna de ellas serían consideradas bajo esta perspectiva como ejecuciones de una obra distinta. Todas ellas contarían como instancias de la *Quinta sinfonía*, al igual que la efectuada por el conjunto instrumental dispuesto originalmente por Beethoven, a saber: flauta piccolo, 2 flautas, 2 oboes, 2 clarinetes en *Si ♭* y en *Do*, 2 fagots, un contrafagot, 2 trompas en *Mi ♭* y en *Do*, 2 trompetas en *Do*, 3 trombones y orquesta de cuerda (Violines, violas, violoncelos y contrabajos).

A favor del sonicismo puro se ha argumentado que hace justicia a la intuición firme de que la identidad de una obra se preserva en la medida en que su integridad estructural se preserva (Kivy, 1988/1993: 77). Lo único que se requiere para que se mantenga la identidad de una obra es que las relaciones estructurales de esta se preserven (Scruton, 1997: 442; Kivy, 1988/1993: 80). Según esta perspectiva, la ejecución de la *Quinta Sinfonía* por una agrupación de chirimías sería una ejecución imperfecta de esa obra. Sin embargo, del hecho de que esta ejecución sea imperfecta no se sigue que dicha ejecución sea la ejecución de otra obra distinta de la *Quinta Sinfonía* (cf. Kivy, 1988/93: 78, 94; Scruton, 1997: 442). Negar la tesis del sonicismo puro conduce, en opinión de Kivy, a la consecuencia contraintuitiva de que el grupo de chirimías estaría ejecutando una obra distinta a la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven, a pesar de que la ejecución que estarían llevando a cabo tiene una estructura de sonidos idéntica a la de la *Quinta Sinfonía*. Por su parte, Roger Scruton define nuestra experiencia de las obras musicales como acusmática, en el sentido de que prestamos atención a los sonidos con independencia de cuál sea su origen causal (Scruton, 1997: 2; 2009: 5). Solamente los rasgos estructurales son los que determinan la organización de nuestra experiencia musical, y son solamente estos los que fijan la identidad de una obra según Scruton. Altura de tono, ritmo, armonía y melodía son los rasgos que determinan nuestra experiencia musical y los únicos que cuentan como aquellos que individúan una obra (Scruton, 1997: 20). Por lo tanto, tanto para Kivy como para Scruton, la identidad de una obra musical depende solo y exclusivamente de su organización sonora, con independencia de los timbres particulares que esta pueda adquirir.

Las razones que se ofrecen desde el sonicismo puro a favor de su tesis son variadas. Se afirma, por ejemplo, que un cambio de instrumentación no afecta a que la obra continúe siendo reconocible, siempre y cuando se respete su estructura de sonidos (Kivy, 1988: 77).[13] Así, la ejecución de la *Quinta Sinfonía* por el grupo de chirimías seguiría preservando en núcleo básico de nuestra experiencia musical de esa obra. Los defensores del sonicismo puro ponen de relieve, además, distintos aspectos de la historia de la música y de nuestras prácticas musicales que apoyan la idea de que el origen causal del sonido es irrelevante para la identidad de una obra. En este sentido, afirman que hay un número considerable de obras cuya instrumentación no está total o

---

[13] Una fundamentación empírica de esta idea se ofrecerá en el capítulo 3 de esta tesis.

parcialmente especificada, que los compositores se han tenido que adaptar muchas veces a los instrumentos que tenían disponibles en su entorno cercano a la hora de determinar la instrumentación de una pieza y que las transcripciones de una misma obra para distintas formaciones instrumentales es una práctica habitual (cf. Kivy, 1988/1993: 79-80; Scruton, 1997: 443-7). Según los defensores del sonicismo puro, todos estos rasgos de nuestras prácticas musicales apoyan la tesis de que la identidad de las obras musicales depende solamente de su organización sonora y no del timbre.

El sonicismo puro ha sido criticado desde distintas perspectivas. Dodd afirma que el principal error del sonicismo puro consiste en no reconocer que el timbre juega también, junto con las propiedades estructurales de tono, ritmo, y armonía, un papel fundamental en nuestra apreciación de las obras musicales. Puesto que las propiedades tímbricas determinan muchos de los rasgos estéticos de una obra, tienen que ser consideradas como propiedades normativas de las obras musicales (Dodd, 2007: 213, 217). Levinson, que coincide con Dodd en esta crítica al sonicismo puro, señala que la nobleza del pasaje del compás 30 al 38 del cuarto movimiento de la Primera Sinfonía de Brahms desaparece si eliminamos en una ejecución el timbre de la trompa (cf. Levinson, 2011: 245). Asimismo, Levinson cita el Bolero de Ravel como un caso extremo que muestra la importancia del timbre en la determinación del contenido estético de una pieza. Puesto que el Bolero consiste en la repetición del mismo tema durante nueve veces, las propiedades estéticas de esa pieza se obtienen por los cambios de instrumentación prescritos por Ravel para cada una de las repeticiones. En consecuencia, Levinson afirma que la obra no tendría sentido si fuese ejecutada por dos pianos (Levinson, 2011: 247).

En virtud de estas inquietudes, el sonicismo tímbrico sostiene contra el sonicismo puro que el timbre de los instrumentos prescritos por el compositor es un factor que determina la identidad de una obra musical. Así, cualquier ejecución de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven llevada a cabo por instrumentos que produzcan timbres distintos de los correspondientes a la instrumentación original prescrita por Beethoven no contarían como ejecuciones de esta obra. Sin embargo, al igual que el sonicismo puro, el sonicismo tímbrico rechaza que el uso de los instrumentos especificados por el compositor sea un requisito para que algo cuente como una ejecución de una obra. En este sentido, una ejecución de la *Quinta sinfonía* de Beethoven llevada a cabo por un sintetizador perfecto que fuese capaz de reproducir exactamente el sonido de los instrumentos para los que Beethoven escribió esa obra contaría como una ejecución apropiada de la *Quinta sinfonía*. Desde el momento en que una ejecución llevada a cabo por el sintetizador tímbrico perfecto y la efectuada por una orquesta son tímbricamente indistinguibles, el sonicista tímbrico afirma que ambas ejecuciones son instancias correctas de esa obra, siempre y cuando reproduzcan adecuadamente su estructura de sonidos. Por tanto, el sonicista tímbrico defiende que el timbre es una propiedad normativa de las obras musicales y, en consecuencia, un rasgo que determina su identidad. El fundamento de esta idea se encuentra nuevamente, según Dodd, en el

empirismo estético moderado (Dodd, 2007: 213).[14] Según esta perspectiva, las propiedades estéticas de una obra sobrevienen a sus propiedades acústicas y a su categoría artística. Las propiedades acústicas son aquellas propiedades de la obra que tienen que ser escuchadas en una ejecución apropiadamente formada de esa obra. Esas propiedades vienen dadas con un timbre, el timbre especificado por el compositor.

El sonicismo tímbrico ha sido cuestionado por S. Davies, quien pone en duda el carácter intuitivo de esta posición citando tres intuiciones que contradicen esa tesis (cf. Davies, 2008: 368-369). Considerando una *Sonata* para piano de Beethoven, Davies afirma que el evento sonoro producido por un sintetizador timbrico perfecto no puede ser considerado como una ejecución de esa pieza, ya que las acciones características para ejecutar la *Sonata* no tienen lugar en este caso. En segundo lugar, Davies señala que la secuencia de sonidos producidos por el sintetizador tímbrico perfecto ofrecen una representación deficiente de la sonata debido a que adolece de algunas de las propiedades estéticas constitutivas de dicha pieza. El ejemplo más claro de esas propiedades es, según Davies, el virtuosismo del último movimiento, que se caracteriza por ser técnicamente exigente para el pianista que lo vaya a ejecutar. Puesto que en el caso del sitetizador tímbrico perfecto no hay pianista ni tienen lugar sus acciones típicas, la secuencia de sonidos producida por el sintetizador adolece de la propiedad del virtuosismo. Por último, Davies indica que en los sonidos generados electrónicamente 'se pierde el calor humano de la ejecución', lo cual afecta a las propiedades expresivas y a otros rasgos que posee la *Sonata*. Por tanto, la hipótesis del sonicismo tímbrico perfecto es rechazada por Davies debido a que las reproducciones de la estructura de sonidos efectuadas por el sintetizador adolecen de ciertas propiedades normativas de la *Sonata*, propiedades que deben ser instanciadas por cualquier ejecución correcta de la *Sonata*. En las reproducciones realizadas por el sintetizador no se pueden 'oir los gestos y acciones que propiamente pertenecen a' la *Sonata*, de manera que no pueden contar como ejecuciones adecuadamente formadas de dicha obra.

En virtud de estas críticas, Davies rechaza el sonicismo en sus dos modalidades y defiende el *instrumentalismo*, la tesis de que no solamente el timbre, sino también la producción causal del sonido a partir de los instrumentos prescritos por el compositor es constitutivo de la identidad de una obra musical. En consecuencia, sola y exclusivamente las ejecuciones de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Beethoven llevadas a cabo con los instrumentos prescritos por el compositor cuentan como ejecuciones de esta obra.

---

[14] El origen histórico de esta tesis se retrotrae al crítico alemán Edward Hanslick, quien afirma que lo bello en la música "radica únicamente en los sonidos y su combinación artística" (Hanslick, 1891/1943: 47). Traducido al vocabulario de la filosofía contemporánea, diríamos que el valor estético de una obra musical depende exclusivamente de su estructura de sonidos. Ahora bien, los elementos que, según Hanslick, integran la estructura de sonidos de una obra son la melodía, la armonía y el ritmo, a los que 'les da colorido el encanto de los múltiples timbres' (Hanslick, 1891/1943: 47). Parece, pues, que Hanslick concibe las estructuras de sonidos no como secuencias de sonidos tipo sin color, sino como secuencias de sonidos con un timbre determinado, lo cual supone anticipar la tesis del sonicismo tímbrico.

De las tres posiciones involucradas en este debate se siguen consecuencias directas acerca de la naturaleza de las transcripciones musicales. Desde la perspectiva del sonicismo puro, las transcripciones de una obra no constituyen obras musicales diferentes de la obra transcrita. Puesto que el timbre no es un rasgo que defina la identidad de una obra, la *Quinta Sinfonía* puede ser adecuadamente ejecutada por diferentes conjuntos instrumentales. En la medida en que las transcripciones involucran un cambio respecto a la instrumentación original de una obra, una ejecución de una transcripción de la *Quinta Sinfonía* para banda de instrumentos de viento podría contar como una ejecución apropiada de la Quinta Sinfonía ya que no hay nada que *prima facie* impida a esta ejecución satisfacer todas las propiedades normativas de dicha obra. [15] En cambio, para el sonicismo tímbrico y para el instrumentalismo, las transcripciones de una obra contarían siempre como obras musicales distintas del original. Al considerar al timbre y a la producción causal del sonido como propiedades normativas para la ejecución correcta de una obra –y en consecuencia, como rasgos que fijan su identidad–, la partitura de una transcripción de la *Quinta Sinfonía* para banda de vientos especificaría distintas propiedades normativas que la partitura de la *Quinta Sinfonía* con la instrumentación original prescrita por Beethoven. Las ejecuciones adecuadamente formadas de la transcripción no lo serían de la partitura original de Beethoven, y viceversa.

A lo largo de esta tesis se verá que algunas de estas perspectivas son complementarias en una explicación adecuada de la naturaleza de las obras musicales, en general, y de las versiones y transcripciones, en particular. Una explicación de esta índole será aquella capaz de acomodar nuestras intuiciones más ampliamente compartidas sobre la naturaleza de estos productos musicales, que serán explicitadas en el capítulo 3. En este sentido, se verá que el sonicismo puro ofrece la óptica adecuada para la individuación de las obras musicales, pues permite que sus versiones y transcripciones no constituyan obras distintas. A su vez, el sonicismo tímbrico se revelará como la perspectiva adecuada sobre la individuación de las transcripciones, estableciendo en combinación con el contextualismo referencial los criterios de identidad de estas.

3. Plan de la tesis

En la sección anterior ha podido constatarse cómo el desarrollo de la *edad de oro* de la ontología de la música ha dado lugar a un auténtico *paraíso de los filósofos* en el que los problemas acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales involucran cuestiones fundamentales de ontología, epistemología o filosofía del lenguaje. Sin

---

[15] A pesar de que esta es la consecuencia que se sigue del sonicismo puro, Scruton distingue entre transcripciones que son la misma obra que la obra transcrita y transcripciones que no lo son. Sus criterios para definir esta segunda clase de transcripciones no aparecen perfectamente definidos. No obstante, parecen apuntar a la idea de que cuando se producen cambios notables en la estructura de sonidos al realizar una transcripción, el resultado es una nueva obra musical (cf. Scruton, 1997: 451-3).

embargo, la proliferación de este elevado número de propuestas podría entenderse como una situación de bloqueo de la disciplina, por una parte, o como el resultado de un mal planteamiento de los problemas que son objeto de estudio en la misma, por otra (cf. Ridley, 2003). En efecto, pese al atractivo de la teoría tipo/ejemplar y el sonicismo puro, todas las posiciones se presentan como la perspectiva más intuitiva o como la posición por defecto que mejor da cuenta de las intuiciones involucradas en las prácticas musicales. Ante esta circunstancia, y dada la gran diversidad de propuestas, surge el problema de determinar un criterio de discriminación entre ellas. A tenor de lo aducido por los distintos autores, parece que las prácticas musicales y las intuiciones involucradas en ellas deben jugar un papel importante. No obstante, cuál sea el papel que juegan en la elección de una posición ontológica acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales es algo que ha de dirimirse, no en una discusión factual –la correspondiente a la ontología–, sino normativa. En este sentido, distintos autores han señalado al plano metaontológico como el ámbito en el que esta cuestión ha de ser resuelta (cf. Kania, 2008, 2012; Dodd, 2008, 2013; Davies, 2009; Stecker, 2009; Thomasson, 2005, 2006, 2010; Davies, 2004, 2009). La metaontología de la música puede definirse sucintamente como el estudio de la naturaleza de las cuestiones de la ontología de la música. Es pues en el ámbito metaontológico donde han de abordarse los asuntos concernientes a los criterios de elección para la posición más adecuada acerca de la ontología de las obras musicales.

Asimismo, se ha mostrado en la sección previa cómo las diversas propuestas en ontología de la música han centrado su atención en las obras musicales, dejando en un segundo plano el estudio de la naturaleza de versiones y transcripciones. No obstante, se ha señalado cómo desde cada una de estas perspectivas se pueden trazar consecuencias tanto directas como indirectas acerca de la ontología de las versiones y transcripciones. Este intento, sin embargo, ha resultado en caracterizaciones problemáticas, imprecisas y en muchos casos contrapuestas sobre la naturaleza de estos subproductos musicales. En consecuencia, la especificación de la naturaleza de versiones y transcripciones parece requerir una mayor atención por parte del ontólogo respecto a estos objetos. Es aquí donde radica la principal motivación de la tesis que se desarrollará a continuación.

Depositar una mayor atención en los casos de versiones y transcripciones no implica que la propuesta que se vaya a desarrollar aquí sea una posición *ad hoc* para estos subproductos musicales. Una posición así sería aquella que estuviese especialmente diseñada para dar cuenta de los casos de versiones y transcripciones pero que no ofreciese una explicación adecuada del principal objeto de apreciación de nuestras prácticas musicales, las obras musicales, ni de otros fenómenos al margen del ámbito musical. Ello conduciría a la indeseable consecuencia de una inflación ontológica ante la necesidad de postular otra clase de entidades para explicar la naturaleza de fenómenos distintos al de las versiones y transcripciones. El mapa de posiciones trazado en la sección anterior resulta relevante en la medida en que la propuesta ofrecida aquí pretende ubicarse dentro de las discusiones allí presentadas. En este sentido, se analizará si alguna de las propuestas previas puede explicar de manera

adecuada, con las modificaciones pertinentes, la naturaleza de versiones y transcripciones. Esta estrategia posibilita, por una parte, garantizar una explicación propicia de la naturaleza de los casos más habituales de obras musicales que no han sido revisadas ni transcritas y, por otra, ofrece la ventaja de obtener una posición con un mayor alcance explicativo que las actuales al dar cuenta de manera adecuada de las versiones y transcripciones musicales.

Como respuesta a la cuestión categorial, la tesis que se defenderá en el presente estudio es que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados –*the hypothesis of nested types*– es la que ofrece la mejor explicación de la naturaleza de las versiones y transcripciones. Según esta hipótesis, las obras musicales son tipos de nivel superior que se instancian en tipos de nivel inferior –sus versiones y transcripciones–, que a su vez se instancian en ejecuciones musicales –eventos de secuencias de sonidos. Se afirmará que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados es la mejor explicación de la ontología de versiones y transcripciones porque es la que ofrece un mejor ajuste entre nuestras prácticas musicales y las virtudes teóricas. Por una parte, se mostrará que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados puede acomodar la intuición preponderante en nuestras prácticas musicales de que las obras musicales son repetibles –es decir, que las escuchamos, nos encontramos con ellas y las apreciamos– en las ejecuciones de sus versiones y transcripciones. Según esta intuición, versiones y transcripciones no constituyen obras musicales distintas de la obra versionada o transcrita, sino simplemente distintas perspectivas de ella o maneras de presentarla. Por otra parte, se mostrará que es la hipótesis que mejor acomoda esta intuición de acuerdo con las virtudes teóricas de simplicidad, elegancia y capacidad explicativa. Asimismo, puesto que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados es propiamente una modificación de la teoría tipo/ejemplar, se garantizan las virtudes teóricas de la teoría tipo/ejemplar con respecto a la explicación de la naturaleza de las obras musicales en general, evitando con ello el problema de constituir una posición *ad hoc* para la explicación de los casos particulares de versiones y transcripciones.

Para que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados pueda cumplir sus objetivos con respecto a la cuestión categorial, se verá que esta ha de ser acompañada por una determinada respuesta a la cuestión por la individuación. Las obras musicales *qua* tipos anidados se individúan por una única estructura de sonidos que posee distintas variables. Siguiendo la óptica de un contextualismo no referencial, tanto el contexto de composición de las versiones y transcripciones de una obra como el contexto de las ejecuciones de estas determinan el alcance de las variables de la estructura de sonidos de la obra versionada o transcrita. En conjunción, estos contextos determinan cuál es el margen de variabilidad admisible de las ejecuciones de una obra para que esta sea repetible en ellas. Asimismo, para admitir como ejecuciones de la misma obra las ejecuciones de transcripciones para distintos conjuntos de instrumentos, las obras musicales han de individuarse según la perspectiva del sonicismo puro. Por su parte, la individuación de las versiones y transcripciones de una obra musical requerirá la referencia al momento de composición, al compositor y a la instrumentación. Estos rasgos son condiciones que fijan la identidad de las distintas versiones y transcripciones

de una obra musical y que juegan un papel determinante en la apreciación de estas. Por lo tanto, las perspectivas del sonicismo tímbrico y del contextualismo referencial serán las adecuadas para explicar la individuación de versiones y transcripciones.

Ahora bien, cabe preguntarse por qué el ajuste entre las prácticas musicales y las virtudes teóricas es un criterio para seleccionar cuál es la propuesta más adecuada en ontología de la música. La respuesta a esta cuestión se ofrecerá en el próximo capítulo. El capítulo 2 estará dedicado a la metaontología de la música. Siguiendo la dirección marcada por las líneas de investigación recientes, se asumirá que es en este ámbito donde se dirime cuáles son los criterios para decidir entre la variedad de propuestas en ontología de la música. En particular, se distinguirá entre dos debates en metaontología de la música, el de la sustantividad de la ontología y el metodológico, siendo este último el relevante para el asunto en cuestión. El debate metodológico es la discusión en metaontología de la música que tiene por objeto determinar cuál es la metodología adecuada a seguir en ontología de la música para determinar la naturaleza de las obras musicales. Las posiciones más destacadas en este debate son el revisionsimo –la posición que defiende que nuestras intuiciones prácticas acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales pueden ser revisadas en virtud de los descubrimientos alcanzados en ontología– y el descriptivismo –que defiende que nuestras intuiciones prácticas no pueden ser revisadas ya que la labor de la ontología consiste en describir nuestra concepción tácita acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales. Se mostrará que ambas posiciones metodológicas incurren en problemas de diversa índole –trivialidad, solipsismo e inconsistencia– y que una propuesta metodológica que supere estos problemas ha de satisfacer dos desiderata. En primer lugar, las posiciones en ontología de la música, relativamente a un determinado contexto, deberían ser capaces de acomodar las intuiciones más extendidas entre los agentes involucrados en las prácticas musicales. Este desiderátum recibirá el nombre de *descriptivismo mínimo*. En segundo lugar, las posiciones ontológicas acerca de las obras musicales deberían ser capaces de revisar nuestras intuiciones prácticas sobre la naturaleza de las obras musicales en el caso de que estas colisionen con principios teóricos firmes. Este segundo desiderátum se denominará *revisionismo mínimo*.

Como se verá en el capítulo 2, la metodología en ontología de la música que mejor satisface estos dos desiderata es aquella que toma por base la noción de *equilibrio reflexivo* de Goodman. Según la noción original aplicada a las reglas de inferencia, una práctica inferencial es válida si satisface las reglas de inferencia, mientras que una regla de inferencia es válida si es capaz de acomodar la mayoría de las prácticas inferenciales que consideramos como válidas intuitivamente. Aplicada a la ontología de la música, una intuición acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales es válida si es compatible con los resultados obtenidos en la investigación ontológica, mientras que los resultados obtenidos en ontología son válidos si son capaces de acomodar el mayor número de intuiciones prácticas más expandidas acerca de la naturaleza de las obras musicales. La metodología del equilibrio reflexivo basada en Goodman que aquí se propondrá distingue entre dos clases de intuiciones prácticas. Por una parte, están aquellas que son

familiares a nuestras prácticas musicales y a las que apelamos frecuentemente. Por otra, están aquellas que además de ser familiares están arraigadas, i.e. aquellas que son centrales a nuestras prácticas musicales en el sentido de que la mayor parte de hipótesis que utilizamos en ellas presupone este núcleo básico de intuiciones. La ontología de la música está habilitada a revisar solamente aquellas intuiciones que sean solamente familiares pero que no estén arraigadas en nuestras prácticas musicales.

Los métodos de la filosofía experimental emergerán aquí como un complemento para que la ontología de la música pueda llevar adecuadamente a cabo su labor desde una perspectiva metaontológica. El método de casos, encuestas y búsquedas en corpus lingüísticos se presentarán como mecanismos fiables para determinar qué intuiciones son familiares en nuestras prácticas musicales, contribuyendo a minimizar la influencia de los prejuicios y preferencias del ontólogo en este asunto. En el mismo sentido, las investigaciones en musicología y teoría de la música se considerarán también como fuentes fiables para caracterizar nuestras prácticas musicales respecto al fenómeno de versiones y transcripciones. Los métodos de la filosofía experimental se introducen aquí simplemente como un complemento de los métodos de la filosofía tradicional y no como una substitución de los mismos, en línea con el *programa positivo de la filosofía experimental*. En efecto, por medio de estos métodos experimentales solamente podemos determinar cuáles son las intuiciones familiares, lo cual nos permitirá descartar en ontología a aquellas posiciones que se presentan erróneamente como la posición intuitiva o la posición por defecto. Sin embargo, para determinar cuáles de las intuiciones familiares son arraigadas, los métodos experimentales no son suficientes, sino que se necesita para ello el análisis conceptual y la reflexión. Como se verá, no es posible determinar positivamente qué intuiciones familiares son arraigadas. Por el contrario, solamente es posible determinar cuáles de las intuiciones familiares no están arraigadas. Es aquí donde entra en juego la reflexión filosófica para determinar si una determinada intuición tiene casos positivos, ninguno negativo, tiene casos indeterminados y no colisiona con ninguna otra hipótesis no descartada previamente o con algún principio teórico firme. El equilibro reflexivo entre principios teóricos y prácticos ocupa un papel fundamental una vez establecida una descripción de nuestras prácticas musicales por medio de recursos empíricos.

La metodología presentada en el capítulo 2 se pondrá en funcionamiento en el capítulo 3, que se dedicará a ofrecer una descripción de nuestras prácticas musicales con respecto al fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones. En primer lugar, se ofrecerá un listado de versiones y transcripciones obtenido a partir de distintos catálogos musicológicos que servirá para ilustrar tanto la dimensión del fenómeno como la manera en la que los musicólogos acostumbran a catalogar las versiones y transcripciones de una obra. Por una parte, se constatará que pese a no ser los casos más habituales, las obras que han sido revisadas y transcritas no constituyen un fenómeno marginal en nuestras prácticas musicales. Por otra parte, se observará que los musicólogos tienden generalmente a catalogar las versiones y transcripciones como obras no numéricamente distintas de la obra versionada o transcrita. Esta tendencia es

coherente con la intuición de que una obra musical es repetible en las ejecuciones de sus versiones y transcripciones. En segundo lugar, a partir de estudios musicológicos sobre obras con distintas versiones y transcripciones, se analizarán las motivaciones conducentes a la composición de versiones y transcripciones de una obra. Se constatará de nuevo que esas motivaciones son coherentes con la idea de que una obra musical es repetible en las ejecuciones de sus versiones y transcripciones y que, por tanto, estas no constituyen obras musicales diferentes. Finalmente, se presentará un estudio empírico por casos realizado para medir el grado de familiaridad de los oyentes con esta intuición. La población del experimento contará tanto con músicos profesionales como con oyentes sin formación musical, y sus intuiciones al respecto se medirán a partir de sus reacciones al escuchar casos reales de versiones y transcripciones en un procedimiento que pretende ser compatible tanto con el empirismo musical como con posiciones contextualistas. Los resultados arrojarán la conclusión de que la intuición de que en las ejecuciones de versiones y trascripciones se repite –es decir, escuchamos, accedemos y valoramos– la obra musical versionada o transcrita es una intuición familiar a nuestras prácticas musicales. En consecuencia con la metodología del equilibrio reflexivo, esta será una intuición que debe ser acomodada por una propuesta acerca de la ontología de las obras musicales salvo que tengamos razones adicionales para revisarla, y que excluye como posiciones por defecto al sonicismo tímbrico, al instrumentalismo y *prima facie* a aquellas perspectivas que identifican a las obras musicales con una sola estructura de sonidos –tesis que recibirá en el capítulo 5 el nombre de *monismo estructural.* Esta intuición recibirá el nombre a lo largo de esta tesis de la *perspectiva estándar* sobre las versiones y transcripciones.

Una vez completada la descripción de nuestras prácticas musicales y determinadas cuáles son las intuiciones familiares respecto al fenómeno de las versiones y transcripciones, el capítulo 4 se dedicará a analizar el planteamiento de Stephen Davies, la propuesta más relevante y detallada acerca de la naturaleza de versiones y transcripciones que puede encontrarse en la bibliografía. Su posición acerca de las versiones es que estas no constituyen obras musicales diferentes de la obra versionada. En consecuencia, su perspectiva es capaz de acomodar la perspectiva estándar sobre las versiones. En cambio, y a pesar de presentarla como la posición por defecto, su posición acerca de las transcripciones no acomoda la perspectiva estándar sobre las transcripciones. Su tesis es que las transcripciones constituyen obras musicales diferentes de la obra transcrita. Mediante dos experimentos mentales, se mostrará que esta tesis tiene consecuencias que contradicen nuestras intuiciones familiares acerca de las transcripciones de las que se dio cuenta en el capítulo 3. En este sentido, su posición se revelará como una posición revisionista en relación con nuestras intuiciones sobre las transcripciones. El resto del capítulo se dedicará a explorar si Davies ofrece alguna razón de peso que justifique la revisión de estas intuiciones. Davies considera que el cambio de instrumentación que se produce en una transcripción es condición suficiente para dar lugar a una nueva obra en aquellos casos en los que la instrumentación original de la obra transcrita hubiese sido especificada por el compositor. Se mostrará que ninguna de las tres razones que pueden identificarse en sus investigaciones a favor de

esta condición –(1) que el contexto de composición determina que la instrumentación es una propiedad normativa de las obras musicales, (2) que el timbre es una condición necesaria de la estructura y contenido de una obra musical, y (3) que ciertas propiedades estéticas como 'virtuosismo' dependen de la instrumentación original prescrita por el compositor– son correctas y que, en consecuencia, no justifican el carácter revisionista de su propuesta. En virtud de ello, la perspectiva de Davies sobre transcripciones será descartada.

El capítulo 5 es el capítulo central de esta tesis y en él se introducirá la hipótesis de los tipos anidados. El capítulo comenzará considerando las consecuencias ontológicas que se siguen de la perspectiva estándar sobre versiones y transcripciones, a saber, una jerarquía de tres niveles de objetos: en una ejecución de la primera versión de la *Quinta Sinfonía* de Sibelius estamos escuchando esa ejecución (primer nivel), la versión ejecutada (segundo nivel) y la obra de la cual la versión ejecutada es una versión (tercer nivel). Puesto que las versiones de una misma obra presentan siempre distintas estructuras de sonidos, y la mayor parte de transcripciones también involucran cambios con respecto a la estructura de sonidos de la versión original, la perspectiva estándar parece ser *prima facie* incompatible con el monismo estructural, la tesis de que las obras musicales se individúan por una sola estructura de sonidos. La acomodación de la perspectiva estándar parece más viable si se asume un pluralismo estructural, según el cuál una obra musical puede estar individuada por más de una estructura de sonidos. Como se mostrará, esta circunstancia plantea un reto para la ontología de la música, pues el monismo estructural es asumido por las distintas variantes de la teoría tipo/ejemplar, que como se vio en la sección anterior es la perspectiva que ofrece la mejor explicación de la naturaleza de las obras musicales desde el punto de vista de las virtudes teóricas. La ontología de la música parece enfrentarse, en consecuencia, al dilema de, o bien tener que adoptar el pluralismo estructural –lo que conduciría a prescindir de ciertas virtudes teóricas, no satisfaciendo el desiderátum del revisionismo mínimo–, o bien preservar el monismo estructural asumiendo una revisión total de la visión estándar sobre versiones y transcripciones –lo que llevaría a no satisfacer el desiderátum del descriptivismo mínimo.

El objetivo del capítulo 5 es mostrar que este dilema es falso. En lo concerniente al primer cuerno del dilema, se considerarán tres propuestas que parecen ser a primera vista compatibles con el pluralismo estructural: la teoría de los continuantes de Rohrbaugh, la teoría de la ejecución de D. Davies y el nominalismo de parecido. Se mostrará que ninguna de estas tres perspectivas es en realidad compatible con el pluralismo estructural, o si lo son, no son capaces de acomodar de manera adecuada la perspectiva estándar sobre versiones y transcripciones. En virtud del fallo en el primer cuerno, el dilema se remodelará en los siguientes términos: o bien tenemos que postular una propuesta *ad hoc* para los casos de versiones y transcripciones –lo cual conduce a no satisfacer las virtudes teóricas mandatadas por el desiderátum del revisionismo mínimo–, o bien tenemos que asumir las consecuencias revisionistas del monismo estructural explicando los casos de las versiones y transcripciones a partir de la teoría

tipo/ejemplar. Llegados a este punto es donde la hipótesis de los tipos anidados se presentará como una solución, revelando la falsedad de este dilema. Se mostrará que la teoría de los tipos anidados puede acomodar de manera satisfactoria la perspectiva estándar sobre versiones y transcripciones y, a la vez, preservar la idea del monismo estructural como tesis acerca de la individuación de las obras musicales.

Según la hipótesis de los tipos anidados, las obras musicales son tipos de orden superior, que se instancian en tipos de orden inferior con los que se identifican sus versiones y transcripciones. Por su parte, estos tipos de orden inferior son instanciados en ejecuciones musicales en las que no escuchamos solamente al tipo de orden inferior que instancian, sino también al tipo de orden superior –la obra versionada o transcrita– contando así como instancias genuinas de este. Se mostrará que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados no postula una nueva categoría ontológica *ad hoc*, sino que los tipos a los que apela son tipos en sentido pleno al preservar los rasgos definitorios de esta categoría ontológica: en primer lugar, la hipótesis de los tipos anidados es aplicable a otros dominios más allá del ámbito musical; en segundo lugar, preserva la transmisión de predicados entre tipos de nivel superior y sus ejemplares (tipos de nivel inferior), y entre los tipos de nivel superior y los ejemplares de los tipos de nivel inferior (ejecuciones musicales); y finalmente, el mecanismo de ostensión diferida para explicar el acceso al tipo a través de sus ejemplares también se aplica a la hipótesis de los tipos anidados. Asimismo, se mostrará cómo la hipótesis de los tipos anidados dispone de dos mecanismos para explicar cómo las distintas estructuras de sonidos de las versiones y transcripciones pueden asociarse con una misma obra y, al mismo tiempo, preservar la tesis del monismo estructural sobre la individuación de las obras musicales, versiones y transcripciones. Como se verá, la hipótesis de los tipos anidados entiende que las obras musicales están individuadas por una sola estructura de sonidos, al igual que cada una de sus versiones y transcripciones. Sin embargo, por una parte, algunas versiones y transcripciones pueden considerarse como casos de instanciación imperfecta de la estructura de sonidos del tipo de orden superior, lo que explicaría los casos en los que desechamos versiones y transcripciones previas de una obra en nuestras prácticas musicales. Por otra, las diferencias estructurales entre las versiones y transcripciones de una obra pueden entenderse como diferencias que caen bajo el alcance de la variabilidad en la instanciación de esa obra: la estructura de sonidos que individúa al tipo de orden superior posee distintas variables cuyos valores se fijan, en primera instancia, por los compositores en los tipos de nivel inferior (versiones y transcripciones) y, en segunda instancia, por los intérpretes en las ejecuciones musicales. El alcance de la variabilidad de una obra es dependiente del contexto de instanciación –del contexto de composición de versiones y transcripciones, en primera instancia, y del contexto de ejecución, en segunda instancia. Esta segunda vía ofrecerá una explicación de los casos en los que las versiones y transcripciones son apreciados como distintas perspectivas igualmente válidas de una misma obra.

Para admitir distintas instrumentaciones así como versiones y transcripciones compuestas por distintos compositores sin que estas constituyan obras diferentes, las

obras musicales entendidas como tipos de orden superior han de individuarse según las tesis del sonicismo puro y de un contextualismo no-referencial que determina la variabilidad de las ejecuciones de la obra en virtud del contexto de composición de sus versiones y transcripciones y del contexto de ejecución de estas. En cambio, se verá que las versiones y transcripciones como tipos de orden inferior no se individúan de acuerdo con estas tesis. Por una parte, versiones y transcripciones *qua* tipos de orden inferior deben cumplir unas condiciones de instanciación respecto a los tipos de orden superior. Según parece indicar la perspectiva estándar, las versiones y transcripciones de una misma obra deben de satisfacer un cierto grado de parecido entre ellas y haber sido indicadas en el mismo proceso de composición. Asimismo, en la medida en que las diversas versiones y transcripciones de una obra especifican distintos conjuntos de propiedades normativas para una ejecución adecuada de cada una de ellas, la óptica levinsoniana de una individuación fina para ellas parece la tesis más plausible. De acuerdo con ello, se defenderá que versiones y transcripciones han de ser individuadas según las perspectivas del sonicismo tímbrico y el contextualismo referencial. La adopción aquí del contextualismo referencial no excluye que la determinación de qué cuenta como una ejecución adecuada de una versión o transcripción venga dada por el contexto de esa ejecución.

Puesto que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados identifica a obras musicales, versiones y transcripciones con tipos, y estos productos musicales se individúan de acuerdo con distintas tesis, se requiere que la categoría ontológica de los tipos sea compatible con distintas tesis acerca de la individuación. El capítulo 6 estará dedicado a mostrar esta compatibilidad. En él se rebatirá lo que aquí se denominará la *concepción heredada* del platonismo y el aristotelismo musical. Según esta idea, existe una dependencia lógica entre las cuestiones categorial y por la individuación, al menos en lo concerniente a la categoría de los tipos. La concepción heredada sostiene, por una parte, que, si los tipos se entienden a la manera platónica, tienen que ser individuados según las tesis del sonicismo puro y del no-contextualismo, y por otra parte, si los tipos se conciben a la manera aristotélica, tienen que ser individuados de acuerdo con el sonicismo tímbrico y el contextualismo referencial. En este capítulo se mostrará que la concepción heredada no es correcta. Específicamente, se defenderá que la tesis de que las obras musicales son tipos, ya sean estos entendidos a la manera platónica o a la aristotélica, es compatible con las tesis sobre la individuación de las obras musicales del sonicismo puro, el sonicismo tímbrico, el no-contextualismo y el contextualismo referencial. Se verá que la discusión entre el platonismo y el aristotelismo tiene que ver con las intuiciones filosóficas acerca del principio de instanciación de las propiedades, una cuestión que es independiente de la cuestión acerca de la individuación de las obras musicales. Esta circunstancia permitirá librarse a la hipótesis de los tipos anidados de cuestiones embarazosas tales como si los tipos platónicos y los aristotélicos son la misma categoría ontológica, o si las obras musicales *qua* tipos de orden superior son descubiertas mientras que versiones y transcripciones *qua* tipos de orden inferior son creadas. El defensor de la hipótesis de los tipos anidados tendría vía libre para defender una posición homogénea en lo concerniente a la cuestión categorial y a la cuestión por

la existencia y persistencia de obras musicales, versiones y transcripciones, a la par que heterogénea con respecto a las cuestión relativa a la individuación de estos productos musicales.

Finalmente, en el capítulo 7 se procederá a una recapitulación y conclusiones de esta tesis, haciendo hincapié en que la hipótesis de los tipos anidados no es una posición *ad hoc* para dar cuenta de los casos de versiones y transcripciones, sino que su aplicabilidad a todos los casos de obras musicales es atractiva, evitando así la postulación de nuevas entidades. Desde la perspectiva de los desiderata teóricos, la hipótesis de los tipos anidados se presentará como la propuesta más sencilla y elegante. La posibilidad de ser revisada o transcrita está abierta para todas las obras musicales – incluso para las que no han sido todavía ni revisadas ni transcritas–. Dada esta posibilidad, si se asigna a una obra que no ha sido ni revisada ni transcrita una categoría diferente a la de un tipo de nivel superior, tendríamos que decir que ha cambiado su naturaleza ontológica en el momento en que esta fuese revisada o transcrita. Sin embargo, semejante movimiento teórico es de difícil justificación y evitable si se adopta la teoría de los tipos anidados para todas las obras musicales. Desde el punto de vista de nuestras intuiciones prácticas, también resulta intuitiva la aplicación de la idea de los niveles múltiples propuesta por la hipótesis de los tipos anidados a los casos de obras musicales sin versiones y transcripciones. En efecto, es intuitiva para aquellos casos en los que el ejecutante, el director de orquesta o el ingeniero de sonido trata de suplir las carencias de la partitura ofrecida por un compositor en términos de balance entre planos sonoros, color, coherencia y claridad estructural, etc. Se trata de casos en los que la partitura presentada por el compositor fuese considerada una versión imperfecta de la obra que trata de ser mejorada por parte del intérprete. En esta misma línea, también explica aquellos casos en los que una ejecución correcta de una partitura no nos satisface. Se trata de casos en los que la autenticidad entendida como *fidelidad a la partitura* entra en colisión con la *autenticidad interpretativa*. En esto casos, una ejecución que se aleje parcialmente de las instrucciones que figuran en la partitura puede considerarse como una ejecución que manifiesta mejor el contenido de esa obra. Una explicación plausible de este fenómeno estaría al alcance de la hipótesis de los tipos anidados, afirmando que la versión indicada por el compositor en la partitura no exhausta todas las variables abiertas de la obra como tal. Dado el carácter no *ad hoc* y la aplicabilidad general de la hipótesis de los tipos anidados a todos los casos de obras musicales, la parte final del capítulo estará dedicada a defender esta hipótesis de críticas recientemente dirigidas contra la teoría tipo/ejemplar con respecto al fenómeno general de las obras musicales.

Chapter 2

The metaontology of music: between descriptivism and revisionism

1. Introduction

The present chapter is devoted to the study of the metaontology of music. While ontology has been generally defined as the study of what there is, metaontology has been characterised as the study of the nature of the questions about what there is (cf. Eklund, 2006; Chalmers, 2009). The scope of metaontology can be splitted into two fields. On the one hand, metaontology can ask about whether there are objective, mind-independent answers to the basic questions of ontology. Let us call it the debate about the *substantivity* of ontology. Three main views can be distinguished within this debate: realism –the thesis that there are objective answers to the questions of ontology, not dependent on what we think about the entities concerned–, anti-realism –which rejects the idea that there are objective answers to the questions of ontology–, and deflationism –the view that there are objective answers to the questions of ontology, but trivial or superficial ones, claiming that ontological disputes are purely verbal. On the other hand, metaontology can ask about the *methodology* implemented in ontology. Let us call it the methodological debate about ontology. Again, three main views can be distinguished within this debate: revisionism –the thesis that practices and intuitions of a particular domain can be revised in light of the results of the best ontological proposal for the entities concerned by these practices and intuitions–, descriptivism –the idea that the task of ontology is merely to describe in an systematic manner the pre-theoretical ontological conception shared by the agents involved in a particular practice–, and reflective equilibrium –the perspective that takes ontology and practices as mutually adjusting between them. The methodological debate and the debate about the substantivity of ontology are not independent, and there are issues overlapping between them. However, the aim of this section is not to provide an analysis of the relations holding between these two debates. Instead, it will focus on the methodological debate, and issues concerning the debate about the substantivity of ontology will be only tangentially approached.

The motivation of this choice lies on that the developments in the ontology of music in the last years tend to locate in methodological aspects the source of disagreement between the different approaches introduced in chapter 1 (cf. Kania, 2008, 2012; Dodd, 2008, 2013; Davies, 2009; Stecker, 2009; Thomasson, 2005, 2006, 2010; Davies, 2004, 2009). It is argued that paying attention to the methodology employed by the different views in the ontology of music could help us to decide between them (cf. Thomasson, 2005; Davies, 2009; Dodd, 2008, 2013). In this vein, a particular view on the ontology of music may be rejected for following a methodology that constitutes an inadequate approach to the phenomenon of musical works. The study of the methodological debate is of special interest concerning the aim of this research. The main goal pursued here is to determine the ontological status of musical versions and transcriptions within the framework of a general ontological account for musical works, in an attempt to avoid an *ad hoc* proposal just for this kind of products. Consequently, settling some issues about the methodology of the ontology of music seems to be crucial for the sake of this goal.

According to Robert Stecker (2009), the general methodological strategy followed in the ontology of music consists in offering an argument to the best explanation for an ontological thesis. This procedure can be sketched in three points: (i) different desiderata are set; (ii) some ontological thesis are rejected for not satisfying the desiderata; (iii) an ontological thesis is defended as the best one in satisfying the desiderata. The determination of what a desideratum should be is a crucial issue for the ontology of music because it plays the role of backing or rejecting an ontological thesis. The desiderata appealed in the ontological discussion may be of a very disparate nature. They may concern modal intuitions, aspects of our musical practices, semantic considerations or theoretical virtues (cf. Stecker, 2009). What the nature of a desideratum should be is a discussion that belongs to the metaontological realm.

Regarding this point, the three main views of the methodological debate distinguished above come at stake. Metaontological revisionism defends the thesis that the conception of musical works embedded in our musical practices *can* be substantially mistaken, so that the ontology of music is entitled to revise this conception to offer an accurate account of the nature of musical works. According to metaontological revisionism, an ontological picture of musical works departing from the view implicit in our musical practices is not *per se* methodologically mistaken. Metaontological revisionism would be prone to endorse desiderata associated to theoretical and explanatory purposes. By contrast, metaontological descriptivism argues that the conception of musical works embedded in our musical practices *cannot* be substantially mistaken. Consequently, any ontological proposal rejecting totally or partially the conception about the nature of musical works implicit in our musical practices would be methodologically unjustified. According to metaontological descriptivism, the role of ontology is to offer a clear, systematic and coherent description of the conception implicit in our musical practices about what a musical work is. Metaontological descriptivism would be more inclined to endorse desiderata having to do with practical

goals. Between these two views, an intermediate perspective can be found. Some authors defend a reflective equilibrium between the philosophical realm and musical practices. They argue that, although the ontological conception implicit in our musical practices must be the starting point of the ontology of music, it should not be assumed as a brute fact without being mediated by a theoretical reflexion.

Stecker (2009) has questioned that the abovementioned methodological strategy can constitute a promising way to solve the disagreement between the different ontological approaches. Although he concedes that desiderata derived from musical appreciative practices are less controversial than those derived from semantic or modal considerations, he argues that there is always more than one ontological thesis satisfying any set of practical desiderata. Stecker understands by musical appreciative practices 'what we say and do with respect to musical works' (Stecker, 2009: 376), which involves our referential practices and critical discourse about musical works (Stecker, 2009: 377). The superiority of the desiderata derived from our musical appreciative practices is grounded, according to Stecker, on the idea that 'what we say and do with respect to musical works' is the most resembling thing to data that can be obtained concerning this artistic realm (Stecker, 2009: 376). However, he acknowledges that any set of desiderata derived from musical appreciative practices is insufficient to decide between rival ontological accounts. In light of this puzzle, Stecker offers an alternative picture according to which the relevant data are not only provided by our musical appreciative practices, but also by other sources such as the empirical sciences studying music, as musicology, music theory, psychology or anthropology (Stecker, 2009: 384). Nonetheless, Stecker only points to this picture as a possible alternative without acquiring any commitment to it because, he argues, 'its potential for providing better data for an ontology of music is as yet unknown' (Stecker, 2009: 384).

This chapter is an attempt to begin to explore this alternative picture. The main goal here is to provide a methodology that enables and facilitate musical ontology to engage in interdisciplinary research with empirical disciplines that study the musical phenomenon. Accordingly, musicology and music theory will be regarded as valid sources to provide data about versions and transcriptions to be explained by an ontological account. In turn, the results obtained in the ontology of music should be valid and may suggest some revisions concerning these empirical domains. In addition, empirical methods employed in experimental philosophy –such as research in linguistic corpus or empirical experiments– will be considered as an accurate way to approach our musical appreciative practices and to obtain valid data about them. Meanwhile, the results obtained in the ontology of music may suggest a revision and have an incidence in those musical and appreciative practices. This chapter will offer a view of how to accommodate these sources of evidence in the ontology of music and how the results of the ontological inquiry may be fruitful for the musical domain.

The thesis defended here is that the methodology that better achieves this purpose is a renewed account of reflective equilibrium that reconsiders Goodman's

original notion in combination with methods employed in experimental philosophy. It will be shown that the traditional positions in the metaontology of music fail, or have strong difficulties, to achieve the goal of this chapter. On the one hand, it will be shown that descriptivism faces the problem of triviality, according to which ontological inquiry cannot contribute with relevant cognitive content to the body of knowledge about the nature of musical works. Under the more charitable interpretation, it will be shown that descriptivism may allow ontology to have cognitive relevance concerning unproblematic and stable domains of our musical practices, but not in the cases of conflicting practices, precisely the ones in which the cognitive contributions of ontology could be more profitable. On the other hand, revisionism faces the problem of solipsism: it provides a methodology that does not ensure that the results obtained in the ontological inquiry can be discussed in an interdisciplinary debate. Revisionism does not provide a clear criterion about what the limit of acceptable revisions of our musical practices is. Finally, it will be shown that David Davies' reflective equilibrium, despite being a more promissory account to achieve the goal pursued here, is simultaneously exposed to the problems of triviality and solipsism.

This chapter will be divided in two sections. The next section is devoted to analyse in more detail the debate between revisionism, descriptivism and reflective equilibrium, introducing their main arguments and posing different objections to them. In the final section, Davies' way to understand the idea of reflective equilibrium will be reconsidered regarding the original notion introduced by Nelson Goodman. It will be argued that, on the one hand, Davies' primacy of practices is not justified by Goodman's notion of reflective equilibrium. It will be maintained that, although an ontological proposal should accommodate widespread intuitions of our musical practices, it is entitled to revise intuitions that do not constitute projectible hypotheses. Accordingly, musical practices constraint the ontology of music, but the results obtained in the ontology of music may modify some local aspects of our musical practices motivated by intuitions involving just familiar but not entrenched intuitions. On the other hand, it will be shown that Davies' method is inadequate to offer an accurate account of our musical practices. It will be argued that this is not an exclusive problem of Davies' position, but one that also affects the other two metaontological views. None of these three views provide methods fine enough to account for our musical practices. Quantitative methods used in experimental philosophy will be defended as a better way to grant that the characterisation of the data of our musical practices relevant for ontology is not biased by the ontological prejudices of the ontological theory proposed. They will determine what intuitions are familiar to our musical practices. Then, conceptual analysis will be appealed to determine which of these familiar intuitions are not entrenched, and hence subject to revision by the ontology of music if certain conditions hold.

2. Descriptivism, revisionism and reflective equilibrium

The debate between descriptivism and revisionism in the metaontology of music sinks its roots in a wider and older discussion that aims to determine the general task of metaphysics. The distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is due to Peter Strawson, who presents the contrast between both views in the following terms:

> Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure (Strawson, 1959: 9).

Strawson adopts the descriptivist viewpoint, according to which metaphysics is defined as an inquiry of our conceptual scheme. He assumes the idea that there is a submerged structure in our language compound by 'categories and concepts which change not at all', constituting 'the indispensable core of the most sophisticated human beings' (Strawson, 1959: 10). Strawson identifies the subject/predicate distinction as the grounds for the metaphysical view of the world implicit in this ahistorical conceptual scheme. The main task of metaphysics is thus to make explicit this core of concepts common to human beings. The most suitable method for this purpose is conceptual analysis. In this respect, Strawson claims that 'the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy' (Strawson, 1959: 9). Consequently, the metaphysical work does not consist in discovering new truths about a particular issue, for 'there are no new truths to be discovered' (Strawson, 1959: 10). Nonetheless, although the object of metaphysics is ahistorical, the metaphysical work is always developed in a historical context, expressing the results in the appropriate language for its particular time. Accordingly, Strawson claims that the metaphysical labour consists in rediscovering the ahistorical truths in the appropriate terms of a particular historical context, for 'no philosopher understands his predecessors until he has re-thought their thought in his own contemporary terms' (Strawson, 1959: 11).

On the opposite, the revisionary approach considers metaphysics as an instrument of conceptual change (cf. Strawson, 1959: 10). Susan Haack locates the origins of revisionism in Alfred N. Whitehead's book *Concept of Nature* (1919). Haack sees Whitehead's work as a project of proposing a new conceptual scheme more suitable for the scientific purposes (Haack, 1979: 361). Our conceptual scheme is regarded as a historical accident based on the mistaken subject/predicate distinction that prevents us from seeing correctly the real structure of the world (Haack, 1979: 366). Consequently, revisionism assumes that our conceptual scheme is not ahistorical, that there are truths beyond our conceptual scheme to be captured, and that the metaphysical task consists in providing a better conceptual scheme for this target. These ideas have an

older antecedent in the fregean project of searching for a canonical notation system that accounts for pure thought. According to Frege, the subject/predicate distinction is not the suitable method for logical analysis, as he illustrates with the following analogy:

> I believe that I can best make the relation of my ideography to ordinary language clear if I compare it to that which the microscope has to the eye. Because the range of its possible uses and versatility with which it can adapt to the most diverse circumstances, the eye is far superior to the microscope. Considered as an optical instrument, to be sure, it exhibits many imperfections, which ordinarily remain unnoticed only on account of its intimate connection with our mental life. But, as soon as scientific goals demand great sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be insufficient. The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited to precisely such goals, but that is just it is useless for all others (Frege, 1879: 6).

In metaphysics, our conceptual scheme based on the subject/predicate distinction is analogous to the eye. As the eye, our conceptual scheme, articulated in ordinary language, is the most suitable instrument for a huge variety of practical purposes concerning our everyday activities: buying bread, going to work, knowing how Benfica played in last night's match, attending concerts or rehearsing musical works. However, the revisionist maintains that it may not be a suitable instrument to carve the metaphysical structure of the world at its joints. The revisionist admits the possibility of cases in which our conceptual scheme is not fine enough to provide an accurate account of the nature of a specific issue. The metaphysical task is to provide in these cases the suitable conceptual apparatus –a microscope– by revising some of our previous concepts.

These fundamental distinctions between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics are on the grounds of the contemporary methodological debate in the metaontology of music. This will be analysed in the remaining sections of this chapter. In the first place, the metaontological descriptivism defended by Thomasson and Kania will be addressed. Next, Dodd's view will be considered as the most salient defence of revisionism. Finally, the reflective equilibrium defended by Davies will be introduced.

2.1 Metaontological descriptivism: Thomasson and Kania.

a) Thomasson's descriptivism

The definitory points of Strawson's descriptivism can be identified in the metaontological view endorsed by Thomasson. She defends the thesis that the discovery model is an inadequate explanation of the way in which we acquire knowledge about the ontology of art (Thomasson, 2005: 221). The discovery model is the idea that the ontological inquiry may provide 'discoveries of fully determinate, mind-independent

facts about the ontological status of works of art of various kinds, about which everyone may be ignorant or in error' (Thomasson, 2005: 221). According to Thomasson, the discovery model is applied to the ontology of artworks by analogy with discoveries of natural and biological kinds, and reinforced by the assumption of causal theories of reference. However, Thomasson argues that this analogy is mistaken because of the *qua problem* faced by causal theories of reference (Thomasson, 2005: 222-3). They assume that there is an independent way of selecting natural kinds –i.e. gold– by ostensibly pointing to a sample of it. The problem is that each sample includes entities of a very different nature –i.e. chemical, functional, biological, etc.–, and it is thus impossible to determine the reference to any kind in the absence of an additional disambiguating concept that specifies the sort of kind that is being pointed to. Thomasson argues that the disanalogy between natural and artistic kinds lies on the way in which the disambiguation is carried out. Regarding natural kinds, the reference of the term is disambiguated by stipulation of the sort of kind being named. However, the same procedure does not rule for art-kinds. According to Thomasson, the disambiguation of the sort of kind involved in fixing the reference of an art-kind term requires two conditions (Thomasson, 2005: 225; 2004: 86):

[1] The grounder of the term's reference must have the idea that the reference of that term will be an art-kind.
[2] A previous background conception of the ontological status of the kind of artworks considered.

Thomasson's view is that a pre-theoretical ontological conception is indispensable for grounding the reference of terms for art-kinds, such as 'symphony', 'novel', 'poem' or 'painting' (Thomasson, 2006: 248). The pre-theoretical ontological conception plays the role of disambiguating the sort of kind involved in grounding the reference of an art-kind term. Art-kind terms function as sortal terms, and to establish the reference of them, the grounder must have a general idea of the existence, persistence and identity conditions of the thing that will be named by this term (Thomasson, 2010: 120). These features make a template of a particular kind of art. The things referred by an art-kind term are those that fit the template of existence, persistence and identity conditions associated to the term. Thomasson's argument is that since this background ontological conception is indispensable for referring to musical works –and artworks, in general– and we are successful in our referential practices, it is not subject to a massive error. Consequently, ontological discoveries leading to a revision of the background ontological conception are unjustified. Similarly to Strawson, Thomason argues that there cannot be art-ontological discoveries because there is nothing to be discovered beyond the tacit ontological conception of our artistic practices (Thomasson, 2005: 227). In other words, Thomasson rejects the thesis of metaontological realism. Firstly, we cannot refer directly to paintings, novels or symphonies apart from a pre-theoretical ontological conception; secondly, the pre-theoretical conception implicit in our artistic practices determines the ontological status of the referents of art-kind terms (their identity, existence and persistence conditions);

therefore, we cannot go on to investigate their nature and obtain surprising ontological discoveries. Discoveries revising the tacit pre-theoretical conception are just impossible.[16]

The pre-theoretical ontological conception may be regarded as a parallel of Strawson's notion of conceptual scheme. It is not compound of accurate ontological concepts clearly articulated. It is rather the background of competent speakers that found and re-found the reference of art-kind terms in artistic practices. According to Thomasson, it is implicit in our artistic practices, and determines the existence, persistence and individuation conditions of artworks of a particular kind. The task of ontology is regarded as a descriptive one, consisting in making explicit this tacit conception in a more formal and systematic way using the method of conceptual analysis (Thomasson: 2010: 120-1; 2006: 251-2; 2005: 226). This is the only right way to determine the ontological status of artworks in Thomasson's perspective. Thomasson is radical at this point:

> The *only* appropriate method for determining their ontological status is to attempt to unearth and make explicit the assumptions about ontological status built into the relevant practices and beliefs of those dealing with works of art, to systematize these, and to put them into philosophical terms so that we may assess their place in an overall ontological scheme (Thomasson, 2004: 87-88)

The indispensability of a pre-theoretical ontological conception to determine the reference of our art-terms leads, according to Thomasson, to the consequence of the impossibility of artworks to have a different and independent nature from the one specified by that pre-theoretical conception. Accordingly, it is impossible to obtain ontological knowledge of artworks inconsistent with the ontological conception implicit in the system of beliefs governing our musical practices. Any ontological approach inconsistent with this system of beliefs and proposing its revision is methodologically mistaken. The only legitimate task of ontology, if any at all, is to make explicit the ontological conception implicit in the system of beliefs that governs our musical practices. Thomasson acknowledges that our artistic practices are dynamic, and that the system of beliefs running them can change through time. Hence, the nature of artworks is open to changes with the evolution of our musical practices. As happens in Strawson metaontological perspective, the task of ontology is not done once for all, since it has to make explicit the new ontological conceptions that arise hand by hand with the development of our artistic practices.

From Thomasson descriptivist approach to metaontology follows a methodological criterion of assessment between rival ontological approaches: the coherence with the 'background practices and (tacit or explicit) beliefs' conforming the pre-theoretical ontological conception of musical works (Thomasson, 2004: 87).

---

[16] Thomasson maintains that the same argument also rules for the ontology of the individual artwork. They do not involve art-kind terms, but rather the title or name of the artwork (cf. Thomasson, 2010: 121-2).

Accordingly, ontological proposals that contradict the beliefs conforming the pre-theoretical conception are not methodologically adequate to account for the nature of musical works. Only ontologies that cohere with this system of beliefs are methodologically apt. The view to be preferred will be the one that best accommodates the pre-theoretical ontological conception of musical works. This methodological criterion leads Thomasson to reject musical nominalism and any ontological proposal that assigns to musical works the category of types, including here pure abstract types, norm types and action types (Thomasson, 2004: 82-3). On the one hand, nominalism is not able to accommodate the persistence conditions attributed to musical works in our practices, since musical works *qua* sets of performances could be finished after their composer's death and would be different with each new performance. On the other hand, the category of types is not able to accommodate, according to Thomasson, the existence conditions for musical works implicit in our musical practices, since musical works *qua* types could not be created nor destroyed. In addition, Thomasson argues that type/token theories are not able to accommodate the way in which musical works are individuated in our musical practices, which takes into account contextual properties.

b) Kania's descriptivism

Kania's view is more focused on an analysis of the consequences entailed by metaontological descriptivism. Nonetheless, he makes explicit his commitment to this approach in different places (cf. Kania, 2012b: 97; 2008: 438). He agrees with two main ideas of Thomasson's proposal. In first place, Kania takes as a fact of the matter that there are ontological intuitions about artworks implicit in our artistic practices (Kania, 2008: 431). Kania regards creatability, repeatability and audibility as examples of this sort of intuitions. Secondly, he shares with Thomasson the rejection of the discovery model. Kania argues that musical works are cultural artefacts to the extent that they are produced by and within 'complex social situations' (Kania, 2008: 437). Accordingly, Kania regards the nature and properties of musical works to be dependent on the system of beliefs that governs the interactions between the individuals involved in those complex social situations. In other words, 'how musical works are depends upon how people think about them' (Kania, 2008: 438). From these two ideas, Kania concludes that the right methodology of music is metaontological descriptivism. As in the case of Thomasson's view, he claims that there is not a nature of musical works independent of the ontological conception implicit in the system of beliefs governing our musical practices. Consequently, ontological inquiry cannot provide surprising discoveries about the nature of musical works that could revise this system of beliefs, by contrast with natural kinds and the knowledge provided by physics (Kania, 2008: 437). The only entitled task of ontology is to make explicit this nascent ontological conception by describing it in a systematic way.

However, Kania diverges from Thomasson in small but relevant nuances in the way to understand metaontological descriptivism. Kania highlights that metaontological

descriptivism prescribes that the task of musical ontology is not to describe the nature of musical works, but rather our conceptions of them (Kania, 2008: 441). The problem that he identifies in Thomasson's approach is that she does not take seriously the descriptivist thesis. Thomasson is more interested in determining the nature that musical works have according to the system of beliefs governing musical practices than in describing how we think about the nature of musical works. This is why, according to Kania, Thomasson is mistakenly concerned with searching for an ontological category that agrees in the most coherent way with the nascent ontological conception implicit in our musical practices. Alternatively, Kania argues that the right consequence of metaontological descriptivism is that there are no musical works at an ontological fundamental level (Kania, 2008: 441). In other terms, metaontological descriptivism entails ontological fictionalism for musical works:

> If we take descriptivism, and thus our conceptions of musical works, seriously, we should conclude that those works have no existence beyond those conceptions of them. (…) If we are not required to posit the existence of musical works as we conceive them in order to account for the data our ontological theory must explain, then we should not (Kania, 2008: 441).

Consequently, the descriptivist assessment criterion to decide between rival ontological views is not the coherence with the tacit or explicit pre-theoretical ontological conception. This is the one endorsed by Thomasson, and it aims to select the view that best determines the nature of musical works at a fundamental ontological level. However, Kania argues, metaontological descriptivism only validates a possible answer to the categorial question, namely fictionalism, the thesis that we talk as if there were musical works but there are not musical works. The right descriptivist assessment criterion is to account for the way we think about musical works without positing the existence of musical works at an ontological fundamental level (Kania, 2008: 443). Since the task of ontology is to describe how we conceive musical works, an ontological proposal should not be ruled out either for being metaphysically indefensible –i. e. for positing an *ad hoc* ontological category to account for the pre-theoretical ontological conception of musical works– or for being incoherent with the pre-theoretical ontological conception of musical works. In Kania's view, the only methodologically right answer to the categorial question is musical fictionalism.

c) Metaontological descriptivism: the problems of triviality and inconsistency

Metaontological descriptivism has been traditionally criticised in that our musical practices cannot constitute the grounds of ontology because they are messy and confusing. This criticism will be put aside for the moment on behalf of two other problems more directly concerned with the goals of the present inquiry. The first one is the *problem of triviality*. Given that for metaontological descriptivism the answers to ontological questions are trivial or superficial, descriptivism is a methodology that does

not ensure that an ontological account may provide relevant knowledge about the nature of musical works.[17]

Descriptivism argues that the ontological nature of musical works is fully determined by our pre-theoretical conception about them.[18] Consequently, we cannot obtain by means of ontological inquiry cognitive content about their nature additional to, or different from, the knowledge we already have in our musical practices and in the empirical sciences that study the musical phenomenon. However, this idea goes against the project to be developed here, for if the results of ontology are trivial, why should we make ontology of music? If the ontology of music does not provide new knowledge, it cannot bring anything relevant to musical practices and its insertion into interdisciplinary projects with other musical sciences is unjustified. Musical ontology would have nothing relevant to contribute in this domain. The descriptivist methodology so conceived opens the door to what Bennett calls a *dismissivist* view of ontology, the idea that ontological questions are 'trifle silly' and something akin to a 'pointless waste of time' (Bennet, 2009: 38). Accordingly, metaontological descriptivism would make unjustified the purposes presented in the Introduction of this inquiry and would make it pointless. Therefore, metaontological descriptivism seems to be incompatible with main motivations of the ontological approach defended here.

It might be argued, nonetheless, that the last paragraph presents a too crude version of metaontological descriptivism, and that a non-radical version of it may be compatible with this project. A more charitable interpretation of the descriptivist approach may be offered. Accordingly, descriptivism should be regarded as committed, not to the idea that the nature of musical works is fully determined by our tacit conception about them, but to the idea that their nature is only mind-dependent. This weaker interpretation would open the possibility for ontology to make a positive cognitive contribution to our musical understanding. In this sense, Chalmers distinguishes between two kinds of descriptivism (Chalmers, 2009: 84-5). Both kinds share the idea that claims of our ordinary ontological conception about Fs and formal ontological claims about Fs have the same correctness conditions given by our tacit ordinary ontology. However, the difference between the two kinds of descriptivism is that one but not the other regards the coincidence between ordinary and formal ontology as a trivial fact about the world. The former corresponds to the crude version of descriptivism criticised in the last paragraph, according to which ordinary and formal ontological claims would have the same cognitive content. The latter, by contrast, would take ordinary and formal ontological claims as differing in their cognitive content, despite coinciding in their correctness conditions. Accordingly, an ontological

---

[17] This is not to deny that an organized description of our musical practices may provide knowledge about the musical phenomenon in general. The problem of triviality just concerns the impossibility of providing knowledge about the nature of musical works for those ontological accounts that follow a descriptivist metaontology.

[18] The position defended by Thomasson and Kania seems to be put in these strong terms. Their view seems to be not only that the nature of musical works is mind-dependent (a weaker claim), but that it is fully determined by 'what we think about them' or by our 'ordinary tacit conception about them'.

project about versions and transcriptions of musical works would not be pointless under this second descriptivist approach. Following it, the ontology of music might provide new knowledge to musical practices and establish a fruitful cooperation with other disciplines studying music. Therefore, this second approach would make metaontological descriptivism compatible with the motivations and goals of the inquiry developed here.

However, this second view of descriptivism is not successful because either it doe not escapes to the problem of triviality or, if it escapes, it leads to what I call here the *problem of inconsistency*. The more important cognitive contribution that the ontology of music *prima facie* could make would be in cases of conflicting practices, i.e. local domains of our musical practices in which our tacit conception is ambiguous or presents internal inconsistences. These are areas of our musical practices in which we do not have a clear knowledge about the entities involved. Examples of them are cases of plagiarism –where it is not clear the borderline between a new work and a version of a previous work–[19], as well as scenarios in which it is difficult to determine when something is a properly formed performance of a work.[20] As we will see in more detail in the next section, these cases are problematic for Thomasson in two respects. On the one hand, if the tacit conception is ambiguous, it cannot select the sort of thing of the sample that we are referring with an art term, for instance, 'musical work', 'version' or 'properly formed performance'. If so, there are no determined answers to the questions about the identity, existence and persistence conditions of the things referred by those terms. Consequently, the ontology of music would be incapable of offering a useful cognitive contribution to clarify typical cases of conflicting practices and hence does not escape to the problem of triviality. On the other hand, if the tacit conception of conflicting practices contains contradictory beliefs about the things referred by the art terms at stake, the conclusion that we achieve following Thomasson's account is that there are no things referred by those terms. If our tacit conception about the kind of things referred by 'version' is contradictory, there are no versions because, firstly, nothing can satisfy a set of contradictory identity, existence and persistence conditions, and secondly, there are no facts independent of our tacit conception that determine the ontological nature of the kind of things referred by 'version'. In other words, Thomasson's account would be eliminativist of such things. However, this consequence turns Thomasson's view in a strongly revisionary account because it is not able to explain the role that terms such as 'version', 'musical work' or 'properly formed performance' play in our musical practices. The revisionism entailed by Thomasson's

---

[19] Evidence regarding this aspect can be found in the empirical experiment presented in chapter 3.

[20] There is a broad variety of intuitions in our musical practices about when a performance is to be counted as a properly formed performance of a work, as noted in chapter 1. A properly formed performance might be one that accurately reproduces all the notes of the score regardless its expressiveness, one that fits the expressive character of the piece regardless having wrong notes, one that it is played on original instruments, one that replaces original by modern instruments to accommodate the expressiveness of the piece to the sensibility of the actual context, one that fits the composer's intentions, one that is informed by the composer's intentions but that goes beyond them to achieve a better result, etc. All of these beliefs have their supporters, and unanimity or a broad agreement is far from being achieved in our musical practices regarding this topic.

eliminativism makes her descriptivist account *inconsistent* with its initial goals and to its main constraint: the impossibility of our tacit ontological conception to be revised.

This last point leads us to the second problem of metaontological descriptivism identified here, the problem of inconsistency, which also affects to Kania's view. According to Kania, if we take descriptivism seriously, we must be fictionalists about musical works, i.e. we must be committed to the idea that musical works do not exist beyond what we think about them. If so, musical works would not be real objects but merely socio-cultural constructs, and composers do not generate any real object by means of their activity. A first problem with this approach is that descriptivism would not be able to account for widespread intuitions regarding the repeatability, audibility and variability of musical works, and confuses the distinction between the job developed by composers and performers (see for more details chapter 7, 4.2). In addition, it would be highly revisionary regarding our intuitions about the role of composers and the identity, existence and persistence conditions of musical works –for instance, we would be wrong in thinking that composers create or generate something when they compose. Consequently, metaontological descriptivism turns out to be an inconsistent methodological approach. It is initially introduced as a methodology that aims to preserve and explain our musical practices, under the assumption that our tacit conception about musical works cannot be mistaken. However, it results into a view that revises some basic intuitions about musical works and it is not able to explain some fundamental aspects of our musical practices.

2.2 Metaontological revisionism

Metaontological revisionism regards ontology as an instrument of conceptual change to produce a better structure of thought, as illustrated by Frege's analogy of the eye and the microscope. As Frege argued that the traditional grammatical categories of 'subject' and 'predicate' do not provide a good analytical tool, revisionism assumes the idea that the categories that are in use in our musical practices are not suitable to provide an accurate knowledge about the nature of musical works. Revisionism stresses that our ordinary concepts, by analogy with the eye, have a pragmatic function: they play a fundamental role in making our ordinary practices successful regarding a broad variety of purposes. In the musical domain, they play a fundamental role in communication between musicians in a rehearsal, in a composer's explanation of her work, in people expressing their preferences for Beethoven's *5th Symphony* over Schubert *5th Symphony*, and so on. Ordinary concepts arise and are articulated to play a practical function. However, they have not been designed to play a theoretical or epistemic function. Their goal is not *explanation*. Accordingly, the revisionist argues that they lack the precision and accuracy of the microscope and do not offer a secure way to determine the nature of musical works. As long as they adequately fulfil their pragmatic function in our musical practices, their legitimacy is not invalidated even if they may provide a distorted image of the nature musical works.

As noted before, the traditional objection in metaphysics addressed by revisionism to descriptivist approaches is that our ordinary language, intuitions and practices are messy and that, consequently, they do not offer a good conceptual apparatus for an accurate metaphysical approach. For instance, Karen Bennett argues that ordinary English is not coherent and that a relevant number of ontological puzzles 'arise from the fact that our commonsense ontological beliefs conflict with each other' (Bennett, 2009: 41). Consequently, the idea that the ontological nature of the items of a particular domain could be fully or partially determined by our conceptual scheme seems to be less obvious than the descriptivist takes it to be. For this reason, Matti Eklund argues that the descriptivist 'must provide some reason to think that the ways we ordinarily speak are a reliable guide to what there is' (Eklund, 2006: 319). In the absence of such a reason, descriptivism would not be entitled to be regarded as the methodological right approach to metaphysics.

Dodd offers the most sophisticated defence of metaontological revisionism in the musical field. He states his view by claiming that 'the correct ontological theory of a given artwork kind might be substantially revisionary of our folk ontological conception of things of this kind' (Dodd, 2013: 1048). The defence of this viewpoint requires assuming the thesis of *folk-theoretic modesty*, according to which our ordinary ontological conception of artworks 'might be substantially mistaken' (Dodd, 2013: 1048). In other terms, revisionism entails an error theory for our pre-theoretical ontological conception of artworks. However, this error theory is only possible if the nature of musical works is something beyond, or is not determined by, the pre-theoretical ontological conception implicit in our musical practices. Accordingly, metaontological revisionism assumes a particular thesis in the debate about the substantivity of ontology, i.e. metaontological realism, the thesis that the answers to the fundamental questions of ontology are objective (Dodd, 2013: 1048; Chalmers, 2009: 77). Metaontological realism argues that the correctness of the answers given to the fundamental ontological questions –questions about the identity, existence and persistence conditions of an item or a kind of items– is mind-independent. It does not depend on the way we ordinarily think or speak about such items. The manner in which ontological realism accommodates the folk-theoretic modesty thesis is explained by Dodd in the following terms:

> The metaontological realist about the ontology of art believes that the respective facts of the matter here obtain independently of our ability to discover them. Our thought about the ontological status of artworks is, at best, a map of the art ontological facts: something that may better or worse represent the objective terrain that constitutes the subject matter of the ontology of art, but which does nothing to fix this terrain's nature. (…) If the ontological nature of an artwork kind, Fs, is a matter of objective fact in the sense believed by the metaontological realist, then there is no guarantee that our common sense ontological conception of Fs is correct, even in outline. The ontological theory of Fs implicit in our thought, talk and artistic practice might be a substantially inaccurate representation of how Fs really are (Dodd, 2013: 1049).

Since the nature of Fs is independent of the way we speak and think about them, the door is open to the discovery model, i.e. to achieve surprising discoveries about the nature of Fs by means of ontological inquiry. By contrast with Thomasson's descriptivism, conceptual analysis is not regarded by revisionism as a suitable method to determine the nature of Fs. Since the ontological facts about Fs are mind-independent, they cannot be obtained by analysing what we think about them. Alternatively, the revisionist argues that the proper methodology to investigate the nature of Fs is akin to a quasi-scientific methodology. It regards the answers about the nature of Fs 'as hypothesis that are assessed according to 'a loose battery of criteria for choice', among which are 'explanatory power, simplicity and integration with the findings of other domains', together with the coherence with the folk thought about Fs (Dodd, 2013: 1051). Therefore, contrary to Thomasson's view, revisionism holds that the assessment criterion to decide between different candidates about the ontological nature of Fs is not merely the coherence with our pre-theoretical ontological conception about Fs. Since a balance has to be made among the different criteria involved, the theory selected can be more or less revisionary of our folk thought about Fs.

The discovery model, grounded on metaontological realism, is regarded by Dodd as the default position not only in general metaontology (Dodd, 2013: 1051), but also in the metaontology of art, as the views defended by Gregory Currie, Mark Sagoff, Nicholas Wolterstorff and Peter Kivy exemplify (cf. Dodd, 2012: 77). There are two facts that, according to Dodd, favour the general acceptance of the discovery model in ontology. In the first place, ontological proposals about Fs are in the 'explanation business' (Dodd, 2012: 77). The main goal of an ontological proposal about Fs is to offer the best explanation about the nature of Fs. The best ontological theory is not the one that best coheres with our folk ontological conception, but the one that offers the best explanation of Fs in light of theoretical virtues. Accordingly, the theory to be chosen may be one that revises some of our pre-theoretical beliefs about the nature of Fs. The second fact alleged by Dodd as favouring the discovery model points to Frege's metaphor of the eye and the microscope introduced before. Dodd argues that there is a disanalogy between an ontological proposal about Fs and our folk ontological conception about Fs: the former has a constraint that the latter lacks. Ontological proposals about Fs are constrained by the need of explaining the phenomena about Fs that raise philosophical questions and puzzles. By contrast, the folk ontology about Fs has not this constraint because its goal is not explanation, but rather to offer a concept of Fs that plays a successful role in our ordinary practices involving Fs (Dodd, 2012: 79). For instance, when engaged in the folk discourse about musical works, speakers are mainly interested in issues concerning the aesthetic appreciation of them, disregarding the explanation of the phenomena that motivate the ontological inquiry (Dodd, 2012: 79). The configuration of folk concepts about musical works is guided by targets others than the ones that guide the ontological inquiry. The success of those concepts lies on the success of our musical appreciative practices, not on offering an accurate explanation of the nature of them. The conclusion that Dodd obtains is that ontological

proposals about Fs are entitled to differ from the folk conception of Fs. Since the target of folk concepts is not explanatory but pragmatic, they might cover up mistakes about the nature of Fs (Dodd, 2012: 79).

Given this framework, relevant questions arise. A first one is how metaontological revisionism is tenable in light of the *qua problem*. A second one is how it might face Kania's reasons in favour of descriptivism introduced in the previous section. Dodd faces both Thomasson's and Kania main arguments for metaontological descriptivism. In what follows, the replies given by Dodd in defence of metaontological revisionism will be considered.

a) Dodd vs. Thomasson: an alternative solution to the qua problem.

As noted in the previous section, Thomasson argues that the *qua problem* blocks the possibility of metaontological revisionism, leaving descriptivism as the only acceptable view in the metaontology of art. Thomasson appeals to a hybrid descriptive/causal theory of reference fixing to solve the *qua problem* that is incompatible with the discovery model in the ontology of art. However, Dodd's strategy consists in showing that there is an alternative account of reference-fixing compatible with the discovery model in ontology that is also able to overcome the *qua problem*.

Dodd distinguishes two different semantic theses in Thomasson's rejection of the discovery model (Dodd, 2012: 81-3). The first one is that the reference of a term requires a minimal conceptual content to be fixed. This conceptual content disambiguates, among the different sorts of things contained by a sample, which one is to be referred by the term. This role is played by the pre-theoretical ontological conception about the items that the grounder of the reference of the term aims to refer. However, as Dodd notes, this thesis is not sufficient to dismiss the discovery model. Thomasson obtains the rejection of the discovery model by adding a second semantic thesis to this first one. The role that the pre-theoretical ontological conception plays in Thomasson's account does not only consist in the disambiguation of the reference of our art terms, but also determines the identity, existence and persistence conditions of the items referred by those terms. In Dodd's words, the pre-theoretical ontological conception about Fs is considered by Thomason as 'something that determines the reference of 'F' by laying down the condition that entities must satisfy, if the term is to apply to them' (Dodd, 2012. 82). Dodd identifies two aspects entailed by this thesis that make the discovery view unfeasible (cf. Dodd, 2012: 83). In the first place, if the Fs exist, they are just those things that satisfy the identity, existence and persistence conditions set by the pre-theoretical ontological conception about Fs. Fs are only those things that fit the template determined by the pre-theoretical ontological conception of them. Consequently, no ontological inquiry can demonstrate the falsity of the pre-theoretical ontological conception about Fs, since the nature of Fs is not something other than the one that it specifies. And, in the second place, there are no facts about Fs

that could reveal that our ordinary conception of them needs to be more accurate. Accordingly, any revision of our ordinary conception about Fs would be methodologically unjustified.

Dodd presents Gareth Evan's theory as an alternative solution to the *qua problem* that allows at the same time for the discovery model in ontology (Dodd, 2012: 84). Evans' theory assumes Thomasson's first semantic thesis, according to which a minimal conceptual content is necessary for the reference of a term to be fixed. However, this conceptual content does not fix the reference of the term by fit –i.e. by determining the identity, existence and persistence conditions to be satisfied by the things referred by the term–, but by causal origin –i.e. the referent of the term is that thing, or that kind of things, that is the dominant or causal source of the relevant body of information that the grounders of the reference associate with the term (Evans, 1985: 12-3).[21] Evans proposes his theory to account for the phenomenon that a subject S may refer to a thing x by means of a description that x does not satisfy (cf. Evans, 1985: 14-6). In the majority of cases, according to Evans, x is the thing that is dominantly or causally responsible for the body of information that S possesses –the set of descriptions that S associates with the term with which S intends to refer to x. For S to refer to x by means of 'X', it is not necessary that x satisfies the set of descriptions that S associates with 'X'. Alternatively, it is only necessary that x be the causal or dominant source of this set of descriptions. Accordingly, Dodd notes that since the conceptual content fixes the reference of a term not by fit but by causal origin, it is possible for that content to contain inaccuracies regarding the identity, existence and persistence conditions of the thing, or kind of things, referred by the term (Dodd, 2012: 85). Therefore, Evans' theory entitles ontological inquiry to achieve discoveries about the nature of Fs that revise our pre-theoretical ontological conception of them while avoiding, at the same time, the *qua problem*.

Evans' account is considered by Dodd as a superior competitor with respect to Thomasson's hybrid causal/descriptive theory of reference fixing in two aspects. Firstly, Evan's view allows for the possibility of the body of information associated with a term to contain inconsistences. Let us suppose that the content associated to the term 'musical work' is compound by inconsistent beliefs. Dodd argues that, 'since nothing can satisfy an inconsistent template', Thomasson must conclude that there are no musical works (cf. Dodd, 2012: 85). This is the sense pointed in the last section in which Thomasson's view is potentially eliminativist about musical works. However, that would be a revisionary conclusion to very high extent. Speakers generally assume an ontological commitment when they use the term 'musical work'. According to Dodd, the easier way to avoid this problem is to reject Thomasson's thesis of reference fixing by fit and embrace Evan's account, which identifies the reference of a term with the dominant or causal source of the conceptual content associated with that term. Since, in

---

[21] Evans explicitly claims that he finds absurd the idea that the reference of a term is a thing that satisfies by fit a set of descriptions associated with that term (cf. Evans, 1985: 12).

Evans' view, it is possible for the term to refer even if the body of information has inconsistent beliefs, the pre-theoretical ontological commitment involved in the use of the term 'musical work' can be preserved (Dodd, 2012: 86). A second kind of problematic scenarios for Thomasson is that in which the pre-theoretical ontological conception included in the conceptual content associated with the art-term is not satisfied, despite not containing inconsistent beliefs. These cases –in which the art-term refers, although the grounders of the term are substantially mistaken about the nature of the things referred by it– cannot be adequately explained by Thomasson. Thomasson would regard these cases as ones in which the term does not refer because its application conditions –those that determine the identity, existence and persistence conditions of the reference– are not fitted. Dodd considers that Evans' account is free of this problem. If the degree of distortion in the conceptual content is not overdone, the term may still refer to the causal or dominant source of this content (cf. Dodd, 2012: 88). Therefore, if Dodd is right, Evans' account of reference fixing is to be preferred to the view defended by Thomasson because it overcomes these two relevant problems faced by Thomasson's causal/descriptive account of reference-fixing. Accordingly, Thomasson's reasons to justify metaontological descriptivism seem to fade.

The descriptivist might concede that the account defended by Dodd avoids the difficulties entailed by Thomasson's second semantic thesis. However, it might be objected that Evans' position is inferior with respect to Thomasson's first semantic thesis. It might be claimed that Evans' account does not offer a solution of the disambiguation of the reference of art-terms. The descriptivist might argue that Evans' view does not explain the way to specify the sort of thing playing the role of the dominant or causal source of the body of information associated with the term. Nonetheless, Dodd remarks that Evans' account holds that the dominant or causal source of the body of information is determined by additional factors to the sort of thing causally responsible for the body of information. For instance, regarding the art-kind term 'painting' Dodd maintains that 'fundamental facts about the kinds of creatures we are (…) determine that it is physical objects –rather than arrangements of atoms, surfaces of objects, or whatever– that tend to be salient to us' (Dodd, 2012: 93). However, the musical case seems to be more difficult insofar this direct answer is not available. Indeed, if we follow the same reasoning as in the case of 'painting', the fundamental facts about the kind of creatures we are would determine that the dominant causal source of the body of information associated with the term 'musical work' would be physical objects –i.e. performances, scores, recordings and so on. The worry is that Dodd cannot accept this answer. As introduced in chapter 1, he defends that musical works cannot be identified with any of its performances, recordings or scores, and regards them to be abstract objects.

Consequently, Dodd is forced to offer a more elaborate explanation of how the reference of the term 'musical work' is grounded. According to Dodd, the tendency to locate in physical objects the focus of our attention when confronted with a sample 'can be overridden by contextual factors' (Dodd, 2012: 94). In the case of musical works,

these contextual factors are provided by our musical practices. As it will be shown in Chapter 4 by means of an empirical study of the aesthetic use of predicates concerning musical appreciation, our aesthetic interest is not restricted to an interest in physical items as performances or recordings. In particular, we have developed an additional aesthetic interest in what Dodd describes as 'items that are common across' these events and of which these events are instances (Dodd, 2012: 94). Dodd does not offer the empirical support for this idea that will be presented here in chapter 4, but he enumerates different 'facts' of our musical practices in which this phenomenon manifests:

> The grounding and regrounding of 'work of music' marks an interest in such items—an interest manifest in facts such as the following: that a practice of using musical notation has developed, thereby enabling composers to provide clear instructions for the generation of multiple realizations of their ideas; that we evaluate certain performances as interpretations of what the composer has used this notation to represent; that we worry about whether a given performance authentically renders the score's instructions in sound; and that we concern ourselves with the question of whether such a performance succeeds in doing justice to the full aesthetic and expressive content of the thing the composer has characterized in her score (Dodd, 2012: 94).

Accordingly, our aesthetic interest about items that are repeatable in different performances and recordings disambiguates the reference of the term 'musical work'. These are cases in which the musical work is the primary focus of appreciation. This phenomenon enables non-physical repeatable items to be the dominant or causal source of the body of information associated with the term 'musical work', leaving in a second plane of attention the physical objects –performances, recordings, scores, etc.– in which they manifest. By this way, the possibility for musical works to be considered as abstract objects remains available.

To sum up, Dodd replies to Thomasson's descriptivism that there is a better alternative account of reference-fixing. He defends that Evans' view avoids in an easier manner some difficulties faced by Thomasson's hybrid causal/descriptive theory and, at the same time, accommodates in an elegant way the discovery model in the ontology of music. Since metaontological revisionism is the default position and there are no good reasons backing Thomasson's descriptivism, we should reject the latter and embrace the former.

Regarding the methodological debate, an aspect of Dodd's revisionism is to be highlighted. The role played by the tacit ordinary ontological conception of musical works in Dodd's metaontological approach is different than the one assigned by Thomasson's descriptivism. In Thomasson's account, the tacit conception does not only disambiguate the reference of a term as 'musical work', but it also fixes the identity, existence and persistence conditions of the items referred art-kind term. It fixes the answers to the identity and persistence questions about the nature of musical works. The answers to these two questions determine, according to Thomasson, the answer to the

categorial question in the ontology of music. By contrast, the revisionist story is different. The ordinary ontological conception tacit in our musical practices plays the role of determining the object of the ontological inquiry by fixing the reference of the term 'musical work'. However, since the main function of the art-kind term 'musical work' is not explanatory but pragmatic, the tacit conception associated to this term might be substantially mistaken about the identity, existence and persistence conditions of musical works. Accordingly, the revisionist argues that the answers to the identity and persistence questions are not (completely) given by our musical practices. An accurate answer to these questions is a matter of ontological inquiry. In this way, Dodd defends that the determination of the identity, existence and persistence conditions 'proceeds by means of an ontological proposal' –not necessarily coincident with the ordinary ontological conception that is tacit in our musical practices–, which assigns to musical works an ontological category (Dodd, 2012: 75). Dodd argues that the assignation of an ontological category to musical works 'will settle (or, at least, help us begin the process of settling) the existence and identity conditions of Fs' (Dodd, 2012: 75-6; cf. 2008: 1116).

b) Dodd vs. Kania: a refutation of local descriptivism

Thomasson's descriptivism may be regarded as a global metaontological approach to the extent that it applies to all ontological domains. By contrast, Kania does not commit himself to this ambitious thesis and prefers a modest one. Kania stresses the idea that musical works are cultural artefacts. The consequence that he obtains from this claim is that musical works cannot we substantially different from the way we think they are. Kania assumes what Dodd calls the *determination thesis*, the idea that 'how musical works are (ontologically speaking) is determined by how we take them to be in our critical and appreciative practice' (Dodd, 2013: 1055). According to the determination thesis, 'the facts of the matter in the ontology of art are not objective, but determined by the folk ontological beliefs implicit in our critical and appreciative practice' (Dodd, 2013: 1055). Accordingly, Kania's argument is that since musical works are cultural artefacts, their nature is fully determined by our folk ontological beliefs and, consequently, it is impossible to achieve discoveries about musical works' nature that revise our ontological pre-theoretical beliefs about them. By contrast, he considers that substances or tropes are metaphysically fundamental in a way that musical works are not. Regarding those entities that are not cultural artefacts, Kania leaves open the possibility for metaphysics to be revisionary (cf. Kania, 2008: 437). Kania argues that 'the fact, if it is one, that fundamental metaphysics is revisionary does not directly imply that musical ontology is revisionary' (Kania, 2008: 438). Consequently, Kania's descriptivism is local insofar he rejects that metaontological revisionism and the thesis of folk-theoretic modesty apply *only* in the particular domain of artworks.

Dodd's criticism against Kania's metaontological position is that it fails to provide a strong reason showing why we should embrace descriptivism in this particular domain. It fails to 'demonstrate there to be special features of the case of art ontology that make descriptivism in this area obligatory' (Dodd, 2013: 1055). According to Dodd, the appeal to the determination thesis does not constitute *per se* a sufficient reason in favour of local descriptivism. It needs to be clarified the *kind* of determination that supposedly holds between artistic practices and art ontological facts. The determination cannot be causal, since causality is a contingent relation and the kind of determination to be demanded by the thesis is of metaphysical necessity (Dodd, 2013: 1056). If the nature of artworks were determined by artistic practices, there would be no possible world in which artistic practices are the same as they are in the actual world and artworks have a different nature. Accordingly, the determination holding between practices and the ontological status of artworks cannot be of a causal nature. With this clarification in mind, the determination thesis can be reformulated in the following terms: 'the kinds of properties that works of art must have, and not merely the existence of these works, must be non-causally determined by how we think of such works in our artistic practices' (Dodd, 2012: 1057). However, Dodd offers two objections and a counterexample with respect to this reading of the determination thesis.

In the first place, this remodelled version of the determination thesis conflates epistemic with ontological issues. Dodd regards the determination thesis as true about the epistemology of artworks but not about their ontology. The ontological conception tacit in our appreciative practices 'reveals what kinds of properties practitioners regard or presuppose such things to have' (Dodd, 2013: 1057-8). But from the fact that we think that Fs are G, it does not follow that the nature of Fs is G. It is still needed, Dodd maintains, a reason that justify that the nature of Fs ontologically depends on what we think about them, and this reason is not provided by Kania's account. At most, Kania claims that since musical works are cultural artefacts, their nature depends on how we think about them. However, and this is Dodd's second objection, such a claim does not constitutes a reason in favour of the determination thesis. According to Dodd, from the fact that something is an artefact –a human creation as the causal outcome of human intentions– it does not follow that its nature is determined by our practices (Dodd, 2013: 1059). Dodd puts pencils as a counterexample of the determination thesis for artefacts. Artefacts are typically functional objects, which tend to have the properties suitable for being successful in their function. But this fact, Dodd argues, does not grant that 'how we think about pencils determines their ontological nature, since an artefact's ontological nature does not supervene on its function' (Dodd, 2013: 1059). Accordingly, since supervenience does not hold here, there could be differences in the ontological nature of pencils without differences in their function. If so, pencils 'could still be used for writing whether or not they turned out to be enduring entities, spacetime worms or instantaneous temporal stages' (Dodd, 2013: 1059). The same phenomenon might arise in the case of musical works even if we regard them as cultural artefacts. Their ontological nature might not supervene on their cultural function –i.e. the role

93

they play in our musical practices–, and Kania does not offer any argument or reason to rule out this possibility.

Accordingly, local descriptivism for the ontology of musical works is not justified. As we will see in the next chapter, an error theory about the intuitions of agents involved in our musical practices is not implausible. Composers' intentions might not only be mistaken about the ontological nature of musical works, but also about the function they play in our musical practices. A composer might fail to present as a new version of a previous work a piece with a radically different sound structure from the original piece. Audience, musicians and criticism will tend to regard it as a new musical work different from the work versioned.[22] In the same vein, a composer would fail to present a transcription for brass band of an orchestral work as a new musical work, even if that was her intention when making the transcription.[23] But also audience and critics may be mistaken about the functional nature of a piece of music. For instance, Mozart's *Rondo K514* was regarded during several decades as an example of Mozart's naïve compositions, or as a piece adapted to the reduced capabilities of the hornist Joseph Leutgeb when he was old, avoiding for this purpose fast or high notes in the French horn solo part. However, these beliefs about the place that the *Rondo* occupies in our musical practices were revealed as mistaken when Alan Tyson (1987) demonstrates that the *Rondo* was finished after Mozart's death by his student Franz Xavier Süssmayr. This point reinforces Dodd's argument against Kania's descriptivism. Since we can be mistaken about the functional nature of a musical work, if we assume the supervenience of the ontological nature of a work on its function in our practices, it follows that we can be mistaken about the ontological nature of a work. Knowing a work's function in our musical practices is not the same as knowing the phenomenal character of an experience. The latter, but not the former, excludes the possibility of being mistaken. Therefore, in the absence of any additional reason to support it, local descriptivism for artworks arises as an unjustified metaontological proposal. The thesis of folk-theoretical modesty holds even in the domain of cultural artefacts.[24]

c) The revisionist methodological criterion of assessment and the problem of solipsism

As we have seen in this section, the revisionist strategy concedes the primacy to the categorial question. The assignation of an ontological category to musical works is

---

[22] This aspect is examined by means of question 7 of the third case of the experiment presented in the next chapter.

[23] This aspect is examined by means of question 7 of the second case of the experiment presented in the next chapter.

[24] From a contextualist perspective, the possibility of being mistaken about the function of a work does not only apply to the musical domain, but also to other kinds of art. A paradigmatic example of it in literature is given by recent empirical studies about the authorship of Shakespeare's works (cf. Taylor & Egan: 2017). Such studies reveal as mistaken the role that was assigned to certain works in virtue of mistakenly assuming that their authorship was purely of Shakespeare. The discovery that the authorship of these works is collaborative rather than individual changes the significance, value and place that they occupy in our artistic practices from a contextualist point of view.

presumed to give, or to help us to give, the answer to the questions about the individuation and the persistence conditions of musical works (cf. Dodd, 2012: 75; Dodd, 2008: 1116). The criterion to choose between alternative ontological proposals consists in determining which of them offers the best explanation –according to the theoretical virtues of simplicity, explanatory power, integration in a more general body of knowledge and coherence with musical practices– of the relevant mind-independent facts about the nature of musical works. These facts –those that raise the philosophical questions about works of music– are repeatability and audibility in Dodd's viewpoint. Repeatability is defined as 'the fact that they are items that can have multiple sound-sequence-events as occurrences', while audibility is said to be 'the fact that work and performance stand to each other as type and token nicely explains how it is possible to listen to a work by listening to a performance of it' (Dodd, 2007: 3). Therefore, the best ontological proposal is the one that best explains the repeatability and audibility of musical works according to metaontological revisionism.

Following this methodological principle, Dodd rejects the action-type theory, the action-token theory, historical particularism, musical perdurantism and the initiated-types theory for different reasons. The action-type theory is rejected for failing to explain repeatability. Since it takes musical works to be types of compositional actions, one of whose components is a sound structure, only a part of a musical work, but not the musical work as a whole, would be repeated in performances (cf. Dodd, 2008: 1123). The action-token theory also fails to explain repeatability because it considers musical works to be events, and events are not repeatable (cf. Dodd, 2008: 1124). Historical particularism, which regards musical works as continuants ontologically dependent on their incarnations –scores, performances, recordings and so on–, does not offer once again a suitable explanation of repeatability. Dodd argues that from the fact that an entity is ontologically dependent on others, it does not follow that the latter ones are occurrences of the former. As exemplified by the stages of a person, which are not regarded as occurrences but as temporal parts of this person, stages of a continuant are not occurrences (cfr. Dodd, 2008: 1128). Musical perdurantism, for its part, is rejected on the basis of not offering an adequate explanation of the audibility of musical works. Since performances are temporal parts of musical works, what we hear in a performance is just a part of a musical work, but not the musical work in *toto* (cf. Dodd, 2007: 157). Finally, the initiated-types theory is rejected for failing to satisfy theoretical virtues. Initiated types or indicated structures are regarded as 'ontologically mysterious' entities, seeming to be an *ad hoc* category to explain musical works (cf. Dodd, 2008: 1121-2). By contrast, the type/token theory is regarded as the one that offers the best, simplest and clearest explanation of the repeatability and audibility of musical works.

Let us assume that the type/token theory explains the repeatability, audibility and variability of musical works in a simpler and more elegant way than its ontological competitors. Despite this advantage, the type/token theory has received several criticisms for entailing consequences contrary to central aspects of our musical practices. The two most broadly discussed of them are the idea that versions are musical

works different from the original and the rejection of the intuition that composers create their works (cf. Sharpe, 2001; Trivedi, 2002; Howell, 2002; Rohrbaugh, 2003; Hazlett, 2012; Bertinetto, 2016). Let us consider the case of versions. In the next chapter, several evidence grounding the intuition that the musical work versioned is repeated in the performances of its versions will be provided. For instance, it will be noted that musicology does not tend to catalog versions as numerically different musical works from the work versioned, that our aesthetic interest in hearing different versions is not the same than in hearing different musical works, that the composer's activity is of a different sort regarding versions than regarding a new musical work, and so on. Nonetheless, Dodd is not troubled by the way in which the type/token theory contradicts this intuition and finds difficulties to accommodate those facts grounding it. He regards the revision of these aspects as 'a small price to pay' for the benefits that the type/token theory provides in comparison with its competitors (cf. Dodd, 2007: 37, 90, 94). This attitude coheres with his metaontological revisionist strategy. However, it is not justified for a reason similar to the one that led to the rejection of metaontological descriptivism in the previous section.

It has been pointed out in section 2.2 that metaontological descriptivism faces the problem of triviality. Since metaontological descriptivism regards the claims of musical ontology as trivial or superficial and prevents it from the possibility of providing new knowledge about the nature of musical works, it would be difficult to justify the ontological inquiry beyond the philosophical domain. The ontology of music would have nothing relevant to contribute to musical practices and to other disciplines that study the musical phenomenon from a cognitive point of view. In this sense, the ontology of music would be confined to a philosophers' game. One of the initial appeals attributed to metaontological revisionism is that it does not prevent *prima facie* musical ontology from providing new knowledge about the nature of musical works. However, similarly to descriptivism, Dodd's metaontological attitude opens again the possibility for musical ontology to be a simple philosophers' game but from a different perspective, i.e. via the *problem of solipsism*. This problem consists in that metaontological revisionism does not offer a criterion to limit the revisionary consequences of an ontological proposal. In this sense, revisionism allows for the possibility of musical ontology to provide a characterisation of musical works radically different from our ordinary conception of them. Such characterisation runs the risk of not being translatable to the concept of musical work operative in our musical practices and that grounds the inquiry of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of music. In other words, an unlimited revision of central aspects of our musical practices would lead to change the subject matter about the concept of musical work.

The problem of solipsism lies on that metaontological revisionism puts no limits to the discovery model. It offers no constraints to the number and kind of beliefs belonging to our folk ontological conception about musical works that could be revised by ontological inquiry. As a result, metaontological revisionism is a potentially solipsist methodology in two respects. On the one hand, a concept of musical work radically

different from ordinary conception would not be operative in our musical practices. Since our musical practices are reasonably successful in achieving their main goals, no motivations would be found to proceed to a global revision of the core of beliefs governing them. The costs of a global revision hardly justify the benefits that could be obtained. By contrast, a positive contribution of ontology would be in local aspects of our practices. It is in local domains and in specific areas where our musical practices can be regarded as confusing and inefficient to achieve their goals. It is there where the agents involved demand and are receptive of solutions. Examples of these areas are the case of versions and transcriptions that this inquiry addresses, but there are others such as the determination of what counts as a properly formed performance, the status of autonomous creative music systems (cf. Puy, 2017), or the phenomenon of deep aesthetic disagreements about musical works. Consequently, metaontological revisionism allows for the possibility of an Ockham's razor that it is not acceptable concerning the domain of our musical practices. The lack of constraints to the beliefs that could be revised makes revisionism unable to guarantee the incidence of ontology in our musical practices. A concept of musical work radically different from our musical practices would be inoperative in our practices and nonetheless methodologically right according to revisionism. Consequently, revisionism does not provide a suitable methodology for ontology to succeed in implementing conceptual changes, which was precisely one of the initial aims of metaontological revisionism and the fregean project, as it was introduced at the beginning of .

On the other hand, empirical disciplines that study music do not question the concept of musical work operating in our practices, but rather they build their inquiry upon such a concept. Since the possibility of denying some central intuitions of our musical practices is methodologically open for revisionism, the ontology of music might offer a concept of musical works that is not translatable to the concept managed by disciplines such as musicology, sociology and psychology of music. Accordingly, the ontology of music would be methodologically entitled to characterise musical works in a way that is incompatible, or even inconsistent, with the characterisation of the object of study assumed by the disciplines that study the musical phenomenon. In this way, a methodologically valid ontological theory might run the risk of becoming a fantastic story describing a philosophers' paradise that has little to do with the real musical phenomenon. Consequently, metaontological revisionism does not ensure the interdisciplinary validity of the results obtained in the ontology of music, which is the main methodological goal pursued in this chapter.

Therefore, metaontological revisionism is potentially solipsist in two problematic respects: it does not ensure the success in achieving, on the one hand, the main goal of revisionary metaphysics –namely, conceptual change–, and on the other, the methodological goal pursued in this chapter –the interdisciplinary dialogue with other disciplines and the incidence in our musical practices. Similarly to the problem of triviality faced by metaontological descriptivism, the problem of solipsism confronted by metaontological revisionism has two vectors: one of them precludes the internal

goals of revisionism, while the other inviabilizes the main objective of this chapter. The relevant question at this point is whether it is necessary to adopt this problematic metaontological attitude to defend the type/token theory. As it will be defended in this research, the answer to this question is negative. It will be shown that it is possible to preserve the virtues of the type/token theory while avoiding some of its undesirable consequences, at least the ones concerning musical versions. The unjustified character of Dodd's attitude constitutes the motivation in this study to try to develop the type/token theory in a way that it may accommodate our musical practices and intuitions concerning the ontology of musical versions and transcriptions. Dodd's revisionary consequences entailed by the type/token theory concerning versions are not, in this sense, 'a small price to pay' but rather a very high one. Accordingly, given the appeal of the type/token theory regarding other aspects about the ontological nature of musical works, we should not conform to the revisionary consequences concerning musical versions implied by the type/token theory in its actual state. Rather, we should develop it to avoid such revisionary consequences.

2.3 Metaontological desiderata and Davies' reflective equilibrium

The methodological debate developed in the two previous sections seems to lead us to a dilemma. On the one hand, to avoid the problem of triviality, the ontological inquiry must have the possibility of providing a new cognitive content about the nature of musical works not previously contained in our tacit conception embodied in our musical practices. In other words, a right methodology should not preclude the discovery model in the ontology of music. On the other hand, to avoid the problem of solipsism, the results of ontological inquiry should not be entitled to deny central intuitions of our musical practices. As corollary from this dilemma, two metaontological desiderata can be derived:

Minimal descriptivism:
Ontological accounts of musical works, within a given context, should be able to accommodate widespread musical intuitions.

Minimal revisionism:
Ontological accounts of musical works should be able to revise our practical intuitions whenever they clash with sound theoretical principles.

Both desiderata acknowledge that there is something right in both the descriptivist and revisionary approaches. Minimal descriptivism is a desideratum derived from the problem of solipsism, and it acknowledges to descriptivism the idea that an ontological account of musical works that cannot accommodate a central core of widespread intuitions would miss the point concerning the object of study of this discipline, making its results useless for our practices. Meanwhile, minimal revisionism

is a desideratum derived from the problems of triviality and inconsistency, and it acknowledges to revisionism the idea of rejecting an unconstrained acceptance of our practical intuitions.

The solution to this impasse seems to point to an intermediate way between revisionism and descriptivism that allows for a moderate revision of our ordinary ontological conception of musical works. David Davies has embraced this project introducing a new perspective in the metaontological debate, which has been labelled *reflective equilibrium*. It might be regarded as *prima facie* satisfying the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism. Davies' metaontology has been classified either as revisionist by some metaontological descriptivists (cf. Thomasson, 2006: 252) and as descriptivist by some metaontological revisionists (cf. Dodd, 2013: 1047). This contrasting assessment suggests that Davies' metaontology is halfway between the two extreme poles of descriptivism and revisionism. In his account, descriptivist and revisionary aspects can be identified. While the formers are emphasized by the objections made by revisionists, the latters are stressed by the descriptivist criticisms.

The methodology defended by Davies is that any proposal in the ontology of art must be articulated in the form of what he calls 'epistemological arguments', whose structure he summarizes as follows (Davies, 2004: 23):

> 1. An epistemological premiss. Rational reflection upon our critical and appreciative practice confirms that certain sorts of properties, actual or modal, are rightly ascribed to what are termed "works" in that practice, or that our practice rightly individuates what are termed "works" in a certain way.
> 2. A methodological premiss – the pragmatic constraint. Artworks must be conceived ontologically in such a way as to accord with those features of our critical and appreciative practice upheld on rational reflection.
> 3. An ontological conclusion. Either (negative) artworks cannot be identified with X's, or (positive) artworks can or should be identified with Y's.

According to the structure of epistemological arguments, Davies general methodological thesis is that a right account on the ontology of art must be derived from the epistemology of art. Epistemological considerations about our critical and appreciative practices have to be at the bottom of any ontological inquiry, constituting the first premise of any ontological proposal. Davies regards this as one of the points of disagreement with the metaontological revisionism defended by Dodd. According to Davies, Dodd proceeds in reverse, considering epistemological matters about our judgements concerning artworks and their individuation only after having defended that the type/token theory is the account that best explains the repeatability and audibility of musical works (Davies, 2009: 161). On the opposite, Davies maintains that the defence of an ontological claim must come 'only after an appeal to broadly epistemological considerations concerning our appreciative and artistic practice' (Davies, 2009: 161). However, this criticism against Dodd's revisionism does not seem to be plainly

justified. As illustrated by Dodd's quote in part *a)* of the previous section, Dodd's appeal to repeatability and audibility is grounded on a variety of facts of our musical practices. For instance, he appeals to the 'practice of using musical notation', to the way 'we evaluated certain performances', to our worry of whether a performance does justice 'to the full aesthetic and expressive content of the thing the composer has characterized in her score', and so on (cf. Dodd, 2012: 94). Accordingly, the first premise of the epistemological argument is satisfied by Dodd's methodological procedure. Repeatability is a feature of musical works that we obtain by attending to different facts of our musical practices and our critical discourse about them. Therefore, deriving the ontology of music from the epistemology of music does not constitute the divergence between Davies and Dodd metaontological approaches.

We should rather attend to a second point of dissention that Davies identifies regarding Dodd's metaontology, which concerns the interpretation of the *pragmatic constraint*. Davies intends the pragmatic constraint as a methodological claim that constrains the ontology of art. According to Davies, the pragmatic constraint has a normative dimension consisting in that 'it does not require that ontology conform to our practice per se, but to those features of our practice that we deem acceptable on reflection' (Davies, 2009: 162). The normative dimension of the pragmatic constraint is what differentiates Davies metaontology from the descriptivist accounts defended by Kania and Thomasson. These authors consider that the ontology of art is trivial to the extent that the nature of artworks is nothing over and above the characterisation of them in our pre-theoretical conception tacit in our artistic practices. By contrast, Davies acknowledges the possibility of aspects of our musical practices to be mistaken. He maintains that not all our pre-theoretical beliefs about artworks are reasonably acceptable for a right ontology of art. Accordingly, a right ontology of art does not consist in a simple description of our ordinary ontological conception of artworks, but only of those aspects that overcome a rational reflection. In Davies words, 'a theoretical account of our commerce with artworks stands in an essentially normative, and not merely descriptive, relationship to the norms that operate in actual critical practice and the judgments in accordance with those norms that we actually make' (Davies, 2004: 20). The normative dimension of the pragmatic constraint entails a criterion of assessment between rival ontological proposals different from the defended by crude descriptivism. The ontological proposal to be chosen is not the one that best coheres with our ordinary conception of musical practices *simpliciter*, but with 'a theoretical representation of the norms that should govern the judgments that critics make concerning works' (Davies, 2004). Therefore, the normative dimension of the pragmatic constraint defended by Davies makes his metaontology to be potentially revisionist regarding some aspects of our musical practices. By this way, Davies account evades the problem of triviality addressed here against pure descriptivist approaches.

However, Davies understands that the scope of discoveries and revisions of our ordinary conception of artworks is not as free as in the case of Dodd's revisionism. Davies argues that Dodd's makes an inadequate reading of the pragmatic constraint,

according to which 'appreciative practice and ontology constrain one another' (Davies, 2009: 162). Alternatively, Davies claims that the constraints go only in one direction: from our artistic practices to ontology. Davies confers the primacy to artistic practices, to the extent that they constrain the valid results of ontology, but the results of ontology are not entitled to constraint our practices. According to Davies, the pragmatic constraint establishes that 'it is our practice that has primacy and that must be foundational for our ontological endeavours, because it is our practice that determines what kinds of properties, in general, artworks must have' (Davies, 2009: 162). Accordingly, the point in which Davies diverges from Dodd's revisionism is the rejection of metaontological realism for artworks. Since the properties that artworks have are determined by our artistic practices, the nature of such artworks is nothing beyond what we think about them. They have not a mind-independent nature. Consequently, although some revisions of our artistic practices are accepted in Davies' account, such revisions do not concern the achievement of surprising discoveries about the ontological nature of musical works. They rather concern by means of rational reflection the discovery of particular elements of our practices that are in conflict between them. Therefore, against Dodd, Davies claims that we cannot select specific aspects of our practice for doing ontology –in Dodd's case, repeatability and audibility– but rather we must consider our artistic practices as a whole to offer a complete characterisation of the artworks' nature. No methodologically appropriate ontological approach is entitled to diverge *too much* from our *actual* musical practice in Davies' view.

Accordingly, it seems *prima facie* that Davies' metaontology is a plausible solution to the dilemma between the problems of triviality and solipsism. On the one hand, since the procedure of ontological inquiry by means of epistemological arguments involves a rational reflection upon our practices, its study may provide relevant results for modifying our musical practices. On the other hand, the primacy of practices entailed by the pragmatic constraint rules out as methodologically inadequate any ontological approach that departs radically from fundamental aspects of our musical practices. Therefore, it seems to satisfy the two desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism.

However, this is a mistaken conclusion if we attend closely to Davies' approach. In the first place, there are some items that need more refinement. For instance, it is not clear what the rational reflection upon musical practices consists in. Regarding this worry, Davies' appeals to the notion of 'reflective equilibrium' typically attributed to Nelson Goodman and John Rawls. According to this notion, Davies argues that 'we must measure our actual practice against a set of principles offered as a model of right practice, and assess our willingness to revise either our practice or the principles in the face of incompatibilities between the two' (Davies, 2004: 22). The problem is that the primacy of practice defended by Davies cannot be grounded on Goodman's notion of reflective equilibrium, as it will be shown in the next section. Davies' primacy of practice also makes difficult the justification of the ontological inquiry in artistic

domains, for changes in artistic practices would never be motivated by the results obtained in ontological research. In addition, Davies' way to solve scenarios in which there are conflicting elements in our practices remains still unclear. He seems to assume that, in such scenarios, the elements in conflict are not at the same level. For his position to be consistent, one of the practices should be less central than the other, and it is this one that can be removed by the rational reflection. However, it is possible for both elements in conflict to be at the same level, and even more, for both of them to be central to our musical practices. Indeed, as Dodd argues, the idea that our practice of appreciating musical works 'represents the artist's achievement as the primary object of appreciation' and the idea that musical works are 'things that we listen to in performance' are conflicting between them and, nonetheless, they seem to be both equally central to our musical practices (Dodd, 2012: 85). Davies' account has not a way to solve conflicts of this kind and he does not offer an account to explain what the central status of an intuition is. Consequently, Davies' metaontology does not solve satisfactorily the problem of triviality because, firstly, the nature of musical works is fully determined by what we think in our musical practices after rational reflection, and secondly, ontology cannot help us to solve scenarios of conflicting practices. It will be defended in the next section that more faithfulness to the notion of Goodman's reflective equilibrium is needed to solve the problem of triviality.

A second problem of Davies' metaontology is the mediation of rational reflection in the epistemological premise. Since ontological prejudices can be involved in the rational reflection, it might distort the data of our musical practices to be explained by ontology. In other words, his methodology does not ensure that the data are not characterised by the conceptual apparatus of the ontological theory, so that it does not guarantee the avoidance of begging the question. In addition, and more important, the normative character of the pragmatic constraint does not ensure that the data to be explained by musical ontology are the data of our *actual* musical practices. Since the outcome of rational reflection is a prescription of how practices *should be* instead of a description of how they *are*, it provides counterfactual, but not actual, data of our musical practices. In other terms, Davies' methodology does not guarantee an accurate account of the musical practices of our actual world. The prescriptive character of the pragmatic constraint leaves open the possibility to be describing in the epistemological premise the musical practices of a possible world different from our actual world. Consequently, Davies' metaontology offers no convincing solution, not only to the problem of triviality, but also to the problem of solipsism. Alternatively, in the next section, it will be defended that an empirical methodology is a more suitable way to account for the elements involved in our actual musical practices and for the relative relevance of each one of them.

3. Reconsidering reflective equilibrium in the metaontology of music

In this section, the idea of a reflective equilibrium will be reconsidered as an intermediate solution between the problem of triviality, entailed by crude descriptivism, and the problem of solipsism, implied by crude revisionism. Although *prima facie* Davies' metaontology seemed to represent this intermediate view, his defence of the primacy of practices inclines his position towards the descriptivist side, distorting the pretended equilibrium between formal ontology and musical practices. In addition, the manner in which practical aspects are approached following Davies' metaontology does not ensure an accurate account of our actual musical practices, not guaranteeing an obtainment of a right set of data to be explained by ontology. The reconsideration of reflective equilibrium that will be developed here aims to overcome these problems of Davies' metaontology. For this purpose, in the first place, Goodman's notion of 'reflective equilibrium' will be revisited; in the second place, Davies' primacy of practices will be criticised from a goodmanian approach; and finally, the introduction of methods of experimental philosophy will be defended as a better way to account for our actual musical practices.

3.1 Goodman´s reflective equilibrium and the musical case

The origin of the method of reflective equilibrium is attributed to Goodman (Rawls, 1971: 21; [25] Cohnitz & Rossberg, 2016; 2006; Norman, 2016), although it did not receive this name until being developed by Rawls (1971). This method is introduced by Goodman to solve the problem of induction, i.e. how the legitimacy or justification of predictions is obtained (Goodman, 1964/1983: 60-1). On the one hand, we cannot appeal to the observation of facts to justify an inductive conclusion, since future facts have not still happened. On the other, predictions cannot be inferred from previous observations because, as Hume pointed out, there are no necessary connections between matters of fact. Goodman's way to solve this problem consists in noting that the justification of inductive inferences is of a same kind as the justification of deductive ones. The justification of either a deductive or an inductive conclusion 'requires no knowledge of the facts it pertains to' (Goodman, 1964/1983: 63). A deductive conclusion is justified when the deductive inference conforms the rules of logical inference. In a similar way, an inductive conclusion is justified when the inductive inference conforms to the rules of induction. The problem now is to determine how these rules are justified. According to Goodman, the rules of both sorts of inferences are justified by their conformity with our inferential practices (Goodman, 1964/1983: 63). A rule is justified if it can accommodate the set of inferences that we intuitively

---

[25] Rawls explicitly attributes there to Goodman the application of the idea of a 'process of mutual adjustment of principles and considered judgments' in domains other than moral philosophy.

consider as valid ones. Accordingly, the justification of inferences is explained by means of the method of the reflective equilibrium: our inferential practices of producing instances of inferences are justified if they conform to inferential rules, and inferential rules are justified if they conform to what we intuitively consider as valid inferences in our inferential practices. Regarding the case of deduction, Goodman explains this idea in the following terms:

> This looks flagrantly circular. I have said that deductive inferences are justified by their conformity to valid general rules, and that general rules are justified by their conformity to valid inferences. But this circle is a virtuous one. The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved lies the only justification for either (Goodman, 1964/1983: 64).

Accordingly, the reflective equilibrium in the case of deduction consists in a mutual adjustment between the theoretical principles of deduction and our particular deductive practices. This adjustment is what provides, on the one hand, the justification of instances of deductions obtained in our inferential practices and, on the other, the justification of the principles that justify those practices. If an inferential rule is not supported by our inferential practices, this rule is not justified and we are entitled to remove or substitute it by another rule. Conversely, if a particular practice of producing inferences does not accord with any of the inferential principles, it is not justified and we are urged to modify it.

Let us move from the inferential realm to the musical domain. The method of reflective equilibrium may be also regarded as an adequate explanation of the relation between musical practices and music theory. Concerning a particular musical work, an instance of voice leading or chord is regarded as valid if it conforms the rules of harmony or counterpoint. For example, primitive *organa* between IX and XI centuries are compositions that include parallel movements between voices at intervals of 4th, 5th and 8th. At the time of composition, these parallel movements were regarded as valid ones because they satisfy the rule that music must proceed by consonant intervals.[26] However, with the development of the technic of polyphony, these instances of voice leading began to be intuitively regarded as invalid ones. The initial cosmological and mathematical values of music regarded as 'a science' gave gradually pass to a conception of music as an 'art of pleasure of senses',[27] and variety started to be

---

[26] This rule has its origin in acoustic and mathematic considerations related to cosmological theories inherited from Greek culture in the Middle Ages. Consonant intervals are the easier to perceive because they are grounded on the simplest and most perfect mathematical proportions, which reflect in the best way the cosmological harmony (cf. Boetius, 500/2005: Liber I). Intervals of 8th, 5th and 4th are the former of the harmonic series and the acoustically most similar to the fundamental pitch.

[27] I take these labels from D'Alembert distinction in its *Elements de musique suivant les principes de M. Rameau* (1779).

considered as an aesthetic value of music.[28] Polyphony and rhythm were regarded in the *Ars Nova* as the main technical means to achieve this goal.[29] Parallel voice movements at consonant intervals of 4th, 5th and 8th began gradually to be intuitively regarded as unsuitable movements to achieve variety in a musical work, and composers started to avoid them in their compositions. This tendency turned out in the replacement of the former rule by a new one that conformed better with the musical practices of that time, i.e. a rule that sanctions positively the cases that were intuitively regarded as valid ones in musical practices, on the one hand, and negatively those that were intuitively taken to be invalid in those practices, on the other. The consummation of this replacement was achieved in Johannes Tinctoris' *Book III on Counterpoint* (1477/1875), whose rule No. 2 explicitly forbids parallel movements of 5th and 8th between different voices. Once this rule was justified, it has exercised a remarkable influence on the way of composing music in later centuries, almost completely eliminating the practices of disposing voices at parallel movements of 8th and 5th.

The example of the previous paragraph shows that there is a reflective equilibrium between musical practices and the principles of music theory –namely, the principles or rules of harmony and counterpoint in this particular case. On the one hand, an instance of voice leading is justified –i.e. regarded as valid– when it conforms the rules of harmony. On the other, a rule of harmony is justified if it can accommodate the set of instances of voice leading that are intuitively regarded as valid in musical practices and reject those that are intuitively regarded as invalid in those practices. Consequently, there is a mutual adjustment between musical practices and music theory. Examples of this phenomenon multiply, not only in the field of harmony and counterpoint, but also in other areas of music theory. Musical structures or forms, such as the fugue, the sonata, the symphony, the rondo or the suite, sanction as valid or invalid the structure of particular musical works. However, the rule of the sonata is justified only if it accommodates the structures of musical works that are regarded as valid instances of a sonata in our musical practices. In this way, the composer Julio Bas makes the following claim in his *Trattato di Forma Musicale*: 'In the evolution of art, through the diversity of works that can be found, one cannot fail to notice how things have been made and the proceedings carried out by the great majority of composers. And since theory is nothing but a result of practice, those facts and processes have become principles of doctrine' (Bass, 1922: I; my translation).[30] Accordingly, the formal rules of music are justified by the successful proceedings typically employed in particular musical compositions. Once justified, these rules become *doctrine* and

---

[28] The development of this aesthetic conception is taken up by Descartes some centuries after, who in his *Musicae Compendium* (1650) considered the aesthetic value of variety as one of the eight *principia* to be accounted by music theory.

[29] Paradigmatic examples of the outcome of this evolution are the politextual *motets* of XIII century and the *Messe Notre-Dame* of Guillaume Machaut in the XIV century.

[30] 'Nell'evoluzione dell'arte, attraverso alla diversità delle opere che s'incontrano, non si può non accorgersi come ci sieno fatti e procedimenti su sui si è trovata la gran maggioranza dei compositori. E poichè la teoria non è che un risultato della pratica, quei fatti e quei procedimenti son divenuti principi di dottrina.'

determine whether the structure of a particular musical work is justified. However, as the French composer Charles Koechlin argues, 'these rules are not infallible dogmas' because their justification lies on particular cases of musical practices, so that they are open to change with the evolution of those practices (cf. Koechlin, 1946: 2; my translation).[31]

Consequently, there are two relevant aspects to be noted regarding this phenomenon. In the first place, *contra* Davies, the method of reflective equilibrium is not something to be implemented by the philosopher when she is doing ontology of music to select the 'acceptable' features of our musical practices. It is rather a way – maybe the main way– in which musical practices evolve through time in a dialectical relation with the principles of music theory. The acceptable practices of a given time are those that conform to the rules of music theory at that time, and the rules of music theory are justified by our practical intuitions, which change through different historical contexts. Accounting for what elements of our musical practices are acceptable is just a matter of seeing how this dialectic has been historically developed, as the two previous paragraphs exemplify. If the philosopher operates a second reflective equilibrium over this one, she will not obtain a characterization of which our 'acceptable' musical practices *are* (at a given time). Rather, she will obtain a characterization of how musical practices *should be*, i.e. a description of the musical practices of a possible world different from our actual world, and an endorsement of a reorganization of the logical space such that places this possible world closer than those in which our actual practices are otherwise. In other words, she would be describing a way in which our actual practices could have been, and endorsing her commitment to this way rather than with others. The normative character of the pragmatic constraint involved in Davies' reflective equilibrium opens the possibility to obtain a misleading characterisation of the musical practices of our actual world when his method is applied. If we follow Davies' metaontology, the possibility of doing ontology of musical works of *other* possible worlds rather than from our actual world is opened. However, we are interested in the ontology of musical works of our *actual* world, and Davies metaontology does not guarantee this goal.

In the second place, the assumption of the method of reflective equilibrium in the metaontology of music lead us, *pace* Davies, to the idea of a mutual adjustment between musical practices and ontology. If we want to remain loyal to this method as it was introduced by Goodman, we have to admit not only that ontology is constrained by musical practices, but also the possibility that ontology constrains or modifies some aspects of our musical practices. Accordingly, the primacy of practices alleged by Davies does not seem to be justified, as it will be shown in the next section. In this

---

[31] Koechlin exemplifies this point in his historically situated musical practices of the 20th century: 'Ces règles ne sont pas des dogmes infaillibles. La prohibition absolue des quintes successives n'est pas plus raisonnable, dans la musique libre, que celle des fausses relations, ou que l'obligatoire préparation des dissonances' (Koechlin, 1946: 2) ('These rules are not infallible dogmas. The absolute prohibition of successive fifths is no more reasonable in free music than that of false relations, or the compulsory preparation of dissonances').

sense, Goodman's reflective equilibrium will provide a way to satisfy the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism.

3.2 Questioning Davies' primacy of practices: familiarity vs. entrenchment

As it has been noted, to avoid the problems of solipsism and triviality requires, on the one hand, that ontology adjusts to our actual musical practices and, on the other hand, that a modification of our musical practices motivated by the results obtained in ontology remains as an open possibility. Goodman's notion of reflective equilibrium accounts for this two-way adjustment. Despite adopting the idea of reflective equilibrium as an element of his metaontology, Davies' thesis of the primacy of practices disregards this two-way adjustment, rejecting the possibility of a modification of our musical practices by the results obtained in ontology. This aspect makes Davies' metaontological position vulnerable to the problem of triviality. Nonetheless, the contention here is that remaining faithful to the original Goodman's method may help us to avoid the problem of triviality without failing into the problem of solipsism.

If we follow Goodman's method, musical ontology must always accommodate the central core of our musical practices. However, by contrast with Goodman, Davies' reflective equilibrium dismisses the relevance of the theoretical realm. As we have seen in the case of musical composition, the rules of harmony and counterpoint obtain their justification on the practices lead by the intuitions of composers. Compositional practices have a primacy but just in this temporal sense. Nonetheless, once these rules are justified, and even if they do not constitute 'infallible dogmas', they have an important impact in our musical practices guiding the way in which they subsequently develop. Indeed, since the publication of Tinctoris' book, the usage of parallel movements of 5th and 8th almost disappears in musical composition until being vindicated again in the 19th century by impressionist composers. The strength of the theoretical level in the reflective equilibrium is stressed by Rawls with the example of grammar. He claims that 'we may not expect a substantial revision of our sense of correct grammar' by the knowledge of a linguistic theory, for its rules 'seem especially natural to us'. Nonetheless, Rawls argues that 'such a change is not inconceivable, and no doubt that our sense of grammar may be affected to some degree anyway by this knowledge' (Rawls, 1971: 49). Accordingly, since the theoretical principles find their justification in our practices, it is impossible to discover a global mistake of such practices in light of the knowledge of such principles. However, this knowledge can reveal local aspects of those practices as substantially mistaken and in need of revision. This is thus a view in which the possibility of relevant discoveries in the theoretical realm does not collide with the problem of theoretical solipsism, accommodating minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism.

Goodman himself is explicit and even more radical on this point. He regards the dual adjustment between rules and practices as an instance of the dual adjustment between definition and usage of a term, consisting in that 'the usage informs the definition, which in turn guides extension of the usage' (Goodman, 1964/1983: 66). However, he makes the following observation:

> Of course this adjustment is a more complex matter than I have indicated. Sometimes, in the interest of convenience or theoretical utility, we deliberately permit a definition to run counter to clear mandates of common usage. We accept a definition of "fish" that excludes whales (Goodman, 1964/1983: 66).

These words are of an extremely relevance because Goodman assumes that, in reflective equilibrium, the only criterion to be satisfied by a theoretical proposal is not the coherence with practices. Other aspects, such as the theoretical virtues considered by the revisionist, play a role in determining the methodological appropriateness of a theory. The defender of reflective equilibrium agrees on this point with the revisionist insofar a methodologically apt theoretical proposal is one that conforms a balance between different aspects that does not only include the coherence with practices, but also theoretical virtues such as simplicity or explanatory power. In Goodman's example, a revisionary definition of 'fish' can be assumed in our practices in light of an explanation that carves better the nature of the world at its joints. In the same way, revisionist results of ontology should be accepted in our musical practices if they offer an explanation that carves better the nature of musical works at their joints.

The possibility of revising local aspects of our practices is motivated by Goodman's distinction between the notions of 'entrenchment' and 'familiarity'. The degree of entrenchment of a predicate in our practices is relative to the actual projections of that predicate and of all the predicates coextensive with it (Goodman, 1964/1983: 95). According to Goodman, a predicate is actually projected in a hypothesis if the hypothesis 'is adopted after some of its instances have been examined and determined to be true, and before the rest have been examined' (Goodman, 1964/1983: 87). In other words, a hypothesis is actually projected if it is supported –it has positive (true) instances–, unviolated –it has no negative (false) instances–, unexhausted –it has undetermined cases (neither positive nor false), mainly future cases–, and if all the hypotheses conflicting with it have been overridden (Goodman, 1964/1983: 90, 104). Consequently, the more times a predicate has been actually projected, the more entrenched it is. The entrenchment of a predicate derives thus from the use of language, but Goodman is very careful at this point distinguishing between entrenchment and familiarity:

> Entrenchment and familiarity are not the same. An entirely unfamiliar predicate may be very well entrenched, as we have seen, if predicates coextensive with it have often been projected; and another way a new predicate can acquire entrenchment will be explained presently. Again, a very familiar predicate may be rather poorly entrenched, since

entrenchment depends upon frequency of projection rather than upon mere frequency of use (Goodman, 1964/1983: 90).

This distinction between entrenchment and familiarity allows for the possibility of the discovery model in the ontology of music. A particular use of a predicate might occur with a high frequency in our ordinary musical discourse and, nonetheless, being a non-entrenched use of that predicate because it has only occurrences in non-projectible hypothesis, i.e. ones that are either non-supported (having no-positive cases), or violated (having negative cases), or exhausted (having no undetermined cases) or ones that conflict with non-overridden hypothesis. Consequently, if philosophical examination determines that a very common use of a predicate has no actual projections or it is not projectible, we are entitled to revise or remove this use of the predicate from our conceptual scheme when we try to determine the nature of musical works. For instance, it has been argued that we are very familiar in our musical practices with the idea that musical works can change over time (cf. Rohrbaugh, 2003; Bertinetto 2016). It is said that Sibelius' *5th Symphony* changed between 1915 and 1919 by means of the different versions of this work presented by the composer. Accordingly, it has being defended by some authors the hypothesis that musical works are temporally flexible entities. However, this hypothesis conflicts with the non-overridden hypothesis that if an object changes, it no longer exists in its previous state (cf. Dodd, 2007: 88-9). Indeed, since nowadays the 1916 version of the symphony is equally performable as the 1919 version of it, there are no grounds to say that the symphony does not exist in the state previous to 1919. The non-overridden hypothesis of change is an entrenched one to the extent that it is presupposed by a high number of other projectible hypotheses in any field. For instance, concerning the growth of babies, we expect a baby to be bigger when she is 8 months old than when she was 2 months old. We would say that she has changed because we would not expect that she is now in the same state as when she was 2 months old. Or, for example, when we ask some one to cook some potatoes, we expect that they will change, i.e. that they will not remain in the same state as before being cooked. Or, in physics, when we say that water changes from solid to liquid state, we say that it is no more in its previous state. Therefore, the hypothesis that musical works are temporally flexible is not projectible because it conflicts with the entrenched hypothesis that if an object changes, it no longer exists in its previous state. Consequently, the predicate 'changing over time' applied to musical works is not an entrenched use of that predicate, despite of being common in our ordinary musical discourse. Accordingly, we are entitled to revise the beliefs that assume the hypothesis that musical works can change overtime –or its equivalent hypothesis that musical works are temporally flexible. This is an example in which ontological research shows that the ordinary ontological conception of musical works tacit in our musical practices is mistaken, justifying a revision of the beliefs involving the hypothesis that musical works are temporally flexible.

Accordingly, Goodman's distinction between entrenchment and familiarity shows that Davies' defence of the primacy of practices in the relation between musical

practices and formal ontology cannot be accepted from the perspective of reflective equilibrium. The right primacy of practices does not consist in establishing a one-way adjustment in which the theoretical realm is constrained by practices. At best, the primacy of practices is only temporal. Without inferential practices that we consider intuitively right, there are no justified inferential rules. Without musical practices that intuitively regard some melodic movements as right, there are no justified rules of harmony and counterpoint. Without musical practices in which we intuitively deal with musical works in a particular way, there is no sensible musical ontology. However, this temporal primacy does not mean that rules of inference could not modify our inferential practices, that the principles of harmony and counterpoint could not modify the practices of composers, and that the results in ontology could not modify the way in which we deal with musical works and our conception of them.[32]

The framework provided by the methodology of reflective equilibrium allows overcoming the problems of triviality, inconsistency and solipsism by satisfying the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism. According to Goodman's original notion applied to rules of inference, a practical inference is valid if it satisfies the rules of inference, while a rule of inference is valid if it is able to accommodate most of the inferential practices intuitively regarded as valid ones. In the case of musical composition, an instance of voice leading is valid if satisfies the rules of harmony and counterpoint, while a rule of harmony and counterpoint is valid if it is able to accommodate most instances of voice leading intuitively regarded as valid ones. In the case of musical ontology, an intuition of our musical practices about the nature of musical works is valid if it is compatible with the results obtained in the ontology of music following the theoretical principles of simplicity, explanatory power and compatibility with our best theories in other domains. In turn, the results in ontology are valid if they can accommodate most of our widely shared intuitions about musical works' nature. The two-way adjustment prescribed by the methodology of reflective equilibrium offers a clear way to satisfy the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism. This idea of two-way adjustment is complemented with the distinction between familiar and entrenched practical intuitions. Familiar intuitions are those that are widely shared and used in our musical practices for different practical purposes. By contrast, entrenched intuitions are those that constitute projectible hypothesis, i.e. ones that are supported (having positive cases), non-violated (having no negative cases), or non-exhausted (having undetermined cases) or ones that do not conflict with non-overridden hypothesis. Entrenched intuitions, for their characteristics, play the role of constituting the core of our musical practices. The ontology of music is methodologically entitled to revise only familiar but not entrenched intuitions if there are good reasons for such a revision, i.e. if it is demanded by the theoretical virtues of explanatory power, simplicity or integration with findings in other domains. By this

---

[32] Nonetheless, the view presented here may be regarded as a developed view of metaontological revisionism, one that provides constraints to the revisions that are permissible. Indeed, Dodd (2013) accepts the idea of reflective equilibrium, but he does not develop the consequences of this commitment.

way, the methodology of reflective equilibrium guarantees a suitable balance between practical and theoretical desiderata.

The relevant question now is how the familiar and entrenched status of an intuition can be determined. As the example of temporal flexibility has shown, conceptual analysis is a tool for determining when an intuition assumed as familiar is not entrenched. The entrenched character of an intuition is not something that may be positively shown. By contrast, it is a matter of showing if an alleged familiar intuition is a hypothesis having no positive cases, or having negative cases, or having no indeterminate cases, or one that conflicts with other non-overridden hypothesis or sound theoretical principles. In other words, it is a matter of showing that it is not a projectible hypothesis, a task to be made by means of conceptual analysis. However, how about the familiar status of an intuition? Conceptual analysis does not apply to determine the familiarity of an intuition. As it will be argued in the next section, this is a matter of an empirical nature. More precisely, the use of quantitative methods employed in experimental philosophy –the method of cases or research in linguistic corpus–, along with the results of empirical enquiries developed by musicology or music theory, are the right tools to determine the familiar status of an intuition. Accordingly, on the side of descriptivism, conceptual analysis plays an important role in the ontology of music. However, contra descriptivism and on the side of revisionism, conceptual analysis does not cover all the ontological task, and empirical methods will provide some mind-independent data.

3.3 Recovering our musical practices

If, on the one hand, Davies' defence of the primacy of practices is unjustified under the methodology of reflective equilibrium, on the other hand, Davies' way to account for musical practices is not adequate. Following his methodology, we run the risk of obtaining a description of a way in which our musical practices could be rather than a description of the way they actually are. Since our interest in ontology is motivated by the aim of determining the nature of musical works of our actual world, Davies' methodology does not guarantee this purpose. The method of reflective equilibrium defended here, despite rejecting the primacy of musical practices, confers a significant relevance to them. They constrain musical ontology by characterising the phenomena to be explained and limiting the acceptability of the results obtained in the ontological inquiry. Accordingly, paying attention to the way in which musical practices are accounted is of an extreme relevance from a methodological point of view.

The employment of an inadequate methodology to describe our musical practices does not affect merely Davies's view, but also to a significant number of approaches. Christopher Bartel indicates two worries in this respect. In the first place, he points out that ontologists typically 'appeal to intuition as a reliable guide to our

artistic practices' (Bartel, 2017: 2). The trouble that he identifies in the way in which ontologists usually proceed is that it is not clear 'how widely shared are the intuitions' appealed to by them (Bartel, 2017: 2). Ontologists are suspicious of taking their own intuitions as generally shared and firmly entrenched ones in our musical practices. The methodology employed by them does not ensure that the intuitions to which they pay attention are really central ones governing our musical practices. Accordingly, Bartel claims that 'perhaps philosophers never describe musical practice innocently, but rather always describe it through the lens of their philosophical commitments' (Bartel, 2017: 5). If that were the case, the descriptions they offer of our musical practices could not constitute the database to check an ontological theory, since musical practices would not be characterized in a way independent of the conceptual apparatus of the theory. Consequently, the methodology typically employed by ontologists does not guarantee that the theories it validates do not beg the question.

The second worry pointed out by Bartel questions the appropriateness of appealing to intuitions to offer an accurate description of our musical practices. Bartel explains this worry in the following terms:

> It is a widely accepted methodological point within this debate that any theory of the ontology of musical works must be consistent with the actual practices of composers, performers, music critics, and knowledgeable audiences. However, actual musical practice is a fairly messy affair (…). When actual musical practice is inconclusive—or even contradictory—one must make some decision to favor one aspect of the practice over some other. Of course, to do so we must offer reasons that look beyond musical practice itself. Philosophers often do this by appealing to intuition; but then we must accept that such intuitions are no longer acting as a guide to musical practice, and instead are acting as an arbiter between conflicting practices (Bartel, 2017: 3).

According to Bartel, the appeal to intuitions does not guarantee to be describing accurately our musical practices. Bartel does not regard intuitions as something that always belongs to the realm of musical practices, but as something that sometimes plays the role of arbitrating between practices in conflict. Considering the dispute between Levinson and Dodd about the creatability of musical works, he argues that what he calls 'the creatability intuition' is the motivation for Levinson to assign to musical works the category of initiated types. On the other side, he takes what he calls 'the repeatability intuition' as the motivation for Dodd to assign the category of types of sound-sequence events to musical works. These two intuitions are regarded as conflicting between them. The problem, according to Bartel, is that both intuitions 'are reflective of our actual musical practices', describing different aspects of it, and that 'musical practice does not indicate which of them is primary' (Bartel, 2017: 4). Bartel considers that Dodd's way to solve this conflict is to favour the repeatability intuition by appealing to another intuition, the intuition that musical works are abstract objects. However, this last intuition is not reflective of our musical practices, Bartel argues, because it is a philosophical intuition, and thus Dodd's defence of the type/token theory is not grounded in musical practice (Bartel, 2017: 5).

Regarding the first worry, Bartel's solution seems to be a satisfactory answer. He appeals to the use of empirical methods typically employed in experimental philosophy to check how widespread an intuition is (Bartel, 2017: 1, 6). Surveys of how people react when confronted with real musical examples constitute an independent way to check the degree of familiarity of some intuitions in our musical practices. This way seems to be *prima facie* free of the philosophical commitments of the ontologist. The methods of experimental philosophy offer thus a suitable manner of describing musical practices that qualify the quantitative results obtained to be the database to check an ontological theory. However, the participants in the survey should not be restricted only to laypeople, as Bartel does (cf. Bartel, 2017: 6). Musical practices are compound by a heterogeneous group of agents playing different roles, and the familiarity of an intuition is dependent on the complex interactions between this heterogeneity of agents. Sometimes there are notable differences between musicians and non-musicians. Other times intuitions are so highly familiar that are shared by all kind of agents, regardless their differences in knowledge. This phenomenon will be noted in the empirical study presented in the next chapter. Since both musicians and non-musicians are relevant agents of our musical practices, accounting for these different kinds of sensibilities and intuitions seems to be crucial in order to offer a good description of our practices.

Concerning this point, it is important to specify the role that the empirical part plays in the metaontological realm. Two main programs have been distinguished in experimental philosophy: a negative program and a positive one (Alexander, Mallon & Weinberg, 2010: 297-8). Both programs are about the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence or data. However, the goal of the negative program is to challenge this practice by empirically showing that the methods traditionally used in philosophy are not suitable. Empirical methods appear here as a substitute of the traditional philosophical machinery. By contrast, the positive program understands the use of empirical methods as a complement of the traditional philosophical ones.

To satisfy the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism introduced above as a consequence of the problems of solipsism and triviality, the use of experimental methods should be constrained to a *complementary tool* for the philosophical task. In this sense, the negative program should be rejected in the ontology of music. The results of empirical research may be such that they show that the intuitions of agents involved in a particular practice –artistic, musical, linguistic, etc.– are messy concerning a question of philosophical interest. It may be the case that the majority of answers given by different sets of population are contradictory, i.e. the majority of members of a set answers 'yes' to a question while the majority of members of another set answers 'no' to the same question. It might be also that there were no clear tendency of the subjects in endorsing a particular intuition regarding a philosophical question. The defenders of the negative program of experimental philosophy would conclude that the questions that matter and are substantive for

philosophers do not actually matter and are not substantive for the agents involved in the practices concerned (Machery, 2017). These agents are successful and competent in their practices in spite of having messy intuitions about the topics of philosophical interest. Such philosophical questions should be abandoned according to the supporters of the negative view. However, the negative view must be rejected in light of the methodology of reflective equilibrium introduced above to account for the desiderata of minimal revisionism and minimal descriptivism. By means of experimental methods we can only determine the degree of familiarity of an intuition. This is a relevant factor because the coherence with practices is *one* of the desiderata that an ontological theory must satisfy according to reflective equilibrium. But it is not the *only* desideratum. *Ceteris paribus* relatively to other parameters, an ontological proposal that coheres with a big number of familiar intuitions will be preferred to other proposal that coheres only with a reduced number of them. However, as argued previously, a philosophical theory is entitled to revise familiar beliefs that do not constitute projectible hypothesis. For this reason, the methodological account proposed here agrees with Knobe and Nichols view, which argue that 'the mere fact that a certain percentage of subjects hold a particular view cannot on its own have a significant impact on our philosophical work' (Knobe & Nichols, 2008: 6).

Accordingly, the introduction of empirical methods is intended here in light of a *positive program of experimental philosophy*, according to which experimental methods are a complementary tool for traditional philosophy. In our particular case, they constitute a tool for a way of characterising the data concerning musical works to be explained by ontology. This tool guarantees a characterisation of the phenomenon independent of the prejudices of the ontological views proposed as candidates to explain such data. Accordingly, the ontologist's own intuitions would not be regarded as representative of the intuitions that people would or should have about the nature of musical works because the might be biased by the view that the ontologist wants to defend. Alternatively, the ontologist must empirically check what the intuitions of people are about such cases (cf. Alexander, Mallon & Weinberg, 2010: 298-9). In addition, thought experiments may still be regarded as useful to elicit certain intuitions about the nature of musical works. However, empirical methods should be employed to measure the degree of familiarity of the intuition elicited (cf. Daly, 2010: 124) Nonetheless, given the distinction between familiar and entrenched intuitions entailed by reflective equilibrium, the results obtained by means of empirical sources are not definitory. The impact of experimental results in philosophical inquiry is indirect, as defended by Knobe and Nichols (cf. 2008: 6). Consequently, the metaontology of music rejects *direct extramentalism*, a view of the positive program according to which we can 'draw conclusions about nonmental entities from premises that include empirical claims about folk intuitions or judgments' (Alexander, Mallon & Weinberg, 2010: 299). This view does not satisfy the desideratum of minimal revisionism, preventing to achieve discoveries beyond what we think about the nature of musical works. Alternatively, to satisfy this desideratum, the results empirically obtained should be regarded as merely reflecting 'facts about our minds' (cf. Alexander, Mallon & Weinberg, 2010: 299), i.e.

114

as merely telling us what the beliefs shared by the agents of our musical practices are. Accordingly, the metaontology of music would embrace a 'mentalist' view of empirical research within the positive program of experimental philosophy. More specifically, it should be embraced a *conceptual mentalist* approach, which takes 'an interest in what actual conceptual structure is instantiated in people's heads' (Alexander, Mallon & Weinberg, 2010: 300).

By means of empirical methods, we can identify which intuitions are familiar to the agents involved in our musical practices, or in other words, what 'the conceptual structure instantiated in them' is. The degree of familiarity of an intuition is a factual matter that can be measured by applying different methods of experimental philosophy. They provide the degree in which an intuition is shared by the participants in our musical practices in a way that is more accurate and independent of the philosophical convictions of the ontologist. Their application helps to avoid the worry of question begging pointed by Bartel. This procedure will be employed in the next chapter, where the intuitions of people about versions and transcriptions will be measured by means of an empirical study. However, as noted previously, familiarity and entrenchment do not overlap. An intuition determined as very familiar by means of empirical methods might not be an entrenched intuition. Empirical methods do not provide us with a tool to determine which of those familiar intuitions are also entrenched ones. In general, there is no way to determine when an intuition is entrenched. As previously noted, we may only proceed in a negative way, by showing when an intuition is not entrenched. This is a matter of conceptual analysis, consisting in finding whether the intuition at stake is a hypothesis in conflict with a non-overridden hypothesis of a more projectible scope, as shown in the previous section by the example of change and the temporal flexibility of musical works. Therefore, the use of empirical methods does not exhaust the philosophical task. In line with the positive program of experimental philosophy, the field is open to the use of the traditional methods of philosophy. Once determined by quantitative methods which intuitions are more familiar to our musical practices, it is time for philosophical analysis to determine which of those intuitions are entrenched and which are not.

In this research, two methods of empirical philosophy will be employed: research in linguistic corpus and the method of cases. This last one has been recently criticised. According to Machery (2017), the method of cases faces two challenges: the problem of demographic effects and the problem of presentational effects. The first one consist in that people usually respond differently to a same case depending on their culture, gender, age and other contextual parameters. The second challenge is that a superficial variation on the presentation of a single case induces a same set of people to respond differently. These two challenges supposedly undermine the validity of the result achieved by means of the method of cases (cf. Machery, 2017). However, the problem of demographic effects does not affect the inquiry developed here in the same way as they affect in other areas in philosophy. Firstly, it is assumed here that the present inquiry is relativized to the context of western musical tradition. As we shall see

in chapter 7, the musical works' features relevant for ontology are relative to that cultural context, a circumstance that does not necessarily prevent the factual character of those features. In addition, other factors that are supposedly relevant in other areas of philosophy –such as age, or expertise in a specific domain– are not decisive here in order to alter the main tendency of the responses, as it will be shown by the experiment presented in chapter 3. Meanwhile, that experiment accounts also for the second challenge –the problem of presentational effects. By means of different questions about the same topic, the same cases to be tested will be presented in different manners. The results will show that these superficial differences in the presentation of the cases do not entail significant differences in the general tendencies of the subjects' responses concerning the main issues about the individuation of versions and transcriptions.

In addition to the methods employed by experimental philosophy, the results offered by other empirical sciences that study the musical phenomena, such as musicology, psychology or sociology, also constitute a good source for the musical evidence that should be explained by ontology. They offer us relevant data about the nature of musical works and the way we think about them without such data being biased by the pre-conception of the ontologist. In particular, chapter 3 will consider the way in which musicologists classify versions and transcriptions and will appeal to musicological enquiry as a source of information for the motivations of producing musical versions and transcriptions. Accordingly, the methodology proposed here combines either empirical philosophy –using empirical results obtained from musical sciences– and experimental philosophy –conducting our own empirical experiments (cf. Prinz, 2008: 196-7).

It is important to distinguish at this point practical intuitions from philosophical ones. Intuitions are just beliefs, whose truth is not guaranteed (cf. Williamson, 2007: 214 and ff.). Practical intuitions are beliefs whose content is about specific aspects of our musical practices and that play the role of guiding our musical practices in a specific direction. As it has been shown in the previous section, practical intuitions guided composers of the *Ars Nova* to avoid parallel movements of 8th and 5th, which results in rules that sanction negatively this kind of voice leading. These intuitions modified the practice of composition towards a specific direction regardless if the beliefs involved were true or false. Indeed, the harmonic developments implemented by impressionist composers some centuries latter revealed that some of these intuitions were not true beliefs at a given context. Nonetheless, it is hard to see that the whole participants in a particular practice are mistaken, since they are moderately successful in their interactions and in achieving the goals of that practice. Accordingly, it is sensible to adopt the idea that the entrenched intuitions –i.e. the beliefs actually projected by the agents involved in a particular practice– are plausibly true concerning the issues they are about, at least in a particular context or a set of contexts (cf. Williamson, 2007: 238).

On the other hand, there are philosophical intuitions, i.e. beliefs that guide the proper philosophical practice. An example is the intuition of the eternality of properties, the belief that properties have no temporal origin. An intuition of this kind is not supported by any aspect of our musical practices and, consequently, may help us to understand the ontological nature of musical works beyond what we think about them in our practices. It may be the case that the outcomes of philosophical research guided by this intuition could conflict with some beliefs of our musical practices. In such cases, if the practical intuition is entrenched, it cannot be revised and the ontological proposal is not acceptable. However, if the practical intuition is just a familiar but not an entrenched one –for instance, one that it is not supported by any positive fact–, it can be subject to revision by part of the philosophical theory. The creatability of musical works is an example of a just familiar but non-entrenched intuition, as we will see in chapter 7.

The empirical research developed in this inquiry concerns just practical intuitions. According to the idea of reflective equilibrium defended here, the appropriateness of an ontological theory has to be measured by its conformity with the beliefs of our musical practices. The explanation or interpretation of the musical facts given by the ontology of music must respect the practical intuitions that are entrenched and should be able to accommodate most of our intuitions that are solely familiar ones. This conformity justifies the appropriateness of the theory and ensures the avoidance of theoretical solipsism, constituting a second way in which practices constrain ontology.

Summarizing, the role that our musical practices play in the ontology of music can be now better specified from a metaontological point of view. Two desiderata have emerged from the problems of triviality and solipsism developed in previous sections. On the one hand, minimal descriptivism is a desideratum that claims that ontological accounts of musical works, within a given context, should be able to accommodate widespread musical intuitions. On the other hand, minimal revisionism is a desideratum that claims that ontological accounts of musical works should be able to revise our practical intuitions whenever they clash with sound theoretical principles. The methodology able to account for both desiderata is reflective equilibrium in the original goodmanian sense. Accordingly, every familiar intuition must be accounted for in our ontological accounts of musical works, unless it is not entrenched, but merely familiar. Familiar intuitions should be accommodated in the ontological framework unless it conflicts with sound theoretical principles or non-overridden hypothesis. The ontologist's task with respect to practical intuitions involves two steps: firstly, determining the set of those familiar intuitions by means of empirical or musicological methods; secondly, eliminating as a result of a reflective process those familiar intuitions that clash with other non-overridden widespread practical intuitions or sound theoretical principles. Sound theoretical principles are explanatory power, simplicity, compatibility with our best theories on other domains, or being able to produce a number of practical hypotheses that are backed by familiar intuitions.

Musical ontology must only preserve entrenched beliefs. Entrenched beliefs suppose a constraint to the ontological work, guaranteeing an adequate description of the phenomenon. On the other hand, non-entrenched beliefs are a symptom of cases of conflicting practices, cases in which opposed or even contradictory beliefs are on a same plane to guide musical practices. As a result, musical practices might have not a clear guidance in those particular areas, where rules that sanction negatively a set of cases have not been overridden and coexist as valid rules with others that sanction positively the members of that set. An example of such areas is the one concerning copyright, where the borderline between originality and plagiarism is not clear. In those cases, musical ontology is entitled to revise practical intuitions. There are co-existing intuitions sanctioning a same case as plagiarism and non-plagiarism. Since they are intuitions that guide musical practices, a revision of them by the results obtained in the ontology of music may change indirectly our musical practices and help to dissolve these cases of conflict. Ontology can be in these cases an instrument of conceptual change that promotes a better development of our musical practices. It may favour a more acute way to appreciate musical works, for instance, in cases of plagiarism. This is the manner in which ontology should constrain musical practices, completing the two-way adjustment between practice and theory implied by the method of reflective equilibrium.

It might be objected that ontology is a descriptive but not a prescriptive discipline, so that it is not clear the way in which the adjustment of practices by means of the ontological theory could be achieved. It is true that musical ontology cannot modify our musical practices in the same way that a theory of harmony and counterpoint does. While the latter consists in a set of rules and is mainly prescriptive, the former is eminently descriptive. However, the results obtained in ontology can reveal that some practical intuitions very familiar to the agents involved in our musical practices are mistaken about the nature of musical works, and consequently, that they are unjustified beliefs that ought to be replaced. Since practical intuitions guide our musical practices, changes in our practical intuitions may imply changes in our musical practices. It is this indirect way in which musical ontology can constrain our musical practices.

4. Conclusions

In this chapter, the methodological debate in the metaontology of music has been revisited. The main goal pursued here was to determine a methodology that enables musical ontology to engage in interdisciplinary debates and to solve problems where our musical practices are not firmly established. Three main views have been distinguished: descriptivism, revisionism, and reflective equilibrium.

Two problems have been identified concerning metaontological descriptivism: triviality and inconsistency. Since descriptivism claims that the nature of musical works

is not different from what the ordinary ontological conception tacit in our musical practices takes them to be, the answers given by formal ontology are trivial or superficial. Accordingly, the ontologist's answers about the nature of musical works would not be cognitively relevant. This is the problem of triviality. To avoid this worry, the possibility of formal and ordinary ontological claims to coincide in their correctness conditions but differing in cognitive value has been explored. This option does not solve the problem for Thomasson's view. If there is any relevant cognitive contribution that formal ontology could make, that would be in cases of conflicting practices. However, if conflicting practices involve a set of ambiguous beliefs of our tacit conception, Thomasson's account of reference-fixing is unable to provide the mechanisms to select the sort of thing of the sample to which we are referring with an art term. Consequently, the existence, persistence and identity conditions of the sort of things named with the art-kind term would be undeterminable. Ontology still falls in this case under the problem of triviality not being able to provide cognitive relevant information about the nature of musical works beyond the tacit conception of our practices. If, alternatively, the practices in conflict involve contradictory pre-theoretical beliefs about the nature of the items involved, Thomasson's answer would be to deny the existence of such items because nothing can satisfy an inconsistent set of existence, persistence and individuation conditions. In this case, Thomasson's view would be inconsistent because her eliminativism about those items is a revisionary account, what contradicts the initial descriptivist aims of her proposal. The problem of inconsistency also stands for Kania's descriptivism. His descriptivism is committed to fictionalism about musical works, which entails highly revisionary consequences concerning the existence and persistence conditions of musical works and the role played by composers and performers. Since the initial motivation of descriptivism was to preserve our pre-theoretical beliefs about the nature of musical works, Kania's conclusion that musical works do not exist is unacceptable. It reveals his descriptivism as an inconsistent position in metaontology, for there is no justification in his account for such a revisionary consequence.

Metaontological revisionism, arguing for the discovery model in the ontology of music, was introduced as a possible solution to the problem of triviality. Dodd offers an alternative proposal of reference-fixing for art terms that allows for the discovery model and, at the same time, avoids the problems in dealing with conflicting practices faced by Thomasson's view. In addition, since revisionism is regarded as the default position in ontology, Kania's local descriptivism turns out to be unjustified because he does not provide any convincing reason to support this special status of musical works and cultural artefacts. However, revisionism faces the problem of solipsism. This problem has been identified with a lack of constraints in the scope of the acceptable revisions of our musical practices from the results obtained in formal ontology. If musical ontology says something so radically different from our ordinary conception, there might be a translation gap between ontology and musical practices. Dodd's revisionism does not guarantee this problem to be dodged. His revisionism opens the possibility to a disconnection between our musical practices and ontological achievements. As a result, methodologically valid ontological achievements would turn out to be irrelevant for our

musical practices and other disciplines approaching the musical phenomenon. In addition, since we are reasonably successful in achieving the goals of our musical practices, a global mistake in our pre-theoretical beliefs about them seems to be implausible.

To avoid the problems of triviality, inconsistency and solipsism entailed by descriptivism and revisionism respectively, two desiderata that should be satisfied by any suitable ontological account of musical works have been identified. The first one, minimal descriptivism, is that ontological accounts of musical works, within a given context, should be able to accommodate widespread musical intuitions. The second one, minimal revisionism, is that ontological accounts of musical works should be able to revise our practical intuitions whenever they clash with sound theoretical principles. Minimal descriptivism ensures the connection between ontology and musical practices, while minimal revisionism guarantees to avoid the problem of triviality.

Davies' reflective equilibrium has been presented as an intermediate position that seemed to *prima facie* satisfy both desiderata. It does not accept uncritically our musical practices, restricting at the same time the outcomes of ontology that are acceptable by means of the pragmatic constraint. However, Davies' reflective equilibrium is not between musical practices and formal ontology, but between musical practices and the principles of right practice. This view is problematic, firstly, because it cannot solve scenarios in which the intuitions that support practices in conflict are equally central to those practices. His methodology does not provide a mechanism to decide which of the intuitions in conflict has to be ruled out. Secondly, Davies' reflective equilibrium is motivated by a particular reading of the pragmatic constraint that leads him to defend the primacy of practices. However, it has been shown that such primacy of practices is not justified from the point of view of reflective equilibrium. Rawls' example of grammar, the musical case of parallel movements of 8th and 5th, and Goodman's case of definition and usage of a term illustrate the dynamics of a two-way adjustment between practical and theoretical realms entailed by the original idea of reflective equilibrium. Davies' defence of a one-way adjustment of theory from practices makes his view vulnerable to the problem of triviality. In addition, Davies disregards Goodman's crucial difference between entrenchment and familiarity: a use of a predicate may be very familiar – frequently used– in our practices and, nonetheless, be a predicate that is not entrenched in them. Consequently, very familiar beliefs might not be entrenched beliefs of our practices and they are open to revision regarding the results obtained in ontology. And finally, the third problem of Davies' metaontology concerns the first premise of the epistemological argument and his particular reading of the pragmatic constraint. The normative character that he confers to the epistemological premise and to the pragmatic constraint opens the possibility to obtain a description of musical practices of possible worlds different from our actual world. We describe what practices should be instead of what they are. Consequently, it is a methodology that does not guarantee providing the data of our actual musical practices, which are the object of study of musical ontology.

It has been argued that recovering Goodman's original idea of reflective equilibrium is the best way to account for the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism. On the one hand, musical practices constrain the ontology of music. Every familiar musical intuition must be accommodated by our ontological account of musical works, unless it's not entrenched, but merely familiar. The ontologist's work with respect to these practical intuitions involves two steps. Firstly, she has to identify the set of those familiar intuitions, by empirical or musicological methods. Secondly, she has to eliminate, as a result of a reflective process involving conceptual analysis, those familiar intuitions that clash with other widespread practices or sound theoretical principles. Theoretical principles –such as explanatory power, simplicity or compatibility with our best theories on other domains– constraint our practices, contributing to show which practical intuitions are misleading and should be replaced. This is the manner in which ontology should constrain musical practices, completing the two-way adjustment between practice and theory implied by the method of reflective equilibrium.

To avoid bias from the view proposed by the ontologist, it has been argued that the best way to account for the data of our practices to be explained by ontology should be obtained by methods used in experimental philosophy –empirical experiments, statistics in corpus of predicates and surveys– and by the results of other disciplines studying music –musicology, psychology, anthropology, etc. Empirical methods should be applied to determine the degree of familiarity of one intuition in our musical practices. However, they do not determine whether a familiar intuition is also entrenched. The degree of entrenchment of an intuition depends on its projectibility. This is a matter to ascertain if the hypothesis (intuition) in question is supported, unviolated, undetermined and if it does not contradicts other non-overridden hypothesis. The use of the methods of experimental philosophy does not exhaust the philosophical task if we follow Goodman's reflective equilibrium. Consequently, the use of empirical methods here should be understood as falling under the positive program of experimental philosophy, i.e. as a complement of the traditional methods employed in philosophy that, in this particular case, helps to avoid the ontologist's prejudices in determining the practical data to be explained.

According to reflective equilibrium, the assessment criterion between rival ontological approaches is not the mere coherence with practices, but a balance between such coherence and the theoretical virtues of simplicity, explanatory power and integration in a more general body of knowledge. It makes no sense to proceed to revisions in domains in which our musical practices are successful, for it is indicative that our pre-theoretical conception is right. Revisions of our pre-theoretical conception seem to be more justified in cases of conflicting practices. These are cases where ontology can make a positive contribution promoting conceptual change with the aim of achieving a progress in those practices. In such cases, if one of the intuitions involved in the conflict is not entrenched but just familiar, it should to be removed if the results of

ontology reveal it as mistaken about the nature of musical works. Alternatively, if the intuitions in conflict are equally well-entrenched ones, the other theoretical virtues beyond the coherence with practices determine which of the intuitions should be ruled out. Accordingly, reflective equilibrium is superior to descriptivist approaches because it can solve satisfactorily these cases. To the extent that ontology is descriptive but not prescriptive, its results constrain musical practices in an indirect way. Since practical intuitions guide our practices, showing that some intuitions are mistaken is the way in which ontology can influence the subsequent development of practices.

Finally, since it was only tangentially approached, a clarifier note is relevant concerning the consequences that follow from this analysis of the metaontological debate about the substantivity of ontology. The picture offered here assumes a commitment to metaontological realism about musical works. The distinction between practical and entrenched intuitions entails that the nature of musical works is not fully determined by the tacit ordinary conception that we have about them in our musical practices. In this sense, the answers to the questions about the ontology of musical works can be said to be objective (or mind-independent) because their correctness do not depend on the way we ordinarily think or say about these objects in our musical practices. But this is not to say that the correctness of these questions is mind-independently determined in an absolute way. The objectivism endorsed here is a moderate one, according to which the correctness of the answers to the music-ontological questions is dependent on judgments about domains others than our ordinary thought about musical works. This condition suffices for the core idea of realism: the possibility of obtaining surprising discoveries about the ontological status of entities in a particular domain. As Frege's metaphor illustrates, these other conceptual frameworks are finer ones for explanatory purposes, as the microscope is in comparison to the eye. However, we cannot dispense with the microscope or any other optical mechanism, as we cannot dispense with any conceptual framework in doing ontology. Such idea would be completely pointless.

Chapter 3

Musical versions and transcriptions I: empirical data

1. Introduction

In light of the methodology introduced in the previous chapter, this one is devoted to make explicit the widespread musical intuitions concerning the ontological status of musical versions and transcriptions. It was defended there that the data to be explained by the ontology of music should be provided by the empirical sciences studying music and obtained by empirical methods employed in experimental philosophy. The advantage of this methodological approach lies on that it ensures a characterisation of the data more independent of the philosopher's ontological prejudices than the obtained by means of the methodologies traditionally employed in the ontology of music. This is not to say that empirical methodologies provide a description of the musical phenomenon free of ontological commitments. Rather, they contribute to prevent the data from being biased by the philosopher's own ontological commitments. Nonetheless, the limits of the incidence of the results obtained from experimental methods and musicology rest on determining which intuitions are familiar to our musical practices. By contrast with the negative program of experimental philosophy, the identification of such intuitions does not lead us to endorse or reject any ontological account about versions and transcriptions. It will rather lead us to identify what views cannot count as the default position in the ontology of music about those musical products. As it has been shown, the methodology of reflective equilibrium is only compatible with a mentalist approach of the positive program in experimental philosophy. Accordingly, the results obtained will only show how we think about musical works, but then it is time for a further step in which by means of philosophical reflection we have to determine which of these beliefs constitute entrenched ones.

Since the focus of this thesis is to determine the ontological status of musical versions and transcriptions, the empirical evidence recovered will attain them. For this purpose, this chapter will be divided in two sections. In section 2, the phenomena of versions and transcriptions will be approached attending to different parameters: the scope and relevance of versions and transcriptions in our musical practices, how

versions and transcriptions are usually catalogued, and how musicologists approach them in their analysis. In section III, an empirical study of listeners' intuitions about versions and transcriptions will be offered. The empirical study aims to determine how we intuitively individuate versions and transcriptions, i.e. to determine whether or not we intuitively regard versions and transcriptions as musical works different from the work versioned or transcribed. As argued in chapter 2, the degree of familiarity of an intuition does not determine its entrenchment, and ontology is only constrained to preserve entrenched intuitions. However, since the coherence with our familiar intuitions is one of the criteria for ontological choice according to reflective equilibrium in metaontology, accounting for the way in which we think about versions and transcriptions is of a great relevance. *Ceteris paribus* regarding explanatory power, simplicity and integration in other domains of knowledge, the ontological proposal to be preferred will be the less revisionary of our familiar intuitions.

2.   Description of the phenomenon

Musical works are typically understood as accurate, final and perfectly finished entities in Western musical tradition. Our musical and critical practices tend to identify each musical work with only one sound structure, the one that is indicated by the original score written by the composer. Beethoven's 5th *Symphony* is identified with the sound structure indicated by him in 1808, Strauss' *Ein Heldenleben* is identified with the sound structure indicated by the Bavarian composer in 1898, and so on. Besides these current cases, it is not uncommon in our musical and critical practices to talk about works of music that have more than one version. As defined in chapter 1, a version is a revision of a previous work that involves partial modifications on the original sound structure and, sometimes, on the original instrumentation. Versions of musical works can be undertaken either by the work's composer or by a different person. For instance, on the one hand, Sibelius modified his *Fifth Symphony* twice –in 1916 and 1919– after the premiere of the work, seeking to improve the previous versions. On the other, Karl Marguerre is said to have penned a performing version of Mozart's *Horn Concerto* in D K412/514 from the original manuscript, which was incomplete. Something similar happens with transcriptions. Transcriptions were defined in chapter 1 as a change of a work's original instrumentation, which sometimes may involve changes in the original sound structure to adapt it to the technical and physical specificities of the new set of instruments. Similarly to versions, they can be produced by the original work's composer or by another person. For instance, Brahms wrote twenty *Hungarian Dances* between 1852 and 1869 for four-hands piano. He later transcribes three of them, Nos. 1, 3 and 10, for orchestra (cf. Tranchefort, 1998: 195). However, we can find orchestral transcriptions of the remaining dances carried out by other composers, such as Antonin Dvorak, Hans Gál, Andreas Hallén or Ivan Fischer.

The cases of versions and transcriptions seem to collide *prima facie* with the more typical ones, those in which composers indicate one and only one version of their

musical works. Both versions and transcriptions have in common that they implement modifications on usually regarded as previously finished musical works. Even though they are not overwhelmingly common, cases of versions and transcriptions are neither marginal nor rare. The practice of transcriptions is not unusual in our musical practices. We can find several examples of Beethoven's symphonies transcribed for piano, or Bach's corals transcribed for brass quintet. These transcriptions are usually written by others than the original work's composers. It is also not unusual to find versions composed by other than the original work's composer, as Marc Parrot's version of Nino Bravo's *Libre* or Robbie William's version of Queen's *Bohemian Rhapsody*. It might be thought that cases in which a composer decides to revise a work that she has supposedly previously finished are more bizarre than the previous ones. However, even if they are, a relevant number of examples can be found. The following table offers a list of cases of musical versions implemented by the original work's composer.

Composer	Work	Versions	Observations	Duration
Balakirev (1837-1910)	Russian Overture nº 2	1864		12'
		1887		
Bartók (1881-1945)	Second Suite for Orchestra (Op. 4) (BB 40)	1907		
		1921		
		1943		
Bartók (1881-1945)	Concert for Orchestra (Sz. 116; BB123)	1944	Lengthen the last movement	40'
		1945		
Beethoven (1770-1827)	Overture Fidelio	Leonora II (1805) Op. 72b	They are not musical works but parts of a musical work.	14'
		Leonora III (1806) Op. 72c		12'
		Leonora I (1807) Op. 138		9'
		Fidelio, overture in E major (1814) Op. 72		6'
Beethoven (1770-1827)	Piano Concerto nº1 (op. 19)	1795		27'
		1801		
Berlioz (1803-1869)	Le Maure jaloux (H9)	H9A (1819)	Romance for voice and piano	
		H9B (1822)	L'Arabe jaloux – autograph survives	
Berlioz (1803-1869)	Amitié reprends ton empire (H10)	H10A (1819)	Romance for 3 voices and piano	
		H10B (1823)	Autograph survives	

Berlioz (1803-1869)	No. 4 La Belle Voyageuse Ballade	H42A (1829)	For voice and piano	
		H42B (1834)	For male quartet and orchestra (lost)	
		H42C (1842)	For mezzo-soprano and orchestra	
		H42D (1851)	For female chorus and orchestra	
Berlioz (1803-1869)	La captive	H60A (1832)	For voice and piano	
		H60B (1832)	For voice and piano	
		H60C (1832)	For voice, cello and piano	
		H60D (1834)	For soprano and orchestra (lost)	
		H60E (1848)	For contralto or mezzo-soprano and orchestra, in E major	
		H60F (1848)	For contralto or mezzo-soprano and orchestra, in D major	
Berlioz (1803-1869)	Les Champs Romance for voice and piano	H67A (1834)	Romance for voice and piano	
		H67B (1850)		
Berlioz (1803-1869)	Zaïde. Boléro.	H107A (1845)	For voice and piano	
		H107B (1845)	For voice and orchestra	
Berlioz (1803-1869)	Le Chasseur danois	H104A (1844)	For voice and piano	
		H104B (1845)	For voice and orchestra	
Berlioz (1803-1869)	Ouverture du Corsaire	H101A (1844)		
		H101B (1851)		
Berio (1925-2003)	Concertino for clarinet, violin, harp, celesta and strings.	1949		
		1970		
Berio (1925-2003)	Epiphanies for orchestra and a female voice	1961	Movements are added	40'
		1965		
Borodín (1833-1887)	Simphony nº 2	1877		31'
		1879		
Bolulez 1925	Le soleil des eaux	1948		9'
		1958		
		1965		
Bolulez 1925	Pli selon pli	1957	- Composed in stages. - New movements are added and reorganized.	67'
		1959		
		1960		
		1962		
		1962		
		1984		
Boulez 1925	Figures, Doubles, Prismes for orchestra	1958	- Conceived as "work in progress". - Sections are added and dimensions are enlarged.	13'
		1963		
		1968		

Boulez 1925	Répons	1981	- Conceived as "work in progress". - Sections are added and dimensions are enlarged.	45'
		1982		
		1984		
		1985		
Brahms (1833-1897)	Variations on a Haydn theme	Op. 56a (orchestra)		17'
		Op. 56b (dos pianos		
Britten (1913-1976)	Concert for piano and orchestra (Op. 13)	1938	New version of the slow movement.	35'
		1946		
Britten (1913-1976)	Concert no. 2 for violin and orchestra (Op. 13)	1939		32'
		1951		
Bruckner (1824-1896)	Symphony no. 1 (A 77)	1868	New end. Light touch-ups	46'
		1891		
Bruckner (1824-1896)	Symphony no. 2 (A 93)	1872	Cuts in each movement. Replacement of horn by clarinet in the final solo of the adagio.	55'
		1877		
Bruckner (1824-1896)	Symphony no. 3 (A 94)	1873	Cuts in movements. Added a coda in the Scherzo.	55'
		1877		
		1878		
		1889		
Bruckner (1824-1896)	Symphony no. 4 (A 95)	1874		65'
		1878	Revision movs. 1 and 2. New Scherzo. Shortened finale	
		1880	New end. They usually play the first three movements of 1878 and the end of 1880.	
		1888		
Bruckner (1824-1896)	Symphony no. 8 (A 117)	1887	Mov. 1: suppression fortissimo conclusion by pianissimo. Mov 2: modifying themes of the trio. Movs. 3 and 4: shortened. Edition of the 1890 version but without the cuts.	75'
		1890		
Chaikovski (1840-1893)	Symphony no. 1 (Op. 13)	1868	Revision of movements 1, 2 y 4	43'
		1874		

Chaikovski (1840-1893)	Symphony no. 2 (Op. 17)	1873	Mov 1: - Theme A new - Theme B = subject A 1873. Mov. 2: not revised. Mov. 3: orchestration and accompaniments. Mov. 4: cut of 150 in re-exposure.	38' y 33'
		1879		
Chaikovski (1840-1893)	Romeo and Juliet	1869		20'
		1870	Rewrite introduction. Modification of the development.	
		1880	Details coda.	
Gálvez-Taroncher 1974	Spanish Song Book		Work in progress	
Grieg (1803-1907)	Piano Concerto (Op. 16)	1868	Love Derwinger records the 1868 version for the first time in 1999.	
		1872		
		1906		
Liszt (1811-1886)	Tasso, lamento e trionfo	1849		19'
		1854		
Liszt (1811-1886)	Hamlet	1858	New part (character Ophelia)	14'
		1876		
Mahler (1860-1911)	Symphony no. 1	1889	One less movement	50'
		1896		
Messiaen (1908-1992)	Anthem for great orchestra	1932	Missing score 1932 version	13'
		1947		
Milhaud (1892-1974)	The Ox on the Roof: The Nothing-Doing Bar	Op. 58a 1919	Op. 58c has a different title: *Tango de los Fratellini*	19'
		Op. 58b (Violin y orch.)		
		Op. 58c (Piano and small orch.)		
Prokofiev (1891-1953)	Symphony N° 4 (Op. 47/112)	1930	Increase the dimensions	39'
		1947		
Rachmaninov (1873-1943)	Concerto for piano no. 1 (Op. 1)	1892		25'
		1917		
Ravel (1875-1937)	Ma mère l'Oye	1908	From children's piece to 4 hands to a ballet. - Add a prelude, an episode and several new interludes.	28'
		1911		
Rimski-Korsakov (1844-1908)	Antar, symphonic suite (Symphony N° 2) Op. 9	1868 (Balakirev 1869)	Programmatic work. Retouches, integral reconstruction and development of passages.	
		1879 (Published by Bessel 1880, reedition 1903)		28'
		1897 (Published en 1913)		35'
Rubinstein (1829-1894)	Symphony N° 2, Océano	1851	4 mov	40'
		1863	Adagio y Scherzo added	
		1880	7th movement added	

Schoenberg (1874-1951)	The night transfigured	1899	Strings sextet	30'
		1917	Strings orchestra	
		1943	Strings orchestra	
Schoenberg (1874-1951)	Chamber Suite N° 1. Op. 9	1906	15 instr. soloists	21'
		1935	Big orchestrta	
Schumann (1810-1856)	Symphony no. 4 (Op. 120)	1841	Revision and reinstrumentation	30'
		1851		
Schumann	Fantasie in C, Op. 17	1836		
		1839		
Sibelius (1865-1957)	Symphony no. 5 (Op. 82)	1915	4 movements	30'
		1916	Lost	
		1919	3 movements	
Sibelius (1865-1957)	En Saga	1892		18'
		1901		
Sibelius (1865-1957)	Lemminkainen Suite (Op. 22)	1896	1954: he order of the two central parts is reversed	46'
		1897		
		1954		
Stravinsky (1882-1971)	Pastorale for voice and piano	1908	Voice and piano	
		1923	Arranged for voice and woodwind instruments	
		1933	For violin and piano	
		1933	For violin and four woodwinds	
Stravinsky (1882-1971)	The Firebird	1910	Ballet in two scenes	
		1911	Rearranged as suite for piano solo and as suite for orchestra	
		1919	Reorchestrated	
		1945	Revised	
Stravinsky (1882-1971)	Petrouschka	1911		
		1911	Arranged for piano four hands	
		1921	Three movements excerpted and arranged for piano solo	
		1947		
Stravinsky (1882-1971)	Pulcinella	1919	Ballet in one act with 3 solo voices	
		1920	Suite arranged for small orchestra	
		1925	Suite arranged for violin and piano	
		1933	Suite italienne for violin and piano	
		1932	Suite italienne for cello and piano	
		1949		
Stravinsky (1882-1971)	Suite italienne	1933	Suite italienne for violin and piano	
		1932	Suite italienne for cello and piano	

Stravinsky (1882-1971)	Apollo, Leader of the Muses	1928	Ballet in two tableaux for string orchestra	
		1948		
Stravinsky (1882-1971)	Capriccio for Piano and Orchestra	1928	Ballet allegory in four tableaux	
		1934	Orchestral suite	
		1949	New version	
Stravinsky (1882-1971)	Symphony of Psalms for chorus and orchestra	1930		
		1948		
Richard Strauss (1864-1949)	The burguês gentilhombre, orchestral suite (Op. 60)	1912	From interludes for Molière's comedy to orchestra suite	35'
		1917		
		1919		
Wagner (1813-1883)	Fausto, obertura em re menor	1844		12'
		1855		

The list presented above collects 60 examples of musical works that are said to have different versions composed by the original work's composer. It is not an exhaustive list of all cases of musical versions. The research is mainly based on the corpus of musical works included in René Tranchefort's (1998) *Symphonic Music Guide*, and complemented by some examples obtained from René Tranchefort's (2005) *Chamber Music Guide*, the Complete List of Works of Hector Berlioz given in *The Hector Berlioz Website*,[33] a List of Works of Igor Stravinsky provided by CUNY,[34] the *Béla Bartók Thematic Catalogue,* [35] and other punctual examples of contemporary composers that are not still accounted on any corpus. Accordingly, the list is mainly focused on symphonic musical works –a genre that includes symphonies, overtures, symphonic poems, concertos and ballets– of the most relevant composers in Western musical tradition. More residually, it also contains a small number of examples of chamber music works. Consequently, the list is not exhaustive, but it seems sufficient to illustrate the dimension of the phenomenon of work's versions in what might be regarded as the most bizarre kind of cases: those in which the version is produced by the original work's composer. Showing the relevance of this kind of cases ensures the relevance of more typical ones, such as versions and transcriptions made by other than the original work's composer.

The list contains some examples that might be regarded as transcriptions rather than versions according to the definitions given above. For instance, Ravel's *Ma mère l'Oye* was initially composed in 1908 for four-hands piano, and then it was reconverted in a ballet for orchestra by Ravel himself in 1911. Other examples are Stravinsky's arrangements for piano solo of *The Firebird* and *Petrouschka*. All these cases may be

---

[33] The complete catalogue is available here: http://www.hberlioz.com/Works/Catalogue.htm.
[34] https://qcpages.qc.cuny.edu/hhowe/music784/Stravinsky_Works.html
[35] The complete catalogue is available here: http://zti.hu/index.php/en/ba/bartok-compositions/manuscripts

regarded as transcriptions rather than versions. However, the original pieces to which such transcriptions correspond were modified more than once by their composers, so that these cases were accounted on the list as one of the multiple revisions of such works. More interesting are the cases of Berlioz's *La Belle Voyageuse*, *Zaïde* and *Le Chasseur Danois*. *La Belle Voyageuse* was originally composed in 1829 and orchestrated by Berlioz in 1834. However, they are labelled as 'version I' and 'version II' in Berlioz's catalogue. The same procedure is applied in the case of *Zaïde* and *Le Chasseur Danois*. Concerning both works, what appears as 'version II' in Berlioz's catalogue may be considered as a transcription made by the original work's composer according to the definition of 'transcription' given here. However, they are introduced in the table because we want to preserve the highest fidelity to the way in which these musical products are treated in musicological cataloguing practices. In this sense, the borderline between versions and transcriptions is not as clear as it might seem *prima facie*. It might be that versions and transcriptions are pointing to the same, or a very similar, phenomenon. However, this issue will remain unexplored until the next two chapters, where the ontological status of versions and transcriptions will be explored in more detail.

A relevant aspect to be observed in the list is that there is a notable tendency in musicology to catalogue the versions of a work with the same number of work (opus). This is the case of Bartok's *Second Suite for Orchestra*, which has three versions –from 1907, 1921 and 1942– that are classified in the *Béla Bartók Thematic Catalogue* with the same nomenclature: BB40. The nomenclature 'BB' is defined as the 'work number' in the *Béla Bartók Thematic Catalogue*.[36] Bartok's *Second Suite for Orchestra* with its three versions appears described in the following way in the abovementioned catalogue:

---

[36] The complete catalogue is available here: http://zti.hu/index.php/en/ba/bartok-compositions/manuscripts.

BB 40
Suite no. 2, op.4, for orchestra (1905–1907)
Sketches (incomplete): (1) fragmentary continuity sketches for Mov. I–II, and IV (PB, in 12FSS1ID1); — (2) partial sketches (BBA, in 2002a).
Autogr. score, originally titled *Szerenád* [Serenade], printer's copy of the 1st edition by the composer *(Selbstverlag B.B.),* with a later revision of pp. 29–32 (PB 12FSS1ID1).

Revised copies of the 1st edition:
(1) Bartók's personal copy (BBA BH32).
(2) Copy of the Budapest Philharmonic Society (BBA 2131).
(3) Printer's copy of the 1921 2nd edition, UE 6981 (WSLB).
Slightly revised copy of the 2nd edition (BBjr).
MS orchestral parts, copyist's work with Bartók's autogr. corrections (heavily corrected, representing the text of the 1st and 2nd editions) (Budapest F.Liszt Academy of Music, deposited in BBA).
American revision:
(1) Copy of the UE edition with rewritten pages in Mov. IV, c1942 (photostat of the [missing?] MS pages) (PB 12FSFC1).
(2) Printer's copy of the 1948 3rd edition, B&H 16160, marked *revised 1943 edition* (without Bartók's hand) (PB 12FSFC3).
2-piano version: **BB 122**.

It is remarkable that only a piano version of this piece –which would be regarded as a transcription rather than as a version according to the definitions given above– is classified with a different number of work. The other three versions –in which is not operated a change of instrumentation– are regarded in the catalogue as not constituting numerically different musical works. This is also the case of Bruckner's *8th Symphony*, which has two versions of 1887 and 1890, both of them classified with the same number of work: A117. In this sense, these versions are regarded as non-numerically different musical works. The same thing happens with Sibelius' *5th Symphony*, whose 1915, 1916 and 1919 versions are indistinctly catalogued as Op. 82. Accordingly, the three versions of this symphony are not considered as numerically different musical works.

Other typical procedure is to assign the same number of work to the different versions of a piece, but distinguishing between them with letters. The Hector Berlioz catalogue proceeds in this way, assigning the same number of work (H) but different letters to the different versions of a piece. For instance, this is the case of Berlioz's *La Captive*, which is classified in the following way:

| 1832 | *La Captive*
Version I (H60A): for voice and piano
First performance: Louise Vernet sang the work at the Villa Medici both before and after Berlioz's stay in Rome. See also Subiaco and the chapter on Berlioz in Legouvé's *Soixante ans de souvenirs*
Version II (H60B): for voice and piano
Version III (H60C): for voice, cello and piano
First performance: 30 December 1832, Salle du Conservatoire
See 1848 for Versions V-VI and Table II, 1834 for Version IV | 15 |

| before November 1834 | La Captive
Version IV (H60D): for soprano and orchestra
Performed on 23 November 1834, Salle du Conservatoire, Girard conducting
Lost
See Table I, 1832 for the other versions (extant) | |
| before November 1834 | La Jeune Paysan breton (H65B) | |

| 1848 | La Captive
Version V (H60E): for contralto or mezzo-soprano and orchestra, in E major
First performance: 29 June 1848, London, Berlioz conducting (with Pauline Viardot)
Version VI (H60F): for contralto or mezzo-soprano and orchestra, in D major
First performance: 29 October 1848, Versailles, Berlioz conducting
See 1832 for Version I | 13 |

As pointed previously, the Berlioz's catalogue does not distinguish between versions and transcriptions. What in the catalogue are regarded as the versions IV, V and VI of *La Captive* would be considered as transcriptions under the definition offered here. The relevant fact is, nonetheless, that all these versions and transcriptions are classified with the same number of work and distinguished only with letters. In other terms, they are not regarded in the catalogue as *musical works* numerically different from the original version of 1832 for voice and piano. Another example of the same kind is the case of Mihauld's *The Ox on the Roof: The Nothing-Doing Bar*. This piece has three different versions composed by Mihauld, which are classified with the same number of work (Op. 58) but with different letters: a, b and c respectively.

Therefore, a general tendency in musicology to reject a classification of versions and transcriptions as works numerically different from the original can be observed in the list presented above. Of course, counterexamples of this tendency can be found. For instance, let us consider the Mueller & Eckhardt (2001) list of works of Franz Liszt. Apart from a remarkable career as composer and pianist, one of the most outstanding facets of Liszt was his labour as a transcriber (cf. Kregor: 2010). He did not only transcribe for other instruments many of his original compositions, but also a relevant number of musical works composed by others than him. The cases that more interest us here are those in which Liszt was the composer of the original work transcribed. An example of them is *Der Tanz in der Dorfschenke*, which was initially written for orchestra. It appears in Mueller & Eckhardt list with the nomenclature G16/2. However, the Liszt's transcription for piano of this piece is classified in the catalogue with a nomenclature radically different, namely, A189/1. Contrary to the tendency appreciated in the table, this classification suggests that the transcription is considered as a work numerically different from the original and belonging to a different musical genre. Additional examples like these can be easily found in Mueller & Eckhardt list. However, the assumption that transcriptions are different works from the work transcribed should not be attributed so quickly to the Mueller & Eckhardt classification. In the same list, other examples pointing on the opposite direction can also be identified. For instance, *Die Loreley* is a vocal song originally written by Liszt of voice and pianoforte, and it figures in the classification as N5. However, Liszt's transcription of

this piece for voice and orchestra appears in the catalogue as N5/3, i.e., as the same number of work but distinguished by a number, similarly to the way in which the versions and transcriptions of Berlioz's *La Captive* are classified. This case, and similar others that can be identified in Mueller & Eckhardt list, suggests the idea that transcriptions are not different works form the original, which contradicts the idea prompted by the way in which the transcription of *Der Tanz in der Dorfschenke* is classified. Consequently, the ontological view of versions and transcriptions assumed by Mueller & Eckhardt in making the list cannot be easily determined, and hence it does not constitute a straightforward counterexample to the tendency noted in the table.

Putting aside these concerns, the musicologists' tendency to consider that versions and transcriptions of a same work are not works numerically different deserves a closer examination. The relevant issue now is to explore what the motivations that ground this trend are. Considerations about the resemblance between different sound structures are typically involved. But this seems not to be a sufficient motivation because similar sound structures can be classified in some cases as different musical works. We should look for additional motivations to classify versions and transcriptions of a work as works non-numerically different. This is the aim of the next section. In first place, the focus will be put on the composer's motivations to produce a new version of a work regarding three paradigmatic examples –Bruckner's *8th Symphony*, Sibelius' *5th Symphony* and Rimsky-Korsakov's version of Musorgsky's *Pictures at an exhibition*. Next, the composer's motivations to generate a transcription will be attended, paying special attention to Liszt's case. Finally, another sort of purely technical and contextual issues will be considered as a relevant source of motivations for the trend in musicology to catalogue versions and transcriptions as non-numerically different works from the original.

2.1 Composer's motivations

This section is devoted to explore the composer's motivations for generating versions and transcriptions of previous works. These motivations might ground the tendency of classifying the versions and transcriptions of a work as works non-numerically different. In order to differentiate both phenomena, the composer's motivations for the generation of both kinds of musical products will be addressed separately.

a) *Motivations for a new version*

Bruckner's *8th Symphony* has two versions, from 1887 and 1890, composed by him. Among the motivations for producing the version of 1890, some of them are intimately tied to Bruckner's context of composition, while other ones can be regarded as purely musical or formalistic ones. The most important motivations dependent on his

context of composition involve his relationship with the famous conductor Herman Levi, one of the most influential musicians in Munich and the Bavarian Court at Bruckner's time. Fascinated by Bruckner's previous works, Levi aided Bruckner in different ways to promote his career as a composer (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 15-17). The correspondence between them was fruitful, and when Bruckner finished the 1887 version, he wrote Levi offering to him in gratitude the premiere of the work (Korstvedt, 2000: 15). Bruckner was very proud of his 1887 version, and his expectations were to gratify Levi with the premiere of an outstanding musical piece. However, things did not run as Bruckner expected. Levi felt 'terribly disappointed' with a work to which 'the orchestra and the public' would 'offer great resistance' form his point of view. He judged the instrumentation of the piece as 'impossible' to perform and its formal structure as a 'copy' of Burckner's *7th Symphony* (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 17). To this extent, Levi recommended Bruckner a revision of this work, specially attending to reduce the difficulties that the first version of the symphony posed to be performed (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 18). Therefore, Levi was neither rejecting the *8th Symphony* as a whole nor asking Bruckner to compose a new different musical work. He only demanded Bruckner to revise some aspects of the work to adjust it to the orchestra's technical possibilities and to the taste of the Bavarian public.

Bruckner was initially refractory to Levi's criticisms, in spite of politely accepting them. He was convinced of the artistic value of his 1887 and sure that it was possible to be performed (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 19). Nonetheless, some months later after quietly reflecting upon Levi's criticisms, Bruckner acknowledges the need to revise the work and to proceed to 'major alterations' on it. However, Bruckner's main goal in the 1890 version was not to simplify the 1887 version for public and performers. Although the initial motivation for the 1890 version was a contextual affair –namely, Levi's rejection of the 1887 version–, the main motivation for Bruckner was to revise some aspects of the 1887 version that he did not find accurate from a purely musical or formalistic viewpoint (Korstvedt, 2000: 19, 72). In Korstvedt analysis, the changes introduced by Bruckner in the 1890 version 'exhibit a compelling musical logic and it is wholly understandable that Bruckner felt that they improved the work' (Korstvedt, 2000: 72-76). For instance, he altered the harmonic scheme to approach the recapitulation of the first movement in order to 'solidifying the tonal framework' of the development, starting and finishing this section with the dominant of C in the 1890 version (Korstvedt, 2000: 76). In the second movement, Bruckner revised the B and C themes to 'emphasize' and 'clarify' the preparation of the Trio (Korstvedt, 2000: 77). Therefore, Bruckner's motivation in producing the 1890 version was not to generate a new musical work different from the 1887 version, but rather to improve some musical items of it. These changes obey to a purely musical motivation rather than to an attempt to make the piece easily performable. In this sense, Bruckner's motivation might be interpreted as if he thought that the performances that would result from following the instructions he gave in the first version's score do not offer an adequate access to the work, namely, his *8th Symphony*. By contrast, he would be committed to that the performances following the instructions he wrote in the 1890 score would provide a

better, or maybe the right, access to that work. In any case, both the contextual and formalistic motivations point to the idea of revising and improving the 1887 version of the *8th Symphony* rather than to produce a new and different musical work.

Another interesting example in which both contextual and formalistic motivations play a role is Sibelius' *5th Symphony*, a work that has three versions, from 1915, 1916 and 1919, respectively. Formalistic motivations seem to be the chief ones in leading Sibelius to produce the 1916 version. Sibelius composed the 1915 version with hurries, and different commentaries in his diary evince his worries to finish the work on time for the date signed for its premiere, the 8 December 1815, in a concert organised for his birthday (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 41-2). One month after the premiere, Sibelius began to express his dissatisfaction with the 1915 version, claiming that he was 'still not satisfied with the symphony's form' (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 51). To this extent, Sibelius fused the first and second movements of the 1915 version in only one movement, and added a new section to the coda of the former second movement in order to provide 'more balance' for the fused movement of the 1916 version, considerably larger than the initially conceived in the 1915 version (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 52).

Another formal motivation underlying the composition of the 2nd and 3rd versions of the symphony has to do with his doubts concerning the artistic genre in which the work was to be understood. He expressed in different places his worries of whether the piece should fall under the symphonic genre or if, alternatively, it should be regarded as a fantasia (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 40). These doubts are of an extreme relevance because the artistic category in which the artist places his work has consequences for the structure or form that he gives to that work. The emplacement of a work by its author within an artistic category generates certain expectations about the work in an appropriate audience, expectations that have to do with the form and content of the piece in performance. If the piece is ascribed to the symphonic genre, more structural regularities are expected by the listener. If, alternatively, the work is placed in the category of fantasia, the listener expects a freer piece than the ones falling under traditional musical forms. The artistic genre of fantasia is typically associated to pieces that aim to express the inner world or subjectivity of the artist, and traditional forms are not regarded as the suitable means of expression of such kind of content. Additionally, if a fantasia expresses the inner world of an artist, and she changes radically some years later, a radical revision of the piece would be justified to accommodate it to the actual mental state of the composer. This explains Sibelius' doubts in reducing the work to just one movement, or maintaining the three-movement form regarding the 1919 version, or in recomposing radically the first movement, or in maintaining the 1916 first movement (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 54-57). The motivation of these changes is not to compose a new musical work different from the original version, but rather to solve a formal problem concerning the artistic category to be ascribed to the work.

Contextual motivations also played a crucial role in encouraging Sibelius to compose the 1919 version. The 1916 version obtained a heterogeneous reception, and

negative reviews in relevant journals were addressed against the pizzicato movement (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 53). Especially influential was the point of view of the baron Axel Carpelan, one of Sibelius' more closest friends and regarded sometimes as one of his spiritual mentors. Carpelan's praise of the 1916 first movement was decisive for Sibelius not to delete it in the 1919 version, and his worries about the pizzicato movement and other parts of the symphony were considered by Sibelius to revise the symphony (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 54-56).

In all these cases, what it is at stake is not the composition of a new work different from the 1916 version, but rather a musical improvement of it. It is right that Sibelius is ambiguous in his claims concerning this point. For instance, he claims the 22 March 1918 that 'I'm composing new works. Today, the last movement of the fifth' (Hepokoski, 1993: 56), which clearly suggests that he is regarding the revision of the symphony as the composition of a new different work. However, his claim on 22 April 1918 that 'The Fifth Symphony, *mirabile*, not to say *horribile*, *dictum*, is finished in its final form' (Hepokoski, 1993: 57) suggests the opposite idea, i.e. that the new version is not a different piece but the result of operating refinements in previous versions corresponding to previous stages of the process of composition of the symphony. In any case, the general context in which such claims are made presuppose the idea that Sibelius was working on a revision of some parts of the same piece of music.

Interesting is also the case of Rimsky-Korsakov's version of Musorgsky's *Pictures at an exhibition*. By contrast with the two former examples, this a case of a version made by a composer other than the original work's composer and after his death. To this extent, Rimsky-Korsakov's version was not intended by Musorgsky. It was commissioned by a publisher interested in editing *post-mortem* some of Musorgsky's unpublished works (cf. Russ, 1992: 22). The modifications operated by Rimsky in Musorgsky's score, again, obey to formalistic motivations, having to do with the improvement of purely musical procedures. This view is illustrated by Rimsky's judgment about Musorgsky's general work:

> I undertook to set in order and complete all of Musorgsky's works and turn over gratis to the Bessel firm those that I should find suitable for the purpose (…). [Musorgsky's manuscripts] were in exceedingly imperfect order; there occurred absurd, incoherent harmonies, ugly part-writing, illogical modulation, ill-chosen instrumentation (…). Publication without a skilful hand to put them in order would have had no sense save a biographical-historical one (cited in Russ, 1992: 22).

Rimsky's judgment is that Musorgsky's manuscripts are not accurate from a purely musical point of view. His claim that it would make 'no sense' to publish them without a revision, except a mere 'biographical-historical' interest, presupposes a realism about musical works that regards their existence and identity conditions to go beyond the composer's life and intentions. In this sense, he judged that the way in which Musorgsky presents his works is not accurate and does not makes (musical or artistic) justice to them. His main motivation is thus to offer a presentation of such

works more faithful to them from a technical and purely musical point of view. More precisely, Rimsky's judgment is that a performance that accurately follows Mussorgsky's instructions in the original score of *Pictures at an exhibition* would not provide a right or adequate access to the work. This judgment is what motivates the changes he introduced in his version of the work and all other works that he revised for Bessel publisher. In any case, it seems obvious that he does not intend as new works the versions that he delivers to Bessel publisher.

Nonetheless, the changes operated by Rimsky in *Pictures at an exhibition* are not radical ones. His revisions mainly involve adjustments in phrasing, dynamics and articulation, while harmonic and rhythmical changes are very few and punctual (Russ, 1992: 23). A relevant point to be highlighted is that Rimsky's version of *Pictures at an exhibition*, but not Musorgsky's original one, was regarded as the main reference of this piece. Musorgsky's manuscript was not available until 1975, and some of the most famous orchestral transcriptions of *Pictures at an exhibition* –as Ravel, Cailliet or Funtek ones– were made upon Rimsky's version. Despite this fact, all these transcriptions are regarded as orchestrations of the same musical work initially composed by Musorgsky. To this extent, almost all the transcribers of this piece tried to be as faithful as possible to Mussorgsky's original style of composition (cf. Russ, 1992: 77-84).

Therefore, as we have seen in this section, the main motivations either contextual or formalistic for writing a new version of a musical work point to the idea that the new version is neither intended nor conceived as a new work different from the work versioned. In this sense, they support the general tendency of musicological classification of versions observed in the table offered at the beginning of the chapter. The way in which musicologists tend to classify a work's version coheres with (and accommodates) the sort of motivations that usually lead a composer to produce a new version of a work. It has been also noted that the intuitions involved in this topic are not absolutely straightforward and clear. Nonetheless, the examination of this last point will occupy the last part of this chapter.

b) *Motivations for a transcription*

As in the case of versions, the motivations for transcribing a musical work can obey to both contextual and purely musical factors. For instance, a musical work can be transcribed to facilitate its performance in a particular context. If, in a particular context, it is difficult to find musicians to shape a whole orchestra, a transcription of an orchestral piece for piano or a small ensemble will facilitate the availability of performances of that piece. This is a case in which an original piece is adapted to the constraints imposed by a particular context to be performed. The motivation for writing a transcription is here of a purely contextual nature. However, sometimes the motivations for a transcription have to do with non-contextual and formal musical

aspects. Other times contextual and formalistic aspects are combined in motivating a transcription.

One pure musical motivation is to exploit the instrumental and colour possibilities of a musical work. Given the original version of the work with its original instrumentation, a composer can discover musical colours on it that could be better achieved or exploited if performed with other sort of instruments. This motivation seems to explain the big number of transcriptions of Musorgsky' *Pictures at an exhibition*. Regarding this work, Russ argues that 'these colourful and sometimes powerful pieces with their unsympathetic writing for the piano have left the feeling that the work should be orchestrated' (Russ, 1992: 76). Russ' words suggest that the way in which Musorgsky presented *Pictures* does not exhaust the musical, timbral and expressive possibilities of that work. It demands to be orchestrated in order to develop the potential colours that are not completely exploited by means of its original instrumentation. The demand comes from a pure formalistic motivation of developing at maximum the artistic possibilities of a musical work. This formalistic view justifies also a composer to make a transcription with the aim of improving the original work's version. In this way, Ravel tried to refine in his transcription Musorgsky's original dynamics and accents, introducing a wide variety of them in order to improve the expressive character of the piece, taking advantage of the expressive range of the orchestral instruments that he introduces. Similarly, Kregor argues that 'Liszt was well aware of the ways in which transcriptions could accomplish what the original works could not' (Kregor, 2010: 3-4). According to Kregor, Liszt conceived his transcriptions as a means to develop the previously unexhausted musical possibilities of a work. In all these cases, the motivation is not to compose a new musical work, but to improve and exploit the musical possibilities of a work by means of transcribing it for instruments different from the ones originally prescribed by the composer.

In association with this idea, a transcription may be motivated by the aim to obtain a better understanding of a particular musical work. For instance, Schönberg regarded transcriptions for piano of orchestral pieces as a means to facilitate the judgment about the musical quality of a work. According to Schönberg, 'a work could be better judged without an orchestral decoration, that one could better find out what it really contained of musical quality' (cited in Kregor, 2010: 22). The transcription for piano facilitates the appreciation of what he takes to be the work's essence, namely, its colourless sound structure −i.e. melody, harmony and rhythm. Insofar the transcription for piano simplifies the complexity of colours and textures of an orchestral work, it simplifies the lecture and listening of the core of that piece. The same seems to be the point of Liszt's transcriptions of Beethoven and Berlioz symphonies (cf. Kregor, 2010: 5-6). Again, this is a formalistic motivation. The aim of the transcription is not to obtain a new musical work different from the work transcribed, but rather to facilitate the judgment about the musical quality of the transcribed work. The transcription here is not intended as a substitute of the work transcribed, but rather as a new way of presenting the original that illuminates certain aspects of it.

Although the main motivations either contextual or formalistic for transcription point to the idea of presenting in a new way the work transcribed, this does not entail that the composition of a transcription is not a creative process. The generation of a transcription does not consists in mechanically copying note-per-note the original work's version for a different set of instruments. The transcriber has to evaluate and take decisions to solve some musical and acoustic problems that arise in this task. For instance, returning to the case of *Pictures at an exhibition*, two main worries to transcribe it have been highlighted (Russ, 1992: 76). In the first place, the difficulties of being faithful to Musorgsky's orchestral style, for the corpus of orchestral pieces by Musorgsky is not enough to determine clear criteria. In second place, the presence in the original version for piano of a relevant amount of dense textures in the low-register, rapid movements entirely in the high register and passages pretending the virtuosity of a piano performance constitutes a challenge to transcribe the piece for orchestral instruments. In light of these difficulties, the transcriber has to reinterpret the piece and to take decisions to offer a satisfactory and acceptable score for orchestral performance. This is not a peculiarity of *Pictures at an exhibition*, but a phenomenon to be faced regarding the transcription of any musical work. To this extent, not any way of transcribing a musical work is adequate for the new medium. In addition, there may be many different valid ways of solving the difficulties for transcription raised originally by the work, and the transcriber has to decide which ones she considers to be the most accurate in a particular situation (cf. Russ, 1992: 83).

Attending to different examples of transcriptions, Kregor distinguishes two models of transcription by analogy with literary translation. The first model consists in approaching the original work's version to the reader of the new musical medium (cf. Kregor, 2010: 19-27). The goal of this model is to obtain a piece absolutely idiomatic for the instruments of the new musical medium. The target here is that the transcription obtained has the appearance of an original piece for the new musical medium. As a paradigmatic example, Kregor appeals to Czerny's transcription of Mozart's 'Lacrimosa' of his *Requiem*. Kregor argues that the criterion followed by Czerny is similar to the literal paraphrase in translation: to preserve the fidelity note-per-note with the original, obtaining a material that constitutes the skeleton upon which the idiomatic elements of the piano (the new medium) are placed (cf. Kregor, 2010: 20). Kregor argues that Czerny is faithful to Mozart to the extent that he reformulates the original motives and figurations to the pianistic idiom of the new medium. The result is a 're-creation of what Mozart's 'Lacrimosa' might have looked and sounded like had it been composed for the piano' (Kregor, 2010: 25). Accordingly, the score presented is fully adapted to the piano language and technics. The piano player has to face it as if it just were the score of any piece originally written for piano.

The second model of transcription consists in approaching the reader to the original version of the work transcribed (cf. Kregor, 2010: 27-33). In this model, the transcriber does not intend to provide a fully idiomatic score to the performers of the

new medium. By contrast, the goal is to introduce foreign elements to the idiom of the new musical medium in an attempt to make the performer to abandon the musical procedures with which she is familiarized. In other words, the target is to move the richness of the original work's version to the new medium generating on it new technical and expressive means. One of the paradigmatic composers following this practice is Liszt, as he himself acknowledges:

> I am the one who first proposed a new method of transcription in my piano score of the *Symphonie Fantastique*. I applied myself as scrupulously as if I were translating a sacred text transferring, not only the symphony's musical framework, but also its detailed effects and the multiplicity of its instrumental and rhythmic combinations to the piano (cited in Kregor, 2010: 28).

By contrast with Czerny, Liszt is not satisfied with translating the 'general framework' of the piece into a fully idiomatic piece for piano. He aims to preserve the details, colours and rhythms of the original version of the work, regardless whether some of them are bizarre for the pianistic language. In his transcription of the *Symphonie Fantastique*, he consciously maintains foreign elements to the piano technics and language. Liszt is faithful to Berlioz's symphony in a different way than Czerny was to Mozart's requiem. Liszt's goal is to re-create in the transcription the experience that the audition of Berlioz's original version of the work aroused him (Kregor, 2010: 32). For this purpose, Liszt tries to obtain unusual timbres for the piano presenting a score whose writing contains foreign elements for the piano language.

Both models seem to back the musicological tendency of classifying transcriptions as works non-numerically different from the original version of the work transcribed. The creativity involved in both models is not intended to generate a new different musical work. Alternatively, creativity is directed to preserve the identity of the transcribed work in the new idiomatic medium in which it is presented by means of the transcription. In the first model, the target is to present the work in the new medium as if it were originally composed for that medium. The creativity of the transcriber is directed to adapt and reformulate the elements of the original instrumentation in a familiar and idiomatic way for the new medium. In the second model, the goal is to present the work in the new medium preserving the experience that it arouses with its original instrumentation. The creativity of the transcriber is addressed here to extend the techniques and resources of the new medium to emulate the original expressive effects of the work.

Therefore, the way in which musicologists trend to classify versions and transcriptions coheres with the composers' motivations surrounding the production of these musical products. In the next section, additional motivations apart from the composer's typical ones will be considered. In particular, it will be attended to the physical material upon which a composer operates the revision of a work, the place that instrumentation typically occupies in the process of composition of a work, and some issues about the authenticity of versions and transcriptions. As it will be shown, such

additional motivations also point in the same direction, backing the idea that the versions and transcriptions of a work do not constitute numerically different musical works.

2.2 Additional motivations: materials, methods of composition and authenticity

One of the additional circumstances that may motivate a musicologist to classify a work's versions as works non-numerically different has to do with the material on which the composer develops her compositional process and generates her products. In this sense, it is not unusual for a composer to revise a musical work upon the original physical score of the previous version. For instance, Bruckner revised the 'Finale' movement of his 8th *Symphony* directly on the autograph score of the 1887 version (Korstvedt, 2000: 20). This is also the case of Sibelius with the 1919 version of his 5th *Symphony*, who wrote it upon part of the scores of the 1916 version. In addition, the orchestral parts of the 1916 version were revised to be reused for the premiere of the 1919 version, introducing in them the changes mandated by Sibelius (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 52). These proceedings of our musical practices suggest that the 1916 version should be regarded as one more step within the process of composition of the 5th *Symphony*. Once Sibelius declared his disappointment with the 1916 version and started to compose the version of 1919, the 1916 orchestral parts were regarded as provisional drafts that should be implemented by Sibelius' revisions. Similarly, once Bruckner started to feel disappointed with the 1887 version of his 8th *Symphony,* he went on to regard as provisional drafts what he had regarded before as final scores of his process of composition. This explains why he wrote the 1890 'Finale' on the original score of the 1887 version. These practices reinforce the idea that subsequent versions do not constitute different works from the original version. In these cases, versions are the hallmark of different stages of the process of composition of a same musical work. Although the 1887 version may coexist with, and may be equally performable than, the 1890 version, Sibelius declared the latter as the final and definitive state of the work to the detriment of the former. At other times, versions are not regarded as hallmarks of different stages of the process of composition of a same work, but as equally valid different ways of presenting the same piece for different purposes. This is illustrated by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th versions of Berlioz's *La Belle Voyageuse*. In any case, the practices in this respect favour the trend to classify versions as not constituting different versions from the original work's version.

Regarding transcriptions, one additional motivation for musicologists to classify them as musical works non-numerally different from the work transcribed concerns a method of composition notably shared by salient composers. This method has two phases, temporally successive and hierarchically differentiated. Temporally speaking, the first phase concerns the composition of the work's themes and the harmonic succession, i.e. the work's sound structure, while the second phase concerns the

instrumentation of that sound structure. The temporal aspect makes instrumentation ontologically dependent upon the composition of a sound structure. Hierarchically speaking, the sound structure is considered as the core of the musical work, while instrumentation is regarded as a non-basic feature of the work. This allows for the possibility of multiple right instrumentations of the same work, whose identity is mainly defined by its sound structure. This method of composition was followed, for instance, by Bruckner in the composition of his *8ᵗʰ Symphony* (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 11-14). He drafted the whole symphony in a piano score between the summer of 1884 and 16 August 1885, and orchestrated the sound structure of the piano draft between September 1885 and April 1887 (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 11). In addition, Bruckner performed on the piano the whole first movement draft on 23 September 1884 to Joseph Schalk and Robert Hirsch (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 12). Sibelius also followed this process of composition, for example, in the composition of his *5ᵗʰ Symphony*. He sketched in a piano score the main themes and harmonies of that symphony between August 1914 and June 1915, and only proceeded to orchestrating them after that date (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 32 and ff.). This method of composition was also followed by one of the most paradigmatic orchestrators of the history of Western musical tradition: Ravel. It is claimed that 'most of Ravel's major orchestral works started life as piano pieces, and transcription was almost a second nature to him' (Russ, 1992: 79). In addition, the hierarchy mentioned above is fully endorsed by Fétis, one of the master's of transcription. It is said that Fétis follows 'a clear hierarchy of (1) melody, (2) harmony, (3) articulation, and (4) texture' (Kregor, 2010: 25). The relevance of this method – which ascribes to the composition of a sound structure a temporal and hierarchical primacy over its instrumentation in the process of composition of a musical work–, and the fact that it is followed by eminent composers, constitutes a good motivation for musicologists to classify transcriptions as numerically the same work as the work's original instrumentation. [37]

A more relevant aspect is that both versions and transcriptions are subject to be judged in our critical and appreciative practices as authentic or inauthentic. The most typical case concerns transcriptions made by a composer other than the original work's composer. What is at stake in this case is whether the transcription is accurate, or faithful, with respect to the original composer's style and to the structural characteristics of the work transcribed. Among the transcriptions of *Pictures at an exhibition*, Ravel's orchestration is judged to be 'more respectful to Musorgsky' than Henry Wood's one (Russ, 1992: 77). However, Vladimir Ashkenazy presented in 1982 an alternative orchestration to Ravel's one, which he considers to be inauthentic. He argues that Ravel's transcription was 'highly perfumed and insufficiently Russian'. By contrast, he tried to offer a transcription 'guided by the deeper undercurrents of this predominantly dark-coloured piece' (cited in Russ, 1992: 78). Accordingly, Ashkenazy criticises that Ravel's impressionistic aesthetics makes his transcription inauthentic regarding, on the

---

[37] Kivy also acknowledges the relevance of this two-steps method of composition and cites some other interesting examples that can be consulted (cf. Kivy, 1988/1993: 81-2).

one hand, the Russian sprit of the composer and, on the other, the structural features of the work. Nonetheless, it is Funtek's transcription the one considered to be more faithful to Musorgsky, but it is criticised to the same extent for being unimaginative and uncreative (cf. Russ, 1992: 83-4). In this last sense, Funtek's orchestration has been denigrated for being closer to a mechanic copy for orchestral instruments rather than to a transcription. Liszt defends in this respect an equilibrium between creativity and fidelity: 'in transcription there is no need for too much invention: a certain conjugal fidelity to the original is usually best (…); the right balance between too much and too little' (cited in Kregor, 2010: 1). Therefore, the authenticity of a transcription requires a kind of fidelity to the work transcribed that does not consist in a mechanic copy of the work's sound structure for other instruments and that leaves a range of *variability* open to the transcriber's creativity.

If transcriptions made by other than the original work's composer are usual candidates to be judged as authentic or inauthentic, the opposite case is the one concerning versions made by the original work's composer. It is less common to find judgments about the authenticity of a composer's version of one of her works. It seems obvious that, except in case of madness or amnesia, a composer will be faithful to her style and to the structure of her works, supposedly to be known by her better than by anyone.[38] Hence, the criterion for authenticity mentioned in the previous paragraph would seem to be trivially satisfied by this kind of versions. Accordingly, judgments about the authenticity of versions composed by the original work's composer would be pointless because all of them would be trivially true. However, despite the initial appearances, the musical products of this kind are objects of interesting discussions about authenticity, and relevant examples can be found.

A paradigmatic historical case concerns Bruckner's *8th Symphony*. As introduced previously, the most important contextual motivation for Bruckner's revision was Levi's rejection of the 1887 version of the symphony. This contextual factor elicited during the mid-1930s a prominent debate about the authenticity of the 1890 version. The point of the debate is that Bruckner was fully satisfied with the 1887 version until Levi's negative judgment, and that he did not change his mind until quite time after that moment. Bruckner retained for some time the idea that it was possible to perform the 1887 version, and he found right the aesthetics and form of it. Accordingly, the 1890 version may be regarded as inauthentic to the extent that Bruckner produced it adopting by external pressure other aesthetic and artistic standards than the ones that he really endorsed. Korstvedt puts the problem in the following terms:

---

[38] This claim does not entail a kind of privileged epistemic access for composers. The kind of epistemic access for composers to their works and style is the same than the epistemic access that any other person has. The only privilege is quantitative in time –a composer spends more time with herself and with her works than anyone else– and in specific musical knowledge –which allows her to predict and understand more things than a layman. Therefore, the claim in question is far from favouring a Cartesian epistemological dualism and it rests on the line sketched by Wittgenstein and Ryle in this respect.

> A number of writers and scholars (…) came to believe that the incident and its psychological after-effects were decisive in sending Bruckner into what they saw a spiral of uncertainty and self-doubt, during which he undertook (…) a series of ill-advised revisions of not only the Eight Symphony, but also the First, Third, and Fourth Symphonies (all of which were revised between 1887 and 1890). It was argued that because of their ostensibly compromised origins, the revised versions of these works were less than fully authentic and needed to be discarded in favour of new editions based on Bruckner's 'pure' manuscript scores' (Korstvedt, 2000: 68).

Robert Haas, one of the most important editors of Bruckner's symphonies, was a supporter of this view and tried to put it into practice. In his 1939 edition of the symphony, he introduced passages of the 1887 version into the 1890 version 'in an effort to construct an 'ideal' text that restored the work's 'organic life-essentials', which had supposedly been compromised by external pressure during the revision' (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 69). In Haas' view, neither the 1887 nor the 1890 versions offer *per se* a perfectly accurate approach to Bruckner's *8ʰ Symphony*. This is the reason that explains why he substituted some parts of the 1890 for other ones corresponding to the 1887 version that were free of the external pressures concerning Levi's affair.

There is another sense in which a version can be judged as inauthentic. An inauthentic version in this second sense is one that is presented under the authorship of the work's composer but that includes elements not composed or consented by her. An example of this is the version of Bruckner's *8ʰ Symphony* published in 1892. This version is mainly based on the 1890 version, but it differs in some relevant respects – including cut of bars, new repetitions, changes in orchestration, tempo, and dynamics– from the preserved Bruckner's final manuscript of this symphony (cf. Korstvedt, 2000: 69, 107-10). There is a notable consensus in rejecting the 1892 version as inauthentic under the assumption that such changes were made without Bruckner's consent or awareness. They were motivated by editorial purposes or other interests that have nothing to do with Bruckner's musical and artistic labour. However, this is not the sense of authenticity that strikes us here and that is relevant for this research. It is rather the first one, in which a version consented and signed by the work's composer may be regarded as inauthentic. Consequently, this second sense of inauthenticity will be leave aside in what follows and the focus will be put on the first one.

An outstanding consequence of this phenomenon is that, if it makes sense to speak about the authenticity of versions produced by the original work's composer, and if judgments about the authenticity of versions are not trivial, a musical work's version is not identified with a work in itself. If a musical work were identified with one of its versions, the judgment about the authenticity of that version would be trivially true, while the judgment about the authenticity of any of its other versions would be trivially false. This would be an undesirable result, for instance, of identifying a musical work with the last of the versions indicated by the work's composer. Alternatively, if each version were identified with a distinct musical work, the judgment about the authenticity of any version would be again trivially true. If a version constitutes *per se* a

musical work, it would be trivially authentic in respect to itself given the reflexive character of identity. Therefore, assuming a non-identity between musical works and versions is necessary as a success condition for judgments about the authenticity of versions. This assumption does not collide with any non-overridden entrenched belief, and it enables the formulation of a relevant number of projectible hypotheses of our critical and appreciative practices, so that ontology we must preserve and explain it in light of the methodology introduced in chapter 2. A similar phenomenon arises concerning transcriptions. If a transcription were not something different than the work transcribed, the judgments about its authenticity would be trivially true. However, the transcription does not constitutes a musical work itself different from the original, for the idea of a musical work to be authentic with respect to another musical work is quite bizarre and unfamiliar to our musical practices, being difficult to grasp what this idea exactly means. Otherwise, the transcription qua musical work would be again trivially authentic in respect to itself given the reflexivity of identity.

The discourse about authenticity makes versions and transcriptions closer to another sort of musical products, namely, musical performances. Musical performances are the musical products most commonly involved in judgments about authenticity. A performance is said to be authentic if it is a creative faithful realization of the composer's specifications (cf. Davies, 2003: 58). Since what a composer specifies or indicates in a particular context is a musical work, and since the composer's specifications underdetermines all the aspects required for a performance, it can be said that a performance is authentic if it is a creative faithful realization of a musical work (cf. Scruton, 1997: 440 and ff.; Dodd, 2015: 485).[39] The relevant point is that 'being authentic' is used in all these cases as a dyadic predicate. When we say that Harnoncourt's performance of the *Brandenburg Concertos* is authentic, we say that it is an authentic performance relatively to that work. Similarly, when we say that Funtek's transcription of *Pictures at an exhibition* is authentic, we say that it is an authentic transcription relative to that work. Analogously, when we say that Bruckner's 1890 version of the *8th Symphony* is not authentic, we say that it is not authentic relative to that work. In general, the predicate 'being authentic' determines a relation of the form '*x* is authentic of *y*' (R_{xy}), where *x* belongs to the maximal set of performances, transcriptions or versions, and *y* belongs to the maximal set of musical works. Therefore, the success conditions of judgments about authenticity presuppose the existence of two kinds of things different in nature as candidates to enter such a relation. However, this difference in nature cannot consist in that versions, transcriptions and performances constitute themselves works different from the ones of which they are authentic.

S. Davies' definition of the authenticity of performances regards them not as merely faithful realizations of a work, but also as *creative* ones. If authentic performances were only faithful ones, they might be thought to be copies of an original.

---

[39] The authenticity of performances is a topic that will be developed in more detail in Chapter 7.

However, it is impossible for a performance to be a copy of a musical work. In the first place, as Davies notes, performances are intrinsically creative because the composer's specifications –i.e. the normative properties for performance in which a musical work consists– 'underdetermines the sound of a performance of that work' (Davies, 2003: 56). Consequently, authentic performances of the same musical work may differ in relevant aesthetic respects, what corresponds to the manifestation of a work's *variability*. Secondly, performances cannot be copies of a musical work due to the epistemic role they play in respect to musical works. As Dodd argues, 'whereas a copy of a painting is another work that resembles the original, a symphony's performances are the very means by which we encounter the symphony itself' (Dodd, 2007: 10). A performance provides empirical access to a musical work to experience it. If performances were copies of musical works, they could not play this epistemic function because copies are artworks in themselves, regardless their close similarity with the original work. To this extent, rather than copies, performances are occurrences of a musical work in which that work manifests itself. As D. Davies puts, performances are instances, i.e. entities that make 'manifest to the receiver some or all of the properties bearing upon' the work's appreciation (Davies, 2012: 644). In addition, given their creative character, a properly formed performance of a work may present the work in a different way than another properly formed performance of it highlighting some aspects of the work rather than others. This is not to say that performances are always mediums to epistemic and appreciatively access to a musical work. As it will be noted in the next chapter, they can be also primary objects of our aesthetic appreciation due to their creative and unique character. Accordingly, when something is judged as an authentic performance, it is judged as an entity that is a faithful, but original and unique, occurrence of another entity, namely, a musical work. Different authentic performances of a work are instances that present in different accurate ways the work performed.

This epistemic aspect of authenticity is preserved in our musical practices when the predicate is applied to versions and transcriptions, either by composers or musicologists. The epistemic view of versions is exemplified, for instance, by Korstvedt's assessment of the 1890 version of Bruckner's *8th Symphony*:

> The musical substance of Bruckner's revision (…) shows that he neither merely capitulated to Levi's judgment nor attempted to mollify or simplify his initial conception; rather, he sharpened his conception of the symphony (Korstvedt, 2000: 70).

> Rather than compromising the symphony's boldness, then, the revisions sharpen it by drawing the music at times more daringly and at times more carefully. The 1890 version is, in other words, less striking for any taint of accommodation than for its intensification and concentration of characteristics that were already present, if less vividly, in the 1887 version (Korstvedt, 2000: 83-4).

By contrast with Haas judgment of the 1890 version, Korstvedt takes this version to be more authentic than the 1887 one. He regards it as more accurate, in which relevant elements of the work that appear in a fuzzy manner in the 1887 version are

sharpened in a more explicit way in the 1890 version. In this way, he regards the 1890 version as improving the epistemic access to the work with respect to the version of 1887. It reflects a Bruckner's more 'sharpened conception', a more accurate understanding, of the 8th Symphony. In Korstvedt view, the 1890 version will provide a better experiential encounter with the 8th Symphony when properly performed. Accordingly, since Korstvedt judges the 1890 version as more authentic than the 1887 one, it might be said that the 1890 version is a better instance of the 8th Symphony by analogy with the authenticity of performances.

Another paradigmatic example of the epistemic view of versions is the already mentioned Rimsky's judgment about Musorgsky's manuscript final versions of his unpublished works. He regards them as containing imperfect details –'absurd' and 'incoherent harmonies', 'ill-chosen instrumentation', etc.– that qualifies them as inauthentic versions of these works. They offer, in Rimsky view, a misleading epistemic access to those works. This is why Rimsky claims that the publication of such manuscripts without being revised and improved 'would have no sense save a biographical-historical one'. He regards them valuable only from a historical point of view, but not as accurate instances of the works to which they correspond since they do not provide an adequate epistemic access to such pieces. They are not faithful enough to the works of which they are versions, and Rimsky considers that his task is precisely to revise the manuscripts to offer more accurate and faithful versions of these works.

Regarding the case of transcriptions, the composer Ferruccio Busoni provides a clear example of the epistemic view of these musical products. Defending the value of transcriptions, he makes the following claim: 'transcription occupies an important place in the literature of the piano; and looked at from a right point of view, every important piano piece is the reduction of a big thought to a practical instrument' (cited in Kregor, 2010: 10). His defence of the transcription practice for piano assumes the strong claim that every piano piece is a transcription of a more complex piece for more instruments. Consequently, a relevant value of any piano piece, and hence of any piano transcription, is that they facilitate the epistemic access to a musical work by means of facilitating their performance with a 'practical instrument', the piano, as a substitute of a bigger musical ensemble of more difficult availability. In sum, Busoni regards any piano piece as a transcription, and any transcription as an instance that facilitates our epistemic access to a work. This is the same view as the one endorsed by Schönberg, who regarded transcriptions for piano of orchestral pieces as a means to facilitate the judgment about the musical quality of a work (cf. section b). Accordingly, any authentic transcription of a musical work might be rightly said to be a genuine occurrence of it.

The epistemic view of transcriptions does not go against the creative character of these products. On the opposite, it favours a good articulation between creativity and fidelity in a way that satisfies Liszt's lemma introduced above. It is at this point that the variable character of musical works introduced before concerning the authenticity of performances acquires a greater relevance. The variable character of a musical work in

performance rests on the fact that the composer's specifications in a score do not exhaust all the elements of a properly formed performance of that work. This fact is what opens the range of creativity for the performer. It makes sense that, given our talk about the authenticity of versions and transcriptions, a similar phenomenon arises for these kinds of musical products. In this sense, the composer's specifications in a score do not exhaust all the elements for something to be a performance in which we can encounter, hear and experience that work. This fact is what opens the range for the creativity of the transcriber to explore the timbrical possibilities of a work, on the one hand, and of the composer to revise or produce a new version of the work, on the other.

Accordingly, the creative character of transcriptions as instances of a musical work represents another aspect of the manifestation of a work's variability: there can be different authentic transcriptions of the same musical work. Each one of these authentic transcriptions highlights different aspects of the work transcribed. By means of their performances, an authentic transcription of a work facilitates the epistemic access to some aspects of that work, while another authentic transcription facilitates the epistemic access to other aspects of that work different from the former. A clear example of the endorsement of this view is provided by Russ' assessment of the prolific number of transcriptions of *Pictures at an exhibition*:

> Musorgsky's original text may not be immutable, but what is added should provide us with *new insights* and be of the *highest artistic and technical quality* (…). Ravel's solutions to the problems of orchestrating Pictures are not the only ones (…). We should not reject more Musorgskian possibilities such as the strings and woodwind at the beginning of Funtek's transcription (Russ, 1992: 76-83; my italics).

The creative character of transcriptions is assumed to the extent that different kinds of orchestral transcriptions may be regarded as valid or authentic. Russ' criterion of acceptance is twofold. First, they should provide an *insight* of the work, i.e. they should be faithful to the work and provide a right epistemic access to it. By similarity with authentic performances, it might be said that transcriptions should be instances or occurrences of the work. In the second place, they should provide *new* insights, and it is here where originality and creativity are accommodated. They should offer a new knowledge or perspective of the work, and the means to accomplish this condition are the technical and artistic quality of the transcriber, which makes the difference. An authentic transcription should present the work transcribed in a new, but accurate way.

This last point leads us to the notion of 're-presentation' or 'presenting again'. The idea that versions and transcriptions re-present a previous musical work is significantly familiar to the critical and musicological discourse. Arguing against the idea that musical transcriptions and literary translations are copies of the original, Kregor claims the following:

> The piano transcription and its counterparts in literature and the visual arts were not generally considered to be prohibitive, exclusively reproductive or especially insidious

products in the nineteenth century (…). The umbrella concept of translation crystallized elements of subjective re-presentation in a way that invites an investigation of how 'fidelity' was conceptualized and how it spilled over into the realms of music, art and literature (Kregor, 2010: 12).

The core idea endorsed by Kregor is that an authentic transcription presents in a different manner the musical work transcribed. This phenomenon is regarded as analogous to the one that happens with authentic performances, which are taken to sonically present in a different manner the musical work performed (cf. Scruton, 1997: 441-2). But this view might be also applied to authentic versions, regarding them as presenting in a different manner the musical work versioned. This view is illustrated again by Korstvedt's evaluation of Bruckner's 1890 version of the 8th Symphony:

> As well as reshaping climatic sections, Bruckner's revisions *heighten a very different aspect of the symphony*. In addition to loudly grand passages, the Eight Symphony is characterized by stretches of remarkably still, quiet music (…). In the 1890 version, Bruckner subtly highlighted some of them (Korstvedt, 2000: 85; my italics).

In this passage, the symphony's features seem to be considered by Korstvedt as independent of its versions. The different versions of the symphony are regarded as highlighting and hiding some of these features that independently characterize the work. The 1890 version is assessed positively by Korstvedt insofar it highlights proper and accurately some crucial aspects of the symphony. This version re-presents the work, offering a new and suitable epistemic access to it.

Although it will not be discussed until the next chapter, it is important to note at this point that the idea of re-presentation concerning transcriptions, but not versions, has had resonance in the philosophical discussion. In a finely way that seems to accommodate this idea, S. Davies outlines the required symbiosis between the creative and faithful character of an authentic transcription arguing in the following terms: 'Because a transcription is more than a mere copy of the original, it reflects on its model through the way it re-presents its model (…). Transcriptions are also valued for enriching our understanding and appreciation of the merits (and demerits) of their models' (Davies, 2003: 53). The details of Davies' approach will not be discussed now. Nonetheless, the salient point is that Davies' acknowledges from a philosophical perspective the abovementioned idea the epistemic role of authentic transcriptions of presenting again but in another way the musical work transcribed.

In sum, authentic versions and transcriptions are not regarded as copies of the original works in our critical and musicological discursive practices, in the same way as authentic performances are also not. While copies are different works from their originals, authentic versions and transcriptions are supposed to provide an accurate epistemic access to the versioned or transcribed works. By analogy with authentic performances, they might be well regarded as instances or occurrences of musical works because through them we can encounter the musical work versioned or transcribed. To

this extent, authentic versions and transcriptions are similar to authentic performances on that they take part on the manifestation of the repeatability and variability of a musical work. However, versions and transcriptions are of a different nature from performances and consequently, the former provide a kind of epistemic access to the work that is different from the latter. Authentic performances re-present the work offering an epistemic access that is directly perceptual (sonic), while authentic versions and transcriptions provide this perceptual epistemic access by means of their properly formed performances. The phenomenon of the authenticity of versions and transcriptions constitutes an additional motivation for the trend in musicology of cataloguing versions and transcriptions as musical works non-numerically different from the works versioned or transcribed.

Therefore, the three phenomena of our musical practices explored in this section – namely, the physical material upon which a composer operates the revision of a work, the place that instrumentation typically occupies in the process of composition of a work, and the authenticity of versions and transcriptions– seem to back the musicological intuition of classifying the versions and transcriptions of a work as non-numerically different musical works. They cohere with the composers' motivations for composed a new version or transcription of a work explored in the previous section. Accordingly, the idea that the versions and transcriptions of a work do not constitute new different musical work is well motivated in our musical practices.

3. Our intuitions: an empirical experiment

The previous section has provided a descriptive account of how versions and transcriptions are regarded in our musical practices. Firstly, it has been attended the place and scope that they occupy in the musical repertoire. In spite of not being the most common or paradigmatic musical products, it has been noted that musical works with more than one version made by the original work's composer and transcriptions changing the original work's instrumentation are phenomena neither marginal nor rare. Secondly, it has been attended to the way in which versions and transcriptions are individuated in our musical practices. In particular, it has been observed that musicologists tend to classify the versions and transcriptions of a work as works non-numerically different. Thirdly, the motivations for this tendency have been explored attending to different parameters. In the first place, different historical examples in which the composer's motivations for producing a version or a transcription reinforce the idea that these musical products do not constitute musical works different from the work versioned or transcribed have been provided. In this sense, musicological classifications of versions and transcriptions fit the typical composer's intentions in generating these kinds of musical products. In the second place, beyond the composer's intentions, other additional motivations for the tendency of not classifying versions and transcriptions as musical works different from the works versioned or transcribed have been examined. These additional motivations have to do with the physical material that

composers manipulate to generate versions, with the role and place that instrumentation has in a notably shared method of musical composition, and with considerations concerning authenticity involved in the critical and appreciative discourse about versions and transcriptions.

The aim of this section is to complete the description of the phenomenon of versions and transcriptions by checking the intuitions of the agents involved in our musical practices concerning the individuation of these musical products. More precisely, the target is to measure how familiar it is in our musical practices the intuition that versions and transcriptions do not constitute musical works different from the works versioned or transcribed. For this purpose, an empirical experiment has been developed to measure the degree of familiarity of this intuition in listeners when confronted with the audition of real cases of versions and transcriptions. The hypothesis of the experiment is that listeners consider themselves to be hearing the same work in a performance of a work's original version as in a performance of other version or transcription of that work, rather than different musical works. If that were the case, there would be good reasons to consider as familiar to our musical practices the idea that versions and transcriptions do not constitute works numerically different from the work versioned or transcribed. In the experiment, 145 participants have been confronted with three scenarios: (1) a work inspired by a previous one; (2) a transcription made by other than the original work's composer; (3) a version made by the original work's composer. In each of these scenarios, after having listened to the derivative musical product and the original piece, participants had to fill a questionnaire that explores different issues concerning the individuation of these kinds of musical products.

The relevance of this empirical experiment lies on the absence of a study of this nature in the debate about versions and transcriptions. By contrast, this kind of research in which the reactions of listeners to music are checked by means of a questionnaire is more common in the field of musical perception, emotion and cognition (cf. Park & Chong, 2017; Juslin, Harmat & Eerola, 2014; Eerola, Ferrer & Alluri, 2012; Pearce & Müllensiefen, 2017; Schaal, Banissy & Lange, 2015; Hofmann, Wesolowski & Goebl, 2017). It is also a current research procedure in the field of studies concerning the products generated by creative music systems and computer music (cf. Delgado, Fajardo & Molina-Solana, 2009; Monteith, Martínez & Ventura, 2010; Roig et al. 2014). However, only one experiment carried out by Christopher Bartel (2017) can be found in recent literature concerning the study of the specific case of versions and transcriptions. Although Bartel's experiment is initially addressed to measure the intuition of whether musical works are repeatable, some interesting results can be extracted for the individuation of versions and transcriptions, especially in the third of the cases that he examines (cf. Bartel, 2017: 12-13). Nonetheless, as it will be analysed in the next section, Bartel's experiment is methodologically misleading because listener's intuitions are checked in an scenario that does not satisfy the way we usually approach music. Bartel's experiment does not simulate the conditions under which the aesthetic appreciation of music usually takes place. The participants in Bartel's

experiment are not confronted with the audition of musical works but with a description of them. Since the natural and usual way to approach music is not by description but by acquaintance (i.e. aurally), the results obtained by Bartel are not methodologically justified. Bartel's experiment is not fully empirical because participants are not introduced in a scenario in which the real experience of music is simulated. In this sense, the experiment presented here is intended to fill this gap in the literature regarding the individuation of versions and transcriptions.[40]

3.1 Assessing Bartel's experiment

Bartel's experiment is intended to measure the degree of familiarity of the intuition that musical works are repeatable. Specifically, it tries to test the degree in which the repeatability intuition is shared by subjects not contaminated by the philosophical discussion (cf. Bartel, 2017: 6). The results that he obtains from this empirical study are roughly the following: firstly, that the participants' notion of repeatability is more restrictive than the sense in which it is typically used by philosophers; secondly, that the same notion of repeatability is indistinctively applied to classical and popular music; and thirdly, that the repeatability intuition is not as broadly shared as philosophers usually regard it (Bartel, 2017: 14-5). In the more favourable case of the three ones tested by Bartel, only 62% of participants accept the repeatability of a work in different performances. Bartel concludes that the repeatability intuition cannot be appealed in order to justify or support a specific ontological account regarding the categorial question because it is not sufficiently shared by subjects that are neutral to the ontological debate (Bartel, 2017: 13, 17).

However, Bartel's experiment is not as conclusive as he pretends against the idea that musical works are repeatable. If the aim of the empirical study is to test the degree of familiarity of the repeatability intuition, it is misleading in two respects. In the first place, the study is methodologically misguided. Bartel grounds his experiment on the assumption that 'laypeople's intuitions can show us something about our musical practices without being encumbered by any former commitment to some philosophical theory' (Bartel, 2017: 6). The problem is that the epistemic access to musical works

---

[40] Another way to put this point runs is thus. Bartel follows the methodology typically labelled in experimental philosophy as the 'method of cases' (cf. Machery, 2017), in which individuals are confronted with a piece of text and have to make a judgment to a question formulated at the end of it. Machery endorses a minimalist interpretation of these sort of judgements, considering them as being of the same kind as our everyday judgements –i.e. as those that we make when we reed a newspaper or about a tram itinerary. The problem is that Bartel's cases force individuals to make an aesthetic judgment of a different kind than our everyday aesthetic judgments, or even to make a sort of judgment that has nothing to do with aesthetic judgments and the aesthetic appreciation of artworks. These last ones are judgments that require first hand acquaintance with the object judged, which enables the exercise of taste, a point that is absent in Bartel's cases. However, in this research I'll regard the listener's answers as intuitions rather than as judgments, given the secondary role of propositional information in the empiricist phase of the experiment.

provided in the study to participants is not the epistemic access to musical works that we usually have in our musical practices. In our musical practices, the typical epistemic access to a musical work is given in a first-hand experiential encounter with a performance of the work. Paradoxically, this empirical aspect involved in our usual way to appreciate musical works is absent in Bartel's empirical study. In his study, participants are not confronted with musical performances, but with *descriptions* of them. Therefore, since the repeatability intuition is tested in an epistemic and appreciative practice that has not a central place in our musical practices, the results obtained in the experiment do not reflect the degree in which the repeatability intuition is actually shared in such practices. Additionally, the descriptions offered by Bartel in his experiment involve aesthetic and expressive attributions. However, it is generally assumed that the aesthetic use of a predicate requires the exercise of taste in a first-hand acquaintance with the object judged (Sibley, 1959; Levinson, 1980; Scruton, 1997; Dodd, 2007). Since aesthetic attributions are taste-dependent and they can involve scenarios of faultless disagreement, there are grounds to think that the descriptions offered by Bartel to the participants in the study could have biased their responses. Therefore, Bartel's empirical study is methodologically misguided and it does not ensure the validity of the results obtained.

The second worry about Bartel's study concerns the nature of the cases presented to participants. He presents three kinds of cases: provenance difference, affective difference and connotation difference. The provenance difference case tests the repeatability intuition confronted with performances of the same sound structure made by different performers. The description of the performances offered to the participants in this first case is the following:

> AC/DC is an Australian rock band that formed in 1973 who had numerous hits and best-selling albums throughout the 1970s and 80s. They are regarded as one of the most influential rock bands ever and were inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 2003. 'Back in Black' is one of their greatest hits. Dirty Deeds is an American AC/DC-tribute band that formed in 2000. They aim to offer a perfect imitation of AC/DC's music and live performances. Imagine that Dirty Deeds is such a good tribute band that, when they perform 'Back in Black' in concert, their performance sounds indistinguishable from performances by AC/DC. In that case, a concert bootleg recording of a Dirty Deeds' performance of 'Back in Black' would sound exactly like an AC/DC bootleg of that song. Taking all of this into account, would these be two recordings of essentially the SAME song, or are they actually recordings of two DIFFERENT songs? (Bartel, 2017: 9).

The problem with this description is that it presents a case that is far from describing a common case of our musical practices. It is closer to the hypothetical scenarios typically appealed to by philosophers, rather than to a typical case of our musical practices. In our musical practices, never –or hardly ever– two performances of the same sound structure sound sonically indistinguishable. Even more, hardly ever two performances of the same structure made by the same performer sound sonically indistinguishable. Sonically distinguishable differences are almost always present in timbre, articulation, tempo and character. Consequently, the case presented is forcing

the intuitions of the participants and does not reflect the common behaviour of the repeatability intuition in our musical practices. In other words, the case is adulterated by philosophical background in presenting a scenario that is more hypothetical than real, so that it does not reflects the real behaviour of subjects in our musical practices concerning the repeatability intuition.

The affective difference case aims to test the repeatability intuition when confronted with two performances of the same sound structure differing in the perceived emotional tone and the performers who made them. The case is introduced to participants by means of the following description:

> The song 'I Will Always Love You' was originally written and recorded by Dolly Parton in the early 1970's. In Dolly's original recording, the song sounds humble, solemn, and unpretentious, and it expresses a feeling of being resigned about a lost love with dignity and restraint. In 1992, Whitney Houston released a recording of 'I Will Always Love You'. Whitney's recording contains the same lyrics and the basic melody; but it sounds dramatic, powerful, and heartrending. Taking all of this into account, are these two recordings of essentially the SAME song, or are they actually recordings of two DIFFERENT songs? (Bartel, 2017: 11).

The problem of this scenario is that it is not a case to test the repeatability of musical works, but the limits of their variability in performance. The case presents two performances of the same sound structure that are opposed regarding their affective and aesthetic content. Consequently, the case is testing whether so different performances fall under the scope of the variability of a musical work. The results of the experiment – 39% answer that they are performances the same piece vs. 61% that they are performances of different pieces– do not show anything against the repeatability of musical works. Instead, they would show that the scope of the variability of a musical work has a limit to the extent that it cannot admit among its properly formed performances ones being radically different in their aesthetic content. In other terms, the experiment shows that the same musical work is not taken to be repeated in performances that are antagonistic from the aesthetic point of view, but it does not show that a work is not taken to be repeated in performances presenting non-antagonistic aesthetic differences.

The last scenario –connotation difference– aims to check the repeatability intuition facing cases of two performances differing in their lyrical content, affective content and performers. It is presented to participants as follows:

> 'Hurt' is a song written by Trent Reznor and released by Nine Inch Nails in 1994. The song is a dark industrial rock ballad. Despite the song's slow tempo, the instrumental is pounding and oppressive. The song's bleak introspective lyrics make references to self-harm and heroin addiction. In 2002, 'Hurt' was recorded by Johnny Cash. Cash's version of the song is equally dark and introspective; however some of the lyrics have been changed to reference Cash's devout Christianity and the industrial instrumentation of the original has been replaced with a simple acoustic guitar and piano arrangement. In Cash's

recording, the song seems to be referencing the aging music legend's failing health. Taking all of this into account, are these two recordings of essentially the SAME song, or are they actually recordings of two DIFFERENT songs? (Bartel, 2017: 12-3).

The problem with this third scenario is again that it is not a case to directly test the repeatability intuition. It is rather a scenario to check whether transcriptions and versions are taken to be the same musical work with respect to the original. To be more precise, this scenario measures how much a version or a transcription could depart from the original work for it not to be regarded as a new musical work, different from the original. As defined in the chapter 1, a transcription of a musical work is the work written for, or performed by, instruments different from those originals prescribed by the work's composer. A new version of a work, meanwhile, is a revision of the work's original version involving changes in the original sound structure. The latter is the case of Cash's performance. Consequently, the case proves that we tend to regard Cash's performance as a performance of a different musical work than 'Hurt'. The contention of the inquiry developed here is that in a performance of a version or transcription we do not hear a musical work different from the work versioned or transcribed. In this vein, the results obtained by Bartel would determine that Cash's performance is not a performance of a version or a transcription of 'Hurt', but a performance of a musical work inspired by, or based on, 'Hurt'.

Therefore, Bartel's experiment is misguided in methodology and content, so that it proves no relevant results concerning the familiarity of the repeatability intuition in our musical practices. Consequently, the lack of a right experiment testing the familiarity of the repeatability intuition and its consequences for the individuation of musical works constitutes the main motivation for the experiment that will be presented here.

3.2 Methodology

The main goal of the experiment is to measure the intuitions involved in our musical practices about the individuation of musical versions and transcriptions, specifically, if the intuitions of participants tend to individuate them as different or the same works as the works versioned or transcribed. A derivative aim is to test to which extent participants associate aesthetic differences with differences in work-identity. As previously noted, there is a lack of empirical research regarding the topics pursued here. Consequently, the methodology applied in this experiment neither strictly follows nor reproduces methodologies followed by studies in other musical domains, such as the study of emotions, musical perception and cognition, or the evaluation of creative music systems.

This experiment presents two notable methodological differences in relation to studies in musical emotion and perception. Firstly, a typical procedure in experiments of

this sort is to confront participants with short musical excerpts (cf. Park & Chong, 2017; Juslin, Harmat & Eerola, 2014; Eerola, Ferrer & Alluri, 2012). However, since the main goal of the present research is to examine the intuitions about the identity of versions and transcriptions, this procedure is not apt. Rather, participants must be confronted with whole pieces or movements because what is at stake is the identity of a whole piece or movement. Some musical works inspired in previous ones may be in some parts exactly alike their originals, but radically different in some other parts. A version may revise some parts of the original, while leaving others intact. A transcription may be perceived as boring if faced as a musical work different from the original because it frustrates all of the listener's expectations in searching for differences by following its sound structure. All these relevant aspects for individuation matters can be measured only if participants are confronted with the audition of whole pieces or movements and not with excepts of them.

A second methodological difference regarding studies in musical emotion and perception has to do with the way to account for the emotional or affective responses of participants. In this kind of studies, participants are given a list of selected emotional terms and asked to rate the emotional states after listening to the musical samples (cf. Park & Chong, 2017; Juslin, Harmat & Eerola, 2014; Eerola, Ferrer & Alluri, 2012). However, since a derivate goal of the present research is to test the way in which participants link aesthetic differences with differences in work-identity, this procedure is not apt. The relevant aspect for this test is to check whether participants associate identity difference with aesthetic (affective or emotional) difference. Giving a closed list of emotional terms may bias the participant's answers regarding this point, oversimplifying the aesthetic differences in their responses to the audition of the samples. This worry is particularly pressing in this experiment due to the high degree of similarity between the audio samples to be displayed. Alternatively, offering no list of pre-selected emotions leaves open the way for participants to express their intuitions in a more direct and immediate manner.

This experiment also presents methodological differences with respect to Bartel's (2017) experiment. Bartel confronts participants with hypothetical scenarios by means of describing different kinds of musical performances. However, since the main target of the present study is to measure the familiarity of our intuitions about the individuation of versions and transcriptions *involved in our musical practices*, this procedure is not apt. For this purpose, the conditions in which music is typically assessed and aesthetically appreciated in our musical practices will be simulated. The natural way to access to musical works in our musical practices is not by reading a description of any of their performances. It is rather by means of an audition of any of their live or recorded performances. This is why participants are confronted in the present study with audio samples rather than with descriptions of musical performances. Of course, the ideal circumstances would be those in which participants were confronted with real live performances. However, given logistical and economical

constraints, and given the extended practice of listening to musical recordings, this procedure is acceptable for the intended purposes.

Finally, this experiment has important methodological differences regarding studies about the valuation of the products generated by creative music systems. They are usually based upon developments of Turing's test. Participants are typically confronted with the products of creative music systems with no more contextual information given (cf. Delgado, Fajardo & Molina-Solana, 2009; Monteith, Martínez & Ventura, 2010; Roig et al. 2014). However, the results obtained by Turing tests would only be valid for the supporters of musical empiricism. Since the scope of the validity of the results obtained in the present study is intended to attain also the supporters of non-empiricism, the methodological procedure employed by Turing tests is not apt. For this reason, this study comprises two phases in the questionnaire: one empiricist, in which participants are asked questions in the absence of contextual information; and one non-empiricist, in which each question introduces contextual information about the music heard in the samples. One interesting aspect to be measured is the variation in the participants' answers before and after the introduction of contextual information about the music displayed.

3.3 The audio samples

The experiment involves the hearing of six audio samples by the participants. By contrast with other musical experiments, the audio samples employed in this research are not short excerpts of musical works. As noted previously, to achieve the goals of this experiment, the audio samples must be of complete works or movements. When selecting the audio samples, this requirement presented the challenge of avoiding works or movements of an excessive duration. The audio samples selected should be of a not very long duration, in an attempt to maintain the concentration of participants and make the overall duration of the experiment viable from a logistic point of view. Therefore, the choice of the works selected was conditioned to an adequate duration for the experiment.

The experiment consists of three cases of two audio samples each. The first case concerns the phenomenon of works inspired by previous ones, the second one is focused on transcriptions and the third one is devoted to versions of musical works. An additional requirement for the audio samples is their appropriateness regarding the topic of each one of the three cases. The details and peculiarities of each sample are described next:

CASE 1:

- **Audio 1:**
  Title: *Ave Regina Caelorum* (Brevis). Liber Usualis, pág. 69[1]. Antiphonae finales B. M. V.
  Performers: Schola Cantorum Coloniensis. Conductors: Gabriel Maria Steinschulte/Albert Richenhagen/Theo Brandmüller.
  Duration: 45''

- **Audio 2:**
  Title: *Ave Regina Caelorum*
  Composer: Domenico Bartolucci
  Performers: Cappella Musicale Pontificia Sistina/ Conductor: Domenico Bartolucci.
  Duration: 1' 40''

The audio samples of Case 1 satisfy the three requirements presented above: they are of complete musical works, they are not too long, and they are appropriated to illustrate the case of musical works inspired by previous ones. The peculiarities of Bartolucci's piece make the contrast between audio files 1 and 2 of a high interest for the research developed here. The comparison between the two pieces can be regarded as an extreme case of this kind as long as Bartolucci reproduces in its integrity the melody of the Gregorian piece *Ave Regina Caelorum* (Brevis) presented in the audio 1.[41]

Complete score of *Ave Regina Caelorum Brevis*. Liber Usualis, p. 69¹·

---

[41] Although the sociological concept of musical work came to exist quite time after the composition of Gregorian melodies, there is a sense relevant for the ontology of music –concerning their repeatable character, which will be indirectly tested here– under which Gregorian melodies can be regarded as musical works. A complementary explanation on this point is offered by Roger Scruton (2009: 10-11).

The *Ave Regina Caelorum Brevis* is a piece of Gregorian Chant. Consequently, it is a monodic piece consisting in just one melodic line with a religious text. In this case, the melody is in a syllabic stile upon the *plagalis* Lydian Mode over F. In Bartolucci's piece, the syllabic style, rhythm, tempo and modality of the original Gregorian melody is preserved in the soprano voice, in this case over B flat. The first phrase of the original melody is elaborated in a polyphonic palestrinian style, with imitations of the original melody in the contralto, tenor and basso voices over the IV and I degrees of the mode (bars 1-23 of Bartolucci's work). This contrapuntist treatment requires a repetition of the first semi-phrase of the original melody between bars 5 and 8, and to prolong the end of the original semi-phrase the first time that it appears (bars 4 and 5). The second phrase of the original melody is treated in a homophonic style, emphasising the expressive character of the words 'Virgo' and 'gloriosa' with long notes in their tonic syllables (bars 24-31). The third phrase of the original melody is again developed in an imitative fashion between the different voices, which requires prolonging the original melody with long notes to allow imitations in the other voices (bars 32, 33, 37, 43, 45 and 46) and to repeat the first semi-phrase of this third phrase between bars 38 and 40.

The preservation and fidelity to the original melody is what makes it an interesting case to be tested in this experiment. On the one hand, Bartolucci's work respects in a faithful way the Gregorian melody with very few exceptions and, on the other hand, there is a highly elaborated development of counterpoint and harmony that is absolutely absent in the original piece. These features make Bartolucci's *Ave Regina Caelorum* an extreme case of a work inspired by a previous one, and it is interesting to test to what extent it is intuitively regarded by listeners as a musical work different from the original.

Full Score of Domenico Bartolucci's *Ave Regina Caelorum.*

CASE 2:

- **Audio 3:**
  Title: *Escualo*
  Composer: Ástor Piazzolla
  Performers: Quinteto Piazzolla, Ástor Piazzolla.
  Duration: 3'20''

- **Audio 4:**
  Title: *Escualo*
  Composer: Ástor Piazzolla (Transcription by Luis Otero)
  Performers: Proemium Metals Brass Quintet
  Duration: 3'32''

The audio samples of Case 2 satisfy again the three requirements introduced above: they are of a complete musical work, their duration is relatively short, and they are appropriate to illustrate the case of transcriptions. Audio file 3 is performed by Piazzolla and his quintet, compounded by bandoneon, violin, bass, piano, and electric guitar. Audio file 4 presents a transcription for brass quintet –two trumpets, horn, trombone and tuba– of the piece performed in Audio 3. The transcription written by Otero makes a balance between the two views of transcriptions introduced in this chapter. Model 2, the one that consists in approaching the reader to the composer or to the original piece, is predominant. Otero tries to preserve *ad maximum* the original sound structure and tango idiom in his transcription. He preserves not only melody and rhythms, but also character and accentuation. For instance, ornaments, glissandi and figurations idiomatic of the original violin are preserved in the 1st trumpet melody, and arpeggios and intervals relatively simple for the original instruments but extremely difficult for brass instruments are also preserved in the transcription:

Bars 66-69 Idiomatic writing for violin translated to 1st trumpet.

Bars 39-43 of Otero's transcription: examples of glissando in trumpets and difficult arpeggios.

Bars 133-136 of Otero's transcription: example of difficult intervals and arpeggios.

Nonetheless, Otero also picks up from the model 1 of transcription, which consists in approaching the original work to the reader or listener of the new musical medium. He tries to exploit the sonority of the new medium, the brass quintet, and the virtuosic technique of the particular performers that commissioned him the transcription. In this way, Otero's creativity in making the transcription acquires greater notoriety. For instance, he moves up to the high register some original passages for the brilliance of the 1st trumpet player, and when the main theme of the piece appears again in bar 100, he decides to put it on the basso in an attempt to give more variety to the piece and to exploit the virtuosity of the tuba player, by contrast with the original Piazzolla's version.

Extreme passages in the high register for trumpet.

Main theme in the bass.

Again, the aim of preserving the work's original sound structure, and the fidelity with its style, makes Otero's piece an authentic transcription of Piazzolla's *Escualo*. Nonetheless, his faithfulness does not preclude him to develop his compositional creativity. These features make interesting to test to what extent Otero's transcription would be intuitively regarded by listeners as a musical work different from the original.

CASE 3:

- **Audio 5:**
  Title: *Symphony Nº 2. Movement III. 1872 Version.*
  Composer: *Pyotr Ilyitch Tchaikovsky*
  Performers: London Symphony Orchestra/ Conductor: Geoffrey Simon
  Duration: 4' 22''

- **Audio 6:**
  Title: *Symphony Nº 2. Movement III. 1879 Version.*
  Composer: *Pyotr Ilyitch Tchaikovsky*
  Performers: Philharmonia Orchestra/ Conductor: Riccardo Muti
  Duration: 5'05

The audio samples of Case 3 also satisfy the three requirements presented above. In this case they are not of a complete musical work. The examples found of full musical works with more than one version made by the original work's composer exceed 5 minutes duration, which makes them inadequate for an experiment of this nature. For this reason, it has been opted for choosing a whole movement of one of these musical works and a revision of the same movement made by the original work's composer. The duration of each sample is around 5 minutes, which puts them on the threshold of adequacy for this experiment. Additionally, the conjunction of audio files 5 and 6 presents a case near to be paradigmatic, which makes it relevant for the purposes of the experiment. The changes in the original sound structure introduced by Tchaikovsky in the 1879 version of this movement are important, but the general character of the 1879 preserves the original one despite the revisions. The main harmonies, general structure and themes are preserved, which disguises in perception the changes introduced in the sound structure. Two are the most salient revisions of the sound structure introduced by Tchaikovsky in the 1879 version. The first one concerns the beginning of the movement. The melody of the A theme proceeds now by arpeggios on the strings, rather than by syncopes, as was the case in the 1872 version. In addition, the second violin and viola parts are completely remodelled, and some revisions are also made in the basso.

1872 Version. Beginning of the third movement.

1879 Version. Beginning of the third movement.

The second relevant revision of the sound structure is placed in the flute solo of the Trio. Although the musical idea and harmonies are the same in both versions, the flute melody is completely remodelled in the 1879 version. In addition, the colour of the accompaniment is changed from *col legno* (1872 version) to *pizzicato* effect (1879 version) on the strings.

166

Flute solo. Trio 3rd Movement. 1972 Version.

Flute solo. Trio 3rd Movement. 1879 Version.

The high resemblance of both the 1872 and the 1879 versions, along with these perceptible changes in the original sound structure, makes the comparison between these two movements an interesting case for testing listeners' intuitions of whether they are the same or different musical works. More precisely, it is interesting to test whether listeners take them to be hearing in the audition of both tracks the same musical work. As already noted, due to the excessive duration of complete musical works, the audio samples of the case concerning versions had to be confined to movements of larger works.

Finally, it is interesting to point out that the audio samples have been also selected in an attempt to cover a diversity of musical genres and musical contexts. Concerning musical contexts, it goes from the Middle Ages (audio 1) to the 20th century (audio files 2, 3, and 4), and the classical-romantic period of Western music (audio files 5 and 6). Regarding musical genres, it goes from religious music (audio files 1 and 2) to popular music (audio files 3 and 4), and symphonic music (audio files 5 and 6). This broad scope allows the validity of the results achieved not to be constrained by a particular musical genre or musical context. They are intended to be valid for the appreciation of music in general.

3.4 Participants

145 listeners (82 females and 62 males aged from 19 to 70 years, with average age of 22'34 years) took part in the experiment. Most of them are students of the University of Granada and the Music Conservatory of Granada. They were recruited by internal calls in the Faculty of Philosophy, the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Social Work of the University of Granada, and in the Music Conservatory of Granada. Participants were asked to take part voluntarily in the study and were said that their anonymity would be guaranteed. By nationality, most of them are Spaniards (n = 138), but there are also from other European and American countries (Austrian, n = 1; Mexican, n = 2; French, n = 1; Italy, n = 1; Dutch, n = 1; Lithuanian, n = 1).

Participants have been also classified by their musical expertise and specific knowledge. Three levels have been stipulated: no musical education beyond the one acquired in general school (n = 52), basic musical education (n = 41), and professional musical education (n = 52). In the third level are included those participants that either have obtained a professional degree in the Music Conservatory or actively participate as professional performers, composers or teachers in musical practices.

3.5 Materials

The experiment has been developed in four different academic places in Granada: the Faculty of Philosophy, the Faculty of Arts, the Music Conservatory and the Faculty of Laws. In all these locations, a room provided with audio stereo equipment and a screen for PowerPoint presentation has been chosen, guaranteeing a suitable environment to prevent participants from being disturbed and to optimize the acoustical conditions for right audition. The rooms were also provided with enough chairs and tables for all the participants, disposed in the symmetric form of a current quadrangular concert hall. The audio samples and a PPT presentation were stored in a pen drive connected to the multimedia equipment of the room. Participants were invited to sit down comfortably, and they were provided with a pen and three sheets of paper with the questionnaire to be filled. The text was in Spanish, and it had a first part asking for general information –age, sex, nationality, job, general level of musical studies (none, basic, professional), musical preferences (none, classical music, modern music, folk/ethnic music) and general level of academic studies (School Graduate, Secondary Education Graduate, University Graduate). The second part of the paper included the gaps for answering the questions of the three cases. The questions were not given in the paper but projected in the PPT presentation in order to control the participants time of response to guarantee the intuitive character of their response, preventing them to know the questions beforehand or to have excessive time for reflection that might bias their answers. For this purpose, the PPT presentation included only a question per slide, and slides were changed by the experiment supervisor according to a previously stipulated timetable.

3.6 Procedure

When participants arrived at the room, they were invited to sit comfortably and they were given the questionnaire. The experiment was divided into two steps. In the first step, participants were informed that they would undergo a musical experiment for philosophical research, not mentioning the target of the experiment –to obtain the listeners intuitions about the individuation of versions and transcriptions of musical works– so as to prevent their answers from being biased. Additionally, they were explained the procedure of the experiment. Following the description and procedures of the study, participation consent was obtained. In this first phase of the experiment, participants were also given time to fill the first part of the questionnaire, the one demanding general information.

The second step was divided into three parts, one for each of the three cases to be tested: works inspired by previous ones (case 1), musical transcriptions (case 2), and musical versions (case 3). Each one of the cases was also divided into two steps. The first phase consisted in the audition of the two audio files of the case. The two audio samples were heard successively with an interval of 10 seconds between them. After 10 seconds, the second phase started. In this second step, the questions about the two audio samples were projected in the PPT presentation, and participants were given a limited response time for each question previously stipulated in a timetable attending to the difficulty, extension and nature of the question. Once the questionnaire was finished, the same procedure was repeated twice for cases 2 and 3. The overall duration of the experiment was around 31 minutes (see next table for a general sketch of the procedure).

General steps	Information			Time
First step	General information, procedure explained, consent.			3'
Second step	Case 1	First step	Audio 1	45''
			Rest	10''
			Audio 2	1' 40''
			Rest	10''
		Second step	Questions	2' 25''
			Rest	20''
	Case 2	First step	Audio 3	3'20
			Rest	10''
			Audio 4	3'32''
			Rest	10''
		Second step	Questions	2' 25''
			Rest	20''
	Case 3	First step	Audio 5	4' 22''
			Rest	10''
			Audio 6	5' 5''
			Rest	10''
		Second step	Questions	2' 25''
			Rest	20''
Total time				30' 59''

In each one of the cases, the questionnaire was divided into two phases. The first phase tried to measure the participants' responses under a musical empiricist approach,[42] and it comprehended the first five questions. In this phase, any contextual information regarding the music performed was avoided. Questions 6, 7 and 8 belong to a second phase, in which contextual information about the music performed was introduced. Due to this distinction, questions from 1 to 5 are the same for all the three cases, whereas questions from 6 to 8 vary depending on the music performed in each case. All the questions are to be given for yes/no answers except the second question of each case (Q2). The questions and their correlative time for response given to participants are as follows:

---

[42] By empiricist approach I am referring here to musical empiricism, one of the views of the aesthetic appreciation of musical works introduced in chapter 1. This is the view that the limits of the aesthetic appreciation of a musical work are given only by what can be heard in a properly formed performance or reproduction of that work. Contextual information is irrelevant for the aesthetic appreciation of it according to musical empiricism.

Stage	Questions		Time
Empiricist phase	**Q1.** Would you say that audio 1 and audio 2 are two different pieces of music? (Yes/No)		10''
	Q2. Have you been aroused by any feeling or emotion? (None, the same in both cases (say which), different in both cases (say which))		20''
	Q3. Would you accept that audio 1 and audio 2 were programmed as different pieces in the same concert? (Yes/No)		10''
	Q4. Imagine that you buy tickets for a concert in which, according to the organizers' advertisements, all the pieces to be performed are said to be different. Would you admit in that concert that both audio 1 and audio 2 were performed? (Yes/No)		15''
	Q5. Have you already heard these pieces before? Did you know them? (Yes/No)		10''
Non-empiricist phase	Case 1	**Q6.** The piece that is heard in audio 1 is an anonymous Gregorian chant titled *Ave Regina Caelorum*. Would you say that audio 2 is also an anonymous Gregorian chant called *Ave Regina Caelorum*? (Yes/No)	20''
		Q7. Suppose that audio 2 is from a later author. Would you say that the first time the audio 2 was performed was the premiere of a new piece? (Yes/No)	20''
		Q8. The piece heard in audio 2 is titled *Ave Regina Caelorum*, it has the same lyrics as audio 1 and it is based on the melody of audio 1, but its author is the Italian composer of s. XX-XXI Domenico Bartolucci. Would you say that audio 2 is a different piece but inspired by audio 1? (Yes/No)	40''
	Case 2	**Q6.** The piece that is heard in audio 1 is called *Escualo* and its author is Ástor Piazzolla. Would you say that audio 2 is also the piece *Escualo* and that its author is Ástor Piazzolla? (Yes/No)	20''
		Q7. Would you admit Piazzolla to present audio 2 as a composition (creation) other than audio 1? (Yes/No)	20''
		Q8. The piece heard in audio 2 is a transcription (arrangement) that Luis Otero has subsequently made for brass quintet of the Ástor Piazzolla's piece *Escualo*. Would you admit Otero to present audio 2 as a creation of him different from audio 1? (Yes/No)	40''
	Case 3	**Q6.** The piece heard in audio 1 is the third movement of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. Would you say that audio 2 is also the third movement of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*? (Yes/No)	20''
		Q7. Would you admit Tchaikovsky to present audio 2 as a composition (creation) other than audio 1? (Yes/No)	20''
		Q8. The piece heard in audio 2 is a second version of the piece performed in audio 1 composed 7 years later by Tchaikovsky himself. Would you admit Tchaikovsky to present audio 2 as a new piece different from audio 1? (Yes/No)	40''

The order in which the questions were posed to participants deserves a separate commentary. Q1 inquired directly for the individuation of the two pieces listened in the two audio samples of each case. The goal was to obtain the more intuitive and immediate answer to this issue just after hearing the music in a pure empiricist approach, without mediation of any additional information. Just after, in an attempt to avoid losing the immediacy of the participants' experience of the music heard, Q2 asked for the participants' aesthetic (emotional and affective) response to the audio files reproduced. Since the interest here is to measure the relation between aesthetic

difference and work-identity difference, participants were asked to say whether the two samples heard elicited the same or different emotions and to specify which ones. Q3 poses in an indirect way the same question as Q1. However, Q3 opens more possibilities to be balanced concerning the intuitions about the individuation of musical works: Q3 does not ask directly for the participants' response about the identity of the music reproduced in merely hearing it, but rather how this direct empirical response is balanced against other additional external factors, such as the weight of institutional aspects. Q4 inquires again for the same issue about identity than Q1, but in this case emphasizes the participants' perspective according to the role they are used to playing in our musical practices (usually as spectators, but also as performers or composers). What Q4 demands is the participants' direct empirical response about the identity of musical works relatively to their usual role in our musical practices. To close this empiricist phase, Q5 asks for the previous knowledge that participants have of the music heard. The abscence previous knowledge of the pieces performed guarantees the musical empiricist character of the answers given by participants in this phase.

The non-empiricist phase starts with Q6, which introduces contextual information about the music displayed in the first audio of each case: name of the work and composer. By means of this information, participants are enabled to locate the piece in its musico-historical context. Q6 asks for the intuitions of participants about the identity of the second sample of each case given the contextual emplacement of the first sample. Q7 inquires the relevance and impact that the authority of the work's composer has in the intuitions about the identity of musical works. Finally, Q8 introduces the contextual information relative to the music heard in the second sample of each case and the kind of relation it is taken to have with the music heard in the first audio of each case –if it is based on, or is a transcription or version of the previous sample. Q8 tries to ascertain what the participants' intuitions about the individuation of musical works are once given all the parameters to contextually locate the music heard. Consequently, it will be interesting to check whether there is a significant difference between the answers given to Q1 and the ones obtained in Q8.

The motivation of the introduction of different questions about the same topic, either in the empiricist or in the non-empiricist phase, lies on the aim of minimizing what has been labelled as the problem of *presentational effects* of the method of cases (cf. Machery, 2017). This problem consists in people responding differently to a single case when a superficial aspect of it is modified. By means of the two phases (empiricist and non-empiricist) and the different questions involved in each phase about the same topic, we want to measure if the tendencies in the participants' responses are preserved through the slight variations in the presentation of the cases introduced by each question.

3.7 Results

The results obtained have been processed according to only two parameters: musical education (ME) –i.e. the degree of participants' musical expertise– and aesthetic difference (AD) –i.e. the relation between differences in work-identity and differences in aesthetic content. The results could have been also processed regarding other parameters, such as sex, age or musical preferences. Although these results would be highly interesting, they are not strictly the most relevant for the research developed here. On the one hand, it is more interesting to know whether musical expertise changes the perception of music. Should there be relevant differences between musicians and non-musicians, a balance would have to be made to assess which set of intuitions is more decisive regarding ontological issues. On the other hand, since a derivative goal of this study is to determine the familiarity of participants with the work-individuation principle, attending to the relation between work-difference and aesthetic-difference seems to be crucial. This is why the data processed are confined just to ME and AD.

Regarding ME, the results obtained in the three cases are the following (in the tables are accounted only the results obtained to the yes/no questions, excluding thus Q2):

CASE 1

| | | Musical education | | | | | | Total | |
| | | None (*n* = 52) | | Basic (*n* = 41) | | Professional (*n* = 49) | | (*n* = 142) | |
		n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Q1	Yes	37	71'15	32	78'04	39	79'59	108	76'05
	No	15	28'84	9	21'95	9	18'36	33	23'23
Q3	Yes	37	71'15	33	80'48	39	79'59	109	76'76
	No	15	28'84	8	19'51	10	20'40	33	23'23
Q4	Yes	45	88'23	34	82'92	40	81'63	119	83'80
	No	6	11'76	7	17'07	8	16'32	21	14'78
Q5	Yes	5	9'8	6	14'63	9	18'36	20	14'08
	No	46	90'19	35	85'36	40	81'63	121	85'21
Q6	Yes	15	28'84	12	29'26	14	28'57	41	28'87
	No	37	71'15	29	70'73	35	71'42	101	71'12
Q7	Yes	28	53'84	21	51'21	23	46'93	72	50'7
	No	24	46'15	19	46'34	26	53'06	69	48'59
Q8	Yes	43	82'69	32	78'04	44	91'66	119	83'8
	No	9	17'3	9	21'95	5	10'41	23	16'19

CASE 2

		None (n = 52)		Basic (n = 41)		Professional (n = 50)		Total (n = 143)	
		n	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**
Q1	**Yes**	14	26'92	14	34'14	3	6	31	21'67
	No	38	73'07	27	65'85	47	94	112	78'32
Q3	**Yes**	19	36'53	14	34'14	6	12	39	27'27
	No	33	63'41	27	65'85	44	88	104	72'72
Q4	**Yes**	19	36'53	18	43'9	10	20	47	32'86
	No	33	63'41	23	56'09	40	80	96	67'13
Q5	**Yes**	7	13'46	3	7'31	13	26	23	16'08
	No	44	84'61	38	92'68	37	74	119	83'21
Q6	**Yes**	27	51'92	25	60'97	40	80	92	64'33
	No	25	48'07	16	39'02	10	20	51	35'66
Q7	**Yes**	30	57'69	14	34'14	4	8	48	33'56
	No	22	42'30	27	65'85	46	92	95	66'43
Q8	**Yes**	12	23'07	9	21'95	3	6	24	16'78
	No	40	76'92	32	78'04	47	94	119	83'21

CASE 3

		None (n = 52)		Basic (n = 41)		Professional (n = 52)		Total (n = 145)	
		n	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**	**n**	**%**
Q1	**Yes**	9	17'3	10	24'39	5	9'61	24	16'55
	No	43	82'69	31	75'6	47	90'38	121	83'44
Q3	**Yes**	15	28'84	7	17'07	2	3'84	24	16'55
	No	37	71'15	33	80'48	50	96'15	120	82'75
Q4	**Yes**	16	30'76	11	26'82	4	7'69	31	21'37
	No	36	69'23	30	73'17	48	92'30	114	78'62
Q5	**Yes**	8	15'38	5	12'19	13	25	26	17'93
	No	44	84'61	36	87'8	39	75	119	82'06
Q6	**Yes**	37	71'15	32	78'04	48	92'3	117	80'68
	No	15	28'84	9	21'95	4	7'69	28	19'31
Q7	**Yes**	19	36'53	9	21'95	3	5'76	31	21'37
	No	33	63'46	32	78'04	49	94'23	114	78'62
Q8	**Yes**	25	48'07	17	41'46	9	17'3	51	35'17
	No	27	51'92	24	58'53	43	82'69	94	64'82

As it has been noted, there is a difference in the number of participants between cases 1, 2 and 3. This difference affects only the group of professional musicians. Case 3 was done by all the participants (n = 145), while case 1 was not submitted by three of them and case 2 by two of them, respectively. The results are classified according to the degree of musical education. Odd columns provide the number of participants that filled a particular *yes/no* answer to the questions, while even columns display the percentage

of answers relatively to the totality of the members of the specific group (no musical knowledge, basic knowledge, professional knowledge).

It is a salient point that participants give clear answers to the direct question about the individuation of musical works (Q1), with majoritarian answers over 75% in all the three cases. A vast majority of participants considers that they are hearing two different musical works in hearing audio files 1 and 2 (76'05% vs. 23'23%). By contrast, a large majority of them believes that they are hearing the same musical work when hearing audio files 3 and 4 (21'67% vs. 78'32%). The differences are larger regarding case 3, in which an outstanding majority of participants thinks that they are hearing the same musical work in audio files 5 and 6 (16'55% vs. 83'44%). In other words, the majority of participants intuitively consider, from an empiricist point of view, that hearing audio files 3 and 4 gives them access to the same musical work –the transcription case– and that they encounter the same musical work when they hear audio files 5 and 6 –the version case. By contrast, the same phenomenon does not arise for audio files 1 and 2, which are regarded as giving access to two different musical works. In addition, it is noteworthy that the tendencies become more acute among professional musicians than among non-musicians in all the three cases. 79'59% of professional musicians regard audio files 1 and 2 as corresponding to different musical works, 94% consider that audio files 3 and 4 correspond to the same musical work, and 90'38% take audio samples 5 and 6 as corresponding to the same musical work.

Attending Q8, when all the contextual information about the pieces performed has been introduced, the general tendencies about the individuation of musical works are preserved, although some differences should be highlighted. In case 1, the tendency becomes more acute, with an 83'8% of participants regarding audio file 2 as a performance of a musical work different from the work performed in audio file 1. A similar phenomenon happens with the case of transcriptions, with an 83'21% of participants finding that they hear in the performance of Otero's transcription the same musical work as in the performance of Piazzolla's original. However, the opposite phenomenon arises with the case of versions made by the original work's composer (Tchaikovsky), in which the number of participants that regard audio files 5 and 6 as performances in which they encounter the same musical work is more reduced now (64'82 %). The reason for this different behaviour in case 3 seems to point to the weight that participants without musical knowledge give to the composer's authority in the individuation of his works. Case 3 is the only one in which the two audio samples correspond to performances of musical entities generated by the same composer, and Q8 asks if they would admit that the composer presents these musical products as different musical works. The relevant issue is that, despite the influence that the appeal to the composer's authority may have, the tendency in the empiricist phase (Q1) is still kept in the non-empiricist phase (Q8), and most of the participants regard versions as the same work as the original. Again, the intuitions of professional musicians regarding Q8 are clearer than the ones held by non-professional musicians, with all the majoritarian trends obtaining over 82%.

Focusing now on case 1, the answers given to all questions support the intuition that audio files 1 and 2 are performances that correspond to two different musical works, with a percentage that exceeds in all cases 70% of answers. It is remarkable that the more clear tendency concerns Q4, with 83'8% of positive answers. The only exception in which the results are very equilibrate concerns Q7, having 50'7% of positive answers versus 48'59% of negative ones. The intuitions of participants are not clear as to whether the first performance of Bartolucci's *Ave Regina Caelorum* was the premiere of a new musical work. These results may respond to the influence of other intuitions about authenticity and originality. Finally, it is important to note that 85'21% of participants had never heard these pieces before, which ensures the validity of the results obtained in the empiricist phase.

Regarding case 2, the answers given to all questions support the intuition that audio files 3 and 4 are performances in which the same musical work is heard. However, the trends of the answers are not as definite as in case 1. On the one hand, the direct questions about the individuation of transcriptions obtain absolutely clear answers, having over 75% of participants considering that by means of audio file 4 they access the same musical work as in hearing audio file 3, either under an empiricist approach (Q1) as under a non-empiricist one (Q8). However, the intuitions are not so clear regarding more indirect questions, for instance, Q4, Q6 and Q7. There is a neat contrast between non-musicians and professional musicians concerning these questions. The intuitions are messy in the case of non-musicians, with majoritarian answers ranging between 51'92% and 65'85%. By contrast, professional musicians have clear intuitions regarding Q4, Q6 and Q7, with majoritarian answers ranging between 80% and 92% of participants. This contrast might have to do with the skills provided by musical training in the perception of music. Instrumentation is a parameter more easily apprehended in auditory perception than others for a person without musical training. This phenomenon might make non-musicians more sensitive than professional musicians to changes in instrumentation. However, this interpretation of the results would be misleading because they have clear intuitions concerning the direct question (Q1). A more accurate explanation of this phenomenon is that non-musicians are more sensitive than professional musicians to institutional issues –introduced by Q4– and to the composer's authority –introduced by Q6 and Q7. Finally, it is remarkable that a vast majority of participants (83'21%) had never heard this music before, ensuring again the validity of the results obtained in the empiricist phase.

Case 3 is where the participants' intuitions are clearer. All the answers given support the intuition that audio files 5 and 6 are performances that present the same musical work. Excepting Q8, the majoritarian trend is endorsed in all cases for over 78% of participants. As it happens in the other two cases, the trends are more pronounced in the case of professional musicians than in the case of non-professional musicians. However, even the intuitions of non-musicians are clearer here than in the two other cases. In addition, there are no significant differences between the empiricist

176

and the non-empiricist phases. Finally, a high percentage of participants again (82'06%) had not heard the music of audio files 5 and 6 before, which warrants the validity of the results of the empiricist phase.

Therefore, although far from unanimity, there are highly pronounced trends in the participants' answers to the three cases. The data obtained show that participants have clear intuitions to a satisfactory extent regarding the cases tested. On the one hand, participants mostly share the intuition that in a performance of a piece inspired by previous one they are hearing a musical work different from the original work. On the other hand, participants mostly share the intuition that in a performance of a transcription or a version they do not hear a musical work different from the work versioned or transcribed. Accordingly, these two intuitions are to be regarded as familiar to our musical practices. It is true that only a case of each one of the three phenomena has been tested. However, the paradigmatic character of the cases chosen makes highly plausible that these results will iterate in clearer trends in more common cases.

Regarding AD, the results obtained are summarized in the following table:

Work-difference (Q1)	Aesthetic reaction (Q2)	Musical education						Results (n = 436)	
		None		Basic		Professional			
		n	%	n	%	n	%	N	%
Yes (n = 165)	None	11	18'33	5	8'62	12	25'53	28	16'96
	The same	19	31'66	20	34'48	21	44'68	60	36'36
	Different	30	50	33	56'89	14	29'78	77	46'66
No (n = 271)	None	12	12'76	4	6'15	10	9'8	26	9'96
	The same	57	60'63	49	75'38	64	62'74	170	65'13
	Different	25	26'59	12	18'46	28	27'45	65	24'9

Files from 1 to 3 collect all the affirmative answers to Q1 in the three cases, classifying them attending to the aesthetic response of participants to the audio files reproduced. In particular, it has been distinguished between participants that experienced no feelings or emotions when hearing the two audio files of each case, participants that experienced the same feeling or emotion in hearing the two audio files of each case, and participants that experienced different feelings or emotions when hearing the two audio files of each case. In the three following files, the negative answers to Q1 have been processed following the same kind of tripartite taxonomy.

The results obtained regarding the positive answers to Q1 show that there is no clear trend in this respect. None of the three possible aesthetic reactions –none, the same or different– is over 50%. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that most of participants considering that the audio files of each case correspond to different musical works also experienced different feelings when hearing them. The difference regarding those participants that experienced the same feeling to both audio files is over 10%. Consequently, although it is not broadly shared, the intuition that aesthetic difference is associated to identity difference seems to be more familiar to the participants of the experiment. This intuition is more shared between non-musicians than between

professional musicians. Indeed, more than 50% of non-musicians associate work-difference (positive answer to Q1) with aesthetic difference (the report of different feelings in hearing the audio files).

By contrast, a clearer trend in the participants' intuitions regarding the negative answers to Q1 can be identified. More than 65% people that answered negatively to Q1 experienced the same feeling in hearing the two audios versus 24'9% that experienced different feelings. Accordingly, participants tend to associate different performances with the same musical work when there are no differences in their aesthetic responses to those performances. In other words, participants are more willing to think that they are having access to the same musical work when the performances heard elicit the same kind of aesthetic response.

Therefore, it seems that the link between aesthetic sameness and numerical identity is more familiar to participants than the link between aesthetic difference and identity difference. When the same kind of aesthetic response to the first audio sample is also preserved in hearing the second sample, participants tend to think that the performances heard correspond to the same musical work. Nonetheless, this is not to say that the link between aesthetic difference and identity difference is irrelevant in our practices. Indeed, close to 50% of participants associate aesthetic difference with numerical difference, which shows that differences in aesthetic content is a factor that plays role in the individuation of musical works.

3.8 Discussion

The intuitions of the different kinds of agents involved in our musical practices – listeners, composers, non-musicians and lay people– have been typically appealed in the debate about the individuation of musical works in general, and of versions and transcriptions in particular (cf. Davies, 2017: 59-64, 2008: 368-371; Dodd, 2007: 204-5; Rohrbaugh, 2003: 199; Bartel, 2017). Intuitions have been regarded as data for the ontology of music and a guide to interpret different features of our musical practices. The aim of this study was to measure what these intuitions are regarding the individuation of versions and transcriptions. Nonetheless, the results obtained are not only relevant for the individuation of versions and transcriptions, but also for other fundamental topics in the philosophy of music. In addition, the scope of the results is intended to be valid for both an empiricist and a non-empiricist (contextualist) approach to the individuation of musical works.

Let us consider, firstly, the case of transcriptions. In the case tested, the participants most shared intuition is that in hearing a performance of Otero's transcription they do not hear a musical work different from the one they hear in a performance of Piazzolla's original instrumentation of *Escualo*. They regard both performances as ones providing epistemic access to the same musical work. As a result,

it might be inferred that pure sonicism is the default position in the individuation of musical works. Indeed, the results in this case reflect that people do not take timbral properties to be relevant for the individuation of the musical work involved. To this extent, a properly formed performance of Otero's transcription also satisfies in auditory experience –either in a naked experience (empiricist phase) as in an experience contextually informed (contextualist phase)– the normative properties for being a properly formed performance of the work *Escualo*. The work *Escualo* is taken to be present in a right performance of Otero's transcription.

However, to make a generalization of this particular case would be to make a too strong inductive inference. In fact, there might be some extreme cases in which timbral properties and their causal production by their physical source are part of the identity of a particular musical work (cf. Davies, 2017: 62-4). In this sense, a much more plausible inference would be to claim that neither timbral sonicism nor instrumentalism can be regarded as a default position concerning the individuation of musical works. The results obtained in case 2 reveal that the theses of timbral sonicism and instrumentalism do not correspond to familiar intuitions for the agents involved in our musical practices. This goes against the defences of timbral sonicism and instrumentalism developed by Dodd (2007) and Davies (2008) respectively. Participants do not intuitively regard a change of instrumental medium as entailing a change in the identity of a musical work, at least in the case tested and, by extension, in other similar cases. This is why a performance of Otero's transcription is still regarded as a performance of *Escualo*, the work originally indicated by Piazzolla for other instruments. Accordingly, the assumption of timbral sonicism or instrumentalism as default positions on the individuation of musical works is not tenable on the basis of the intuitions that govern our musical practices. An extension of the scope of these views, taking them as general theses –i.e. as default positions– about the individuation of musical works, is to be regarded as a non-justified revisionary approach.

In the case of versions, a similar phenomenon arises. The participants most shared intuition is that in hearing a performance of the 1879 version they are not hearing a musical work different from the work they hear by means of a performance of the 1872 version. Participants take both performances as providing epistemic access to the same musical work, namely, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony Nº 2*. Consequently, the participants' main intuition is that a change in a sound structure does not imply a change in work-identity, at least in this particular case. Indeed, both versions present slight differences in their sound structures. The results obtained do not sustain the thesis that every musical work is individuated by one, and only one, sound structure –a thesis that will be labelled in chapter 5 as *structural monism*. Different musical performances satisfying different sets of structural properties may be regarded as performances of the same musical work, as it happens with the 1872 and the 1879 versions. This is not to say that sound structures do not play a crucial role in the individuation of musical works. The point is just that participants admit that the same musical work may be associated to performances exhibiting two (slightly) different sound structures. The

intuition that differences between sound structures do not determine different work-identities is familiar for the agents involved in our musical practices, at least in this particular case. Accordingly, the results of the experiment reveal that structural monism in its crude view –this entailing that two slightly different sound structures individuate two different musical works– is not the default position about the individuation of musical works.

Therefore, timbral sonicism, instrumentalism and structural monism –some of the most discussed thesis in the debate about the individuation of musical works in the ontology of music– cannot be regarded as default positions, at least in the way that they have been usually regarded. Their role should be reconsidered, not only regarding the specific case of versions and transcriptions, but also concerning the general problem of the individuation of musical works. Nonetheless, the results achieved here have relevant consequences for other fundamental topics in the ontology of music.

The first one concerns the repeatable character of musical works. This experiment indirectly shows that the belief that musical works are repeatable artworks is broadly shared by the agents involved in the experiment. This belief is presupposed at least by the participants that answer negatively to Q1 in cases 2 (78'32%) and 3 (83'44%). Regarding case 2, participants mostly consider that the work *Escualo* occurs twice by means of the performances reproduced in audio files 3 and 4, and hence that it is repeated in those performances. Concerning case 3, most of participants again regard Tchaikovsky's *Symphony N° 2* as occurring twice in the performances reproduced in audio files 5 and 6, and thus they deem that this work is repeated in such performances. The presupposition by participants of the thesis that musical works are repeatable is a success condition for their judgments that they are hearing the same musical work in hearing the audio files 3 and 4, and 5 and 6, respectively. It is noteworthy that the percentage of participants that clearly assume the idea that musical works are repeatable artworks is significantly greater than the percentage obtained in Bartel's experiment. In the best of cases, he only obtains 62% of participants as backing the repeatability intuition. However, as previously noted, Bartel's experiment is not methodologically adequate. The low result he obtained in favour of the repeatability intuition is due to the unfamiliar scenario in which he tested this intuition. By contrast, when participants undergo a simulation of a real scenario of our musical appreciative practices, the strength and scope of this intuition can be noted, as well as the central role that it plays in our musical practices.

A second important consequence of this experiment for the individuation of musical works concerns the relation between aesthetic content and work-identity. For clarification, let us consider the differences regarding two commitments between three main views on this issue, namely, aesthetic uniqueness, Levinson-Leibniz's view and the work-identity principle:

Commitment	Individuation thesis		
	Aesthetic uniqueness	Levinson-Leibniz	Work-individuation principle
1. Different aesthetic content → different work-identity	+	+	-
2. Different work-identity → different aesthetic content	+	-	-

The thesis of aesthetic uniqueness argues that, since each artwork has a unique aesthetic content, each artwork is individuated by its own aesthetic content. Accordingly, two different aesthetic contents correspond to two different musical works, and two different musical works are associated to two different aesthetic contents. It cannot be the case that the same work is associated to two different aesthetic contents, and that two different musical works share the same aesthetic content. By contrast, Levinson acknowledges the possibility that two different musical works may be associated to the same set of aesthetic attributions (cf. Levinson, 2011: 108, 132). Nonetheless, by Leibniz's law, he assumes that aesthetic differences entail differences at the level of work-identity. The work-identity principle accepts in a broad perspective Levinson's view, but it adds a restriction to the inference that differences in aesthetic content imply different work-identities. Aesthetic differences entail work-identity differences only when the two different aesthetic contents are not compatible with the same description of the non-aesthetic level. The work-individuation principle admits the possibility that different sets of aesthetic attributions are compatible with the same non-aesthetic description, and in this last case, aesthetic differences do not give rise to work-identity differences.

The results obtained show that the intuitions exhibited by participants in musical appreciative practices are far from backing the thesis of aesthetic uniqueness. Indeed, 36'36% of participants admits compatible the situation of having different works with the same aesthetic content, while the percentage of participants that associate different work-identities with different aesthetic contents is no more than 46'66%. The differences are not relevant between those that admit that performances that elicit the same aesthetic response may correspond to different musical works, and those that associate performances eliciting different aesthetic responses with different musical works. Therefore, the idea that works are individuated by their unique aesthetic content is not broadly shared in our musical appreciative practices. By contrast, much more familiar is the thesis that the same musical work is associated to the same aesthetic content. More precisely, participants are more familiar with the intuition that in hearing in performance similar sound structures, and when those performances elicit the same kind of aesthetic response, they tend to say that they are hearing the same musical work. 65'13 % of participants that regarded no work-identity difference also regarded no

aesthetic-difference in hearing the audio samples. However, this tendency is not overwhelmingly shared, which justifies the restriction made by the work-individuation principle over Levinson-Leibniz's view, admitting the possibility in which the same musical work may be associated to different aesthetic contents.

Another interesting result of the experiment concerns the dispute between contextualism and anti-contextualism concerning the individuation of musical works. The way in which participants individuate the musical works heard in the audio samples is not significantly modified when contextual information of the works is introduced. The trends obtained in the answers to Q1 –which measures the pure empiricist intuition of participants about the individuation of the musical entities heard in the audio files– are preserved in the questions that provide information about composers, time of composition and musical genre. In some cases, the trend increases with respect to the pure empiricist phase when contextual information is added. For instance, in case 1, Q1 obtains 76'05% and Q8 83'8%, and in case 2, Q1 has 78'32% and Q8 83'21%. In other cases, the trend displayed in the pure empiricist phase decreases with the addition of contextual information. For example, in case 1, Q7 obtains 50'7% vs. 76'05 of Q1; in case 2, Q6 has 64'33% vs. 78'32% of Q1; and in case 3, Q8 deserves 64'82% vs. 83'44% of Q1. As previously noted, the decrease of the trends has to do with the relevance and authority that participants –specially, non-musicians– confer to the composer decisions and to institutional verdicts. However, none of the two authorities is strong enough to change the trends of participants intuitions about the individuation of the musical works heard in the experiment. Therefore, the incidence of the contextual information in the individuation of musical works is lesser than it is usually taken to be (cf. Levinson, 2011; Davies, 2004; Trivedi, 2002; Currie, 1989). The way in which participants individuate the musical entities heard in the experiment is not substantially changed before and after the introduction of contextual information.

Finally, the most relevant differences in the answers are related to the level of musical education and expertise of participants. Regarding the cases tested, the intuitions of professional musicians are much clearer than the ones held by participants with basic or none musical education. In almost all questions, the trends of professional musicians range over 80% of answers. By contrast, the trends are more attenuated among participants with none or basic musical education, rarely ranging over 80% of answers in all cases. Although the trends of professional and non-professional musicians coincide, this phenomenon opens the debate of what the relevant intuitions for ontology are. In general, the appeal to intuitions of agents involved in a particular practice have been often criticised in metaphysics arguing that agents' intuitions are messy (Bennet, 2009; Eklund, 2006). The same criticism has been also reproduced in the domain of the ontology of music (Bartel, 2017). However, the results of this experiment show that this criticism is not right at least concerning the cases tested. They suggest that the objection oversimplifies the problem in considering the agents' intuitions homogeneous. Sharper distinctions have to be made. Two kinds of agents are clearly distinguished. On the one hand, participants with professional education have

absolutely clear and strong intuitions about the issues posed. Accordingly, the abovementioned criticism is wrong regarding this set of agents. On the other hand, the intuitions of participants with none or basic musical education are also clear, but not as strong and definite as those of professional musicians, and only regarding specific questions they can be said to be messy –i.e. Q6 and Q7 in case 2, and Q7 and Q8 of case 3. Two consequences are to be obtained: firstly, that agents' intuitions are not as blurry and messy as the defender of this criticism supposes; secondly, that we have to decide which set of participants provide the intuitions that are relevant for ontology, whether professional or non-professional musicians, given the notable differences between them. These two consequences can be extrapolated to the domain of general metaphysics regarding any practice.

4. Conclusions

This chapter was intended to provide a descriptive account of how versions and transcriptions are regarded in our musical practices. In the first section, the place and scope that they occupy in the musical repertoire has been accounted. Despite not being the most common cases, musical works with more than one version made by the original work's composer and transcriptions changing the original work's instrumentation have been revealed as phenomena neither marginal nor rare. Secondly, the way in which versions and transcriptions are individuated in our musical practices has been considered. It has been noted that musicologists tend to classify versions and transcriptions as works non-numerically different from the work versioned or transcribed. Thirdly, the motivations for this tendency have been explored attending to different parameters. In the first place, different historical examples were provided in which the composer's motivations for composing a version or a transcription reinforce the idea that these musical products do not constitute musical works different from the work versioned or transcribed. In this sense, musicological classifications of versions and transcriptions fit the typical composer's intentions concerning these kinds of musical products. In the second place, additional motivations for the tendency of not classifying versions and transcriptions as musical works different from the works versioned or transcribed have been examined. These have to do with the physical material that composers manipulate to compose versions, with the role and place that instrumentation has in a notably shared method of musical composition, and with the critical and appreciative discourse about the authenticity of versions and transcriptions.

In the second section, an empirical experiment has been introduced to measure the intuitions involved in our musical practices concerning the individuation of versions and transcriptions. The results obtained in the experiment have revealed as familiar the intuition that in hearing a performance of a version or a transcription we are hearing, encountering, experiencing and accessing the same work as when we hear a performance of the original version or instrumentation. Most participants take themselves to be hearing the same musical work when they hear a performance of the

1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony Nº 2*. Analogously, most of participants consider that they are hearing the same musical work when they hear Piazzolla's original instrumentation of *Escualo* and Otero's transcription of that work. The familiarity of this intuition is more broadly shared by professional musicians than by the other participants. This intuition may be regarded as grounding the musicological tendency of classifying versions and transcriptions as works numerically non-different from the works versioned or transcribed. The intuitions shared by participants are that a change in sound structure, or a change in instrumentation, is not enough to obtain a new musical work. Consequently, neither timbral sonicism, nor instrumentalism nor structural monism can be regarded as default positions concerning the individuation of musical works. In addition, the experiment shows that the idea that musical works are repeatable is assumed by those participants that regard the work versioned or transcribed as occurring in the performances of its versions and transcriptions. Moreover, the results show that contextual information does not substantially affect the participants' intuitions about the individuation of musical works. Finally, interesting differences have been regarded between professional musicians and non-musicians: while the former sometimes exhibit messy intuitions, the latter have clear and definite ones about the issue at stake. This last remark opens a debate of which intuitions should be regarded as the relevant ones for the ontology of music, whether those of lay people or those of the professional musicians.

In terms of the methodology of reflective equilibrium introduced in chapter 2, the task developed in the present chapter is indispensable to offer an ontological account of musical versions and transcriptions. The results obtained from musicological inquiry and from the three cases tested in the experiment serve to show, on the one hand, what the familiar intuitions about the ontological status of musical works are familiar to our musical practices and, on the other, what intuitions are not entitled to be regarded as the default position about this issue. Methodologically speaking, the conformity with our musical practices is one of the desiderata to be satisfied by an ontological account in order to avoid the problem of solipsism. However, the description provided here does not constitute the last word in our ontology, on pain of falling pray to the problem of triviality. The role that results obtained here play is merely that of a point of reference for ontology: an ontological account must preserve *ad maximum* the way in which we deal with versions and transcriptions in our musical practices if no other theoretical explanatory virtues are affected. This is what the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism have settled. That is, between two ontological accounts equal in explanatory power, simplicity and integration in other domains, the account that best accommodates our musical practices will be preferred. This is why it is important to obtain an accurate description of them as the one provided here by means of empirical methods and attending to the results and procedures employed in musicology and music theory. Nonetheless, since the results achieved attain issues about repeatability and classical views in the individuation of musical works –as sonicism or instrumentalism–, they are relevant, not only for the particular phenomena of versions and transcriptions, but also for the general discussion concerning the nature of musical works.

Chapter 4

Musical versions and transcriptions II: discussing Stephen Davies' account.[43]

1. Introduction: Davies' account on versions and transcriptions

As noted in the previous chapter, versions and transcriptions of musical works can be undertaken either by the work's composer or by a different person. Regarding the case of versions, on the one hand, Sibelius wrote two versions of his *Fifth Symphony* –in 1916 and 1919– after the premiere of the work, seeking to improve the original version. On the other, Karl Marguerre is said to have penned a version of Mozart's *Horn Concerto* in D K412/514 from the original manuscript, which was incomplete. A similar phenomenon arises with transcriptions. For instance, Berlioz transcribed in 1834 his composition of *La Belle Voyageuse* for male quartet and orchestra, a piece originally written in 1829 for voice and piano. Alternatively, several examples of transcriptions made by other than the original work's composer can be easily found, as Otero's transcription for brass quintet of Ástor Piazzolla's *Escualo*. For simplicity, this chapter will be mainly focused on versions and transcriptions made by the same composer of the original version of a work. Nonetheless, the results achieved will hold also for versions and transcriptions composed by other than the original composer of the work.

Stephen Davies has devoted a significant part of his work in the philosophy of music to the study of versions and transcriptions. In Davies' account, a common feature of versions and transcriptions is that both kinds of musical products come after the completion of a previous musical work. This previous work is the work *of* which they are versions or transcriptions. In Davies' words:

> A musician might begin to compose, using a finished work as her source. If she carries the process of re-composition far enough, she writes a new piece. The new work is influenced by the original, and perhaps audible traces of this inspiration remain detectable in quotations or allusions. In a different scenario, the composer does not carry the process

---

[43] This paper is based on two papers published in *Debates in Aesthetics,* Vol. 13, No. 1., in which I address some criticisms to Davies' account on transcriptions and Davies responds to those objections.

very far and she conceives of herself as revising the source rather than going beyond it. The product is what I have called a work version. The practice of transcription lies between these extremes. The audible relation with the original is preserved, as is the sound-structural outline and much else, yet the change in instrumental medium distances the transcription from its model, with the result that a *new work* is produced (Davies, 2007 : 87. My emphasis).

According to Davies' view, versions and transcriptions are musical products that require as a necessary condition that a musical work has been previously finished. In his view, versions are revisions of a *previous work* without departing so substantially from it that they constitute a new musical work. By contrast, the hallmark of transcriptions is that they translate a *previous work* into a different instrumental medium. For instance, when the original piece is written for orchestra, its medium is constituted by the orchestral instruments. Changing the medium of this piece would be transcribing it, for example, for piano, organ or voices. In contrast to versions, transcriptions are considered by Davies to be new musical works. Thus, in Davies' view, versions and transcriptions have different ontological weight: both versions and transcriptions are musical entities, but only the latter constitute new musical works distinct from a previously finished musical work.

According to Davies, versions involve changes in the *constitutive* properties of the previous work (Davies, 2007: 86). Davies' idea is that when the composer revises a previous work in order to produce a new version of it, she can alter the sound structure of the original piece, changing notes, adding new parts and deleting others. However, for Davies those changes in a work's sound structure are not sufficient to give rise to a new work. On the other hand, transcriptions do not necessarily involve changes in the previous work's sound structure. Transcriptions, as Davies points out, aim to preserve 'the audible relation with the original' and 'the sound-structural outline'. Modifications in the sound structure for transcriptions are required only when the instruments of the new medium are not technically able to play the original sound structure. However, he regards the change of medium necessarily involved in transcriptions as sufficient for a transcription of a medium-specific work to count as a new work. Following Davies' view, there may be cases in which differences in sound structures are not enough to give rise to new musical works –the case of versions–, while there may be others –works whose medium has been specified by the composer– in which a change of medium is sufficient to obtain a new musical work. The latter is, according to Davies, the case of transcriptions of medium-specific works.

In light of the results obtained in the empirical experiment introduced in the previous chapter, Davies' view on versions accommodates the main intuition involved in our musical practices concerning their individuation. According to this intuition, in the performances of a new version of a work we do not hear a different but rather the same musical work as the one we hear in the performances of the original version of that work. By contrast, Davies' view on transcriptions contradicts the corresponding intuition about their individuation that has been revealed as familiar to our musical practices in the previous chapter. According to this intuition, in the performances of a

transcription we do not hear a new musical work different from the one we hear in the performances of the original instrumentation of that work. However, Davies' account would reject this intuition, at least in the case of transcriptions of medium-specific works. Since he takes transcriptions of medium-specific works to be different musical works from the work transcribed, we would hear in a transcription's performance a different musical work from the work transcribed. Therefore, while Davies' thesis about versions is non-revisionary of the practical intuitions, his view about transcriptions is revisionary and cannot be regarded as the default position.

The conformation with the widely shared intuitions in our musical practices is, as far as possible, a desideratum to be accomplished by an ontological theory according to the methodology defended in chapter 2. According to minimal descriptivism, ontological accounts of musical works, within a given context, should be able to accommodate widespread musical intuitions. A revision of a belief that is familiar to our musical practices is only justified when there are good reasons for it. According to the desideratum of minimal revisionism, a familiar belief can be revised only if this belief is, by means of reflection and conceptual analysis, identified as a non-entrenched one, or if preserving it hinders the satisfaction of sound theoretical principles. From empirical research we can ascertain what intuitions are familiar, but it is by means of conceptual analysis the way in which we can determine which of the familiar intuitions are not entrenched ones. The thesis of this chapter is that Davies' view on transcriptions is not right. Section II will be devoted to show that Davies' ontological thesis about transcriptions is revisionary of the beliefs involved in our musical practices. In section III, it will be explored in Davies' account if there is any reason to justify his revisionary thesis about transcriptions. Three possible reasons will be considered, namely, the relevance of the context of composition in determining the normative character of instrumentation, the influence of timbre in the identity of a work's sound structure, and the idea that virtuosity is a normative property of musical works that depends on the instrumental medium prescribed by the composer. However, it will be shown that none of these reasons is strong enough to support the idea that transcriptions of medium-specific works constitute musical works different from the work transcribed. In other words, they do not show that the intuition that transcriptions constitute the same work as the work transcribed is not an entrenched one. The conclusion that will be obtained is that Davies' revisionary account in transcriptions is not justified. In this sense, it will be pointed out that the difference between versions and transcriptions seems not to be ontological, but merely conceptual.

2. Davies' revisionism

As pointed out above, the thesis defended in this chapter is that Davies' account of transcriptions is not right. The argument to be developed is that his view is revisionary and that he does not offer convincing reasons to support a revision of the familiar intuitions involved in our musical practices about this kind of musical products.

Consequently, the first step is to show Davies' revisionism about transcriptions. In this section, it will be explored in more detail why Davies' view of transcriptions is revisionary. Davies' thesis is that transcriptions of medium-specific works constitute musical works different from the work transcribed. By means of two thought experiments, some pre-theoretical intuitions grounded in our actual musical practices will be highlighted to show why considering transcriptions to be different musical works from the work transcribed is problematic, even when the transcribed works are medium-specific. Next, Davies' answers to these problems will be considered. And finally, this section will conclude with some objections to Davies' response, appealing to relevant data obtained in the experiment introduced in the

It is common practice for singers to rehearse operas, from Monteverdi to Puccini, with a piano transcription of the orchestral part. Consider Verdi's *Nabucco*, an opera of the 19th century that is medium-specific. Let us imagine that Lucia, a soprano, and Hannah, a pianist, are rehearsing in a room. Suppose that Maria enters the room and says: 'Lucia, that sounds like the aria 'Anch'io dischiuso un giorno' of Verdi's *Nabucco* – is it?'. What should Lucia's answer be? If we interpreted transcriptions as new musical works differing from the work transcribed, Lucia's answer should be that it is the aria 'Anch'io dischiuso un giorno', but not of Verdi's *Nabucco* but of Mario Parenti's *Nabucco* (Mario Parenti is the author of the transcription for piano). However, this kind of answer would be inconsistent with our intuitions regarding musical practice. Maria knows of only one opera called *Nabucco*, which was composed by Verdi. It would be surprising for her to learn of another work with the same name, with an aria having the same melody, rhythms, and harmony, and composed by a person other than Verdi. Indeed, notwithstanding the creativity and the interpretive work involved in writing the transcription, no informed person would credit Mario Parenti with composing a musical work for piano and voices called *Nabucco*.

A second example in order to stand out the counterintuitive character of the thesis that transcriptions constitute new musical works different from the work transcribed is the following. Imagine that the London Contemporary Music Festival commissions the Argentinian composer Jorge Valdano to compose a new work for a brass quintet for that year's festival. He is told that the piece should last no more than 10 minutes and that it should evoke the Argentinian musical style. To fulfil the assignment, Valdano decides to make a transcription for brass quintet of Astor Piazzolla's work *Primavera Porteña*. Being convinced that a change of medium is enough to give rise to a new musical work, he changes the medium –from bandoneon, violin, bass, piano, and electric guitar– to two trumpets, a French horn, a trombone, and a tuba. He also readjusts the original melodies to the idioms of the new instruments, avoiding certain ornaments and modifying musical articulations that are especially difficult for brass instruments. With this, Valdano demonstrates creative and interpretative skills. As Valdano is convinced that his transcription is truly a new work, he decides to give it a different name from the original: *Bonaerensis*. Imagine now that, at the premiere, Piazzola's *Primavera Porteña* is performed followed by *Bonaerensis*. How would the audience react? Most of the audience, and especially those who bought

their tickets expecting the premiere of a new work, would feel cheated. In sharing most of the sound structure, harmony, and voice-leading, *Bonaerensis* and *Primavera Porteña* are arguably too close to be felt to count as distinct musical works. It is true that the audience might think that *Bonaerensis* is an ironical work satirizing the concept of creating a musical work. But even in this case, *Bonaerensis* wouldn't be considered a new *musical* work, but a new *conceptual* work of art.

These two hypothetical examples illustrate that it is counterintuitive and problematic to take transcriptions as constituting musical works different from the work transcribed, even when it is a medium-specific work. As it will be developed in the , it is more intuitive, and free of this kind of problems, to regard a transcription of a work W as a new insight of W or way of presenting it. In a transcription, the work transcribed is presented again (re-presented) in a new way, different form the original version indicated by the composer. To re-present W by means of a transcription is not to present a new work, but to present W in a way different from the one in which W was originally presented by its composer. To re-present W just means that we hear, encounter and experience W by means of a performance of a transcription of it that highlights other aspects or potentialities of W. If a transcription were a musical work different from W, in hearing a performance of a transcription of W we would not be hearing W but rather this new different work.[44] This seems to be the idea behind the intuitions of our musical practices, and Davies' view contradicts them. As a result, Davies' account should be regarded as a revisionary view on transcriptions.

Davies has responded to these two thought experiments arguing that none of them support the objection that his view on transcriptions is revisionary and counterintuitive (cf. Davies, 2017: 61). Regarding Valdano's case, he dismisses its relevance because it is 'an unusual case in which Valdano's piece flouts the usual convention for transcriptions by not publicly announcing the source from which his is derived' (Davies, 2017: 60). Davies claims in this sense that there is 'a more or less standard way of titling' a transcription, and he gives the examples of 'Beethoven–Liszt, *Symphony No. 5 in C minor*' and 'Mussorgsky–Ravel, *Pictures at an Exhibition*' (Davies, 2017: 60). Concerning this last case, Davies explains how this way of titling transcriptions is usually understood: 'what is normally said to be performed is a piece by Mussorgsky–Ravel, this being shorthand for saying the source piano work is by Mussorgsky and the orchestral transcription that is to be played is by Ravel' (Davies, 2017: 60). Consequently, since the musical work that plays the role of the transcription's source is not announced in Valdano's case, Davies claims that this is an unusual case, unentitled to illustrate anything about our intuitions about transcriptions.

It is right that Valdano's case is not a usual one. However, Davies' attempt to dismiss the relevance of the intuitions highlighted in Valdano's case is not convincing because he misinterprets the usual way of titling transcriptions. In the first place,

---

[44] Davies introduced this epistemological idea of transcriptions as re-presentations of the work transcribed (cf. Davies, 2003: 53). But, as we can see, this idea is incompatible with his ontological thesis that transcriptions are musical works different from the work transcribed.

regarding the title 'Mussorgsky–Ravel, *Pictures at an Exhibition*', Ravel is considered the composer of the transcription, but not the composer of a new musical work different from Mussorgsky's *Pictures at an Exhibition*. In addition, Mussorgsky is not regarded as the composer of a musical work different from the musical work that is heard when Ravel's transcription is performed. Musorgsky is not taken to be the composer of a 'source piano work', but rather the composer of the work that is heard in a performance of Ravel's transcription. This way of interpreting the transcriptions' tittles is grounded on the intuitions that people have when confronted with cases of transcriptions. These intuitions were the ones that Valdano's case was intended to highlight, despite of being unusual case.

The intuitions that back the interpretation of transcriptions' tittles defended in the last paragraph are also exhibited by 'normal' cases of transcriptions. This phenomenon is illustrated by the results obtained in the experiment introduced in the previous chapter. The experiment's participants, when confronted with an audition of the performances of Ástor Piazzolla's *Escualo* and of a transcription of this work for brass quintet made by Luis Otero, mostly consider that they are hearing the same musical work in both cases. 78% of participants reject to be hearing different musical works (Q1). In the case of professional musicians this percentage increases until 94%. 72% of participants reject these two musical entities to be programmed as different pieces in the same concert (Q3). And 83% of participants reject Otero's transcription to be presented as a new musical work different from Piazzolla's *Escualo* (Q8). In particular, Q8 asks literally the following: 'The piece heard in audio 2 is a transcription (arrangement) that Luis Otero has subsequently made for brass quintet of Ástor Piazzolla's piece *Escualo*. Would you admit Otero to present audio 2 as his own creation different from audio 1?'. Q8 thus provides to the experiment's participants the information that is typically provided by a transcription's tittle according to the examples offered by Davies. Consequently, Davies should accept the results of the experiment. These results back an interpretation of transcriptions' tittles according to which the transcriber is considered a composer of the transcription, but not a composer of a musical work different from the work transcribed –not even of a different but derivative work. Davies' view on transcriptions is revisionary concerning people's intuitions when confronted with the audition of transcriptions in the sort of situations that can be typically found in our musical practices.

There is an additional worry concerning Davies' interpretation of transcriptions' tittles. If we follow it, it is impossible to distinguish between transcriptions and works inspired by previous ones.[45] In the latter case, there are two musical works: one that is the inspired work, and other one that is the source of inspiration of the inspired work. In the inspired work, some elements of the source work can be recognised. The inspired work may even take sometimes literally extracts of the source work, being a paradigmatic example of this phenomenon Bartolucci's *Ave Regina Caelorum* analysed

---

[45] As noted in chapter 1, this problem is common to all views that regard musical versions and transcriptions as musical works different from the ones versioned or transcribed.

in the previous chapter. Davies' way of interpreting transcriptions' tittles seems to reduce the case of transcriptions to the case of inspired works. However, transcriptions and inspired works are different kinds of musical products that play different roles in our musical practices. These differences are exhibited by the contrasting intuitions that the audience has when confronted with transcriptions and inspired works. On the one hand, the audience regards that they are hearing the same work in a transcription's performance as in a performance of the work's original instrumentation. On the other hand, the audience considers that what is heard in a performance of an inspired work is a musical work different from the source work. This phenomenon is illustrated by the opposite responses given by participants to cases 1 and 2 of the experiment introduced in the previous chapter. Case 1 contrasted the case of an inspired work –Bartolucci's *Ave Regina Caelorum*– with the work that is the source of inspiration –the Gregorian antiphon *Ave Regina Caelorum*. 76% of participants deem that they are hearing two different musical works in these two performances (Q1). By contrast, in the case of transcriptions, 78% of participants think that they are hearing the same musical work. In the case of Bartolucci's inspired work, 76% of participants admit this piece to be programmed in the same concert as a musical work different from the source work *Ave Regina Caelorum* (Q3). By contrast, 72% of participants reject Otero's transcription to be programmed as a different work from Piazzolla's *Escualo* in the same concert. And while 83% of participants accept that Bartolucci presents his piece as a new musical work different from the source work, 83% of participants reject that Otero presents his transcription as a new work different from the work transcribed. These contrasting intuitions suggest that the case of transcriptions and the case of inspired works are different in nature. Davies confuses them, and assimilates transcriptions to inspired works. Therefore, his account is also revisionist on this issue, and he owes an explanation that justifies why the contrast between the intuitions regarding transcriptions and inspired works should be removed by revising the intuitions concerning transcriptions.

Regarding Verdi's case, Davies admits that Lucia and Hannah are performing Verdi's Nabucco. However, he dismisses this case as a counterexample against his view arguing that it is not a case of transcription, but rather a case of *piano reduction* 'created for use in rehearsals' (Davies, 2017: 60). Davies acknowledges that 'in the absence of suitable orchestral resources, the performance may be accompanied by a piano playing the reduction in a public concert' (Davies, 2017: 60-1). The contrast between piano reductions and transcriptions is stated by Davies in the following terms:

> In most cases, transcriptions are based on the entirety of a work and are presented as independent of the original, whilst acknowledging their derivative status. That is not what happens when the orchestral score of an opera or ballet is reduced for piano for the purposes of facilitating rehearsal with singers or dancers (Davies, 2017: 61).

A first difference between reductions and transcriptions is that the latter but not the former 'are presented as independent of the original, whilst acknowledging their derivative status'. This must be justified with examples of this practice of presentation of transcriptions. Davies does not offer any example on this specific point. If the

examples are the cases of transcriptions' tittles given above, Davies' claim seems to lie on the assumption of his particular interpretation of transcriptions' tittles. However, as argued above, this interpretation is misguided and revisionist of our intuitions. In addition, Davies' understanding of the motivations for piano reductions seems to be too narrow. It does not account, for instance, for the motivations for the reduction practices carried out by Schönberg and his disciples pointed out in the previous chapter. According to Schönberg, reductions for piano of orchestral works –including ballets and operas– are a means of facilitating an artistic and aesthetic judgment about the quality of the work reduced or transcribed. Therefore, a reduction may be motivated by the aim to obtain a better understanding of a particular musical work. This was also the motivation that moved Liszt to make his numerous transcriptions for piano of orchestral pieces. Consequently, the conditions provided by Davies to distinguish between piano reductions and piano transcriptions do not offer a clear borderline, and it seems that there are no reasons to exclude Verdi's case as a case of transcription.

Therefore, Davies' attempt to reject the accusation of revisionism concerning his account of transcriptions is not successful. The idea that transcriptions constitute musical works different from the work transcribed is contrary to the intuitions involved in our appreciative practices of transcriptions. In addition, it is contrary to the way in which musicologists typically classify transcriptions, as noted in the previous chapter. Consequently, Davies must provide an explanation that justifies why our beliefs about transcriptions have to be revised. The next section will be devoted to explore whether in Davies' account there is any reason strong enough to support his revisionary thesis about the ontological status of transcriptions.

3.   Discussing Davies' Reasons

Given the conclusion obtained in the previous section that Davies' account is revisionary regarding our practical intuitions about transcriptions, this section is devoted to explore, in Davies' account, strong motivations and reasons that might justify that revision. In this sense, it is noteworthy to point that Davies doesn't intend his distinction to merely capture our intuitions. He does not confine the defence of his view to our tacit musical understandings, but also offers other reasons for his account. Davies' main reasons to support his view will be considered here in order to see whether they are strong enough to justify such a revisionist account concerning transcriptions.

Davies' main point is that a change of medium of a medium-specific work is enough to give rise to a new musical work different from the work transcribed. Davies endorses this idea in different places:

> Usually, a change in medium involves a change in instrumentation (and note changes consequent on this). It is possible to produce a new piece through a change in instrumentation, because most musical works are medium-specific (Davies, 2003: 48).

> Where a medium-specific piece is adapted to a new medium the result is a distinct work (Davies, 2007 : 86).

Davies' first claim mentions the possibility of obtaining a new work by means of changing its instrumentation. This idea seems *prima facie* reasonable. We may think about some contemporary pieces that we may label as 'timbrical works'. These are a sort of pieces that lack a clear melodic, contrapuntal or rhythmical line, and that are based on a succession and overlapping of different timbres and textures generated by specific effects for the instruments prescribed by the composer. We may admit that these works cannot be transcribed for all kinds of instruments, for instance, for piano. We may even admit that an extreme work of this kind that cannot be transcribed for any alternative instrumentation, at least in an authentic fashion, in the way that authenticity was understood in the previous chapter. However, Davies' second claim extends the range of possibilities of obtaining a new work by a change of instrumentation beyond to this reduced set of timbrical woks. Davies holds that this hypothesis applies to all musical works that are medium-specific. This extension is revisionary with respect to the way in which we deal in our musical practices with many of the transcriptions of medium-specific works. Audience's intuitions and musicological classifications tend to reject the idea that a transcription of a medium-specific work is a musical work different from the work transcribed. This phenomenon was illustrated in the previous chapter by transcriptions of medium-specific works made by the original work's composer as Berlioz's *La captive*, Brahms' *Variations on a Haydn theme*, Milhaud's *The Ox on the Roof* or Stravinsky's *Pastorale for voice and piano*.

By contrast, in Davies' view, a crucial feature that determines the identity of a medium-specific work is the instrumental medium (instrumentation) for which that work has been originally written by its composer. Transcriptions involve a change of instrumental medium from the original one specified by the work's composer. Consequently, such a change is sufficient to consider the result as a new musical work. Three reasons can be found in Davies' work to support this claim: (1) in the case of medium-specific works, the context of composition determines that the medium originally specified by their composer is constitutive of their identity; (2) that colour (or timbre) is a necessary condition of the structure and content of a musical work; and (3) that certain aesthetic properties constitutive of a work's identity depend on the instrumental medium specified by the composer. In what follows, these three reasons will be analysed with the aim of determining whether they are strong enough to justify Davies' revisionary thesis about the ontological status of transcriptions.

3.1 Davies' first reason discussed: the relevance of the context of composition.

A first reason found in Davies' account to support the idea that a change of medium is sufficient for obtaining a new work has to do with the role played in the

individuation of medium-specific works by their context of composition. According to Davies, the features relevant for a work's identity are determined by the musico-historical context in which it is composed (Davies, 2001: 58, 74, 76). The conventions governing musical practices in the context of composition of a work determine the meaning of the composer's notations in the score, and hence the properties that are normative for the performances of that work. Consequently, the context of composition that determines whether instrumentation is part of the identity of a given piece. If the conventions implicated in the context in which W is composed determine that a specific instrumental medium is constitutive of W's identity, a transcription of W will result in a new musical work different from W.

Davies does not think that instrumentation is always constitutive of a work's identity. Hence, he rejects an absolute instrumentalist account for the individuation of musical works: that is, he rejects the thesis that a properly formed performance of a work must *always* exhibit the timbral qualities intended by, and be performed by the instruments prescribed by, the composer, regardless of the conventions involved in the context of composition (Davies, 2008: 374-5). According to Davies, musical works began to be more and more medium-specific from the 18th Century. He claims that it is only since the 19th century that works' instrumentation has been mandated by its composer (Davies, 2008: 374). Instrumentation is mandatory only if a work is composed in contexts in which conventions and musical practices make the composer's indication of the work's performance-means to be taken as directions concerning the identity of the piece. The practices of the context of the Renaissance do not determine that the instruments prescribed by the composer are constitutive of her work's identity. Gabrieli's *Canzona per sonare no. 1* performed either by an organ or by a brass ensemble would count as properly formed instances of that piece. By contrast, according to Davies, the relevant practices of Tchaikovsky's context would exclude any performance not played by the instruments prescribed by Tchaikovsky as a performance of his *Second Symphony*. This last one is a context in which the work's instrumentation is taken to be mandated by the work's composer. The pieces composed in those contexts are thus medium-specific works (Davies, 2007: 86-7; 2003: 48).

Despite the claim that the context of composition settles some of the properties that belong to a work's identity, it does not follow from this idea that a change in instrumentation results in a new work. Contrary to what Davies maintains, when a transcription of a medium-specific work is made, the result is not usually a new musical work. Even in 19th century's contexts, where musical practices determine that being performed by the instruments prescribed by the composer is a normative property of musical works, the practice of transcription was common and transcriptions were not usually counted as compositions of new works. From the idea that instrumentation is a normative property for a musical work's properly formed performances, it does not follow that it is a property constitutive of the identity of that work. What follows is the weaker claim that it would be more preferable the work to be performed by the original instrumentation. In other words, the change in instrumentation implemented in a

transcription does not preclude us to hear, encounter and access the work transcribed when we hear a transcription's performance. To this extent, a performance of a transcription for brass band of Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony* may be regarded as an inauthentic performance of that work, but it is nonetheless a (maybe less preferable) performance of Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony* and of no other work (cf. Scruton, 1997: 442; Kivy, 1988/1993: 77-8). Normative properties, by contrast with typical non-normative properties, admit gradual instantiations: they can be instantiated in a more or less degree. Such a performance would be one that would satisfy in a lesser degree the normative properties of Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony* than a performance carried out by a symphonic orchestra. Consequently, this phenomenon opens the possibility of having new instrumentations of a medium-specific work without originating new works different from the work transcribed.

Although Davies maintains his thesis about transcriptions, he has acknowledged this point in his response to this criticism. Davies argues in the following terms:

> Puy says these show that a work can be instrument-specific yet be instanced in performances on other instruments. I think that imperfect renditions can count as performances of their target work, though they involve departures from maximal authenticity and (like the piano reduction rendition of an operatic aria at a public concert) may require careful advertising if an audience is expected to pay (…). But I do not think of transcriptions as similarly imperfect. It would be odd to fault Liszt's piano transcriptions of Beethoven symphonies for being for the piano (Davies, 2017: 63).

The concession made by Davies to my view is little but important. He concedes that a performance of the piano reduction of Verdi's Nabucco is a performance of the 'target work', namely, Verdi's *Nabucco*. It is a performance that counts as an occurrence –although as an *imperfect* occurrence in Davies' view– of the work transcribed, in which we can experience, hear, encounter and access Verdi's *Nabucco*. Consequently, if Davies concedes this point, and since Verdi's *Nabucco* is a medium-specific work, Davies must also concede that a change of medium in a medium-specific work is not enough to give rise to a new musical work different from the original, even if we admit Davies' distinction between piano reductions and piano transcriptions. Therefore, the main motivation for supporting Davies' thesis about transcriptions seems to vanish.

In addition, it is important to note that imperfect renditions do not have necessarily less artistic and aesthetic value than the perfect renditions of a work. A charming performance of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* with some notes wrong may be preferred to a perfect but cold performance of it because the former conveys in a better way the character of the work.[46] So, even if we regarded the performances of Liszt's

---

[46] As it will be developed in chapter 7, these are cases in which *score compliance authenticity* conflicts with *interpretative authenticity*. A performance departing in some points from a score's notations may be regarded as an authentic performance to the extent that it offers a better insight of that work. Scruton points in this direction, arguing the following: 'while the composer intended certain sounds to be produced, by way of a performance of that work, he also intends those sounds to be heard as music –in

piano transcriptions of Beethoven's symphonies as imperfect renditions of such symphonies, we would not be necessarily 'faulting' Liszt's transcriptions. In the same way as the imperfect charming performance of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* may be sometimes preferred, a performance of Liszt's transcription may be preferred for highlighting some aspects of the piece that are more camouflaged in an orchestral performance. We may value the new way in which Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is presented in Liszt's transcription, the new insight of this work offered by Liszt. Accordingly, a way is open to regard transcriptions' performances as performances of the transcribed work rather than as performances of a different work, even when the work transcribed is a medium-specific one.

Nonetheless, I agree with Davies that transcriptions' performances are not typically regarded as imperfect performances. The crucial point is why we should regard them as performances of works different from the work transcribed. The case of piano reductions illustrates that a change of medium is not enough to obtain a new musical work even in cases in which the context of composition determines that it is normative for a work to be performed on the instruments mandated by the composer. In addition, Davies notes that one of the aims of transcriptions is to preserve 'the audible relation with the original' (Davies, 2007: 87). However, to preserve the audible relation with the original is to say that we encounter in a transcription's performance the same work as in a performance of the original. This is why the transcribed work can be said to be repeated in a transcription's performance. In addition, as noted in the previous chapter, we distinguish in our musical practices between authentic and inauthentic transcriptions in a similar way as we speak of authentic and inauthentic performances. Authentic transcriptions are those that provide a right epistemic access to the work transcribed, despite the creativity of the transcriber. Accordingly, transcriptions' performances may be regarded as genuine occurrences of the works transcribed, and their differences with the performances played on the original instruments mandated by the composer can be explained in terms of a works' variability. A musical work is said to be variable to the extent that its 'multiple instances can differ from one another in artistically relevant respects' (Davies, 2012: 643). Consequently, the timbrical differences exhibited by transcriptions' performances are compatible with these performances being genuine instances of the works transcribed.

The answer given above might result unsatisfactory because it can be identified a tension between two claims: firstly, that transcriptions' performances of medium-specific works fall under the scope of the variability of the work transcribed; and secondly, that instrumentation is normative for medium-specific works. It is assumed that the properly formed instances of a work are those that satisfy the normative properties of that work. Consequently, the range of a work's variability holds those performances that, despite presenting relevant artistic and aesthetic differences between them, satisfy the normative properties of a work. If transcriptions' performances do not

---

other words, as organized in the way that music is organized. (…) Musicianship consists in bringing that order to the fore, even at the cost of acoustic accuracy' (Scruton, 1997: 443-4).

satisfy the normative properties regarding instrumentation of medium-specific works, they should not be considered as falling under the range of such works' variability.

However, this objection is not right. The range of a work's variability is not determined by the prescriptions given in a score *simpliciter*, or by the conventions of the context of composition, as Stephen Davies assumes. As David Davies notes, the marks on a score 'do not mandate anything at all' *per se* (Davies, 2012: 651). By contrast, the range of a work's variability is determined by its context of performance. More precisely: the scope of a work's variability is determined by the way the instructions given by the composer in a score are understood or interpreted by a performative community. According to D. Davies, 'it is through the practices and norms of a performative and receptive community that the proper understanding of the composer's prescriptions is given' (Davies, 2012: 653). In other terms, 'the very content' of the norms prescribed by a composer in a score 'depends upon the actual practices of those who apply them' (Davies, 2012: 654). The reason given by Davies is a disanalogy between natural kinds and musical works: while the character of normative properties of a natural kind is specified by natural laws and statistic regularities, there are no natural laws nor statistic regularities that can be appealed to determine the correct character of a performance. In the case of musical works, David Davies suggests that norms should be regarded as rules and, according to Wittgenstein's lemma, 'it is impossible to make fully explicit what must be done to comply a rule' (Davies, 2012: 655). The interpretation of a rule cannot be given by another rule that tells us how to interpret the former, on pain of incurring in an infinite regress, but by how this rule is applied in actual practices.[47]

Given this framework, the inscriptions in a score of a work's instrumentation by its composer do not determine *per se* the scope of that work's variability. They require to be interpreted by a performative community. We may find a performative community in which the instrumental prescriptions given by the composer are interpreted at their face value, i.e., as the work to be performed by the *same* historical instruments and in concert halls of the time of the work's composition. An example of these performative communities is a festival for historical performance, in which a performance played on instruments different from Beethoven's context would not be regarded as a properly formed performance of that work. The range of this work's variability is very narrow in this performative community. But we may find other performative communities in

---

[47] Scruton also endorses a similar view about the role played by the context of performance in the individuation of musical works, and hence in determining the scope of a work's variability. He assumes the difference between natural kinds and musical works by arguing that 'the identity of musical works is determined not by nature, but by convention' (Scruton, 1997: 441). To this extent, he argues that there is a dialog between composer and performer characterised as follows: 'just as the composer lies down instructions for the performer, so does the performer, in his turn, instruct the composer, setting the piece in a new social and musical context, and dressing it accordingly. (…) We do not, in practice, confine ourselves to a study of the composer's actual intentions. We are just as interested in his hypothetical intentions: what would he have wanted, we ask ourselves, if he were living now, in this society, and with an audience like this' (Scruton, 1997: 445). Consequently, disregarding Scruton's appeal to intentions, the relevant point is that the composer's instructions in a score are interpreted according to the conventions of the context in which the piece is performed.

which the Beethoven's prescriptions are interpreted in a way that make wider the variability of this work. For instance, in the performative community that regularly attends the concerts of the Hallé Orchestra at the Bridgwater Hall in Manchester, Beethoven's prescriptions are interpreted as allowing this piece to be properly instantiated on performances played on modern instruments. But we may also find a community in which Beethoven's instrumental prescriptions are interpreted as having to do more with the expressive character of the themes rather than with specific timbre. The specifications of timbre would be regarded as mere indications of the character of the themes, so that a transcription's performance of this work would be regarded as a properly formed performance of it in case it realizes such characters. In this last performative community, the variability of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is even wider. Therefore, there is no tension in saying that instrumentation is normative for medium-specific works and, at the same time, to say that transcriptions' performances may fall under the scope of the variability of the work transcribed, even when it is a medium-specific work.

3.2 Considering Davies' second reason: the structural influence of timbre

A second reason in Davies' account that might support his thesis about transcriptions is that colour (or timbre) is generally a condition of the structure and content of a musical work. Since transcriptions involve a change of medium, and a change of medium *usually* entails a change of colour,[48] a transcription of a work W would modify W's original structure and content, resulting in a new, different piece. Davies defends this point using an analogy between music and painting. Concerning painting, Davies claims:

> The colours of paintings often make a vital contribution to organizing the represented space or revealing its contents in other ways (…). Other structurally relevant spatial effects are generated via interactions between the relative area, contrast, complementarity, saturation, hue, and brightness of the colours used (Davies, 2008: 363).

In the case of music, an analogous phenomenon takes place according to Davies:

> A work's instrumental colour often makes a vital contribution to structural and other features. It helps delineate form and can add expressive and depictive qualities that are central to the work's character and identity (Davies 2008, p. 365).

---

[48] Cases in which a change of medium does not entail a change of colour are logically possible. If we play Beethoven's *5th Symphony* in a Perfect Timbral Synthesizer, *ex-hypothesi* there is a change of medium without a change of timbre. However, in practice, there has not been nor does it appear that there will be any time soon transcriptions that change the medium without altering the colour of a piece. It is hard to see how such cases would satisfy our practical interests in transcriptions (cf. Davies 2003: 51-54). Accordingly, I will assume for the rest of the chapter that, concerning transcriptions, a change of timbre follows from a change of medium, although one can imagine that one does not necessarily follow from the other.

It seems right the idea that colour 'helps delineate' the form of a musical work. The instrumentation chosen by a composer tends to emphasize some aspects of a work's sound structure that are relevant for facilitating the transmission of the work's aesthetic content in a performance of it. However, in order to support the thesis that transcriptions are different works from the work transcribed, Davies' claim should go beyond this. Indeed, different ways of orchestrating a sound structure may accomplish this goal. For instance, a sharp and brilliant passage is typically rendered by trumpets in an orchestra but, in the absence of brass instruments available, the composer may assign this same passage to flutes, clarinets and violins. The composer may achieve a similar expressive effect relatively to the instrumentation that is available to her. Nonetheless, since instrumentation merely emphasizes a work's content, it would not be a determinant element of the work's identity. What suggests that Davies' point about the contribution of timbre to a work's identity goes beyond a mere emphasizing of a work's climatic points is his expression of 'a vital contribution'. In this sense, Davies regards that the key of the analogy between music and painting is that 'in music, the equivalent of colour is timbre' (Davies, 2008: 364). If that were the case, and taking the expression of 'a vital contribution' at its face value, timbre in music would be a constitutive element of a sound structure and, consequently, a constitutive element of a work's identity.

However, the equivalence between colour and timbre is not adequate to ground an analogy between painting and music that might illustrate the relevance of timbre as an element constitutive of a musical work's identity. Although we ordinarily use the word 'colour' to refer to the instrumentation of musical works, we do so in a metaphorical way, and the analogy with painting is mistaken regarding the ontological purposes concerning the individuation of musical works.

Attending to judgments about harmony in painting and music is helpful to reveal the misleading point of the analogy. In the case of painting, we talk about harmony between colours. Chromatic harmony is a specific term that refers to the 'correct proportion and correspondence between colorations or between combinations of colours' (Gallego & Sanz, 2001; 96). For instance, we say that Monet's *Impression, soleil levant* has a harmonic combination of blues and grays. However, we do not talk about harmony between timbres in the case of music. For example, we do not say that the orchestration of Debussy's *Sirenes* is harmonic. We would say that it is balanced, brilliant, smooth, but not harmonic. Strictly speaking, harmony in music means the proportion between pitch heights, and this point illustrates the very disanalogy between colour in painting and timbre in music. This disanalogy is grounded on the physics of colour and sound. On the one hand, colour depends on wave frequency. Higher wave frequencies tend towards the ultraviolet spectrum, while lower wave frequencies tend towards the infrared spectrum. On the other hand, height of pitch or tone also depends on the frequency of the fundamental pitch. If the wave frequency is higher, the pitch is more acute, and if wave frequency is lower, the pitch is less acute. However, timbre does not depend on wave frequency but on the intensity of the harmonic pitches associated with a fundamental pitch. Intensity is related to wave amplitude, which is independent of wave frequency. Therefore, if we want to draw an analogy between

music and painting, height of pitch in music is a better candidate than timbre as an analogue of colour in painting. According to the right interpretation of the analogy, if colour is a constitutive element of the identity of a painting, height of pitches is a constitutive element of musical works' identity. Sound structures thus depend on heights of sounds and not on timbre. But then, the right way to see the analogy between painting and music does not serve the purpose of justifying Davies' ontological account of transcriptions. Since a change of medium entails a change of timbre, and since the structure of a musical work would not depend on timbre, a change of medium of a work W would not entail a change in W's structure, and hence in W's identity. The result of this change of medium would not be a musical work different from W. Therefore, Davies' second reason to support his thesis about transcription does not work.

Davies has replied that this analogy is very familiar in many musical cultures, and that it is 'perfectly apt for my purpose, which was to highlight a similarity between how we experience colour and timbre, not to seek an underlying structural similarity between them' (Davies, 2017: 64). I have nothing to object to this. My objection is not that this analogy is not common to our artistic practices. I am even not claiming this analogy not to be useful for some practical purposes concerning the aesthetic appreciation of musical works. My point is just that this analogy is misleading regarding the explanatory purposes of the ontology of music, and leads to misconceptions about the constitutive elements of musical works' identity.

3.3 Rejecting Davies' third reason: virtuosity as an attribute of musical works

A third reason that might justify Davies' revisionary thesis on transcriptions is that certain aesthetic properties constitutive of the identity of musical works are dependent upon the specific medium prescribed by the composer. Arguing for this view, Davies claims that 'recognizing what is achieved in the work involves consideration of the constraints its media impose' for performance (Davies, 2008: 365). Davies takes virtuosity as an example of those properties constitutive of a work's identity that depend on the medium prescribed by the composer. Being virtuosic is a constitutive property of Beethoven's *Sonata* because 'it is a characteristic of the work that it is technically demanding of the pianist who would perform it' (Davies, 2008: 369). The argument in favour of Davies thesis about transcriptions regarding properties as *being virtuosic* may be reconstructed as follows:

(1) Virtuosity is a property constitutive of the identity of the *Sonata*.
(2) The work possesses the property because it is written for piano.
(3) Being written for piano is the instrumental medium specified by the composer.
(4) Therefore, the instrumental medium specified by the composer is constitutive of the identity of the *Sonata*.

This would be the argument that supports the idea that a change of the medium specified by the composer is sufficient for a change of work-identity. Since transcriptions always involve a change of medium, and a change of medium would remove some constitutive properties of a work, as it is the case of *being virtuosic*, transcriptions would always imply changes in work-identity of medium-specific works.

The problem with this argument is that premise (2) is false. Premise (2) establishes a relation in terms of causation between the medium specified by the composer and the *Sonata*'s possession of virtuosity. According to (2), if the Sonata were not written for piano, it would not be virtuosic. However, it seems to be right only in certain cases. For instance, if the *Sonata*'s sound structure were performed by a PTS, it would not be virtuosic. By contrast, there are other cases in which it seems that the work would maintain the property even if performed on other instruments than the prescribed by the composer. For example, the *Sonata* would still be virtuosic if a trumpet and a tuba performed its sound structure. Therefore, causation is not a right explanation of the relation that holds between the medium specified by the composer and a work's possession of virtuosity. Alternatively, the right way to describe this relation is in terms of supervenience. The virtuosic character of the *Sonata* supervenes on the instrumental medium specified by the composer in the sense that a correct performance of the *Sonata*'s sound structure cannot lack the property of being virtuosic without being performed on other instruments than the prescribed by the composer. According to the supervenience thesis, there are no differences at the aesthetic level without differences at the non-aesthetic one. If there are differences at the aesthetic level, it is granted that there are differences at the non-aesthetic one. Consequently, if a correct performance of the *Sonata*'s sound structure is not virtuosic, then it is not performed on the medium mandated by the composer.

Let us consider now a reconstructed version of the previous argument in terms of a supervenience relation between a work's virtuosity and the medium specified by the composer:

(5) Virtuosity is a property constitutive of the identity of the Sonata.
(6) Virtuosity supervenes on the instrumental medium prescribed by the composer.
(7) A change of medium of the Sonata's sound structure can, in some cases, be sufficient for a correct performance of this sound structure to lack virtuosity.
(8) Since a work W_1 is not identical with another work W_2 if the aesthetic properties of W_1 and W_2 differ, a correct performance on other instrumental medium of the *Sonata*'s sound structure lacking virtuosity is a performance of a musical work different from the *Sonata*.
(9) Therefore, a change of medium can, in some cases, be sufficient for a change of identity.

This version of the argument does not support the more ambitious thesis that all transcriptions of all medium-specific works constitute musical works different from the work transcribed. It rather supports the more modest thesis that, usually, a transcription of a medium-specific work constitutes a musical work different from the work transcribed. We might think that Davies' is satisfied with this more modest thesis about

the ontology of transcriptions. But even in this case, this argument fails to support such a modest thesis because its first premise (5) is not true. As some authors have pointed out, being virtuosic is not a property of musical works but a property of performances, and thus it can be neither a normative property of the *Sonata* nor a constitutive property of its identity (cf. Kivy, 1988/1993: 91; Dodd, 2007: 228-9). In what follows, this idea will be defended taking as staring point an empirical research in a linguistic corpus of the way in which predicates are used in our musical practices to make aesthetic attributions of musical works and performances.

The research has been conducted in a general corpus (Corpus of Contemporary American English), and the results obtained are illustrated in the following table:

	Predicate	Total occurrences	Musical occurrences	Attribution to MW	Attribution to performances
KIND I	Atonal	128	85	77 (90'58 %)	8 (9'41 %)
KIND II	Virtuosic	195	121	15 (12'39 %)	106 (87'6 %)
KIND III	Rhythmical	100	25	14 (56 %)	11 (44 %)

Three predicates typically used in the critical and appreciative discourse about instrumental music have being selected: 'atonal', 'virtuosic' and 'rhythmical'. In the table above, the third column corresponds to the total occurrences that the predicate has in the corpus, while the fourth recovers the number of specific musical occurrences of those predicates, i.e. occurrences in which the predicates are used to make an attribution of music or appear in musical contexts –excluding thus the occurrences in non-musical contexts or those in which the attribution is about a non-musical item. The fifth and sixth columns display the number and percentage of attributions to musical works and performances of each predicate in respect to the total musical occurrences of it. The result obtained is that both musical works and performances are objects of our primary aesthetic appreciation. In this sense, three kinds of predicates can be distinguished attending to the way they are used to make aesthetic attributions of musical works and performances:

> KIND I: predicates whose primary aesthetic use is about musical works. It is exemplified by predicates as 'atonal'.

> KIND II: predicates whose primary aesthetic use is about performances. It is exemplified by predicates as 'virtuosic'.

> KIND III: predicates whose primary aesthetic use is indistinctively about both musical works and performances. It is exemplified by predicates as 'rhythmical'.

The distinction between these three kinds of uses of predicates regarding the aesthetic attributions of musical works and performances obtained from the results of

the research are a guide to determine what our familiar intuitions concerning the properties we attribute to musical works and performances are. The three kinds will be analysed in more detail, offering an ontological explanation of them and trying to extract the consequences that follow for Davies' account of 'virtuosic'.

3.3.1 KIND I

Aesthetic attributions involving predicates as 'atonal' are primarily applied to musical works and rarely used as an attribute of performances. The reason for this asymmetry is that predicates belonging to this kind, when applied to performances, are applied in a derivative way from the musical work performed. The direction of the explanation of the attribute comes from works to performances: a performance of Schönberg's *Pierrot Lunaire* is atonal *because* the performed work is atonal. It is presupposed that 'atonality' is an attribute of *Pierrot Lunaire* that must be exhibited by any properly formed performance of the work. Being atonal is regarded as an aesthetic attribute of the work *Pierrot Lunaire* that is normative for its properly formed performances. This point explains the difference between the following utterances by the speakers A and B:

> **A:** *Pierrot Lunaire* is atonal.
> **B:** The performance of *Pierrot Lunaire* I attended yesterday was atonal.

While A's utterance sounds correct and we are familiar with this sort of judgments, B's utterance sounds bizarre and it is not clear what exactly B means. Given the presupposition that any properly formed performance of *Pierrot Lunaire* must be atonal, it is difficult to understand B as aesthetically qualifying a performance of *Pierrot Lunaire*. Instead, B's claim may be interpreted as meaning that B esteems the performance she attended yesterday as a properly formed performance of *Pierrot Lunaire*. In this case, the attribution of 'being atonal' is equivalent to 'being a properly formed performance of *Pierrot Lunaire'*. If B's utterance is taken at its face value –i.e. as aesthetically qualifying the performance as atonal–, it is not an informative claim of the performance because atonality is a property of any properly formed performance of *Pierrot Lunaire*. Consequently, the judgment 'the performance of *Pierrot Lunaire* I have listened to in last night's concert was atonal' would not be informative: it would attribute a feature that it is taken to be common to any performance of *Pierrot Lunaire* and thus cannot play the function of characterizing the features that individuate that particular performance of *Pierrot Lunaire*. This is why B's utterance sounds *prima facie* bizarre.

Regarding this kind of aesthetic attributions, performances of musical works are artistically valued only as a medium for conveying an aesthetic content that strictly belongs to the work performed. In artistic contexts, a medium is taken to be a means whereby an artistic content is communicated, so that the function of a medium is *mediation* (cf. Davies, 2013: 225). Regarding the term 'atonal', the role of a

performance of *Pierrot Lunaire* is the transmission of the atonality of the piece. It mediates between the work and the audience to communicate an aesthetic content that strictly belongs to the work performed. Concerning this case of aesthetic attributions, performances of musical works play an epistemological role: they are entities that make manifest to the receiver the properties that bear upon the appreciation of the work they are performing (cf. Davies, 2012: 644). Therefore, they play an epistemological role mediating between the aesthetic content of a work and the audience.

Accordingly, five salient features that characterize aesthetic attributions belonging to KIND I can be identified:

(1) They are attributions of an aesthetic content that strictly belongs to musical works.
(2) The attribution of such features to a properly formed performance of the work is condition-governed (the performance is *P* because the work is *P*).
(3) Such attributions are shared by all the properly formed performances of the same musical work.
(4) Consequently, a predicate such as 'atonal' is not a distinctive feature of any properly formed performance of *Pierrot Lunaire*. It plays no role in individuating the properly formed performances of such piece because all of them share this attribute.
(5) Relative to this kind of attributions, performances are regarded as mediums to convey the normative attributes of the work performed.

Therefore, taking attributions of Kind I as predicating properties of musical works rather than properties of performances is the simplest way to accommodate the speaker's intuitions concerning those features. Such intuitions are revealed by the way in which predicates of this kind are used, accounted by the empirical research of the corpus. The view that this kind of predicates are attributions of the aesthetic content of musical works rather than of their performances is thus to be regarded as the default position that explains their aesthetic uses.

3.3.2 KIND II

KIND II of aesthetic attributions is exemplified by the predicate 'virtuosic'. Aesthetic attributions involving predicates as 'virtuosic' are primarily used as attributions to performances –87% of occurrences– but rarely to musical works. A direct explanation of this asymmetry is that predicates belonging to this kind are involved in aesthetic attributions to performances rather than to musical works when used aesthetically. When those predicates are applied to a musical work, they are applied in a derivative way from the properly formed performances of that work. The direction of the explanation of the attribute is from performances to works: Beethoven's *Sonata for horn and piano Op. 16* is virtuosic because it has virtuosic performances. If there were no virtuosic performances of the *Sonata*, the predicate 'virtuosic' would not be correctly

applied to that work. It is a necessary condition for a musical work to be correctly judged as virtuosic that some of its properly formed performances rendered in a normal way are virtuosic. Regarding this kind of aesthetic attributions, musical works are aesthetically valued only as a medium for conveying an aesthetic content that belongs to performances. Virtuosity is not a normative attribute of a work that has to be conveyed by its properly formed performances. Accordingly, a performance judged as non-virtuosic may nonetheless be regarded as a properly formed performance of a work that is typically taken to be virtuosic.

Chamber music competitions with the same compulsory work for all the contestants are paradigmatic cases that illustrate the phenomenon that certain aesthetic attributions are primarily attributions of performances rather than of musical works. In these contexts, the focus of aesthetic appreciation is not the musical work performed but the performances made by the contestants. The musical work is only a medium to test the virtuosity, accuracy, cleanness, smoothness or vividness of the contestants' performances. On the one hand, we can find in those situations performances that, although they do not satisfy the required standard for virtuosity and hence are not candidates to win the prize, they are nonetheless properly formed performances of works typically regarded as virtuosic. On the other hand, a work whose typical performances are not virtuosic, and hence a work that would not be said to be virtuosic, can be properly performed in a virtuosic way by some of the contestants, for instance, playing it faster than usual or staging acrobatic bodily movements while performing the piece. These two scenarios are not unusual in musical competitions. They illustrate in a clear way that aesthetic attributions involving predicates such as virtuosic, accurate, clean, smooth or vivid are applied primarily to performances and only derivative, if any, to the works performed.

Accordingly, five salient features that characterize aesthetic attributions belonging to KIND II can be identified:

(6) They are attributions of an aesthetic content that strictly belongs to performances.

(7) The attribution of such qualities to the work performed is condition-governed (the work is *P* because its performances are *P*).

(8) The properly formed performances of the work can gain or lose these qualities in a different context of performance.

(9) Consequently, a predicate such as 'virtuosic' is not a distinctive feature of Beethoven's *Sonata*. It plays no role in individuating the *Sonata* because its properly formed performances can lose the quality of being virtuosic in a different context of performance while the identity of the piece remains unaltered.

(10) Relatively to this kind of attributions, works are regarded as mediums to convey an aesthetic content of a particular performance.

Therefore, a direct explanation of the results obtained in the research above is that aesthetic attributions that involve this kind of predicates do not concern a work's

205

aesthetic content, but rather the *way* or *manner* in which the aesthetic content of the work is conveyed in a properly formed performance of it. Predicates of this kind are mostly used as attributions to performances, as the research reflects. The simplest way to explain this use, and thus to accommodate the speakers' intuitions, is to regard them as attributions of an aesthetic content that belongs to performances rather than to the works performed. Consequently, this view is to be regarded as the default position concerning the aesthetic use of predicates of this kind.

3.3.3 KIND III

Aesthetic attributions involving predicates as 'rhythmical' are indistinctively used in the ways of both KIND I and KIND II just described above. In the corpus, 56% of specific musical uses are attributions to musical works, while 44% are attributions to performances. The most direct explanation of this equilibrium is that 'rhythmical' can be primarily applied in the same fashion to musical works and performances. 'Being rhythmical' is an aesthetic normative quality of the first movement of Beethoven's *Sonata*, so that any properly formed instance is a medium for conveying this aesthetic feature of that piece. In this case, the aesthetic attribution is about the aesthetic content of the work. Alternatively, a properly formed performance of the second movement of the *Sonata*, a piece of music that by no means would be judged as rhythmical, can be said to be rhythmical because it keeps tension and expressiveness in accordance with the metrics of the music. In this last case, the work serves as a vehicle for conveying an aesthetic content of a particular performance, and the aesthetic attribution is about the way in which the second movement of the *Sonata* is performed.

A similar phenomenon arises with other formal aesthetic attributions such as 'balanced', 'rhythmical' or 'genre-inclusive'. We can say that Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is balanced, in the sense that its orchestration is well equilibrated between all the instruments involved, or that the length of the whole work and its different sections keeps a good proportion, or that it has a good distribution between more and less tensioned sections, and so forth. Moreover, a performance can be said to be balanced in two senses: in a derivative way, according to which the performance is a good medium for transmitting the balance of the work, or in a primary way, according to which the performance itself keeps a good equilibrium between the instruments and also a good proportion between the tempos of the different sections, and so on. Accordingly, a balanced work can have both balanced and unbalanced performances. On the opposite, there can be balanced performances of unbalanced works, in which the conductor and the performers are able to supplement certain shortcomings in the orchestration or duration of the work.

Therefore, the simplest way to explain the uses of predicates as 'rhythmical' is that they are liable to be used in both ways illustrated by KIND I and KIND II. They are predicates that sometimes are used to make aesthetic attributions of a musical work's content and other times of a performance's content. This can be regarded as the best

way to accommodate our intuitions regarding the uses of this kind of predicates reflected by the empirical research, being thus the default position about them.

3.4 Davies' view on 'virtuosic' reconsidered

The direct explanation of the three kinds of predicates distinguished above is the one that satisfies in the simplest way the metaontological desideratum of minimal descriptivism. Such explanation is to be regarded as the default position about their uses. Rejecting this explanation would require to show that it clashes with an entrenched intuition or with sound theoretical principles according to the desideratum of minimal revisionism. Davies, among other authors, rejects the direct explanation given above of predicates belonging to KIND II. They reject the idea that 'virtuosic' is a primary aesthetic attribute of performances rather than of musical works (cf. Davies, 2003, 2007, 2008; Levinson, 2011). Davies maintains that 'virtuosic' is a primary attribute of musical works that are medium-specific. Our task now is to find in Davies' account whether he provides a good reason that may satisfy the desideratum of minimal revisionism in order to support this revisionary thesis. In other words, we will look into Davies' view to find if there is any reason there that reveals as a non-entrenched intuition the idea that 'virtuosic' is a primary attribute of performances.

Davies regards 'virtuosic' as an example of those attributes crucial for the identity of musical works that depend on the medium prescribed by the composer. He puts this point in the following terms:

> To say a work is original or virtuosic is to say something about the properties it has when played correctly (…). Surely it is false to assume modern listeners are incapable of recognizing the virtuosic character of Nicolai Paganini's music when they see and hear it played on a violin (Davies, 2001: 63).

Davies' point is that 'virtuosity' is a normative property of a work W that must be satisfied by W's performances in order to be correct performances of W. However, according to Davies, virtuosity has not to do with the number of notes, register, or tempo, but with the difficulty of playing certain passages in a specific instrument. In medium-specific pieces, he argues, 'the virtuosic character of a piece rests on the difficulties of playing it correctly on the specified instruments' (Davies, 2001: 63). Accordingly, virtuosity would be an attribute of the work that has to be conveyed by any of its properly formed performances. A non-virtuosic performance of a virtuosic work would not be a properly formed performance of it.

A first concern with Davies' view is that, if he considers 'virtuosic' as an aesthetic attribution of the same kind as 'atonal' –i.e. as belonging to KIND I–, he owes an explanation of the different uses of both terms. As illustrated in the table above, 'atonal' and 'virtuosic' are two predicates that exhibit a radically different behavior in our appreciative practices: 90'58% of musical uses of 'atonal' are attributions to musical works, contrasting with the 12'39% of musical uses of 'virtuosic' in

attributions to works. Alternatively, the musical uses of 'atonal' applied to performances constitute a 9'41%, contrasting with 87'6% of 'virtuosic' to the same end. Consequently, if Davies regards 'atonal' and 'virtuosic' as attributions of KIND I, he must offer an explanation of the contrasting uses of both predicates in order to accommodate our musical appreciative practices. This explanation is also required even if he regards 'virtuosic' as a predicate of the same kind as 'rhythmical' –i.e. as an attribution belonging to KIND III–, for attributions of this kind also exhibit a different behavior as the one exhibited by 'virtuosic'. The need of such explanation would turn his account in a non-straightforward view of the way in which aesthetic attributions are used in our appreciative practices. Two worries arise at this point concerning Davies' view according to the methodological principles defended in chapter 2. Firstly, if he offers this additional explanation, his account would be more complex than the one offered here, running the risk of lacking the theoretical virtue of simplicity. Secondly, in the absence of such additional explanation, his view would be a non-justified revisionary explanation of our aesthetic attributions.

Contrary to Davies, the account that best accommodates our musical appreciative practices is the one that takes 'virtuosic' to be an attribution of performances' aesthetic content. Historical examples and aspects of our musical practices that support this idea can be easily found. For instance, there are pieces whose properly formed performances were technically challenging to the performer when they were composed. However, they become nowadays much easier to perform in a properly formed way due to technical advances in the instruments.[49] When Beethoven wrote his *Sonata for Horn and Piano*, true intonation and some fast passages of this piece were very difficult –if not impossible– to achieve on the natural horn.

Beethoven's *Sonata for Horn and Piano*, **op. 17, 3rd movement.**

When valves and cylinders were implemented on the horn, the *Sonata* became much easier to perform in an accurate way. However, although those technical improvements made appropriate performances of the *Sonata* less technically challenging, the identity of the piece remained the same. The *Sonata* properly

---

[49] This view has been roughly sketched, but underdeveloped, by Scruton (1997: 446) and Kivy (1988/1993: 91).

performed today on the chromatic horn is not a different work than the *Sonata* performed on 18 April 1800 by Beethoven on the pianoforte and Giovanni Punto on the horn. Therefore, being virtuosic is not a property individuating the *Sonata* because the piece can lose this property in a different context of performance without altering its identity.

This phenomenon is not only motivated by technical improvements of instruments, but also by other aspects of the context of performance. When premiered, some works of the Romantic era were regarded as challenging to play on the instruments prescribed by the composer due to their modulations, chromatisms, intervals and rhythms. Today, for musicians educated in the background of dodecaphonism, serialism, aleatoric music, michrotonal music, and so on, most part of Romantic pieces are not regarded as especially challenging. However, the identity of such pieces has not changed, and present-day audience can access their aesthetic content in spite of thinking that appropriate performances of those works are not particularly challenging. The standards of difficulty change hand by hand with the evolution of compositional styles and performing practices: aspects that were regarded as especially challenging in the 19th century are regarded as non-challenging today. However, the aesthetic content and the identity of a musical work seem to be independent of such changes. While performing practices have changed, the identity of the pieces remains the same. Tchaikovsky' *Fourth Symphony* performed today is the same piece that was performed on 22 February 1878 in Saint Petersburg conducted by Rubinstein, in spite of being today much more easier to play than when it was premiered, in 1878. Rather, what has changed along these centuries is our knowledge of the piece and the way in which we, as performers or listeners, have access to it. Nowadays, after some technically improvements on instruments and after dodecaphonism or michotonalism, that piece is not especially challenging to perform but, nonetheless, when we perform it we are performing the same piece as in the 19th century. Therefore, if virtuosity depends on difficulty, and difficulty can be removed on different contexts of performance, virtuosity is not properly an attribute of musical works and it cannot play a role in determining their identity.

Accordingly, aesthetic attributions as 'virtuosic', dependent on the specific instrumental medium in which a work is performed, cannot be counted as attributes determining the identity of musical works. The adscription of virtuosity to a work does not only depend on the constraints that the instrumental medium imposes, but also on other factors that can vary between different contexts of performance across which the identity of the piece remains the same. In other words, the constraint that an instrumental medium imposes on performance does not depend on the physical stuff of that medium in an invariant way. The difficulties imposed by the physical stuff of the medium are relative to a context of performance. This context of performance consists of the techniques for performing instruments, technical development of instruments, musical background of the performers, degree of professionalization and specialization of the performing practices, performing fashions and tendencies, etc. Therefore, the

same medium-specific work can be properly performed in an easy way today and difficult tomorrow, and conversely, but the identity of this piece remains the same.

Davies has contested this view on the aesthetic use of 'virtuosic'. He argues in the following terms:

> To say that a work is virtuosic is to say that, even if it is played with seeming ease, it should be apparent that it is difficult to play on the specified instrument under standard circumstances, including relativization to the time of composition (to allow for general improvements in technique) (Davies, 2017: 62).

Regarding the relativization to the time of the work's composition argued by Davies along with his modal claim, his answer can be summarized as follows: w is a virtuoso piece iff were it played on the instrument(s) for which it had been composed, it would make great technical demands on the performer.[50] Davies makes an additional remark concerning the relationship between the original difficulties to perform a work and the technical development of musical instruments and performing practices:

> What of improvements to instruments that make the performance easier? If there are radical changes then there might be questions to be asked about the authenticity of the rendition, precisely because the playing comes easier (Davies, 2017: 62).

Accordingly, if the improvements to instruments were such that they remove the original difficulty for performance posed by the work, Davies would be inclined to say that a performance of this work on the developed instruments does not count as an authentic performance of it. If it is right that Beethoven's *Sonata* is easy to perform in the modern horn, none of these performances should be regarded as genuine performances of that work. Such performances would not be correct instances of this work because they fall short of conveying a normative attribute of the work constitutive of its identity, namely, virtuosity.

However, Davies' response is not convincing. In the first place, his remark on authenticity seems to be pointless in the case of Beethoven's *Sonata*. When the authenticity of the performances of this work on modern instruments is approached, the main issue is not whether it is easier or harder to perform it in an appropriate way. Rather, the main question is whether the modification of the original sonic qualities of a right performance of the work's sound structure preserves the general mood or character of a right performance of it on the original instruments –for instance, stopped notes of the natural horn versus all-open-notes of the modern horn, power of sound of the modern horn versus weakness of sound of the natural horn, etc. It is a question that concerns the variability of musical works in performance rather than the challenges that the work imposes on performance, that is, with virtuosity.

In the second place, the modal condition that Davies sets for 'virtuosic' to be regarded as a primary aesthetic attribute of musical works is not sufficient for this purpose. The general form of Davies' condition is the following: w is x iff were w

---

[50] I am very grateful to Derek Matravers on this point.

performed on the original instruments, *w* would be *y* (being *x* an aesthetic attribution, *w* a musical work, and *y* the *definiens* of *x*). Instances of this general modal condition are also satisfied by other predicates that we clearly regard as primary aesthetic attributions of performances and never of musical works. This phenomenon is easier to see attending to attributions that are typically associated to a negative valence, as it is the case of 'blurry'. For instance, some passages of the first movement of Christoph Forster's *Horn Concerto* and of the third movement of Giovanni Punto's *Fifth Concerto for Horn* could only be played in a blurry way at the time of composition due to the technical limitations of the natural horn.

Cristoph Forster's *Horn Concerto*

Giovanni Punto's *Fifth Concerto for Horn*

At the time of composition of these works, there was no other way to perform them but in a blurry way. With the implementation of valves and cylinders on the horn, these passages can be played today in a non-blurry, clear and sharp way. Consequently, an analogous phenomenon to the case of 'virtuosic' also arises with 'blurry': it is an attribute of the properly formed performances of a work in its context of composition that may be removed in subsequent contexts of performance by technical developments on instruments and performing practices. If we apply Davies' criterion for 'virtuosic' to the case of 'blurry', we should conclude that Forster's *Horn Concerto* and Punto's *Fifth Concerto for Horn* are blurry musical works. According to Davies, a work is virtuosic if and only if, were it played on the original instrument(s), it would be difficult to play. The corresponding condition in the case of 'blurry' runs as follows: a work is blurry if and only if, were it played on the original instrument(s), the articulation of its melodies would be difficult to understand. Both Punto and Forster works satisfy this condition, and consequently, endorsing Davies' criterion for 'virtuosic' commits us to say that Punto's and Forster's works are blurry.

However, we would be reluctant to attribute to Punto's and Forster's pieces the quality of being blurry. 'Blurry' is typically regarded as an aesthetic attribution with a negative valence associated to undesirable contingencies of a particular context of performance. Applied to a work rather than to its performances, it would lead us to an inappropriate negative evaluation of it because the attribution is grounded on contingent

external aspects to the work itself. Composers often challenge the current technical development they find in the instrumental medium available in their context of composition, and their imagination usually goes beyond the technical constraints their actual instrumental medium contingently imposes. Sometimes, the artistic content articulated by the composer in a work is not adequate to the current state of the medium of conveying it: the techniques of instruments and the development of performing practices are insufficient to convey the artistic content of the work in a suitable way. Even the most appropriate performance in the context of composition of a piece might not be the best medium through which the aesthetic content of that piece is transmitted. This phenomenon explains the motivations for technical improvements to musical instruments and the evolution of performing practices along the history of Western musical tradition. Accordingly, a wider perspective of our musical practices shows that the counterfactual condition 'if it were played on the original instrument(s), it would be difficult to understand the articulation of its melodies' does not constitute a sufficient justification to consider 'blurry' as a primary aesthetic attribution to musical works rather than to performances.[51] The blurriness of the performances in the context of composition of such pieces would be regarded as a contingent quality to be overcome with the improvement of instrumental techniques and performing practices.

If the appeal to counterfactual conditions relative to the context of composition does not entitle one to qualify predicates such as 'blurry' as primary aesthetic attributions of musical works, there is no reason to deny the same phenomenon for other predicates of the same kind, such as 'virtuosic'. The insufficiency of this counterfactual condition is easier to see regarding attributions like 'blurry', which are typically associated to a negative valence. We would be unjustifiably underestimating a work's value. However, the same also rules over aesthetic attributions that are typically associated to a positive valence, as it is the case of 'virtuosic'. We would be unjustifiably overestimating a work's value if we regarded this predicate as a primary aesthetic attribution of the work's aesthetic content. If we resist to say that a work is blurry when it satisfies its corresponding counterfactual condition relative to the time of composition, we must also resist to say that a work is virtuosic even when it satisfies its corresponding counterfactual condition. Both predicates are of a same kind and are subject to the same sort of analysis. Therefore, the reason adduced by Davies is not enough to justify his view of 'virtuosic' as a primary attribution to musical works, a revisionary approach contrary to the current use of this predicate in our musical appreciative practices. A stronger reason would be needed to embrace such an account.

It might be argued that the parallelism drawn here between blurriness and virtuosity is misplaced because the standard for blurriness is context-dependent. Following this objection, the standard for a performance on a horn to be blurry in the

---

[51] It is much more plausible to see Punto and Forster as committed to counterfactuals that point to the opposite direction in regretting the technical limitations of the horn of their time. For instance, it is not implausible that they embrace counterfactuals such as 'if the horn could combine the different tones in the same instrument, my piece would not sound blurry'.

18ᵗʰ century would be different than the standard for blurriness endorsed in today's musical practices. Given the technical development of the horn in the 18ᵗʰ century, additional lack of clarity and sharpness was demanded at that time for a performance on this instrument to be counted as blurry in comparison to present-day contexts. Accordingly, the standard for a performance to be blurry was more demanding in the 18ᵗʰ century than in today's musical practices. Consequently, although a properly formed performance of Punto's or Forster's concertos on the natural horn is regarded as blurry according to the standard of today's musical practices, it would not be regarded as blurry according to the context of 18ᵗʰ century musical practices. Therefore, blurriness is not a property of these works of music because the counterfactual condition 'a work is blurry if and only if, were it played on the original instrument(s), the articulation of its melodies would be difficult to understand' is not satisfied according to the standards of the 18ᵗʰ century. Part of what is considered today as difficult to understand would not be regarded in this sense in the 18ᵗʰ century. Consequently, since the condition does not hold for those works, the examples of Punto and Forster on blurriness do not enable us to criticise the relevance of that condition.

The answer to this objection is that the same kind of analysis may be applied to the use of 'virtuosic'. The standards for virtuosity may be regarded as context-dependent. The standard for a performance on a horn to be virtuosic in the 18ᵗʰ century would be different than the standard for virtuosity endorsed in today's musical practices. Given the technical development of the horn in the 18ᵗʰ century, performers and public were more familiar with the constraints of the instrument at that time. In this sense, more difficulties were required than today for a performance on the natural horn to be counted as virtuosic. Accordingly, the standard for a performance to be virtuosic was more demanding in the 18ᵗʰ century than in today's musical practices. Consequently, although a properly formed performance of Beethoven's *Sonata* on the natural horn is regarded as virtuosic according to the standard of today's musical practices, it would not be regarded as virtuosic according to the context of 18ᵗʰ century musical practices. Therefore, virtuosity would not be again a property of this work of music because the counterfactual condition 'a work is virtuosic if and only if, were it played on the original instrument(s), it would be difficult to play' is not satisfied according to the standards of the 18ᵗʰ century. Part of what is considered today as difficult to play would not be regarded in this sense in the 18ᵗʰ century.

Therefore, the analysis of 'virtuosic' goes hand by hand with that or 'blurry'. If we assume that Davies' condition holds for 'virtuosic' and we regard it as an aesthetic attribution of musical works, the same criterion should be maintained with respect to 'blurry'. However, we would be bound to avoid this consequence. Alternatively, if we argue that the condition does not hold for 'blurry', we should admit for similar reasons that it does not hold for 'virtuosic. In this case, the condition would be useless.

4. Conclusions

This chapter has been devoted to discuss Davies' view of transcriptions. According to Davies, transcriptions are different musical works from the work transcribed. It has been shown that this thesis is revisionary regarding our musical practices. In the first place, the counterintuitive consequences of this thesis have been displayed by means of two thought experiments. These thought experiments have been rejected by Davies for being either unusual (Valdano's case) or inappropriate (Verdi's case). Against his response, it was argued that, firstly, the goal of these thought experiments was to elicit the reader's intuitions about the individuation of transcriptions, secondly, that these intuitions correspond to those obtained by empirical procedures in the previous chapter, and thirdly, that the thought experiments are grounded on musical practices regarding transcriptions. Once obtained the conclusion that Davies' thesis is revisionary, I enquired whether there is any reason in his account that justifies the revision of our musical practices in light of this thesis. In particular, I enquired whether Davies provides some account that reveals the intuition that transcriptions are not different from the work transcribed as a non-entrenched one. Three possible reasons supporting his claim have been examined and rejected here. Firstly, according to Davies, the context of composition determines whether a piece is medium-specific, and if a piece is medium-specific, instrumentation is a constitutive element of its identity. Against this, I argued that the normative character of the prescriptions made by a composer regarding instrumentation is relative to the context of performance and not to the context of composition. In this sense, transcriptions' performances may fall under the scope of variability of the transcribed work, whose limits are determined by the context of performance. Secondly, Davies' idea that colour (or timbre) is a necessary condition of the structure and content of a musical work has been rejected by showing the physical disanalogy between colour in painting and colour (or timbre) in music. Finally, Davies argues that certain aesthetic properties constitutive of the identity of musical works depend on the specific medium prescribed by the composer, taking 'virtuosic' as a paradigmatic case of this phenomenon. Against this view, it was shown by means of an empirical research in a linguistic corpus that Davies' thesis that virtuosity is a property of musical works is revisionary regarding the aesthetic uses of 'virtuosic' in our appreciative practices. Next, it has been noted that Davies does not provide any good reason to justify this revisionary view about virtuosity. In conclusion, none of the three reasons found in Davies' account to justify his thesis about the ontological status of transcriptions is strong enough to support his claim. Davies is thus unsuccessful in his attempt to show that the intuition that transcriptions are not different works from the work transcribed is not entrenched.

Since Davies' ontological distinction between versions and transcriptions – regarding the latter, but not the former, as new musical works– is not justified, the difference between them seems to be more conceptual than ontological. Both versions

and transcriptions are musical entities, and they are musical entities *of* a musical work, which may be regarded as another musical entity. The difference between versions and transcriptions concerns the aim and point of both. When a composer writes a new version of a work, she is usually trying to improve on a previous version, but the musical aims of the new version seem to be the same as the ones that guided the composition of the earlier version. By contrast, the aims that guided the composition of a transcription seem to be different than the aims of composing the musical work transcribed. The aim of a transcription is usually to translate a work into a new musical medium. However, this difference in aims between versions and transcriptions is not sharp, as it has been shown in chapter 3. Sometimes, the goals of composing a version and a transcription overlap. Both versions and transcriptions may be produced to facilitate the performances of a work, to improve previous versions of a work, to exploit the possibilities of a work, and so on. Despite the difficulties in distinguishing versions and transcriptions by their aims, it seems clear that the difference between them is not ontological in the way regarded by Davies. These aspects will be the focus of the next chapter, where the ontological status of versions and transcriptions will be addressed.

Chapter 5

Musical versions and transcriptions III: the hypothesis of nested types

1. Introduction: structural monism vs. structural pluralism

We usually say that versions and transcriptions are *of* a musical work. For instance, we speak about 'the 1872 version *of* Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No.* 2' or 'Otero's transcription *of* Piazzolla's *Escualo'*. The way in which we typically refer to versions and transcriptions suggests a kind of relation between a version or transcription and a musical work. The experiment introduced in chapter 3 has shown that there is a widely shared intuition in our musical practices that in a performance of a version or a transcription we are hearing the musical work this version or transcription is said to be *of*. In a performance of the 1872 version *of* Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, and in a performance of the 1879 version *of* Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, listeners broadly assume to be hearing the same work, namely, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. Accordingly, it is assumed that there is a one-many relationship between Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* and the performances of its versions from 1872 and 1879: the performances of both versions make manifest the same work, the work these versions are *of*. In addition, it is assumed that in these performances, in which Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* manifests, we can encounter, experience, hear and know this very work, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. Consequently, it is assumed that in a performance of the 1872 version *of* Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* we are not merely hearing that particular performance, nor just the 1872 version of the symphony. We are hearing three things:

1. That particular performance.
2. *The version that this performance is* of *(the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's Symphony No. 2).*
3. *The musical work that this version is* of *(Tchaikovsky's Symphony No. 2).*

According to this familiar intuition of our musical practices, two transitive relations are taken to hold. Firstly, the manifestation of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* in its 1872 version is transmitted to the performances of this version. This is a transitive

ontological relation that establishes a one-many relation between the work (Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*) and the performances of one of its versions (the 1872 version). Secondly, the epistemic access to the 1872 version, provided by a performance of it, is transmitted to the work that this version is *of*, namely, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. This is a transitive epistemic relation in virtue of which we hear a work by means of hearing a performance of one of its versions. Therefore, according to the standard view embodied in our musical practices, the performances of different versions of the same musical work are regarded as *occurrences* of the work that these versions are *of*.

The same phenomenon arises for transcriptions, as it was displayed in the experiment of chapter 3. In a performance of Otero's transcription *of* Piazzolla's *Escualo*, listeners do not consider to be hearing the original instrumentation prescribed by Piazzolla. However, they broadly assume that in a performance of Otero's transcription they are hearing the musical work this transcription is *of*, namely, *Escualo*. Again, three things are assumed to be heard in this case:

1. That particular performance.
2. Otero's transcription (which is a different instrumentation from Piazzolla's original one) that this performance is *of*.
3. The musical work that this transcription is *of* (*Escualo*).

According to the standard view of our musical practices, two transitive relations also hold in the case of transcriptions. Firstly, the manifestation of Piazzolla's *Escualo* in Otero's transcription is transmitted to the performances of this transcription. This is a transitive ontological relation that establishes a one-many relation between the work (Piazzolla's *Escualo*) and the performances of one of its transcriptions (Otero's transcription). Secondly, the epistemic access to Otero's transcription, provided by a performance of it, is transmitted to the work this transcription is *of*, namely, Piazzolla's *Escualo*. This is a transitive epistemic relation in virtue of which we hear a work by means of hearing a performance of one of its transcriptions. Therefore, according to the standard view embodied in our musical practices, the performances of different transcriptions of the same musical work are regarded as *occurrences* of the work these transcriptions are *of*.

The standard view on versions and transcriptions that results from the intuitions involved in our musical practices has traditionally raised a challenge to be accommodated within the ontology of music. The problem can be put as follows. The different versions or transcriptions of a same work have different sound structures. For instance, as noted in chapter 3, the flute solo of the third movement of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is completely remodelled in the 1879 version with respect to the 1872 version, and the melody of the A theme proceeds now by arpeggios on the violins, rather than by syncopes, as happened in the 1872 version. In Otero's transcription of Piazzolla's *Escualo*, the main theme is changed of tessitura and put on the bass. If the performances of a work's versions or transcriptions are occurrences of the work they are

said to be of, and these versions or transcriptions involve different sound structures, more than one sound structure has to be associated with the same musical work. However, this consequence seems to contradict a widely shared thesis about the individuation of musical works, namely, structural monism:

> STRUCTURAL MONISM: musical works are individuated by one, and only one, sound structure.

Alternatively, to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions, it seems *prima facie* to be required rejecting structural monism and embracing structural pluralism:

> STRUCTURAL PLURALISM: a musical work may be individuated by more than one sound structure.

However, as noted in chapter 1, it has been broadly assumed in the ontological debate that the thesis of structural pluralism is incompatible with the view that musical works are types. The worry is that the identification of musical works with types has regarded as the most theoretically virtuosic explanation of the ontological nature of musical works, and more precisely, of their repeatable character. Consequently, if we try to accommodate the standard view of versions and transcriptions within the ontology of music, we would have to embrace an ontological account that looses explanatory power regarding central features of the nature of musical works. If that were the case, a revision of the intuitions that support the standard view on versions and transcriptions would be justified in light of theoretical virtues.

The aim of this chapter is to show that such revision of our beliefs concerning versions and transcriptions is not necessary. The thesis that will be defended here is that the view that musical works are types can accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions by means of the hypothesis of *nested types*. According to this hypothesis, a musical work is a higher order type that is instantiated by other types of lower order. Versions and transcriptions are lower-order types that are tokens of the higher order type that a musical work is. Performances are concrete particulars that instantiate versions and transcriptions qua lower order types, as tokens of them. The hypothesis of nested types will illustrate that structural monism, assumed as the right view for the individuation of types, is not incompatible with the idea that versions and transcriptions do not constitute different works from the work versioned or transcribed in spite of exhibiting different sound structures.

To defend this thesis, this chapter is structured in four sections. In the second section, the thesis of structural monism will be analysed in more detail. The main theories that assume structural monism will be identified, attending to those that link the thesis that musical works are types with structural monism for the individuation of musical works. In addition, the problems of embracing structural monism in the way it is assumed in the bibliography will be considered. In the third section, ontological accounts that can accommodate the thesis of structural pluralism will be attended.

However, it will be shown that none of them offers an adequate explanation of the ontological nature of musical works and that they are not able to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions in a suitable way. In the fourth section, the hypothesis of nested types will be introduced. It will be shown how it can accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions while keeping, at the same time, the explanatory virtues of a type/token theory in explaining the nature of musical works. Finally, in the fifth section, some particular issues about the individuation of musical works *qua* nested types, and also about the individuation of versions and transcriptions, will be considered.

2.   Analysing structural monism

Structural monism for musical works –*monism* hereafter- is the thesis that a musical work is individuated by one, and only one, sound structure. According to *monism*, there are only two possible relations between musical works and sound structures:

a)   A one-to-one relation: each musical work is related to only one sound structure, and a sound structure can be related to only one musical work. This is the most common view to be found in the ontological debate.

b)   A many-to-one relation: more than one musical work can be associated to the same sound structure. Even though it is not as common, musical works that share the same sound structure can be found, or so it is defended by some views. For instance, according to Levinson, the same sound structure indicated by Strauss and Schönberg would be associated to two different musical works (cf. Levinson, 1980: 11; see also chapter 1).

Monism rejects the possibility of a third kind of relation between musical works and sound structures: a *one-to-many relation*, according to which a unique musical work is related to more than one sound structure. Rejecting the possibility of a one-to-many-relation between musical works and sound structures, *monism* is claiming that the relation that holds between them is one of a special kind from a logical point of view. According to *monism*, the relation between musical works and sound structures is a *function of musical works over sound structures*, i.e. a function whose domain is the set of musical works and whose codomain is the set of sound structures:

M = {x / x is a musical work}

S = {y / y is a sound structure}

f = {<x, y> / x ∈ M and y ∈ S}

Excluding the possibility of a one-to-many relation between musical works and sound structures, *monism* inherits the characteristic trait functions, i.e. that each element of the domain of a function cannot be related to more than one element of its codomain.

Nonetheless, the one-to-many relation between a musical work and its versions and transcriptions is the one that supposedly holds in the cases of musical works with different versions according to the standard view introduced above. Given that between a work's versions there are always structural differences, the claim that performances of the different versions of a same musical work are occurrences of that work seems to entail that the same musical work is associated to different sound structures. In Tchaikovsky's 1879 version of his *Second Symphony*, the first movement has new *A* theme, whilst the *A* theme of the 1872 version appears now as the *B* theme; moreover, the third movement has differences in the melodic lines of the themes A (violins) and B (flute), and the fourth movement was cut off in 150 bars. Despite an important number of similarities between the two versions, the 1879 version is associated to a different sound structure with respect to the 1872 version. Only the second movement remained intact. Therefore, if the standard view is right –and consequently, we hear Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* when we hear a performance of the 1872 version as well as when we hear a performance of the 1879 version– Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is associated to two different sound structures and, hence, we have to admit that a musical work can be associated with more than one sound structure. This seems to fit the way we talk about musical works with different versions in our musical and critical practices. But this is precisely the possibility that seems to be rejected by ontological theories that assume structural monism.

Structural monism has been typically assumed for those views that, from different points of view, affirm that musical works are types. One clear example of this assumption can be found in Dodd's account. In his earlier papers, a musical work is defined as a sound structure: a structured type whose constituents are sound-types (Dodd, 2002: 380). A musical work is identified with only one sound structure. The reason seems to lay on the nature of types. Types are ontologically thin entities (Dodd, 2007: 53-56). A type is an unstructured[52] entity individuated by the set of conditions that something must meet in order to be one of its properly formed tokens. In the case of musical works, these conditions are specified by the succession of sounds in a specific structure. A change in one of these sounds or in the disposition of them would establish a new condition to be satisfied by the tokens of that type and, hence, it would result in a different type. Since different versions are associated with different sound structures, they establish different conditions for a performance to be a token of a type. The different sound structures of the two versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* determine, consequently, different types and hence different musical works. The only possible relation among musical works and sound structures allowed by this view is the

---

[52] Given the abstract nature of types, they have neither spatial location nor spatial parts. In addition, they may be regarded either as existing at all times or existing outside time but, in both cases, types are not extended in time and hence they have no temporal parts. It is in this sense in which types are said to be unstructured entities (cf. Dodd, 2007: 48-50). By contrast, the tokens of a musical work qua type, sound sequence events, are concrete particulars located in space and time, and hence they are structured entities having spatiotemporal parts. To this extent, it is argued that there is no isomorphic relation between type and its tokens (cf. Dodd, 2007: 50-3).

one-to-one relation, where each musical work is related to only one sound structure, and a sound structure can be only related to one musical work.

In more recent papers, Dodd defines a musical work as a type of sound-sequence events (Dodd, 2007: 2). This definition is *prima facie* free of the commitment to a one-to-one relation between musical works and sound structures. However, even there structural monism is assumed by Dodd. Regarding the case of versions, he proceeds to a revision of the intuitions involved in the standard view. According to Dodd, 'two scores that specify even marginally variant conditions for a properly formed performance to meet can only count as scores of distinct works' (Dodd, 2007: 90). Consequently, contrary to the standard view, the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* should be regarded as a 'second work that differs very slightly from the original', namely, the 1872 version of that Symphony (cf. Dodd, 2007: 90). The work heard hear in a performance of the 1872 version and the work heard in a performance of the 1879 version are different works because these performances are tokens of different types in virtue of satisfying different sets of conditions.

However, Dodd's is not the only view on musical works to assume structural monism. This thesis has been also endorsed by the accounts that regard musical works as initiated types (cf. Levinson, 1980; Howell, 2002; Trivedi, 2002). These accounts agree on Levinson's definition of musical works, which states that a musical work is an S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t, i.e. a sound/performing means structure indicated by a composer at a specific time (Levinson, 1980: 20). This account considers that what individuates a musical work is not only a sound structure, but also the reference to the composer and to the time of composition. Since other parameters are taken into consideration, the relation among musical works and sound structures allowed by this account is not a one-to-one relation, but a many-to-one relation, where more than one musical work can be individuated by the same sound structure. Nonetheless, only one sound structure is still considered to be a parameter that determines the individuation of musical works, and thus the third possibility, a one-to-many relation between musical works and sound structures, is precluded. In addition, the relativization just to a particular time, rather than to different times or to a time-interval, makes difficult to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions. The different sound structures that the standard view associates with a same musical work in the case of versions and transcriptions are never indicated all of them at the same time, but at different times (see table 1 in chapter 3). However, according to the initiated types theory, a specific time of indication is a parameter that determines the identity of a musical work. A change in the time of composition would imply a change in work-identity. Finally, versions and transcriptions made by different composers would also count as different musical works because the reference to a composer is regarded as a parameter that determines the identity of a musical work.

Accordingly, the standard view for versions and transcriptions is more difficult to accommodate for the initiated types theory than for the type/token theory defended

by Dodd. For the initiated types theory, the 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* are different musical works, not only for having different sound structures, but also for being indicated by Tchaikovsky at different times. Similarly, Otero's transcription is a different musical work from Piazzolla's *Escualo*, not only for having different sound structures, but also for being indicated by a different composer at a different time. Therefore, the initiated types theory is not able to accommodate the intuition that in a performance of a version or a transcription we hear the musical work of which they are a version or transcription.

A third alternative account of musical works as types is presented by Currie. He regards musical works as action-types, i.e. as an event-type that has particular events as tokens (cf. Currie, 1989: 66). Currie maintains that Beethoven's *Hammerklaiver* is the action type [x, S, H, D, t], where *x* is an open place for a person (the composer), *S* is the *Hammerklavier*'s sound structure, *H* is the heuristic path through which *S* is discovered, *D* is the relation *x discovers y by means of z*, and *t* is an open place for a time (the time in which *x* discovers *S*). According to Currie, the constitutive elements of a musical work are *S*, *D* and *H* (cf. Currie, 1989: 70). These are the elements that fix the identity of Beethoven's *Hammerklavier*. Consequently, the same musical work can have more than one composer and being indicated at multiple times. However, Currie assumes again that the same musical work cannot be associated to more than one sound structure. He assumes the thesis of structural monism and, with this, the impossibility of a one-to-many relation between musical works and sound structures, the option that seems to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions.

Therefore, it is strongly assumed in the ontological debate that if we assign to musical works the category of types, we have to be committed to structural monism, the idea that musical works are individuated by one, and only one, sound structure. Since versions and transcriptions involve differences in sound structures, the assumption of monism would entail that the different versions or transcriptions of a musical work are different works of music. Contrary to the standard view, performances of versions and transcriptions would not be occurrences of the work of which they are versions or transcriptions. Following monism, when we hear a performance of the 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* we would be hearing two different musical works. Consequently, if we assign to musical works the category of types, we would have to revise the intuitions involved in our musical practices that support the standard view on versions and transcriptions. The problem is that these intuitions seem not to be only familiar ones. They seem to play a central role in our musical practices as well, and a revision of them would entail substantive modifications of our musical practices. For instance, no one thinks that Tchaikovsky composed eight symphonies but only six, even knowing that his symphonies No. 1 and No. 2 have two versions each. However, if we think that versions are different works of music, we would have to revise this belief and to claim that Tchaikovsky composed eight symphonies.

At this point, the defenders of monism may object that they are committed to the number of *works* Tchaikovsky composed, but not with the number of *symphonies* that are attributed to him. Monism is a thesis about the nature of musical works, not a claim concerning the classification of works of music into specific musical genres. With the use of 'musical work' we undertake a commitment with respect to the number of entities that there are, while the use of 'symphony' does not involve such a commitment. Accordingly, taking the 1872 and 1879 versions to be two different musical works does not entail that Tchaikovsky composed more than six symphonies.

This objection is, however, ungrounded. The concept of 'musical work' is determinable by the concept of 'symphony', and 'symphony' is a determinate of 'musical work'. This is to say that the set of symphonies is included within the set of musical works. If something is a symphony, it is a musical work. Consequently, the set of conditions for something to be a musical work must be included within the set of conditions for something to be a symphony. Something that satisfies the conditions for being a musical work may not satisfy the conditions for being a symphony, but rather for being a concerto, an overture or a sonata. It may be helpful for the reader to interpret the claim that the concept of 'musical work' is determinable by the concept of 'symphony' in terms of William Johnson's (1921: 174) distinction between determinable and determinate predicates, or in terms of determinable and determinate properties (Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2002: 48). Examples of this distinction are *being coloured*, *being red* and *being scarlet*. *Being red* is a determinate of *being coloured*, but it is also a determinable of *being scarlet*. For the discussion that follows, two features of the distinction determinate/determinable highlighted by Rodríguez-Pereyra are relevant. One is 'the incompatibility of determinates of the same determinables (i.e. if a particular is red, then it is not white, nor green, nor yellow etc., if it is scarlet, then it is not crimson, nor purple, nor vermilion etc., if it is round, then it is not square, nor triangular etc.)' (Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2002: 48). Analogously, if something is a symphony, it is not a sonata, nor an overture, nor a concerto, nor a trio, etc. The second feature is that 'having a determinate property entails having the determinable property of which it is a determinate and that having a determinable property entails having one of the properties that are its determinates' (Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2002: 48). Analogously, if something is a symphony, it has also the property of being a musical work, and if something is a musical work, it has also the property of being a symphony, or a serenata, or a sonata, or a cantata, or a concerto, or an overture, or any other of its determinate properties.

The crucial point is to know how these additional conditions that the concept of 'symphony' adds to the ones established by the concept of 'musical work' are determined. Two alternatives can be distinguished, depending on whether 'symphony' is considered as a formal or as a context-dependent concept. If we take the concept of 'symphony' to be a formal concept, the constraint made over 'musical work' obeys merely to structural features:

X is a symphony iff X satisfies S,

where *X* is a musical work and *S* is the set of structural sonic parameters that characterize a symphony. Some of them are, for instance, being composed for orchestra, being structured in different movements, having the importance of the melodies shared by the different instruments, etc. All of these structural features can be found both in the 1872 and 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* and, hence, from a formalist point of view, if they are two different musical works, they are two different symphonies.

However, it can be considered that the constraint imposed by the concept of 'symphony' on the concept 'musical work' is context-dependent, that is, depending not on structural sonic parameters, or not only on them, but also on some contextual features. Accordingly, being *X* a musical work and *t* its time of composition, *X* is a symphony iff:

(i) *X* is admitted as a symphony by its composer, the public and the specialized musical criticism at *t*.

(ii) *X* is similar enough to the other musical works admitted as symphonies until *t*.

The 1872 and the 1879 versions were admitted as symphonies by the composer, public and criticism in 1872 and 1879 respectively, and they are similar enough to other musical works considered as symphonies until 1872 and 1879. So, the two versions satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) and, therefore, from a contextualist point of view, if they are two different musical works, they are two different symphonies.

Consequently, if the monist claims that the 1872 and 1879 versions are two distinct works of music, she is committed to accept that these versions are two distinct symphonies, both under the crude formalist account and under a contextualist approach. However, this idea entails the commitment to the claims that Tchaikovsky has over six symphonies, that when he was composing the 1879 version he was composing a different musical work, that when we are hearing performances of those versions we are hearing different musical works, and so on. All these commitments would imply a substantive revision of the intuitions involved in our musical practices on which the standard view on versions and transcriptions is grounded. Given the apparent entrenched character of these intuitions, a revision of them would entail an important change in the way we should deal in our musical practices with this kind of musical products. Therefore, if the thesis that musical works are types were bound to structural monism, it would be a revisionary view to a high extent. Nonetheless, the entrenched character of the intuitions that support the standard view might be questioned. As noted in chapter 2, we do not have a positive way to prove the entrenched character of a familiar intuition. Alternatively, we can only prove when a familiar intuition is not entrenched. Accordingly, those intuitions grounding the standard view might be regarded just as familiar intuitions. In this case, the revisionary consequences entailed

by the type/token theories would be justified in case there were no alternative ontological explanation of musical works that accommodates the standard view on versions and transcriptions. According to the desiderata of minimal revisionism, those intuitions should be revised in light of the sound theoretical principles that support the type/token theory. This is the issue to be explored in the next section.

3. Structural pluralist accounts criticized

The aim of this section is to explore whether the revisionary consequences entailed by structural monism should be endorsed. Assuming the link between the thesis that musical work are types and structural monism, other alternative ontological accounts that *prima facie* do not assume structural monism will be considered. In this sense, ontological proposals compatible with the thesis of structural pluralism –the thesis that allows for a one-to-many relation between musical works and sound structures– will be identified. In particular, Rohrbaugh's continuants view, David Davies' action token theory and Rodríguez-Pereyra's resemblance nominalism will be attended. It will be analysed if those views can accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions and offer, at the same time, a satisfactory explanation of the ontological nature of musical works. If they could, we would be free of the revisionary commitments about versions and transcriptions entailed by type/token theories.

3.1 The continuant view

Rohrbaugh regards musical works, and repeatable artworks in general, as a particular kind of continuant. A musical work is a *real object*, i.e. a higher-level object that is ontologically dependent on its embodiments on physical things (cf. Rohrbaugh, 2003: 198-9). Musical works are real, that is, they exist in space and time because they ontologically depend on physical things in which they are embodied, for instance, performances, scores or recordings. A work's embodiments are all those things on which a work depends to exist through time. A work's instances –performances or recordings– are just a subset of a work's embodiments, and instantiation is just a more specific form of embodiment relation. According to Rohrbaugh, musical works *qua* real objects can change over time and could have been different than they actually are. In other words, musical works *qua* real objects are temporally and modally flexible entities (Rohrbaugh, 2003: 178). In this sense, he argues that the identity of musical works and other repeatable artworks cannot be understood in terms of structures (Rohrbaugh, 2003: 184, 189). Rather, the identity and persistence of such works through time is dependent on a succession of different things that are causally linked to the first physical embodiment of those works (Rohrbaugh, 2003: 191).

Temporal flexibility would be the feature of musical works that would accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions in Rohrbaugh's account. Following Rohrbaugh's view, the association of Tchaikovsky's 1872 and 1879 versions to the same work would be explained in terms of change: the 1879 version is a change experimented by Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, a temporally flexible entity, with respect to its previous state of 1872 in virtue of a casual connection between the work's embodiments concerning the two states. Both the performances of the 1872 and the 1879 versions would be embodiments of the same real object and hence of the same musical work, namely, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. Accordingly, the performances of both versions would be occurrences of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* and, to this extent, different sound structures may be associated to the same musical work. A similar strategy would be adopted in the case of transcriptions. Otero's transcription would be regarded as a change that Piazzolla's *Escualo*, a temporally flexible entity, experiments though time. Both the performances of Otero's transcriptions and Piazzolla's original instrumentation of *Escualo* would count as embodiments of the same musical work. Accordingly, they would be occurrences of *Escualo* where we can encounter the very same work originally indicated by Piazzolla. Therefore, the thesis that musical works are real objects seems to be *prima facie* compatible with structural pluralism and capable to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions.

However, the way in which Rohrbaugh's view captures the standard view is not satisfactory. The weak point of this approach is that it cannot explain the co-existence of the different versions of the same musical work. As Dodd points out, if an object changes, it no longer exists in its previous state (cf. Dodd, 2007: 88-9). If Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* changes in 1879, it no longer exists in the state of 1872. However, the 1872 and the 1879 versions are *ontologically on a par*: both of them can be performed, listened, experienced, and thus both exist in the same way. Tchaikovsky's 1879 version of the symphony did not cancel 1872's version of the work. Therefore, since earlier and later versions of a work can coexist, Rohrbaugh's proposal is not a satisfactory account of the phenomenon of work's versions. In light of the methodological proposal defended in chapter 2, the mistake of Rohrbaugh's view consists in addressing the strategy to account for versions and transcriptions from the hypothesis that musical works are temporally flexible entities. Rohrbaugh's justification of the hypothesis that musical works are temporally flexible is that this is a very familiar and broadly shared belief in our musical practices. The problem is that, despite its familiarity, it does not constitute an entrenched belief because it conflicts with the non-overridden hypothesis that if an object changes, it no longer exists in its previous state. As noted in chapter 2, this last hypothesis seems to be an entrenched hypothesis on which many of other projectible hypotheses depend. Consequently, Rohrbaugh's strategy is not adequate to provide a satisfactory account of the nature of musical works and of the standard view on versions and transcriptions.

3.2 The performance theory

A second view that might be regarded as compatible with structural pluralism is the thesis that musical works are compositional actions-tokens. According to David Davies, a musical work is a compositional action (performance) that specifies a focus of appreciation (Davies, 2004: 146). The focus of appreciation of a work has a complex structure that consists in: 1) a sound structure, or more precisely, a set of constraints on legitimate performance of the work specified by a composer; 2) the acoustic possibilities of the instruments available for the composer; 3) the manner in which the set of constraints for performance –the score– is to be taken, given the interpretive conventions of the performing community to whom it is addressed (Davies, 2004: 213-5). According to this definition, Beethoven's *5th Symphony* would be the particular action carried out by Beethoven to specify a set of norms for correct performance, given the constraints of the instrumental medium that he had available at the time of composition and a particular way to interpret these norms.

Davies' definition of what a musical work is assumes the thesis of structural monism to the extent that it associates each musical work with only one set of norms for correct performance, and hence, with only one sound structure. However, since action-tokens are events, and events are extended through time, there is nothing that *prima facie* excludes the possibility of a composer specifying more than one set of norms for correct performance during the course of that action. These different sets of norms for correct performance might be accommodated in two alternative ways. If a set of norms for correct performance is not an element that determines the individuation of a focus of appreciation, the focus of appreciation of a work would be compound by more than one set of norms for correct performance. However, this option is implausible because, first, these different sets would specify incompatible norms for correct performance, and secondly, the acoustic possibilities of the instruments available for the composer may change during the course in which these sets of norms are specified. Alternatively, if a set of norms is an element that determines the individuation of a focus of appreciation, the specification of different sets of norms for correct performance by a composer in the course of a compositional action would generate different foci of appreciation. This seems to be a more promissory view. Accordingly, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* would be the compositional action carried out by Tchaikovsky between 1872 and 1879 in which two focus of appreciation were specified: the 1872 version and the 1879 version. In this way, different sound structures –i.e. set of norms for correct performance– can be associated to the same musical work, and therefore, the thesis that musical works are compositional action-tokens can accommodate the thesis of structural pluralism.

However, although the view of musical works as compositional actions may accommodate the hypothesis of structural pluralism, it does not accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions. In particular, it cannot accommodate the cases of versions and transcriptions made by different composers and at different times.

228

In the first place, an action-token is a concrete particular action individuated in our actual world by the agent who does it. The action type of writing a sound structure ψ in a score carried out by two different agents A and B gives rise to two different action-tokens, even if the scores that they produce are visually indistinguishable. They are different action-tokens of the same action-type, i.e. the action type of specifying or indicating ψ. Accordingly, transcriptions that preserve unaltered the sound structure of the original instrumentation of a musical work would count as a different musical work if specified by other than the original work's composer. The problems for the action-token theory to accommodate the standard view are more obvious if A and B write different sound structures, ψ and ψ' respectively, because the actions carried out by A and B are tokens of different action-types: the action type of specifying ψ and the action type of specifying ψ', respectively. Consequently, since the sound structures of Piazzolla´s original instrumentation of *Escualo* and Otero's transcription are slightly different, these musical entities would be different action-tokens of different action-types, and hence, different musical works.

In the second place, action-tokens are events, and events are regarded as particular entities having definite temporal boundaries, a specific time-interval that individuates them in our actual world (cf. Casati & Varzi, 2015). The event of me drinking a pint of Guinness the 22 February 2018 between 8 pm and 8:30 pm in my kitchen, and the event of me drinking a pint of Guinness the 23 February 2018 between 8 pm and 8:30 pm in my kitchen, are different events because they have different locations in time and temporal boundaries that do not overlap. Accordingly, if we follow the thesis that musical works are action-tokens, Otero's transcription is a different work from Piazzolla's *Escualo* because it is a different action-token or event: it is an action carried out by a different agent –Luis Otero– and it has a different location in time, with temporal boundaries that do not overlap with the ones corresponding to Piazzolla's action –October of 2010, more than 18 years after Piazzolla's death. Consequently, if they are different action-tokens, they are different musical works according to the performance theory. But if they are different musical works, we cannot explain how a performance of Otero's transcription is an occurrence of Piazzolla's *Escualo*. The same consequences follow from the performance theory for versions composed by other than the original composer of the work, as it is the case of Marguerre's version of Mozart's *Horn Concerto* in D K412/514. Therefore, despite being compatible with structural pluralism, the view of musical works as compositional actions is not able to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions. In addition, if the difficulties of this view to explain the repeatability and audibility of musical works are considered (cf. Dodd, 2008: 1124), the action-token theory should be ruled out as a plausible candidate to explain the phenomenon of versions and transcriptions.

3.3 Resemblance nominalism

A third view that might accommodate the thesis of structural pluralism is a resemblance nominalism for musical works. As a nominalist view, this account would define musical works as sets of performances. However, this nominalist variant removes the relevance that the score has in the individuation of musical works in Goodman's nominalist account. According to Goodman, the performances that belong to the set of performances that a musical work is are the compliants of the characters of pitch and rhythm of a score (Goodman, 1968: 129). Those characters concern exclusively structural parameters of a musical work. Any change introduced in a score, specifically, in the characters that concern structural parameters of a work, results in the determination of a different class of performances and, therefore, in the determination of a different musical work. Since the scores of versions and transcriptions present differences in the notational characters of their scores, they would determine different sets of performances and thus different musical works. Accordingly, the relevance that Goodman gives to the role of the score commits his view to structural monism. Resemblance nominalism, by contrast, may elude the commitments to structural monism assumed by Goodman's view.

According to resemblance nominalism, a musical work is a class of performances whose members satisfy certain resemblance conditions. In this account, *resemblance* is a primitive relation that makes a thing belong to the classes of particulars to which it resembles. The primitive character of resemblance consists in that, given two objects a and b, 'if a and b resemble each other, there is no other fact to which the resemblance between a and b reduces' (Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2002: 63). Following this principle, 'what makes it true that a is F is not that a belongs to the class of Fs, but that it resembles the other members of that class' (Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2002: 57). In the musical case, what makes a particular having a property –for instance, being a performance of Beethoven's *5th Symphony*– is not belonging to a class –in this case, the class of performances of Beethoven's *5th Symphony*– but resembling the other members of that class –the performances of Beethoven's *5th Symphony*.[53] Therefore, what makes a performance belong to the class of performances of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is that it satisfies certain resemblance conditions. According to resemblance nominalism, resemblance 'comes by degrees' (Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2002: 65). Consequently, the membership of a performance to the class of performances of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is due to a degree of resemblance q such that there are not

---

[53] This point makes resemblance nominalism free of a charge addressed by Wollheim (1980: 6) and Stephen Davies (2003: 31) against other nominalist accounts in the ontology of music. According to these authors, the way of grouping performances into sets requires the reference to musical works or to something else than performances themselves. Resemblance nominalism solves this problem by the primitive character of the relation of resemblance between performances.

two performances of Beethoven's 5th *Symphony* that resemble each other in a degree less than q (cf. Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2002: 65-8; 2011).[54]

Similarly to Rohrbaugh's view, resemblance nominalism does not understand the individuation of musical works in terms of sound structures. Alternatively, it is understood in terms of resemblance between performances. This perspective enables resemblance nominalism to accommodate the thesis of structural pluralism. The correct performances of the 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* resemble each other in a certain degree of resemblance (q_1). Consequently, those performances satisfy certain resemblance conditions given by q_1. Since what makes a performance belong to a certain class of performances is the satisfaction of certain resemblance conditions, the performances of the 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* belong to a same class of performances in virtue of satisfying q_1. Let us call this class of performances 'Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*'. Accordingly, the performances of the 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* are performances of the same musical work, namely, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, regardless the structural differences between the two versions. Therefore, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is the class of performances whose members are performances that satisfy a degree of resemblance q_1 such that there are not two performances of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* that resemble each other in a degree less than q_1. *Similiter*, since the performances of Otero's transcription of *Escualo* and the performances of Piazzolla's original instrumentation resemble each other in a degree of resemblance q_2, they belong to a same class of performances, and hence to the same work, in virtue of satisfying the resemblance conditions given by q_2. Accordingly, *Escualo* is the class of performances whose members are performances that satisfy a degree of resemblance q_2 such that there are not two performances of *Escualo* that resemble each other in a degree less than q_2.

Resemblance nominalism is free of the problem of individuating the versions and transcriptions of a same musical work as different musical entities. This is a problem that stands for other views that identify musical works with concrete objects, as it is the case of musical perdurantism (cf. Chapter 1). While Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is the class of performances whose members are performances that satisfy a degree of resemblance q_1, the 1872 and the 1879 versions are two subclasses of this class of performances that satisfy the degrees of resemblance q_3 and q_4, respectively. The degrees q_3 and q_4 establish degrees of resemblance between performances higher than the one determined by q_1. The 1872 version would be the class of performances whose members are performances that satisfy a degree of resemblance q_3 such that there are not two performances of the 1872 version that resemble each other in a degree less than q_3. For its part, the 1879 version would be the class of performances whose

---

[54] The gradable character of resemblance also makes resemblance nominalism free of Goodman's paradox. The degree of resemblance for the performances of Beethoven's 5th *Symphony* may be such that it admits charming performances with some wrong notes.

members are performances that satisfy a degree of resemblance q_4 such that there are not two performances of the 1879 version that resemble each other in a degree less than q_4. The two versions are two different entities, i.e. two classes of performances, which belong to a broader class of performances determined by a less demanding degree of resemblance (q_1). The same strategy would be applied by the resemblance nominalist to the case of transcriptions.

Therefore, according to resemblance nominalism, there are only concrete entities in the ontology of music. Performances are particular concrete entities. Musical works are just sets of performances that resemble between them to a certain degree. Versions and transcriptions of a musical work are just subsets of the performances of that work. The performances of a version or a transcription are a subset of performances that resemble between them in a higher degree than with the other performances that belong to the maximal set of performances of that work. By this way, resemblance nominalism can accommodate not only structural pluralism, but also the standard view on versions and transcriptions, according to which the performances of versions and transcriptions are occurrences of the work versioned or transcribed.[55]

However, resemblance nominalism is not free of some problems that beset other nominalist accounts, and seem to be more pressing when the phenomenon of versions and transcriptions is considered. In the first place, given the commitment that there are only concrete entities in our ontology, resemblance nominalism is eliminativist about musical works. Consequently, resemblance nominalism endorses the idea that all true sentences in which it seems that we are committed to the existence of musical works can be paraphrased into sentences about performances that avoid such commitment. This strategy has been shown to be problematic (cf. Dodd, 2007: 22-25). The relevant point is that the worries concerning the paraphrase strategy are higher when the talk about versions and transcriptions is taken into account. Let us consider the following four sentences involving claims about versions and transcriptions:

(1) Both the 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* start with a G major chord.

(2) The 1887 version of Bruckner's *8th Symphony* is more authentic than the 1890 version of that symphony.

(3) Tchaikovsky composed two versions of his *Symphony No. 2* in 1872 and 1879.

(4) Ashkenazy's transcription of *Pictures at an Exhibition* is guided by the deeper undercurrents of this predominantly dark-coloured piece.

---

[55] To allow for structural pluralism, the degree of resemblance determined by q_3 and q_4 is supposed to be lower than the degree of resemblance determined by q_1. The degree of resemblance in virtue of which a performance is a member of the class that a musical work is corresponds to the degree of variability for the performances of that work. Since in the case of musical works with versions and transcriptions differences in sound structures fall into the scope of a work's variability, it seems that the degree of resemblance for performances of works with versions and transcriptions is lower than in the case of works without versions and transcriptions.

Following the nominalist strategy, it seems that a right and intuitive paraphrase of (1) in terms of performances is (1*):

(1*) All performances of the 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* start with a G major chord.

However, as it has been noted (cf. Dodd, 2007: 22), the intuitive appeal of this kind of paraphrases is revealed as merely apparent when we attend to their logical form. The logical form of (1*) may be represented as follows:

(1**) $(\forall x)$ (x is a performance of the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, or x is a performance of the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2 → x* start with a G major chord).

The main worry concerning this paraphrase is that, according to the standard view on versions and transcriptions, predicates as 'is a performance of the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*' seem to be relational predicates. Specifically, 'is a performance of the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*' seems to be a triadic predicate with two singular terms as its constituents referring to both a version and a musical work respectively. The nominalist's attempts to provide an analysis of dyadic predicates as 'is a performance of *In This House, On This Morning*' that might reveal as illusory the appearance of a work's singular term within the predicate are considered to be implausible (cf. Dodd, 2007: 22-3). These attempts seem to be more implausible in the case of the triadic predicates involved in our talk about versions and transcriptions because the difficulties increase with the inclusion of an additional singular term apparently referring to a musical entity different from musical performances.

Proceeding in the way in which an apparently intuitive paraphrase of (1) has been obtained, the corresponding paraphrase of (2) would be the following:

(2*) All performances of the 1887 version of Bruckner's 8th *Symphony* are more authentic than all performances of the 1890 version.

However, (2*) seems to miss completely the point of what we want to say when we judge the authenticity of the 1887 and the 1890 versions of Bruckner's 8th *Symphony*. In this sense, it might be thought that sentence (2) is analogous to sentence (5):

 (5) Bartok's *Fifth Quartet* sets people's nerves on edge.

An intuitive paraphrase of (5) paraphrase would run as follows (cf. Dodd, 2007: 23):

(5*) Most performances of Bartok's *Fifth Quartet* set people's nerves on edge.

This paraphrase avoids the commitment to the universal quantification over the members of a work's performances set. Accordingly, the paraphrase of (2) would be reconstructed in this way:

(2**) Most performances of the 1887 version of Bruckner's 8th *Symphony* are more authentic than most performances of the 1890 version.

If (2**) is accepted as valid, then the paraphrase account offered by the nominalist is not unified: sometimes universal quantification is applied and sometimes not. The immediate worry that arises at this point is that resemblance nominalism would offer *ad hoc* paraphrases of multiple sorts. Nonetheless, (2**) seems to be still misguided in capturing our talk (2) because the commitment is that the 1887 version is authentic, regardless whether it is performed or not in an authentic way. Even more, attending to the historical remarks made in chapter 3, the difficulties to perform the 1887 version in an authentic way were among Bruckner's motivations to write the version of 1890. In this sense, it might be rightly argued that the 1887 version is more authentic than the 1890 version because the former was more difficult to perform in an authentic way in its context of composition. The 1887 version would be more authentic than the 1890 version because most of its performances would be inauthentic. This example shows the irreducibility of our talk about works, versions and transcriptions to a talk about performances. We are not judging the authenticity in which a sound structure is, or may be, performed, but rather the authenticity of this sound structure in relation to a work. The object of our judgment in (2) seems to be different and non-reducible to the object of our judgment in (2**).

Then, we might think that (2) deserves paraphrases of a similar kind as (3). The more plausible paraphrase that the nominalist would suggest for (3) is (3*):

(3*) Tchaikovsky created two symphonic scores in 1872 and 1879.

Accordingly, the paraphrase of (2) would be the following:

(2***) The symphonic score created by Bruckner in 1887 is more authentic than the one he created in 1890.

However, paraphrases of this kind seem not to capture again our talk about versions and transcriptions. What Tchaikovsky composed is not two scores, but rather two versions by producing two scores. What he composed is something that can be heard or aurally experienced, but scores cannot be heard or aurally experienced. In addition, this way of paraphrasing seems to be at odds to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions. If it equates the composition of a version with the creation of a symphonic score, it would be committed to that Tchaikovsky has more than 6 symphonies. As a result, this kind of paraphrase would lead us to assume some of the

undesirable consequences of embracing structural monism pointed in the previous section.

Finally, it seems almost impossible for the nominalist to find a plausible paraphrase of (4). Nonetheless, (4) is not a bizarre claim invented here to raise *ad hoc* difficulties against the nominalist account. Rather, (4) is taken from a real example of our musical practices. It captures the way in which Ashkenazy judged his transcription of *Pictures at an Exhibition* and justified it as a better transcription than Ravel's one, as noted in chapter 3. The crucial issue is that (4) cannot be paraphrased neither in terms of performances (4*) nor in terms of scores (4**).

(4*) All/most performances of Ashkenazy's transcription of *Pictures at an Exhibition* are guided by the deeper undercurrents of the predominantly dark-coloured character of all/most performances of that piece.

(4**) The orchestral score of *Pictures at an Exhibition* created by Ashkenazy is guided by the deeper undercurrents of this predominantly dark-coloured piano score.

Therefore, resemblance nominalism would entail an untenable account on paraphrases in the case of versions and transcriptions. Although it seems *prima facie* that it accommodates in an easy way the standard view on versions and transcriptions, the revisionary costs for our talk about versions and transcriptions is massive and unjustified.

In addition, resemblance nominalism does not elude a second problem already advanced by Wollheim. The problem has to do initially with the identity conditions of musical works, and it is inherited regarding the identity conditions of versions and transcriptions. Firstly, we usually identify moments in which a composer finishes a version of a musical work. Indeed, we typically distinguish a version from another by reference to the moment in which it is known that the composer finished that version. In this way, we distinguish the 1872 version from the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. However, if a version is a set of performances that resemble between them to a certain degree, and the performances of such version 'go on being produced for an indefinite period', there is no a moment in the composer's life in which we could say that this version is finished or completed (cf. Wollheim 1980: 6). Nonetheless, there is an additional worry associated to this issue. A new version or transcription of a work would *add* a new subset of performances to the maximal set of performances of that work. Since the sound structure of a new version or transcription includes structural changes, the addition of this new subset of performances implies a change in the degree of resemblance for something to belong to the maximal set of performances of that work. This change consists in a reduction of the degree of resemblance so as to admit

new performances as members of the maximal set. However, since sets are extensionally individuated by their members, the identity of a musical work would change with the composition of a new transcription or version of it. Therefore, the work of which Sibelius composed a version in 1816 would be a different musical work from that of which Sibelius composed a version in 1819. However, according to the standard view, the versions composed by Sibelius in 1816 and 1819 are versions of the same work, namely, his *Symphony No. 5*. Consequently, from the perspective of musical composition, resemblance nominalism is not able to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions.[56]These worries concerning versions and transcriptions, besides the traditional problems of nominalism to explain the existence and identity conditions of unperformed works, lead us to dismiss resemblance nominalism as a candidate to explain the ontological nature of versions and transcriptions.

Therefore, three ontological accounts that seem to be *prima facie* compatible with the thesis of structural pluralism have been identified, namely, the continuant view, the action-token theory, and resemblance nominalism. However, it has been shown that none of them is able to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions in a satisfactory way. In addition, these three views have in common the rejection of the thesis that musical works are types. However, these views present different sorts of problems to explain the repeatability, audibility and variability of musical works (see chapter 1). Given that the thesis that musical works are types has been regarded as the best explanation of the ontological nature of musical works in general, should we embrace again a type/token theory and admit as justified a revision of the intuitions that support the standard view on versions and transcriptions? The aim of the next section is to offer an answer to this question.

4. The hypothesis of nested types

The conclusion achieved in the previous section seems to lead us to a serious dichotomy. On the one hand, the alternatives to type/token theories have been revealed as non-plausible candidates to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions. In addition, they present serious difficulties to explain central features of musical works, such as repeatability, audibility and variability. Accordingly, a relevant question can be posed as follows: should we adopt again a type/token theory and assume the revisionary consequences that it supposedly entails concerning versions and transcriptions? Nonetheless, on the other hand, we might still want to preserve our intuitions about versions and transcriptions. In this sense, an alternative question arises: should we develop an *ad hoc* ontological category to explain this kind of cases in the

---

[56] As we shall see in the next section, this problem does not arise for the hypothesis of nested types because the identity of the work remains the same with new versions (the identity of the work does not depend on its performances) and to compose a musical work is to discover it by the first time, i.e. to produce the first version of the work, an epistemically more valuable discovery than the discoveries of ulterior versions and transcriptions.

ontology of music? This second option would have the cost of being non-parsimonious in two respects. Firstly, if we retain the category of types for most musical works but assign to works with versions and transcriptions a different category, the musico-ontological realm would become qualitatively inflated with the introduction of a new kind of entities. In addition, if the different category is different from those posited by our best general metaphysical theories –which would seem to be the case, given the analysis developed in the previous section–, the general ontological realm would suffer an inflation with the introduction of a new sort of entities. However, the dichotomy between retaking a type/token theory assuming a high revisionary cost and introducing an *ad hoc* ontological category to accommodate the standard view is a merely apparent dilemma. In this chapter, it will be shown that the thesis that musical works are types is compatible with the standard view on versions and transcriptions and, consequently, apt to avoid a highly revisionary cost concerning our intuitions about versions and transcriptions.

Nonetheless, before introducing the solution this dilemma, some relevant observations are to be made. On the one hand, there is something right in the intuition that establishes a link between structural monism and the idea that musical works are types. Types are ontologically thin entities, individuated by the condition to be satisfied by their properly formed tokens. Different sound structures associated to the same type would determine different conditions for something to be a properly formed token of that type. Consequently, musical works *qua* types are individuated by only one sound structure. This consequence has also the benefit of preserving the alleged relevance that a sound structure has in the individuation of musical works (cf. Kivy, 1988/1993: 80; Scruton, 1997: 442). On the other hand, there is something right in the thesis of structural pluralism. Although we can doubt whether a musical work may be individuated by more than one sound structure, it seems right that different sound structures may be associated to the same musical work. This is not only shown by the standard view of versions and transcriptions, but also by the fact that we regard as occurrences of a musical work performances that are not properly formed, i.e. performances that exhibit slightly different sound structures. Accordingly, a weaker structural pluralist thesis seems to give voice to a familiar intuition of our musical practices, namely, that a musical work may be associated with more than one sound structure.

As noted in the previous chapter, Stephen Davies assumes the standard view on versions. He considers that they do not constitute a musical work different from the work versioned (cf. Davies, 2007: 87). In this sense, he seems to assume the thesis of structural pluralism. In addition, he assumes the thesis that musical works are types – more specifically, norm kinds (cf. Davies: 2003: 32-5). Consequently, Davies' account might seem to be promissory in order to reconcile the thesis that musical works are types with the thesis of structural pluralism. However, hopes vanish quickly. Davies does not explain how the view of musical works *qua* types may be compatible with

structural pluralism. He seems to be confined to a mere description of what happens in our musical practices regarding the phenomenon of versions. In this sense, he claims that 'the introduction of work versions to our musical ontology is messy, but so what? It respects a lack of neatness shown by composers themselves in the labeling and dissemination of their music' (Davies, 2007: 83). In the same way, he argues that 'it is disconcerting to have to accept that a work's identity can survive alteration to its work-constitutive features following its authorization as a completed piece' (Davies, 2007: 86). Accordingly, Davies does not aim to present a solution of how musical works *qua* types may be associated to the different sound structures of its versions. His account is not helpful on this point.

In addition, Davies' talk of versions and transcriptions is not precise and induces more obscurities on this issue. According to Davies, the composition of versions and transcriptions uses 'a finished work' as a source (Davies, 2007: 87). He considers that versions and transcriptions are of a previously finished musical work. However, this view raises numerous problematic questions. Is the previously finished work revised in a version? If it is revised and the revision does not result into a new work, how can we say that it has been previously finished? If versions revising the original work are not new works, what happens with the identity of the original work? Since versions involve changes in the constitutive properties of the previous work, does the work's identity *change* through time? If so, would not Davies' view be subject to the same criticism addressed in the previous section against Rohrbaugh's account? These aspects are not clear in Davies' account and no answer can be found in his papers.

The origin of the confusion is that Davies misinterprets the standard view on versions and transcriptions. He identifies a work with the first of its versions. He seems to regard the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, not as *the first* version *of* that work, but as an *original work* that is later revised by Tchaikovsky to produce the 1879 version of that piece. In the same way, he seems to regard Piazzolla's original instrumentation of *Escualo*, not as the *first version* (with the *original* instrumentation) of that work, but as an *original work* that is later transcribed by Luis Otero. The problem is that, in both cases, this insight does not accurately account for the standard view on versions and transcriptions. A performance of the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is not a performance in which we hear, encounter or experience the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2.* In other terms, a performance of the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is not an occurrence of the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. Alternatively, according to the standard view, what we hear in a performance of the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2.* is Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2.*, and not its version of 1872. More precisely, as noted in the introduction, three things are heard in a performance of the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* according to the standard view:

1. That particular performance.

2. The version that this performance is *of* (the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*).
3. The musical work that this version is *of* (Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*).

In a similar way, in a performance of Otero's transcription, we are not hearing Piazzolla's original instrumentation of *Escualo*, but the work *Escualo*. A performance of Otero's transcription is regarded as an occurrence of the work *Escualo*, but not as an occurrence of Piazzolla's original instrumentation. More specifically, as observed in the introduction, in a performance of Otero's transcription of *Escualo* we are hearing three things according to the standard view:

1. That particular performance.
2. Otero's transcription (which is a different instrumentation from Piazzolla's original instrumentation) that this performance is *of*.
3. The musical work that this transcription is *of* (*Escualo*).

Consequently, Davies' talk is imprecise and does not capture in an accurate way these relevant details of the standard view. A version of a musical work is typically obtained by means of revising a score of a previous version, but this fact does not make the previous version to be identified with the work itself. A new instrumentation of a work is typically obtained by means of transcribing to a new medium the score of a previous instrumentation of that work, but this fact does not make the original version with the original instrumentation to be identified with the work itself.

The best way to account for the standard view on versions and transcriptions – and to reconcile at the same time the thesis of structural monism for musical works *qua* types with the thesis of structural pluralism for musical works– is to regard *versions and transcriptions* as more or less perfectly formed *instances of a musical work qua type*. This idea seems to be plausible and intuitive. On the one hand, among the versions of a same musical work, one of them is typically preferred to the others. Between the two versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, the 1879 version is much more performed than the 1872 version. We regard the second version as more valuable than the first version. In this sense, it might be said that the 1872 version is regarded as a less perfectly formed instance of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* than the 1879 version. On the other hand, transcriptions are typically made from the preferred version of a musical work. The aim to preserve the sound structure of this preferred version reveals the aim of producing a properly formed instance of the work by means of that transcription. In addition, the account of versions and transcriptions as instances of a musical work seems to capture in an intuitive way our judgments about the authenticity of versions and transcriptions in the sense introduced in chapter 3. By analogy with the authenticity of performances, a version and transcription can be said to be authentic with respect to a score –the revised or transcribed score of a previous version of the work. But, in the same way as performances, versions and transcriptions can also be said to be authentic

239

with respect to a work, in this case the work versioned or transcribed. This phenomenon was illustrated in chapter 3 with the judgments of Ashkenazy about the transcriptions of *Pictures at an Exhibition* and Robert Hass about some versions of Bruckner's symphonies. An inauthentic version or transcription in this latter sense can be explained as a non-properly formed instance of the work versioned or transcribed. Therefore, the view of versions and transcriptions as instances of the work versioned or transcribed is not unintuitive and captures important features of our musical practices.

The relation of instantiation is the relation that holds between a type and its tokens. The idea of instantiation applied to versions and transcriptions induces a *hierarchy of levels*: we have an entity of a higher order level, a type, that is instantiated in lower order entities, the tokens of that type in which the type occurs. The hierarchy consists in a one-to-many relation between the type and its tokens. This mechanism provides the type/token theory with a way to account for the standard view on versions and transcriptions. According to the standard view, in hearing a performance of a version or a transcription we are hearing three things: a performance, the version or transcription of which this performance is, and a musical work of which the version or transcription is said to be. By means of the hypothesis of nested types, the type/token theory can account for the standard view, distinguishing between three levels linked by the relation of instantiation:

1. The musical work, identified with a higher order type ($\mathcal{T}$).
2. A version or transcription of that work, identified with a lower order type (T) in which the higher order type ($\mathcal{T}$) is instantiated.
3. Musical performances (p), identified with tokens of a lower order type (T) in which a version or transcription is instantiated.

The picture that results from the hypothesis of nested types in the case of musical works with more than one version or with different transcriptions can be sketched as follows:

In the picture above, $\mathcal{T}$, T_n, and p_1 are the different kinds of musical entities involved in our ontology about versions and transcriptions. The arrows indicate some relations that may obtain between them. Red arrows indicate relations of instantiation, while blue arrows indicate relations of causal dependence –as *being inspired by*, *being motivated by*, and so on. According to the hypothesis of nested types, a musical work is identified with a higher order type $\mathcal{T}$ that can be multiply instantiated by other types of lower order (T_n). Versions and transcriptions of $\mathcal{T}$ are identified with lower order types (T_1, T_2, T_3…T_n) that can be multiply instantiated in musical performances (p_1, p_2, p_3…p_n). Accordingly, between $\mathcal{T}$ and any of its versions or transcriptions holds a relation of instantiation, and performances are always tokens of a lower order type, i.e. tokens of a specific version or transcription. However, the relation of instantiation does not hold between the different versions or transcriptions of $\mathcal{T}$. Alternatively, causal relations may hold between the acts of indication of the different versions and transcriptions of a musical work. Given that T_1 has been indicated before than T_2, the act of indication of T_2 may causally depend on the act of indication of T_1, but the converse does not hold. Similarly, causal relations may hold between the act of indication of a version and a performance of a previous version of the same work. In this sense, for instance, the act of indicating T_2 may be causally dependent on the composer's experience of p_3, but the converse does not hold. In a similar way, causal relations may hold between the performances of the same version or transcription. An earlier performance of a version (p_1) may inspire later performances of the same version (p_2, p_3) or even performances of ulterior versions or transcriptions (p_4).[57]

---

[57] The idea of a hierarchy of levels has been roughly and implicitly pointed by Scruton. In reflecting about musical versions, he argues the following: 'Performances are not versions; but versions are made

Some important remarks are to be made in order to clarify the picture proposed by the hypothesis of nested types. In the first place, the idea that types may instantiate other types is not problematic in principle. Types are abstract universals. They are abstract to the extent that they lack spatial location. They are universals in the sense that they are 'something that does, or at least can, occur repeatedly' (Lewis, 1986b: 26). In this latter sense, since types can have multiple occurrences, they satisfy a neutral and sensible definition of what a universal is:

> Something is a universal if and only if it can be instantiated by more than one entity (whether it can be instantiated by particulars or universals) –otherwise it is a particular (cf. Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2011).

The relevant point in the distinction between particular and universal lies on that 'while both particulars and universals can instantiate entities, only universals can be instantiated' (Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2011). Accordingly, if types are universals, they may be instantiated by other universals, and hence by other types. Let us consider the example of the type of the chromatic horn. The chromatic horn is a type of instrument, different from the natural horn or the alpine horn. This is a higher order type that it is instantiated in different models of chromatic horns, which are lower order types. For instance, the German maker Alexander Mainz has more than 12 models of chromatic horns, one of them is the Alexander 103. The Alexander 103 is a type of instrument different from the Alexander 107, despite both being tokens of the same type, namely, the chromatic horn. The Alexander 103 is a lower order type that is instantiated by particular concrete musical instruments that satisfy the conditions to be tokens of that type. Therefore, nothing precludes a type to be instantiated by other entities and to be, at the same time, an instance of a higher order type.

A second observation is that the hypothesis of nested types satisfies a crucial difference between types and other kinds of universals, for instance, properties. This feature of types is stated in the following claim:

> If a predicate 'is F' is true of a token in virtue of the token's being a token of a type K, then 'is F' is also true of K (Dodd, 2007: 17; cf. Trivedi, 2002: 74).

The predicates 'is coloured' and 'is rectangular' are true of both of the Union Jack as a type and any of its properly formed tokens. This phenomenon also arises for nested types, as it happens in the case of the chromatic horn introduced above. The predicates 'is conical', 'is made out of metal' and 'has valves' are true, not only of both the Alexander 103 and of its properly formed tokens, but also of the higher order type

---

for performance, and they reflect the need to descend from the abstract particular which is the work of music to the concrete event which is its realization, through intermediate steps which may themselves involve a creative act, an imaginative mediation on the original as the composer defined it' (Scruton, 1997: 454' (Scruton, 1997: 454). Unfortunately, Scruton rested here and did not develop the ontological consequences implicit in this analysis. To make explicit such consequences is the aim of the hypothesis of nested types that has been introduced in the previous paragraphs.

of the chromatic horn. The transmission of predicates does not hold only between a particular horn and the type that it instantiates as a token of it. If the type in question is a lower order type –the Alexander 103– that instantiates a higher order type –the chromatic horn–, a subset of the predicates in virtue of which a physical object is a token of the Alexander 103 is also transmitted to –i.e. is also true of– the higher order type, as happens with the predicates 'is conical', 'is made out of metal' and 'has valves'. The transmission of this subset of predicates between the tokens of the lower order type and the higher order type is what makes them also tokens of the higher order type by transitivity. Therefore, higher order types are types in a full sense, not assimilable to properties or other kinds of universals.

Related to the issue of the transmission of predicates between the tokens of lower order types and higher order types, a third relevant remark about the hypothesis of nested types concerns the main motivation to postulate it in the ontology of music. The aim of the hypothesis of nested types is to explain how in a performance of a version or a transcription we hear, not only that performance and the version or transcription performed, but also the musical work versioned or transcribed. The hypothesis of nested types offers a clear explanation of how we enter into contact with the musical work itself by means of hearing a properly formed performance of any of its versions or transcriptions. The type/token theory appeals to the *quinean* notion of 'deferred ostension' to explain how types lie behind their tokens (Quine, 1969: 40). If I am asked to explain the abstract singular term 'alpha', I can write in a paper the inscription 'α', point to this inscription, and say 'This is alpha'. My pointing is a direct ostension to the inscription, but also to the abstract singular term alpha in a deferred way. Consequently, by pointing to the particular inscription I am pointing to two things at the same time: the particular inscription and the letter type that lies behind such inscription. The same phenomenon also holds for nested types. If someone asks me 'What is the chromatic horn?', I can point to a particular token of the Alexander 103 model and say 'This is the chromatic horn'. My pointing to that particular horn constitutes a direct ostension to the physical object pointed at, and an indirect ostension to the Alexander 103 and the chromatic horn, the lower order type and the higher order type that lie behind that physical object. My pointing is thus not only to the physical object that is a token of a lower order type –the Alexander 103–, but also to the higher order type of which the Alexander 103 is a token –the chromatic horn. The transmission of predicates between tokens of the Alexander 103 and the higher order type of the chromatic horn reinforces the idea of the indirect reference. Accordingly, the presence of a token of a lower order type guarantees the demonstrative reference to the higher order type of which the lower order type is a token.

By analogy with demonstrative reference, the audibility of a musical work *qua* type in its performances *qua* tokens of that type has been explained as follows:

> The token stands proxy for the type, and thereby enables one's perceptual experience to 'pass through' the token, and so relate the listener to the type lying behind it (…). The

> presence of a token secures the obtaining of a relation between a person and a type. Hearing a performance of a work just is to hear the work in performance; and the reason why this is so is that the work stands behind a performance of it in exactly the same way that a letter-type stands behind its concrete tokens (Dodd, 2007: 11-2).

According to the type/token theory in its simple view, in hearing a performance of a musical work we are indirectly hearing the work itself of which the performance is a token. Since the token 'stands proxy for the type' that lies behind it, we can hear the type 'passing through' the token. The hypothesis of nested types argues that this mechanism can be iterated. Since a token 'stands proxy for the type' that lies behind it, we hear a lower order type passing through its tokens, but since a lower order type is also a token of a higher order type, we hear the higher order type passing through the lower order type. The perceptibility is transmitted from tokens of a lower order type to the higher order type of which that lower order type is a token.

Before going into the case of versions and transcriptions, let us illustrate the point of the transmission of perceptibility with a slight modification of the example of the chromatic horn. The chromatic horn is not only a type of instrument. It can be also regarded as a type of timbre. The chromatic horn is a type of timbre different from the type of timbre of the natural horn. While the predicate 'is homogeneous in all the register' applies to the chromatic horn, it does not apply to the natural horn. The Alexander 103 also produces a type of timbre characteristic of this model that is different from the produced by the Jupiter JHR1100. The predicates 'is round' and 'is powerful' apply to the Alexander 103, but not to the Jupiter JHR1100. If someone that is familiar just with the sound of the natural horn, but not with the chromatic horn, asks me 'How does the chromatic horn sound?', I can play a scale in my particular instrument –a token of the Alexander 103– and say 'This is how the chromatic horn sounds'. The timbre produced by my horn is a token of the timbre of the Alexander 103. However, the timbre of the Alexander 103, a lower order type of timbre, is a token of the timbre of the chromatic horn, a higher order type of timbre. The relevant point is that, in hearing a token of a lower order type –the timbre of a token of the Alexander 103–, my interlocutor has access and hears a higher order type –the timbre of the chromatic horn. The perceptibility is transmitted from the former to the latter, and this is guaranteed by the transmission of predicates between tokens of the Alexander 103 and the higher order type of the chromatic horn. The predicate 'is homogeneous in all the register' is true of both, the token of the lower order type and the higher order type.

The hypothesis of nested types argues that the same phenomenon also holds for musical works with versions and transcriptions. According to this hypothesis, in a token of a lower order type –i.e. in a performance of a version or a transcription– we hear the higher order type –a musical work– of which the lower order type is a token. Since a performance of a version is a token of that version, when we hear that performance we also hear the type that stands behind it, namely, the version. In addition, since the version is also a token of the work of which it is a version, when we encounter the

version by means of a performance of it, we simultaneously encounter the musical work of which it is this version. The hypothesis of nested types assumes that the same phenomenon arises also in the case of transcriptions. Put in terms of the picture introduced above, p_1 is a token of the lower order type T_1 –a version or a transcription–, and T_1 is a token of the higher order type $\mathcal{T}$ –a musical work. Since tokens stand proxy to their types, our perceptual experience passes through p_1 to T_1, and from T_1 to $\mathcal{T}$. The perceptibility is transmitted from p_1 to $\mathcal{T}$ by passing through T_1. By this way, the hypothesis of nested types explains the standard view on versions and transcriptions, according to which performances of versions and transcriptions are occurrences of the musical work versioned or transcribed.

Let us illustrate the hypothesis of nested types with the three kinds of cases to which it applies. Applied to the case of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, the resultant picture according to the hypothesis of nested types is the following:

Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is identified with the higher order type $\mathcal{T}$, which is instantiated by two lower order types: T_1 –identified with the 1872 version– and T_2 – identified with the 1879 version. Each one of the lower order types (T_1 and T_2) is instantiated in musical performances. The tokens of T_1 are the properly formed performances of the 1872 version, i.e. the performances (p_n^1) that satisfy the normative properties specified in the score of that version. The tokens of T_2 are the properly formed performances of the 1879 version, i.e. the performances (p_n^2) that satisfy the normative properties specified in the score of that version. Performances p_n^1 are occurrences of T_1, in which we can hear, encounter, experience and have access to the 1872 version composed by Tchaikovsky. In addition, T_1 is an occurrence of $\mathcal{T}$, in which we can encounter, hear, experience and have access to the work, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. Consequently, since in hearing p_n^1 we are hearing T_1, and in hearing T_1

we hear $\mathcal{T}$, by transitivity we can say that in hearing p_n^1 we hear $\mathcal{T}$. In a similar way, performances p_n^2 are occurrences of T_2, in which we can hear, encounter, experience and have access to the 1879 version composed by Tchaikovsky. In addition, T_2 is an occurrence of $\mathcal{T}$, in which we can encounter, hear, experience and have access to the work, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. Consequently, since in hearing p_n^2 we are hearing T_2, and in hearing T_2 we hear $\mathcal{T}$, by transitivity we can say that in hearing p_n^2 we hear $\mathcal{T}$. Therefore, in hearing p_n^1 and p_n^2, we are hearing different versions (T_1 and T_2), but the same musical work ($\mathcal{T}$). This is the way in which the hypothesis of nested types explains the strong intuition that we are hearing the same musical work in the performances of the 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*, namely, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. The picture also accounts for the causal relations between the act of indication of T_1, or the generation of any of its performances, and the act of indication of T_2. In this sense, it explains the view of T_2 as produced by a revision of the score of T_1, as well as the motivations concerning aspects of T_1 and its performances for Tchaikovsky to compose T_2.

A very similar picture arises in the case of transcriptions according to the hypothesis of nested types. Let us consider the case of *Escualo*:

Piazzolla's *Escualo* is identified with the higher order type $\mathcal{T}$, which is instantiated by two lower order types: T_1 –identified with Piazzolla's version of the work with its original instrumentation– and T_2 –identified with Otero's transcription. Each one of the lower order types (T_1 and T_2) is instantiated in performances. The tokens of T_1 are the properly formed performances of Piazzolla's original version, i.e. the performances (p_n^1) that satisfy the normative properties specified in the score of that version. The tokens of T_2 are the properly formed performances of Otero's transcription, i.e. the performances (p_n^2) that satisfy the normative properties specified

in the score of that transcription. Performances p_n^1 are occurrences of T_1, in which we can hear, encounter, experience and have access to Piazzolla's version of *Escualo* with its original instrumentation. In addition, T_1 is an occurrence of $\mathcal{T}$, in which we can encounter, hear, experience and have access to the work Piazzolla's *Escualo*. Consequently, since in hearing p_n^1 we are hearing T_1, and in hearing T_1 we hear $\mathcal{T}$, by transitivity we can say that in hearing p_n^1 we hear $\mathcal{T}$. In a similar way, performances p_n^2 are occurrences of T_2, in which we can hear, encounter, experience and have access to Otero's transcription. In addition, T_2 is an occurrence of $\mathcal{T}$, in which we can encounter, hear, experience and have access to the work *Escualo*. Consequently, since in hearing p_n^2 we are hearing T_2, and in hearing T_2 we hear $\mathcal{T}$, by transitivity we can say that in hearing p_n^2 we hear $\mathcal{T}$. Therefore, in hearing p_n^1 and p_n^2, we are hearing different versions (T_1 and T_2), but the same musical work ($\mathcal{T}$). This is the way in which the hypothesis of nested types explains the strong intuition that we are hearing the same musical work in the performances of Piazzolla's original version of *Escualo* and Otero's transcription of that work. The picture also accounts for the causal relations holding between the act of indication of T_1, or the generation of any of its performances, and the act of indication of T_2. In this sense, it explains the view of T_2 as produced by a transcription of the score of T_1, as well as the motivations concerning aspects of T_1 and its performances for Otero's to compose T_2.

The hypothesis of nested types applies also in a direct way to what traditionally has been regarded as the typical cases of musical works, those whose original score has not been revised. Let us consider the case of Shostakovich's *5th Symphony*, a work that was neither revised by Shostakovich nor transcribed by any other composer after the premiere of the work in 1937. The corresponding picture of this work that results for the hypothesis of nested type is the following:

$\mathcal{T}$ = Shostakovich's 5th Symphony

T_1 = Shostakovich's 1937 version T_2 = X's version or transcription

p_n^1 p_n^2

$t_{-\infty}$ $t_{+\infty}$

Shostakovich's 5th *Symphony* is identified with the higher order type $\mathcal{T}'$, which is instantiated in only one lower order type (T_1). T_1 is the one and only version of this work, indicated by means of the score produced by Shostakovich in 1937. This lower order type is instantiated in what we commonly regard as the properly formed performances of Shostakovich's 5th *Symphony* (p_n^1). Performances p_n^1 are occurrences of T_1, in which we can hear, encounter, experience and have access to Shostakovich's 1937 unique version. In addition, T_1 is an occurrence of $\mathcal{T}'$, in which we can encounter, hear, experience and have access to the work, Shostakovich's 5th *Symphony*. Consequently, since in hearing p_n^1 we are hearing T_1, and in hearing T_1 we hear $\mathcal{T}'$, by transitivity we can say that in hearing p_n^1 we hear $\mathcal{T}'$. Given the transitivity of audibility and that this work has only one version, we can stipulate for simplicity to use the term 'Shostakovich's 5th *Symphony*' to refer to that version, and so with all works with only one version. Moreover, the picture given by nested types opens the possibility to accommodate future versions and transcriptions of this work made by other than Shostakovich. A new version or transcription of this work would be identified with a lower order type T_2 that would instantiate $\mathcal{T}'$, and whose indication would be causally connected with the act of indication carried out by Shostakovich in 1937 and with the performances of the score that he produced at that time.[58]

To conclude this section in which the hypothesis of nested types has been introduced, relevant advantages of this hypothesis in comparison with its competitors will be highlighted. In the first place, it accommodates the standard view on versions and transcriptions in a non-problematic way, making compatible the thesis of structural monism for musical works *qua* types with the weaker thesis of structural pluralism that acknowledges the possibility of a musical work to be associated with more than one sound structure. The higher order type ($\mathcal{T}'$) with which the hypothesis of nested types identifies a musical work is individuated by one and only one sound structure. Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* and Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 1* are different musical works in virtue of being individuated by different sound structures. Accordingly, structural monism holds for the individuation of $\mathcal{T}'$. $\mathcal{T}'$ can be instantiated in types of lower order (T), with which the hypothesis of nested types identifies versions and transcriptions. A lower order type T_n is individuated by one and only one sound structure. The 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is a musical entity

---

[58] This third application case of the hypothesis of nested types to works that have not been revised or transcribed will be approached again in chapter 7. Instead of a picture of three levels of objects, it will be pointed out the possibility of considering a picture of four levels of objects: musical works (higher order types), instantiated in versions and transcriptions (types of a lower order than the former), which in turn are instantiated in musical interpretations (types of a lower order than versions and transcriptions), which finally are instantiated in musical performances. This does not alter the point of the hypothesis of nested types. The point of it is that there is a hierarchy of more than two levels of objects related by means of instantiation relations. The hypothesis of nested types is not committed to the number of levels being exactly three, but only to their being more than two.

different from the 1879 version of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* because they are individuated by different sound structures. Accordingly, structural monism holds for the individuation of versions and transcriptions. In addition, since $\mathcal{T}$ can be instantiated in lower order types T_n exhibiting different sound structures, different sound structures may be associated with the same musical work. Consequently, there is nothing that *prima facie* precludes the compatibility of the theses of structural monism and structural pluralism for musical works under the hypothesis of nested types.

There are two possible ways in which the hypothesis of nested types accommodates structural pluralism. Firstly, the differences between the sound structures that individuates a lower order type T_n and the sound structure that individuates the higher order type $\mathcal{T}$ may be regarded as cases of imperfection. In this view, T_n is not a perfectly formed instance of $\mathcal{T}$. This account explains the cases in which one of the versions of a musical work is preferred to the other versions of it. The other versions of $\mathcal{T}$ are discarded as candidates to be performed in concert in favour of the preferred one, which typically corresponds to the last version signed by the composer.[59] The hypothesis of nested types would explain such preferences regarding the highlighted version as a perfectly (or more perfectly) formed instance of the work than the other versions. The other versions are discarded in virtue of being imperfect instances of the work. They would be taken to offer an imperfect or inadequate insight of the work. This view also explains the aim of a composer in indicating a better version of a same work by revising a previous one. The previous version would be regarded as an imperfect instance of the work, and the goal of the composer would be to provide a better insight of that work by means of the new version. This is a first way in which the hypothesis of nested types accommodates the idea that different sound structures may be associated to the same musical work.

The second way in which the hypothesis of nested types accommodates structural pluralism consists in regarding the sound structure that individuates a higher order type $\mathcal{T}$ as more generic than the sound structures that individuate the lower order types in which $\mathcal{T}$ is instantiated. The sound structure that individuates $\mathcal{T}$ would include variables to be filled in different ways in the sound structures that individuate the lower order types. In this sense, the differences between the sound structures that individuate T_n and the sound structure that individuates $\mathcal{T}$ are not explained in terms of imperfect instantiation. By contrast, they are explained in terms of specifying possibilities of instantiation opened and permitted by the higher order type. The fact that there are sound structures more generic than others is paradigmatically exemplified by our musical practices concerning concertos for solo instruments. Mozart's *Horn concerto*

---

[59] Although it is not always the case. For instance, Bruckner's *4ᵗʰ Symphony* has 4 versions (1874, 1878, 1880, 1888), but the last version is not the one usually performed. Alternatively, it is common to perform the first three movements of 1878 and the end of 1880 (cf. Tranchefort, 1986b: 219-20).

K495 has a free cadenza for the soloist in the first movement. The sound structure that individuates Mozart's concerto can be represented as φ_x, being φ the sound structure prescribed by Mozart's score and *x* a variable to be filled by the sequence of sounds produced by the horn soloist in the candenza. The variable may be filled by very different cadenzas in performance, and those different performances would be perfectly formed instances of the concerto if they accomplish adequately with the sound structure φ. However, it is sometimes announced in a program that the soloist will perform Mozart's *Horn concerto K495* with Hermann Baumann's cadenza, a cadenza composed by this particular composer. The sound structure to be performed is a less generic and a more specific one, namely, φ_a, where φ is the sound structure indicated by Mozart's score and *a* is the sound structure of Baumann's cadenza. Only performances that perfectly accomplish with φ and *a* can be regarded as perfectly formed performances of Mozart's-*Horn-concerto-K495*-with-Hermann-Baumann's-cadenza. An analogous phenomenon happens with the relation between versions and transcriptions and the works they are of according to the hypothesis of nested types. In the same sense, the sound structure of a higher order type may have variables that do not specify all the aspects for their instantiation in lower order types, which opens the possibility to different sorts of specifications in different sound structures. These different ways to fill the variable of the sound structure that individuates $\mathcal{T}'$ are different ways of presenting $\mathcal{T}'$ in perfectly formed instances of it. The hypothesis of nested types explains in this way why the differences in the sound structure of a transcription with respect to the sound structure of the score of the original instrumentation do not imply regarding them as imperfect instantiations of a work. It accounts thus for the peculiarities of the two models of transcriptions introduced in chapter 3. In the same way, it explains why sometimes we find equally valuable different versions of the same work. The resulting picture of this analysis is the following:

This picture represents how a higher order type may be instantiated in different ways in a perfectly formed manner. The higher order type $\mathcal{T}'$ is individuated by the sound structure φ, which has two variables x and y. x is to be filled when instantiated by lower order types, and it can be filled in many different ways. Accordingly, the instantiation of $\mathcal{T}'$ in T_1 results in the sound structure $φ_{ay}$ and in T_2 results in $φ_{by}$. The sound structures that individuate T_1 and T_2 are different between them, determining the different identity of T_1 and T_2. In addition, these two sound structures are different from the sound structure that individuates $\mathcal{T}'$. However, T_1 and T_2 are perfectly formed instances of $\mathcal{T}'$, since both of them satisfy the condition determined by $\mathcal{T}'$ for something to be a properly formed token of it, namely, φ. Meanwhile, the variable y is to be filled in performances, as tokens of the lower order types, and it may be filled in very different ways. Accordingly, the instantiation of T_1 in p_1 results in the sound structure $φ_{aa}$ and in p_2 results in $φ_{ab}$. The sound structures that individuate p_1 and p_2 are different between them, determining the different identity of p_1 and p_2. In addition, these two sound structures are different from the sound structure that individuates T_1. However, p_1 and p_2 are perfectly formed instances of T_1, since both of them satisfy the condition determined by T_1 for something to be a properly formed token of it, namely, $φ_a$. The hypothesis of nested types explains how the different performances of a version or a transcription fall within the scope of variability of that version or transcription. In addition, it also explains how the properly formed performances of the different versions and transcriptions of the same work fall within the scope of variability of the work they are versions and transcriptions of.[60] Therefore, the hypothesis of nested types can accommodate structural pluralism, not only regarding versions and transcriptions as imperfect instances of a higher order type, but also regarding them as properly formed instances that offer different correct insights of the same higher order type.

Beside the compatibility between monism and pluralism, the hypothesis of nested types presents other interesting points that make it preferable to other rival ontological accounts. One of these relevant aspects is that, while it avoids identifying versions and transcriptions with musical works, it acknowledges their status as musical entities. Accordingly, the hypothesis of nested types can explain how the first version indicated by a composer may be the source of other versions or transcriptions of the same musical work. In addition, it acknowledges the authorship of a composer's version or transcription. We usually identify the composer of a work with the individual that indicates the first version of that work. The hypothesis of nested types offers a satisfactory explanation of the status of composers that indicate subsequent versions or transcriptions of that work. It regards them, not as composers of a work, but as composers of other musical entities that are subsidiary of the work's original version, a task that also involves a relevant degree of creativity. As we have seen, the sound structure of a work *qua* higher order type has variables to be filled by means of the

---

[60] As noted in the previous chapter, the scope of variability is determined by the context of performance.

creativity of a composer in order to produce the score of a version or a transcription. Consequently, the hypothesis of nested types has a way to acknowledge that, while the composer or a subsequent version or transcription of a work takes previous versions of that work as a source of composition, she has a range of manoeuvre to develop her creativity. The hypothesis of nested types is superior to any eliminativist account of versions and transcriptions in these respects. Moreover, it offers an explanation of those claims about works, versions and transcriptions that are non-reducible to claims about performances. In this sense, the hypothesis of nested types is also preferable to any nominalist account that is eliminativist about works, versions and transcriptions.

The identification of versions and transcriptions with lower order types also makes the hypothesis of nested types a preferable account considering its competitors. In the first place, it explains the repeatability and audibility of a work in the performances of its versions and transcriptions. Such explanation is unavailable for other type/token theories because they regard versions and transcriptions as musical works different from the work versioned or transcribed in them. Additionally, since the hypothesis of nested types identifies versions and transcriptions with types, and types are repeatable, it explains the repeatability of versions and transcriptions and their being ontologically on a par. This issue helps the hypothesis of nested types to avoid a view of musical works as temporally flexible entities, which makes it a superior alternative to the continuant's view defended by Rohrbaugh. Moreover, the identification of versions and transcriptions with lower order types does not preclude an easy accommodation of the most current cases of musical works with only one version indicated by the original composer of the work. The hypothesis of nested types has explanatory power in a simple way. It has explanatory power because it applies, not only to the special cases of versions and transcriptions, but also to the common cases of works with only one version indicated by the original composer. It is simple because it offers the same explanation for the most common cases of musical works as well as for the special cases of musical works with more than one version or transcription indicated either by the original or other composer.

Finally, the hypothesis of nested types also exhibits the theoretical virtue of being qualitatively parsimonious. It explains the cases of versions and transcriptions by appealing to a category posited by our best general metaphysical theories. In addition, it explains the ontological nature of all sorts of musical works –with or without versions and transcriptions– by appealing to just one ontological category, namely types. Accordingly, the hypothesis of nested types 'keeps down the number of different kinds of entity', satisfying the condition for a doctrine to be qualitatively parsimonious (cf. Lewis, 1973: 87). Of course, the hypothesis of nested types is quantitatively unparsimonious since it multiplies the number of types regarding other type/token theories. However, this does not constitute a concern because, as Lewis puts it, only qualitative parsimony is relevant as a theoretical virtue.

Therefore, the hypothesis of nested types emerges as a solution of the dilemma posed at the beginning of this section. It emerges as a satisfactory ontological account to explain the ontological nature of musical versions and transcriptions in a way that accommodates the intuitions in which the standard view on versions and transcriptions is grounded. In this sense, it shows that it is unnecessary to assume the revisionary consequences typically associated with the thesis that musical works are types. In addition, it shows that we can avoid these revisionary consequences without embracing an *ad hoc* ontological category. The hypothesis of nested types shows that we can preserve the explanatory virtues of a type/token theory while avoiding, at the same time, the revisionary consequences for the standard view on versions and transcriptions traditionally associated with a theory of this sort. Having shown this point, in the next section, some relevant details concerning the individuation of musical works *qua* nested types will be sorted out.

5. The individuation of musical works *qua* nested types

This section is devoted to clarify how musical works and their versions and transcriptions are individuated under the hypothesis of nested types. In particular, it will be considered how these musical products deal with the thesis of pure sonicism, timbral sonicism, instrumentalism, indexical contextualism, non-indexical contextualism and non-contextualism. Pure sonicism argues that the identity of a musical work is given by a timbreless or colourless sound structure. By contrast, timbral sonicism claims that timbre is a feature that determines the identity of a musical work. Instrumentalism, meanwhile, is the thesis that the causal source of the timbre prescribed by the composer is constitutive of the identity of musical works. Indexical contextualism is the idea that the identity of a musical work is determined by reference to the composer and to the time of composition. Non-indexical contextualism argues that the identity of a work is determined by the conventions and shared understandings of a musical context –either the context of composition or the context of performance–, which determine how a composer's prescriptions are to be understood. Non-contextualism, on the opposite, considers that the identity of a musical work is independent of any contextual feature. In this section, the way in which these ideas apply to the individuation of musical works and their versions or transcriptions will be analysed. It will be explored how musical works and their versions and transcriptions under the hypothesis of nested types deal with these theses on the individuation question.

According to the hypothesis of nested types, a musical work is a higher order type that can be instantiated in other types of lower order, which are versions or transcriptions of that work. Those versions or transcriptions can be indicated by the same or different composers and may exhibit different sorts of instrumentation. In order to be properly instantiated in lower order types with these characteristics, a musical

work *qua* higher order type is individuated by pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism. The identity of the higher order type cannot depend on any particular timbre to be instantiated in a properly formed way in different transcriptions, which are associated to different sorts of instrumentations. In addition, the identity of this higher order type cannot depend on the reference to a composer or a particular time of composition in order to admit as properly formed instances versions and transcriptions indicated by different composers at different times. According to the picture drawn above, a musical work *qua* higher order type is individuated by a generic sound structure that has different variables. Three of these variables are for instrumentation, time of composition and name of the composer, which are filled in different manners in the instances of the higher order type, namely, in its versions and transcriptions. Moreover, the sound structure that individuates the higher order type includes an additional variable to allow that versions and transcriptions of it with slight modifications between their sound structures do not count as imperfect instantiations of it.[61]

Contextual factors play a role in constraining the scope of the variable places of a musical work's sound structure. The way in which non-indexical contextualism applies here slightly departs from the canonical view defended by S. Davies (2001). The function of the context consists neither in determining what features are constitutive of a work's identity nor in specifying how the composer's instructions in a score are to be understood. As we will see in more detail in the next section, contextual factors determine what counts as appropriate instances of a work in two levels. In the first level, it determines what counts as a version or transcription of a work by setting the degree of similarity to which versions and transcriptions of the same musical work must adjust. In a given *context of composition*, the indication of a sound structure is rejected as a version or transcription of a musical work if it does not satisfy the relevant degree of similarity with other versions and transcriptions of the same work. In addition, contextual factors determine when the indication of that sound structure is part of the process of composition of a work, as a requirement for the indicated sound structure to count as a version or transcription of that work. In the second level, it determines what counts as a performance of a version or transcription by determining the degree of similarity to which the performances of a version or transcription may adjust. In a given *context of performance*, the relevant conventions, performative practices and aesthetic trends determine how the scores' instructions of a version or transcriptions are to be interpreted in performance, constraining how different the performances of that version or transcription may be. The conjunction of the functions of the context of composition of versions and transcriptions, on the one hand, and of the context of performance, on the other, determine the variability of a musical work *qua* higher order type in

---

[61] The sound structure that individuates a musical work with a cadenza for the soloist would include an additional variable for the cadenza. This variable would not be filled by the instantiation of the higher order type in a lower order type, but in a performance of the lower order type as a token of it. Nonetheless, more details are avoided in this case in order to focus more specifically on the cases of versions and transcriptions.

performance. In other words, they constrain the set of performances in which the work is repeated, i.e. in which we can hear, experience and appreciate the work's content. As we will see, these contexts are dynamic, being open the possibility for the range of a sound structure's variables to be modified through time.[62]

Let us consider some examples that may help to illustrate the view sketched in the previous paragraphs. *Escualo* is a higher order type individuated by the sound structure φ_{vwxyz} where v is a variable for a way of specification of structural patterns, w for a composer, z for a time of composition, y for a set of instruments for performance and z for aspects to be implemented in only in musical performances (i.e. tempo, ornaments, candenzas, nuances, intonation, etc.). The sound structure φ_{vwxyz} can be expressed in more familiar levinsonian terms as follows: φ_z-as-indicated-in-way-v-by-w-at-time-x-for-instrumentation-y. What determines *Escualo*'s identity is the sound structure φ_z, which admits different instantiations depending on the way its variable places are filled. The variable places of this higher order type may be saturated in different ways in its properly formed instances. The sound structure φ_{vwxyz} instantiated by Piazzolla's first indication of *Escualo* results in φ_z-as-indicated-in-*a*-by-*Piazzolla*-at-1960-for-*i*, while instantiated by Otero's transcription results in φ_z-as-indicated-in-*a'*-by-*Otero*-at-2010-for-*i'*. *a* and *a'* are different ways of specifying the sound structure φ. In way a', the melody is one octave up between bars 70 and 72, and two octaves down between bars 100 and 116. Meanwhile, *i* and *i'* are different sets of instruments for performance: *i* corresponds to bandoneon, violin, bass, piano, and electric guitar, and *i'* to two trumpets, horn, trombone and tuba. The way in which Otero's indicated structure satisfies the variables of the sound structure φ_{vwxyz} falls within the scope of these variables determined by his context of composition, and hence it is admitted as a transcription of the work *Escualo*. The differences between Piazzolla's *Escualo* and Otero's transcription of this work are accommodated by this way within the identity of the same musical work, despite both of them being different musical entities.

The same procedure applies in the case of versions. Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* is a higher order type individuated by the sound structure ψ_{vwxyz} where v is a variable for a way of specification of structural patterns, w for a composer, x for a time of composition, y for a set of instruments for performance and z for aspects to be implemented in performance. Again, The sound structure ψ_{vwxyz} can be expressed in more familiar levinsonian terms as follows: ψ_z-as-indicated-in-way-v-by-w-at-time-x-for-instrumentation-y. What determines Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* identity is the sound structure ψ, which admits of different instantiations depending on the way its variable places are filled. The variable places of this higher order type are saturated in different ways in its properly formed instances. The sound structure ψ_{vwxyz} instantiated

---

[62] The combination of this sort of kinematic non-indexical contextualism –holding the contexts of composition and performance evolving through time– with a type-ontology have already been anticipated by Scruton (cf. 1997: 441-442; 444-446). However, we provide here a theoretical framework that specifies the relations between these elements, solving relevant aspects that remain unclear in Scruton's account.

by Tchaikovsky's 1872 version results in ψ_z-as-indicated-in-a-by- Tchaikovsky-at-1872-for-i, while instantiated by Tchaikovsky's 1879 version results in ψ_z-as-indicated-in-a'-by-Tchaikovsky-at-1879-for-i. The instrumentation i is the same in both versions, namely, the symphonic orchestra. a and a' are different ways of specifying the sound structure ψ. For instance, according to a, the A theme of the third movement proceeds by syncopes on the violins over an A flat pedal. By contrast, in a', the A theme of the third movement proceeds by arpeggios on the violins over an A flat pedal. The same structural pattern, as the sequence of the chords $< H_7, C_\flat, C_\natural, F_\flat, \sharp F_\sharp >$ over a pedal of A flat, can be specified in multiple manners, being syncopes and arpeggios two of them. The way in which Tchaikovsky's 1879 indicated structure satisfies the variables of the sound structure ψ_{vxyz} falls within the scope of these variables determined by his context of composition, and hence it is admitted as a new version of the work, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2*. The differences between both versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* are accommodated this way within the identity of the same musical work, despite both of them being different musical entities.[63]

The lower order types with which versions and transcriptions are identified according to the hypothesis of nested types are individuated in a different way than the higher order type that they instantiate. Versions and transcriptions are individuated by timbral sonicism –or, alternatively, by instrumentalism– and by the way in which they specify some general patterns of the higher order type of which they are instances. A version or a transcription is a musical entity that is also individuated by a sound structure, but of a more specific degree than the sound structure that individuates the higher order type with which the work versioned or transcribed is identified. Accordingly, timbral properties and a particular way of specification of structural patterns are parameters that determine the identity of a particular version or transcription of a work. Versions and transcriptions are different musical entities. These two timbral sonicist conditions are enough to individuate versions and transcriptions of the same musical work as different musical entities. Nonetheless, it may be thought that the reference to the composer and the time of composition plays also a crucial role in the identity of versions. In this sense, it might be argued that the reference to these parameters is required in an adequate aesthetic appreciation of these musical products

---

[63] One might ask the defender of the hypothesis of nested types what exactly the sound structure of a work with versions and transcriptions is. In this particular case, if the sound structure of Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony* is neither the sound structure specified by the score of the 1872 version nor by the score of the 1879 version, it might be thought that a relevant question is the following: which is exactly the sound structure of that work? Very probably, the defender of the hypothesis of nested types would not be able to tell which. However, the lack of a definite answer to this point should not be counted as an objection against the hypothesis of nested types. The question at stake is, indeed, a too demanding question. It would be like to ask the perdurantist what exactly the continuant of this specific work is, or the nominalist what set exactly that work is. This is more of an epistemological worry rather than an ontological one. If nominalism or perdurantism cannot be ruled out for lacking an answer to that question, the same goes for the hypothesis of nested types. Nonetheless, it seems plausible to think that the version approved by the composer is a perfect instantiation of the sound structure of the higher order type, and that the versions not approved by her are imperfect instantiations of the higher order type. In this sense, the sound structure of the version approved by the composer can be regarded as the closest one to the work's sound structure.

and in the adscription of aesthetic value to them. The reason that may be adduced is that each version or transcription of a work reveals, and is constrained by, the epistemic perspective that a particular composer at a particular time has of that work. In this sense, with the indication of different versions and transcriptions of the same work, the epistemic perspective that a composer (or composers) has of that work may grow and increase. Accordingly, the latter acts of indicating different versions of the same musical work are causally dependent on the acts of indication of previous versions or transcriptions of the same work. Thereof, the idea that versions and transcriptions of the same work are individuated by indexical contextualism seems to be plausible.

Let us see how this view applies to our examples of versions and transcriptions. The 1872 and the 1879 versions of Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2* are different entities, first of all, because a same structural pattern –the sequence of chords $< H_7, C_\flat, C_\natural, F_\flat, \sharp F_\sharp >$– is specified in different ways in both versions: by syncopes in the 1872 version and by arpeggios in the 1879. Nonetheless, this pattern could have been specified differently, including passing notes, appoggiaturas and other musical resources, which would give rise to a new version different from the two previous. Accordingly, the 1872 and 1879 versions are two different instances of the same higher order type, Tchaikovsky's *Symphony No. 2.* That is, *monism* holds for work's versions. A change in a sound structure is necessary to give rise to a new version of a work. In addition, the two versions determine different sets of normative properties to be satisfied by their properly formed performances. A properly formed performance of the 1872 version is not a properly formed performance of the 1879 version, and vice versa. Consequently, the 1872 and the 1879 are different lower order types, and hence different musical entities because they are properly instantiated by different sets of performances. Therefore, a timbral sonicist criterion seems to be enough to individuate the different versions of a musical work. Nonetheless, the properly formed performances of a version may exhibit aesthetic differences between them since the set of instructions of a version does not exhaust all the aspects for performance and the interpretation of such instructions is given by the context of performance. To this extent, the variability of the properly formed performances both the 1872 and the 1879 is relative to the contexts in which they are performed. Accordingly, the individuation of versions seems to be explained, not only on a timbral sonicist approach, but also by the non-indexical contextualist view introduced above.

In addition to this timbral sonicist criterion of individuation, we may think that other contextual parameters determine the identity of both versions. The 1872 version and the 1879 version are different because they have been indicated at different times, which implies different aims of the composer in the indication of these versions. Tchaikovsky's goal with the composition of the 1872 version was to compose a new musical work by means of indicating that version in a score. By contrast, Tchaikovsky's goal with the composition of the 1879 version was not to produce a new musical work, but to improve some aspects of the previous version –the ones that he regarded as

inadequate to provide an accurate access in performance to the work– by revising its score. Accordingly, comparative judgments concerning both versions and about solely sonicist parameters seem to play a central role in the aesthetic appreciation of such versions. For instance, it might be said that the modifications introduced in the second version of the third movement make it more dynamic than the first version.[64] The time of composition of both versions, and hence the fact of the 1879 version being composed after the 1872 version, has an incidence in the aesthetic appreciation of these musical entities and in the value that we ascribe to them. If the 1879 version were indicated before than the 1872 version, the lack of dynamicity of the 1872 version in comparison to the 1879 version would deserve a more negative evaluation than in the actual case. Accordingly, it may be said that if the 1872 version were composed at a different time it would be a different version. It seems to be part of the identity of the 1872 version to be the first version of that work. Complementarily, the reference to the composer seems to be also a constitutive feature of the identity of a version. It seems that it determines the appreciation of a version of that work the composer who generates it. Accordingly, if the 1879 version were generated by a composer other than Tchaikovsky, it would constitute a version different than the version indicated by Tchaikovsky.

However, it is not absolutely clear if the contextualist view about the individuation of versions introduced in the last paragraph is demanded by the standard view. The tendency in the responses offered by participants in the experiment developed in chapter 3 in the sonicist and non-conextualist phase is kept in the contextualist phase. The answers do not present a change of tendency when contextual information about the pieces heard is introduced. Regarding Q1, 83% of participants consider that the 1872 and the 1879 do not constitute different musical pieces, while regarding Q8, 64'82% would not admit them to be presented as different musical pieces by Tchaikovsky. The differences in the answers might constitute a motivation to consider the reference to the composer as constitutive of the identity of a version. The point to be solved is if these differences are enough to justify the reference to the composer as an element of the identity of versions. In addition, the experiment has shown that the intuition that aesthetic differences entail differences on matters about individuation is not broadly shared by participants (46'66%). Therefore, it is not clear if the aesthetic differences entailed by the reference to the time of composition of the 1872 and the 1879 versions are relevant to individuate them as different versions.

A similar phenomenon arises for transcriptions. Piazzolla's original version of *Escualo* and Otero's transcription of that work are different musical entities, first of all, because they specify different instrumentations, and hence, different norms for performance. Nonetheless, *Escualo* has been transcribed for other instrumentations

---

[64] Other examples of this sort of comparative judgments can be found in chapter 3. For instance, the 1890 version of Bruckner's *8th Symphony* can be said to be more coherent than the 1887 version. In this sense, Korstvedt argues that Bruckner altered the harmonic scheme to approach the recapitulation of the first movement in order to 'solidifying the tonal framework' of the development, starting and finishing this section with the dominant of C in the 1890 version (Korstvedt, 2000: 76).

different from the brass quintet: piano, choir, philharmonic orchestra, etc. All these instrumentations of *Escualo* constitute different transcriptions, and hence, musical entities different from Otero's transcription. In addition, Otero's transcription is distinguished from Piazzolla's original version of *Escualo* in virtue of the differences in the sound structures between these two musical entities: for instance, the main theme of the piece appears in bar 100 of Otero's transcription on the bass rather than in the highest voice as it appears in Piazzolla's original version. Again, *monism* holds for the individuation of musical transcriptions. A change in a sound structure is sufficient to give rise to a new transcription of a work. Otero's transcription is properly performed by a different set of performances than the sets of performances that properly instantiate Piazzolla's original version or a transcription of *Escualo* for orchestra. In all these cases, different sets of norms for performance are involved. As it happens in the case of versions, a timbral sonicist criterion is thus enough to individuate musical transcriptions. Nonetheless, the different properly formed performances of Otero's transcription may differ in aesthetically relevant ways given that the set of instructions of a transcription does not exhaust all the aspects for performance and the interpretation of such set is given by the context of performance. In this sense, the variability of the properly formed performances both the Piazzolla's original version and Otero's transcription is relative to the contexts in which they are performed. Again, the individuation of transcriptions seems not to be explained only by timbral sonicism, but also by non-indexical contextualism.

In addition to the timbral sonicist point of view, Otero's transcription can be regarded as a musical entity different from Piazzolla's original version because it has been indicated at a different time and by a different composer. Being indicated at a different time and by a different person are features of Otero's transcription that seem to be relevant for the aesthetic appreciation of it. Judgements about the originality of Otero's transcriptions are relative to the fact that this musical entity is a transcription of *Escualo*, and that it has been composed after the first version indicated by Piazzolla and by a different composer. The goals of Piazzolla in generating the first version of *Escualo* are not the same as the goals of Otero in generating a transcription of it. In the first case, the aim is to produce a new musical work, while in the second case, the aim is to adapt the work to an instrumentation different from the original one conceived by Piazzolla. Consequently, the artistic and aesthetic quality of Otero's transcription has to be measured considering the two models of transcription introduced in chapter 3: the model of approaching the original work to the reader of the new musical medium, and the model of approaching the reader to the original musical medium. Consequently, under the hypothesis of nested types, Otero's transcription is a lower order type that instantiates a higher order type –the work *Escualo*– and that is individuated by the instrumentation and the reference to the transcriber and time of transcription.

However, it is not clear again if the intuitions involved in our musical practices back this contextualist approach. As in the case of versions, the tendency in the

responses offered by participants in the experiment in the sonicist and non-conextualist phase concerning transcriptions are kept in the contextualist phase. Regarding Q1, 78'32% of participants consider that Piazzolla's original version of Escualo and Otero's transcription do not constitute different musical pieces, while regarding Q7, 66'43 of participants would not admit both the original version and the brass quintet transcription to be presented as different musical pieces by Piazzolla. Nonetheless, it is true that the introduction of contextual information slightly modifies the participants' answers. The incidence of contextual information is clearer contrasting Q7 and Q8. While 66'43 of participants would not admit both the original version and the brass quintet transcription to be presented as different musical pieces by Piazzolla, 83'21% would not admit the transcription to be presented as a different musical piece by Otero. The participants' answers are thus sensitive to the identity of the composer that makes the transcription. However, it is not clear if these differences are enough to justify the reference to the composer and to the time of composition as elements constitutive of the identity of a transcription.

It is important to note that the difference between a composer and a transcriber is mainly a question of epistemic degree. The original composer discovers more things than the transcriber. Her discovery requires more imagination and more mastery in voice leading, harmony and counterpoint than the transcriber's discovery. By contrast, the transcriber only discovers a new way of presenting a previously indicated work, having as a starting point the original work's version. This epistemic difference in degree entails a qualitative difference between the composer of the original version and the transcriber. The transcriber is a debtor, in a significant part, of the compositional activity of the composer of the original version of the work. The act of indication of the transcriber causally depends on the act of indicating the original version of the work. If Piazzolla had not indicated the first version of *Escualo*, Otero would not have composed his transcription. There is thus an asymmetry given in terms of causal dependence between the act of indication carried out by the original composer and the one generated by the transcriber.

In the same way, the difference between the composer of the original work's version and the composer of a later version is a matter of epistemic degree. Although similar mastery in voice leading, harmony and counterpoint seems to be required in both cases, the original composer discovers more things and his discovery requires more imaginative effort. By contrast, the composer of the ulterior version only discovers a new way of presenting a previously indicated work, having as a starting point the way of presentation given by the original composer. The composer of a new version of a work may have different aims for producing that version than the aims that guide a transcriber to produce a transcription. Sometimes, the aims that guide the activity of a composer in composing a version is to provide a better epistemic access to a work by revising a previous version. Other times, the aim that guides the composition of a version is the same that guides the composition of a transcription: it is just to provide a new way of presenting in performance a previously indicated work. In any case, the

composer of a new version of a work is a debtor in a significant part of the compositional activity of the composer of the original work's version, as it happens in the case of transcriptions. The act of indication of the composer of an ulterior version causally depends on the act of indicating the original version of the work. If Tchaikovsky had not indicated the version of 1872, he would have not indicated the version of 1879. If Mozart had not indicated a first –although incomplete– version of the Horn Concerto K412/514, Karl Marguerre would have not indicated his version of that work. There is thus an asymmetry given in terms of causal dependence between the act of indication of the original version of a work and ulterior versions of it.

According to the methodology introduced in chapter 2, an ontological approach to versions and transcriptions should account for the intuitions involving these phenomena of our musical practices, namely, that the acts of indication of later versions and transcriptions causally depend on the act of indication of the original version of the work. Accounting for this fact may help to solve the issue of whether contextual parameters determine the identity of versions and transcriptions. This is the task to be developed in the next section.

6. Instantiation conditions of musical works in versions and transcriptions and their individuation

The point developed in the last paragraphs of the previous section, in addition to the results of the experiment and the empirical evidence considered in chapter 3, reveals that the association of different sound structures with the same musical work is constrained by some conditions. As noted in the previous section, these are contextual conditions that determine the scope of the variables of the sound structure that individuates a work as a higher order type. At least, two conditions can be identified:

a) An appropriate degree of similarity between the sound structures involved.
b) The different sound structures must be indicated by acts of indication that are parts of the same process of composition.

First of all, similarity between sound structures is a necessary condition for something to be considered a new version or transcription of a same work. The different sound structures individuating each one of the different versions or transcriptions of a musical work must resemble each other to a certain degree. Suppose that after the premiere of *Metamorphosen*, Strauss writes a new score P_2 that is radically different from P. The sound structure indicated by P_2 is a non-contrapuntist one, whose harmony is completely consonant, only over the I, IV and V degrees of the tonality of C Major without any modulation. We will reject that P_2 represents a new version of *Metamorphosen*, even if those were Strauss' intentions. By contrast, a high degree of similarity between the 1872 and the 1879 versions of the third movement of

Thcaikovsky's *Second Symphony* in performance is what motivates listeners to associate these different sound structures with the same musical work.[65] In the same way, listeners consider that they are hearing the same musical work in a hearing of a performance of Piazzolla's original version of *Escualo* and Otero's transcription due to the similarity between the sound structures of Piazzolla's version and Otero's transcription in performance. Therefore, similarity between the sound structures individuating versions and transcriptions is always a necessary condition –and sometimes a sufficient one–[66] for those sound structures to be associated to the same musical work.

Similarity between sound structures is taken here in Lewis' sense: as an overall similarity relative to the conversational context (Lewis, 1973: 91-2; 1971: 208-10; 1968: 28). Two sound structures can be similar in many respects. The degree of similarity for two sound structures to be associated with the same musical work, and also what features are the relevant for taking them to be similar, depends on, and is balanced by, the musical context. An artistic context –otherwise labelled as artistic medium– has been defined as set of shared understandings and conventions upon which the artist produces her work (Davies 2011b, 49). This view of artistic context is very close to Robert Stalnaker's characterization of what a context is, who defines it as 'a body of information that is presumed to be shared by the parties to a discourse' (Stalnaker 2014, 2). In the musical case, the body of information is compound by musical theories and knowledge regarding artistic practices, which involves considerations about musical genres, styles, forms, performing practices, aesthetic taste, etc. This body of information is presupposed in a pragmatic sense by a composer when she is composing and by listeners when they are hearing music. Typically, an agent of a musical context takes for granted the truth of this body of information and assumes that the others involved in the musical context –other composers, performers, critics, listeners– do the same, as it happens in ordinary conversational contexts (cf. Stalnaker 2014, 3-4). Consequently, the pragmatic presuppositions of the agents involved in a musical context determine the degree of similarity required for two sound structures to be associated to the same musical work.

---

[65] At the aesthetic level, the constraint of similarity is supported by the results of the experiment in chapter 3 attending to the relation between aesthetic difference and work-identity difference. It was noted there that listeners are more familiar with the intuition that in hearing in performance similar sound structures, and when those performances elicit the same aesthetic response, they tend to say that they are hearing the same musical work. Additionally, most participants tend to associate differences at the aesthetic level with different work-identities. As observed in chapter 3, there are no absolutely clear trends in both respects, but these are the intuitions that find more support by listeners.

[66] Paradigmatic cases of this phenomenon are different versions of a folk song. Neither the composer nor the time of composition of a folk song is usually known. The contextual criteria of resemblance between sound structures seems to be a sufficient criteria in this kind of cases to determine when different sound structures correspond to different versions of the same folk song. Nonetheless, if the practices of performing these similar structures are far away in space, this may cast doubts as to whether they are to be associated to the same piece. Again, it seems that the appeal to other contextual factors –as the place of instantiation– play a role in determining when a higher order type is instantiated in its versions and transcriptions.

Three relevant remarks are to be made. The first one is that the musical context, as any other conversational context, is not static. It has a kinematics that makes it evolve through time.[67] For instance, concerning the symphonic genre in the classicist period, the degree of similarity admitted is narrower in comparison to the romantic period. In the classicist period, the composer was more constrained by rules concerning musical form, harmony and instrumentation. In the romantic period, the freedom of the composer is enlarged, having as a goal the originality of the composer and her stile rather than her accommodation to conventional styles, forms and rules. Since the constraints of formal rules in the classicist period are stronger, the differences required between sound structures to count as different symphonies, and hence as different musical works, is narrower than in the classical period. Consequently, in the classical period, for different sound structures to be associated to the same symphony, the resemblance between them has to be of a very high degree. Alternatively, in the romantic period, more differences between sound structures are admitted for them to be associated to the same symphony, the degree of resemblance required being lower than in the classical period.

A second remark is that different musical genres determine different degrees of similarity. For instance, in the genre of film music, the differences required for something to count as different musical soundtrack are higher than in the case of religious music. Or, conversely, the degree of similarity for something to count as a version of a soundtrack is lower than for something to count as version of a work of religious music. In the case of cinema, the technics of *Leitmotif* is typically followed by composers, as the soundtracks of *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly* (Ennio Morricone), *The Godfather* (Nino Rota) and *Los Gozos y las Sombras* (Nemesio García Carril) paradigmatically illustrate. In these cases, the composers associate a musical theme to each one of the main characters of the film, identifying their visual appearance with their personality by means of music. The theme associated to each character is varied and evolved as long as the personality of the character varies and evolves through the film. Usually, the theme associated to the main character is used at the initial track of the film to catch immediately the attention of spectators and lead them into the atmosphere of the film. If another film starts with the same musical motif as, for instance, *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly*, it would not count as a new soundtrack, but as a version of the soundtrack of *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly*.[68] The same phenomenon does not arise concerning the artistic genre of religious music. Cases in which a new work starts with the same motif or melodic line as a previous work can be easily found, and an example of it is Bartolucci's *Ave Regina Caelorum*. Concerning this musical genre, the connection of a composition with tradition is a value, so that composers typically make explicit the source of inspiration if their composition is

---

[67] The kinematics of the common ground, Stalnaker argues, is not explained by conventional rules, but by the pragmatic process of *accommodation* (cf. Stalnaker, 2014: 46 and ff).

[68] This phenomenon has direct consequences for plagiarism. If the composer of the music of the other film is not Morricone, and she does not inform that the soundtrack is a version of Morricone's *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly*, it very plausibly would be considered as a case of plagiarism.

inspired by a previous one. Therefore, the degree of similarity required for different sound structures to be associated with the same musical work is sensitive to the musical genre in which the musical products at stake are placed.

A third remark is that degree of similarity is correlative to the degree of variability of a musical work *qua* higher order type. The degree of similarity required for different sound structures to be associated with the same musical works determines the scope of the admissible differences between the instantiations in lower order types of a musical work qua a higher order type. It determines the degree of aesthetic differences that the tokens –i.e. versions and transcriptions– of a higher order type may exhibit in order to count as properly formed tokens of that type. Given that similarity between sound structures is context-dependent, the variability of a musical work *qua* a higher order type is also context-dependent. It depends on the context of composition of its versions and transcriptions. It is in its context of composition in which a musical entity is accommodated as a new version or transcription of a same work or of a different work. The degree of similarity assumed in Tchaikovsky's context is what enables the sound structure that he indicates in 1879 to be the second version of his *Second Symphony*, and hence to be counted as a properly formed instance of that work. It might be argued that this point contradicts the view defended in chapter 4, according to which the range of the variability of a version or transcription is determined by its context of performance. However, there is no such contradiction. The relevant context for the variability of a type is its context of instantiation. The context of instantiation of a higher order type, a work, is the context of indication of any of its versions and transcriptions, lower order types in which the higher order type is instantiated. Alternatively, the context of instantiation of a lower order type is a context of performance, for lower order types are instantiated in musical performances. It is in a context of performance in which the composer's inscriptions in the score of a version or a transcription are interpreted in order to be performed.

However, similarity is not a sufficient condition for something to be a version of a work sometimes. Two sound structures can exhibit a high degree of resemblance between them and be, however, associated to different musical works. This is the case of musical works inspired in, or based on, previous works, or works that include literal extracts from previous works. An example of this is Domenico Bartolucci's *Ave Regina Caelorum*, introduced in the experiment in chapter 3. The piece is based on the Gregorian piece *Ave Regina Caelorum* (Brevis). Indeed, the melody of this chant is reproduced note per note in Bartolucci's work, from the beginning to the end of the piece. The high degree of resemblance between both pieces is given by the fact that Bartolucci reproduces in its integrity the melody of the Gregorian piece. However, the contrapuntist imitative treatment of this melody and the modal harmony employed by Bartolucci leads us to consider this piece as a new different work from the original chant. A performance of Bartolucci's work is not regarded as an occurrence of the work that is instantiated when the Gregorian chant is performed according to the responses given by the participants in the experiment of chapter 3. Therefore, similarity is not a

sufficient condition for different sound structures to be associated with the same musical work attending to the intuitions involved in the standard view.

As we have seen, we cannot take musical works to be continuants that change over time, because while the previous versions of a work can coexist with the latter version, the previous states of a continuant cannot coexist with its actual state. In contrast, the process of composition of a musical work can be regarded as a continuant. The process of composition of any musical work is extended through time. It is a 'spatiotemporal worm' in Lewis' sense. It is the mereological sum of its temporal parts. Drafts and scores of the versions of a work give rise to temporal parts of the process of composition of that work. The acts of indication of work's versions –or, alternatively, the different composer's actions whereby the different versions of a work are specified as foci of appreciation– are temporal parts of the same process of composition. The different sound structures individuating each one of the versions are associated to the same musical work in virtue of having been specified or indicated within the same process of composition. The sound structure of the 1872 version and the sound structure of the 1879 version are both associated to Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony* in virtue of being indicated within the same process of composition. The indications made by means of the scores of the 1872 and the 1879 versions are temporal parts of the same process of composition: the process of composition of Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony* piece. In contrast with the view that takes musical works to be continuants, there is no problem in taking the processes of composition of musical works to be continuants. The 1872 temporal part of the process of composition of Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony* does not coexist with the 1879 temporal part: when the 1879 temporal part took place, the 1872 temporal part had ceased to exist. However, what has been indicated or specified as focus of appreciation in these temporal parts of the process of composition does not cease to exist, so that the 1872 and the 1879 versions of the symphony can coexist.

As a continuant, the identity and persistence through time of the process of composition of a work is given in terms of similarity and causation between its temporal parts (cf. Lewis, 1976: 56-8). The acts of indication of the different versions of a given work must be interconnected by similarity and causation. Again, similarity between the temporal parts of the process of composition is taken here in Lewis' sense: as an overall similarity relative to the conversational context. Two acts of indication can be similar in many respects. Whatever features are the relevant for taking them to be temporal parts of the same process of composition depends on, and are balanced by, the conversational context. In the conversational context relative to musical and critical practices of western tradition, relevant features of similarity between two acts of indication are, generally, the compositional technique employed, the agent's motivations and purposes in making them, and what is indicated through them (general structure parameters, themes, style and harmony). However, there could be conversational contexts that privilege other features, such as the emotional state of the composer or the general

mood evoked in performance by the sound structure indicated. In the conversational context of folk music, on the other hand, the identity of the composer is not usually relevant to determine when two different sound structures are versions of the same musical work.

Nevertheless, similarity among the acts of indications is not sufficient to associate to the same musical work the different sound structures indicated by these acts. Suppose that in 1878 Tchaikovsky had an accident and became amnesiac. He preserved his compositional skills but he forgot all the works he had composed until 1878. In this case, it would be difficult to say that what he indicates in 1879 is a new version of his *Second Symphony*. It seems that a new process of composition is taking place in 1879 because there is no continuity with the process of composition developed in 1872. A causal connection is needed between Tchaikovsky's 1872 and 1879 acts of indication. We understand causation here in counterfactual terms, defined as follows: if the first event had not been the case, the second one would have never existed (Lewis, 1973b: 158-61). Applied to our case, the sound structures indicated by Tchaikovsky in 1872 and 1879 are associated to the same musical work only if the following counter factual holds: if the act of indicating the former had not taken place, the act of indicating the later would have never existed. There is a casual connection between Tchaikovsky's compositional actions for the 1872 version and those of composing the 1879 version. Tchaikovsky's 1879 version was the result of his disappointment with the creative process that resulted in the 1872 version. If Tchaikovsky had not indicated a sound structure in 1872, he would have not been disappointed with this indication, he would have not decided to revise his work, and he would have never specified in a different way the sound structure that individuates his Second Symphony in 1879. In other words, it is not conceivable that Tchaikovsky would have made the 1879 act of indication without having made the 1872 act of indication.

The two conditions –similarity between sound structures and being indicated by acts of indication that are temporal parts of the same process of composition– also apply to versions and transcriptions made by other than the work's composer. The sound structure of Otero's transcription is associated to the same work to which it is associated the sound structure of Piazzolla's original version of *Escualo* in virtue of his act of indication being part of the same process of composition. After deeply studying Piazzolla's style, Otero became identified with Piazzolla's musical aims and compositional techniques in composing the first version of *Escualo*. His aims just consist in offering a new way of presenting the same work. His act of indication is not only similar to Piazzolla's, but also causally depends on it to the extent that if Piazzolla had not indicated *Escualo*'s sound structure, Otero would have not composed his transcription of *Escualo*. Something similar happens with the act of indication made by Karl Marguerre to complete Mozart's Horn Concerto. His act of indication is similar enough in aims and technique to Mozart's acts of indicating the previous drafts of this piece, and it is causally dependent on them. Therefore, it is indifferent who the composer of the version or the transcription is (if she is the composer of the original

version or another person, as it happens in the cases of the Horn Concerto and *Escualo*). The relevant point is that the acts of indication of versions and transcriptions are related in terms of similarity and causation with the original version of the work. If not, the musical product at stake is not to be counted as an instance of the higher order type.

Therefore, the ontology of works with versions and transcriptions requires the reference to aspects of the context of composition of those versions and transcriptions, as it is revealed by conditions a) and b). However, it is important to note that conditions a) and b) are, strictly speaking, neither individuation conditions of musical works *qua* higher order types nor individuation conditions of versions and transcriptions *qua* lower order types. Rather, a) and b) are *instantiation conditions* of a work (a higher order type) in its versions or transcriptions (lower order types). Similarity between the different versions or transcriptions of the same work is an acoustical parameter that can be perceived by means of the properly formed performances of those versions or transcriptions. However, as it has been shown, the degree of resemblance to be satisfied by the versions or transcriptions of the same work is balanced by the context in which versions or transcriptions are composed. Condition b), meanwhile, establishes that the different versions and transcriptions of a same work must be indicated by acts of indications that belong to the same process of composition to which the act of indication of the first version of a work belongs. The process of composition of a work is understood here as a continuant whose temporal parts are the acts of indication of the versions and transcriptions of that work. Such acts of indications are linked by similarity and causation with the act of indication of the first version of the work. Since acts of indications are events, they are tied to a particular location in space and time. In addition, the similarity between the acts of indication is also balanced by the context in which those acts of indication take place. Consequently, condition b) is also sensitive to contextual aspects.

The contextual dependence of conditions a) and b) has consequences for the individuation of versions and transcriptions. Let us consider two sonically indistinguishable sound structures, one indicated by Tchaikovsky at 1879 in an attempt to improve the 1872 version of his *Second Symphony*, and the other indicated by Brahms at 1850 and, hence, without knowing nothing about the 1872 version of that work. The sound structure indicated by Tchaikovsky would count as a version of Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony*, in whose properly formed performances we can hear, encounter, experience and appreciate the very same work that in the properly formed performances of the 1872 version. However, the sound structure indicated by Brahms would not count as a version of Tchaikovsky's *Second Symphony*, and we would not hear, encounter, experience and appreciate in its properly formed performances the very same work than in the properly formed performances of the 1872 version. The reason is that Brahms' act of indication does not satisfy condition b), and consequently it does not belong to the same process of composition than the act of indication carried out by Tchaikovsky in 1872. Therefore, the two sonically indistinguishable sound structures

indicated by Tchaikovsky and Brahms at different times would count as different entities, i.e. as versions of different musical works. Therefore, the identity of versions requires the reference to its composer and the context of composition, as it is demanded by indexical contextualism. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the reference to the time of composition and to the composer does not exclude that work's versions are also individuated by non-indexical contextualism. The instructions given by Tchaikovsky and Brahms are always interpreted in a context of performance. This context determines the scope of the variability of those versions and, by transitivity, the scope of the variability of the work versioned.

Similar phenomena arise in cases of transcription. Let us suppose that the same sound structure with the same instrumentation as Otero's transcription were indicated by Richard Strauss before Piazzolla's indication of the first version of *Escualo* and, hence, without knowing nothing about Piazzolla's original indication. These two sound structures are sonically indistinguishable, even from a timbrical point of view. The sound structure indicated by Otero would count as a transcription of *Escualo*, in whose properly formed performances we can hear, encounter, experience and appreciate the very same work than in a properly formed performance of Piazzolla's original version of *Escualo*. However, the sound structure indicated by Strauss would not count as a transcription of *Escualo*, and we would not hear, encounter, experience and appreciate in its properly formed performances the very same work than in the properly formed performances of Piazzolla's original version. The reason again is that, despite the resemblance between the sound structures indicated by Piazzolla and Strauss, Strauss' act of indication does not satisfies the condition b). Consequently, it does not belong to the same process of composition than the act of indication carried out by Piazzolla. Therefore, the two sonically indistinguishable sound structures indicated by Otero and Strauss at different times would count as different entities: the former as a transcription of *Escualo* and the latter as a version or transcription of a different musical work. This case shows that the references to the composer and to a time of composition are aspects that determine the identity, not only of versions, but also of transcriptions. Again, the instructions given by Otero and Strauss are always interpreted in a context of performance. This context determines the scope of the variability of those transcriptions and, by transitivity, the scope of the variability of the work transcribed. Thus, counting the reference to the time of composition and to the composers as conditions that fit the identity of transcriptions is compatible with saying that transcriptions are also individuated by non-indexical contextualism in the sense introduced in this chapter.

In sum, musical works qua higher order types are individuated by pure sonicism –to admit different instrumentations– and by non-indexical contextualism –the variability of their versions, transcriptions and performances depends on degrees of similarity sensitive to the common ground of context of composition and performance. In turn, musical versions and transcriptions are individuated by timbral sonicism –which allows the individuation of different transcriptions of a same work and also accounting for the causal relations that hold between them–, by non-indexical contextualism –

which determines the scope of the variability of versions and transcriptions in performances–, and usually [69] by indexical contextualism –which allows the individuation of the original work's versions and its ulterior versions and transcriptions.

7. Conclusions

In this chapter, the hypothesis of nested types has been defended as the best explanation of the standard view on versions and transcriptions. According to the standard view analysed in chapter 3, when we hear a properly formed performance of a version or transcription we are hearing, accessing, experiencing and appreciating, not only that version or transcription, but also the work versioned or transcribed. Consequently, if the standard view is assumed, the musical work versioned or transcribed is repeated and audible in the properly formed performances of its versions and transcriptions.

The standard view challenges a broadly expanded view within the ontology of music, labelled here as structural monism. According to structural monism, a musical work is individuated by one, and only one, sound structure. Since versions of a same musical work always exhibit different sound structures, and different transcriptions of a same work always involve a change in instrumentation, ontological views that assume structural monism seem not to be able to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions. Versions and transcriptions would count as different musical works from the works versioned or transcribed and, consequently, the musical work versioned or transcribed would not be repeated in the properly formed performances of its versions and transcriptions. The alternative to structural monism is structural pluralism, according to which a musical work may be individuated by more than one sound structure. Structural pluralism seems to accommodate in an easier way the standard view of versions and transcriptions. The problem is that type/token theories, typically consider as the best explanations of the ontological nature of musical works, are assumed to be incompatible with structural pluralism. Therefore, the standard view on versions and transcriptions seems to lead us to a dilemma in the ontology of music. If we want to preserve the theoretical virtues of type/token theories in the ontology of music, we should reject the standard view on versions and transcriptions and assume a high revisionary cost concerning our intuitions and practices about this kind of musical products. On the other hand, if we want to avoid such revisionary cost, we should embrace another ontological category compatible with structural pluralism to explain the particular realm of musical versions and transcriptions at the expense of loosing explanatory power, simplicity and other theoretical virtues.

---

[69] In cases in which similarity is not sufficient for determining when different sound structures are to be associated to the same musical work. See for more details footnote 66.

This chapter has shown that this dilemma is false. The second section has been devoted to analyse the first horn of the dilemma. In particular, the thesis of structural monism has been approached by focusing in the way in which it is assumed by different type/token theories, namely, the type/token theory defended by Dodd, the initiated-type theory and the action-type theory. It has been shown the difficulties that these views have in order to accommodate the standard view on versions and transcriptions. For Dodd's theory, versions and transcriptions would be different musical works because they exhibit different sound structures and, hence, they determine different sets of conditions for performance. A similar problem is faced by the action-type theory. In addition, for the initiated-type theory, versions and transcriptions constitute different musical works from the work versioned and transcribed not only in virtue of structural differences, but also for being indicated at different times and, sometimes, by different persons. It has been shown the counterintuitive consequences that follow from the way in which these theories assume structural monism. The paradigmatic consequence is that Tchaikovsky, Sibelius, Borodin or Bruckner would have composed, not only more musical works than the ones that we attribute to them in our musical practices, but also more symphonies.

The third section of the chapter is focused on the second horn of the dilemma. Different alternatives to type/token theories *prima facie* compatible with structural pluralism have being examined as to whether they can accommodate the standard view of versions and transcriptions and offer a plausible account of the ontological nature of musical works. Three accounts have being considered: the continuant view, the performance theory and resemblance nominalism. The continuant view explains the association of the same musical works with the different sound structures of its versions and transcriptions in terms of change. This proposal is grounded on the familiar intuition that musical works are temporally flexible entities. However, this intuition collides with the non-overridden hypothesis that if an object changes it no longer exists in its previous state, because earlier versions and transcriptions of a musical work are ontologically on a par with its ulterior versions and transcriptions. Accordingly, the continuant view is ruled out as a plausible candidate. In second place, the performance theory accommodates the thesis of structural pluralism in a way that is incompatible with the standard view on versions and transcriptions. It would explain the association of different sound structures of versions and transcriptions with a same musical work as a compositional action (action-token) in which more than one focus of appreciation is generated. However, it cannot accommodate the cases of versions and transcriptions made by different composers at different times. Given the individuation conditions of events, the actions developed by two composers at different times would always count as different action-tokens, and hence as different musical works. Finally, resemblance nominalism appears as the best candidate to explain the standard view on versions and transcriptions. According to resemblance nominalism, musical works are sets of performances that resemble between them to a certain degree. Versions and transcriptions of a musical work are just subsets of the performances of that work. The performances of a version or a transcription are a subset of performances that resemble

between them in a higher degree than with the other performances that belong to the maximal set of performances of that work. However, applied to the cases of works with versions and transcriptions, the paraphrases of our talk about works, versions and transcriptions only in terms of performances are more problematic than in the current cases of musical works without versions and transcriptions. These paraphrases entail revisions of our intuitions about versions and transcriptions as undesirable as the ones entailed by type/token theories. Moreover, resemblance nominalism presents problems concerning the individuation of works with versions and transcriptions. If resemblance nominalism is right and a version is a subset of the maximal set of performances of a work, the composition of a new version of a work entails the addition of a new subset of performances to the maximal set of performances of that work. The addition of this new subset of performances entails a change in the degree of resemblance to be satisfied by all the performances of that work. Consequently, either the identity of a work changes with each new version or transcription of it and the result is a new work –if sets are extensionally individuated–, or the musical work changes through time. The first option is incompatible with the standard view, while the second faces the same problem as the continuant view.

Given that there are no plausible alternatives to type/token theories according to the conclusions achieved in the third section, the dilemma of this chapter turns into the following: either we assume the revisionary consequences of type/token theories, or we have to inflate our ontology by the postulation of an *ad hoc* category for versions and transcriptions that is not posited by our best general metaphysical theories. Section four has shown that this dilemma is false. The hypothesis of nested types emerges here as an account that preserves the explanatory advantages of the type/token theories and, at the same time, that accommodates in an elegant way the standard view of versions and transcriptions. In addition, it accommodates the standard view without assuming the thesis of structural pluralism in the strongest sense, and thus avoiding the problems about the existence and persistence conditions about musical work to which this thesis is bound. Alternatively, it accommodates a soft thesis of structural pluralism, according to which a musical work is not individuated by more than one sound structure, but it can be associated to more than one sound structure.

According to the hypothesis of nested types, a musical work is a higher order type that is instantiated in lower order types. Versions and transcriptions are lower order types that instantiate a higher order type (a work) and that are instantiated in musical performances. It has been shown that types appealed by the hypothesis of nested types are types in full sense. Firstly, it has been shown the applicability of the hypothesis of nested types in other domains different from the ontology of music. Secondly, it has been shown that there is a transmission of predicates between higher order types and their tokens (lower order types), and between higher order types and the tokens of lower order types (performances). Thirdly, the explanation of the access to a type by means of its tokens provided by the notion of deferred ostension is also suitable for the hypothesis

of nested types. The hypothesis of nested types adds an iteration of the deferred ostension. Since a token 'stands proxy for the type' that lies behind it, we hear a lower order type (a version or a transcription) passing through its tokens (performances), but since a lower order type is also a token of a higher order type (the work versioned or transcribed), we hear the higher order type passing through the lower order type. The perceptibility is transmitted from tokens of a lower order type to the higher order type of which that lower order type is a token. In addition, it has been shown that the hypothesis of nested types can explain how the different sound structures of versions and transcriptions can be associated to a same musical work without rejecting structural monism, and hence, without assuming structural pluralism in the strongest sense. There are two compatibles explanations available for the hypothesis of nested types. In the first place, the differences between the sound structures of the versions and transcriptions of a work may be explained in terms of imperfect instantiation: versions and transcriptions are not properly formed instances of the higher order type. This seems to be a suitable explanation for the cases in which a composer is not satisfied with a previous version and in which a transcription is made for utilitarian purposes. The second explanation regards the differences of the sound structures of versions and transcriptions of the same work as a consequence of the variability of the properly formed instances of a higher order type. According to this view, the sound structure that individuates the higher order type is more generic than the ones that individuate any of its versions and transcriptions. The sound structure that individuates a higher order type has variables to be filled by the sound structures of its lower order types. These variables can be filled in different ways, and the scope of the admissible differences is determined by the context of composition of versions and transcriptions.

In section five, the individuation of musical works *qua* nested types has been addressed. In order to admit different instrumentations and versions and transcriptions made by different composers, musical works qua higher order types are individuated according to pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism. The identity of a musical work *qua* higher order type depends neither on a specific instrumentation (or timbre), nor on being indicated by a particular composer at a specific time. Rather, its identity is determined by a colourless sound structure with variable places to be filled by its tokens –lower order types with which versions and transcriptions of that work are identified– and by the performances of its versions and transcriptions. Accordingly, a musical work is a higher order type individuated by the sound structure φ_{wxyzp} (where w is a variable for a way of specification of structural patterns, x for a composer, y for a time of composition, z for a set of instruments for performance and p for different aspects of performance (cadenzas, nuances, tempo, etc)). The scope of these variables is contextually constrained by the context of composition of its versions and transcriptions, in first instance, and by the context of performance, in second instance. Their combination determines the scope of the variability of the performances of a work.

The individuation of versions and transcriptions *qua* lower order types has not been addressed until section six, where the instantiation conditions of higher order types were considered. Two conditions have been identified for musical works qua higher order types to be instantiated in lower order types (versions and transcriptions): a) an appropriate degree of similarity between the sound structures that individuate the versions and transcriptions of a same work; b) the different sound structures must be indicated by acts of indication that are parts of the same process of composition, Condition a) is mainly a sonicist condition that depends on the aural recognition of similarities in the performances of the versions and transcriptions of the same work. However, the degree of similarity is determined by the context(s) in which such versions and transcriptions of that work –i.e. the context(s) in which the work *qua* higher order type is immediately instantiated in lower order types. The second condition is also context-dependent. The process of composition of a work is a continuant, whose temporal parts are events in which composers indicate a version or a transcription of that work. To belong to the same process of composition, the acts of indication must be similar enough in different respect (aims, scope, musical technique) that are measured by the context of composition. In addition, these acts of indication must be causally related, to the extent that ulterior acts of indication causally depend of earlier acts of indication. Condition a) is sometimes not sufficient for a sound structure to be regarded as a corresponding to a new version of a musical work –specially in context in which the degree of similarity at stake is not clearly established– and it is there where condition b) plays its role. These two instantiation conditions of musical works *qua* higher order types in versions and transcriptions qua lower order types show that the individuation of versions and transcriptions depends, not only in a sound structure but also on timbral and contextual parameters. Consequently, versions and transcriptions are individuated by a sound structure, by a specific instrumentation (timbral properties), by reference to the composer and time of composition, and their variability in performance is determined by the interpretation given by the conventions of a context of performance.

A worry arises at this point. Higher order types (musical works) and lower order types (versions and transcriptions) are both types. The conclusion of this chapter is that musical works *qua* higher order types are individuated by sonicism and non-indexical contextualism, while versions and transcriptions *qua* lower order types are individuated by timbral sonicism, indexical contextualism and non-indexical contextualism. However, there are views that consider that types cannot be contextually individuated, or individuated by their timbral properties. Does this constitute a problem for the hypothesis of nested types introduced in this chapter? The answer to this question is offered in the next chapter.

Chapter 6

Defending the hypothesis of nested types: contextualising Platonism, decontextualizing Aristotelianism

1. Introduction

This chapter is devoted to analyse whether types can be contextually individuated. Considering this issue requires attend to the relations between the three fundamental questions in the ontology of music introduced in chapter 2: the categorial, the individuation and the persistence questions. Since metaontology has been defined as the study of the nature of the questions about what there is, the metaontology of music includes the study of the relation between the three fundamental questions of the ontology of music. In the state of the arts presented in chapter 1, we identified some accounts assuming that there is a close connection between the categorial and the individuation questions. Examples of this phenomenon are the proposals defended by Levinson, Currie or Davies, which try to derive the answer to the categorial question from the answer given to the individuation question. Nevertheless, it can be also noted that defenders of a same thesis concerning the categorial question maintain different perspectives concerning the individuation question. For instance, Predelli's view is instrumentalist and contextualist while Goodman's account is sonicist and non-contextualist, but both of them agree on that a musical work is a class of performances.

The thesis that will be defended in this chapter is that the categorial and the individuation questions are independent, at least concerning the ontological category of types. It will be shown that claiming that musical works fall under the ontological category of types does not entail a certain set of identity conditions for them. And, *vice versa*, particular identity conditions for musical works do not entail specific ontological categories to sort out musical works. While an entailment between the kind of entity that a musical work is and its existence conditions can be sketched, the same does not work between the identity conditions and the ontological category that we could ascribe to pieces of music, at least concerning the category of types. For this purpose, we will

attend to the views that explicitly assume that there is a link between the categorial and the individuation questions. This chapter will start introducing the *received view*, a rooted assumption in the philosophical literature that links Platonism with sonicism and non-contextualism, on the one hand, and Aristotelianism with instrumentalism and contextualism, on the other. Although these entailments are grounded in strong philosophical intuitions concerning Platonism and Aristotelianism, the links between categorial and individuation issues as they stand in the contemporary literature on the ontology of musical works will be rejected. It will be shown that an aristotelian view of types is compatible with sonicism and non-contextualism, and that a platonic view of types is compatible with instrumentalism and contextualism. In the subsequent sections we will put the stress on a traditional two-levels type token theory instead of on a multiple-levels type/token theory –the view defended by the hypothesis of nested types. The reason is that the received view that links Platonism with sonicism and non-contextualism and Aristotelianism with instrumentalism and contextualism is rooted in a traditional conception of a two-levels type token theory. Our aim here is to respond to the received view, and since the hypothesis of nested types is a novel story, we will put it aside for a moment to respond to the received view in its own terms. Once this is done, the consequences for the hypothesis of nested types will be extracted.

With this aim, this chapter is divided in five sections. In the next section, the received view on Platonism and Aristotelianism will be introduced, paying attention to two of the most relevant accounts on both sides, namely, the ones defended by Dodd and Levinson. In section 3, it will be defended an argument for the compatibility of Platonism with contextualism and instrumentalism, on the one hand, and of Aristotelianism with pure sonicism and non-contextualism, on the other. This argument is intended to show the misleading character of the received view. In section 4, the aristotelian position defended by Levinson will be analyzed in more detail, in order to offer a convincing account to their supporters for the compatibility of initiated types with pure sonicism and non-contextualism. In the final section, it will be shown how the compatibility of the category of types with different views on the individuation of musical works applies to the hypothesis of nested types, and how the view proposed here solves the problem of creatability for this hypothesis. This last section is intended to clarify some aspects of the view concerning the individuation of musical works, versions and transcriptions under the hypothesis of nested types introduced in the previous chapter.

2. Musical Platonism and Aristotelianism: the received view

Musical Platonism and Aristotelianism are, strictly speaking, responses to the categorial question. They are both set in a realistic ontological perspective regarding abstract objects and thus they share the claim that a musical work is a kind of abstract object that fall under the ontological category of *types*. According to a traditional two-levels type/token theory, a type is an abstract and generic entity that becomes instantiated when a token holds certain properties. Tokens are concrete particulars. The relation between types and tokens is usually taken to be that of *exemplification*: a token is not a copy that resembles a type, but an exemplar of it where the type is manifested. Having tokens is what makes types repeatable, and this is the feature (repeatability) usually taken to distinguish types from other kinds of abstract objects (Wetzel, 2009: xi).

The usual application of a traditional two-levels type/token theory to the musical domain identifies musical works with types, while the different performances of the same musical work are said to be tokens of the same type. Nevertheless, in spite of sharing the fundamental assumptions of the realist perspective about abstract objects, Platonism and Aristotelianism diverge from certain features of types and, hence, of musical works. The most important disagreement between these theoretical approaches concerns the existence conditions for types: Aristotelianism holds that types have a temporal origin, while Platonism rejects this idea. This divergence has been developed in multiples ways. The most typical way to draw this contrast is to say the Platonist claims that types have independent existence apart from their tokens, whereas the Aristotelian holds that the existence of types is dependent on their first instantiation. Nonetheless, there are other Aristotelian accounts that assume the ontological independence between types and tokens, locating the temporal origin of a type in its possibility of being instantiated, rather than in its first actual instantiation. The crucial point is that the approach to the categorial question has consequences concerning issues about the creatability and destructibility of works of music. However, this is not the case for the individuation question, despite theories assuming such dependence. Let us show this in more detail by focusing on the Platonist and Aristotelian cases.

There is a moderately widespread philosophical intuition that musical Platonism is bound to non-contextualist and sonicist views, while musical Aristotelianism is linked to contextualist and instrumentalist approaches. This intuition, which we call *the received view*, can be stated as follows:

> Here is one statement of Platonism about musical ontology: musical works are eternal and discovered (pure) sound-structure types, independent of musico-historical context and instrumentation, which do not matter to the work's identity and individuation. And here is one statement of Aristotelianism: musical works are types that are created (and destroyed) in certain musico-historical contexts by composers whose categorial or

framing intentions about instrumentation matter to the work's identity and individuation. As this shows, Platonism goes with non-contextualism and sonicism, whereas Aristotelianism, contextualism, and instrumentalism go hand in hand.[70]

Since Platonism traditionally places abstract entities within a realm which is set apart from the sphere of causality governing the physical world, it is natural to attribute to the Platonist the idea that, if musical works are abstract objects, they are not caused by anything in the physical world. Consequently, their identity is independent from the composers' actions, the time of composition, and the specific timbre of musical instruments. On the other hand, Aristotelianism is usually seen as a reaction against Platonism, one that pushes abstract objects back to earth, making them immanent to the physical world. It is thus also natural to ascribe to the Aristotelian the idea that, if musical works are abstract objects, their identity causally depends on the actions and intentions of the composers, the time and place of composition, and so on. Therefore, according to the received view, the categorial and the individuation questions are not independent, at least in the case of Platonism and Aristotelianism. Next, let us show how the received view is embodied in two of the most relevant accounts of Platonism and Aristotelianism in the ontology of music: the ones defended by Dodd and Levinson, respectively.

In one of his earlier papers, Dodd offers the following definition of a work of music:

> This conception (the simple view) has it that such works are sound structures: structured types that have only sound types as constituents (…) The simple view is a robust version of musical Platonism (Dodd 2002, 380).

In a more recent work, Dodd revises his definition by saying:

> The type/token theory –an answer to the categorial question– has it that a musical work is a type whose tokens are sound-sequence-events. (...) I shall present the view of musical works as types of sound-sequence-events (Dodd, 2007: 8).

Dodd's definitions may be analyzed as establishing a link between the categorial and the individuation questions, although he never explicitly assumes this commitment. The received view underlying Dodd's position can be sketched as follows:

(1) Musical works (MW) are types.

(2) Types have no origin.

(3) Given (1) and (2), MW pre-exist the activity of their composers.

(4) If MW pre-exist the activity of their composers, the identity of MW do not depend upon the actions developed by the composers in the context of composition.

(5) Thus, Platonism entails non-contextualism.

---

[70] I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for these clarifying words.

Premise (1) is the ontological realist statement that musical works are abstract objects, namely types. Premise (2) is the Platonist commitment to the existence conditions of types. Dodd diverges here from the typical Platonist view about the lack of temporal origin of abstract entities. The traditional story regards abstract objects as timeless entities, i.e. as entities existing outside time. However, Dodd's account of the lack of temporal origin of types is that they are eternal, i.e. that they exist at all times (Dodd, 2007: 58).[71] In any case, the relevant point is that the Platonist regards types as existing independently of any of their instances and as having neither temporal origin nor location. If we assume premise (1) as true, then, by (2), we arrive at (3): that musical works pre-exist the activity of their composers. Thus, if musical works are types, they have no origin and are not created by their composers, but discovered by them. Crucially, the point that establishes the relation between the categorial and the individuation questions is that if musical works are eternal entities, the context of composition plays no role in fixing their identity: since sound structures exist independently of composers' activity, their identity do not depend upon the actions taken by composers in their specific contexts, but upon the internal relations between their elements (sound-types). Only the artistic and aesthetic properties dependent upon these internal relations are relevant to the work's identity because it exists before and independently of any relation with elements external to it. This is precisely the dubious point reflected in (4), which introduces the received view about the link between the categorial and the individuation questions. It seems that Dodd is committed to this assumption in his early papers, as the following claim illustrates:

> The Platonist, by contrast, treats musical works as sound structures pure and simple, and thus admits the bare metaphysical possibility that the *Archduke Trio* was composed earlier than in fact was, and by another composer (Dodd 2002, 387).

These words suggest that arguing that musical works are eternal types entails the defense of an non-contextualist view concerning the identity of a piece and, therefore, that the question of the individuation would depend upon the categorial question. Nevertheless, this assumption seems to be removed in Dodd's recent papers (Dodd 2007 and 2013), where he derives his sonicist position –which holds that work-identity conditions consist merely in acoustic indistinguishability– from an independent principle; namely, from what he calls 'moderated aesthetic empiricism', the thesis that 'a work's aesthetic properties supervene on its acoustic properties and its (artistic) category' (Dodd 2007).[72]

---

[71] Dodd offers two reasons for the view of types as eternal entities. Firstly, locating types at time (in this case, at all times) facilitates an explanation of our epistemic contact with this kind of entities. As Dodd notes, 'if an audience is to listen to a work, *qua* type, at *t*, then the work must be present at *t*: it must be available to be heard at that time' (Dodd, 2007: 59). In second place, if types were timeless entities, sentences as 'The Ford Thunderbird exists now, has always existed, and will always exist' would be senseless. However, Dodd points that we can make sense of claims of this kind, and that they are rather only controversial (Dodd, 2007: 59). For the sake of the argument that will be developed in this chapter, the contrast between timelessness and eternality is irrelevant. However, it will be of an extreme importance in the defence of type/token theories developed in chapter 7.

[72] The word in brackets is not in the original.

On the other hand, Aristotelianism holds that musical works are types, but maintains that they are more than simple sound structures (Levinson 1980, 6). According to Levinson, an accurate account of the ontological nature of musical works must meet three desiderata: the *creatability* requirement (musical works are brought into existence by the composer's compositional activity), the *fine individuation* requirement (musical works are individuated by the reference to the composer and to the context of composition), and the *inclusion of performance means* requirement (specific means of performance or sound production are integral to musical works) (Levinson, 1980). According to the thesis defended in this chapter, the creatability requirement is an answer to the question about the existence conditions of musical works, and hence it is related to the categorial question. By contrast, the fine individuation and the inclusion of performing means requirements are answers to the identity question and they are independent of the categorial question. However, it seems that Levinson believes that first and second requirements are linked and, therefore, that the creatability requirement has consequences for the categorial question:

> To satisfy the first and second requirements of adequacy, it is necessary to realize that a musical work is not a structure of the *pure* sort at all, and thus not even an S/PM structure *simpliciter*. (…) An S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t, unlike a S/PM structure *simpliciter*, does not pre-exist the activity of composition and is thus capable of being created" (Levinson 1980, 20).

> My view, recall, is that a musical work is not a pure structure of sounds—a Platonic universal, as Kivy styles it—but instead a sort of universal brought down to earth: a contextually qualified, person-and-time-tethered abstract object, what I call an *initiated type* (Levinson 2011, 216).

Thus, it seems that according to Levinson the categorial and the individuation questions are not independent. The answer to the individuation question might determine an answer to the categorial question: specifically, that musical works are what he calls 'initiated types'. Initiated types ontologically depend upon the actions of composers and performers in order to exist and, hence, have a temporal origin. Accordingly, we can sketch the received view between the categorial and the individuation questions that underlies Levinson's account as follows:

(1) MW are abstract objects.

(2) MW do not exist prior to the composer's compositional activity.

(3) Composers determining identical sound structures in different musico-historical contexts invariably compose distinct MW.

(4) If (1), (2) and (3), then MW are contextually qualified, person-and-time-tethered abstract objects.

(5) A contextually qualified, person-and-time-tethered abstract object is an initiated type.

(6) Thus, given (1), contextualism entails Aristotelianism.

Premise (1) relies on the main assumption of the realist perspective about abstract objects as applied to musical works. Premise (2) is a consequence entailed by Levinson's creatability requirement, which according to our analysis belongs to the realm of the existence question. Premise (3) is derived from Levinson's fine individuation requirement, which in our account belongs to the domain of the individuation question. The crucial point that establishes the link between the categorial and the individuation questions is (5), which settles the identity between a claim concerning individuation issues ('a contextually qualified, person-and-time-tethered abstract object') and a statement belonging to the ontologico-categorial realm ('an initiated type'). A contextually qualified, person-and-time-tethered object can be associated with an indicated structure. This leads Levinson to claim that 'all indicated structures are, perforce, initiated types' (Levinson 1980, 21).

Therefore, we can take Dodd's and Levinson's accounts as exemplifying the intuition presented at the beginning of this section: on the one hand, musical Platonism is linked to non-contextualism and sonicism and, on the other hand, musical Aristotelianism is bound to contextualism and instrumentalism. In the next section, we reject this intuition by claiming that one thing is to answer to the categorial question, and another independent matter is to address the individuation question. The discussion concerning whether musical works are Platonic (eternal) or Aristotelian (initiated) types is a discussion concerning the categorial question, which attempts to determine what kind of entity musical works are. At issue here are considerations concerning the ontological features that must be shared by *all* musical works, which concern aspects about their existence and repeatability conditions. The discussion of whether the context of composition and the instruments prescribed by the composer fix the identity of musical works concerns the individuation question, which aims at determining the parameters or conditions that settle the identity of musical works. What is at issue in the individuation question is to determine when two musical entities *a* and *b* are the same musical work, and this involves a discussion concerning the sort of aesthetic properties that we ascribe to musical works: either those whose ascription exclusively depends upon the hearable features of the work –musical empiricism (cf. Dodd 2007, 205-12)– or other properties whose ascription depends on other non-sonic features of the work. In the next section we propose that the categorial and the individuation questions can be independently addressed, and that the answer we offer to the first does not commit us to a specific answer to the second, and *vice versa*.

3. Assessing the received view: contextualizing Platonism and decontextualizing Aristotelianism

In this section I argue against the received view, which links Platonism and Aristotelianism (two accounts concerning the categorial question) to determinate accounts on the individuation of musical works. The thesis defended here –that the categorial and the individuation questions are independent in the ontology of music–

opposes this received view. In short, my argument against the received view runs as follows:

(1) a type is individuated by the condition that must be satisfied by its properly formed tokens;

(2) this condition is a property;

(3) this property can be a monadic aural property (non-contextualism and sonicism) or a relational property involving elements associated with context-dependent parameters (contextualism and instrumentalism);

(4) types inherit their existence conditions from their associated properties;

(5) the existence conditions of properties depend on the principle of instantiation of properties;

(6) if we reject the principle of instantiation of properties, types are eternal (Platonism), regardless if their associated property is a monadic or a relational one;

(7) if we endorse the principle of instantiation of properties, types are initiated (Aristotelianism), regardless if their associated property is a monadic or a relational one;

(8) therefore, Platonism is compatible with contextualism and instrumentalism, and Aristotelianism is compatible with anti-contextualism and sonicism.

In order to develop this argument, let me start by considering two metaphysical distinctions. The first one is the opposition between universal and particular entities. Universals are entities that can be instantiated by other entities, while particulars cannot be, although they can instantiate universals. A second distinction is between abstract and concrete entities. An abstract entity exists outside space but it may exist at all times, while a concrete entity exists in both space and time having a specific and single spatiotemporal location. These two distinctions are not mutually exclusive. An example of this is the medieval dispute between *universalia ante rem* and *universalia in re*. A universal *ante rem* is a universal that exists outside its instances and, if its instances are concrete objects, that universal exists outside space and time. That is, a universal *ante rem* is an abstract entity. Meanwhile, universals can also be taken to be concrete entities (Armstrong, 2010: 7-16; Lewis, 1986a: 64-67; Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2011; Swoyer & Orilia, 2014). A universal *in re* is a universal that exists in its instances and, if its instances are concrete objects, the universal exists in space and time.

Types are multiply instantiable entities that are deemed to exist outside space and to have no specific and unique location in time. Accordingly, types are abstract universals (Wetzel, 2009: 124). Types are individuated by the condition that must be satisfied by concrete objects in order to become properly formed tokens of that type. This condition is a property associated to the type (Wolterstorff, 1980: 47; Dodd, 2007: 49). This property is 'being a properly formed token of that type', because there is no property that all and only tokens of a type have in common besides being tokens of that

type (cf. Wetzel, 2009: 106-112).[73] For simplicity, it will be said that if T is a type, 'being a *t*' is the property associated with the type T that must be fitted by the properly formed tokens of the type T.

Types derive their existence conditions from the existence conditions of their associated property. The discussion between Platonism and Aristotelianism thus hinges on the existence conditions of the associated properties of types, which have consequences for the existence conditions of types. For Platonism, properties exist independently of being instantiated, while Aristotelianism rejects this claim. That is, Platonism rejects the *Principle of Instantiation of Properties*, while Aristotelianism endorses it. However, Platonism and Aristotelianism are not concerned with the identity of those associated properties. A type is individuated by its associated property, and this property can be ontologically dependent on having instances or not, but determining which are the conditions that this property establishes for something to be a properly formed token of this type is an independent issue. While the discussion between Platonism and Aristotelianism belongs to the categorial question, the determination of which is the associated property that individuates a musical work *qua* type –that is, the condition that must be upheld by performances *qua* properly formed tokens of a work– is an independent discussion, and one that belongs to the individuation question. Accordingly, we will hold that Aristotelianism and Platonism are equally compatible with contextualism and anti-contextualism. Let us examine this point in more detail.

Platonism rejects the Principle of Instantiation for properties, positing that properties exist without being instantiated. The existence of properties does not depend on the existence of any object of the physical world. Consequently, if there are properties, and they are abstract objects, they exist without temporal origin. It is intuitive to claim that an aural property such as 'being a φ' (where φ is a simple sound structure) exists eternally. It makes sense to consider a sound structure to exist even though it has not been instantiated. However, this intuition seems not to be so clear when we take into account properties such as 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-a-in-t' (where *a* is a composer and *t* the time of composition), that involve contingent individuals. In the literature, these properties have been called 'impure properties', i.e. properties whose specification includes the reference to another entity (Dodd, 2002: 391). We could take the existence of such properties to be dependent upon the existence of the entities referred to in their specification. On this view, a property such as 'being a son of Barack Obama' exists only if, and when, the contingent individual Barack Obama

---

[73] Wetzel develops an interesting exhaustive account on that topic. She makes an analogy between words and biological species, and claims that 'there is nothing interesting all and only uttered tokens of a particular word have in common other than being tokens of the word, and also that tokens of a word make up a real kind, just as members of a species do. Presumably, then, I am committed to the claim that there is nothing interesting (known or unknown) that all and only members of a living species have in common other than being members of that species (i.e., no nontrivial, interesting, 'natural', projectible property)'. After rejecting the morphological, genetic, population Pland linage approaches, she also rejects similarity as a necessary condition between the tokens of the same type and concludes that 'there is no theoretically interesting property that all tokens of a word have in common (other than being tokens of that word) is that *what is important about a word token is what type it is a token of*' (Wetzel, 2009: 112).

exists. Analogously, the property 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-a-in-t', whose specification requires the reference to a composer, would not exist until the composer involved in the specification of that property exists.

However, the Platonist can hold that impure properties are also eternal properties. The Platonist can still reject the Principle of Instantiation by claiming that a relational property exists beyond the existence of its relata (cf. Dodd, 2002: 396). Since it makes sense to talk and think about relational properties whose relata do not yet exist, have ceased to exist or cannot exist, it also makes sense to talk about the existence of relational properties beyond the existence of their relata. For instance, consider the property 'being the first child born in EEUU in 2025'. We are now in 2018, so that this property cannot be instantiated at this moment. But from the fact that a property is not instantiated it does not follow that the property does not exist. Indeed, I can wish that the first child born in 2025 would be my son, we can make bets on whether the first child born in 2025 will be of European origin, we can imagine how fortunate the parents of the first child born in 2025 would feel, and so on. Since we can say and think about all these things, it is not unintuitive to claim that the property exists even though it has not yet been instantiated. The Platonist could be more radical and claim that the existence of a property is completely independent of whether the property is instantiated, or less extremist, as Dodd (2000: 435-6) is, and maintain that a property exists if and only if it is instantiated now, was instantiated in the past, or will be instantiated in the future. However, in both cases the Platonist holds the intuition that the property pre-exists the first of its instantiations. Applying the Platonist view to musical works, the property 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759' is a property that pre-exists the act of indication made by Haydn in 1759, despite involving contingent individuals in its specification. Accordingly, if musical works are types and the existence conditions of types are determined by their associated properties, Haydn's *First Symphony* pre-exists the act of indication made by Haydn in 1759. However, the identity of this symphony is not given here by an aural property, such as 'being a φ', but by a relational property that involves the relation between the sound structure φ and two elements associated with the context of composition of the piece: a composer (Haydn) and a time (1759).

More generally, we can see now the compatibility between musical Platonism and contextualism. Consider the type φ (where φ is a simple sound structure). Its identity is determined by the condition that a token must meet in order to be a token of this type: 'being an exemplar of φ'. This condition is the property associated with the type φ. Thus, φ exists if and only if 'being an exemplar of φ' exists. Properties are eternal and, hence, 'being an exemplar of φ' is an eternal existent. Thus, φ, the type individuated by that eternal property, is also an eternal existent. This is Dodd's argument for the eternality of types (Dodd, 2002: 381-382). Crucially, this argument also works with types such as this: φ-as-indicated-by-c-in-t (where c is a composer and t a time). This type is individuated by the property 'being an exemplar of φ-as-indicated-by-c-in-t', and if the property is eternal, and there is no reason to suppose it is not from

the Platonist view, the type is eternal, too. However, in contrast to the property 'being an exemplar of φ', 'being an exemplar of φ-as-indicated-by-c-in-t' is a relational property that establishes a relation involving a sound structure (φ) and two elements, i.e. a composer (a) and a time (t), traditionally associated with context-dependent parameters. Thus, the type φ-as-indicated-by-c-in-t is an eternal type; however, its identity is given not only by structural parameters, but also by context-dependent parameters as well, such as 'the composer' or 'the time of the composition'. Therefore, musical Platonism is equally compatible with contextualist and anti-contextualist accounts on the individuation of musical works.

By the same reason, we can take Platonism to be compatible with instrumentalist accounts. Properties such as 'being an exemplar of φ-as-performed-by-a-violin' is also an impure property, because its specification includes the reference to another entity, in this case a violin. This property could not be instantiated until violins came to exist, back in the 17th Century. If we reject the Principle of Instantiation, this property has to be regarded as existing prior to its first instantiation, so that a musical work whose composer prescribes specific instruments for performance can pre-exist the existence of such instruments, even if we take this property to be constitutive of the identity of the piece. Therefore, if a type is individuated by the property 'being an exemplar of φ-as-performed-by-a-violin', and this property is eternal, types such as φ-as-performed-by-a-violin are also eternal and, consequently, Platonism is compatible with instrumentalism. We can also make this property to be conjunctive with other properties such as 'being an exemplar of φ-as-indicated-by-c-in-t'. In other words, we can defend both an instrumentalist and a contextualist account regarding the individuation of musical works claiming that a type is individuated by a property such as 'being an exemplar of φ-as-indicated-by-c-in-t-and-as-performed-by-i', where i is the name of an instrument or a set of instruments. The resulting type is φ-as-indicated-by-c-in-t-and-as-performed-by-i, which is equivalent to levinsonian's indicated structures: sound/performing-means-structure-as-indicated-by-c-in-t. Accordingly, if we reject the Principle of Instantiation, this conjunctive property is eternal and, consequently, the type is also eternal, despite being individuated by a relational property that involves contextual features.

By contrast, Aristotelianism holds the Principle of Instantiation of Properties. This principle allows for the possibility that the properties are located in space and time and exist only in their instances. Accordingly, types would be universals *in re*, that is, universals that are ontologically dependent upon their instances and that exist only in their instances. However, this interpretation is precluded from the Aristotelian account for two reasons. Firsty, since universals *in re* exist *in* their instances, if the instances of a universal *in re* are spatio-temporally located entities –as, for example, the performances of a musical works are– the corresponding universal will not be an abstract entity, but rather a concrete one, i.e. spatio-temporally located. However, types are by definition abstract entities, so that a type-ontology would be precluded if musical works were identified with universals *in re*. Moreover, Aristotelianism would lose a clear distinction between a musical work and its performances, which is crucial to

explain the repeatability of musical works. The second reason is that, since universals *in re* exist *only* in their instances, if there is no instance of the universal, the universal does not exist. Universals *in re* come into, and go out of, existence. If types were universals *in re*, the associated property to the type would exist only when it is instantiated. However, Aristotelianism would resist the idea that Beethoven's *5th Symphony* exists only when it is performed and that it ceases to exist when nobody is playing it, for it raises new problems for the creatability conditions of musical works that this account aims to avoid.

Consequently, musical Aristotelianism must interpret the principle of instantiation of properties in a way that is compatible with the assumption that types are universals *ante rem*, i.e. abstract objects. The Aristotelian can adopt a view that is close to Armstrong's (1978), according to which if a property is ever instantiated, then it always exists. Following this view, a property needs only an initial instantiation in order to exist and, after that first instance, the property continues to exist even if it is not instantiated again. Accordingly, the properties 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759' and 'being a φ' are not eternal from the Aristotelian viewpoint. Both properties begin to exist only when their first instantiation takes place —that is, when the first properly formed token of the type exists. The property 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759' began to exist when a performance for the first time reproduced a sequence of sounds indicated by Haydn (φ) in a way that reflects Haydn's conception of music and the predominant style of performing music in Haydn's context.[74] This performance is the first properly formed token of the type to which the property 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759' is associated. Since types inherit their existence conditions from their associated properties, the type φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759 comes into existence by means of this performance. By contrast, the property 'being a φ' only needs a sound structure φ to be performed for the first time in order to exist. The type φ does not require to be properly instantiated being performed in a way that reflects Haydn's conception of music and the predominant style of performing music in the context of Haydn. The property 'being a φ' establishes a less demanding condition for something to be an appropriate performance of Haydn's first symphony. The first instantiation of the property 'being a φ' could have taken place either with Haydn playing his work on the piano before the official premiere, or with musicians

---

[74] Alternatively, we could contend that the existence of the work's score is a sufficient condition for the existence of the work. For a competent musician, the musical work is manifested in the score when he reads it. Accordingly, the specification of the sound structure φ must count as the first instance of the type's associated property. In the case of type φ, it would be enough for the instantiation of its associated property that the sound structure φ is specified at any time and for any composer. In the case of the type φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759, it is also necessary for Haydn to have specified the sound structure in 1759. However, our argument rules the same under this view. Moreover, if the score is not an instance of the musical work and the musical works begins to exist with the score, then Musical Aristotelianism would encounter a problem, because the existence of the work would precede the existence of its first instance. Therefore, Musical Aristotelianism would not be ontological Aristotelianism *in sensu stricto*, but a kind of ersatz Platonism or a Perdurantist view as Peter Alward conceives it, according to which scores can be temporal parts of musical works (Alward 2004, 333).

performing φ in a post-Romantic style, or with a computer accurately reproducing φ (had there been computers in Haydn's time), and so on. These performances can be counted as the first properly formed token of the type to which the property 'being a φ' is associated, and, since types inherit their existence conditions from their associated properties, the type φ begins to exist by means of any of these performances.

Both properties, 'being a φ' and 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759', can be regarded as having a temporal origin, so that the types associated with those properties also have a temporal origin. They are thus Aristotelian (initiated) types. However, 'being a φ' is an aural property that makes no reference to the context of composition, and to the composer, while 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759' is a relational property that involves a sound structure (φ) and two elements, i.e. a composer (Haydn) and a time (1759), both entrenched in the spatio-temporal realm. They establish two different conditions for something to be an appropriate performance of Haydn's First Symphony –that is, they settle different conditions for something to be an appropriate token of the initiated type that this work is. In the case of 'being a φ-as-indicated-by-Haydn-in-1759', the condition is more demanding than it is for 'being a φ', since it is required not only that an accurate reproduction of the sound structure φ takes place, but also that this performance must be related to the style of performing music in Haydn's context. Since types are individuated by the condition that the properly formed tokens of a type must satisfy, both properties settle the individuation of Haydn's Symphony in a different way: in one case, the work is individuated by reference to the context of composition and to the composer (and thus it is a view associated with contextualism), while in the other this does not happen (hence it is associated with non-contextualism). Therefore, Aristotelianism is equally compatible with contextualist and anti-contextualist accounts of the individuation of musical works.

Therefore, the contention that musical works are Platonic or Aristotelian types is compatible with both contextualist and non-contextualist accounts and, at this point, the question of the individuation does not depend upon the categorial question. The same also applies to the importance of the performing means in the identity of a piece. The discussion about the relevance of the context of composition or the performing means involves the degree of exigency that the associated property to the type establishes for something being an appropriate token of the type. This degree of exigency is more stringent in the case of contextualism and instrumentalism than in the case of non-contextualism and sonicism: there are more requirements to be satisfied by an appropriate performance of the work. To count the context of composition or the performing means as fixing the identity of works of music, we do not need to solve issues regarding the existence conditions of types and the nature of their associated properties. Rather, we need to resolve issues concerning the requirements established by the property associated with the type for something being an appropriate exemplar of this type. According to the methodology introduced in chapter 2, this is a matter of accommodating our widespread practical intuitions – unless they clash with sound

287

theoretical principles or entrenched beliefs– about when we hear in different performances the same or different works.

Since Platonism and Aristotelianism are both compatible with non-contextualism, contextualism, sonicism and instrumentalism, they are answers to the categorial question that can also satisfy D. Davies' work-relativity thesis regarding the individuation of musical works. According to this view, the features that determine the identity of musical works depend on our modal intuitions regarding any specific work. Platonism and Aristotelianism can also accommodate the non-indexical contextualism endorsed by S. Davies. As we have seen in chapter 1, it is common to both accounts the idea that there are pieces for which the identity of the composer is constitutive to them, while there are others for which this is a contingent feature. In addition, both defend that the same phenomenon also arises with the instruments prescribed by the composer: sometimes timbre fixes the individuation of musical works and sometimes does not. The compatibility of Platonism with relational properties involving the identity of the composer and the reference to the instruments prescribed makes Platonism apt to accommodate both non-indexical contextualism and the work-relativity thesis. In the same vein, Aristotelianism can accommodate non-indexical contextualism and the work-relativity thesis because it is compatible with pure aural properties. By contrast, if we endorse the received view, we wrongly would not acknowledge these possibilities of Platonism and Aristotelianism. While Platonism can accommodate works that are individuated by reference to their composer and to the instrumentation prescribed by the author, Aristotelianism is able to account for pieces individuated only by their sound structure. In other terms, we are free for ascribing the ontological category of Platonic types to pieces whose set of individuation conditions is broader, and thus more demanding for something to be a properly formed instance of that type –this is what S. Davies called thick works. To the same extent, we are free to adjudicate the category of Aristotelian types to pieces that are individuated by their sound structure alone.

4. Coming back to Levinson

It might be argued that, while we have shown that aristotelian types are compatible with sonicist and non-contextualist views, we are not properly challenging Levinson's account. In the light of the conclusions of the last section, we can construct platonic and aristotelian views about musical works that are equally compatible with non-indexical contextualism and the work-relativity thesis regarding the individuation of musical works. However, it might be claimed that while our characterization of Platonism accounts for Dodd's view, the kind of Aristotelianism presented here does not cover Levinson's proposal. Aristotelian types have been characterized as a kind of abstract entities that come to exist by means of the generation of their first instance. In the case of musical works, this first instance would be the first performance of a piece. However, levinsonian types do not come to exist by the production of their first instance. Instead, they come to existence just at the moment in which it is *possible* for

them to be instantiated. The existence conditions for levinsonian types are given in terms of the possibility of instantiation, but not in terms of the existence of the associated property that individuates the type. The possibility of instantiation of a levinsonian type is supposedly given by the act of indication made by the composer, which constitutes for Levinson a reason to include the identity of the composer and time of composition as constitutive elements of a musical work, and this is why levinsonian types are bound to contextualism and instrumentalism. Therefore, since it is Levinson's view on which the received view is grounded, the received view is partially immune to the attack presented above. The received view could still hold that Levinson's Aristotelianism is bounded to contextualism and instrumentalism. So, if we want to prove that the categorial and the individuation questions are independent, we must be sure that Levinson's view is compatible with sonicism and non-contextualism.

The easier answer to this concern would be to say that platonic and levinsonian types are the same kind of entity, and that the differences between them is a matter of degree concerning their existence conditions: in the platonic case are given by the existence of the property individuating the type, while in the levinsonian one are given by the possibility of instantiation. If they were the same ontological category and they are bound to different explanations of the individuation of musical works, this would automatically show that the categorial question is independent of the individuation one, inasmuch as the same ontological category would be compatible with incompatible views regarding the individuation issue. However, this line of reasoning seems not to be very promissory. In a recent paper trying to clarify these issues, Levinson argues that indicated structures are half-abstract and half-concrete entities and concedes the possibility for musical works not to be strictly types:

> Is an indicated structure, that is, a structural-type-as-indicated-in-a-context, itself strictly speaking a type? Well, odd as it may seem, perhaps not, and for the following reason. If, as many philosophers maintain, types are wholly defined in terms of essential properties, ones that must be possessed by any token of the type, and if, in addition, such properties, even when relational, are held to be eternal, and so not subject to creation, then types will also be eternal, and equally not subject to creation (Levinson, 2012: 56).

In light of the previous section, it can be noted a certain confusion in Levinson's account between topics concerning the property that individuates a type and topics concerning the existence conditions for types. To speak about indicated structures is not to speak about any ontological category at all, but about the individuation of an entity or a set of entities under consideration. In claiming that a musical work is an indicated structure, what we are saying is that one specific sound structure and the act of indication of this sound structure are elements that fix the identity of that work, which entails the consequence that the same sound structure indicated by Haydn and Puccini gives rise to two different musical works. However, with this claim, we are not specifying the ontological category to which musical works belong nor whether musical works have a temporal origin. To say that the *Fifth Symphony* is an indicated structure is not a final answer to the categorial question, for it makes sense to ask what the

ontological nature of an indicated structure is. Is it an abstract object apart from a physical object? Is it something embodied in an object? Or is it simply 'the way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact'? (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 2.032). In qualifying an object as a structure (indicated or not), we are not committing ourselves with its ontological nature. 'Structure' and 'sound structure' are not terms that refer to any ontological category. If we adopt the *tractarianan* view, a structure is only a way in which things can combine themselves. Moreover, in the specific case of the ontology of music, the terms 'structure' and 'sound structure' refer specifically to identity conditions for musical works. The notion of 'sound structure' is appealed when we are considering whether two musical objects constitute the same piece or, by contrast, they are different musical works. When we say that musical works are pure sound structures or indicated sound structures, we are not assigning any ontological category to them, but setting their identity conditions. If, on the one hand, we maintain that the *Fifth Symphony* is a pure sound structure, our commitment is that this piece is individuated only by its sequence of pitches. On the other hand, if we hold that the *Fifth Symphony* is an indicated sound structure, our commitment is that this piece is not only individuated by its sequence of pitches, but also by reference to Beethoven and the time of composition. However, the question about what kind of entity this piece is remains unsolved. Therefore, the talk about sound structures concerns the individuation question, but not the categorial question, so that sound structures are not an ontological category different from types. They are not an ontological category at all.

Levinson's initial approach seems to respect this distinction, since he always differentiates between 'indicated structures' and 'initiated types' (Levinson, 1980). However, our criticism is that he derives an unjustified conclusion, namely, his conclusion that 'all indicated structures are, perforce, initiated types' (Levinson 1980, 21). In this conclusion he is identifying indicated structures with initiated or aristotelian types, identification that, as we have argued, is not justified. Aristotelianism claims that all types are initiated, since it endorses the Principle of Instantiation of Properties. Its commitment is that types, as abstract instantiable entities, begin to exist only when their associated properties are instantiated. However, whether these properties involve a pure sound structure, or an indicated structure, or more than one sound structure, lies beyond the scope of the Aristotelian answer to the categorial question and belongs to considerations on whether or not the act of indicating is a constitutive element of the identity of musical works.

To sum up the answer offered here to the worries concerning levinsonian types, firstly, if levinsonian types are the same ontological category as platonic types, and the differences between them is only a matter of degree regarding their existence conditions, then the hypothesis that the categorial and the individuation questions are independent is trivially proved. Secondly, indicated sound structures do not constitute *per se* an ontological category different from types, so that they are not an ontological category necessarily bounded to contextualism and instrumentalism. Consequently, the appeal to indicated sound structures does not constitute a challenge for the hypothesis of

the independence of the two ontological questions. Let us now, in third place, to explore the possibility for Levinson to be defending a particular view within the aristotelian approach of types, one that makes justice to his characterization of musical works as half-abstract and half-concrete entities, and as entities that are created by the actions developed by their composers. Accordingly, levinsonian types would be a kind of types that have origin, but that they do not come to exist by their first instantiation –namely, a performance– but rather by the possibility of having instances given by the act of indication made by the composer.

To illustrate this third way it may be useful to revisit Howell's appointments on Levinson's approach. He distinguishes between properties, patterns and types (Howell, 2002: 115-116). Properties are predicative features of objects. Patterns are sets of parts or features possessed by an object. Patterns are individuated by properties and thus, according to Howell, the pattern exists if and only if the property that individuates the pattern exists. Sound structures are patterns that are individuated by a property. However, the point of Levinson and Howell is that although types (musical works) involve patterns, their existence requires more than the existence of a property. Musical works are cultural types, and they only exist if there are cultural practices that allow their instantiation. Only through the indication of a pattern by the composer within a specific community the pattern becomes a type. According to Levinson, what a composer makes in indicating a sound structure is not merely selecting some notes and drawing our attention to them, but also he is establishing a rule for the correct performances of a piece. Levinson expresses this idea as follows:

> To indicate, as a composer, a particular sequence of notes consists precisely in establishing a rule to reproduce the sounds in a certain way following the indications of a particular, historically-situated musical mind. And it is as such an indicated structure that we can identify a classical musical work (Levinson, 2012: 54).

The act of indication makes normative a previously existing pattern, and the result of such indication is the coming into existence of a new entity, namely, an initiated type. The composer creates an initiated type by initiating through his act of indication the cultural practices to perform a musical work. This initiation is usually made by means of a score, but it is also open the possibility to be made by a first performance of a piece. If this is true, musical works do not pre-exist the activity of their composers and are created by them. Moreover, according to Levinson, the act of indication creates a link between the composer and the work such that the reference to her is a constitutive element of the identity of the piece. This is what makes initiated types to be a kind of half-abstract and half-concrete objects (cf. Levinson, 2012: 55).

However, even under this interpretation of initiated types, the hypothesis that the categorial and the individuation questions are independent is not defeated. The reason is that the idea that a type is individuated by reference to its composer and the time of indication does not follow from the claim that a type begins to exist only when there are

cultural practices to instantiate it. In other terms, an initiated type is not necessarily individuated by reference to its composer and to the time of indication merely because it begins to exist when there are cultural practices to instantiate it. Let us consider now the patterns φ and φ-as-indicated-by-c-in-t. Both patterns exist if and only if the properties 'being an exemplar of φ' and 'being an exemplar of φ-as-indicated-by-a-in-t' exist. These patterns only become initiated types when cultural practices allowing their instantiation begin to exist. If musical works are initiated types, they do not preexist these practices –among them, the act of composing the work by the composer. However, the individuation of these types does not depend on when and where these cultural practices have taken place by the first time, but on the property associated with the pattern linked to them. In the case of the pattern φ, the property individuating the work is the property of 'being an exemplar of φ', which in contrast with the property 'being an exemplar of φ-as-indicated-by-a-in-t' does not include any relation to contextual parameters. When the appropriate cultural practices are developed, the pattern φ becomes a cultural type; however, its individuation does not depend upon contextual features, but only on aural parameters of a sound structure. Therefore, defending that musical works are initiated types is compatible again with contextualist and non-contextualist accounts and, once more time, the question of the individuation is not dependent upon the categorial question or vice versa.

Several examples of the phenomenon exposed in the last paragraph can easily be found. The *Xota da Guía* is a very common piece in the repertory of Galician's bagpipers. The community of Galician's folk musicians is one in which there is a cultural practice to perform such a piece. We can intuitively concede that this piece began to exist when these cultural practices for this kind of performances emerged in the community of Galician's folk musicians. However, it is unknown who, if any, is the composer of that piece, and it is impossible to stipulate with relatively exactitude the time in which the cultural practices for this kind of performances emerged. The *Xota da Guía*, then, is not individuated by reference to a particular composer and to the time of composition. Nor by its instrumentation, since it can be indistinctly performed in a folk party by a bagpipe, a violin or a flute. This piece is individuated only by a sound structure that admits variable instantiations. Therefore, we might assign to this piece the ontological category of initiated types, guaranteeing that it is a non-eternal abstract object that it is exemplified by its performances, in spite of being individuated just by reference to a sound structure. Similarly, this very phenomenon arises with all folk songs whose author and time of composition is unknown. Levinson's answer could be that he is committed only with western classical music, and that the cases of folk music are out of the scope of his theory. Nevertheless, the appointed phenomenon for folk music also arises for some pieces that fall under Levinson's category of 'western classical music'. There is a considerable number of works that, despite having a score – what makes them different from folk songs–, have no title and of which it has been impossible to determine the identity of the composer and the time and place of composition –or, at least, something more specific that assigning to them a broad temporal interval, as a century, and a broad region, central Europe. It is impossible to

individuate such pieces by reference to their composers and times of indication. However, we can admit that such pieces begin to exist when their scores were created, allowing this pieces for the possibility of having instances. Consequently, these pieces can be regarded as initiated types, in spite of being individuated just by a sound structure, i.e. in spite of being individuated following a sonicist and non-contextualist approach.

Therefore, in facing the objection that the characterization of musical Aristotelianism made in section 3 misconceives Levinson's proposal of initiated types, we have considered three possible ways of making justice to Levinson's motivations. In the first place, we have considered initiated types as belonging to the same ontological category than platonic types, stipulating their differences just as a matter of degree regarding their existence conditions. Secondly, we have examined the idea that indicated sound structures are an ontological category different from platonic types. Finally, we have regarded the hypothesis of understand initiated types as a *sui generis* kind of aristotelian types, ones that do not begin to exist by means of their first instance but rather when it is possible for them to be instantiated. In this section, the second hypothesis has being rejected after showing that it is theoretically incorrect. The conclusion achieved in this section is that aristotelian types are compatible with non-contextualist and sonicist approaches, even if they are understood under the first and third hypothesis that account for Levinson's characterization of initiated types. Consequently, Levinson's account of initiated types does not constitute a challenge for the general hypothesis that the categorial and individuation questions are independent in the ontology of music.

5. Consequences for the hypothesis of nested types

In the previous sections of this chapter, it has been shown how the category of types is compatible with the different views on the individuation of musical works. This has been done attending to the way in which types are characterised by traditional two-levels type/token theories for two reasons: firstly, given that the hypothesis of nested types is a novel account and that the received view of Platonism and Aristotelianism concerns traditional two-levels type/token theories, the initial goal was to defeat the received view in its own terms; secondly, it is easier to show the compatibility of Platonism and Aristotelianism with the different views on the individuation of musical works with a type/token theory simplified in two levels. However, now is turn to see how the compatibility of types –in the Platonic or in the Aristotelian approach– with the different views on musical works' individuation applies to the hypothesis of nested types introduced in the previous chapter. For this purpose, let us recall the picture of musical works, versions and transcriptions that emerged there.

$$\mathcal{T}\,[\varphi_{vwxyz}]$$

$$T_1\,[\varphi_{aPtiy}] \qquad T_2\,[\varphi_{bPt^2iy}] \qquad T_3\,[\varphi_{cPt^3i^2y}]$$

$$p_1[\varphi_{aPtia}] \quad p_2[\varphi_{aPtib}] \quad p_3[\varphi_{aPtic}] \quad p_4[\varphi_{bPt^2ia}] \quad p_5[\varphi_{bPt^2ib}] \quad p_6[\varphi_{bPt^2ic}] \quad p_7[\varphi_{cPt^3i^2a}] \quad p_8[\varphi_{cPt^3i^2b}] \quad p_9[\varphi_{cPt^3i^2c}]$$

$$t_{-\infty} \longrightarrow t_{+\infty}$$

According to the hypothesis of nested types, a musical work is a higher order type that is individuated following the thesis of pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism. To this extent, a musical work is a type individuated by a simple sound structure (φ_{vwxyz}) with different variable places (v, w, x, y and z) that are filled by its versions and transcriptions, in first instance –variables v, w, x and y–[75], and by musical performances, in second instance –variable z.[76] The associated property that individuates this type is 'being an exemplar of φ_{vwxyz}'. This condition states that for something to be an exemplar of the type φ_{vwxyz} it must satisfy the sound structure φ and fills the places v, w, x, y and z in a free way. The free way in which v, w, x, y and z are to be filled may be either unrestricted –the scope of the variables has no constraints– or restricted –the scope of the variables is constrained. In the restricted sense, the constraints for filling the variables v, w, x, y and z may be invariable –the constraints are fixed independently of any musical context and apply in all musical contexts– or variable –they are sensitive to the common ground of a musical context and may vary from context to context. Given the role played in our musical practices by aspects of similarity concerning the instantiation conditions of musical works in versions, transcriptions and performances, and that similarity is a context-dependent relation, the last view has been considered the one that best accommodates our practical intuitions. Therefore, constraining the scope of the variables of a work's sound structure is the way in which musical contexts of composition and performance play a role in the individuation of a work in a non-indexical approach.

---

[75] v is the place for a way of specifying a sound structure, w is the place for a composer, x is the place for a time of composition, and y a instrumentation.

[76] z is a place for different aspects of performance, such as interpretation, nuances, etc.

The relevant point is that the property 'being an exemplar of φ_{vwxyz}' is compatible with both the Platonic and the Aristotelian view of properties, regardless if the variables *v, w, x* and *y* are filled in an unrestricted or a restricted way. Although contextual factors determine the scope of the variables in a non-indexical contextualist approach, a work is individuated by a pure sound structure. To this extent, the idea that a pure sound structure φ_{vwxyz} with variable places exists even though it has not been instantiated is as intuitive as for a sound structure ψ without variable places. Since the property of 'being an exemplar of φ_{vwxyz}' is not an impure property, it seems *prima facie* that there are no worries to reject that the principle of instantiation applies to it, and consequently, to regard it as an eternal property. Therefore, it seems that nothing precludes the type φ_{vwxyz} to be an eternal type, and hence a platonic type. However, as we have seen, we may accept that the principle of instantiation of properties also holds for properties that are not impure. This is a matter of balancing our philosophical intuitions, which have nothing to do with the practical intuitions of our musical practices. Accordingly, if we admit that the principle of instantiation holds for properties as 'being a ψ', we should admit that it also applies to a property 'being an exemplar of φ_{vwxyz}', since the condition to be satisfied by the properly formed tokens of the types associated to them is the same.

Versions and transcriptions of a work are individuated, according to the hypothesis of nested types, by a sound structure of a more specific degree than the one that specifies the work versioned or transcribed. In cases in which similarity between sound structures is a sufficient condition for the instantiation of a higher order type, the sound structure individuating the higher order type is specified by a way of specifying the structural pattern φ –variable *v*, which corresponds to the implementation of passage notes, arpeggios, scales, etc.– and by a specific instrumentation –variable *y*. In cases in which similarity between sound structures is not a sufficient condition, the higher order type is specified, in addition to the variables *v* and *y*, by the reference to the composer –variable *w*– and by the time (and maybe the place) of composition –variable *x*–, which determine the work's process of composition to which the act of indication of the lower order type belongs. To this extent, musical versions and transcriptions are individuated by timbral sonicism, indexical contextualism, and non-indexical contextualism. The result of this specification results in a lower order type individuated, for instance, by the sound structure φ_{aPtiz}, where *a* is the name of a way of specifying the structural pattern φ, *P* is the name of a composer, *t* is a time of composition and *i* is a specific set of instruments for performance. The sound structure φ_{aPtiz}, although more specific than the sound structure φ_{vwxyz}, has still a variable place to be filled by its properly formed performances, namely, the variable *z*, which involves different aspects that can be only specified in performance (interpretation, cadenzas, nuances, tempo, etc.). As noted in the previous chapter, the scope of this variable is determined by the common ground of a context of performance. The instructions given by a composer in a score indicating the sound structure that individuates a particular version or transcription are interpreted in

light of the conventions in force in a context of performance, which determine what movements are valid. By constraining the scope of the variables of a version's sound structure is the way in which a context of performance plays a role in the individuation of a work in a non-indexical approach.

The relevant point is that the property 'being an exemplar of φ_{aPtiz}' is compatible with both the Platonic and the Aristotelian view of properties, regardless if the scope of the variable z is determined by different context of performance. The property 'being an exemplar of φ_{aPtiz}' is an impure property, involving the reference to spatiotemporally located entities to be specified. To put it clearer, let us consider the 1872 version of Tchaikovsky's 2nd *Symphony*. The associated property to this version *qua* lower order type is the property of 'being an exemplar of φ_z-as-indicated-in-a-by-Tchaikovsky-at-1872-for-i' (being a a particular way of specification of φ_z indicated by the original score of 1872, i the instrumentation of the symphonic-romantic orchestra, and z the variable place of φ to be filled in performance). Therefore, since this property involves the reference to entities spatiotemporally located, it seems intuitive that the principle of instantiation holds for it, and consequently, that the corresponding type (φ_{aPtiz}) is an Aristotelian non-eternal type. However, as we have seen, the Platonist has no problems to accommodate impure properties in her account. As it has been noted in section 3, the Platonist can reject the Principle of Instantiation by claiming that a relational property exists beyond the existence of its relata. For a property to exist, the Platonist only requires that it was instantiated in the past, it is instantiated now or it will be instantiated in the future. Nothing precludes from this picture the property 'being an exemplar of φ_z-as-indicated-in-a-by-Tchaikovsky-at-1872-for-i' to exist before Tchaikovsky's birth or prior to the existence of violins and tubas. Accordingly, since the Platonist can reject that the principle of instantiation of properties applies over properties such as 'being an exemplar of φ_z-as-indicated-in-a-by-Tchaikovsky-at-1872-for-i', its corresponding type can be held to be an eternal one, and thus a platonic type.

As pointed before, since type φ_{aPtiz} is individuated by a more specific sound structure, timbral sonicism and indexical contextualism, its associated property is more demanding for something to be a token of that type than the one associated to the type φ_{vwxyz}, a type that is individuated by a more generic sound structure, following the views of pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism. There is no difference in nature between the properties individuating these two types —one a higher order type, and the other a lower order type–, but just a difference in the degree of exigency for something to be a properly formed token of those types. If the existence conditions of such types are interpreted in a Platonic or in an Aristotelian way is a matter to elucidate concerning our philosophical intuitions. To this extent, it is a phenomenon of the same kind as the one that has been shown to arise between the types φ and φ-as-indicated-by-a-in-t. Therefore, regarding musical works as higher order types individuated by pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism, and versions and transcriptions as lower

order types individuated by timbral sonicism, indexical contextualism and non-indexical contextualism, does not commit us to say that works, versions and transcriptions are different in nature and that have different existence conditions.

6. Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to show that the categorial and the individuation questions are independent, at least concerning types. For this purpose, the focus was put on the widespread view that links, on the one hand, Platonism with sonicism and non-contextualism, and on the other, Aristotelianism with instrumentalism and contextualism. This account, introduced in section II as 'the received view', has been rejected here on the basis of the argument presented in section III. This argument shows that the differences between Platonism and Aristotelianism merely concern the existence conditions for types, having nothing to do with the definition of which the parameters that determine the identity of such types are. Accordingly, Platonism and Aristotelianism disagree about the endorsement of the Principle of Instantiation of Properties, but not necessarily about the identity conditions for types. Consequently, both platonic and aristotelian types are compatible with all the views about the individuation of musical works –contextualism, non-contextualism, sonicism and instrumentalism.

The reconstruction of the aristotelian view of types offered in section III might not satisfy the defenders of Levinson's account. For this reason, three hypotheses have been offered in section IV to account for levinsonian initiated-types. The first hypothesis regards initiated types as the same ontological category than platonic types, placing the differences between them in their existence conditions: the existence conditions for platonic types are given by the property that individuates the type, while the existence conditions for levinsonian types are given by the possibility of being instantiated. If this hypothesis is true, the thesis that the categorial and the individuation questions are independent trivially follows. The very same category of types is bound to sonicism and contextualism if their existence conditions are understood in a platonic way, and to instrumentalism and contextualism if we follow Levinson's account on their existence conditions. The second hypothesis is that initiated types are indicated sound structures, and that sound structures are an ontological category different from platonic types. This hypothesis has been rejected by showing that the notion of 'indicated sound structure' does not refer to any ontological category. It has been argued that this notion is not informative about the nature of musical works, but rather about the parameters that constitute the identity of a musical work, corresponding thus to a particular way to understand the individuation of musical works. The third hypothesis considered is one that regards initiated types as a *sui generis* kind of aristotelian types. By contrast with aristotelian types, initiated types do not come to exist by means of their first instance but rather when there are musical practices that make possible their instantiation. However, folk music and anonymous pieces have been given as counterexamples showing that the

existence of practices by means of which such pieces come to exist do not entail that musical works are necessarily individuated by reference to their composers and to the time of composition. Therefore, none of these three possible understandings of initiated types defeats the idea of the independence between the categorial and the individuation questions.

The conclusions of this chapter have important consequences for the hypothesis of nested types. Firstly, it shows that the different way of individuating musical works qua higher order types, and versions and transcriptions qua lower order types, does not constitutes a problem, even if works, on the one hand, and versions and transcriptions, are identified with the ontological category of types. In the previous chapter, it was achieved the conclusion, on the one hand, that musical works qua higher order types are individuated according to pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism. On the other hand, it was concluded that versions and transcriptions qua lower order types are individuated according to timbral sonicism (or even instrumentalism), indexical contextualism and non-indexical contextualism. According to the results of this chapter, these conclusions of chapter 5 do not imply that musical works, on the one hand, and versions and transcriptions, on the other, are associated with different kind of types. If that were the case, the hypothesis of nested types would not be economical ontologically speaking, multiplying in our ontology the kinds of entities. However, as we have seen in the present chapter, the category of types is compatible with antagonist views on individuation of musical works and other musical products. The difference in the individuation of a work and its versions and transcriptions lies on the degree of exigency of the property that individuates the types with which these musical products are identified. The degree of exigency is more demanding in the case of lower order types (versions and transcriptions) than in the case of higher order types (the musical work). The identity of a lower order type depends on more parameters than the identity of the higher order type. It is determined, not only by a sound structure, but also by the reference to the composer, time of composition and instrumentation. In contrast, the identity of a higher order type is only determined by a sound structure, whose variable places are contextually constrained. Consequently, the condition for something to be a performance of a lower order type is more demanding than the condition for something to be a performance of a higher order type. This point explains why in performances of different versions or transcriptions of a same musical work we hear the work of versioned or transcribed, and, at the same time, in a performance of one of the versions or transcriptions of that work we hear only the version or transcription performed and not the other versions or transcriptions of the work.

A second important consequence of the conclusions of this chapter concerning the hypothesis of nested types is that it solves the problem of the creatability of musical for this view. As it has been argued in chapter 2, the creatability intuition is only a familiar but not an entrenched intuition in our musical practices. Nonetheless, we might want to preserve and accommodate this intuition in our ontological account. The conclusions of this chapter enable the hypothesis of nested types to accommodate the

creatability intuition. They give two ways in which the hypothesis of nested types is compatible with the creatability intuition. On the one hand, we may endorse the principle of instantiation of properties. In this case, a musical work is created when the first of its versions is indicated by its composer. According to the principle of instantiation of properties, a property begins to exist with the first of its instances. According to the type/token theory, the existence of a type is ontologically dependent on the existence of the property that individuates it. By means of indicating the first version of a work, a composer is instantiating by the first time the property that individuates that work qua a higher order type. By means of producing the first instance of that work, the composer is bringing into existence the property that individuates that higher order type and, with this, the higher order type itself. Alternatively, we might think in a levinsonian way that it is the possibility of being instantiated in which brought into existence a type. A work qua a higher order type can be instantiated when there is a person with enough musical knowledge and expertise to discover it, and when that person employs her knowledge in trying to compose it a first version of that work. In other words, a work begins to exist when its musical process of composition –conceived as a continuant in the way pointed in the previous chapter– begins to exist. For instance, Beethoven's *5ᵗʰ Symphony* began to exist when Beethoven started to work on it and made the first drafts of that work before the act of indicating the first version –and the only one made by Beethoven– of that work. Therefore, the hypothesis of nested types is compatible and can accommodate the creatability intuition.

Chapter 7

Further challenges to the hypothesis of nested types

1. Introduction

According to the hypothesis of nested types introduced in Chapter 5, musical works are higher order types, whose instances are types of a lower order. Those lower order types are the versions and transcriptions of a work, and they are instantiated by musical performances. Given the transmission of predicates between the tokens of the lower order types (musical performances) and the higher order types instantiated by those lower order types, the hypothesis of nested types explains how a musical work is repeatable through the performances of their versions and transcriptions. The hypothesis of nested types thus accommodates the familiar intuition corresponding to the standard view on versions and transcriptions, according to which in the performances of the versions and transcriptions of a work we do not hear different musical works but the work that is versioned or transcribed –in addition to those performances and the versions or transcriptions performed. In this sense, the hypothesis of nested types achieves a satisfactory balance between theoretical and practical desiderata. It preserves the theoretical virtues –simplicity, elegance, explanatory power and integration with the findings in other domains– of a type/token theory in order to explain musical works' repeatability and, at the same time, is able to accommodate widespread intuitions about the nature of versions and transcriptions and their relation to the musical work that is versioned or transcribed. In addition, it reveals as merely familiar, but not entrenched, the intuitions of the temporal flexibility of musical works and structural pluralism (in its strongest view), suggesting their revision in light of their clashing with sound theoretical principles or other entrenched intuitions. Therefore, the hypothesis of nested types is faithful to the methodology of reflective equilibrium, and hence, it satisfies the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and revisionism, avoiding the problems of triviality, inconsistency and solipsism. It constitutes to this extent the best explanation of works that have been revised or transcribed, and that consequently have more than one version or transcription.

This final chapter will be devoted to consider different worries concerning the hypothesis of nested types. It will start by addressing the most pressing of them, namely, that the hypothesis of nested types is an *ad hoc* position in the ontology of music to account for the particular cases of works with different versions and transcriptions. Traditional type/token theories postulate just two levels of objects, i.e. they distinguish between musical works (types) and performances (event-tokens). In turn, the hypothesis of nested types would postulate at least an additional level of objects –a distinction between works (higher order types), versions and transcriptions (lower order types), and performances (event-tokens)– that would be superfluous to explain the nature of works that have never been revised or transcribed. Against this worry, it will be argued that extending the application scope of the hypothesis of nested types to all musical works –including to those that have never been revised or transcribed– is justified under the methodology of reflective equilibrium. On the one hand, it will be shown that the hypothesis of nested types is able to accommodate widespread intuitions about musical authenticity in a better way than a traditional two-level type/token theory. It will reveal the hypothesis of nested types as a superior candidate to satisfy the desideratum of minimal descriptivism. On the other hand, it will be shown that explaining the nature of works that have never been revised or transcribed by means of the hypothesis of nested types is more profitable from a theoretical point of view. Since the possibility of been revised or transcribed is open for all musical works, and given that the hypothesis of nested types is the best explanation of works that have been revised or transcribed, offering an account of the nature of the works that have never been revised or transcribed by means of a view different from the hypothesis of nested types would require an additional explanation. We would have to explain why the nature of them changes at the time in which they are revised or transcribed. This point will reveal the hypothesis of nested types as a superior candidate in satisfying the desideratum of minimal revisionism, not only regarding a traditional two-levels type/token theory, but also regarding other alternative ontological explanations.

Once this general concern against the hypothesis of nested types is overcame, showing that its application to explain the nature of all musical works is justified under the methodology of reflective equilibrium, the final part of this chapter will be devoted to consider particular criticisms recently addressed against the general idea that musical works are types. Identifying musical works with types, as the hypothesis of nested types does, has been objected from different points of view. Allan Hazlett (2012) and Alessandro Bertinetto (2016) have developed an indirect strategy. Assuming that a type/token theory is the best explanation of musical works' repeatability, these authors reject that musical works are repeatable and, indirectly, that a type/token theory may provide a suitable explanation of their nature. Hazlett grounds his argument on the alleged incompatibility between the modal inflexibility of types and the modal flexibility of musical works if we identify musical works with types. However, it will be argued that musical works *qua* types are modally flexible entities. Bertinetto bases his rejection of musical works' repeatability on the creativity of performative practices.

Nonetheless, it will be shown that the acknowledgment of this creative sphere does commit us to reject the familiar intuition that musical works are repeatable. By means of the mechanism employed to accommodate interpretative authenticity, the hypothesis of nested types makes compatible those creative practices with the idea that musical works are repeatable. In addition, Bertinetto also argues that the scope of type/token theories is constrained by the phenomenon of musical improvisations. However, it will be shown that a type/token theory may fully characterise musical improvisations by means of the category of event-token. Finally, two direct objections against the idea that musical works are types will be considered. Firstly, Marcus Rossberg (2012) argues that a type/token theory cannot account for the intuition that musical works can be destroyed. Against this view, it will be argued that this intuition is a non-entrenched one, and hence one that can be revised according to reflective equilibrium. Secondly, Kania claims that type/token theories do not offer a good account of some salient features of our practices and that is methodologically ungrounded. It will be shown, in response, how a type/token theory can account for these practical aspects and how it satisfies in a right way the methodology of reflective equilibrium. It will be concluded that none of these objections constitute an unsolvable challenge against the idea that musical are types and hence against the hypothesis of nested types.

2. The worry of *ad hoc*ism and the authenticity of musical performances

The hypothesis of nested types appeals to entities postulated by our best ontological theories about the world, namely, types and events. However, in spite of this remark, the worry that the hypothesis of nested types is an *ad hoc* device to account for the nature of musical works might still persist. It might be thought that it is a view specially designed to account for the phenomenon of versions and transcriptions, but that it leads to an ontological inflation when it comes to explain the most common cases of musical works that have never been revised or transcribed. This ontological inflation may be understood in two different ways. On the one hand, it might be thought that we should postulate an additional ontological category, different from types, to explain the normal cases of musical works. This option should be ruled out given that type/token theories are regarded as the best explanation of the repeatable nature of musical works that have never been revised or transcribed (cf. Chapter 1). On the other hand, if we try to apply the hypothesis of nested types to those works, it might be thought that it incurs in an ontological inflation by positing at least an additional level of objects. This additional level –the distinction between higher and lower order types– might be regarded as superfluous with respect to the traditional two-level type/token theories available in the ontological debate. It would seem that traditional type/token theories explain in a satisfactory way the nature of the normal cases of musical works without appealing to an ontology of three or more levels as the one defended through the hypothesis of nested types.

In response to this worry, it will be argued that the application of the hypothesis of nested types to the domain of all musical works –including the normal cases of works that have neither been revised nor transcribed– is justified under the methodology of reflective equilibrium. It will be shown that this application is theoretically sound, in addition of being intuitive from the perspective of our musical practices. Accordingly, the hypothesis of nested types will be revealed as the one that best satisfies the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism to explain the nature of all musical works. This idea will be developed in the following paragraphs. Firstly, the intuitive practical appeal of the hypothesis of nested types for works that have never been revised or transcribed will be considered by attending to aspects concerning the authenticity of their performances. In the second place, the theoretical advantages of extending the scope of the hypothesis of nested types to all musical works will be attended.

As noted in Chapter 5, the hypothesis of nested types identifies a work as Diaz-Jerez's *Anemoi* –one that has never been revised or transcribed– with a higher order type $\mathcal{T}$. At least so far, this type has been instantiated in only one lower order type, T_1. T_1 is the one and only version of this work, indicated by means of the score produced by Diaz-Jerez in 2014. When performers play this score, they are performing the original version of this work, the only one that exists at the moment. In general, all works that have never been revised or transcribed are understood by the hypothesis of nested types as works having only one version. This one is the original version specified by means of the original score produced by the work's composer.

The ontology of at least three levels of objects –higher order types, lower order types and event-tokens– posited by the hypothesis of nested types to account for the nature of all musical works can accommodate widespread intuitions about interpretation and authenticity of a work's performances. The idea that we are playing always a version of a work seems to explain some phenomena that involves creativity beyond the creative action developed by the work's composer. These aspects remain unclear and underexplained by a traditional two-level type/token theory.

For instance, let us think about a work that has never been revised or transcribed. It is not unusual to find cases in which performers, conductors or sound engineers try to supply the shortage of the score provided by the composer in terms of balance, colour, coherence or structural clarity. Sometimes a conductor has to ask to some performers of the orchestra not to play according to the dynamics of the score. If they follow the dynamics as they are specified on the score, especially if their music is in a tense tessitura, some relevant melodies of other powerless instruments could become inaudible in the performance. It seems to be a case in which the balance of the work is not accurately achieved in the score provided by the composer. The instrumentation in such cases seems to be poorly executed, not making a right distribution between the

instruments playing the main melodies and the instruments playing the accompaniments. It may also happen that the way in which the accompaniments are structured –rhythm, melodic design, tessitura– disturb the perception of the main(s) melody(ies). In this sense, a correct performance of the score would not be sufficient to provide a satisfactory aural experience of the work in performance. The hypothesis of nested types has an easy explanation for such paradoxical scenarios. It explains them as cases in which the score of the only one and original version of such work is regarded as a work's imperfect version that the conductor, the performers or the sound engineer try to improve. They develop their creativity, not by composing a new version or transcription of the work, but by *interpreting* the work *going beyond* the score provided by the composer: the conductor makes new balances of the instrumentation, the performer alters the original dynamics and nuances, and the sound engineer changes the volumes of the audio tracks.

In addition, performers and conductors may sometimes also overlook some notational instructions of the score in search of a deeper understanding of the work. As Dodd (2015) has noted, these are cases in which *score compliance authenticity* and *interpretative authenticity* come into conflict, and in which the second kind of authenticity is preferred in order to render a better insight of the work. According to score compliance authenticity, a faithful performance of a work W is one that accurately renders W's score into sound (Dodd, 2015: 485). Alternatively, according to interpretative authenticity, an authentic performance of a work W is one that displays a deep or profound understanding of W's content (Dodd, 2015: 489). The first kind of authenticity is typically identified with a historical interest or value, while the second one has to do with the power of a performance to reveal aspects of a work's content (cf. Scruton, 1997: 441-450)[77]. In Dodd's view, these two values cannot be identified. As he notes, 'there are, after all, plenty of 'page-turning', drab performances that comply with W's score while shedding precious little interpretive light on W' (Dodd, 2015: 187). Taking an example from Sir John Barbirolli, Dodd remarks that the understanding involved in interpretative authenticity requires a profound interpretation of the work that cannot be reduced to understanding and putting into practice the instructions notated in a score. In this sense, the interpretation required is not reduced to 'fill in the gap' between a score's musical notation –which underdetermines some sonic aspects

---

[77] Scruton is taxative on this point. On the one hand, he identifies the movement of historically 'authentic' performance grounded on score compliance authenticity with a mere historical but not aesthetic interest. To this extent, he argues that 'we might enjoy the result, but not in the way that the original audience enjoyed the original performance' (Scruton, 1997: 450). On the other hand, he appeals to an interpretative authenticity of musical works in the following terms: 'A performance aims to present the particular pattern as an object of intrinsic interest. And to do this, it must contain more features than are specified in the pattern, and may, within the established conventions, deviate from the pattern without ceasing to be a performance of it. However, the aim of the performance is not merely to produce a particular pattern of pitches, but to present those pitches as music, and therefore to make whatever additions and adjustments are required by a musical understanding' (Scruton, 1997: 441). Accordingly, an authentic performance is one that interprets the work to offer an insight of it that increases our musical understanding of this work, and this task may imply some departures from the instructions notationally prescribed by a composer in a score. These are cases in which score compliance authenticity come into conflict with interpretative authenticity.

demanded to produce a correct performance of it– and the sound of a performance. Instead:

> It requires the performing artist to start with the score, but then make sense of it in such a way as to find the deeper level of musical content—that involving its significance or point—that lies beyond it: something that must see him construct an aesthetic vision of the whole (…). Performers must interpret the work—that is, think creatively about how to realize the work in a way that goes beyond the scored notes—in order to determine what the full requirements of an interpretively faithful performance are (Dodd, 2015: 490-1).

Following this view, the score provided by the composer is regarded as a medium that facilitates the understanding of a musical work, whose content is beyond that score. It facilitates the creative interpretation required for an authentic performance in this sense, which relies on the performer's judgment of what aspects of the work are to be salient and what ones are not.

Interpretative authenticity is regarded by Dodd as a 'central performance value within the Western classical tradition' (Dodd, 2015: 492). In most cases, this kind of authenticity goes hand in hand with score compliance authenticity. Indeed, an insightful presentation of a work in performance usually requires the performer's full compliance with the score's instructions. However, both kinds of authenticity may come into conflict sometimes. Dodd reflects on this phenomenon in the following terms:

> Our mainstream practice allows that a performance might sometimes make better sense of W, and be more successful as a result, by virtue of deviating from elements of W's score. A performer truly sensitive to the music she is playing might judge, from within the aesthetic vision of W she constructs, that certain of the specific instructions laid down by W's composer frustrate the successful development of W's point, run contrary to W's character, or otherwise compromise W's aesthetic consistency; and, as a consequence, there might be occasions on which she justifiably concludes that such normative conflict is best negotiated by departing from those of the composer's scored instructions that would prevent her from evincing a deeper understanding of the work performed (Dodd, 2015: 492-3).

The hypothesis of nested types offers a clear and straightforward way to accommodate this phenomenon by means of an ontology of at least three-levels. Let us recall our example of Diaz-Jerez's *Anemoi*, a work that has never been revised or transcribed. The hypothesis of nested types identifies it with a higher order type T, which is instantiated in only one lower order type, T_1 – the one and only version of this work, indicated by Diaz-Jerez's original score in 2014. This version is not identical with the work, but just a way in which the work is presented as an instance of it. Since Diaz-Jerez's score of *Anemoi* only specifies an insight of the work –a version, and in this case, the only one and original version–, the door is open for the performer to go beyond this version into a deeper understanding of the work's content and depart from the instructions given by the original score in an attempt to present in a different way that work in performance.

Accordingly, the cases in which score compliance authenticity is in conflict with interpretative authenticity can be accommodated by the hypothesis of nested types in two ways. Firstly, as cases in which the original version of the work constitutes a way of presenting it that offers an insufficient insight of the work's content. The original version is regarded here as an imperfect instance of the higher order type with which the work is identified. In these cases, the performer's departure of the score is authentic to the extent that she tries to offer a new version of the work in performance that provides a more accurate access to the work. Secondly, as cases in which the performer tries to provide a new version that offers an alternative way of presenting it that facilitates the access to the work's content to the audience of a specific context of performance. In these cases, the original version is not regarded *per se* as defective, and the new versions are introduced by means of performances as alternative views of the work that are suitable from different points of views.

For instance, the composer is sometimes constrained by the technical development of instruments when producing the original version of the work. If the performing practices and instruments are technically developed after the work's composition, the interpreter may take advantage of these developments to provide a new version of the work more accurate to it. This captures Dodd's example of the substitution of bassoons by horns in the recapitulation of the first movement of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* decided by some conductors once the valve-mechanism was implemented on those instruments (cf. Dodd, 2015: 494). When this mechanism was implemented, horns became able to play this part without changing the timbre between open and stopped notes, which offers a better contribute to the expressive character of the work than rendering this passage by bassoons. This is a case in which a perfect compliance of a performance with the original score does not guarantee the best access to it (cf. Scruton, 1997: 446). Alternatively, some departures from the original score may offer a better insight of the work in performance. Such a performance is a performance of what may be regarded as new version of the work, a lower order type that instantiates in a better way the higher order type. This new version, by contrast with Beethoven's original version, substitutes the bassoons for horns just before the recapitulation of the B theme of the first movement.

Other times, as in Andreas Staier's recording of Mozart's *Rondo alla turca*, the performer may decide to depart from the score in order to 'produce precisely the kind of interpretation that best evinces the Rondo's point, given the work's place within our musical culture in the twenty-first century' (Dodd, 2015: 494). This is a performance in which he puts the melody on the bass line and improvises counter-melodies that add more complexity to the listening of the main theme. Since the hypothesis of nested types takes the variability of a work's performances to be ultimately dependent on a context of performance, Staier's performance may be regarded as instantiating a new version of the *Rondo*, in which the *Rondo* itself is instantiated. Such a version is intended as one providing a better understanding of the work for a contemporary audience. It tries to account for what Scruton calls the 'historicity of human ear'

(Scruton, 1997: 444). The pattern of sounds of Mozart's original version of the *Rondo* is not perceived in the same way by Mozart's audience than by the contemporary audience, educated in a very different musical background. Staier's performance would be instantiating a new version of the *Rondo* that tries to transmit to the actual audience the freshness and joviality that a performance of Mozart's original version of the *Rondo* transmitted to his contemporaries. This new version performed by Staier is not a better but an alternative instance of the *Rondo* qua higher order type that facilitates the understanding of the work to the actual audience.

With respect to interpretative authenticity and the cases in which it conflicts with score compliance authenticity, the hypothesis of nested types proves to be superior to a traditional two-level type/token theory. According to a two-level type/token theory, a score determines a set of norms for performance that correspond to the set of normative properties that individuates a work W as a type. Types are ontologically thin entities, individuated by the condition that something must satisfy in order to be a properly formed token of it (cf. Chapter 5, section 2). Accordingly, a performance departing in any respect from the score would be regarded either as an improperly formed instance of W –i.e. as an imperfectly formed token that does not satisfies all the properties of the set of conditions that individuates W as a type– or as a properly formed instance of a different work W_1 –i.e. as a perfectly formed token that accurately satisfies a set of properties different from the one that individuates W as a type. Consequently, a traditional two-level type/token theory is not able to accommodate the practice of interpretative authenticity when it conflicts with score compliance authenticity. It has no way to explain how a performance departing from W's score might be regarded as a good, valuable, and hence as an authentic performance of W. Therefore, the hypothesis of nested types is not only superior to a two-level type/token theory concerning the cases of works that have been revised or transcribed. It also has the advantage of accommodating the intuitions grounding interpretative authenticity, a practice that Dodd and Scruton take to be central to our musical practices.

In addition, the hypothesis of nested types also offers an intuitive explanation of the cases in which interpretative authenticity does not conflict with score compliance authenticity.[78] These are cases in which the creative freedom of the performer is constrained to develop microstructural nuances and macrostructural proportions that are underspecified by the notational characters of a score (cf. Davies, 2011: 109-110). Stephen Davies calls *performances interpretations* these performances that do not depart deliberately from a score's instructions, and defines them in the following way:

> The performance interpretation of a work, W, is the overall expressive and structural vision
> of W that emerges from W's complete performance (Davies, 2011: 110).

---

[78] For some views, this is the only kind of authentic performance. For instance, Stephen Davies argues that only performances that are faithful to a score are candidates to be authentic performances of that work (cf. Davies, 2011: 108-9).

From an ontological point of view, Davies regards performance interpretations as performance types that can have multiple tokens (Davies, 2011: 110). To this extent, he argues that a performance interpretation 'can be repeated' in different concrete performances, made either by the same or by different performers, and that the same performer can provide different performance interpretations of the same work at different times. By means of these different interpretations, the performer provides different insights of the work. However, given the identity conditions of types as ontologically thin entities, it is hard to see how these different performance types can be associated to the same musical work, and how the resulting performance tokens can be regarded authentic performances of that work. As in the case of the conflict between interpretative authenticity and score compliance authenticity, a two-level type/token theory is not able to accommodate performance interpretations as authentic performances of musical works *qua* types. Different performance tokens of different performance interpretations as types would be regarded at most as imperfect performances of a work W. Under a two-level type/token theory, if something is a perfectly token of a type T, it cannot be also a perfectly formed token of a type T*: either it is an imperfectly formed token of T* or it is not at all a token of T*. Therefore, if a performance is a perfectly formed token of a performance interpretation as a type, it cannot also be a perfectly formed token of a musical work W as a type, given that the performance interpretation and W are different types since they establish different conditions to be properly instantiated. The performance that is a perfectly formed token of a performance interpretation as a type could be regarded, at most, as an imperfectly formed token of the work as a type, which precludes it from being an authentic performance of the work. This view would not able to explain why such a performance would be a good and valuable performance of the work. In addition, since the performance interpretations as types and W are different types, a two-levels type token theory does not offer an explanation of the relations that hold between them and how the tokens of performances interpretations can be also tokens –perfectly or imperfectly formed– of W.

Again, the hypothesis of nested types emerges here as an appealing explanation of the phenomenon of performance interpretations. On the one hand, it may accommodate it by means of a three-level ontology. Performance interpretations are lower order types, individuated by a sound structure that instantiates a less specific sound structure that individuates a higher order type. In other words, performance interpretations of a work W are versions of W providing different insights of it. They fulfil the variable places of the sound structure that individuates W as a higher order type. The hypothesis of nested types offers here again a clear and straightforward way to accommodate these widespread intuitions about musical authenticity. On the other, it may accommodate the phenomenon of performance interpretations under a four-level ontology. A performance interpretation would be a lower order type T. T instantiates a type of a higher order than it (T) –a work's version or transcription–, which in turn instantiates a type of a higher order than it ($\mathcal{T}$) –a musical work. In addition, T is

instantiated in concrete musical performances, event-tokens of T. The resulting picture of this view is as follows:

$$\mathcal{T}'$$

$$T_1 \quad T_2 \quad T_3$$

$$T_1 \quad T_2 \quad T_3 \quad T_4 \quad T_5 \quad T_6$$

$$p_1 \quad p_2 \quad p_3 \quad p_4 \quad p_5 \quad p_6 \quad p_7 \quad p_8 \quad p_9 \quad p_{10}$$

$$t_{-\infty} \longrightarrow t_{+\infty}$$

This hierarchic view of four-levels of objects seems to capture the intuitions concerning performance interpretations. Performance interpretations are obtained, following Davies' definition, from the interpretation of a score's prescriptions. However, a score is always a score that indicates a version of a work. Accordingly, performance interpretations are types of interpretation of a version. They are types (T_n) of a lower order than the type with which the version that they are interpreted is identified (T_n). To this extent, performances interpretations as types are instantiating a work's version and are instantiated in musical performances. But since versions are instances of a musical work as a higher order type ($\mathcal{T}'$), a performance interpretation provides also a new insight of the work, falling its properly formed performances under the scope of the variability of $\mathcal{T}'$. To this extent, a performance token (p_1) of a performance interpretation type (T_1) can be regarded as a properly formed token of a work as a higher order type ($\mathcal{T}'$) to the extent that it fills the variable places of the sound structure that individuates $\mathcal{T}'$ within the scope of variables determined by the context in which p_1 is produced. By contrast with a two-level type/token theory, the hypothesis of nested types admits the possibility of a performance p_1 to be be regarded as a good, valuable and hence as an authentic performance of $\mathcal{T}'$. The implementation of a fourth level of objects does not constitute a problem for the hypothesis of nested types. The hypothesis of nested types is just committed to a multiple-levels ontology hierarchically related between them by means of instantiation. Whether these levels are three or more

than three would depend on the requirements to accommodate our widespread musical intuitions according to the methodology introduced in chapter 2.

Let us consider now the theoretical advantages of the hypothesis of nested types apart from its ability to accommodate widespread intuitions about the creativity of performances and authenticity. From the point of view of theoretical desiderata, the hypothesis of nested types provides an account of all musical works that combines unity, simplicity and explanatory power. The possibility of having new versions and transcriptions is open to all musical works, including those that have actually been neither revised nor transcribed. If we understand the nature of those works in a different way than the one offered by the hypothesis of nested types, we should say that their nature has changed at the moment in which they were revised or transcribed by the first time. If we assign an ontological category to them different from the one assigned by the hypothesis of nested types, we should abandon the identification of them with such category once they were revised or transcribed. Accordingly, an additional explanation of why the nature of those works has changed would be required. This problem can be put in clearer terms as follows, taking W to be a musical work and t_n temporal moments:

(1) If a work has been revised or transcribed, it is identified with a higher order type $\mathcal{T}$.

(2) An ontology that posits more than two levels of objects is superfluous to explain the nature of works that have never been revised or transcribed.

(3) W has been neither revised nor transcribed at t_o.

(4) If (2), W is identified at t_o with an entity (E) different from a higher order type: a lower order type, a set of performances, a fusion or other.

(5) W is revised or transcribed at t_1.

(6) If (1), W is identified at t_1 with $\mathcal{T}$.

(7) E $\neq \mathcal{T}$.

(8) Therefore, W's nature has changed from t_o to t_1.

In light of the previous chapters, premise (1) is true in virtue of the hypothesis of nested types being the best explanation of the nature of musical works that have been revised or transcribed. Premise (2) is the thesis defended by those who claim that the hypothesis of nested types is an *ad hoc* position in the ontology of music. The result of assuming both ideas is that, if a work W that has not been revised or transcribed at t_o is revised or transcribed at t_1, we are committed to the idea that W's nature has changed from t_0 to t_1. As we have seen in chapter 5, claiming that musical works change when revised or transcribed clashes with entrenched hypothesis. In addition, holding both (1) and (2) is unsuitable from the point of view of theoretical desiderata, for it demands an additional explanation of how and why W's nature has changed from t_0 to t_1. The inclusion of such an additional explanation would put this option in an odder position in terms of the virtues of simplicity and explanatory power than if we adopt the hypothesis of nested types for all musical works. This problem would arise also for all musical works that have never been revised or transcribed, since the possibility of being revised

or transcribed is open to all them. In this inquiry, it has been shown that we cannot dispense with premise (1). Consequently, premise (2) should be ruled out.

For instance, let us suppose that, before being transcribed by Luis Otero in 2010, we identify the work *Escualo* either with a lower order type –one whose tokens are musical performances– or with, say, a set of performances. Given that the hypothesis of nested types is the best explanation of the phenomenon of musical versions and transcriptions, we should identify the work *Escualo* with a higher order type once Otero made the transcription of it. Additionally, we should explain why the nature of the work has changed with the composition of Otero's transcription and how its identity is preserved through this change in nature. Similar problems arise if we identify Sibelius' *5th Symphony* with a lower order type, or a set of performances, or a fusion and so on, before this work had been revised by the first time by Sibelius. We should reassign its ontological category once Sibelius made the revision, identifying the work with a higher order type, and also explain why its nature has changed while its identity is preserved. The same trouble would turn up with future cases. Gustavo Diaz-Jerez's *Anemoi for brass quintet* has never been revised or transcribed for other instruments. We might be tempted to identify this work at this moment with a lower order type, a set of performances, a fusion or any other ontological category different from a higher order type. However, if Diaz-Jerez decides to transcribe it for a string quintet in 2022, given that the hypothesis of nested types is the best explanation of the nature of versions and transcriptions, we should identify the work *Anemoi* with a higher order type in 2022, and explain why its nature has changed at that moment while its identity is preserved.

These obscure theoretical movements are not necessary. They can be avoided if the nature of all musical works is explained following the hypothesis of nested types. A work such as *Anemoi* –one that at this moment has been neither revised nor transcribed– is to be regarded as a higher order type, which is instantiated in the only and original version that this work has, the one composed by Diaz-Jerez in 2014. The performances of *Anemoi* are the tokens of the lower order type with which the one and only version of this work is identified.[79] If *Anemoi* is revised or transcribed, the resulting version or transcription will be identified with a different lower order type as an instance of the higher order type with which *Anemoi* is identified. Under the hypothesis of nested types, the nature of *Anemoi* does not change with the composition of the second version or the first transcription of it. And there are no apparent reasons that might induce us to think that such a change takes place in these cases. Alternatively, what changes with the composition of these versions and performances would be our knowledge of that work, since they present different (new) insights of the work. Therefore, the hypothesis of nested types offers a unified, simple and powerful explanation even of those works that have not been yet revised or transcribed, given that the possibility of obtaining new versions and transcriptions is open for all musical works.

---

[79] If we assume the conclusion achieved with the phenomenon of performance interpretations, the only one and original version of *Anemoi* is instantiated in different performance interpretations, which in turn are instantiated in physical musical performances.

These theoretical advantages of extending the application of the hypothesis of nested to all musical works are added up to the advantages of accommodating widespread intuitions concerning creative performances and authenticity. Accordingly, the extension of the scope of the hypothesis of nested types to explain the nature of all musical works is justified under the view of reflective equilibrium because it fits the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism. Therefore, the hypothesis of nested types should not be regarded as an *ad hoc* position regarding the phenomenon of versions and transcriptions, but as a general account for the nature of musical works.

Given that extending the scope of nested types to an explanation of all musical works is justified, some recent criticisms generally addressed against the identification of musical works with types will be considered in the rest of this chapter. The relevance of attending to those criticisms lies on that, as any other type/token theory, the hypothesis of nested types identifies musical works with types, in this case with higher order types. In addition, it also identifies a work's versions and transcriptions with types, more precisely with lower order types. The identification of musical works with types has been largely criticised by different authors. Dodd has faced some of these criticisms in different places (2007, 2008, 2012, 2013). In this section, it will be assumed that Dodd's responses are satisfactory and will not be considered here. Alternatively, the focus will be put on recent criticisms not considered by Dodd. In particular, this section will provide a response to the arguments presented by Hazlett (2012), Rossberg (2012), Kania (2012c) and Bertinetto (2012, 2016). It will be shown that none of these criticisms constitute an unsolvable objection for a type/token theory and hence to the hypothesis of nested types. This conclusion will complete the answer to the worry of *ad hoc*ism. In particular, it will reinforce the response to the first option of the worry, namely, that we do not need to postulate a different kind of entity for the normal cases of musical works.

3. Against Hazlett's argument: musical works qua types are modally flexible entities

As we have seen in chapter 1, repeatability has been considered a crucial feature to determine what kind of thing a musical work is (cf. Goodman, 1968; Wollheim, 1980; Wolterstorff, 1980; Levinson, 1980; Kivy, 1983; Rohrbaugh, 2003; Dodd, 2007). It is a feature that has been taken to characterize them as multiple artworks, by contrast with pictures or sculptures, which are regarded as singular artworks. The thesis that musical works are types has been defended as the ontological account that offers the best explanation of musical works repeatability (cf. Dodd, 2007; Davies, 2003; Levinson, 2011; Wollheim, 1980). Assuming this point, Hazlett's strategy is to reject the idea that repeatability is a feature of musical works, and hence derivatively to reject the thesis that musical works are types. Accordingly, his argument is not strictly an argument against the thesis that musical works are abstract objects, i.e. types, but an

argument against the idea that musical works are repeatable. The argument is presented in the following way (Hazlett, 2012: 162):

(i)   If there are repeatable artworks, they are abstract objects.
(ii)   No abstract object has any accidental intrinsic properties.
(iii)   Would-be repeatable artworks have at least one accidental intrinsic property.
(iv)   Therefore, there are no repeatable artworks.

The conclusion of Hazlett's argument is not that musical works are not abstract objects, and hence types, but that musical works are not repeatable. Accordingly, the argument's conclusion denies a musical works' feature that corresponds to a familiar and widely shared intuition in our musical practices accounted by empirical methods in Chapter 3. In this sense, musical works repeatability constitutes a datum –a crucial datum– to be explained by the ontology of music. According to the methodology of reflective equilibrium, this constitutes a familiar intuition that the ontology of music should try to accommodate if there are no good reasons justifying its revision. It will be shown that Hazlett's argument does not serve to this purpose because his argument fails. In this section, it will be argued that, although the three premises of Hazlett's argument are true, the argument is not valid because the conclusion does not follow from the premises. The thesis that will be defended here is that musical works *qua* types are modally flexible entities. In particular, it will be argued that the modal inflexibility of types is compatible with the modal flexibility of musical works even if we identify musical works with the ontological category of types. The solution will be given by modal realism and David Lewis' counterpart theory, although it seems not to be the only option available, as it will be shown in the final part of this section. For this purpose, this section is divided in four parts: the first one will assess Hazlett's argument examining the truth of its premises; the second one will be devoted to present the compatibility between the modal inflexibility of types and the modal flexibility of musical works; the third part will consider two possible objections; and the final one will be devoted to sketch possible alternatives that elude a commitment to the counterpart theory and modal realism.

3.1 Assessing Hazlett's argument

Hazlett's argument appeals to the notion of essences and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. These notions may add unnecessary difficulties to the issue that is being addressed. Nonetheless, the argument may be presented in an equivalent formulation that avoids the use of those notions. This formulation will be preferred here to the original one, and it runs as follows:

(i)   If there are repeatable artworks, they are abstract objects.
(ii*)   Abstract objects are modally inflexible entities.
(iii*)   Would-be repeatable artworks are modally flexible entities.
(iv)   Therefore, there are no repeatable artworks.

Claim (ii*) is regarded here as equivalent to claim (ii). In (ii), Hazlett argues that abstract objects have all their intrinsic properties essentially. According to Hazlett, essences play two simultaneous roles. On the one hand, they individuate the things of which they are essences: 'the essential properties of *x* are meant to distinguish *x* from other things' (Hazlett, 2012: 165). On the other hand, they provide the persistence conditions of the things of which they are essences by constraining the properties these things could have in other possible worlds: 'the essential properties of *x* are meant to tell us the ways in which *x* couldn't be different from how *x* actually is' (Hazlett, 2012: 165). The properties an object has essentially are the properties that it has in all possible worlds. Accordingly, if abstract objects have their intrinsic properties essentially, they have their intrinsic properties in all possible worlds. In other terms, abstract objects are modally inflexible to the extent that they could not have been different from the way they are in our actual world. This is the sense in which (ii*) is equivalent to (ii). The reason of this phenomenon lies, according to Hazlett, on that 'the existence of (…) abstract objects (…) makes no demands on the world (…). There is nothing the world must be like for it to be the case that (…) abstract objects exist' (Hazlett, 2012: 166).

Meanwhile, claim (iii*) is regarded here as equivalent to claim (iii). Hazlett argues that musical works do not have all their intrinsic properties intrinsically. For instance, Hazlett claims that *Pictures at an Exhibition* 'could have not included the reprise of the 'Promenade' between the sixth and seventh 'picture', had Mussorgsky not included it' (Hazlett, 2012: 168). *Pictures at an Exhibition,* and all musical works in general, has in other possible worlds intrinsic properties different from the ones they have in our actual world. In other terms, musical works are modally flexible to the extent that they could have been different from the way they are in our actual world. This is the sense in which claim (iii*) is equivalent to claim (iii)

The defenders of type/token theories would be prone to say that the argument is incorrect because (iii*) is false (cf. Dodd, 2007). However, it seems plausible to say that musical works could have been different from the way they actually are. In this sense, Hazlett claims that *Pictures at an Exhibition* 'could have not included the reprise of the 'Promenade' between the sixth and seventh 'picture', had Mussorgsky not included it' (Hazlett, 2012: 168). If we attend to our musical practices, we can find that composers are externally constrained by deadlines, specific requirements of a commission, limitations in the instruments available for performance, and so on. For instance, as noted in chapter 3, Sibelius composed the 1915 version of his *5th Symphony* with hurries of all sorts. Different comments in his diary evince his worries to finish the work on time for its premiere, the 8 December 1815 (cf. Hepokoski, 1993: 41-2). It makes sense to think that if Sibelius had had more time, his work would have been different. Therefore, (iii*) seems to be right according to our musical practices.

By contrast, those views that regard that (iii*) is well established by our musical practices would be inclined to say that (i) is false (cf. Rohrbaugh, 2003). However, it was shown in chapter 1 that there is no good alternative account to types in order to explain musical works repeatability. Perdurantist accounts, which regard musical works as continuants ontologically dependent on their incarnations –scores, performances, recordings and so on–, do not offer a suitable explanation of repeatability. From the fact that an entity is ontologically dependent on others, it does not follow that the latter are occurrences of the former (cf. Dodd, 2008: 1128). Moreover, if performances are temporal parts of musical works, what we hear in a performance is just a part of a musical work, but not the musical work in *toto* (cf. Dodd, 2007: 157). The action-token theory also fails to explain repeatability, because it considers musical works to be events, and events are not repeatable (cf. Dodd, 2008: 1124). Musical nominalism has to face problems regarding the individuation and existence conditions of unperformed works, as well as in explaining our talk about musical works that is not reducible to our talk about performances (Dodd, 2007; Davies, 2003). In addition, other alternative accounts considered in chapter 5 –as Rohrbaugh's continuant view and resemblance nominalism– have been revealed as problematic to provide a suitable explanation of the nature of works that have been revised or transcribed. Therefore, (i) seems to be right.

Finally, (ii*) seems to be also right, not just considering abstract objects in general, but also regarding types. As noted in chapter 5, types are ontologically thin entities –they are individuated by the condition to be satisfied by their properly formed tokens (Dodd, 2007: 54). A possible change of a type entails a change in the condition for something to be an instance of it, which results in a different type. Therefore, a type could not have been different from the way it is in our actual world. Consequently, the puzzlement with Hazlett's argument is that its three premises seem to be true and, however, we would be reluctant to accept its conclusion because it denies a musical work's feature, repeatability, that corresponds to a familiar and widespread intuition assumed by a broad number of projectible hypothesis that we make in our musical practices, as noted in chapter 3. According to the methodology of reflective equilibrium, this intuition concerning the nature of musical works should be accommodated by an ontological account unless it is revealed as a non-entrenched intuition for clashing with sound theoretical principles or non-overridden hypothesis. To this extent, it will be shown in the next section that Hazlett's argument does not prove that the repeatability intuition is a non-entrenched one, and consequently, a revision or rejection of this intuition in our ontological account about musical works will be revealed as unjustified.

3.2 The solution to the puzzlement: Lewis' counterpart theory

In the two responses offered above against Hazlett's argument, the main assumption in which this argument is grounded has not been questioned, namely, that the modal inflexibility of abstract objects –premise (ii*)– is incompatible with the modal flexibility of musical works –premise (iii*). This assumption is false, at least

concerning types, and this is the reason of why the conclusion does not follow from the premises, making the argument invalid. The defender that musical works are types has a way to show that musical works *qua* types are not modally inflexible entities. The solution to this puzzlement is given by Lewis' counterpart theory about modality, and it is inspired by the strategy followed by Caplan and Bright (2005) to defend that ordinary objects *qua* fusions are modally mereologically variable even if fusions are modally mereologically constant.

According to Lewis, a world includes all the things that are at any distance or time (Lewis, 1986a: 1). The limits of a world are given by the maximal sum of spatiotemporal relations between its members. If two individuals are spatiotemporally related, they are inhabitants of the same world. As Lewis claims, 'nothing is so far away from us in space, or so far in the past or the future, as not to be part of the same world as ourselves' (Lewis, 1986a: 70). The consequence of this idea is that possible worlds are isolated from one another. Since a possible world comprehends anything that is at any distance or time, there are no spatiotemporal relations between different possible worlds (cfr. Lewis, 1986a: 70-1). Consequently, the same thing cannot be in different possible worlds (Lewis, 1983: 27). Since possible worlds are isolated, the individuals belonging to a possible world are confined to that world. What happens then with our modal talk? It involves considerations about possible worlds. With a modal claim we are saying how things could be in a different way than they actually are. What am I doing when I claim that 'Nemesio could have been 2 cm taller'? If possible worlds are isolated, my claim is not that there is a possible world in which Nemesio –the very same individual to which 'Nemesio' refers in our actual world– has different properties, in this case the property of being 1,70 cm tall. Alternatively, what I claim is that there is a possible world (W) in which an individual *x* of W is 1,70 cm tall and that *x* is a counterpart of the individual referred by 'Nemesio' in our actual world (@). Hence, the individual referred by 'Nemesio' in @ and the individual *x* of W stand in a counterpart relation. In Lewis' words, 'to say that something here in our actual world is such that it might have done so-and-so is not to say that there is a possible world in which that thing itself does so-and-so, but that there is a world in which a counterpart of that thing does so-and-so' (Lewis, 1971: 205). Therefore, to say that Nemesio could have been two centimetres taller is to say that there is a possible world in which Nemesio has a counterpart who is 1,70 cm tall.

Given this framework, two observations are to be made. The first one is that our modal predications are *de re*, not *de dicto*, predications (cf. Lewis, 1971: 204-5). In a modal claim we are not considering what happens with a particular claim in different possible worlds. For instance, we are not considering whether the *dictum* 'Nemesio could have been 2 cm taller' is true by looking for a possible world in which the individual denoted in that world by 'Nemesio' is 1,70 cm tall. Rather, we are considering what happens in other possible worlds to the thing denoted in our actual world by the term 'Nemesio'. Modality is modality of things, not of expressions. However, since possible worlds are isolated, we cannot consider the way in which the

very same individual denoted in @ by 'Nemesio' is in a different possible world. Instead, we are considering the way in which the counterpart in that world of the individual referred in @ by 'Nemesio' is. In Lewis' words, 'to say that something here in our actual world is such that it might have done so-and-so is not to say that there is a possible world in which that thing itself does so-and-so, but that there is a world in which a counterpart of that thing does so-and-so' (Lewis, 1971: 205). Accordingly, to say that Nemesio could have been two centimetres taller is to say that there is a possible world in which Nemesio has a counterpart who is 1,70 cm tall.

The second observation is that a counterpart relation, Lewis argues, is a relation of similarity, the only kind of trans-world relation available given the isolation of possible worlds (cf. Lewis, 1983: 28; 1986: 71). Accordingly, the former relation inherits the indeterminate character of the latter. Lewis enumerates four aspects in which the counterpart relation is indeterminate:

> (1) As to which respects of similarity and difference are to count at all, (2) as to the relative weights of the respects that do count, (3) as to the minimum standard of similarity that is required, and (4) as to the extent to which we eliminate candidates that are similar enough when they are beaten by competitors with stronger claims (Lewis, 1983: 42).

Accordingly, Nemesio's counterpart may be sometimes a French horn player, but other times may be a Benfica's football player, a prime minister or even a gorilla. Which one is the relevant counterpart of Nemesio in a possible world depends on how items from (1) to (4) are determined by the context in which the proposition 'Nemesio could have been 2 cm taller' is uttered. The resolution of the vagueness of the counterpart relation is context-dependent, and it may be resolved in very different ways in different contexts (cf. Lewis, 1983: 43). Consequently, a variation in the relative relevance of the different aspects of similarity and dissimilarity results in the selection of different counterparts relations (cf. Lewis, 1971: 208). For instance, as Lewis puts, two aspects of similarity between human beings are personal traits and bodily traits. If the conversational context puts the focus on personal traits, the relevant counterpart of Nemesio in a possible world W will be surely a French horn player, regardless whether that French horn player is very different from Nemesio in bodily traits, or other aspects. However, if the conversational context highlights bodily traits, and in W there is other individual who, in spite of not being a French horn player but a prime minister, resembles much more Nemesio in bodily traits, the relevant counterpart of Nemesio in W will be the prime minister.

The counterpart theory provides the way to reconcile the modal inflexibility of types with the modal flexibility of musical works. If the thesis that musical works are types is right, *Pictures at an Exhibition* is identical with T in @ –regardless whether T is either a higher order types whose instances are other types of lower order or a lower order type whose instances are musical performances. Accordingly, '*Pictures at an Exhibition*' is substitutable *salva veritate* by 'T' in all claims about that work in @. For

instance, the claims '*Pictures at an Exhibition* has 15 movements' and 'T has 15 movements' are both true. The relevant point is that '*Pictures at an Exhibition*' and 'T' are not substitutable *salva veritate* in modal claims. While the claim '*Pictures at an Exhibition* could have not included the reprise of the 'Promenade' between the sixth and seventh movements' is true, the claim 'T could have not included the reprise of the 'Promenade' between the sixth and seventh movements' is false. The reason is that the use of each one of these terms gives rise to different contexts that select different counterpart relations, even if *Pictures at an Exhibition* is identical with T in @. In a modal claim, while the use of '*Pictures at an Exhibition*' selects a *musical work* counterpart relation, the use of 'T' selects a *type* counterpart relation. Let us consider a possible world W in which the counterparts of all movements of *Pictures at an Exhibition*, with the exception of the 'Promenade', are disposed in the same way as they are disposed in @. Let us call T* the type of sound-sequence events that obtains in W from the counterparts of all the movements of *Pictures at an Exhibition* with the exception of the 'Promenade'. T* is a *musical work* counterpart of *Pictures at an Exhibition* in W. Accordingly, *Pictures at an Exhibition* could have had different movements than it actually has and, consequently, *Pictures at an Exhibition* is a modally flexible entity. By contrast, T* is not a *type* counterpart of T, and any type that does not have counterparts of all the movements that *Pictures at an Exhibition* has in @ is a type counterpart of T. The type counterpart relation only selects as counterparts of T those types of other possible worlds individuated by the same condition that individuates T in @. Accordingly, T could not have had different movements than it actually has and T is thus a modally inflexible entity.

In conclusion, musical works *qua* types are modally flexible, even if types are modally inflexible. Identifying musical work with types is thus compatible with regarding musical works as modally flexible entities and types as modally inflexible entities. The type T with which we have identified Pictures at an Exhibition in @ has different counterparts in other possible worlds depending on the relevant counterpart relation determined by the conversational context in which a modal claim is uttered. In the next section, two main objections against the view addressed here will be considered.

3.3 Two possible objections

A first objection against the view proposed in the previous section stresses a particular feature of the counterpart relation. The counterpart relation is a relation that holds between inhabitants of possible worlds. A relevant worry that might arise at this point is whether types are inhabitants of possible worlds. According to Lewis, inhabitants of possible worlds are things that are at any distance or time. Are types things of this kind? On the one hand, an affirmative response trivially follows for those views that regard types as *universalia in re*, i.e. as existing in space and time (cf. Armstrong 2010, 7-16; Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2011; Swoyer and Orilia, 2011).

Nonetheless, this view of types has been rejected as a suitable account for the nature of musical works for different reasons pointed in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the answer is not so clear for types conceived as *universalia ante rem*. In addition, the worry introduced by this objection is specially pressing concerning the platonic view of types, according to which types have no temporal origin and are neither created nor destroyed. Types that exist outside their instances and that, in addition, have no origin and are not destroyed are more difficult to be regarded as inhabitants of possible worlds, i.e. as things that fall under spatiotemporal relations.

However, the Platonist has a way to accommodate types as inhabitants of possible worlds. Two explanations have been given for their characteristics of lacking temporal origin and the impossibility of being destroyed. The first one regards types as timeless entities, i.e. that types exist outside space and time. The second one is that types, *qua* abstract objects, exist outside space, but are *eternal*, i.e. they exist at all times. As Dodd has noted, the first option is problematic because it cannot explain the epistemic availability of types in virtue of which we can think and talk about them, and in the case of musical works, it cannot explain how we can hear, experience and encounter musical works *qua* types (cf. Dodd, 2007: 59). For instance, if I go to listen to a performance of *Pictures at an Exhibition* tonight, 27th February of 2018, the work must be available to be heard at that time. Considering types as eternal entities rather than as timeless ones helps us to explain our epistemic access to them by means of their tokens. But if types are eternal and hence exist at all times, they are inhabitants of possible worlds, and the counterpart relation applies to them. Therefore, musical works *qua* types are modally flexible, even if we accept the platonic intuition that types have no temporal origin and that they are neither created nor destroyed.

A second objection against the view defended in this paper can be posed in the following terms. Given the isolation of possible worlds, a counterpart of a musical work T of @ in other possible world W is a different object from T, namely, T*. The counterpart relation will always assign as a counterpart of *Pictures at an Exhibition* an object different from the object it is in @. Consequently, if we follow the counterpart theory, what we obtain is not that the modal inflexibility of types is compatible with the modal flexibility of musical works. What we obtain, rather, is that premise (iii) is false, i.e. that musical works are not modally flexible. My answer is that this phenomenon does not arise only for musical works, but for any modally flexible or inflexible object under the counterpart theory. For any object O –musical works, persons, medium-size physical objects, etc.–, when we say that O could have been different (i.e. that O is modally flexible), we say that O has counterparts in other possible worlds with properties different than O's properties. Modal flexibility just means this under the counterpart theory. Alternatively, for any object O –musical works, persons, medium-size physical objects, etc.–, when we say that O could not have been different (i.e. that O is modally inflexible), we say that, for any object O* that is the counterpart of O in a possible world W_n, O* has the same properties than O. Modal inflexibility just means this under the counterpart theory. Consequently, even in the case of modal inflexibility,

the counterparts of O in other possible worlds are objects that, despite having the same properties as O, are different from O. Therefore, the objection is misguided because it is grounded on a misunderstanding of the counterpart theory and modal realism.

Therefore, none of the two objections seems to be right and they do not defeat the thesis defended in this section. Consequently, we can still hold that the modal flexibility of musical works is compatible with the modal inflexibility of types even if we identify musical works with types. Hazlett's argument does not justify the revision of the intuition that musical works are not repeatable, and hence it does not constitute an objection to the thesis that assigns to musical works the ontological category of types. By extension, the hypothesis of nested types is also immune to Hazlett's attack.

3.4 A third and awkward worry

Finally, it might be argued that the compatibility between the modal flexibility of musical works *qua* types and the modal inflexibility of types offered here depends on the assumption of modal realism and the counterpart theory. In this sense, it might be objected that the defence of the idea that musical works are types rest on too strong assumptions. One might be tempted to reject the idea that possible worlds really exist and that they are spatiotemporally isolated, holding between them only counterpart relations. Accordingly, accepting that musical works *qua* types are modally flexible entities would lead us to an ontological inflation concerning possible worlds by the assumption of modal realism.

An immediate answer to this objection will be to claim that to prove that Hazlett's argument fails requires just showing that there is at least way in which the modal flexibility of musical works and the modal inflexibility of types is not incompatible even if we identify musical works with types. This is enough to prove that the conclusion does not follow from the premises of the argument. And this is precisely what has been done in this section. The objection concerns a different issue from the one concerned here. It points to the discussion of what is the ontological framework about modality that we should embrace, which is something outside the scope of this thesis.[80]

Nonetheless, in an attempt to respond to this worry, we will try to briefly sketch the plausibility of the thesis that musical works *qua* types are modally flexible entities under an approach that presupposes neither the counterpart theory nor modal realism. Such an account is the one provided by Armstrong (1989). Armstrong maintains a combinatorialist view of possible worlds, according to which a possible world is any conjunction of possible atomic states of affaires, and mere possibilities are no-existent

---

[80] In addition, it should be noted that Lewis introduces in a non-revisionary way his modal realism, as the best way to account for our ordinary language, respecting the semantic innocence and the ontological commitments with quantifiers typically assumed by competent speakers (cf. Lewis, 1973: 84 and ff.).

recombinations of actual elements (Armstrong, 1989: 47, 54). In Armstrong ontology, the world contains individuals and universals (properties and relations), which only exist as constituents of states of affaires. In this sense, the state of affairs a's being F is the truthmaker of 'a is F'. Consequently, there are no uninstantiated properties or relations. Armstrong follows the principle of instantiation of properties introduced in the previous chapter, which claims that a property begins to exist only when it is instantiated or, in other words, only when it is the constituent of a state of affairs. Armstrong argues to this extent that 'a possible property or relation (...) is not *ipso facto* a property' (Armstrong, 1989: 43). In Armstrong framework, mere possible states of affaires are non-existent recombinations of actual elements, i.e. mere logical possibilities (Armstrong, 1989: 48). Accordingly, possible worlds are all the conjunctions of atomic states of affaires. This view leads Armstrong to defend a fictionalist view about possible worlds in which 'the merely possible worlds and possible states of affaires do not exist, although we can make ostensible or fictional reference to them' (Armstrong, 1989: 49).

Within this framework, the plausibility of the thesis that musical works *qua* types are modally flexible entities can be understood as follows. Let us consider again the modal claim '*Pictures at an Exhibition* could have not included the reprise of the 'Promenade' between the sixth and seventh movements'. A performance of *Pictures at an Exhibition* is a state of affairs constituted by a set of individuals (physical sounds) disposed in a specific relation R, a universal that might be regarded in our case as a type. *Pictures at an Exhibition* is R (a type) that only exists in the states of affaires that it constitutes. *Pictures-minus-Promenade* would be the type R*, which would determine the same relation between physical sounds in performance except for the Promenade. However, according to Armstrong's fictionalism, we just make fictional reference to *Pictures-minus-Promenade* and R* and hence we do not make any ontological commitment to this entity in our modal claims. Consequently, we speak about how *Pictures at an Exhibition* could have been in a way different from the way it actually is without identifying it with another type –and hence with another musical work– different from R, namely R*, because while R exists, R* does not exist. R* is just an alien universal, something that is neither identical with actual (instantiated) universals nor have as constituents actual universals, and thus something that does not exist (cf. Armstrong, 1989: 54-6). In other words, R* is a fiction that results form the recombination of the atoms that are constituents of the states of affaires in which R exists.

Therefore, in our modal claims concerning *Pictures at an Exhibition*, we are not identifying this work –which in the actual world is identified with the type R– with other types different from R. In this sense, there is no ontological impediment to regard *Pictures at an Exhibition* as a modally flexible entity, given Armstrong fictionalism about possible worlds. The idea that the modal flexibility of musical works is compatible with the modal inflexibility of types, even if we identify musical works with types, is plausible under an ontological approach to modality that escapes from modal realism and the counterpart theory. This plausibility has been briefly sketched here

without going into further details, but it seems to be enough to reassure the objector on this point.

4. Defending musical works' repeatability against Bertinetto's view

Alessandro Bertinetto follows a similar strategy to Hazlett's one against type/token theories. He offers an account that rejects the idea that musical works are repeatable, and derivatively, that the nature of musical works is not satisfactorily explained by a type/token theory. However, he holds this strategy from a different point of view than the adopted by Hazlett. He does not reject musical work's repeatability on the basis of a theoretical argument, but rather by analysing our musical practices. Bertinetto assumes David Davies's pragmatic constraint. As it has been noted in chapter 2, the pragmatic constraint is a methodological principle that proclaims the primacy of musical practices in the ontology of music. It settles that an adequate account of the ontology of musical works must start with epistemological considerations about our appreciative and artistic practices (cf. Davies, 2009: 161). In assuming the pragmatic constraint, Bertinetto (2016) regards the aesthetic experience of music as the starting point for his ontological proposal, arguing that the aesthetic experience of music has primacy over the ontology of music. He maintains that the ontology of music has to be developed upon the way in which we aesthetically appreciate music, to the extent that the properties to be ascribed to musical works are determined in our aesthetic experience of them.

Starting form our musical and appreciative practices, Bertinetto defines music as 'something to be played and listened to' (Bertinetto, 2016: chapter 5.4). Following this definition, Bertinetto argues that music only exists as something that can be aurally experienced and that has only real existence in musical performances. Accordingly, Bertinetto identifies the experience of music with the experience of a performative practice. He characterizes musical performances as improvisations, in the sense that they are a process that always involves the production of unexpected sonorities in virtue of the decisions taken by the performers about the process itself during its course. Since a performative practice is always characterized by a degree of unpredictability, Bertinetto obtains that the experience of music is the experience of the unexpected. Inasmuch Bertinetto assumes Davies' pragmatic constraint, his ontology of music has to account for this way in which we aesthetically appreciate music, namely, for the experience of the unexpected. To this extent, Bertinetto defends that real music only exist in performances and, consequently, the identity of musical works is fixed in and by their performances. Since performances always involve creative unexpected elements and are events –particular entities ontologically dependent on the relevant conventions governing a given context of performance–, Bertinetto concludes that the identity of musical works is not static. He argues that their identity evolves and is transformed through time by means of their different performances and the evolution of

the performative practices. Therefore, musical works would not be repeatable in Bertinetto's view, and the function of performances is not the repetition of a musical work whose identity is fixed previously and independently of them. Bertinetto summarizes this view as follows:

> (The experience of music) is precisely the experience of a performative practice. Music is not real as a (expected) work; real music is always that of (unexpected on principle) performances. Also the performance or interpretation of a musical work is in itself constitutively unexpected and unexpected is always the concrete reality of the work, which lives only in performances (Bertinetto, 2016. My translation).[81]

Bertinetto attributes the mistake of regarding musical works as repeatable entities to what he calls 'formalist ontologies'. Following Lydia Goehr (2007), he imputes to these ontologies the mistake of assuming the concept of musical work presupposed by an aesthetic ideal (the *Werktreue*) of a particular historical period (the classic-romantic period).[82] According to the Werktreue, what makes a performance valuable is its fidelity in reproducing the musical work performed. The Werktreue claims that the relation between a work and its properly formed performances is a relation of correspondence or matching: the performance must match the features of the work. The more a performance matches the features of the work, the more aesthetic value that performance has. This view on the aesthetic appreciation of musical performances presupposes, according to Bertinetto, the idea of a musical work whose identity is fixed previously and independently from its performances in the work's score written by the composer. However, Bertinetto argues, this is an aesthetic ideal historically located in the classic-romantic period. Bertinetto maintains that, before the classic-romantic era, performers were not demanded to follow the composer's inscriptions written in a score. The aesthetic ideal for a performance was not its matching with a previously fixed work in the composer's score. Instead, the performers were required 'to embellish and therefore to improvise on those indications, which could be used with wide discretion' (Bertinetto, 2016. My translation).

In addition to its restricted historical scope, the Werktreue is mistaken for two reasons according to Bertinetto. In the first place, the notational characters of a score undermine the instructions for performance. To produce a performance of a work, its score always requires the performer's creative activity to complete the notational instructions. This phenomenon goes beyond the idea of a simple matching between performance and work performed in Bertinetto's view. In the second place, Bertinetto argues that it is impossible to determine the identity of a piece previously and independently of its performances. According to Bertinetto (2016), the distinction

---

[81] (L'esperienza musicale) è appunto l'esperienza di una pratica performativa. La musica non è reale come opera (attesa); la musica reale è sempre quella (per principio inattesa) della performance. Anche l'esecuzione o l'interpretazione di un'opera musicale sono di per sé costitutivamente inattese e inattesa è sempre la realtà concreta dell'opera, che vive soltanto nella performance (Bertinetto, 2016).

[82] I will not argue here against Goehr (2007) socio-historical reduction of the concept of musical work. I will assume that, on what matters for the ontology of music, his view has been satisfactorily refuted by Roger Scruton (cf. Scruton, 2009: 9 and ff.).

between a good and a merely correct performance is required to determine the identity conditions of a musical work. However, this distinction is only possible if we can distinguish between essential and accidental elements of a musical work. Meanwhile, this latter distinction depends on assessments relative to particular historical musical practices to be accomplished and understood. Bertinetto concludes that the properties determining the identity of a musical work are specified by its performances and by the way in which they are assessed in a historical musical practice, and consequently, the concept of musical work endorsed by the Werktreue is misguided.

Following this line of reasoning, Bertinetto claims that what we take to be a musical work is fiction, i.e. a socio-cultural construct. He defends a kind of fictionalism about musical works. According to Bertinetto, our talk about musical works is not ontologically committing. By the term 'musical work' we do not refer to a real existent object, but rather to a 'cultural and historically constructed object within the scope of the classic-romantic musical tradition –and of its practices, institutions and discourse–, which considers as normative the identity and eternity of the work' (Bertinetto, 2016, my translation). Consequently, there is no existent musical work that can be repeated by means of its different performances, and the composer does not properly compose a musical work. He merely gives a set of instructions for performance (Bertinetto, 2016). There are only performances always providing unexpected features to musical experience and in constant evolution together with the development of cultural and artistic practices. Since the identity of musical works is given by its performances, their identity is continuously changing and transforming. Bertinetto argues in the following terms:

> Musical works qua fictions are ontologically flexible, because they are continuously reconfigured in mutant cultural practices. The work, which is only real in the practice of performance, is irreducibly a socio-cultural construct (…). Cultural practices are constantly changing, even works, as cultural products, are constantly changing. (Bertinetto, 2016. My translation).[83]

Therefore, Bertinetto defends a radical rejection of the idea that musical works are repeatable, taking it to be grounded on the analysis of our musical practices. Accordingly, if type/token theories are the best explanation of the nature of musical works given their repeatable status, rejecting such status should lead us to abandon type/token theories as plausible accounts in the ontology of music.

In light of what has been argued along this thesis, Bertinetto seems to be right in following the intuition that there is a wide space for creativity within our musical practices beyond composers' activity. As noted in chapter 1, improvisations and performances are, alongside with versions and transcriptions, paradigmatic examples of

---

[83] Le opere musicali in quanto finzioni sono ontologicamente flessibili, perché sono continuamente ri-configurate in pratiche culturali mutevoli. L'opera, che è reale soltanto nella pratica della performance, è irriducibilmente un costrutto socio-culturale. (…) Le pratiche culturali sono in continuo cambiamento, anche le opere, come prodotti culturali, cambiano continuamente.

this phenomenon. Bertinetto's criticism of the Werktreue points on this right direction. His view can be regarded as criticising the idea that score compliance authenticity is regarded as the paradigmatic, and maybe, the only account on musical authenticity. Indeed, considering score compliance authenticity as the only account of musical authenticity would lead to a view of our musical practices that does not do justice to their creative power. Creativity and interpretation would be confined under this view to a mere understanding of the score's instructions in order to accurately perform them. Accordingly, a good or valuable performance would be just one that accurately reproduces the instructions notated in the score under a right understanding of the notational characters. However, *contra* Bertinetto, rejecting score compliance as the paradigm of musical authenticity does not require rejecting the familiar and widely shared intuition that musical works are repeatable. Something similar runs with the relevance of the context of performance of a work. Bertinetto seems to be also right in vindicating the relevance of the context of performance –development of the performing practices, trends and aesthetic preferences, technical development of the instruments available for performance, etc.– in order to properly perform a musical work. However, the acknowledgment of this role of the context of performance does not require rejecting the familiar intuition that musical works are repeatable. And, in light of the methodology of reflective equilibrium, if it is not necessary to revise such familiar intuition, our ontological account of musical works must preserve it.

Bertinetto's right intuition that creativity goes beyond composers' activity and that it is not exhausted by the paradigm of the Werktreue –which corresponds to the ideal of score compliance authenticity– points to another kind of authenticity introduced in the first section of this chapter, namely, interpretative authenticity. According to interpretative authenticity, a performer may produce an authentic performance by departing from a score's prescriptions. The creativity implied by interpretative authenticity not only goes beyond the instructions of the score but also beyond the performer herself in searching for a whole and deep understanding of the work performed. To this extent, the creativity involved by interpretative authenticity is wider than the one appealed by Bertinetto because it is not constrained by the performer's preferences, contrarily to what Bertinetto seems to suggest when he appeals to a discretional use of a score's notations by the performer. It is a kind of creativity that evades a sort of subjectivism implicit in Bertinetto's view. However, as pointed in the first section of this chapter, the hypothesis of nested types is able to accommodate the intuition that musical works are repeatable with this kind of creativity involved by interpretative authenticity. The identification of musical works with types –in particular, with higher order types– offers an explanation of how a performer can be true to a work –i.e. faithful– even if she is departing from the prescriptions given by a composer in a score. The outcome of a composer's activity is never a work W but a version of W, i.e. a lower order type in which W as a higher order type is instantiated. Given that a version, as a token of W, is only a way of presenting W, the door is open to the creativity of other composers and performers to provide new insights of W's content by means of new versions of W that may be obtained either in a score or in performance.

Sometimes, W's first version may be regarded as an imperfect instantiation of W. In this case, the creativity of a performer or composer goes beyond the score's instructions directed to obtain a better insight of W. This new insight of W is a new version of W, which is identified with a lower order type that instantiates the work as a higher order type. This case is exemplified, for instance, by Rimsky-Korsakov revisions of Mussorgsky manuscript or by Bruckner's 1890 revision of his *8th Symphony*, both analysed in Chapter 3. Other times, W's first version is not regarded as a defective instance of W, but as a way of presenting W that does not exhaust W's content. The creativity of the performer or composer is intended in this case to produce a new take on the work that completes our understanding of W's content by producing a new version of W either in score or in performance. This new version is again a lower order type that instantiates the work as a higher order type and that is instantiated in musical performances. In both cases, it is not W's identity but our understanding of W's content what changes. W's identity is determined by a pure and abstract sound structure with different variable places. The role played by the context of performance consists in determining the scope of the variable places of W's sound structure, and hence, as sanctioning whether a particular version or performance counts as an instance of W in which W occurs. The kinematics of the context of performance does not implies, as Bertinetto thinks, a change in W's identity, but rather a change in the scope of its variability –i.e. a change in the sort of things are admitted as valid fillings of W's sound structure variable places, and hence that can be counted as W's genuine occurrences offering a right insight of it. It is by this way that the hypothesis of nested types is able to accommodate the intuition that musical works are repeatable –i.e. that we hear, experience and appreciate a musical work in the performances of its versions and transcriptions– and the kind of creativity required by interpretative authenticity.

Bertinetto is accurate in pointing that the concept of the unexpected plays a relevant role in the way in which we aesthetically appreciate music, and that this unexpected character of music is due to the creativity of performers and composers. However, in light of interpretative authenticity, *the unexpected* is an epistemic concept rather than an ontological one. From an epistemic point of view, the unexpected aspects involved by any performance of W, and the evolution of the performing practices in which these performances are generated, do not imply that W's identity changes through these performances and that is not repeatable in them. Rather, W's performances change our epistemic status – our knowledge and understanding– with respect to that work. The new performances of W and the changes in the performing practices give us new epistemic accesses to W. They provide us with the possibility of discovering new aesthetic aspects of W that remained in the background in its previous versions and performances. It is our knowledge of the piece that changes with any new performance of the piece and not the work's identity.

The epistemic accommodation of the unexpected is compatible with the idea that musical works are repeatable, and the hypothesis of nested types shows how it is

possible. To this extent, it is relevant to note that Bertinetto's sense of repeatability is very influenced by the ideal of the Werktreue and its associated view on score compliance authenticity. Under this paradigm, repeatability is understood as the work specified in a score being copied –being reproduced by extreme fidelity– in its performances. Following this view, the peculiarities of each particular performance are regarded more as a defect rather than as a virtue. However, this sense of repeatability is too demanding in comparison with the sense in which we ask somebody to play again the same piece, or when someone says that she heard at last night's concert a work that she had not heard for twenty years. The relevant sense of repeatability for ontology, accounted in the experiment presented in chapter 3, is that in hearing a performance a work W, we are hearing, encountering and appreciating W. This sense of repeatability is compatible with the variability of the performances of a musical work. Musical works are said to be variable to the extent that its properly formed performances can be different in relevant aesthetic respects. A musical work admits, and can be repeated in, performances that present important differences in tempo, dynamics and articulations. As the experiment in chapter 3 has show, a musical work can be also repeated in performances that present differences at structural and timbral levels. Repeatability and variability are not only compatible, but also one feature requires the other. Since performances are concrete particular entities, each performance is by definition different in some aspect in respect to any other performance. Consequently, if a musical work is repeatable in its properly formed performances, necessarily it is variable. Conversely, if a musical work is not repeatable and admits at most only one properly formed performance, the musical work is not variable because it does not admit performances differing in relevant aesthetic respects. It would admit just one properly formed performance.

In addition to this remark on issues concerning authenticity, Bertinetto's view against the repeatable character of musical works is not well grounded and raises some problems that cannot be accepted under the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism. In particular, it will be argued here that his view is not justified by our musical practices because, in the first place, it starts from a description of musical practices that it is not completely right, resulting in unjustified revisionary consequences. Secondly, it will be defended that there are alternative views acknowledging the repeatability of musical works that can accommodate in a less revisionary way our musical practices.

4.1 A misleading description of our musical practices

Bertinetto regards the notion of improvisation as the central one for describing our musical practices. Both, the activities of performers and composers are described as improvisations, and the alleged unexpected character of the experience of music is grounded on the notion of improvisation. However, the scope of improvisation in music

is more reduced than Bertinetto takes it to be, resulting in a misguided characterisation of our musical practices.

In the first place, Bertinetto maintains that, previously to the classic-romantic paradigm, the composer's inscriptions in the score were considered as a guide for the performer's improvisation to complete the work embellishing it. From this fact, Bertinetto obtains that the composer's score did not fix the identity of the work. Instead, he argues, the identity of the work is reconfigured by means of each new performance of it (Bertinetto, 2016). The problem is that this view is not right in two respects. In first place, the musical material added by the renaissance or baroque performer has a determinate place and function within the work. The function of this material is ornamental, by contrast with the musical material provided by the composer in the score, whose function is structural.[84] The crucial issue is that the structural material –the one given by the composer– plays the function of fixing the identity of the work, while the ornamental material has nothing to do with the individuation of it. Accordingly, there is a way to distinguish between correct and good performances previously to the generation of any performance of a work because there is a way to distinguish between fundamental and variable features of the work. The fundamental features are the structural features given in the work's score, while the variable ones are the ornaments to be implemented in performance. The ornaments of a performance are aesthetically appreciated in the way in which they respect the structural features and the general mood (affetto) of the work in a deep understanding of it.[85] Given the picture offered here, not all the notational aspects of the score are fundamental of the work, since a work may admit different versions and transcriptions. The score fixes all the aspects that are fundamental and constitutive of a particular version or transcription, being a subset of them also fundamental of the work W versioned or transcribed –what makes that version or transcription to be a version or transcription of W, i.e. a W's instance. However, as noted in chapter 5, the sound structure that individuates a particular version or transcription still contains variable places to be filled in performance, corresponding some of them to the renaissance or baroque ornaments.

In the second place, before the classic-romantic era, a score was not only completed by the performer's improvisation, but also and mainly by the performative conventions of the musical context. In the Renaissance and Baroque periods, a big deal of conventions about how to play a piece of music were presupposed in the musical context. Composers did not usually write these presupposed conventions in scores, but

---

[84] My view here is compatible with, and complementary to, Davies (2003) distinction between thick works –those whose sonic properties in performance are almost totally specified by the composer– and thin works –those whose composer does not specify an important number of the sonic properties of its performances (cf. Davies, 2003: 39). In this sense, renaissance and baroque works are thin works in Davies' sense.

[85] The analogy with architecture is straightforward. A building is not a different building for changing the furniture, the colour of the walls or the surface of the doors, but rather for changing its shape –its plant was square before, and now is triangular–, height –it had two levels and now it has 10–, beams, walls, and so on.

they were part of the meaning of the musical notations of those scores. This meaning was not explicit, but implicit given the common presuppositions of a particular musical context. These conventions are part of the common ground of composers and performers at a specific time and place, as previously noted. This body of information is pragmatically presupposed by composers and performers while composing and performing. They take for granted the truth of this body of information and assume that the others agents involved in the musical context –other composers, performers, critics, listeners– do the same, as it happens in ordinary conversational contexts (cf. Stalnaker, 2014: 3-4). Accordingly, the fact that the baroque or renaissance performer went beyond the score in playing some unwritten material does not imply that he was improvising, in the sense of completing the work by inventing a melody just in the moment when he was making that performance. Instead, several times, he was just applying performing norms presupposed in its context of performance, and implicit in the notations of the score. Therefore, before the classic-romantic era, the identity of the work was not as ethereal and undefined as Bertinetto's proposal suggests. The score of a baroque or renaissance piece sufficiently determines the identity of work, given the presupposed conventions of its context and the distinction between structural and ornamental musical material.

Additionally, Bertinetto also argues for avoiding the traditional distinction between composition and performance, and regards the activity of the composer as a performance of an improvisatory character. He argues in the following terms:

> Composition and performance overlap in a relevant way (…). Let us consider writing composition. It can be conceived as the (temporarily) frozen result of improvisation processes and their amendments. In this sense, the process of musical creation is a sort of performance, although it is not (usually) public and although during the compositional process music might only be imagined as if it were sounding, but not really sounding. So, if the composition is the process of creating music through performances (which also proceed by trial and error), it can be conceived as improvisation, in this limited but important sense (Bertinetto, 2016. My translation).[86]

Again, this characterization of our musical practices is not completely accurate. It is true that composition and performance are not so far as traditionally they have been understood. However, they must not be confused on penalty of giving rise to a categorial mistake. Musical composition might be characterised as a performance, but as a performance of a different kind than a performance of a musical work because they involve different kind of skills and knowledge. Musical performance requires a development of bodily skills that is not required for musical composition. The

---

[86] Composizione ed esecuzione si sovrappongono in modo significativo (…) Consideriamo la composizione scritta. Può essere concepita come il risultato (provvisoriamente) congelato dei processi d'improvvisazione e dei loro emendamenti. In questo senso, il processo di creazione musicale è una sorta di performance, sebbene (di solito) non ci sia pubblico e sebbene durante il processo compositivo la musica possa essere solo immaginata come se suonasse, ma non suonare realmente. Quindi, se la composizione è il processo del creare musica mediante esecuzioni (che procedono anche per prova ed errori), essa può essere concepita come improvvisazione, in questo senso limitato, ma importante (Bertinetto, 2016).

development of these bodily skills is relative to the physical configuration of each musical instrument. A horn player, for instance, has to train daily his facial and abdominal muscles to be ready for the flexibility, articulation an colour sound required by a high quality performance, overcoming the physical resistance opposed by the conic and curve configuration of the instrument. The piano player has to train daily his fingers with technical exercises to be apt to play the different intervals, arpeggios and fast notes she finds in a musical performance, conquering at the same time the resistance and disposition offered by the piano keys. None of these bodily skills and daily training is required in musical composition. By contrast, musical composition requires a mental training in conceiving how a combination of instruments and intervals will sound, in addition to a theoretical and practical knowledge concerning voice leading, instrumentation, counterpoint and harmony that is not required for a piano or horn player. Therefore, if musical composition is a performance, it is a performance of a different kind from the performances consisting in playing music in a live concert. Nonetheless, acknowledging the neat difference between musical composition and musical performance does not lead us to an aesthetical underestimation of musical performances, for both musical works and performances are objects of our primary aesthetic appreciation, as it has been shown in chapter 4.

Regarding the improvisatory character of written musical composition, Bertinetto's description is not completely accurate again. It is true that musical composition involves sometimes aspects that typically belong to improvisation. Nevertheless, writing music in a score allows for a conceptual mediation in a degree that is not available in improvisation. The composer can read once and again what she has written in the score, rethinking it and correcting items that she finds that are not right after reflection. This explains the different kinds of commitments typically endorsed by composers of written music and improviser musicians regarding the products they generate: while the former is usually atemporally committed to her product –i.e. she approves it to be performed at any time–, the latter is usually committed to her product at a particular moment and place –i.e. the live performance in which it has being generated. If an improviser musician were asked to transcribe her performance in a score to be performed in other places and times, she typically would like to revise it. She would check whether there are aspects of her performance with which she would not be committed to be performed again. That is, in order to extend her committed beyond the moment and place in which her performance took place, she will demand a reflective revision of the music performed. Therefore, improvisation is sometimes a part of the process of musical composition, but musical composition cannot be reduced to improvisation, even if this notion is considered in a deflationary sense.

Finally, Bertinetto's proposal of reforming the ontology of music from the notion of improvisation rests on his assumption of a strong connection between the experience of the unexpected and improvisation in music. However, what is aesthetically unexpected does not overlaps with what is musically improvised. On many

cases, what sounds aesthetically unexpected in a live performance has been previously analysed in a score, highly calculated and repeated once and again during rehearsals for preparing that performance. What it is aesthetically experienced as unexpected is in a big number of cases the result of a calculated process of repetition rather than the result of taking decisions about the performance during the course of that performance. In other words, what it is experienced aesthetically as unexpected is in many cases the result of repeating in rehearsals the same musical work in a particular way instead of the product of an improvisation. The same phenomenon arises for what is experienced as unexpected in the performance of a play. On many occasions, what the actor seems to improvise has been previously thought and practiced. Therefore, a re-accommodation of the ontology of music over the concept of improvisation does not seem to be plainly justified by the pragmatic constraint. Even if we accept that the experience of the unexpected is nuclear to the aesthetic appreciation of music, this experience is not associated to the result of an improvisation in a big number of cases, and thus it cannot be appropriately explained by the concept of improvisation.

4.2 Revisionary consequences of Bertinetto's account

This inaccurate description of musical practices noted above leads Bertinetto's approach to revisionary consequences concerning our beliefs about the status of musical composition and the identity and persistence conditions of musical works. For instance, Bertinetto claims that a composer does not properly compose a work, but that she rather indicates a set of instructions for performance (Bertinetto, 2016). If this claim were true, two worries would arise: firstly, the borderline between a conductor and a composer would vanish, and secondly, we would regard composers as resembling more to a head of protocol –someone who gives instructions to perform in a particular way in a social event– rather than to a painter or a sculptor –someone who generates a work of art. However, in our musical practices we clearly distinguish between a conductor and a composer. Both give instructions for performance, but the latter is assumed to make something else: she points to a musical work when she indicates this set of instructions. *By means of* specifying a set of instructions for performance, the composer points to something that has an specific content, as illustrated by the kind I of aesthetic predicates distinguished in Chapter 4. She is determining a way of presenting such content that may be performed in different ways and that is open to the performer's creativity in the sense of interpretative authenticity developed in the introduction of this section. Under the hypothesis of nested types, the composer specifies a first version of a work thanks to her creative and imaginative skills. Other composers and performers may produce new versions of that work, on the basis of the knowledge provided by the original composer and in an attempt of obtaining a better understanding of that work. Moreover, we consider composers as having a similar status to painters or sculptors, as we regard the outcome of their generative performances as an artwork. As any other artist, composers manipulate in their generative performances an artistic medium. While painters

manipulate paint and canvas, and sculptors manipulate marble, composers manipulate sounds (cf. Dodd, 2017: 4). They manipulate sounds in a direct way –when they, for instance, try a part of their composition on an instrument during the process of composition–, but also and mainly in an indirect one, *by means* of giving instructions to performers on how to manipulate sounds. In this last sense, the relevant point is that a composer does not merely give instructions for performance, but rather manipulates sounds *by means of* giving instructions for performance.

Similar revisionary consequences follow for the identity and persistence conditions of musical works from Bertinetto's view. Bertinetto's fictionalist thesis that music only exist in performances commits him to a nominalist approach eliminativist about sets, according to which there is no musical work over and above musical performances (cf. Dodd, 2007: 21). The nominalist takes musical works to be just sets of performances. Since a set is extensionally individuated by its members, a difference in one of its members is enough to change the identity of that set. Therefore, if a musical work W is a set of performances, each new performance of W changes the identity of that work because it gives rise to a new set of performances. Bertinetto seems to endorse this view when he makes the following statements:

> Fictionalism with respect to musical works is therefore consistent with a nominalist ontology (...), according to which only events and particular and unrepeatable facts such as musical performances really exist, and with an aesthetic metaontology according to which the concrete aesthetic practices define (that is: to continually re-define, given that these are dynamic historical practices) the identity criteria of fictional social objects such as musical works, as well as the standards for the evaluation of the quality and appropriateness of a performance as interpretation of a work; which, as a fictional construct, is (trans)formed through concrete performances, as well as through versions, recordings, covers, arrangements, etc. (Bertinetto, 2016. My translation).[87]

The problem for the eliminativist nominalist approaches –the views rejecting the existence of a set as an entity in addition to its members– is that they are revisionary with respect to the identity and persistence conditions of musical works. In the first place, when the Berliner Philharmoniker plays on Friday, Saturday and Sunday a program compound by Beethoven's *Violin Concerto* and Beethoven's *7ᵗʰ Symphony*, the nominalist must say that the orchestra is performing three different programs because they would be playing different musical works in each one of these performances. When the orchestra is playing the Beethoven's *7ᵗʰ Symphony* on Saturday, it is playing a different work than the Beethoven's *7ᵗʰ Symphony* played the day before by the same orchestra. However, nobody that attended to the concert on Friday would attend to the

---

[87] Il finzionalismo rispetto alle opere musicali è perciò coerente con un'ontologia nominalista (…), secondo cui soltanto eventi e fatti particolari e irripetibili come le performance musicali esistono realmente e con una meta-ontologia estetica secondo cui sono le concrete pratiche estetiche a definire (ovvero: a continuamente ri-definire, dato che si tratta di pratiche storiche dinamiche) i criteri d'identità di oggetti sociali finzionali come le opere musicali, così come gli standard per la valutazione delle qualità e dell'appropriatezza della performance come interpretazione dell'opera; la quale, in quanto costrutto finzionale, si (tras)forma attraverso le concrete performance, nonché attraverso versioni, registrazioni, cover, arrangiamenti, ecc.

concert on Saturday with the expectation of hearing a new musical work, but rather to a new performance of the same musical work. In second place, regarding the persistence conditions of musical works, since Bertinetto's nominalism claims that music only exist in performances, Beethoven's 7th *Symphony* would not exist when it is not being performed. However, this view would entail a conflation between musical composition and performance disregarded above, taking performers to be creators with the same status of composers. The 7th *Symphony* would be created three times by the Berliner Philharmoniker, namely on Friday, Saturday and Sunday, but this consequence of Bertinetto's theory contradicts our beliefs about the nature of the outcome generated by the orchestra in those days.

Therefore, Bertinetto is right in his attempt of evincing that there are creative practices that involve musical works and that are beyond the work's composer activity. He is also right in claiming that these creative processes generate the unexpected experiences that are crucial in the aesthetic appreciation of musical works. He also cleverly highlights the relevance of the context of performance and the kinematics of our musical practices. However, he is mistaken in thinking that this phenomenon is incompatible with the intuition that musical works are repeatable. By means of accommodating the ideal of interpretative authenticity, the hypothesis of nested types explains how a musical work can be repeated in fresh and original performances of it that may differ from them and depart from the composer's score. In addition, Bertinetto's rejection of musical work's repeatability by appealing to our musical practices is misguided by a defective description of them, which results in revisionary consequences that are not acceptable under the methodology of reflective equilibrium.

5. Bertinetto's argument from improvisation

Bertinetto raises another argument against type/token theories. In this case is not an indirect argument undermining the idea that musical works are repeatable. It is rather a direct argument against type/token theories. Nonetheless, his argument is not a general refutation of a type/token ontology for musical works, but an argument concerning a local aspect of our musical practices, namely, musical improvisations. His argument can be summarized as follows (cf. Bertinetto, 2012: 110; 2016: III.1):

(i)   According to the type/token theory, musical works are multiple instantiable and identifiable entities.
(ii)   Musical improvisations are not multiply instantiable and identifiable entities.
(iii)   Therefore, the type/token theory does not fit musical improvisations.

The first premise of the argument focuses on the merit of type/token theories to explain the repeatability of musical works by assigning to them the ontological category of types (cf. Bertinetto, 2012: 110). The second premise of the argument states that improvisations are not repeatable entities that preserve their identity along their

instantiations. Bertinetto justifies this claim by pointing to some features that, according to him, are distinctive of musical improvisations. He argues that a musical improvisation is a process in which creation and performance overlap, in which 'pre-established instructions for performance' are not followed and that is intended to be 'an ephemeral and unrepeatable event'. Accordingly, musical improvisations are described as singular, unrepeatable, incorrigible and spontaneous (Bertinetto, 2012: 106). From these two premises, Bertinetto derives the conclusion that 'the type/token theory does not fit musical improvisation'.

It is not absolutely clear what Bertinetto's expression that 'the type/token theory does not fit for musical improvisation' means. Let us suppose that this claim means that a type/token theory does not offer an adequate explanation of the ontological nature of musical improvisation. The problem for Bertinetto's argument is that, if this interpretation is right, the conclusion (iii) does not follow from premises (i) and (ii). The conclusion (iii) only follows from (i) and (ii) under the assumption that the type/token theorist will assign to musical improvisations the ontological category of types. However, if the type/token theorist proceeded in this way, she would be making a categorical mistake, for she has another ontological category at hand in her account that offers a much more adequate explanation of the ontological nature of improvisation, namely the category of token. Therefore, Bertinetto's argument is not charitable with the thesis that musical works are types, since in order to be valid it requires the type/token theorist to make a categorical mistake.

The type/token theorist in the ontology of music regards event-tokens to be particular entities. Among particulars, events and physical objects can be distinguished. Physical objects are regarded as having a determinate spatial location while vague temporal boundaries –except for four-dimensional ontologists (cf. Casati & Varzi, 2015). By contrast, events are taken to have determinate temporal boundaries while vague spatial location. Events are tied to their time of occurrence by its existence and persistence conditions. They are non-repeatable entities having unique occurrence: they can occur at most one time per possible world. Accordingly, events are individuated in each possible world by the time in which they take place in that world. Given a possible world, if two events are exactly alike in all respects except in the time in which they take place, they are different events. Crucially, the type/token theorist about musical works identifies tokens with this second kind of particular entities, more specifically with sound-sequence events (cf. Dodd, 2007: 2). Conceived in this way, the category of token seems to offer a satisfactory explanation of the ontological features that according to Bertinetto are characteristic of musical improvisations. Sound-sequence events are singular, unrepeatable and incorrigible. Since events are bound to a unique time interval per possible world, they cannot happen more than once in our actual world. Consequently, they are incorrigible. The only way to correct a sound-sequence event would be to produce another different sound-sequence event in a later time. Additionally, sound-sequence events are spontaneous to the extent that they are generated by agents that have to solve real-time unforeseen and coordination tasks with

the other agents involved in the generative process. Therefore, since the category of token plainly accounts for the features that musical improvisations have, it would be absolutely pointless for the type/token theorist to assign to them a different ontological category.

However, a worry might arise at this point. The category of token is the one assigned by a type/token theory to what David Davies calls *work-performances*, performances that instantiate a musical work and that play an 'essential part in the appreciation' of it (Davies, 2011: 18). By contrast, Bertinetto argues that a musical improvisation is not a performance playing a role in the appreciation of something else beyond the very improvisation (Bertinetto, 2012: 109). Musical improvisations would be assimilated to what Davies calls *performances-works*, performances that are the main and only focus of aesthetic appreciation. To this extent, this kind of performances under which musical improvisations would fall is compound by performances 'which are not plausibly viewed as performances of independent artworks seem themselves to be objects of artistic appreciation and evaluation' (Davies, 2011: 20). Consequently, if a type/token theory assigns to improvisations the category of token, would this mean that improvisations are not ontologically different from work-performances? Or would be rather the type/token theorist concealing some crucial ontological features of musical improvisations by assigning to them the category of token?

The features of singularity, unrepeatability, incorrigibility and spontaneity that according to Bertinetto are characteristic of musical improvisation are also shared by work-performances. The performance of Manuel de Falla's *Canciones Populares* played last night, 11th November 2017 in Córdoba, by the Proemium Metals brass quintet is not an improvised performance but a planned one. However, this performance is singular, unrepeatable, incorrigible and spontaneous. It is singular and unrepeatable because it is different from the performance made the day before by the quintet in the general rehearsal in small details involving tempo, character, phasing and intonation. It would also be different from any other performance made by them or by another brass quintet in the future, despite all of them being instances of the same Falla's work. If the members of the quintet were not satisfied with some aspect of that performance, they would not have the possibility of changing it in that very same performance, but only by means of producing a new performance. In addition, this performance was spontaneous. The first movement starts with a duo of trombone and tuba performers, who took in that performance the tempo a little faster than usual. When the horn and the two trumpets entered with their melodies, they had to adapt on the progress to the tempo previously taken by the trombone and tuba players, which was slightly but significantly different from the one planned in the rehearsals. Similar phenomena took place during that performance, as always happens in any other work-performance, in matters of balance, expression and intonation. In any work-performance, decisions and evaluations made by performers contribute to change in real-time some of the aspects previously planned during the rehearsals and personal studio. In addition, performers respond to inputs coming from the audience and from the physical hall in real-time. Therefore, since the

features of singularity, unrepeatability, incorrigibility and spontaneity can be found in both work-performances and musical improvisations, the type/token theorist is justified in assigning to them the same ontological category.

It might be argued that there is a crucial difference regarding the aesthetic appreciation of improvisations and work-performances that should be reflected in our ontology: while work-performances play a part in the appreciation of something else – the work performed–, this is not the case of musical improvisations, which are objects of our primary aesthetic appreciation. However, it is not the case that work-performances are always aesthetically appreciated as mediums to convey the aesthetic content of the musical work performed. It has been shown in chapter 4 that work-performances are also objects of our primary aesthetic appreciation. The KIND II of aesthetic uses of predicates illustrates that work-performances are also primary objects of aesthetic appreciation, regardless the musical work performed. Therefore, the fact that improvisations are objects of our primary aesthetic appreciation is not a feature that distinguishes them from work-performances and that justifies a difference in the ontological category assigned to them.

Finally, nothing precludes the claim that an improvisation instantiates a musical work. To reject this claim would be to confuse epistemic issues with ontological ones. It is right that in the usual context of musical improvisation, nothing else apart from the improvised performance and the process in generating them is relevant from the point of view of the aesthetic appreciation. However, this phenomenon does not preclude the performer from being at the same time a composer, one who is indicating a sound structure of a new work via an improvised performance. Accordingly, the improvised performance would be the first performance of this new work. Although it is not an object of aesthetic appreciation in the context of that performance, the work instantiated by means of the improvisation may have aesthetic interest for us in a different musical context or in a different context of performance. Examples of this phenomenon are some pieces belonging to the musical genres of *ricercar*, *tiento*, *impromptu* and *fantasia*, which are musical improvisations written in a subsequent musical context to be appreciated as repeatable musical works. Bertinetto is right in claiming that musical improvisations are not repeatable, as any other musical performance. However, the musical works indicated by means of such improvisations are repeatable and fall under the category of types.

Therefore, the view that musical works are types has a simple and direct way to accommodate the phenomenon of musical improvisation within its theoretical framework. It assigns to musical improvisations the category of token, while the category of type is reserved to the musical work indicated by means of the improvisation. Consequently, Bertinetto's argument from improvisation does not constitute an insurmountable problem for a type/token theory.

6. Rossberg and the destroyability of musical works

Rossberg has defended that there is another inconsistency that invalidates the idea that musical works are abstract objects and hence types. In this case, the inconsistency at stake is between the claims that musical works are abstract objects and that all musical works are created and can be destroyed (Rossberg, 2012: 63). Rossberg considers different alternatives that regard abstract objects as creatable and destroyable entities, but argues that none of them offers a satisfactory account of the nature of musical works.

In the first place, he attends to the Aristotelian conception of universals, according to which they are ontologically dependent on their instances. According to the Aristotelian view, universals begin to exist with their first instance and cease to exist when there are no instances of them. Rossberg identifies three worries regarding this conception of abstract objects when applied to explain the nature of musical works (cf. Rossberg, 2012: 65). Firstly, it cannot explain the survival of a musical work between its performances if they are separated in time. Secondly, Aristotelianism entails that a work will be created by means of its first performance rather than by the compositional action carried out by the composer. And finally, this view has no way to explain the existence of unperformed works. Moreover, Rossberg rejects the view that identifies musical works with abstract indicated structures, for abstract structures are 'necessary, atemporal and abstract universals' unable to explain the alleged creatability and destroyability of musical works (cf. Rossberg, 2012: 65, 74). The third option considered by Rossberg is the one that regards types as 'sui generis abstract objects', according to which a type is an equivalence class of its tokens. Under such a view, types would be abstract particulars, their repeatability would be explained by the membership of its tokens to the equivalence class, and the members of the class would be the performances of the work. The main problem that Rossberg finds in this approach is that since classes are individuated by their members, all unperformed works would be the same work. To the extent that two classes are identical if, and only if, they have the same members, and the equivalence class of any unperformed work is always empty, all unperformed works would be identical (Rossberg, 2012: 66-7). Finally, Rossberg claims that types construed as creatable and destructible entities are ontologically superfluous. According to Rossberg, all that is ontologically said of musical works *qua* types constructed in such a way can be translated into sentences that do not appeal to types. Rossberg defends this view by means of an analogy with inscription-types:

> Any ontology that appeals to types of the creatable and destructible fashion can do without them, since it is in fact only concrete tokens that are ever essentially appealed to. Inessential uses of types, like 'the (inscription- type) "Paris" consists of five letters,' can be eliminated from the theoretical discourse in favor of constructions like 'Every "Paris" inscription consists of five letter inscriptions.' For this method, it does not matter whether the types in question are inscription-types, event-types, action-types, or any other kind of type (Rossberg, 2012: 75).

The same phenomenon applies to the musical case in Rossberg's view. If we regard types as creatable and destructible entities, inessential uses of types, like 'Beethoven's *Sonata* is in F major', can be eliminated from the theoretical discourse in favour of constrictions like 'every properly formed performance of Beethoven's *Sonata* is in F major'. Therefore, appealing to types constructed in such a way would be superfluous to explain the ontological nature of musical works. Rossberg's conclusion of this analysis is that since there is no view of abstract objects that satisfactory accounts for the creatability and destroyability of musical works, musical works cannot be ascribed to the category of abstract objects in the absence of an additional theoretical justification (Rossberg, 2012: 80).

All these criticisms can be challenged by the defender of a type/token theory. The type/token theorist does not need to account for the creatability and destructibility of abstract objects to offer a methodologically accurate account of the nature of musical works. The strategy to be adopted by the type/token theorist requires recalling the distinction between entrenchment and familiarity drawn in chapter 2. An intuition that is very familiar to us, to the extent that it is broadly shared –having hence a high frequency of use–, may be nonetheless a non-entrenched one. Only entrenched intuitions –those that are projectible hypothesis and constitute the core of our musical practices– cannot be removed by the discoveries achieved in the ontological inquiry. By contrast, those familiar intuitions that are not revealed as entrenched ones may be revised. Creatability and destructibility are intuitions about the existence and persistence conditions of musical works. The creatability intuition is not factually grounded in our musical practices, which reveals it as a non-entrenched intuition. The same facts that supposedly support the belief that musical works are created can also support the idea that musical works are discovered (cf. Dodd, 2000: 429-34; see also chapter 1). Consequently, both the intuitions that musical works are created and that musical works are discovered cannot be regarded as supported hypothesis, i.e. as hypothesis having positive cases confirming them. Accordingly, they fail one of the features to be entrenched intuitions. They can be thus revised in light of discoveries achieved by the ontology of music if such revision is required in order to keep the balance between the conformation with our musical practices and the theoretical virtues of explanatory power, simplicity and integration with the findings of other domains. Therefore, if respecting the creatability intuition leads us to lose some explanatory power provided by a type/token theory, the creatability intuition may be revised, even if it is a highly familiar intuition.

A similar story applies to the destroyability intuition for musical works. In the first place, it might be regarded as a familiar intuition, but the degree of familiarity of this belief seems to be less than that of the creatability intuition. There is a clear contrast here, one to which Rossberg does not seem to pay much attention to, between artworks that are concrete particulars –for instance, paintings or sculptures– and musical works. In the former case, it seems to be clear what it is for Michelangelo's *David* to be destroyed, and a causal explanation of how this sculpture might be destroyed can be

found. For instance, if a bomb explodes and breaks the *David* into a thousand pieces disintegrating some of them, we will say that the sculpture is destroyed. By contrast, it is not clear what it is for Beethoven's *Sonata* to be destroyed, and a causal explanation of its destruction is hard to find. It might be said that the *Sonata* is destroyed if all the scores of it are destroyed. However, there might still be recordings in which the *Sonata* survives, so that destroying all the scores does not grant the *Sonata* to be destroyed. It is not also granted if we additionally destroy all the recordings of the *Sonata*, for there might be some people that remember its sound structure. Let us suppose, in addition, that all people remembering its sound structure except one person die, and that this one person becomes amnesiac. It is a case in which we have no epistemic access to the *Sonata*, one in which we could not perform it again and, consequently, a scenario in which the *Sonata* might be said to be destroyed. But, what would happen if 20 years later the amnesiac recover his memory and remembers again the *Sonata*? Would we say that it has been destroyed during those 20 years and that it comes to exist again now? But if it does not exist during those 20 years and exists now with the recovery of the amnesiac, would we say that the amnesiac has brought the *Sonata* back to life? It seems here that all facts supporting the hypothesis that the *Sonata* is destroyable also support the idea that the *Sonata* may lack epistemic access during a time. Consequently, none of those facts really supports one hypothesis against the other, so that they might be regarded as non-entrenched intuitions, as it happens in the case of creatability and discovery of musical works. However, the hypotheses that musical works may lack epistemic access, on the one hand, and being destroyable, on the other, are not coextensive hypothesis. Even if both are confirmed by the same cases, the latter enters into conflict with the non-overridden intuition that the same thing cannot be created twice. Therefore, there are even better reasons to revise the destroyability intuition about musical works if it leads us to loose the explanatory power provided by a type/token theory.

Consequently, even if we assume Rossberg's criticisms against the views that regard types as creatable and destroyable entities, the intuitions that musical works are created and that they can be destroyed does not make it impossible to assign to them the ontological category of types. These intuitions are just familiar, but not entrenched in our musical practices. Consequently, a right ontological account of the nature of musical works is not required to accommodate them. They can be revised if the accommodation of them in an ontological account precludes it to satisfy the theoretical virtues of explanatory power, simplicity and integration in other domains. In addition, some of Rossberg worries about the creatability and destroyability of types are questionable in lights of the results achieved in chapter 6. It has been argued there that the creatability and destroyability of types is a matter of our philosophical, but not musical, intuitions concerning the principle of instantiation of properties. The task of the ontologist is to measure whether the consequences in theoretical and practical terms of holding such a principle is more or less profitable. Therefore, Rossberg's point does not constitute an objection against the thesis that musical works are types.

7.   Kania's criticisms to type/token theories

Kania's general criticism against the thesis that musical works are types is that this view does not constitute a methodologically adequate account of musical works. From a metaontological point of view, Kania assumes the primacy of practices entailed by David Davies' pragmatic constraint (see chapter 2, section II.3). Kania interprets the pragmatic constraint in the sense that 'our best musical theories' constitute 'our most important evidence base' to check the answers given to ontological questions (Kania, 2012c: 199). By 'musical theories', Kania does not understand the discipline of music theory, but rather 'our best understanding of this entire cultural sphere, of everything that goes on in the production and reception of music, that is our evidence base for ontological claims about music' (Kania, 2012c: 199-200). Our best understanding of the musical phenomenon identifies, according to Kania, five basic features of musical works that he summarizes as follows:

> (i) musical works are 'multiple' or 'repeatable'; they have 'instances' (performances), none of which can intuitively be identified with the work (…); (ii) we have 'access' to or come into 'contact' with the work 'through' or 'in' any one of these instances (…); (iii) musical works are intentionally created by composers; (iv) they are normative, both in the sense that they specify how their performances should go, and in the sense that they admit of better and worse performances; and (v) they possess aesthetic or artistic properties that seem to depend on the cultural context of their composition (Kania, 2012c: 198-9).

Kania's first objection against a type/token theory is that it is only focused on explaining the features (i) and (ii), ignoring features (iii), (iv) and (v) (Kania, 2012c: 201). The latter features, Kania argues, cannot be straightforwardly accounted by a type/token theory because they prevent musical works from being assimilated to the ontology of properties. The strategy of the type/token theorist is just to address (iii), (iv) and (v) once given an ontological explanation of the aspects (i) and (ii), in an attempt to accommodate (iii), (iv) and (v) to such explanation, either by rejecting them or by 'supplying paraphrases of the relevant judgments' (Kania, 2012c: 201). Accordingly, a type/token theory is not methodologically acceptable because it does not account in an appropriate manner of the whole data of musical works provided by our practices.

The second methodological mistake attributed by Kania to the type/token theorist is the defence of this position as the simplest view to explain features (i) and (ii). Kania argues that judgments about simplicity are relative and contextual. He takes Dodd's judgments about simplicity to be relative to what he calls the 'metaphysical constraint', the restriction that 'our ontological theories of art, as far as possible, ought to appeal only to entities posited by our best general metaphysical theories' (Kania, 2012c: 202). In Kania's opinion, the metaphysical constraint is what motivates Dodd to select (i) and (ii) as the main features to be explained by the ontology of music. The restriction to these two features is what, according to Kania, enables Dodd to assign to musical works a kind of entity posited by our best general metaphysical theories, namely, types. Consequently, Kania's second methodological objection to the

type/token theorist is that she is methodologically mistaken in giving to the metaphysical constraint the same or even more relevance than she gives to the pragmatic constraint.

Let us start with this second objection. As we have seen in chapter 2, metaontological positions that argue for a primacy of practices have to face the problem of triviality. If ontological claims do not add cognitive content to the tacit conception about musical works' nature, ontology would be prevented from providing any relevant cognitive content to the sciences studying music and to our musical practices. An ontological inquiry to study the nature of musical works would be hardly motivated under this view. To overcome this problem, among others, a reflective equilibrium between musical practices and formal ontology has been proposed in chapter 2 as a methodological solution. According to this view, given the possibility of the implicit conception in our musical practices to be mistaken, there should be a mutual adjustment between musical practices and ontological considerations. The tacit conception on musical works might be constituted by beliefs that, despite their being very familiar to us, are non projectible hypothesis. Such beliefs should not be preserved by, or accommodated by, our ontological theory about musical works if they clash with sound theoretical principles or other non-overridden hypothesis (cf. Chapter 2). The methodological criterion endorsed by the defender of reflective equilibrium is not simply coherence with respect to the tacit conception, but it rather involves a balance between such coherence and the theoretical virtues of explanatory power, simplicity and integration with the findings of other domains –what Kania calls the metaphysical constraint. Therefore, if –as Kania says– Dodd keeps a balance between the pragmatic and metaphysical constraints, his defence of the type/token theory is methodologically justified, contrary to what Kania maintains.

It is true that Kania does not appeal here to our tacit musical theory *simpliciter*, but rather to our *best* musical theory –by contrast to Thomasson or even to Kania's earlier papers (cf. Chapter 2, section 2.1). It might be argued that this point helps Kania to elude the worries addressed in the previous paragraph. However, the appeal to our best musical theory raises another sort of concerns. The most salient of them is how the best musical theory is obtained. Kania says nothing regarding this issue. If he assumes the rational reflection upon practices defended by Davies as the way to obtain our best musical theory –even in a depurated fashion so as not to exclude ontological intuitions (cf. Kania, 2012c: 200)–, Kania's view will be subject to the same problems than Davies metaontology discussed in chapter 2. The first salient problem is that some ontological prejudices might be involved in rational reflection, resulting in a characterisation of the musical data that would not be independent of the ontological theory that has to explain them. In the second place, the result of applying the rational reflection may result in a description of the musical practices of other possible worlds different from @, i.e. a description of how musical practices *should* be rather than how they *are*. Therefore, if Kania follows Davies' account, his view will be also subject to

those criticisms. Otherwise, he owes an explanation of how the best musical theory can be obtained. In the absence of such explanation, his methodological view is unjustified.

Let us now return to Kania's first objection against a type/token theory. According to this objection, a type/token theory cannot account for features (iii), (iv) and (v), thus offering a misleading characterisation of the way in which musical works are presented in our practices. However, this objection also seems to be inadequate. In the first place, a type/token theory has a way to account for feature (iv). According to (iv), the normativity of a musical work is twofold: on the one hand, it determines among its performances which are correct and which ones are incorrect, and on the other, how its performances should go. Although Kania is right in saying that (iv) precludes to assimilate musical works to the ontology of properties, it remains open the possibility to assimilate them to the ontology of *normative* properties. As Dodd and Wolterstorff have noted, 'a property *F* is normative within a type *K* just in case (i) *K* is a norm-type; and (ii) it is impossible for there to be something that is a properly formed token of *K* and which lacks *F*' (Dodd, 2007: 32; cf. Wolterstorff, 1980: 58). For simplicity, let us focus now in a traditional two-levels type/token theory. The second clause is what explains the second sense of normativity of a musical work, indicating how its properly formed performances should be: a correct performance of the piece is one that does not lack the normative property *K*. The first sense of normativity, according to which a musical work may have better or worse performances, can be understood in two ways. The first way is relative to the gradual manner in which the normative property *K* is satisfied by the tokens of the type (i.e. its performances). Given two performances *a* and *b*, *a* is better (worse) than *b* iff *a* satisfies *K* in a higher (lower) degree than *b*. In addition, the second way in which the performances of a work may be better or worse is the following: two performances *c* and *d* satisfy at a same degree the condition *K* and nonetheless *c* is better (worse) than *d*. The standards determining the value of *c* and *d* are relative to a particular musical context in which the musical work is performed. The musical context determines the scope of the variability of a work qua type in its tokens. This situation does not constitute a problem for the thesis that musical works are types. As Dodd has pointed out (cf. Dodd, 2007: 33), the conditions given by the normative property *K* individuating a musical work *qua* type do not exhaust all the aspects for performance. Accordingly, the performer has an ample room of maneuver to produce his own interpretation even if his performance fully satisfies *K*. The options available within this space will be assessed as valid or invalid by the musical medium in which the performance is played, determining a wider o narrower scope for the variability of the piece. As we have seen, this strategy is also applied to an ontology of multiple levels as the one posited by the hypothesis of nested types.

In addition, a type/token theory has no problem to accommodate feature (v), according to which some of aesthetic and artistic attributes of musical works involve relational non-aesthetic properties. Examples of these relational non-aesthetic properties are *being composed by Brahms* or *being influenced by Beethoven*. The way in which Kania introduces (v) suggests that the identity of musical works is partly determined by

this kind of relational properties that associate the work's sound structure with different aspects of its context of composition. In other words, it suggests musical contextualism, the view that musical works are individuated by their context of composition. As noted in chapter 6, some defenders of the *received view* take musical contextualism to be incompatible with a type/token theory. Consequently, they regard a type/token theory incapable to account for (v), which constitutes a reason for rejecting a type/token theory for these authors –among which Kania seems to be. However, as it has been shown in chapter 6, the individuation and the categorial questions are independent, at least concerning types. In particular, embracing musical contextualism does not preclude the possibility of ascribing to musical works the category of types. As indicated in chapter 6, a type is individuated by the condition to be satisfied by its properly formed tokens. This condition is a property or a set of properties. Let us call it *K*. The relevant point is that there is nothing that precludes relational properties to belong to *K*. For instance, the relational property ψ-as-composed-by-Beethoven-in-1908 can be regarded as a property individuating Beethoven's *5ᵗʰ Symphony*, i.e. as a property belonging to the condition *K* that individuates Beethoven's *5ᵗʰ Symphony* qua type. Accordingly, only performances that reproduce in an adequate way the sound structure ψ and that stand in a causal relation with Beethoven's compositional act will be regarded as properly formed performances of that piece. In addition, there is nothing that precludes the property ψ-as-composed-by-Beethoven-in-1908 to exist before 1808 (cf. Chapter 6, section 3). This concerns our philosophical intuitions as to whether we should accept the principle of instantiation of properties, which has nothing to do with the construction of a type/token theory *per se*. Therefore, a type/token theory can accommodate musical contextualism and, consequently, it is able to offer an explanation of feature (v).

Finally, a type/token theory, in its Platonist version, will reject feature (iii). However, as we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, it would be methodologically justified in doing so. Kania is mistaken in presenting (iii) as a feature of musical works. It is rather the expression of an intuition interpreting different facts of our practices, namely the creatability intuition, the belief that musical works are created by their composed. However, the same kinds of facts that support (iii) also support (iii'), the idea that musical works are intentionally discovered by their composers. Consequently, (iii) and (iii') are not entrenched beliefs because they are not supported hypothesis. Therefore, the defender of the thesis that musical works are types is justified in revising the creatability intuition if such revision is demanded by the need to maintain the balance between the coherence with practices and the theoretical virtues.

Accordingly, the two methodological objections addressed by Kania against a type/token theory are misguided, not constituting real problems for a type/token theorist. Accordingly, the hypothesis of nested types is immune to Kania's criticisms.

8. Conclusions

In this chapter, different worries concerning the hypothesis of nested types have been considered. The most pressing of them has been considered in the first place, namely, the worry that regards the hypothesis of nested types as an *ad hoc* ontological account of musical works. Against this concern, it has been argued that, embracing the hypothesis of nested types to explain the nature of all musical works is theoretically fruitful. Provided that all musical works can be revised and transcribed, even those that have never been revised or transcribed, the hypothesis of nested types offers a powerful, unified, elegant and simple explanation of their nature. Works that have been neither revised nor transcribed are to be understood as higher order types that are instantiated in one and only version, the one that is specified by the work's composer in the original score. In addition, it has been shown that extending the hypothesis of nested types to all musical works is intuitive from the perspective of our musical practices. In particular, it can accommodate the two most notable views on musical authenticity, namely, score compliance authenticity and interpretative authenticity. The first one is understood as the fidelity to a good understanding of the notations of a version's score. The second one is understood as fidelity to a work's content. The hypothesis of nested types explains cases of conflict between score compliance and interpretative authenticity as ones in which the departure in performance from the original score is intended to give rise to a new version, and hence to a new way of presentation, of that work. It also explains the cases in which score compliance authenticity and interpretative authenticity do not conflict between them. By focusing on the notion of performance interpretations, this kind of products has been accommodated as lower order types that instantiated a version of a musical work *qua* a higher order type. In all these cases, the resulting performances can be regarded as authentic ones because they are properly formed instances of a work conceived as a higher order type, falling under the scope of its variability.

Once it is established that it is intuitive from a theoretical and a practical perspective to endorse the hypothesis of nested types as a general account about the nature of musical works, the rest of the chapter has been devoted to address different criticisms recently addressed against the idea that musical works are types. In the first place, it has been considered Hazlett's argument, which aims to show that the nature of types is incompatible with the nature of musical works because types are modally inflexible entities while musical works are not. As a reply, it has been argued that if types are regarded as eternal entities –i.e. as existing at all times–, the type/token theory can appeal to a *de re* counterpart relation between possible worlds to dissolve the inconsistency pointed by Hazlett's argument. Beethoven's *5th Symphony* could have as a musical work counterpart in a possible world a sound structure different from its sound structure in @. However, this different sound structure is not a counterpart of the type with which the *5th Symphony* is identified in @. Thus, the modal inflexibility of types is compatible with the modal flexibility of musical works even if we identify musical

works with types. It has also been shown that the idea of musical works qua types being modally flexible entities is plausible under alternative accounts that dispense with modal realism and that regard types as non-eternal created entities.

Secondly, Bertinetto's rejection of the intuition that musical works are repeatable, and his rejection of a type/token theory as a suitable explanation of their nature, has been assessed. It has been argued that Bertinetto is right in highlighting that there are relevant practices involving creativity that go beyond the composer's activity, that the context of performance plays a relevant role in determining when something is a properly formed performance of a work, and that the experience of the unexpected is important to our aesthetic appreciation of musical works. This is part of the target of the inquiry developed here, since the phenomenon of versions and transcriptions are examples of this creative sphere. However, it has been shown that these practices fall under the view of interpretative authenticity, and that the hypothesis of nested types is able to accommodate them without dispensing with the familiar intuition that musical works are repeatable. In addition, it has been also argued that Bertinetto's rejection of musical works' repeatability is grounded on a misleading analysis of our musical practices that results in unjustified revisionary consequences concerning the existence and persistence conditions of musical works and the distinction between performers and composers.

Thirdly, Bertinetto's argument from improvisation against type/token theories has been addressed. This argument states that a type/token theory does not account for the features of musical improvisation. It has been replied that this argument is only valid under the assumption that the type/token theorist assigns to musical improvisation the category of type. However, this assumption is not justified because it interprets non-charitably the type/token theorist, forcing her to commit a categorical mistake. It has been shown that the type/token theorist has at her disposal a category that satisfies the features that characterise musical improvisation, namely, the category of token. Accordingly, it would not be motivations for the type/token theorist to assign the category of types to musical improvisations.

Fourthly, Rossberg argues that the thesis that identifies musical works with types is incompatible with the idea that musical works are creatable and destructible, and hence it does not constitute a good explanation of their nature. As a reply to this view defended by Rossberg, it has been argued, firstly, that a type/token theory is compatible with the creatability and destroyability intuitions. The existence conditions of a type are inherited from the existence conditions of the property that individuates that type. If we endorse the principle of instantiation of properties, according to which properties exist only when they are instantiated, types are created with their first instantiation and destroyed with their last one. However, we might be bound to preserve the idea that types are eternal in order to overcome, at the same time, Hazlett's objection. This does not constitute a problem for a type/token theory. Since creatability and destroyability

are just familiar but not entrenched intuitions, the type/token theorists are entitled to revise them to pursue their explanatory goals.

Finally, Kania objects against a type/token theory that it is not methodologically acceptable for two reasons: it does not account in an appropriate way for the data provided by our musical practices –ignoring the idea that they are intentionally created by their composers, that they are normative, and that their aesthetic and artistic properties depend on their context of composition–, and it confers an unjustified relevance to the metaphysical constraint. Regarding the first objection, it has been argued that a type/token theory can accommodate the normativity of types by appealing to normative properties, that the idea that musical works are intentionally created is a non-entrenched intuition that can be revised, and that a type/token theory is compatible with contextualism because a relational property can individuate a type. About the second objection, the appeal to the metaphysical constraint has been justified in light of reflective equilibrium, introduced in chapter 2 as the right methodology for the ontology of music.

Consequently, the thesis that musical works are types –and hence the hypothesis of nested types– is immune to the criticisms considered here. Therefore, there is no relevant obstacle to the characterization drawn here of musical works as higher order types, and their versions and transcriptions as lower order types. This conclusion reinforces the idea developed in the first section that the hypothesis of nested types is not an *ad hoc* position. The point is not only that the application of the hypothesis of nested types to explain the nature of all musical works is justified from theoretical and practical points of view, but also that there is no pressing worries to identify musical works with types.

Conclusions

This inquiry has been devoted to study of the nature of musical versions and transcriptions. It has been intended to palliate the lack in the ontological debate concerning this sort of musical products. Ontological accounts have been traditionally focused on cases of musical works that have never been revised or transcribed, disregarding a broad sphere of creative practices that come after the composer's process of composition of a work. These creative practices concern musical versions and transcriptions, but also issues regarding the authenticity of a work's performances in terms of interpretative authenticity and fidelity to the work. It has been shown in chapter 1 that traditional accounts in the ontology of music are unable to offer a satisfactory explanation of the products and practices of this creative sphere that come after the composition of a work. On the one hand, the views entailing that versions and transcriptions are different works from the work versioned or transcribed face problems to distinguish these musical products from works inspired or based on previous ones. On the other hand, the views tending to regard versions and transcriptions as the same work as the work versioned or transcribed face problems concerning the individuation of versions and transcriptions, and of musical works in general. In this sense, refocusing the ontology of music on this sphere has provided us with a new insight that offers a wider explanatory scope that the traditionally available views, in hope of offering a superior account that overcomes the impasse in the ontology of music in face of the proliferation of a great plurality of views.

It has been shown in this research that the hypothesis of nested types is the best answer to the categorial question in the ontology of music. According to this hypothesis, musical works are higher order types that are instantiated in lower order types –a work's versions and transcriptions–, which are instantiated in musical performances. Concerning the individuation question, it has been shown that musical works are individuated according to pure sonicism and to a sort of non-indexical contextualism that modulates the scope of the variables of a work's sound structure attending, in first instance, to the context of composition of its versions and transcriptions, and in second instance, to the context of its performances. In addition, non-indexical contextualism is complemented by indexical contextualism and timbral sonicism for the individuation of a work's versions and transcriptions.

This view has been defended here as the best explanation of musical works' nature on the basis of the methodology introduced in chapter 2. Recent research has pointed to a metaontological realm as the sphere where the impasse in the ontology of music is to be solved. In this chapter, it has been shown that the two main views in the metaontology of music, i.e. descriptivism and revisionism, face different sort of

problems. Descriptivist accounts, according to which ontology is entitled only to describe our pre-theoretical thought about the nature of musical works, are bound to the problem of triviality –i.e. the problem that ontological claims do not provide cognitive content about the nature of musical works. The descriptivist accounts that overcome the problem of triviality entail eliminativist or fictionalist thesis about musical works, which lead them to the problem of inconsistency to the extent that they betray their basic principle of not revising fundamental beliefs of our musical practices. On the other hand, metaontological revisionism puts no constraints to the revisions that may be operated over our pre-theoretical intuitions. In this sense, revisionism faces the problem of solipsism to the extent that it is a methodology that may validate a concept of musical work that has no applicability in our musical practices and other related domains. The identification of the problems of triviality, inconsistency and solipsism has entailed two desiderata to be satisfied by any suitable ontological account of musical works. The first one is minimal descriptivism, according to which ontological accounts of musical works, within a given context, should be able to accommodate widespread musical intuitions. The second one is minimal revisionism, according to which ontological accounts of musical works should be able to revise our practical intuitions whenever they clash with sound theoretical principles.

It has been shown that the methodology that best satisfies both desiderata is a renewed view of reflective equilibrium based on Goodman's original notion. According to it, an intuition of our musical practices about the nature of musical works is valid if it is compatible with the results obtained in the ontology of music following the theoretical principles of simplicity, explanatory power and compatibility with our best theories in other domains. In turn, the results in ontology are valid if they can accommodate most of our widely shared intuitions about musical works' nature. The mechanism that reflective equilibrium offers to satisfy the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism is the distinction between familiar and entrenched practical intuitions. Familiar intuitions are those that are widely shared and used in our musical practices for different practical purposes. By contrast, entrenched intuitions are those that constitute projectible hypothesis, i.e. ones that are supported (having positive cases), non-violated (having no negative cases), non-exhausted (having undetermined cases) and ones that do not conflict with non-overridden hypothesis. It has been argued that, in order to avoid the ontologist prejudices, the best way to account for our practical intuitions is by combining the methods of experimental philosophy with the results and procedures employed in empirical disciplines studying music, such as musicology or music theory. By contrast, it was noted that empirical methods are not suitable to determine which familiar intuitions are also entrenched ones. We can only determine which familiar intuitions are not entrenched by means of reflection and conceptual analysis. Consequently, the role that empirical methods play in the ontology of music is to be understood under the positive program of experimental philosophy, according to which empirical methods are regarded as a complement of the traditional philosophical ones. According to reflective equilibrium, ontology must preserve entrenched intuitions but it is entitled to revise those that are merely familiar. The latter

are ones that are not as nuclear to our musical practices and those in which a more reduced number of projections of our practices depend on.

Chapter 3 has been devoted to determine what the familiar intuitions are regarding the ontological status of musical versions and transcriptions. Firstly, it has been ascertained that musicologists tend to classify versions and transcriptions as works non-numerically different from the work versioned or transcribed. This trend suggests, and is coherent with, the intuition that versions and transcriptions are not different musical works from the works versioned or transcribed. Secondly, musicological studies about the composers' motivations for producing new versions and transcriptions of a work have been explored. These motivations suggest again that musicologists share the intuition that in producing a version or transcription of a work they are not composing a new work. In addition, this inquiry has revealed a sense of authenticity according to which versions and transcriptions may be faithful or not with respect to a musical work's content, in a similar sense in which musical performances are. Thirdly, an empirical study following the method of cases has been carried out to check the listeners' intuitions when confronted with performances of versions, transcriptions and works based on previous ones. Only in the last case, when listeners are confronted with performances of a previous work and other inspired on it, they have the intuition that in those performances they are hearing to two different musical works. In the other cases, listeners' broadly share the intuition that in hearing a performance of a version or transcription they are hearing not only that version or transcription, but also the work versioned or transcribed. This has been called the standard view on versions and transcriptions. These results also reinforce the idea that repeatability is a familiar intuition to the extent that listeners regard that a same work is repeated in the performances of its different versions and transcriptions.

The results obtained in chapter 3 have been used in chapter 4 to show that Davies' account on transcriptions is revisionary. In this sense, it has been shown that he mistakenly presents as the default position the thesis that transcriptions are different works from the work transcribed. The rest of the chapter has explored whether Davies provides an account showing that the familiar intuition that transcriptions are not different works from the work transcribed is a non-entrenched one, and hence, an account that justifies the revision of that belief. Three alternative reasons in his account have been identified, all of them trying to support the idea that a change of instrumental medium (instrumentation) entails a change in a work's identity. The first one is that the context of composition determines that instrumentation is a normative property of medium-specific musical works. It has been shown against this idea that the normative character of the prescriptions made by a composer regarding instrumentation is relative to a context of performance and not to the context of composition. Accordingly, transcriptions' performances fall under the scope of the variability of the transcribed work, whose limits are determined by a context of performance. The second one is that colour (or timbre) is a necessary condition of the structure and content of a musical work. Against this view, it has been highlighted that there is a physical disanalogy

between colour in painting and colour (or timbre) in music. This disanalogy shows that, while colour is necessary to painting, it is not to musical works and that its right analogue is pitch height. An the third one is that certain aesthetic properties constitutive of the identity of musical works depend on the specific instrumental medium prescribed by the composer, taking 'virtuosic' as a paradigmatic case of this phenomenon. It has been shown by means of an empirical research that the idea that virtuosic is a property of musical works is revisionary regarding the uses of this predicate. There is a kind of predicates –to which 'virtuosic' belongs– that are mainly used as attributions of performances and not of the works performed. This result suggests the intuition that virtuosic is a property of performances that we only predicate of musical works derivatively from its performances, and hence that it is not part of the work's content. No reason has been found in Davies' account to show that this intuition is a non-entrenched one. The conclusion achieved is that Davies does not provide any account to show that the intuition that transcriptions do not constitute different works from the work transcribed is a non-entrenched one. Consequently, according to minimal descriptivism and reflective equilibrium, this belief must be accommodated by an ontological account of musical works.

In chapter 5, the hypothesis of nested types has been introduced as the best ontological account of musical versions and transcriptions regarding the categorial question. On the side of our musical practices, it can accommodate the standard view, i.e. the intuition that in hearing a performance of a version or transcription we are hearing three things: that performance, the version or transcription performed, and the work versioned or transcribed. It explains this phenomenon by means of iterative instantiations between three levels of objects: firstly, between the work as a higher order type and its versions or transcriptions –lower order types that are tokens of the higher order type–, and secondly, between versions and transcriptions as lower order types and musical performances –sound sequence events that are tokens of lower order types. Given the transmission of properties between types and their tokens, the hypothesis of nested types guarantees that in hearing a performance of a version or transcription we are hearing, not only that performance, but also the version or transcription performed. In addition, since versions and transcriptions are tokens of the work versioned or transcribed, when we accede to a version or transcription by means of its tokens (musical performances), we also accede to the work versioned or transcribed. The transmission of properties between higher order types and musical performances is transitive by passing through types of lower order. On the side of the theoretical virtues, it preserves the theoretical advantages of a type/token theory –regarded as the best explanation of musical works' repeatability– and it is able to accommodate structural monism –the best explanation for the individuation of musical works– with the association of different sound structures with the same musical work entailed by the standard view on versions and transcriptions. It has been shown that different attempts to replace structural monism by a view compatible with structural pluralism –the continuants view, the performance theory and resemblance nominalism– either clash with sound theoretical principles or are not able to accommodate in a satisfactory way

the standard view. Alternatively, the hypothesis of nested types is free of those problems. A musical work as a higher order type is individuated by a sound structure that has different variable forks that are filled by its versions and transcriptions, in first instance, and by musical performances, in second instance. These variable forks correspond to different parameters as instrumentation, structural features, composer, and time of composition (or indication). Accordingly, the sound structure that individuates a musical work as a higher order type is a more indeterminate one that can be instantiated in more determinate and different sound structures, the ones that correspond to its versions and transcriptions. The scope of the variable places of the sound structure individuating a work depend on the context of composition of its versions and transcriptions and on a context of performance, which determine the performances in which that work is repeatable.

Consequently, regarding the individuation question, musical works *qua* higher order types are individuated according to pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism. Pure sonicism is required in order to a work may admit different instrumentations corresponding to different transcriptions of it. Contextual factors, in contrast to Davies' non-indexical contextualism, play the role of determining the instantiation conditions of musical works. Two conditions have been identified. A first one is that the sound structures corresponding to the versions and transcriptions of a same work must satisfy a certain degree of similarity. This degree of similarity is determined by the common ground of the context of composition of such versions and transcriptions and may change over time, hand by hand with the kinematics of the musical common ground. A second condition is that the different sound structures corresponding to the versions and transcriptions of the same work must be indicated by acts of indication that are parts of the same process of composition. It has been shown that a work's process of composition is a continuant extended though time and whose temporal parts are different acts of sound-structures' indication. To belong to the same process of composition, the acts of indication must be similar enough in different respect (aims, scope, musical technique) that are modulated by the context of composition. In addition, these acts of indication must be causally related, to the extent that ulterior acts of indication causally depend on earlier acts of indication. These two instantiation conditions of musical works *qua* higher order types in versions and transcriptions *qua* lower order types show that the individuation of versions and transcriptions depends, not only on a sound structure, but also on timbral and contextual parameters. The versions and transcriptions of the same musical works are different entities that stand between them into temporal and locational relations. Their identity is given also by the norms that they determine for performance, which holds timbral and structural properties. This phenomenon has leaded us to the conclusion that versions and transcriptions are individuated by a sound structure, by a specific instrumentation (timbral properties) and by reference to the composer and time of composition, in spite of these aspects have not been clearly backed by the empirical study presented in chapter 3.

The conclusions achieved in chapter 5 require a type-ontology to be compatible with different views on the individuation question. The plausibility of this strategy has been shown in chapter 6. The aim of this section has been to face the received view on Platonism and Aristotelianism, according to which Platonism entails that musical works are individuated according to sonicism and non-contextualism, and that Aristotelianism implies that musical works are individuated by instrumentalism and contextualism. To reject this view, it has been presented an argument that shows that the differences between Platonism and Aristotelianism merely concern the existence conditions for types, having nothing to do with the definition of which the parameters that determine the identity of such types are. Accordingly, Platonism and Aristotelianism disagree about the endorsement of the Principle of Instantiation of Properties, but not necessarily about the identity conditions for types. Consequently, both platonic and aristotelian types are compatible with all the views about the individuation of musical works – indexical contextualism, non-contextualism, non-indexical contextualism, pure sonicism timbral sonicism and instrumentalism. The different views on the individuation question only concern the degree of exigency demanded by the property that individuates a type for something to be a properly formed token of that type. Indexical contextualism, timbral sonicism and instrumentalism are more demanding than non-indexical contextualism, non-contextualism and pure sonicism.

The conclusions of this chapter have being revealed as having important consequences for the hypothesis of nested types. The fact that musical works *qua* higher order types are individuated by pure sonicism and non-indexical contextualism, and that versions and transcriptions *qua* lower order types are individuated by timbral sonicism, indexical contextualism and non-indexical contextualism, does not imply that musical works, on the one hand, and versions and transcriptions, on the other, are associated with different kinds of types. If that were the case, the hypothesis of nested types would be non-economical from an ontological point of view, multiplying in our ontology the kinds of entities posited. However, the difference in the individuation of a work and its versions and transcriptions lies on the degree of exigency of the property that individuates the types with which these musical products are identified. The degree of exigency is more demanding in the case of lower order types (versions and transcriptions) than in the case of higher order types (the musical work). The identity of a lower order type depends on more parameters than the identity of the higher order type. It is determined, not only by a sound structure, but also by the reference to the composer, time of composition and instrumentation. In contrast, the identity of a higher order type is only determined by a sound structure, whose variable places are contextually constrained.

The second relevant consequence is that the conclusions of chapter 6 solve the problem of creatability for the hypothesis of nested types. They offer two ways in which the hypothesis of nested types is compatible with the intuition that musical works are created. On the one hand, we may endorse the principle of instantiation of properties. In this case, a musical work is created when the first of its instances –i.e. the first of its

versions– is indicated by its composer. The principle of instantiation of properties states that a property begins to exist with the first of its instances. According to the type/token theory, the existence of a type is ontologically dependent on the existence of the property that individuates it. By means of indicating the first version of a work, a composer is instantiating by the first time the property that individuates that work *qua* a higher order type. By means of producing the first instance of that work, the composer is bringing into existence the property that individuates that higher order type and, with this, the higher order type itself. Alternatively, we might think in a levinsonian way that it is the possibility of being instantiated which brought into existence a type. A work *qua* a higher order type can be instantiated when there is a person with enough musical knowledge and expertise to discover it, and when that person employs her knowledge in trying to compose it a first version of that work. In other words, a work begins to exist when its musical process of composition –conceived as a continuant– begins to exist.

In the final chapter, different worries have been addressed concerning the hypothesis of nested types developed here. The more pressing of them is the one that regards this hypothesis as an *ad hoc* position to account for the particular cases of works with more than one version and transcription. This worry may come in two ways. Firstly, it might be thought that we should postulate an additional ontological category, different from types, to explain the normal cases of musical works. This option has been be ruled out given that type/token theories are regarded as the best explanation of the nature of musical work in the normal cases, and specially of their repeatable character. Secondly, it might be argued that the hypothesis of nested types postulates an additional level of objects with respect to a traditional two-levels type/token theory that is superfluous to explain the nature of musical works that have never been revised or transcribed. Against this view, it has been shown that the application of the hypothesis of nested types to the domain of all musical works –including the normal cases of works that have been neither revised nor transcribed– is theoretically profitable and also intuitive from the perspective of our musical practices.

From the point of view theoretical desiderata, the hypothesis of nested types is revealed as the most simple and powerful explanation of musical works' nature. Given that the possibility of being revised or transcribed is open for all musical works, and given that the hypothesis of nested types is the best explanation of works with more than one version and transcription, explaining the nature of works that have never been revised or transcribed by means of a two-levels type/token theory or other ontological account would lead theoretical difficulties. It would require reassigning their ontological category at the time in which they are revised or transcribed to identify them with higher order types. This movement would demand an additional explanation of why the nature of these works has changed at the time in which they have been revised or transcribed by the first time. However, this obscure theoretical movement is revealed as superfluous if the hypothesis of nested types is applied to these works before of their first revision or transcription. From the point of view of practical desiderata, the ontology of multiple levels –higher order types, lower order types and events– posited

by the hypothesis of nested types is intuitive to account for the nature of all musical works. In particular, it offers an simple explanation of interpretative authenticity, and in particular, of cases in which interpretative authenticity conflicts with score compliance authenticity. A two-level type/token theory is unable to explain how there can be authentic performances that depart from the instructions given by a composer in a score. The hypothesis of nested types explains these cases in two ways. Firstly, as cases in which the original version of a work W constitutes a way of presenting W that offers an insufficient insight of the W's content. The original version is regarded here as an imperfect instance of the higher order type with which the work is identified. In these cases, the performer's departure of the score is authentic to the extent that she tries to offer a new version of the work in performance that provides a more accurate insight of the work's content. Secondly, as cases in which the performer tries to provide a new version that offers an alternative way of presenting W that facilitates the access to the W's content to a specific audience of a context of performance. In these cases, the original version is not regarded *per se* as defective, and the new versions are presented as alternative views that are suitable from certain points of views. In addition, the hypothesis of nested types also accommodates in a simple way types of performance interpretations. They are regarded as lower order types that instantiate a work's version and that are instantiated in musical performances. The conclusion achieved is that the extension of the scope of the hypothesis of nested types is justified under the view of reflective equilibrium because it is the one that best fits the desiderata of minimal descriptivism and minimal revisionism. A work that has never been revised or transcribed is identified with a higher order type that is instantiated in one and only lower order type, the original version indicated by the composer's original score.

Once the hypothesis of nested types has been justified as a general account of musical works' nature, recent criticisms addressed against the idea that musical works are types have been considered and rejected. Against Hazlett's argument, it has been shown that musical works *qua* types are modally flexible entities. Bertinetto's rejection of musical works' repeatability has been defeated as an unnecessary movement to acknowledge the creativity involved in interpretative authentic performances, and as a view that is grounded on a misleading description of our musical practices. Bertinetto's argument from improvisation has been rejected by showing that a type/token theory can account for the features of improvisation by means of the category of event-token. Rossberg claim for the destroyability of musical works has been revealed as a non-entrenched intuition that may be revised if it clashes with sound theoretical principles or other entrenched hypothesis. And finally, Kania's criticisms have been rejected on the basis of methodological considerations concerning reflective equilibrium.

Therefore, the hypothesis of nested types, combined with the particular view of non-indexical contextualism developed here, should be regarded as an ontological account of musical works that is superior to its competitors. The greatest attention spent on the cases of versions and transcriptions has provided us with a theory that achieves an optimum balance between practical and theoretical demands, presenting appealing

advantages in both respects regarding the alternative ontological accounts. It is informed by our musical practices and it is suitable to dialogue with them in an interdisciplinary research, offering interesting results that may help to improve some issues of the musical realm. In an attempt to solve the ontological impasse, the hypothesis of nested types, accompanied by non-indexical contextualism, and grounded on the methodology of reflective equilibrium, constitutes *a philosophers' paradise meeting our musical practices*.

Granada, 22 de Julio de 2018.

References

Bibliografía

ALEXANDER, J., MALLON, R. & WEINBERG, J. M. (2010) "Accentuate de Negative". *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*. Vol. 1, No. 2. Pp. 297-314.

ALWARD, P. (2004) "The Spoken Work". *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. Vol. 62, No. 4. Pp. 331-337.

ARMSTRONG, D. M. (1978) *Universals and Scientific Realism*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

ARMSTRONG, D. M. (1989) *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.* Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

ARMSTRONG, D. M. (2010) *Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press: New York.

BARTEL, C. (2017) "The Ontology of Musical Works and the Role of Intuitions: An Experimental Study". *European Journal of Philosophy*.

BASS, J. (1922) *Trattato di Forma Musicale*. Ricordi: Milano.

Beardsley, M. C. (1974) "The Descriptivist Account of Aesthetic Attributions". Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Vol. 28, No. 109 (3). Pp. 336-352.

BENNET, K. (2009) "Composition, Colocation and Metaontology" in D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman, eds, *Metametaphysics,* Oxford University Press: New York.

BENOVSKY, J. (2012) "Aesthetic Supervenience vs. Aesthetic Grounding". *Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics.* Vol. XLIX/V, No. 2. Pp. 166–178.

BERTINETTO, A. (2012) "Paganini does not repeat. Improvisation and the Type/Token Ontology". *Teorema.* Vol. XXXI/3. Pp. 105-126.

BERTINETTO, A. (2016) Eseguire l'inatteso. Ontologia della musica e improvvisazione. Il Glifo: Roma.

BOETIUS, S. (2005) *Tratado de Música*. Prólogo, traducción, notas y appendices de Salvador Villegas Guillén. Ediciones Clásicas: Madrid.

BUDD, M. (2005), "Aesthetics realism and emotional qualities of music", *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 45, No. 2. Pp. 111-122.

References
Bibliografía

Budd, M. (2007) "The intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgments". *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 47, Nº4. Pp. 333-371.

Cameron, R. P. (2008) "There are no things that are musical Works", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 48, No. 3. Pp. 295-314.

Caplan, B. y Matheson, C. (2004) "Can a musical work be created?", *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 44, No. 2. Pp. 113-134.

Caplan, B. y Bright, B. (2005) "Fusions and ordinary physical objects", *Philosophical Studies*, No. 125. Pp. 61-83.

Caplan, B. y Matheson, C. (2006) "Defending musical perdurantism", *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 46, No. 1. Pp. 59-69.

Caplan, B. y Matheson, C. (2008) "Defending 'Defending musical perdurantism' ", *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 48, No. 1. Pp. 80-85.

Casati, R. & Varzi, A. (2015) "Events". *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/events/>.

Chalmers, D. J. (2009) "Ontological Anti-Realism" in D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman, eds, *Metametaphysics.* Oxford University Press: New York.

Cohnitz, D. & Rossberg, M. (2016) "Nelson Goodman". *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/goodman/>.

Cox, R. (1986) "A defence of musical idealism", *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 26, No. 2. Pp. 133-142.

Currie, G. (1989). *An ontology of art*. Palgrave: New York.

Currie, G. (1990) "Supervenience, essentialism and aesthetic properties", *Philosophical Studies*, No. 58, pp. 243-257.

D'Alembert, J. R. (1779/1984) Éléments de Musique Théorique et Practique Suivant les Principes de M. Rameau. Editions D'Aujourd'hui: Plan-de-la-Tour.

Dalgleish, T. and Power, M. J. (Ed.) (1999) *Handbook of cognition and emotion.* John Wiley & Sons: Chichester.

Daly, C. (2010) *An introduction to Philosophical Methods*. Broadview Press: Toronto.

Danto, A. (1964) "The Artworld", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 61, Issue 19, pp. 571-584.

Davies D. (2004) *Art as performance*. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford.

Davies, D. (2009) "The primacy of practice in ontology of art", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 159-171.

DAVIES, D. (2009) "Works and performances in the performing arts", *Philosophy Compass,* No. 4, pp. 744-755.

DAVIES, D. (2010) "Multiple instances and multiple 'instances'", *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 50, No. 4. Pp. 411-426.

DAVIES, D. (2011) *The philosophy of the performing arts.* Willey-Blackwell: West Sussex.

DAVIES, D. (2011b) "Medium", in Gracyk, T. & Kania, A. (Eds.) *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music.* Routledge: Oxon. Pp. 48-58.

DAVIES, D. (2012) 'Enigmatic variations'. *The Monist* 95.4. Pp. 644-63.

DAVIES, D. (2013) "Categories of art". Gaut, B & Lopes, D. (Eds.). *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics.* Routledge: New York.

DAVIES, S. (2001) *Works and Performances. A Philosophical Exploration.* Oxford University Press: Oxford.

DAVIES, S. (2003) *Themes in the philosophy of music.* Oxford University Press: Oxford.

DAVIES, S. (2007) "Versions of Musical Works and Literary Translations". In K. Stock, *Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning and Work.* Oxford University Press: Oxford.

DAVIES, S. (2008) "Musical works and orchestral colour" *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 48, No. 4. Pp. 363-375.

DAVIES, S. (2011) "Musical Understandings". In Davies, S. *Musical Understandings.* Oxford University Press: Oxford. Pp. 88-128.

DAVIES, S. (2017) "Music Matters. Responding to Killin, Ravasio and Puy". Debates in Aesthetics. Vol 13, No. 1. Pp. 52-67.

DE CLERQ, R. (2002) "The Concept of an aesthetic property", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 167-176.

DELGADO, M. FAJARDO, W. & MOLINA-SOLANA, M. (2009) "Inmamusys: Intelligent mulyiagent music system". *Expert Systems with Applications.* Vo. 36, No. 3. Pp. 4574-4580.

DESCARTES, R. (1992) *Compendio de Música.* Introducción de Ángel Gabilondo. Traducción de Primitiva Flores y Carmen Gallardo. Tecnos: Madrid.

DODD, J. (2000) "Musical works as eternal types". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 40, No. 4. Pp. 424-440.

DODD, J. (2002)"Defending musical Platonism". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 42, No. 4. Pp. 380-402.

References
Bibliografía

Dodd, J. (2007) *Works of music. An essay in ontology.* Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Dodd, J. (2008) "Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology". *Philosophy Compass*, No. 3, pp. 1113-1134.

Dodd, J. (2009) "Teaching & Learning Guide for Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology". *Philosophy Compass*, No. 4, pp. 1044-1048.

Dodd, J. (2012) "Defending the discovery model in the ontology of art: a reply to Amie Thomasson on the qua problem". *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 52, 1. Pp. 75-95.

Dodd, J. (2013) "Adventures in the metaontology of art: local descriptivism, artefacts and dreamcatchers". *Philosophical Studies*, No. 165, pp. 1047-1068.

Dodd, J. (2015) "Performing Works of Music Authentically". *European Journal of Philosophy.* Vol. 23, No. 3. Pp. 485-508.

Dodd, J. (2017) "What 4'33" is". *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2017.1408664

Eerola, T. Ferrer, R. & Alluri, V. (2012) "Timbre and Affect Dimensions: Evidence from Affect and Similarity Ratings and Acoustic Correlates of Isolated Instrument Sounds". Music Perception. Vol. 30, No. 1. Pp. 49-70.

Eklund, M. (2006) "Metaontology". *Philosophy Compass*, 1:3, pp. 317-334.

Evans, G. (1985) "The Causal Theory of Names". Collected Papers. Claredon Press: Oxford. Pp. 1-24.

Field, H. (2009) "Epistemology without metaphysics". *Philosophical Studies*, No. 143. Pp. 249-290.

Fisher, J. A. (1991) "Discovery, creation and Musical Works". *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.* Vol. 49, No. 2. Pp. 129-136.

Frege, G. (1879) *Concept Script, a formal language of pure thought modelled upon that of arithmetic.* Translated by S. Bauer-Mengelberg in J. vanHeijenoort (ed.) (1967) *From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931.* Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

Gallego, R. & Sanz, J. C. (2001) *Diccionario Akal del color.* Akal: Madrid.

Giombini, L. (2017) *Musical Ontology. A Guide for the Perplexed.* Mimesis International: Szczecin.

Goehr, L. (2007). *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works.* Oxford University Press: Oxford.

GOODMAN, N. (1964/1983) *Fact, Fiction and Forecast.* Harvard University Press. Cambridge.

GOODMAN, N. (1968) *Languages of Art. An approach to a theory of symbols.* The Hobbs-Merrill Company: Indianápolis.

HAACK, S. (1979) "Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics". *Philosophical Studies*, 35, pp. 361-371.

HANSLICK, E. (1891/1943) *De lo Bello en Música.* Ricordi Americana: Buenos Aires.

HAZLETT, A. (2012) "Againts Repatable Artworks". In Mag Uidhir, C. *Art and Abstract Objects.* Oxford University Press: Oxford. Pp. 161-178.

HEPOKOSKI, J. (1993) *Sibelius: Symphony No. 5.* Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

HOFMANN, A., WESOLOWSKI, B. C. & GOEBL, W. (2017) "The Tight-interlocked Rhythm Section: Production and Perception of Synchronisation in Jazz Trio Performance", *Journal of New Music Research*, 46:4, 329-341.

HOWELL, R. (2002) "Types, indicated and initiated". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 42, No. 2. Pp. 105-127.

HUDSON HICK, D. (2012) "Aesthetic Supervenience Revisited". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 52, No. 3. Pp. 301-316.

JOHNSON, W. E. (1921*) Logic*. Cambridge University Press: London.

JUSLIN, P. N., HARMAT, L. & EEROLA, T. (2014) "What makes music emotionally significant? Exploring the underlying mechanisms". *Psychology of Music*. Vo. 42, No. 4. Pp. 599-623.

KANIA, A. (2008) "The methodology of musical ontology: descriptivism and its implications". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 48, No. 4. Pp. 426-444.

KANIA, A. (2009) "Musical Recordings". *Philosophy Compass*. Vol. 4, No. 1. Pp. 22-38.

KANIA, A. & GRACYK, T. (2011) "Performances and Recordings". In Theodore Gracyk & Andrew Kania (eds.), *Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*. Routledge: New York. Pp. 80-90.

KANIA, A. (2012) "The Philosophy of Music", en *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/music/>.

KANIA, A. (2012b) "In Defence of Higher-Order Musical Ontology: A Reply to Lee B. Brown". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 52, No. 1. Pp. 97-102.

References
Bibliografía

Kania, A. (2012c) "Platonism vs. Nominalism in contemporary musical ontology". In Mag Uidhir, C. *Art and Abstract Objects.* Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pp. 197-219.

Kivy, P. (1973) *Speaking of Art.* Martinius Nijhoff: The Hague.

Kivy, P. (1983/1993) "Platonism: A kind of defense". In Peter Kivy, *The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music*. Cambridge University Press: New York. 1993.Pp. 35-58.

Kivy, P. (1988/1993) "Orchestrating Platonism", en Peter Kivy, *The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music*. Cambridge University Press: New York, 1993. Pp. 75-94.

Kivy, P. (2002) *Introduction to a Philosophy of Music.* Oxford University Press: New York.

Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (2008) "An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto". In Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (Eds.) *Experimental Philosophy.* Oxford University Press: New York. Pp. 3-14.

Koechlin, C. (1946) *Traité de l'Harmonie. Vol. 1*. Éditions Max Eschig: Paris.

Korstvedt, B. M. (2000) *Bruckner: Symphony No. 8.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Kregor, J. (2010) *Liszt as transcriber*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Levinson, J. (1980) "What a musical work is". *Journal of Philosophy,* 77: 1, January. Pp. 5-28.

Levinson, D. (2005) "Aesthetic Properties", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volemes*. Pp. 211-227.

Levinson, J. (2006) "Aesthetic properties, evaluative force, and differences of sensibility". Levinson, J. *Contemplating art. Essays in aesthetics.* Oxford University Press: New York. Pp. 315-335.

Levinson, J. (2011) *Music, art and metaphysics. Essays in philosophical aesthetics.* Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Levinson, J. (2012) "Indication, Abstraction and Individuation". In Mag Uidhir, C. *Art and Abstract Objects.* Oxford University Press: Oxford. Pp. 49-61.

Lewis, D. (1968) "Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic", in Lewis D (1983) *Philosophical Papers, Volume I*. Oxford University Press: New York. Pp. 26-46.

Lewis, D. (1971) "Counterparts of persons and their bodies", in Lewis D (1983) *Philosophical Papers, Volume I*. Oxford University Press: New York. Pp. 47-54.

LEWIS, D. (1973) *Counterfactuals*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

LEWIS, D. (1973b) "Causation" in Lewis, D. (1986) *Philosophical Papers, Volume II*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. 159-213.

LEWIS, D. (1976) "Survival and identity", in Lewis D (1983) *Philosophical Papers, Volume I*. Oxford University Press: New York. Pp. 55-77.

LEWIS, D. (1986a) *On the plurality of worlds*. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford.

LEWIS, D. (1986b) "Against Structured Universals". *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 64: 25–46.

LISCHKÉ, A. (1986) "Nikolai Andreievich Rimski-Korsakov", en Tranchefort, F. R. (Ed.) *Guía de la música sinfónica* (Traducción de Eduardo Rincón). Alianza: Madrid. Pp. 963-974.

MACHERY, E. (2017) *Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds*. Oxford University Press: New York.

MAG UIDHIR, C. (2007) "Recordings as performances". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 47, No 3. Pp. 298-314.

MATRAVERS, D. (1996) "Aesthetic concepts and aesthetic experiences". *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 265-277.

MATRAVERS, D. (2005) "Aesthetic Properties", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volemes*. Pp. 191-210.

MONTEITH, K., MARTINEZ, T., & VENTURA, D. (2010) "Automatic generation of music for inducing emotive response". In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Computational Creativity*. Pp. 140-149.

MORUZZI, C. (2018) "Every Performance Is a Stage: Musical Stage Theory as a Novel Account for the Ontology of Musical Works". *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 73, 3. Pp. 341-349.

NORMAN, D. (2018) "Reflective Equilibrium", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/reflective-equilibrium/>.

NIERHAUS, G. (2009). *Algorithmic Composition. Paradigms in Automated Music Generation.* Springer-Verlag: Wien.

PARK, H. Y. & CHONG, H. J. (2017) "A comparative study of the perception of music emotion between adults with and without visual impairment". *Psychology of Music*.

References
Bibliografía

PEARCE, M. & MÜLLENSIEFEN, D. (2017) "Compression-based Modelling of Musical Similarity Perception", *Journal of New Music Research*, 46:2, 135-155.

PREDELLI, S. (1999) "Goodman and the score". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 39, No 2. Pp. 138-147.

PRINZ, J. J. (2008) "Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy". In Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (Eds.) *Experimental Philosophy.* Oxford University Press: New York. Pp. 189-208.

PUY, N. (2017) "Musical versions and transcriptions. Disputing Stephen Davies Account". *Debates in Aesthetics*. Vol. 13. Issue 1. ISSN 2514-6637. Pp. 33-51.

PUY, N. (2017b) "On the ontological category of computer-generated music scores". *Journal of Creative Music Systems*. Vol. 1. Issue 2. DOI: 10.5920/JCMS.2017.06. ISSN 2399-7656.

QUINE, W. V. O. (1969) 'Ontological Relativity'. In Quine, W. V. O. *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*. Columbia University Press: New York. Pp. 26–68.

RAWLS, J. (1971) *A theory of Justice. Original Edition*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA, G. (2002) *Resemblance Nominalism. A solution to the problem of universals*. Clarendon Press: Oxford.

RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA, G. (2011) "Nominalism in Metaphysics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/>.

ROHRBAUGH, G. (2003), "Artworks as historical individuals". *European Journal of Philosophy*, 11: 2. Pp. 177-205.

ROHRBAUGH, G. (2005) "I could have done that". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 45, No. 3. Pp. 209-228.

ROHRBAUGH, G. (2012) "Must Ontological Pragmatism be Self-Defeating?". In Mag Uidhir, C. *Art and Abstract Objects.* Oxford University Press: Oxford. Pp. 29-48.

ROIG, C., TARDÓN, L. J., BARBANCHO, I., & BARBANCHO, A. M. (2014). "Automatic melody composition based on a probabilistic model of music style and harmonic rules". *Knowledge-Based Systems*, 71. Pp. 419-434.

ROSSBERG, M. (2012) "Destroying Artworks" In Mag Uidhir, C. *Art and Abstract Objects*. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Pp. 62-83.

RUSS, M. (1992) *Musorgsky: Pictures at an Exhibition*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

SCHAAL, N. K., BANISSY, M. J. & LANGE, K. (2015) "The Rhythm Span Task: Comparing Memory Capacity for Musical Rhythms in Musicians and Non-Musicians", *Journal of New Music Research*, 44:1, 3-10.

SCRUTON, R. (1997) *The Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

SCRUTON, R. (2009) *Understanding Music. Philosophy and Interpretation.* Continuum Books: London.

SHARPE, R. A. (2001) "Could Beethoven have 'discovered' the Archduke Trio?", *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 41, No. 3. Pp. 325-327.

SHARPE, R. A. (2004) *Philosophy of Music. An Introduction.* Acumen: Chesham.

SIBELY, F. (1959) "Aesthetics concepts". *The philosophical review*, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 135-159.

STALNAKER, R. (2014) *Context.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

STECKER, R. (2009) "Methodological questions about the ontology of music", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 67, 9. Pp. 375-386.

STRAWSON, P. (1959) *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. Methue: London.

SWOYER, C. & ORILIA, F. (2014) "Properties". *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/properties/>.

TAYLOR, G. & EGAN, G. (2017) *The New Oxford Shakespeare: Authorship Companion*. Oxford University Press: Ney York.

THOMASSON, A. (2004) "The Ontology of Art". In Kivy, P. (Ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics.* Blackwell Publishing: Oxford. Pp. 78-92.

THOMASSON, A. (2005) "The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics". *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 63, 3. Pp. 221-229.

THOMASSON, A. (2006) "Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here?". *Philosophy Compass*, No. 1/3, pp. 245–255.

THOMASSON, A. (2007) *Ordinary Objects.* Oxford University Press: Oxford.

THOMASSON, A. (2009) "Answerable and Unanswerable Questions", in D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman, eds, *Metametaphysics,* Oxford University Press: New York.

THOMASSON, A. (2010) "Ontological Innovation in Art". *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. Vol. 68, No. 2. Pp. 119-130.

References
Bibliografía

TINCTORIS, J. (1477/1875) *Tractatus de Musica*. Imprimerie Lefebvre-Ducrocq: Lille.

TRANCHEFORT, F. R. (1986) "Jean Sibelius", en Tranchefort, F. R. (Ed.) *Guía de la música sinfónica* (Traducción de Eduardo Rincón). Alianza Editorial: Madrid. Pp. 1088-1108.

TRANCHEFORT, F. R. (1986b) "Anton Bruckner", en Tranchefort, F. R. (Ed.) *Guía de la música sinfónica* (Traducción de Eduardo Rincón). Alianza Editorial: Madrid. Pp. 212-234.

TRANCHEFORT, F. R. (2005) *Guía de la Música de Cámara*. Versión española y adaptación de José Luis García del Busto. Alianza Editorial : Madrid.

TRIVEDI, S. (2002) "Against musical works as eternal types". *British Journal of Aesthetics,* Vol. 42, No. 1. Pp. 73-82.

TYSON, A. (1987) *Mozart. Studies of the Autograph Scores*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

VARZI, A. "Mereology" (2012), en *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* , Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/mereology/>2012).

WALTON, K. (1970) "Categories of Art". In Margolis, J. (Ed). (1978) *Philosophy looks at the arts*. Temple University Press: Temple. Pp. 88- 114.

WETZEL, L. (2009) *Types and Tokens. On Abstract Objects*. MIT press: Cambridge.

WILLIAMSON, T. (2007) The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP), 1922, C. K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as "Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung", in *Annalen der Naturphilosophische,* XIV (3/4), 1921.

WOLLHEIM, R. (1974). *On art and the mind.* Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

WOLLHEIM, R. (1980) *Art and its objects*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

WOLTERSTORFF, N. (1980) *Works and Worlds of Art*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.