

“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”



UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA

STRATEGIES OF POPURAL RESISTANCE AND THEIR ROLE IN
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE CULTURE OF NONVIOLENCE IN
THE PALESTINIAN SOCIETY

BY

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THESIS

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“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”

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Abstract

As the title of the thesis indicates –The role of contemporary popular resistance actions in the reinforcement of the culture of Nonviolence in the Palestinian Society: An empirical research”, I am trying to prove with theoretical argumentation and empirical evidence that nonviolent methods of struggle against oppressive and unjust regimes are more effective than the violent ones and furthermore they constitute a powerful tool for wide social change and democracy in Palestine.

The focus both theoretically and empirically is on the Palestinian popular resistance as consciously defined and well-organized collective action among individual Palestinians as well as among popular organizations and committees as a way to feed back the popular will to keep resistance in nonviolent ways.

These activities depict the ~~new~~” role that nonviolent popular resistance is playing in the building up of the culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian and Israeli societies as well as in the International public opinion.

I sustain that M. Gandhi’s methods of nonviolent resistance as a way to social change on moral and practical grounds, is beyond doubt more effective than armed resistance in overturning oppressive and repressive regimes and in leading to more democratic societies.

Recent sociological researches and statistical analyses show that nonviolent resistance presents fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment, and that higher levels of participation contribute to enhanced resilience, greater opportunities for tactical innovation and civic disruption (and therefore less incentive for a regime to maintain its status quo), and shifts in loyalty among opponents' supporters, including members of the military establishment.

The most striking finding is that between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts.

No matter how successful they can be, the nonviolent campaigns fail to achieve their objectives when they are unable to overcome the challenge of participation, when they fail to recruit a robust, diverse, and broad-based membership that can erode the power base of the adversary and maintain resilience in the face of repression.

My argumentation, based on empirical research, supports Gandhi’s idea using a case study, the experience gained from the virtual villages in Palestine, shifting focus from Gene Sharp’s methods of nonviolent resistance, to the nonviolent resistance as a driving force for positive social change.

Based on historical references on how nonviolent campaigns promote democracy, human rights and social justice, it is maintained that nonviolent action remains a very effective means of achieving significant social and political change. Furthermore, it is evidenced that the nonviolent resistance initiatives and the involvement of all Palestinian social strata are interlinked and it is explained how the complex interactions between state and non-state actors decisively affect the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns.

In conclusion, it is illustrated that nonviolent resistance is an effective method against oppression and tyranny, while at the same time it constitutes a powerful tool and the means to achieve wider social change in the society and finally democracy and justice for all.

Resumen de la tesis doctoral en español

Como el título de la tesis indica "El papel de las acciones de resistencia popular contemporánea en el fortalecimiento de la cultura de la no violencia en la sociedad palestina: una investigación empírica", estoy tratando de probar mediante argumentaciones teóricas y evidencias empíricas que los métodos no violentos de lucha contra los regímenes opresivos e injustos son más eficaces que los violentos y además constituyen una poderosa herramienta para un amplio cambio social y democrático en Palestina.

El enfoque tanto teórico como empírico, entiende la resistencia popular palestina como una acción colectiva, consciente y bien organizada entre los individuos palestinos, así como entre las organizaciones y comités populares, como una manera de alimentar la voluntad social de mantener formas no violentas de resistencia.

Estas actividades representan el “nuevo” papel que la resistencia popular no violenta está jugando en la construcción de la cultura de la no violencia en las sociedades palestina e israelí, así como en la opinión pública internacional.

Sostengo, al igual que M. Gandhi, quién entendía sus métodos de resistencia no violenta como una forma de cambio social por motivos morales y prácticos, que es indudable que la resistencia no violenta es más eficaz que la resistencia armada para derrocar regímenes opresivos y represivos y conducir a sociedades más democráticas.

Recientes investigaciones sociológicas y análisis estadísticos muestran que la resistencia no violenta presenta menos obstáculos a la participación y compromiso moral y físico, y que los mayores niveles de participación consiguientes contribuyen a una mayor resiliencia, mejores oportunidades de innovación táctica y disrupción cívica (y por lo tanto menores incentivos para que un régimen mantenga su status quo), y cambios en la lealtad entre los partidarios de los oponentes, incluidos los miembros del establishment militar.

El hallazgo más sorprendente es que entre 1900 y 2006, las campañas de resistencia no violenta tuvieron casi el doble de probabilidades de lograr un éxito total o parcial que sus contrapartes violentas.

No importa cuán exitosas puedan ser, las campañas no violentas no logran sus objetivos cuando son incapaces de superar el desafío de la participación, cuando no logran reclutar una membresía sólida, diversa y amplia que pueda erosionar la base de poder social del adversario y mantener la resiliencia frente a la represión.

Mi argumentación, basada en investigaciones empíricas, apoya la idea de Gandhi sobre el terreno, utilizando el estudio de caso de la experiencia adquirida en las aldeas virtuales de Palestina, desplazando el enfoque de los métodos de resistencia no violenta de Gene Sharp a la resistencia no violenta como motor del cambio social positivo.

Basándose en experiencias históricas que muestran cómo las campañas no violentas promueven la democracia, los derechos humanos y la justicia social, se sostiene que la acción no violenta sigue siendo un medio muy efectivo para lograr un cambio social y político significativo. Además, se evidencia que las iniciativas de resistencia no violenta y la participación de todos los estratos sociales palestinos están interrelacionadas y se explica cómo las interacciones complejas entre actores estatales y no estatales afectan decisivamente los resultados de las campañas no violentas.

Para concluir, se ilustra que la resistencia no violenta es un método eficaz contra la opresión y la tiranía, al mismo tiempo que constituye una herramienta poderosa que ofrece los medios para lograr un cambio social más amplio en la sociedad y finalmente más democracia y la justicia para todos.

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Organizational Structure

This Thesis is structured into three chapters, however opening with a comprehensive general introduction and a final conclusion at the end. It covers over 330 pages with an entire wording capacity of about 99,100.

Chapter one, titled “A Historical overview” attempts a thorough historical overview on Palestine and the nonviolent resistance activities over the last centuries. Chapter one consists of four parts. More specifically:

- The first two parts include a small introduction to the chapter as well as a country profile
- The third part presents an analytic historical overview of the Palestinian – Israeli conflict and of the Palestinian popular resistance struggles over the last 130 years.

A section of this part is devoted to the historical connections between the nonviolent uprisings in other countries and peoples with the ones in Palestine.

- The final part presents the conclusions

Chapter two, titled “Nonviolent Resistance definition and conceptualisation”, identifies nonviolence in a generic manner and introduces a morphosyntaxis of the concept. It further strives to:

- Demonstrate that the concept of nonviolence has evolved over a long period of time and that the ideas have been stemmed from different historical periods and cultures.
- Gradually set the framework for the contemporary popular resistance actions in Palestine as a driving force for the reinforcement of the culture of nonviolence with its socio-economic implications.

Chapter three, under the title “Popular resistance in the reinforcement of the culture of nonviolence as driving force for social change”, consists of three parts. More specifically:

- The first part incorporates an analysis of the roots of nonviolence within Palestinian society as well as the role and contribution of the Popular

Committees (Palestinian and International) to the understanding and organisation of collective actions to keep resistance in nonviolent ways.

- The second part presents a thorough field research in several nonviolent virtual villages’ attempts using surveys among the participants of these activities, such as members of the international and Palestinian Popular Committees, members of peace organisations, and Palestinian individual participants.
- The third part presents the ideas of conflict-driven social change as formulated by Ibn Khaldun and through historical references, as presented by contemporary scholars (i.e. Kurt Schock, Richard A. and Dello Buono), This section presents the nonviolent virtual villages’ attempts as significant means to drive and promote political and social change.

Chapter one:

A historical overview

1.1 Introduction

The history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is elastic. It changes dramatically depending on the angle it is perceived. Therefore, it is important to note that a historic timeline of events concerning this conflict is always difficult to present in an objective manner.

One the other hand, ~~non~~“nonviolence”, a relatively novel concept in terms of theory and practice of socio-political change, continues to be remarkably unexplored. Although, this concept is the theoretical insight behind the most successful socio-political streams and movements of the last century, as well as the most charismatic figures of the contemporary historic space-time, it is still depleted from a terminological, classificatory, analytical and doctrine-wise point of view.

The identification of the concept through certain historical experiences from the ceaseless struggle of Palestinians against Israel’s ~~apartheid~~“apartheid policies” will bridge the above mentioned gap between reality, practice and theory.

Having said that, the overall objective of chapter one is to approach the historical events in a ~~Weberian~~“Weberian neutrality manner” (Weber, Baehr, Wells, 2002) shedding light at the same time to their ~~non~~“nonviolence” connotations.

Furthermore, connecting the concept of nonviolence to certain historical experiences will reveal its multi-perspective meaning not only as a process of socio-political contention, struggle and pressure, but also as a form of socio-economic practice.

Finally, the better understanding of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, from a ~~peaceful~~“peaceful resistance” point of view, will supportively reinforce the main argument of this thesis, that the shift in focus from the armed resistance to the peaceful, popular one is a feasible mean to achieve the independence of Palestine as well as its social cohesion.

Chapter one consists of four parts. More specifically:

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A section of this part is devoted to the historic connections of the nonviolence uprisings in other countries and peoples with the Palestinian ones.

- The final part presents the conclusions

1.2 Country Profile¹

i. Country Map



Palestine, a land with a rich history and a tradition of hospitality, situated at the crossroads between Africa, Europe and the Middle East, has a unique blend of languages, cultures and beliefs. It is also home to some of the most significant religious monuments in the world.

ii. Business and Culture

The overall Palestinian business community is marked by its entrepreneurial nature. Given the nature of the business environment here and a history of reliance on Israel for many goods and services, almost every business established in Palestine has a niche market of needs to fulfill. In addition, returning Palestinians from the US, Europe and around the world have become accustomed to a certain level of professionalism and a certain quality and standard of goods. These standards and needs are becoming visible as the number of

¹ Information for the Country profile is excerpted from World Affairs Council edition "Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A resource Packet for Educators", Kristin Jensen, Jillian Foote, and Tese Wintz Neighbor, May 12, 2009.

ISO certified businesses are increasing locally.

Many owners of large enterprises have international contacts and experience. In the past, business development and trade were directed towards Europe and the Gulf, more recently however local entrepreneurs have been turning to North America for partnerships, joint ventures and technical expertise.

iii. Government Structure

Palestine is an autonomous, secular, nation with a democratically elected government. The process of institutional development began with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. These accords established the Palestinian National Authority as the executive representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Oslo agreement defines the interim rules of administration and authority during the period leading up to a final status agreement with Israel.

The status of Palestine during this period is defined in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government (DOP), signed in Washington in September 1993. In the agreement, the Palestinian National Authority is defined geographically as the self-ruled territories, and administratively as the two main organizations, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the Council of Ministers.

With respect to sovereignty during the interim period, the occupied territories are divided into three different areas according to the level of Palestinian authority. Israel maintains external security in all three areas.

Area "A" covers all Palestinian urban areas where the PNA has full autonomy. The PNA is responsible for administration and enforcement of the law on all levels. This includes civilian and police powers.

Area "B" covers Palestinian rural areas where the PNA has civilian jurisdiction but no police powers. Israeli and Palestinian police patrol together.

Area "C" includes Israeli settlements, military areas and open areas. These areas are under complete Israeli control.

iv. Palestinian Governmental Structure (2009)

The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) is the representative legislative body, or parliament of Palestine. It is a unicameral legislative council comprised of the President, elected to a 4-year term by direct popular vote, and 132 members, directly elected on a multi-member constituency basis. The current President, Mahmoud Abbas, became President of the Palestinian National Authority on January 2005.

The Council of Ministers reports to the PLC. Due to the geographical separation between Gaza and the West Bank (approximately 1.5 hours by car), each ministry maintains two offices and two staffs for the time being.

v. Legal Environment

The Palestinian legal system is currently in the process of being modernized. For this process to be valid and all-encompassing, it is naturally going to take some time. Once the draft laws have been drawn up, each piece of legislation will call for ratification with the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and promulgation.

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At present the legal environment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip represents a conglomeration of a variety of laws imposed upon the areas by historical rulers. The current series of laws being established will add new layers, modernize and unify the existing laws, and establish new laws where necessary.

The Country Fact Sheet is presented in the following table²:

	WEST BANK	GAZA STRIP
Natural Resources	arable land	arable land, natural gas
Land Use	<i>arable land: 16.9% permanent crops: 18.97% other: 64.13% (2001)</i>	<i>arable land: 29% permanent crops: 21% other: 50% (2002)</i>
Population (end of 2012)	2,461,267 <i>note: in addition, there are about 187,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and fewer than 177,000 in East Jerusalem (2009)</i>	1,551,859 (July 2009)
Population Growth	2.178% (2009)	3.349% (2009 est.)
Urban Population	72% of total pop. (2008)	72% of total pop. (2008)
Ethnic Groups	Palestinian Arab and other 83%, Jewish 17%	Palestinian Arab
Religion	Muslim 75% (predominantly Sunni), Jewish 17%, Christian & other 8%	Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 99.3%, Christian 0.7%
Government Type	Israel-occupied	Israel-occupied
GDP per capita (2012)		1.679.3 \$
GPD (US Million)		6.797.3
Unemployment	16.3% (June 2008)	41.3% (June 2008)
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons	<i>refugees (country of origin): 722,000 [Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)] (2007)</i>	<i>refugees: 1.017 million [Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)] (2007)</i>

² Source: CIA World Fact Book.

1.3 Historical Overview: The history of Palestinian – Israeli conflict



1.3.1 The History of Palestinian –Israeli Conflict

1.3.1.1 Early History of the Region: Jewish colonisation and land acquisition in Palestine (pre-1923)

Historic Palestine (Mc Carthy, 1990)

Historically speaking, the land of Palestine was populated by a people known as the Palestinians. Palestinians have always been religiously diverse, with the Muslim majority maintaining friendly relations with their Christian, Jewish, and Druze brethren.

The area known to the Greeks as Philistia and the Romans as Palaestina became Arab after the spread of Islam in the 7th century. From that time and until 1948, the majority of the population was predominantly Muslim. Christian and Jewish communities also maintained a continuous presence in the area since these religions were established. The modern borders of Palestine were drawn by the British, whose forces occupied this part of the Ottoman Empire in 1917-18. The stage for conflict was set when Britain declared that it viewed –with favour the establishment in

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Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”³ ignoring the legitimate national rights of the Arab people and its own promise to the Arabs to support their independence from Ottoman rule⁴.

At the turn of the 20th Century, a new Jewish nationalist ideology called Zionism was developing. Zionism called for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

During this time, increasing numbers of Jewish Europeans immigrated to Palestine, causing the Jewish population to grow from a tiny minority to 35% of the population.

The following map presents a view of historic Palestine:



Historic Palestine

Population of Historic Palestine after 1877		
Year	Non-Jewish Palestinians	Jewish Population
1877	426,908 (97%)	13,942 (3%)

³ Letter from British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Lionel Walter de Rothschild – known as the Balfour Declaration - 2 November 1917. This referred to the indigenous majority population of Palestine as “non-Jewish” and did not recognize its political or national rights. It stated: “It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”.

⁴ Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, confirmed “Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca” -second note from Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein of the Hijaz, October 1915. British Government, “Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Sherif Hussein of Mecca,” October 24, 1915, Parliamentary Papers – Cmd. 5957 (1939)

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1912	665,840 (95%)	36,267 (5%)
1925	780,568 (85%)	137,484 (15%)
1946	1,339,763 (69%)	602,586 (31%)

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is wide-ranging and for the purpose of our analysis the term is also used in relation to the earlier phases of the same conflict, between the Zionist and the Arab population living in Palestine under the Ottoman and then British rule having its roots in the historic claim to the land which lies between the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river.

Between 3000 and 1100 B.C., after the Romans expelled the Jews [in the second century A.D.], Canaanite civilization covered what is today Israel, the West Bank, Lebanon and much of Syria and Jordan.

Jerusalem hills were inhabited by a mixture of different ethical self – defined groups such as: farmers and vineyard growers, pagans and converts to Christianity, descendants of the Arabs, Persians, Samaritans, Greeks and old Canaanite tribes.

–But all these [different peoples who had come to Canaan] were additions, sprigs grafted onto the parent tree...And that parent tree was Canaanite (...) [The Arab invaders of the 7th century A.D.] made Moslem converts of the natives, settled down as residents, and intermarried with them, with the result that all are now so completely Arabized that we cannot tell where the Canaanites leave off and the Arabs begin.” (Beatty Llène, 1957)

–Recent archeological digs have provided evidence that Jerusalem was a big and fortified city already in 1800 BCE⁵ (...). Findings show that the sophisticated water system hereto for attributed to the conquering Israelites pre-dated them by eight centuries and was even more sophisticated than imagined...Dr. Ronny Reich, who directed the excavation along with Eli Shuikrun, said the entire system was built as a single complex by Canaanites in the Middle Bronze Period, around 1800 BCE.”⁶ .

⁵ B.C.E. stands for Before Common Era

⁶ The Jewish Bulletin, July 31st, 1998

1.3.1.2 Early beginnings of Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine

The Zionist movement was founded in response to the worsening persecution of European Jews and out of the desire to join the community of modern nation-states that defined Europe.

Thousands of Jews began immigrating to Palestine, which was then part of the Ottoman Empire.

In the first half of the 19th century, no foreigners were allowed to purchase land in Palestine. This was official Turkish policy until 1856 and in practice until 1867. The reason for this reaction lies in the fact that when the Ottoman Empire conceived the national aspirations of the Zionist movement, opposed to the idea of Jewish self-rule in Palestine, fearing the loss of control over Palestine as a continuation to the loss of other territories to various European powers of the time.

In 1881 the central government of the Ottoman Empire legally allowed Jews to settle anywhere except in Palestine. Furthermore, from 1882 until 1918 (defeat of Ottoman Empire), the Ottomans continuously restricted Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine⁷. In 1892, the Ottoman government decided to prohibit the sale of land in Palestine to Jews, even if they were Ottoman citizens.

However, built on the tradition of the 1640s, when the Jewish communities of Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias organized an association to improve the system of fundraising in the Diaspora, during the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, three key Jewish organizations managed to successfully purchase land⁸.

The main concern of Jewish migrants, when they were purchasing the land, was the displacement of fellahin (villagers and farmers and agricultural laborers) who cultivated the land⁹.

Because of the desire to displace as little number of people as possible, large tracts of land were purchased in the coastal plain the valley areas since most of the area was

⁷ In 1882, Jews were banned from their “Four Holy Cities” (Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias) and in 1891, after briefly allowing some Jewish immigration three years earlier, the Turkish rulers tried to again to close the empire to Russian Jews

⁸ The Jewish Organizations were: Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PJCA), Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC) and Jewish National Fund (JNF)

⁹ "In 1920, Labor Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion expressed his concern about the Arab fellahin, whom he viewed as 'the most important asset of the native population'. Ben-Gurion said 'under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to the fellahs or worked by them'".

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uncultivated and swampy. There were two main reasons why these areas were sparsely populated. The first reason being when the Ottoman power in the rural areas began to diminish in the seventeenth century, many people moved to more centralized areas to secure protection against the lawless Bedouin tribes. This resulted in huge migration to the cities leaving the rural area drastically under populated. The second reason for the sparsely populated areas of the valleys and coastal plains was the soil type. The soil, covered in a layer of sand, made it impossible to grow the staple crop of Palestine, corn. As a result this area remained uncultivated and under populated.

"The sparse Arab population in the areas where the Jews usually bought their land enabled the Jews to carry out their purchase without engendering a massive displacement and eviction of Arab tenants".¹⁰ This is clearly depicted in the following map:



Jewish settlements in Palestine, 1920-1948

The Ottoman Code of 1858 brought about the appropriation by the influential and rich families of Beirut, Damascus, and to a lesser extent Jerusalem and Jaffa and other sub-district capitals, of vast tracts of land in Syria and Palestine and their registration in the name of these families in the land registers. Many of the fellahin did not understand the importance of the registers and therefore the wealthy families took advantage of this. Jewish buyers who were looking for large tracts of land found it favorable to purchase from the wealthy owners. As well many small farmers became

¹⁰ Jewish and Purchase in Palestine

in debt to rich families which lead to the transfer of land to the new owners and then eventually to the Jewish buyers.

–The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 required the registration in the name of individual owners of agricultural land, most of which had never previously been registered and which had formerly been treated according to traditional forms of land tenure, in the hill areas of Palestine generally masha‘a, or communal usufruct. The new law meant that for the first time a peasant could be deprived not of title to his land, which he had rarely held before, but rather of the right to live on it, cultivate it and pass it on to his heirs, which had formerly been inalienable...Under the provisions of the 1858 law, communal rights of tenure were often ignored...Instead, members of the upper classes, adept at manipulating or circumventing the legal process, registered large areas of land as theirs...The fellahin [peasants] naturally considered the land to be theirs, and often discovered that they had ceased to be the legal owners only when the land was sold to Jewish settlers by an absentee landlord...Not only was the land being purchased; its Arab cultivators were being dispossessed and replaced by foreigners who had overt political objectives in Palestine” (Khalidi, 1988).

Jewish organizations often offered to purchase the land from the wealthy owners for more than the actual value of the area paying extraordinarily high prices for the uncultivated and marsh land¹¹.

Huge tracts of land were purchased in the 1920s but in the next decade large tracts of uncultivated land were simply not available. Therefore in the 1930s most of the land was bought from small landowners. Of the land that the Jews bought, "52.6% of the lands were bought from big non-Palestinian landowners, 24.6% from Palestinian-Arab landowners and only 9.4% from the Fellahin".

The following table presents the Israelis land acquisition by period:

¹¹ During a visit to Palestine in 1930, John Hope Simpson, a British politician, noticed: "They paid high prices for the land, and in addition they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay"

**JEWISH LAND ACQUISITION BY PERIOD AND JEWISH NATIONAL FUND
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL¹²**

Year (at the end)	Total Land Accumulated To Date From All Sources	Total Land Accumulated JNF To Date By JNF	Percentage of Total Held
1914	418,000	16,380	3.9
1922	586,147	72,360	12.3
1927	882,502	196,660	22.2
1932	1,025,079	296,910	28.9
1937	1,244,604	369,860	29.7
1940	1,359,857	505,544	37.1
1948	2,000,000 (estimated)	928,240	46.4

JNF: Jewish National Fund

The implications of the above massive land purchase are the following:

i. Palestine Riots

During the time of this increased Jewish migration to the area, riots and massacres began to become more frequent among the people. During the Ottoman times there were conflicts between Jewish land owners and Arab tenants but in the 1920s and 1930s, the riots increased. In 1929 there were a series of violent attacks that resulted in the deaths of many innocent people.

ii. Peel Commission

The British government who was controlling the area during these times organized the Peel Commission to investigate the reasons for the civil unrest. Lord Peel's report found that:

—A summary of land legislation enacted during the Civil Administration shows the efforts made to fulfill the Mandatory obligation in this matter. The Commission point to serious difficulties in connection with the legislation proposed by the Palestine Government for the protection of small owners. The Palestine Order in Council and, if necessary, the Mandate should be amended

¹² Statistics for this table were culled from P. Gurevich and A. Gertz, *Jewish Agricultural Settlement in Palestine*, Jerusalem, 1936, p. 36, and Minutes of the JNF Directorate Meetings from 1924 to 1948.

to permit of legislation empowering the High Commissioner to prohibit the transfer of land in any stated area to Jews, so that the obligation to safeguard the right and position of the Arabs may be carried out. Until survey and settlement are complete, the Commission would welcome the prohibition of the sale of isolated and comparatively small plots of land to Jews.

[...] Up till now the Arab cultivator has benefited on the whole both from the work of the British Administration and the presence of Jews in the country, but the greatest care must now be exercised to see that in the event of further sales of land by Arabs to Jews the rights of any Arab tenants or cultivators are preserved. Thus, alienation of land should only be allowed where it is possible to replace extensive by intensive cultivation. In the hill districts there can be no expectation of finding accommodation for any large increase in the rural population. At present, and for many years to come, the Mandatory Power should not attempt to facilitate the close settlement of the Jews in the hill districts generally.

The shortage of land is due less to purchase by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population. The Arab claims that the Jews have obtained too large a proportion of good land cannot be maintained. Much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamps and uncultivated when it was bought.

Legislation vesting surface water in the High Commissioner is essential. An increase in staff and equipment for exploratory investigations with a view to increasing irrigation is recommended”¹³.

iii. Economic impact

The land purchases did not have all positive effects on the people of Palestine. After the large tracts of land owned by the absentee landlords were bought by Jewish immigrants, parcels of land were bought from small farm owners including fellahin. One of the growing profitable commodities in the area was citrus. Citrus cultivation can be very expensive so many fellahin sold all or parts of their land to pay for the investment into citrus cultivation. There were

¹³ Report of the Palestine Royal Commission - July 1937

negative effects to the transactions made between the Jews and the small farm owners. After the land was sold, many of the fellahin fell into financial problems. Some farmers sold their land during the hype over the high land prices but did not consider the future after the money was spent. Others sold their land believing they would be able to find work in the cities but instead they began to depend on unstable incomes which led to a number of other economic problems.

The fellahin, who sold parts of land in attempt to turn "vegetable tracts into citrus groves, became dependent on world markets and on the availability of maritime transportation. A decrease in the world market demand for citrus or a lack of means of transportation severely jeopardizes the economic situation of these people" (Adelman, Taylor & Francis, 2008).

iv. Arab reaction

Over the years Arabs have argued that they have been displaced due to the increase in Jewish immigration to the area presently known as Israel. "In 1931, a survey of landlessness conducted and eventually offered new plots to any Arabs who had been 'dispossessed'. British officials received more than 3,000 applications, of which 80 percent were ruled invalid by the Government's legal adviser because the applicants were not landless Arabs. This left only about 600 landless Arabs, 100 of whom accepted the Government land offer". French's definition of a 'landless' Arab was often thought as too uncertain for it did not include Arabs who sold their land willingly, people who owned land elsewhere and people who became tenants of land elsewhere. French's survey describes landlessness Arabs as: "Those who can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the lands falling into Jewish hands, and who have not obtained other holdings on which they can establish themselves or other equally satisfactory occupation".

Not all Arabs believe the Jewish land purchases were harmful to the Arab culture and people. According to the editor of the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, "[it] is absolutely necessary that an entente be made between the Zionists and Arabs, because the war of words can only do evil. The Zionists are necessary for the country: The money which they will bring, their knowledge and intelligence, and the

industriousness which characterized them will contribute without doubt to the regeneration of the country" (Adelman, Taylor & Francis, 2008).

1.3.1.3 The Basle Program to the end of World War I (1897-1918)

The First Zionist Congress met in Basle, Switzerland, to discuss the ideas set out in Theodor Herzl's 1896 book *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State)¹⁴. Theodor Herzl, a Jewish journalist and writer living in Vienna, wanted Jews to have their own state - primarily as a response to European anti-Semitism.

The Congress issued the Basle Programme to establish a "home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured by public law" and set up the World Zionist Organisation to work for that end.

A few Zionist immigrants had already started arriving in the area before 1897. By 1903 there were some 25,000 of them, mostly from Eastern Europe. They lived alongside about half a million Arab residents in what was then part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. A second wave of about 40,000 immigrants arrived in the region between 1904 and 1914.

The Talmud¹⁵ mentions the religious duty of colonising the Land of Israel. So significant in Judaism is the act of purchasing land in Palestine, the Talmud allows for the lifting of certain religious restrictions of Sabbath observance to further its acquisition and settlement.

Towards the end of the 19th-century, the creation of the Zionist movement resulted in many European Jews immigrating to Palestine. Most land purchases between the late 1880s and the 1930s were located in the coastal plain area, including "Acre to the North and Rehovoth to the South, the Esdraelon (Jezreel) and Jordan Valleys and to the lesser extent in Galilee". The migration affected Palestine in many ways, including economically, socially, and politically.

¹⁴ Adapted from Karlar Zaltan (2010) article "Theodor Herzl's National Answer to the Misery of the Jewish People" p.p. 197-210 in *European and Regional Studies Journal*, Volume 1, Number 2.

¹⁵ The Talmud is a central text of Rabbinic Judaism, considered second to the Torah. The Talmud has two components: the Mishnah, the first written compendium of Judaism's Oral Law, and the Gemara (c. 500 CE), an elucidation of the Mishnah and related Tannaitic writings that often ventures onto other subjects and expounds broadly on the Hebrew Bible. The terms Talmud and Gemara are often used interchangeably, though strictly speaking that is not accurate.

1.3.1.4 Jewish land-purchasing and colonisation activity during World War I

In 1917, during the First World War, Britain defeated the Ottoman forces and occupied and set up a military administration, named Occupied Enemy Territory Administration¹⁶, across the former Ottoman Syria. The land remained under British military administration for the remainder of the war, and beyond. The British sought to set up legitimacy for their continued control of the region and this was achieved by obtaining a mandate from the League of Nations in June 1922. The formal objective of the League of Nations Mandate system was to administer parts of the defunct Ottoman Empire, which had been in control of the Middle East since the 16th century, "until such time as they are able to stand alone." The civil Mandate administration was formalized with the League of Nations' consent in 1923 under the British Mandate for Palestine which covered two administrative areas. The land west of the Jordan River, known as Palestine, was under direct British administration until 1948, while the land east of the Jordan was a semi-autonomous region known as Transjordan, under the rule of the Hashemite family from the Hijaz, and gained independence in 1946.

1.3.1.5 The Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate (1917-1923-1948)

Jewish-Zionist colonisation and land acquisition in Palestine (pre-1923), traces the ideological and organisational framework underlying the Zionist movement's plans to colonise and acquire land in Palestine. In this part of the chapter we examine the significance of the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the British Mandate for Palestine after World War I, which set the stage for increased Jewish immigration to Palestine. We make reference to key Jewish institutions, including the World Zionist Organisation/Jewish Agency (WZO/JA) and the Jewish National Fund (JNF), both of which played crucial roles in Jewish immigration and land acquisition in Palestine. Jewish-Zionist land acquisition and policies during the British Mandate in Palestine (1923-1948), examine the British role in facilitating Jewish immigration and land

¹⁶The Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) was a joint British and French military administration over Levantine and Mesopotamian provinces of the former Ottoman Empire between 1917–20, set up during and following World War I. The administration ended following the assignment of the French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon and British Mandate for Palestine at the 19–26 April 1920 San Remo Conference.

acquisition in Palestine. Perhaps most significant in this regard are the British amendments to earlier Ottoman law. We discuss how these legal changes not only facilitated land acquisition by Jews in Palestine during the Mandate years, but also paved the way for the later enactment of Israel’s land laws. We make reference to the first Zionist committees set up to examine the feasibility of ‘transfer’ — the mass expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland as part of an effort to secure a predominantly ‘Jewish State’ in Palestine.

i. The British Mandate

After World War I, the Ottoman Empire lost control of many of its former territories, including Palestine. In July 1922, the League of Nations appointed Great Britain to oversee the Mandate for Palestine and to facilitate the establishment of “Palestine-Eretz Israel” (Land of Israel) as a national homeland for the Jewish people. Later that year, all the territory situated east of the Jordan River, representing approximately 75 percent of the land, was removed from the mandate and subsequently became the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan.

ii. The Balfour Declaration¹⁷

England's intentions concerning Palestine were of considerable consequence in determining whether or not a Jewish state would be established in the region. These intentions had been outlined in a public letter from Lord Arthur James Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Walter Rothschild, head of the English Jewish community, dated November 2, 1917. This document stated unequivocally that the British government supports “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” and would help achieve this goal without disrupting the rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. At the time of the Balfour Declaration, 85,000 Jews and over half a million Arabs lived in Palestine. Most Arabs did not want to share the land with the Jews; nor, for that matter, did neighboring Arab nations desire a Jewish country in their midst.

¹⁷ The presentation of the historical documentation and relevant analysis of this chapter is based on the book *Ruling Palestine: A history of legally sanctioned Jewish-Israeli seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine* issued by the Centre of Housing Rights and Evictions (CHORE), Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, May 2015

iii. The Leadership of Chaim Weizmann

Although Balfour was already sympathetic to the Zionist cause, and many British politicians agreed to the idea of a Jewish state in principle, the final language of the letter was the subject of much debate. The person credited with securing the support of Lord Balfour as well as Winston Churchill and Prime Minister Lloyd George was Chaim Weizmann, who was aided by Herbert Samuel, a Jewish Member of Parliament.

During the British Mandate (1922–1948), the economy grew and cultural and educational institutions flourished. Both the Jewish and Arab communities were given autonomy regarding their internal affairs. The *yishuv*, as the Jewish community in Palestine was known, established an elected assembly and national council.

The Fourth Aliyah followed in 1924, and new settlers continued to arrive until 1929. This time, most of the arrivals were immigrants from Poland, victims of growing anti-Semitism who were denied entry into the United States. Consequently, many Jewish small-business owners and artisans chose Palestine as their destination, where they established commercial enterprises. During these years, about 82,000 Jews emigrated; about one-quarter returned.

The last wave of immigration before World War II is known as the Fifth Aliyah (1929–1939). The quarter-million Jews who arrived in Palestine with the Fifth Aliyah were fleeing Germany and Austria following the Nazi rise to power and subsequent anti-Semitic policies. Many of the German immigrants were professionals, and their talents and skills greatly improved the quality of life in the Jewish community. The German Jews participated in the establishment of new industries, construction of a port in Haifa, and construction of new towns and settlements. By the end of the Fifth Aliyah, 450,000 Jews were living in Palestine.

iv. Peace Gives Way to Instability

For the first few years of the Mandate, peace and calm prevailed in the *yishuv*. At the helm was a charismatic man by the name of David Ben Gurion (1886–1973). Ben Gurion had come to Palestine from Poland in 1906, but he soon adapted to new surroundings and assumed a position of leadership.

Soon, Ben Gurion had to deal with the erupting violence against the Jews in Palestine. In 1929, the leader of the Arab populace, the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, initiated riots and looting against the Jews in Jerusalem, Hebron, and Safed. Without any protection from the British, several hundred Jews were wounded and over a hundred killed.

The Jews could not readily defend themselves because Jewish self-defense forces had long been declared illegal by the British. Indeed, in 1920, when Vladimir Jabotinsky reacted to riots in the Galilee by organizing an armed group (a precursor of the Haganah), he and some of his men were arrested by the British and sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years.

In 1936, al-Husseini organized the Arab leaders within Palestine into a military group, the Arab High Command. Outside the Mandate's territory, the Arab nations met in 1937 at the Pan Arab Conference and declared their unanimous opposition to a Zionist state.

Rioting against the Jews became widespread beginning in 1936. Violence and terrorist attacks by the Arabs were leveled at the *yishuv* and the British. In 1939, the British finally sanctioned the arming of the Haganah and acting together, the violence was quelled in 1939.

Nonetheless, the Arabs made their influence felt. The British issued a new White Paper in 1939 that restricted Jewish immigration to the *yishuv* to 75,000 for the following five-year period. This seemed to satisfy the Arabs, and calm was restored until 1947.

1.3.1.6 The UN Partition of Palestine¹⁸

The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a plan for the future government of Palestine. The Plan was described as a Plan of Partition with Economic Union which, after the termination of the British Mandate would lead to the creation

¹⁸ The presentation of the historical facts for the UN Partition of Palestine is based on the following sources:

- i. United Nations Documents, *A/RES/181 (II) of November 1947*
- i. Quant W.B., Jabber P., Mosley Lesch A. (1973) *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, p.7, University of California Press
- ii. The Question of Palestine: Brochure DPI/2517/Rev. 1: Chapter 2, The Plan of Partition and the end of British Mandate, UN Documents, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch2.pdf>

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of independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem. On Saturday morning, 29 November 1947, and against the will of the Palestinian people, the General Assembly in New York voted for the partition of Palestine and accepted Resolution 181. It was supported by 33 votes with 13 opposed and 10 abstentions including Britain, whose Prime Minister Clement Attlee saw to it that Britain’s Commonwealth partners voted for it.

The United Nations had no business offering the nation of one people to the people of many nations. Its General Assembly had neither the legal nor the legislative powers to impose such a resolution or to convey title of a territory
Articles 10, 11, and 14 of the UN Charter bestow the right on the General Assembly merely to recommend resolutions.

Palestine was thus divided into 3 parts: a Jewish part, a Palestinian part and an internationally administered zone to include the city of Jerusalem as a *Corpus Separatum* to be administered by the United Nations. After 10 years, a referendum would be held to seek the views of the city’s residents. Today, that Referendum is dead history.

It should be noted that the status of Jerusalem within the *Corpus Separatum* included in the above resolution, was re-asserted by Resolution 303(IV) of the General Assembly dated 9 December 1949 as the Armistice Line was being finalised at the end of hostilities between the Zionist forces and the neighboring Arab countries.

Part I of the Plan contained provisions dealing with the Termination of the Mandate, Partition and Independence. The Mandate would be terminated as soon as possible and the United Kingdom would withdraw from Palestine no later than the previously announced date of 1 August 1948. The new states would come into existence two months after the withdrawal, but no later than 1 October 1948. The Plan sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements: Arab nationalism and Jewish nationalism (Zionism). Part II of the Plan included a detailed description of the proposed boundaries for each state. The Plan also called for Economic Union between the proposed states, and for the protection of religious and minority rights.

The Plan was accepted by the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine, through the Jewish Agency. The Plan was rejected by leaders of the Arab community, including the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee, who were supported in their rejection by the states of the Arab League. The Arabs argued that it violated the rights of the majority of the people in Palestine, which at the time was 65% non-Jewish (1,200,000), and 35% Jewish (650,000), most of them European born, who immigrated in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries as a result of the Zionist movement.

Immediately after adoption of the Resolution by the General Assembly, the Civil War broke out. The partition plan was not implemented.

Following World War II, escalating hostilities between Arabs and Jews over the fate of Palestine and between the Zionist militias and the British army compelled Britain to relinquish its mandate over Palestine. The British requested that the recently established United Nations determine the future of Palestine. A UN-appointed committee of representatives from various countries went to Palestine to investigate the situation. Although members of this committee disagreed on the form that a political resolution should take, there was general agreement that the country would have to be divided in order to satisfy the needs and demands of both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. At the end of 1946, 1,269,000 Arabs and 608,000 Jews resided within the borders of Mandate Palestine. Jews had acquired by purchase 6 to 8 percent of the total land area of Palestine amounting to about 20 percent of the arable land.

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab. The UN partition plan divided the country in such a way that each state would have a majority of its own population, although some Jewish settlements would fall within the proposed Palestinian state and many Palestinians would become part of the proposed Jewish state. The territory designated to the Jewish state would be slightly larger than the Palestinian state (56 percent and 43 percent of Palestine, respectively) on the assumption that increasing numbers of Jews would immigrate there. According to the UN partition plan, the area of Jerusalem and Bethlehem was to become an international zone.

Publicly, the Zionist leadership accepted the UN partition plan, aspiring to expand the borders allotted to the Jewish state. The Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding Arab

states rejected the UN plan and regarded the General Assembly vote as an international betrayal. Some argued that the UN plan allotted too much territory to the Jews. Most Arabs regarded the proposed Jewish state as a settler colony and argued that it was only because the British had permitted extensive Zionist settlement in Palestine against the wishes of the Arab majority that the question of Jewish statehood was on the international agenda at all.

Fighting began between the Arab and Jewish residents of Palestine days after the adoption of the UN partition plan. The Arab military forces were poorly organized, trained and armed. In contrast, Zionist military forces, although numerically smaller, were well organized, trained and armed. By the spring of 1948, the Zionist forces had secured control over most of the territory allotted to the Jewish state in the UN plan.

On the afternoon of May 14, 1948 the Jewish State of Israel was proclaimed just as the Sabbath began at sunset that day. At 6:11pm Washington time, U.S. President Harry Truman authorised the recognition of Israel. Truman's decision to recognise the new State was not shared by many of his high ranking advisors, such as Dean Rusk, Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Secretary of State George Marshall.

The British mandate ended the next day on 15th May 1948 at noon. Palestine was not only partitioned. It was destroyed.

Neighboring Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq) then invaded Israel claiming that they sought to “save” Palestine from the Zionists. In fact, the Arab rulers had territorial designs on Palestine and were no more anxious to see a Palestinian Arab state emerge than the Zionists. During May and June 1948, when the fighting was most intense, the outcome of this first Arab-Israeli war was in doubt. But after arms shipments from Czechoslovakia reached Israel, its armed forces established superiority and conquered territories beyond the UN partition plan borders of the Jewish state.

In 1949, the war between Israel and the Arab states ended with the signing of armistice agreements. The country once known as Palestine was now divided into three parts, each under separate political control. The State of Israel encompassed over 77 percent of the territory. Jordan occupied East Jerusalem and the hill country of central Palestine (the West Bank). Egypt took control of the coastal plain around

the city of Gaza (the Gaza Strip). The Palestinian Arab state envisioned by the UN partition plan was never established.

In this process, most of Palestine’s indigenous population were expelled and, together with their descendants, became numbers in an UNRWA register. Today, they total about 5.5 million people living in miserable refugee camps in Lebanon (12 camps), Syria (10 camps + 3 unofficial sites), Jordan (10 camps) West Bank (19 camps) and Gaza (8 camps). These Palestinian refugees hold the record of being the longest suffering and largest refugee population in the world. Yet, even within these camps, they remain dignified and determined that, through the application of international Law, their right to return to their homes will be upheld¹⁹.

Land acquisition, land laws and colonisation policies within the State of Israel (1948-1967), analyses the body of law developed in Israel after 1948. Initially, laws were enacted to legalise the confiscation of Palestinian lands. Later laws legalised the registration of such lands in the name of the State and the Jewish people. We examine the significance of changes made to Ottoman law and look at how the new laws were implemented to ‘legally’ dispossess the Arabs of their lands. We examine, among other measures, laws concerning ‘State lands’, and laws relating to the disposition of properties ‘abandoned’ by Palestinian refugees. We trace the processes whereby the newly established ‘Jewish State’ dispossessed some three-quarters of Palestine’s indigenous Arab population of their homeland and took control of their lands.

1.3.1.7 The 1967 war and the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza²⁰

¹⁹ According to the Center for Economic and Social Rights on the “Palestinian Refugees” issue –Palestinians are the largest and oldest refugee population in the world. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was established in 1948 as a temporary mechanism to address the needs of Palestinian refugees until they could exercise their right to return to their homes and receive compensation in accordance with human rights principles and U.N. Resolution 194 UNRWA provides education, health care, relief assistance and social services to the 3.6 million registered refugees, one third of whom live in 59 refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Due to lack of funds, average annual spending per refugee has dropped from about \$200 in 1975 to about \$70 in 1997. In Jordan, refugees are citizens and enjoy a range of economic and social rights. In Syria, refugees are not citizens but have some civil, economic, and social rights. Lebanon bars Palestinian refugees from working in over 70 job classifications, and politicians across the spectrum are against including Palestinians in Lebanese political life”.

²⁰ Main source: Beinun J. and Hajjar L. (2014) *Palestine, Israel and Arab-Israeli Conflict, A Primer*, MERIP, http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/toc-pal-isr-primer.html

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip became distinct geographical units as a result of the 1949 armistice agreement that divided the new Jewish state of Israel from other parts of Mandate Palestine.

From 1948-1967, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was ruled by Jordan, which annexed the area in 1950 and extended citizenship to Palestinians living there. During this period, the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian military administration.

In 1956, Israel joined with Britain and France to attack Egypt in order to reverse the Egyptian government's nationalization of the Suez Canal (then under French and British control). Israeli forces captured Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, but were forced to evacuate back to the armistice lines as a result of UN pressure led by the United States and the Soviet Union (in an uncharacteristic show of cooperation to avert further conflict in the Middle East). By the early 1960s, however, the region was becoming a hot spot of Cold War rivalry as the United States and the Soviet Union were competing with one another for global power and influence.

In the spring of 1967, the Soviet Union misinformed the Syrian government that Israeli forces were massing in northern Israel to attack Syria. There was no such Israeli mobilization. But clashes between Israel and Syria had been escalating for about a year, and Israeli leaders had publicly declared that it might be necessary to bring down the Syrian regime if it failed to end Palestinian commando attacks against Israel from Syrian territory.

Responding to a Syrian request for assistance, in May 1967 Egyptian troops entered the Sinai Peninsula bordering Israel. A few days later, then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser asked the UN observer forces stationed between Israel and Egypt to evacuate their positions. The Egyptians then re-occupied Sharm El-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula and proclaimed a blockade of the Israeli port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, arguing that access to Eilat was through Egyptian territorial waters.

As the military and diplomatic crisis continued, on 5 June 1967 Israel preemptively attacked Egypt and Syria, destroying their air forces on the ground within a few hours. Jordan joined in the fighting belatedly, and consequently was attacked by Israel as

well. The Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies were decisively defeated, and Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

The 1967 war, which lasted only six days, established Israel as the dominant regional military power. The speed and thoroughness of Israel’s victory discredited the Arab regimes. In contrast, the Palestinian national liberation movement emerged as a major actor after 1967 in the form of the political and military groups that made up the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Israel established a military administration to govern the Palestinian residents of the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Under this arrangement, Palestinians were denied many basic political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of political association. Palestinian nationalism was criminalized as a threat to Israeli security, which meant that even displaying the Palestinian national colors was a punishable act. All aspects of Palestinian life were regulated, and often severely restricted by the Israeli military administration. For example, Israel forbade the gathering of wild thyme (za_tar), a basic element of Palestinian cuisine.

Israeli policies and practices in the West Bank and Gaza have included extensive use of collective punishments such as curfews, house demolitions and closure of roads, schools and community institutions. Hundreds of Palestinian political activists have been deported to Jordan or Lebanon, tens of thousands of acres of Palestinian land have been confiscated, and thousands of trees have been uprooted. Since 1967, over 300,000 Palestinians have been imprisoned without trial, and over half a million have been tried in the Israeli military court system. Torture of Palestinian prisoners has been a common practice since at least 1971, and dozens of people have died in detention from abuse or neglect. Israeli officials have claimed that harsh measures and high rates of imprisonment are necessary to thwart terrorism. According to Israel, Palestinian terrorism includes all forms of opposition to the occupation (including nonviolence).

Israel has built hundreds of settlements and permitted hundreds of thousands of its own Jewish citizens to move to the West Bank and Gaza, despite that this constitutes

a breach of international law. Israel has justified the violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and other international laws governing military occupation of foreign territory on the grounds that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not technically “occupied” because they were never part of the sovereign territory of any state. Therefore, according to this interpretation, Israel is not a foreign “occupier” but a legal “administrator” of territory whose status remains to be determined. The international community has rejected the Israeli official position that the West Bank and Gaza are not occupied, and has maintained that international law should apply there. But little effort has been mounted to enforce international law or hold Israel accountable for the numerous violations it has engaged in since 1967.

The UN partition plan advocated that Jerusalem become an international zone, independent of both the proposed Jewish and Palestinian Arab states. In the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel took control of the western part of Jerusalem, while Jordan took the eastern part, including the old walled city containing important Jewish, Muslim and Christian religious sites. The 1949 armistice line cut the city in two. In June 1967, Israel captured East Jerusalem from Jordan and almost immediately annexed it. It reaffirmed its annexation in 1981.

Israel regards Jerusalem as its “eternal capital.” Arabs consider East Jerusalem part of the occupied West Bank and want it to be the capital of a Palestinian state.

1.3.1.8 Land, colonisation and housing policies in East Jerusalem

Although we find many parallels with the legal situation in the rest of the Occupied Territories, we mention the legal status concerning Palestinian land and property in East Jerusalem separately because of the city’s unique status.

Shortly after the 1967 War, Israel extended its law to an expanded East Jerusalem area. For many this unilateral action has been defined as annexation of the city. This has had significant repercussions not only for the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, but also for the entire West Bank.

On December 28, a call for tenders was made for the construction of housing in Pisgat Zeev, Neve Yaakov and Har Homa, colonies surrounding East Jerusalem. This colonization, considered illegal under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, is

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also a stumbling block to the re-launching of peace talks, and has serious impacts on Palestinians’ fundamental human rights.

As far as the status of East Jerusalem is concerned, the Partition Plan adopted by the UN in 1947 anticipated that Jerusalem would be placed under international jurisdiction. However, the establishment of Jerusalem as an international city never took place, since Jerusalem was divided in two under the 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan following the first Israeli-Arab war (1948-1949.)

Under the armistice agreement, the western part of Jerusalem was to be under Israeli control, while the eastern part would be occupied by Jordan. With the June 1967 war East Jerusalem was conquered and militarily occupied by Israel, as was the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and Sinai. Israel then proceeded to annex the 6.5 square kilometers of East Jerusalem, as well as 64 square kilometers of adjacent land in the West Bank containing numerous neighboring Palestinian villages. The international community has never recognized this annexation and still considers East Jerusalem to be under Israeli military occupation.

The question of the holy sites of the Old City – a genuine crossroads, religiously, symbolically and historically – is also a very sensitive issue. The Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall, both sacred for Jews, the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque, sacred for Muslims, and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and the site of the Last Supper, revered by Christians, are all there.

In respect to the colonies in East Jerusalem, since 1967, despite the fact that international law prohibits the transfer of civilians from an occupying power to a territory it has occupied, Israel has progressively implemented a policy of intense colonization of East Jerusalem, expropriating a third of the land in that sector to build Jewish-only colonies. A second third of the territory has not yet been physically colonized, but projects in certain areas of that third are being considered by the Israeli government.

Palestinians are only allowed to build on 13 percent of East Jerusalem, where the bulk of the land is already densely occupied. The number of Israeli colonizers (settlers) in

East Jerusalem has risen from 32,000 in 1977 to around 190,000 in 2007 (in comparison with 225,000 Palestinians), an increase of around 600 percent.

Jewish settlers today live in 14 colonies forming a crescent from the north to the south of the city on its eastern side, contrary to what was agreed upon in the Oslo Accords and subsequent peace plans.

Furthermore, under international law, the Israeli colonies in the occupied territories are all illegal, including those in East Jerusalem. The international community refuses to recognize the policy of annexation and colonization implemented by Israel in East Jerusalem, and has demanded, since 1967, that Israel withdraws ~~from~~ the territories occupied during the recent conflict” through UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)²¹.

Despite that resolution, Israel adopted the Basic Law of 1980 declaring that Jerusalem ~~whole and unified~~” is the Israeli capital. This clause was declared ~~null and void~~” and ~~in~~ violation of international law” by UN Security Council Resolution 478 (1980)²², which considers East Jerusalem as ~~occupied Palestinian territory~~” and its Palestinian residents to be protected by international humanitarian law.

The International Court of Justice also pronounced its opinion on the Israeli colonies in its July 9, 2004 ruling²³: ~~(. . .)~~ Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and an obstacle to peace and to economic and social development (. . .) actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, to change the status and demographic composition of Occupied East Jerusalem have no legal validity and are null and void”.

In his 2008 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967 for the United Nations Human Rights Council, South African lawyer John Dugard was extremely critical of the Israeli policies of colonizing East Jerusalem. He asserted that the checkpoints and roadblocks restricting Palestinians’ movements, as well as the demolition of Palestinian homes, are part of a strategy of

²¹United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)

²²United Nations Security Council Resolution 478 (1980)

²³International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004

Judaization of Jerusalem and reflect Israeli policies of colonialism, apartheid and occupation”²⁴ .

By creating new “facts on the ground” serving its interests, Israel not only maintains tight control over East Jerusalem, but also assures that it will enter any eventual negotiations with the Palestinians over Jerusalem’s status from a position of great strength.

Although a large part of the “Judaization” of Jerusalem was accomplished by the expulsion of Arab residents during the wars of 1948 and 1967, the demographic evolution has also been shaped by measures taken by Israel in times of “peace.” These measures include the strategic extension of the city’s municipal boundaries, bureaucratic and judicial restrictions on the use of land by the Palestinians, the suppression of the rights of Palestinians, an ongoing policy of colonization, and the construction of the Apartheid Wall (Zink 2009: 122–133)

Thus, for example, when the obtaining a building permit is made so difficult for Palestinians by Israel, many Palestinian residents are compelled to build their homes illegally despite the risk of seeing them demolished later by the occupying Israeli forces. Over 100,000 Palestinian residents have lost or are forced to live with the risk losing their right of residence in Jerusalem as Israel confiscates many Palestinians’ residence permits on various different pretexts.

Another measure that can be predicted to provoke the departure of Palestinians from East Jerusalem is the law passed by the Israeli Parliament in 1995 decreeing the illegality of any Palestinian institution in Jerusalem²⁵ .

²⁴ The Associated Press, “UN expert calls Palestinian terrorism 'inevitable consequence' of Israeli occupation”, *Haaretz.com*, February 26 2008

²⁵ International Displacement Monitoring Centre on East Jerusalem Report. In this report is stated that “In 1967, Israel annexed East Jerusalem in addition to 64 square kilometers in West Bank, unilaterally defining this as expanded Jerusalem municipality, and would in 1980 pass legislation reinforcing position of Israel since 1967. This decree was declared illegal in flagrant violation of international law by the UN Security Council. (UN Security Council resolution 252, 1968; HRC resolution 2/4, January 9 2007). Since the annexation, Israel has implemented policies aimed at reducing the number of Palestinians in the city. These take the form of legislation, measures limiting services granted by law, and discriminatory law enforcement in such areas as discriminatory application of municipal planning regulations, access to services, family reunification, and revocation of residency rights (B’tselem, July 2006, ICAHD, 2007)

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Land, colonisation and housing during the ‘Oslo era’ (1993-2000), examine relevant developments during the years of the Oslo ‘peace process’. It traces Israeli land acquisition and settlement building during that period, which not only continued but actually accelerated. Other developments examined include, most significantly, the division of the West Bank into Areas ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’, as agreed upon in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreements (1995), and the implications of such territorial divisions for land and property issues in those areas.

1.3.1.9 The Oslo I Accord or Oslo I

The ‘Oslo I Accord’ or ‘Oslo I’, officially called the «Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements» or «Declaration of Principles (DOP)», was an attempt in 1993 to set up a framework that would lead to the resolution of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It was the first face-to-face agreement between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)²⁶.

Negotiations concerning the agreement, an outgrowth of the Madrid Conference of 1991, were conducted secretly in Oslo, Norway, hosted by the Fafo institute, and completed on 20 August 1993. The Accords were subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993 in the presence of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and U.S. President Bill Clinton. The documents themselves were signed by Mahmoud Abbas for the PLO, foreign Minister Shimon Peres for Israel, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher for the United States and foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev for Russia.

The Accord provided for the creation of a Palestinian interim self-government, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The Palestinian Authority would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. The Accords also called for the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Since 1967 more than 2,000 Palestinian homes are reported to have been demolished, displacing thousands though figures are only available for the last few years (OCHA, March 2011). In 2011, it is estimated that some 86,000 Palestinians are at risk of displacement for having built illegally (UN, May 2011; OCHA, March 2011)”

²⁶ Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13 1993.

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It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian Refugees, Israeli Settlements, security and borders were left to future negotiations. In 1995, the Oslo I Accord was followed by Oslo II. Neither promised Palestinian statehood.

In August 1993, the delegations had reached an agreement, which was signed in secrecy by Peres while visiting Oslo. Peres took the agreement to the United States to the surprise of U.S. negotiator Denis Ross. However, the Palestinians and Israelis had not yet agreed on the wording of the Letters of Mutual Recognition, which constituted an agreement in which the PLO would acknowledge the state of Israel and pledge to reject violence, and Israel would recognize the PLO as the official Palestinian authority, allowing Yasser Arafat to return to the West Bank. Most of the negotiations for this agreement were carried out in a hotel in Paris, now in full view of the public and the press. An agreement was reached and signed by Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, just in time for the official signing in Washington. The Accords were officially signed on 13 September 1993, at a Washington ceremony hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton.

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agreed that it was time to:

- put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict
- recognise their mutual legitimate and political rights
- strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process

1.3.1.10 Palestinians wage nonviolent campaign during First Intifada, 1987-1988

The intifada as a whole began in December 1987 and came to an end in 1993. However, the nonviolent phase of the campaign came to an end in the fall of 1988. Viewing the First Intifada as "nonviolent" is controversial because of the violence that

accompanied the campaign. Three considerations lead to its inclusion into the nonviolent campaign:

- A significant part of the campaign leadership worked very hard to keep the campaign nonviolent
- The masses participated in the nonviolent methods, not in the violence
- Scholars in the field of nonviolent action include the Intifada, although acknowledge its ambiguities

Course of events

The Israeli military occupation of the Palestinian territories that followed Israel’s victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war significantly expanded Israel’s political and economic control over the Palestinian communities in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) set up hundreds of military checkpoints throughout these areas to restrict Palestinian mobility and to guard against potential Palestinian bombers. Palestinians were required to carry identification cards and file Israeli-government issued paperwork in order to travel from one Palestinian community to another. The Israeli government also set up the Israeli Civil Administration to oversee affairs in the Palestinian territories. This administration employed Palestinians as policemen and local government officials to help manage the needs of Palestinian residents living in refugee camps, villages, and cities. This Israeli governing body heavily taxed imports and exports that flowed across the Palestinian border, and controlled access to water and electricity. Palestinians were also required to pay taxes directly to the Israeli state, and as the Palestinian and Israeli economies became increasingly intertwined, many working-class Palestinians found themselves working for Israeli-owned companies and factories. Many of these workers were employed in the growing Israeli settlements as well, helping to lay brick foundations and build homes for incoming Israeli settlers. To add to the sting of this humiliating labor, Palestinians were paid lower wages than Israelis who performed the same work.

By the 1980s, Palestinian discontent about the quality of their living conditions and their lack of political and economic autonomy began to escalate. In 1988, 59 percent of Gaza’s population was under the age of nineteen, and many of these youths had only known life under the Israeli occupation. These frustrated youths wanted to resist

Israeli dominance, and many of them felt that older generations had become too accustomed to the occupation.

In addition, a shortage of arable land and a rising rate of unemployment made life increasingly difficult for many Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Israeli government’s 1985 “iron fist” policy that authorized the use of roadblocks, searches, arrests, deportations, and refusals of family reunification permits only served to further embitter Palestinian residents. By this time, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its call for violent resistance against the Israeli occupation had become largely discredited in the territories, as Palestinian residents realized that their past use of violent methods of resistance did not bring about the end to the occupation nor substantial changes to their everyday lives. As tensions continued to increase, calls for nonviolent resistance became increasingly appealing to this frustrated people.

The spark that ignited the 1987 intifada came in the form of a car crash at a military checkpoint, a crash in which four Palestinians were killed by an Israeli truck driver. Rumors soon spread that the crash was not an accident but an act of vengeance on the part of the Israelis, and soon Palestinian youth began gathering in the streets of Gaza and the West Bank. As such assemblies were deemed illegal by the Civil Administration, the IDF attempted to break up the crowds by firing rubber bullets at the protesters. The protesters scattered as the IDF closed off exit roads and began making arrests, but many of the youthful protesters retaliated by throwing rocks at the Israeli soldiers. Riots soon broke out in Palestinian refugee camps and villages as Palestinian teenagers continued to clash with Israeli soldiers. The international media reported on the clashes, capturing scenes of Palestinian adolescents’ sling-shooting rocks and Molotov cocktails at Israeli tanks and armed soldiers.

With this new uprising, Palestinian proponents of nonviolence including Mubarak Awad and Feisal Hussein helped establish the United National Command for the Escalation of the Uprising in the Occupied Territories (UNC) to form an effective strategy for resistance. With the help of youth volunteers, the UNC distributed thousands of leaflets to Palestinian neighborhoods in order to instruct residents on how to resist Israeli domination. The leaflets instructed residents to boycott Israeli-made products, resign from government and police positions, refrain from paying

taxes to the Israeli government, stage merchants’ strikes, and wage countless other forms of nonviolent disobedience. Many of the symbolic acts of resistance helped to build and rekindle both national and cultural pride, as Palestinian flags were raised during protest marches and traditional Palestinian theater and poetry were performed in open-air spaces. Many protesters also adorned traditional Palestinian clothing to symbolize their resistance to Israeli domination.

The UNC also helped to coordinate local Popular Committees that actively provided Palestinian communities with many social services to help end dependence on the Israeli occupiers. These Committees helped provide residents with childcare, health care, education, and food. When the IDF began to crack down on the protests by brutally beating and shooting demonstrators, Popular Committees like the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees set up hundreds of mobile health clinics to tend to the injured. In addition, Committees like the Union of Women’s Work Committees helped support and plan nonviolent direct actions such as protest marches and road closures. In May 1988, the United National Command for the Escalation of the Uprising in the Occupied Territories (UNC)²⁷ distributed a leaflet in which it instructed Palestinians to regard local Committees as the government of the people rather than the Civil Administration.

The atmosphere of popular protest also encouraged Palestinians to resist in their own creative ways. Some Palestinians set their watches to a different hour than the one imposed by the Israelis, an action which infuriated several IDF soldiers and led to the smashing of many watches. When the Civil Administration decided to close 900 Palestinian schools in February 1988 to prevent youth from organizing, Palestinian teachers held illegal classes in makeshift facilities to ensure that students could continue their education and that younger Palestinian students stayed off the street. In

²⁷ The United National Command for the Escalation of the Uprising in the Occupied Territories (UNC) was established by Palestinian proponents of nonviolence including Mubarak Awad and Feisal Husseini in order to form an effective strategy for resistance. With the help of youth volunteers, the UNC distributed thousands of leaflets to Palestinian neighborhoods in order to instruct residents on how to resist Israeli domination. The leaflets instructed residents to boycott Israeli-made products, resign from government and police positions, refrain from paying taxes to the Israeli government, stage merchants’ strikes, and wage countless other forms of nonviolent disobedience. Many of the symbolic acts of resistance helped to build both national and cultural pride, as Palestinian flags were raised during protest marches and traditional Palestinian theater and poetry were performed in open-air spaces. Many protesters also adorned traditional Palestinian clothing to symbolize their resistance to Israeli domination.

addition, many Palestinians refused to produce identification cards when confronted by Israeli soldiers at roadblocks and military checkpoints. Some burned these cards altogether.

What’s more, many women and girls took the lead on loosening Palestinian food and economic dependence on Israel by collectively cultivating their lands and producing fruits and vegetables. However, as illustrated by its reaction to the Palestinian attempt to create an independently run dairy farm, the Israeli Civil Administration forcibly sought to stem any form of Palestinian economic autonomy. In 1988, several Palestinians in the village of Beit Sahour purchased 18 cows from an Israeli and set up their own dairy farm. In response, Israeli Civil Administration officials pronounced the cows a security threat and ordered the farm to be closed within 24 hours. However, the following day Israeli officials were incensed to find that the cows had been relocated to a secret location.

The Israeli government responded to the protesting Palestinians in a variety of ways. With its intelligence agency, Shin Bet, Israeli officials attempted to stop the production and distribution of the leaflets that were circulating within Palestinian neighborhoods. They were able to intercept thousands of leaflets, but the continual relocation of leaflet production sites made suppression nearly impossible. The IDF also made thousands of arrests, rounding up both leaders and protesters. Prisons were often filled beyond capacity, and it soon became a source of pride for one’s family member to be arrested by the IDF. But because the leadership model of the UNC was unlike the hierarchical model of the PLO (which played a minimal role in the non-violent campaign), new leaders constantly emerged to replace those who had been arrested. In order to break Palestinian morale and prevent protesters from organizing, the IDF imposed a curfew on Palestinian refugee camps, villages, and cities. The IDF also blockaded several Palestinian villages, restricting the flow of goods, food, medical services, and electricity. In order to force Palestinian merchants to end their strike, Israeli officials ordered the IDF to smash open the locks of striking Palestinian stores. And when Palestinian locksmiths volunteered their services to the merchants and replaced the locks, the IDF broke them again, this time in the hopes of attracting looters. In response, the Palestinians set up neighborhood watch committees to protect

the shops from looters. These back-and-forth actions continued for a few more weeks until the IDF eventually gave up.

The Israeli and international media reported daily on the events occurring in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Images of the IDF dropping tear gas and mace from helicopters onto crowds of demonstrators and of Israeli tractors bulldozing the homes of protesters induced many Western European nations to criticize the Israeli government. Israeli peace groups including the Women in Black, Peace Now, and 21st Year also criticized the actions of the IDF. Even some members of the Israeli army expressed a sense of demoralization, as a corps of Israeli military men called Yash Gvul refused to serve in the territories.

Early in 1988, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin had been caught on camera encouraging the IDF to ‘break the bones’ of Palestinian protesters, so when Palestinian campaign leader Mubarak Awad arranged for Israelis to visit Palestinian hospitals where they saw Palestinian children with broken arms and bones, many Israelis began to doubt the role of the military occupation in the Palestinian territories.

Despite these rebukes, the Israeli government continued its forceful repression of the Palestinian uprising. The fact that the United States also did not directly condemn Israel for its actions against the Palestinians encouraged the Israeli government to continue its policies. Israel had already suffered an economic loss of approximately \$1 billion as a result of the Palestinian labor strike, boycotted goods, and the Palestinian refusal to pay taxes. It had also increased the number of troops in the area from 12,000 to 80,000 as well as increased its military expenditures by approximately \$600 million. Although in April 1988 the commander of the IDF told Israeli officials that continued armed force would not resolve the crisis, the Israeli government ordered the round up and deportation of suspected leaders and organizers. These included Mubarak Awad, widely known as ‘the Arab Gandhi’. The Israeli government continued to order mass arrests of committee members, and ordered the IDF to employ plastic bullets rather than rubber ones.

Indeed, as increasing numbers of leaders were placed in jail during the summer of 1988, the discipline needed to maintain the nonviolent campaign became increasingly hard to find. Some leaders of the UNC encouraged protesters to engage in ‘limited’ forms of violence against the IDF, including rock- and Molotov cocktail-throwing,

allowing the nonviolent aspects of the campaign to be overlooked by mass media within Israel and internationally. Indeed, Palestinian protesters flung bottles, pipes, and the IDF’s own tear-gas canisters back at the Israeli soldiers. The campaigners also committed acts of violence against fellow Palestinians who did not participate in or observe the strikes and protests against Israel. In the Gaza Strip, protesters torched 14 Palestinian businesses that did not observe posted strike hours. In addition, Palestinian protesters murdered over 190 ‘collaborators’ in the first 16 months of the campaign. These violent aspects of the campaign hindered the Palestinians’ ability to sway Israeli public opinion in their favor and end the occupation.

After the summer of 1988, the old leadership of the PLO took command of the uprising and the latter years of the Palestinian intifada were characterized by armed struggle, which did not succeed in bringing about the end of the Israeli military occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Outcomes:

The intifada is considered neither as military nor as guerilla conflict. The PLO - which had limited control of the situation - never expected the uprising to make any direct gains against the Israeli state, as it was a grassroots, mass movement and not their venture. However, the Intifada did produce a number of results that Palestinians considered positive:

- By engaging the Israelis directly, rather than relying on the authority or the assistance of neighbouring Arab states, Palestinians were able to demonstrate their identity as a separate nation worthy of self-determination
- It broke the image of Jerusalem as a united, Israeli city
- It caused Jordan to sever its residual administrative and financial ties to the West Bank in the face of sweeping popular support for the PLO
- The failure of the "Iron Fist" policy, Israel's deteriorating international image and Jordan cutting legal and administrative ties to the West Bank and the U.S.'s recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people forced Rabin to seek an end the violence through negotiation and dialogue with the PLO
- The Intifada resulted in international attention to the Palestinians’ cause

- The Palestinians showed for the first time that there were two sides to the Israel-Palestine issue
- American media openly criticized Israel in a way that they had not before
- The success of the Intifada gave Arafat and his followers the confidence they needed to moderate their political programme:
 - At the meeting of the Palestine National Council in Algiers in mid-November 1988, Arafat won a majority for the historic decision to recognise Israel's legitimacy to accept all the relevant UN resolutions going back to 29 November 1947 and to adopt the principle of a two state solution.
- Criticism of Israel came from the UN, the European Community and the United States as well as the Arab states - which during the 1980s were concentrated on the Iran-Iraq War.
- The European Community (later European Union) became an important economic contributor towards the nascent Palestinian Authority.
- The Intifada empowered Palestinians to enter negotiations which lead to the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords
- The uprising can be linked to the Madrid Conference, and thereby to the return of the Palestinian Liberation Organization from their Tunisian exile.¹
- The Intifada exposed many problems with the IDF's conduct in the operative and tactical fields, and also the general problem of Israel's prolonged control of the West Bank and Gaza strip. These problems were noticed, and widely criticized, in international forums.
- the impact on the services sector, including the important Israeli tourist industry, was notably negative

1.3.1.11 Intifada 2000 and the “Peace Process”

i. The flaws of the Oslo Accords

–The United States has been a terrible 'sponsor' of the peace process. It has succumbed to Israeli pressure on everything, abandoning the principle of land for peace (no U.N. Resolution says anything about returning a tiny percentage, as

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opposed to all of the land Israel seized in 1967), pushing the lifeless Palestinian leadership into deeper and deeper holes to suit Netanyahu's preposterous demands.

"The fact is that Palestinians are dramatically worse off than they were before the Oslo process began. Their annual income is less than half of what it was in 1992. They are unable to travel from place to place, more of their land has been taken than ever before, more settlements exist, and Jerusalem is practically lost...

—Every house demolition, every expropriated dunum, every arrest and torture, every barricade, every closure, every gesture of arrogance and intended humiliation simply revives the past and reenacts Israel's offenses against the Palestinian spirit, land, body politic. To speak about peace in such a context is to try to reconcile the irreconcilable” (Said, 1998).

ii. The roots of Intifada 2000

"The explosion of Palestinian anger last September 29 put an end to the charade begun at Oslo seven years ago and labeled the 'peace process.' In 1993 Palestinians, along with millions of people around the world, were led to hope that Israel would withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza within five years and that Palestinians would then be free to establish an independent state. Meanwhile both sides would work out details of Israel's withdrawal and come to an agreement on the status of Jerusalem, the future of Israeli settlements, and the return of Palestinian refugees.

(.....) Because of the lopsided balance of power, negotiations went nowhere and the Palestinians' hopes were never fulfilled. The Israelis, regardless of which government was in power, quibbled over wording, demanded revisions of what had previously been agreed to, then refused to abide by the new agreements. Meanwhile successive governments were demolishing Palestinian homes, taking over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem for Jewish housing, and seizing Palestinian land for new settlements. A massive new highway network built after 1993 on confiscated Palestinian land isolates Palestinian towns and villages from one another and from Jerusalem, forcing many Palestinians to go through Israeli checkpoints just to get to the next town...

(....) According to President Clinton and most of the media, Prime Minister Ehud Barak conceded at Camp David virtually everything the Palestinians wanted, and

Yasser Arafat threw away the opportunity for peace by rejecting Barak's offer. In fact Arafat could not accept it. Barak, backed by Clinton, wanted assurance of Israel's continued strategic control over the West Bank and Gaza, including air space and borders, and insisted that Israel retain permanent sovereignty over most of East Jerusalem, including Haram Al-Sharif. This was a deal no Arab would accept.

(.....) As the protests grew, army helicopters rocketed neighborhoods in several Palestinian cities, destroying entire city blocks and causing scores of casualties. Israeli tanks surrounded Palestinian towns with their guns turned toward the town. Armed Israeli civilians within the Green Line rampaged through Arab neighborhoods destroying Arab property and shouting "Death of Arabs"...Israeli police who were quick to use bullets against Palestinian stone throwers failed to restrain the Israelis and instead fired at Arabs trying to defend their homes. Two Arabs were killed.

(....) The uprising was undoubtedly fueled by the resentment caused by years of daily abuse and humiliation under Israeli occupation. On September 6, a group of Israeli border police stopped three Palestinian workers as they were returning home from Israel and, for no reason at all, subjected them to 40 minutes of torture. *The San Francisco Chronicle* reported on September 19 that the policemen punched the three men, slammed their heads against a stone wall, forced them to swallow their own blood, and cursed their mothers and sisters. The incident only came to light because the policemen took photographs of themselves with their victims, holding their heads by the hair like hunting trophies. Israeli human rights workers said such beatings are a common occurrence, but they are seldom reported" (Marshall R., 2000).

–In the Oslo Agreements, Israel and the West put Palestinian leadership to a test: In exchange for an Israeli promise to gradually dismantle the mechanisms of the occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian leadership promised to stop every act of violence and terror immediately. For that purpose, all the apparatus for security coordination was created, more and more Palestinian jails were built, and demonstrators were barred from approaching the [Jewish] settlements”.

–The two sides agreed on a period of five years for completion of the new deployment and the negotiations on a final agreement. The Palestinian leadership agreed again and again to extend its trial period...From their perspective, Israel was also put to a test:

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Was Israel really giving up its attitude of superiority and domination, built up in order to keep the Palestinian people under its control?

"More than seven years have gone by and Israel has security and administrative control of 61.2% of the West Bank and about 20% of the Gaza Strip and security control over another 26.8% of the West Bank. This control is what has enabled Israel to double the number of settlers in 10 years...and to seal an entire nation into restricted areas, imprisoned in a network of bypass roads meant for Jews only (...).

–Israel has failed the test. Palestinians control of 12% of the West Bank does not mean that Israel has given up its attitude of superiority and domination (...). The bloodbath that has been going on for three weeks is the natural outcome of seven years of [Israeli] lying and deception” (Amira Hass, 2000).

iii. November 2000 - Jimmy Carter's simple statement of the facts

–An underlying reason that years of U.S. diplomacy have failed and violence in the Middle East persists is that some Israeli leaders continue to 'create facts' by building settlements in occupied territory (...)

–At Camp David in September 1978...the bilateral provisions led to a comprehensive and lasting treaty between Egypt and Israel, made possible at the last minute by Israel's agreement to remove its settlers from the Sinai. But similar constraints concerning the status of the West Bank and Gaza have not been honored, and have led to continuing confrontation and violence (...)

–[Concerning UN Resolution 242] Our government's legal commitment to support this well-balanced resolution has not changed...It was clear that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were a direct violation of this agreement and were, according to the long-stated American position, both 'illegal and an obstacle to peace.' Accordingly, Prime Minister Begin pledged that there would be no establishment of new settlements until after the final peace negotiations were completed. But later, under Likud pressure, he declined to honor this commitment (...)

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–It is unlikely that real progress can be made...as long as Israel insists on its settlement policy, illegal under international laws that are supported by the United States and all other nations”²⁸.

–After three weeks of virtual war in the Israeli occupied territories, Prime Minister Ehud Barak announced a new plan to determine the final status of the region. During these weeks, over 100 Palestinians were killed, including 30 children, often by 'excessive use of lethal force in circumstances in which neither the lives of security forces nor others were in imminent danger, resulting in unlawful killings,' Amnesty International concluded in a detailed report”.

–Barak's plan...ensure(s) that useable land and resources (primarily water) remain largely in Israeli hands while the population is administered by a corrupt and brutal Palestinian Authority (PA), playing the role traditionally assigned to indigenous collaborators under the several varieties of imperial rule: the Black leadership of South Africa's Bantustans, to mention only the most obvious analogue (...).

–It is important to recall that the policies have not only been proposed, but implemented, with the support of the U.S. That support has been decisive since 1971, when Washington abandoned the basic diplomatic framework that it had initiated (UN Security Council Resolution 242), then pursued its unilateral rejection of Palestinian rights in the years that followed, culminating in the 'Oslo process.' Since all of this has been effectively vetoed from history in the US, it takes a little work to discover the essential facts. They are not controversial, only evaded” (Noam Chomsky, 2000).

iv. Intifada 2000—An overview

"There is, in the final analysis, only one way to 'stop the violence,' and that is to end the occupation. The desire for liberation will, eventually, always bring an occupied people out into the streets, stones in hand; ready to face the might of powerful armies, preferring to risk death than live in bondage. This is not extreme nation. racism or religious fervor. It is the need to be free (...). [Occupation] means a reality of unending violence. It means being surrounded by an abusive foreign army that enforces a social system indistinguishable from apartheid; confiscations of land that is

²⁸ Former President Jimmy Carter in the *Washington Post*, November 26, 2000.

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then given to hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers in Jewish-only communities linked by Jewish only roads; home demolitions; torture; cities cut off from each other, closed down on a regular basis. It means living in a massive prison (...)”

(.....) Since 1967, there has been only one workable solution to the conflict. The plan is articulated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which sets up a two-part 'land for peace' solution. Part one holds that Israel must withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. Part two calls for all states in the region to live in peace and security in those borders. The Israeli obligation, withdrawal from the occupied territories, is utterly unfulfilled” (Hussein Ibish, 2000).

1.3.1.12 The second Intifada (2000-2005)

The Second Intifada²⁹, commonly referred to as the Al-Aqsa Intifada or the second uprising, began in late 2000 as a result of Israeli occupation policies that not only continued to violate international law but to deprive Palestinians of their basic human rights and ended around 2005.

On Sept. 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon appeared at the Al Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem’s Old City with more than 1,000 Israeli police. In a blatant attempt to provoke Palestinians, he repeated a phrase that was broadcast during 1967 Six Day war when Israeli Occupation Forces seized East Jerusalem, “The Temple Mount is in our hands”, Sharon shouted. Palestinians reacted almost immediately to the threat to Al Aqsa, the third holiest site in Islam.

The Israeli Occupation Forces launched a series of sweeping military offensives and administrative policies designed to collectively punish Palestinians for the uprising. The United Nations quickly released Resolution 1322 citing Israel for the use of excessive force against the Palestinian people. The resolution came less than three weeks after the start of the violence by which time hundreds of Palestinian had already been killed and even more injured.

²⁹ Intifada is an Arabic word derived from a verb meaning "to shake off," and is the term used to describe the two major uprisings against Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The first Intifada erupted in late 1987, after an Israeli truck rammed into a line of Palestinian workers waiting to return to the Gaza Strip, killing four, and prompting spontaneous demonstrations. The second intifada, which started in September 2000, was triggered by a visit to Al Aqsa mosque compound by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and about 1,000 Israeli police.

According to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, at least 4,973 Palestinian civilians were killed over the course of the Second Intifada. Among them were 1,262 children, 274 women, and 32 medical personnel attempting to administer aid to injured civilians. More than 10,000 children were wounded during the five years of violence, as reported by the Swiss-based Defense for Children International, a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting child rights. Most of the deaths and injuries came as a result of air strikes against densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip and major land assaults on various West Bank cities, villages, and refugee camps.

Throughout the Second Intifada, Israeli forces also enforced an oppressive siege on the entirety of Palestine. Initially, Israel placed severe restrictions on Palestinians' ability to move. Israeli human rights group B'Tselem reports that Israel blocked access to Palestinian cities and villages with “concrete blocks, piles of dirt, deep trenches, or checkpoints”. Israeli authorities also enforced an early curfew that prohibited Palestinians from even being outside of their own homes at certain points throughout the day and night.

On June 16, 2002, Israel added another restriction to its list of human rights violations by beginning construction of the Apartheid Wall. Most of the wall has been built on Palestinian land, allowing Israel to annex the land that lay between the wall and 1948 Palestine (today, called Israel). Two years later, the International Court of Justice ruled illegal and ordered the construction to be stopped. Israel has yet to abide by the ruling.

Although the exact end-date for the Second Intifada is still disputed, most sources recognize early 2005 as the period of time during which the uprising subsided.

In addition to the thousands of deaths and injuries, Israeli Occupation Forces demolished some 5,000 Palestinian homes and damaged another 6,500 beyond repair, according to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights.

1.3.2 The History of Popular Resistance in Palestine

—Our people will continue their popular peaceful resistance to the Israeli occupation and its settlement and apartheid policies and its construction of the racist annexation Wall, and they receive support for their resistance, which is consistent with international humanitarian law and international

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conventions and has the support of peace activists from Israel and around the world, reflecting an impressive, inspiring and courageous example of the strength of this defenseless people, armed only with their dreams, courage, hope and slogans in the face of bullets, tanks, tear gas and bulldozers”³⁰.



Photo from the Kaufman-Lacusta book —Refusing to be Enemies - Palestinian and Israeli Nonviolent Resistance to the Israeli Occupation”

1.3.2.1 Introduction

The civil rebellions, that overthrew long-entrenched dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt and have shaken the survival pillars of autocratic regimes in Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, have, nowadays, brought increased attention to the power of strategic nonviolent action.

In Palestine, unarmed civil resistance against all forms of oppression has already had a long, and too often overlooked history.

As Palestinian human-rights attorney Jonathan Kuttub noted –Palestinians have perfected the language of the armed struggle, but not the actual practice of armed struggle, while all the time practicing nonviolence without calling it by that name,

³⁰ Mahmoud Abbas speech at UN General Assembly, *International Middle East Media Center*, 24 September 2011, <http://www.imemc.org/article/62102>

without following the proper path of nonviolence, and without claiming that what they are doing is nonviolent resistance.

(.....) As a result, even though the vast majority of the Palestinian people have never participated in armed struggle except through songs, slogans and rhetoric, the image in the West continues to be that of ~~the~~ the Palestinian as a terrorist or, at best, as a 'liberation fighter' with a gun in his hand, fighting for freedom to liberate his land” (Maxine Kaufman-Lacusta 2011).

Mazin Qumsiyeh (2001) explores the rich history of nonviolent popular-resistance struggles in Palestine over the decades. Rather than being an import, it ~~de~~ developed indigenously, organically, naturally and beautifully”. Mazin Qumsiyeh documents how, in almost 130 years since the onset of political Zionism, "The Palestinian people rose from the ashes of each onslaught to engage in novel forms of civil resistance”. He furthermore notes that conquest, colonization and expansion is by its nature violent and requires violence to maintain it. By contrast, he maintains, those resisting such aggression have more options at their disposal. Further, he recognizes that violent resistance by Palestinians has long been used as ~~ju~~ justification to brutalize the population, further uproot us and destroy our homes and lands”.

Finally, although nonviolent resistance can be subjected to brutal repression, it is far less devastating in terms of both people killed and social and economic disruption.

Indeed, as historic evidence shows, nonviolent resistance in Palestine is present and sound over the last one and half century of Palestinian history, from Ottoman rule to the British mandate to the aftermath of the ~~na~~qba” in 1948, and during the first and second Intifadas. Subsequently there exist numerous examples from popular Palestinian struggles, including petitions, strikes, demonstrations, noncooperation, boycotts, tax refusal, civil disobedience and more.

The main purpose of this part of the chapter is to highlight these nonviolent resistance cases and to transform them in building blocks of our basic argument that nonviolent, popular, unarmed resistance can be proven an irresistible means of utilizing virtually the entire population towards a new culture of active struggle against oppression and brute violence as well as of promoting the strategic advantages of nonviolent methods of resistance.

It is worth noting that the nonviolent resistance has been consistently followed by the Palestinians and in fact only a small proportion of Palestinians engaged in violent resistance as a whole (whether internationally sanctioned or not). And this, despite the fact that various UN resolutions and International regulatory framework pronounce the utter legitimacy of armed resistance³¹.

1.3.2.2 Nonviolent Resistance under Ottoman Rule (1878 - 1917)

According to Qumsiyeh (2011), the Ottoman period is an excellent example of popular and unarmed resistance against the Ottoman rule.

The Ottomans ruled Palestine almost uninterruptedly for four hundred years. The only break in their rule was from 1832-1840 when Muhammad Ali, an Egyptian vassal of the Turkish Empire revolted against his patrons and conquered Palestine, Syria and parts of Asia Minor. However, with the assistance of the British and the Russians, the Ottomans regained control of the area.

The Ottomans never controlled Palestine as a single unit. Instead they divided the immediate and surrounding areas into a number of villayets (districts) whose boundaries altered over the years.

i. The 1834 Arab Revolt in Palestine

From the Ottoman rule period, we select the 1834 revolt in Palestine as major event of popular resistance that can be considered as a determinative event for the Palestinian sense of nationhood as pointed out by Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal .

They argue that the 1834 Arab revolt of the Egyptian conquered part of Ottoman Syria was a formative event for the Palestinian sense of nationhood, in that it brought together disparate groups against a common enemy. These groups are some of those that reemerged later to constitute the Palestinian people.

–The region of Palestine was divided into four districts, attached administratively to the province of Damascus and ruled from Istanbul. ... With a gradual decline in the quality of Ottoman rule, the country suffered widespread neglect. By the end of the 18th century, much of Palestine was owned by absentee landlords and leased to

³¹ For example, UNGA A/RES/33/24 of 29 November 1978 "Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, particularly armed struggle"

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impoverished tenant farmers, and taxation was crippling. The great forests of the Galilee and the Carmel mountain range were denuded of trees; swamp and desert encroached on agricultural land.” (Kimmerling B., Migdal J, 2003:3-20)

At the beginnings of the 20th century, a «local and specific Palestinian patriotism» emerged resulting to the progressive grow of the Palestinian identity. In 1911, a newspaper named *–Filastin*” was published in Jaffa and the first Palestinian nationalist organisations appeared at the end of the World War (Morris Benny, 2001).

Two political factions emerged al-Muntada and al-Arabi dominated by the Nashibi family, militated for the promotion of the Arab language and culture, for the defense of Islamic values and for an independent Syria and Palestine. When the First Palestinian Congress of February 1919 issued its anti-Zionist manifesto rejecting Zionist immigration, it extended a welcome to those Jews ~~among us~~ who have been arabicized, who have been living in our province since before the war; they are as we are, and their loyalties are our own” (Salim Tamari, 2004: 10-26).

According to Benny Morris³², Palestinian Arab nationalism as a distinct movement appeared between April and July 1920, after the Nebi Musa riots, the San Remo Conference and the failure of Faisal to establish the Kingdom of Greater Syria.

This revolt is thought by some to be crucial in the formation of Palestinian identity. According to Shamir, this was ~~the~~ first application of the concept of territorial state. (...) This was the inception of the modern history of Palestine” (Shamir Shimon, 1984: 220-221).

The 1834 Arab revolt in Palestine, also known as the Arab Peasants revolt was a reaction against the conscription into the Egyptian Army by the Muhammad Ali, since Palestinians were indignant at being drafted by the Egyptian army.

At the beginning of the uprising, the rebels managed to take over many cities including Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron. However, the Egyptian military leader

³² Benny Morris is a professor of History in the Middle East Studies department of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. He is a key member of the group of Israeli historians known as the *–New Historians*”, a term Morris coined to describe himself and historians Avin nShlaim and Ilan Pappé. Morris's work on the Arab-Israeli conflict and especially the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has won praise and criticism from both sides of the political divide. He is accused by some academics in Israel of only using Israeli and never Arab sources, creating an "unbalanced picture". Regarding himself as a Zionist, he writes, "I embarked upon the research not out of ideological commitment or political interest. I simply wanted to know what happened."

Ibrahim Pasha, commanding an army force of well-trained 40.000 troops, moved against the rebels and managed to end the insurgence. Furthermore, he managed to conquer Gaza, Ramleh, Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem and Acre. The final defeat of rebels was on the 4 of August in Hebron. His conquest generated a significant demographic change as the region of Palestine had an influx of Muslim tribal immigrants.

ii. The course of events

a. Declaration of revolt in Nablus

Qasim al-Ahmad, clan leader of Jamma-in was appointed as *mustasallim* (administrator) of the Nablus sub-district by Ibrahim Pasha. Qasim was replaced by 'Abd al-Hadi. Qasim organized the *a'ayan* (notables) of Nablus, Hebron and Jerusalem and on 19 May 1834, the clans, led by Qasim, notified Egyptian officials that local Southern Syrian Arab families would no longer furnish the Egyptian army with troops. Governor Ibrahim Pasha responded by sending Egyptian forces into the rebellious cities, thus triggering conflict with the clans. Ottoman-aligned Southern Syrian Arab families in southern Ottoman Syria revolted under the leadership of Qasim al-Ahmad.

The rebellion spread throughout the area known today as the West Bank. During the revolt, a zealous Muslim denounced Ibrahim Pasha as an infidel and exhorted the population of Nablus to join the uprising.

b. Jerusalem

Nablus sent hundreds of rebels to attack Jerusalem aided by a Circassian clan from Abu Ghosh and together conquered most parts of the city on May 31. The Christians and Jews of Jerusalem, sympathetic to Ibrahim as his rule brought them economic prosperity, were seen by the locals as enemies and invaders therefore were singled out for abuse.

Ibrahim's Egyptian army routed Qasim's forces in Jerusalem the next month. Nearby Bethlehem's Muslim Quarter was also destroyed by the Egyptian army and its

inhabitants disarmed. This move was apparently a punishment for the killing of a favored loyalist of Ibrahim Pasha³³.

c. June 1834 engagements

On 9th June, an Egyptian force from the city with reinforcements, consisting of 2,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry engaged rebels approaching from Nablus. 1,500 rebels were killed and 11 taken prisoner. On the 16th June, the army was less successful and had to fight their way back to the city.

d. Hebron

In 1839, an estimated 750 of the town's Muslims had been drafted as soldiers, and some 500 of them were killed. Hebron took part in the rebellion of 1834 and suffered badly from Ibrahim Pasha's campaign to crush the uprising. The town was laid to siege and, when the defenses of the town fell, it was sacked by Ibrahim Pasha's army. Most of the Muslim population managed to flee beforehand to the hills. Some of the Jewish community however stayed behind, and, during the general pillage of the town, five of them were killed. The majority however, like most of the Jews of Safed and Tiberias, fled to Jerusalem.

e. The aftermath

Once the revolt was crushed, Qasim and his two eldest sons were hanged. The Egyptian army razed 16 villages before taking Nablus. 10,000 *fellaheen* were deported to Egypt and the general population was disarmed. Ibrahim Pasha forced the heads of the Nablus clans to leave for nearby villages.

Ottoman rule was subsequently reinstated in 1840, but many Egyptian Muslims remained in Jerusalem.

Finally, in the 1840s and 1850s, the international powers began a tug-of-war in southern Ottoman Syria as they sought to extend their protection over the country's religious minorities, a struggle carried out mainly through their consular representatives in Jerusalem (Keter Jerusalem, 1978: 304-306).

³³ W.M. Thomson wrote "this terrible vengeance failed to quell the turbulent spirit of the people. They are ever distinguished in the great feasts at Jerusalem by their fierce and lawless manners, and if any row occurs they are sure to have a hand in it.

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It is worth noting that historian Rasid Khalidi (1997) has observed that fellahin resistance to land evictions by Ottoman authorities and Zionist militias took the form of both armed and unarmed resistance.

1.3.2.3 Nonviolent Resistance under British Mandate (1917 Balfour Declaration to 1947)

*"For in Palestine we do not propose to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants ... The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land."*³⁴

Several incidents of this period depict the existence of a profound and active nonviolent movement:

i. The first Palestinian – Arab Congress, Jerusalem 27 January-4 February 1919

The road to this first Congress was paved by local Muslim-Christian societies collaborating to form a more centralised society with approved by-laws in Jerusalem calling for education for the youth and encouraging national development in different areas, while protecting individual and national human rights. The Congress was attended by 27 delegates throughout Palestine.

The British authorities allowed the conference to go ahead because they were hoping that the eleven delegates who were supportive of Britain would be able to sway the conference. Instead, on the first day, the conference decided to send a letter to the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris, which stated:

The people of Palestine (...) met and chose their delegate who attended and held a meeting in Jerusalem to discuss the form of government suitable for their country. They decided as a first priority to send your esteemed conference their strong complaint for what they have heard that the Zionists received a promise to make our country a national home for them and that they aim to migrate to this country and colonize it (...) We urge your esteemed conference not to take any decisions about this country until after you know what our desires and wishes are (...)" (Mazin Qumsiyeh, 2011).

³⁴ Lord Balfour, private memorandum to Lord Curzon, his successor, 11 August 1919

ii. Mawsam Al-Nabi Musa religious Festival 4 April 1920

The massive British repression in the 1920s convinced some of the locals to take up armed resistance. This resistance was insignificant and happened after four decades of purely nonviolent resistance. Meanwhile, the civil popular resistance continued and actually accelerated. On March 11, 1920, many peaceful demonstrations were held in all major Palestinian cities concomitant with the foundation of the underground Haganna forces, the forerunners of the Israeli army.

On 4 April 1920, a religious festival, held annually and called Mawsam Al-Nabi Musa, was transformed into a large nationalist demonstration. The uprising of 1920-1921 was the first obvious mass movement for liberation under an increasingly repressing administration of Palestine.

The resistance intensified as Britain decided to appoint the openly Zionist Herbert Samuel as first high commissioner of occupied Palestine in June 1920. As the nonviolent demonstrations were met with violence, the situation deteriorated. In his book *Popular Resistance in Palestine*, Mazin Qumsiyeh cites the course of events as follows:

–On 20 February 1920, British officials gathered notables in Jerusalem to tell them that Britain was seeking a mandate over Palestine which would include the Balfour Declaration; in other words, Palestinians should resign themselves to the reality. Seven days later, an official proclamation was issued to the same effect. That day, 27 February 1920, two events signaled what was to come in response. First, the second Palestine Arab Congress was held in Damascus and again emphasized the need for Arab unity, for resistance to the British occupation and the Balfour Declaration, and for self-determination; and secondly, a demonstration was held in Jerusalem demanding the same. The demonstrations spread on 11 March 1920 to all major Palestinian cities. In Haifa, thousands signed a petition against making Palestine a Jewish national homeland and was delivered to the military ruler there, Colonel Stanton. The 1920 Al-Quds uprising spread quickly, with mass resignations, protests, strikes and other forms of popular resistance.

In 4 April 1920 the annual religious festival known as Mawsam Al-Nabi Musa was transformed into a mass nationalist demonstration. The crowds heard from Aref Al-

Aref, mayor of Jerusalem Musa Kadhem Al-Husseini and Amin Al-Husseini. Al-Husseini had served with the British and Sharif Faisal in recruiting support for the Allies to bring an end to Ottoman rule, but was then disliked by the British. Despite his vacillation, he emerged to become a strong and commanding leader of Palestinian Arab nationalism and a spiritual leader of the resistance. As the crowds entered Jerusalem through the Jaffa Gate, they were harassed by Zionists led by Zeev Jabotinsky, who exploited conflicts to increase the ranks of his underground forces. They got what they asked for as communal violence erupted and five Jews and four Palestinians were killed. The British administration sentenced Aref Al-Aref and Amin Al-Husseini in absentia to ten years' imprisonment each, but they had both fled to Syria. They also sentenced Jabotinsky to 15 years but released him within three months, making him instantly a known entity among the Zionists. Here it is worth noting that Aref Al-Aref was born in Jerusalem in 1891 and had studied in Turkey. He advocated aggressive but nonviolent resistance. He spent three years in exile in Siberia, escaping after the Russian Revolution and then returning to Palestine. He edited the newspaper *Surya Al-Janubiyya* published in Jerusalem from 1919. He was an intellectual who did not live in an ivory tower, but with his people. He was just as comfortable having tea with West Jerusalem elite Palestinian families as with Bedouins in simple tents in the Negev. After a tumultuous career in British-occupied Palestine he became mayor of Jerusalem in 1950 and died on 30 July 1973 in Ramallah".³⁵

iii. The Samuel³⁶ era and the growth of resistance

Two months after Britain's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire in November 1914, Herbert Samuel, a member of the English Parliament and also a member of the Jewish community, circulated a memorandum entitled *The future of Palestine* to his cabinet colleagues, suggesting that Palestine become a home for the Jewish People under the British Rule. The memorandum stated that "I am assured that the solution of the problem of Palestine which would be much the most welcome to the leaders and supporters of the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation of the country to the British Empire".

³⁵ Adapted from Qumsiyeh: A Human Rights Web, Chapter 6, <http://qumsiyeh.org/prchapter6/>

³⁶ Herbert Louis Samuel was a prominent Jewish Zionist, who proved his mettle by silencing critics of the Balfour Declaration and by being on the official Zionist delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

In 1917, Britain occupied Palestine (then part of the Ottoman Empire) during the course of the First World War. Samuel lost his seat in the election of 1918 and became a candidate to represent British interests in the territory. He was appointed to the position of High Commissioner in 1920, before the Council of the League of Nations approved a British mandate for Palestine. Nonetheless, the military government withdrew to Cairo in preparation for the expected British Mandate, which was finally granted 2 years later by the League of Nations. He served as High Commissioner until 1925. Samuel was the first Jew to govern the historic land of Israel in 2,000 years. He recognised Hebrew as one of the three official languages of the Mandate territory.

Samuel's appointment to High Commissioner of Palestine was controversial. While the Zionists welcomed the appointment of a Zionist Jew to the post, the military government, headed by Allenby and Bols, called Samuel's appointment "highly dangerous". Technically, Allenby noted, the appointment was illegal, in that a civil administration that would compel the inhabitants of an occupied country to express their allegiance to it before a formal peace treaty (with Turkey) was signed, was in violation of both military law and the Hague Convention. Bols said the news was received with consternation, despondency, and exasperation' by the Moslem [and] Christian population ... They are convinced that he will be a partisan Zionist and that he represents a Jewish and not a British Government.' Allenby said that the Arabs would see it as "as handing country over at once to a permanent Zionist Administration" and predicted numerous degrees of violence. Lord Curzon read this last message to Samuel and asked him to reconsider accepting the post. The Muslim-Christian Association had sent a telegram to Bols:

-Sir Herbert Samuel regarded as a Zionist leader, and his appointment as first step in formation of Zionist national home in the midst of Arab people contrary to their wishes. Inhabitants cannot recognise him, and Moslem-Christian Society cannot accept responsibility for riots or other disturbances of peace”.

The wisdom of appointing Samuel was debated in the House of Lords a day before he arrived in Palestine. Lord Curzon said that no 'disparaging' remarks had been made during the debate, but that 'very grave doubts have been expressed as to the wisdom of sending a Jewish Administrator to the country at this moment'. Questions in the House of Commons of the period also show much concern about the choice of

Samuel, asking amongst other things 'what action has been taken to placate the Arab population ... and thereby put an end to racial tension'. Three months after his arrival, The Morning Post wrote that –Sir Herbert Samuel's appointment as High Commissioner was regarded by everyone, except Jews, as a serious mistake.”

As High Commissioner, Samuel attempted to mediate between Zionist and Arab interests, acting to slow Jewish immigration and win the confidence of the Arab population. He hoped to gain Arab participation in mandate affairs and to guard their civil and economic rights, while at the same time refusing them any authority that could be used to stop Jewish immigration and land purchase. According to Wasserstein his policy was –subtly designed to reconcile Arabs to the (...) pro-Zionist policy” of the British. Islamic custom at the time was that the chief Islamic spiritual leader, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was to be chosen by the temporal ruler, the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople, from a group of clerics that were nominated by the indigenous clerics. After the British conquered Palestine, Samuel chose Hajj Amin Al Husseini, who later proved a thorn in the side of the British administration in Palestine. At the same time, he enjoyed the respect of the Jewish community, and was honored by being called to the Torah at the Hurva synagogue in the Old city of Jerusalem.

During Samuel's administration the White Paper of 1922 was published, supporting Jewish immigration within the absorptive capacity of the country and defining the Jewish national homeland as –not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride.”

Samuel's role in Palestine is clearly revealed in Mazin Qumsiyeh book Popular Resistance in Palestine, as follows:

–The third Palestinian Arab Congress was held in Haifa on 14 December 1920 and repeated calls to repudiate the Balfour Declaration and promote self-determination. This placed Haifa on the map of cities of resistance and organisation (...). This set the stage for Palestinians to re-evaluate and refocus on a narrower form of Palestinian nationalism. The congress elected an executive committee headed by Musa Kadhem Al-Husseini. When Samuel showed no interest in responding to their

demands, the executive committee travelled to Cairo to meet Winston Churchill, then British Colonial Secretary, but the latter merely agreed to hear their views when he visited Jerusalem. They met in Jerusalem on 8 March 1921, where their demands included: no national home for Jews in Palestine; the end of immigration and land transfers; a national government to represent all the people of Palestine; and no separation of Palestine from its neighboring areas. Churchill rejected these demands and told those gathered that self-determination would only come after our children’s children’ had died.

While Churchill was delivering his insulting speech on 18 March 1921 in which he glorified the crusaders and the Maccabees, a day of general strikes and protests was called for throughout Palestine and one demonstration was met with a hail of British bullets killing several people (e.g., at the funerals of Edward Mansour and Mustafa Al-‘Ajouz). In the demonstration in Tulkarem, thousands gathered and marched from the southern edge of town towards the government building. The march was led by students followed by religious leaders (Christian and Muslim), tribal and political leaders, merchants and ordinary people, all carrying black flags. In Haifa, a Christian child and a Muslim man were killed in a demonstration held in defiance of a ban. When the British ambassador was giving a speech 14 April 1921, a young Palestinian named Jibrán Kazna got to his feet and demanded that the British government stop transforming Palestine into a Jewish homeland and implement Article 22 of the League of Nations on self-determination.

On 29 April 1921, a British officer, Colonel Cox, arrived in the Galilee to put down the unrest. He questioned one of the accused troublemakers’, Habib Wahbeh, charging him with fomenting mutiny, objecting to Zionism, joining the Arab Conference and being a member of a nationalist society. Wahbeh replied that all the allegations were true, except starting a mutiny: As for being against the Zionist government, this is something I do not deny for I believe Zionism would destroy hopes and aspirations of all Palestinians.’

As the nonviolent demonstrations were met with violence, the situation deteriorated. Conservative estimates suggested that 48 Arabs and 47 Jews were killed in April 1921. More realistic estimates give over 100 Arabs killed, mostly on 5 April in Jaffa. At that time Jaffa was in the sights of the British authorities as the hub of resistance.

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Only after the April violence did the British government appoint yet another commission of inquiry”.

iv. The 1929 Palestine Riots

The 1929 Palestine riots, also known as the **Western Wall Uprising**, the **1929 Massacres** refer to a series of demonstrations and riots in late August 1929 when a long-running dispute between Palestinians and Jews over the access to the Western Wall in Jerusalem escalated into violence. The riots, in most cases, took the form of attacks on Jews accompanied by destruction of Jewish property. During the week of riots from 23 to 29 August 133 Jews were killed by Arabs and 339 others were injured, while 110 Arabs were killed by the British police and 232 were injured, while the British were trying to suppress the riots³⁷.

The 1929 Arab Riots in Palestine triggered another British Commission of Inquiry. In this instance, Sir Walter Shaw chaired the four members Commission, which visited the area and delivered its report in March, 1930.

The principle findings of the Shaw Commission were:

- The violence occurred due to racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future.”
- The Arabs feared economic domination by a group who appeared to the Arabs to have unlimited funding from abroad.
- The Commission acknowledged the ambiguity of former British statements to both Arabs and Jews.

One of the commission members, Lord Snell, wrote a dissenting opinion, while the majority recommended:

- An immediate statement of British intentions in Palestine
- A re-examination of immigration policy
- A scientific inquiry into land usage and potential
- A clarification of the Zionist Organization’s relationship with the Mandate

Acting on these recommendations, the British Government authorized the Hope-Simpson expert investigation of land capacity issues, and, after considering the Shaw

³⁷Report of the Commission on the disturbances of August 1929, Command paper 3530 (Shaw Commission report), p. 65

Commission and Hope-Simpson reports, the Colonial Secretary issued the Pass Field White Paper of 1930, the recommended statement updating British policy in the Palestine Mandate.

However, the British still seemed to be saying to each interest group what each wanted to hear, regardless of the facts. For example, at a meeting of the League of Nations Mandates Commission in Geneva in 1930, after the Shaw Report recommended changes in immigration policy, the British representative said:

- We fully realize the important part played by immigration in the policy which we are carrying out under the mandate, as approved by the Council of the League of Nations, namely, that of setting up in Palestine a National Home for the Jewish people. As has been stated repeatedly we have no intention of departing from that policy, or of acting otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the mandate.

Avraham Sela (Sela, 1929), described the riots as ~~un~~unprecedented in the history of the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine, in duration, geographical scope and direct damage to life and property.”

☑ The main events

a. The Western Wall Tensions

The Western Wall is one of the holiest of Jewish sites, sacred because it is a remnant of the ancient wall that once enclosed the Jewish Second Temple. The Jews, through the practice of centuries, had established a right of access to the Wailing Wall for the purposes of their devotions. As part of the Temple Mount the Western Wall was under the control of the Muslim religious trust, the Waqf.

Muslims consider the wall to be part of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam, and according to Islamic tradition the place where the prophet Muhammad tied his horse, Burag, before his night journey to heaven. There had been a few serious incidents resulting from these differences.

As a result of an incident, which occurred in September 1925, a ruling was given which forbade the bringing by Jews of seats and benches to the Wall even though these were intended for the support of worshippers who were aged and infirm. The

Muslims linked any adaptations to the site with the Zionist project, and feared that they would be the first step in turning the site into a synagogue and taking it over.

In September 1928, Jews at their Yom Kippur prayers at the Western Wall placed chairs and customary screens, a few wooden frames covered with cloth, between the men and women present.

Jerusalem commissioner Edward Keith-Roach, while visiting the Muslim religious court overlooking the prayer area, pointed out the screen, mentioning that he had never seen it at the wall before. This precipitated emotional protests and demands from the assembled sheiks that it be removed. Unless it was taken down, they said, they would not be responsible for what happened. This tacit threat was the sheikhs' strategy for getting their way. This was described as violating the Ottoman status quo that forbade Jews from making any construction in the Western Wall area and played into Muslim fears of Zionist expropriation of the site, though such screens had been put up from time to time. Keith-Roach told the beadle that the screen had to be removed because of the Arabs' demands. The beadle requested that the screen remained standing until the end of the prayer service, to which Keith-Roach agreed. When Jewish failed to remove the screen as agreed, ten armed men were sent in, urged on by Arab residents who were shouting, “Death to the Jewish dogs!” and “Strike, strike”. A violent clash took place with worshipers and it was destroyed.

The intervention drew censure later from senior officials who judged that excessive force had been exercised without good Judgement, although the British government issued a statement defending the action.

The internal politics of both sides had been willing to adopt extreme positions and to make use of religious symbols to whip up popular support.

Haj Amin al Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem distributed leaflets to Arabs in Palestine and throughout the Arab world which claimed that the Jews were planning to take over the al-Aqsa Mosque. The leaflet stated that the Government was “responsible for any consequences of any measures which the Moslems may adopt for the purpose of defending the holy Burak themselves in the event of the failure of the Government...to prevent any such intrusion on the part of the Jews.” A memorandum issued by the Moslem Supreme Council stated, "Having realized by bitter experience the unlimited greedy aspirations of the Jews in this respect, Moslems believe that the Jews' aim is to take possession of the Mosque of Al-Aqsa gradually on the pretence

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that it is the Temple”, and it advised the Jews “to stop this hostile propaganda which will naturally engender a parallel action in the whole Moslem world, the responsibility for which will rest with the Jews”.³⁸

In October 1928, the Grand Mufti organised new construction next to and above the Wall. Mules were driven through the praying area often dropping excrement, and waste water was thrown on Jews. A muezzin was appointed to perform the Islamic call to prayer directly next to the Wall, creating noise exactly when the Jews were conducting their prayers. The Jews protested at these provocations and tensions increased.³⁹

–From 1929 onward, the Supreme Muslim Council intensified construction work on the Haram al-Sharif in order to demonstrate their exclusive claims to the Temple Mount (...). Not without reason, Jewish believers felt disturbed in their prayer.” (Harman Graham, 2008).

Right wing Zionists began making demands for control over the wall; some went as far as to call openly for the rebuilding of the Temple, increasing Muslim fears over Zionist intentions. Ben-Gurion said the wall should be “redeemed”, predicting it could be achieved in as little as “another half a year”. During the spring of 1929 the Revisionist newspaper, *Doar Ha Yom* ran a long campaign claiming Jewish rights over the wall and its pavement.

On 6 August the British Palestine Police Force established a police post beside the wall.

On Thursday 15 August 1929, during the Jewish fast, several hundred members of the “Committee for the Western Wall”, among them members of the revisionist Zionist movement Betar youth organization, marched to the Western Wall shouting “the Wall is ours” and raising the Jewish national flag and sang the Jewish anthem⁴⁰.

³⁸ The Shaw Report

³⁹ Ben Dov, Meir, Naor Moderchai; Aner, Ze’ev (1983), *VI: The Struggle for the Wall, The Western Wall*, Israel, Ministry of Defense Publishing House, pp. 123-137, Overdale Ritchie (2004), *The Wall Wailing Wall Riots*”, *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars*, Pearson Education, pp 71, Benvenisti Meron (1996), *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, Metropolitan Books, pp. 80-81.

⁴⁰ The Shaw Report later concluded that the crowd was peaceful and allegations that the crowd was armed with iron bars were not correct, but that there may have been threatening cries made by some “undesirable elements” in the Jewish procession. The authorities had been notified of the march in advance and provided a heavy police escort in a bid to prevent any incidents. Rumors spread that the youths had attacked local residents and had cursed the name of Muhammad

On Friday, 16 August, a demonstration organized by the Supreme Muslim Council marched to the Wall. The Acting High Commissioner summoned Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini and informed him that he had never heard of such a demonstration being held at the Wailing Wall, and that it would be a terrible shock to the Jews who regarded the Wall as a place of special sanctity to them. At the Wall, the crowd burnt prayer books, liturgical fixtures and notes of supplication left in the Wall's cracks. The rioting spread to the Jewish commercial area of town.

Inflammatory articles calculated to incite disorder appeared in the Arab media and one flyer, signed by ~~the~~ Committee of the Holy Warriors in Palestine” stated that the Jews had violated the honor of Islam, and declared: "Hearts are in tumult because of these barbaric deeds, and the people began to break out in shouts of 'war, Jihad ... rebellion.' ... O Arab nation, the eyes of your brothers in Palestine are upon you ... and they awaken your religious feelings and national zealotry to rise up against the enemy who violated the honor of Islam and raped the women and murdered widows and babies.” (Morris, 1999:13).

Mizrachi died on 20 August and his funeral became the occasion for a serious anti-Arab demonstration. It was suppressed by the same force that had been employed in the initial incident. Over the following four days period, the Jerusalem police reported 12 separate attacks by Jews on Arabs and seven attacks by Arabs on Jews.

The Shaw report found that the ~~o~~utbreak in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August was from the beginning an attack by Arabs on Jews for which no excuse in the form of earlier murders by Jews has been established.”

The next Friday, 23 August, thousands of Arab villagers streamed into Jerusalem from the surrounding countryside to pray on the Temple Mount, many armed with sticks and knives. Harry Luke requested reinforcements from Amman. Towards 9:30 am Jewish storekeepers began closing shop, and at 11:00 20-30 gunshots were heard on the Temple Mount, apparently to work up the crowd. Luke telephoned the Mufti to come and calm a mob that had gathered under his window near the Damascus Gate, but the commissioner's impression was that the religious leader's presence was having the opposite effect. By midday friction had spread to the Jewish neighborhood of Mea She'arim where two or three Arabs were killed. The Shaw report described the excited Arab crowds and that it was clear beyond all doubt that at 12:50 large sections of these crowds were bent on mischief if not on murder.

Inflamed by rumors that two Arabs had been killed by Jews, Arabs started an attack on Jews in Jerusalem's Old City. The violence quickly spread to other parts of Palestine. British authorities had fewer than 100 soldiers, six armored cars, and five or six aircraft in country. Palestine Police had 1,500 men, but the majority was Arab, with a small number of Jews and 175 British officers. While awaiting reinforcements, many untrained administration officials were required to attach themselves to the police, though the Jews among them were sent back to their offices.

In a few instances, Jews attacked Arabs and destroyed Arab property. These attacks were in most cases in retaliation for wrongs already committed by Arabs in the neighborhood in which the Jewish attacks occurred. A Police Officer opened fire on an Arab crowd and succeeded in beating off an attack on the quarter which lies between Jaffa and Tel Aviv. The worst instance of a Jewish attack on Arabs occurred in this quarter, where the Imam of a mosque and six other persons were killed.

According to the Shaw Report, the disturbances were not premeditated and did not occur simultaneously but spread from Jerusalem through a period of days to most outlying centres of population.

The following day, Arab notables issued a statement that "many rumors and reports of various kinds have spread to the effect that Government had enlisted and armed certain Jews, that they had enrolled Jewish ex-soldiers who had served in the Great War; and the Government forces were firing at Arabs exclusively". The Mufti of Jerusalem stated that there was a large crowd of excited Arabs in the Haram area who were also demanding arms, and that the excited crowd in the Haram area took the view that the retention of Jews as special constables carrying arms was a breach of faith by the Government. The Government initially denied the rumors, but by 27 August they were forced to disband and disarm the special constables.

b. Desecration of the Nebi Akasha Mosque, 26 August

On 26 August, the Nebi Akasha Mosque in Jerusalem was attacked by a group of Jews. According to the Shaw Report, the mosque was a "sacred shrine of great antiquity held in much veneration by the Moslems". The mosque was badly damaged and the tombs of the prophets which it contained were desecrated.

c. Safed massacre, 29 August

In Safed on 29 August 18 Jews were killed (some sources say 20) and 80 wounded. The attackers looted, set fire to houses, and killed Jewish inhabitants. The main Jewish street was looted and burned. The Safed massacre marked the end of the disturbances.

d. Aftermath

The riots produced a large number of trials. According to the Attorney-General of Palestine, of those convicted of murder, 26 Arabs and 2 Jews were sentenced to death. The Arabs included 14 convicted for the massacre in Safed and 11 for the massacre in Hebron. The Jewish policeman Simchas Hinkis was convicted for the murder of five and wounding of two when a mob broke into a house between Tel Aviv and Jaffa to avenge the murder of six Jews. Joseph Urphali was convicted by two separate trials, and lost his appeal twice, for the shooting of two Arabs from the roof of his Jaffa house.

Some of the Arab convictions were overturned on appeal and all the remaining death sentences were commuted to terms of imprisonment by the High Commissioner except in the case of three Arabs. Atta Ahmed el Zeer, Mohamamed Khalil Abu Jamjum and Fuad Hassab el Hejazi were hanged on 17 June 1930.

Collective fines were imposed on the Arabs of Hebron, Safed, and some villages. The fine on Hebron was 14,000 pounds. The fines collected, and an additional one hundred thousand pounds, were distributed to the victims, 90 percent of them Jews.

A few dozen families returned to Hebron in 1931 to reestablish the community, but all but one family were evacuated from Hebron at the outset of the 1936-1939 revolt in Palestine.

The Arabs in the region, led by the Palestine Arab Congress imposed a boycott on Jewish-owned businesses following the riots.

e. Hope Simpson Royal Commission, 1930

The commission was headed by Sir Hope Simpson and on 21 October 1930 it produced its report, dated 1 October 1930. The report recommended limiting the Jewish immigration due to the lack of agricultural land to support it.

v. 1936 - 1939 revolt

We consider the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine as a nationalist insurgency by Palestinian Arabs in Mandatory Palestine against British colonial rule, motivated by opposition to mass Jewish immigration.

Nevertheless unsuccessful, this nationalist revolt, till now, is marginalised in both Western and Israeli historiography on Palestine. In this part of our presentation of the evolution of historical events, we will attempt to shed some light to what we concede as distinguished anti-colonial struggle of the Palestinian Arab rebels against the English Empire.

According to Ghassan Kanafani (1980), the 1936-1939 revolt consisted of two distinct phases. The first phase was directed primarily by the urban and elitist Higher Arab Committee (HAC) and was focused mainly on strikes and other forms of political protest.

By October 1936, this phase had been defeated by the British civil administration using a combination of political concessions, international diplomacy (involving the rulers in various countries such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, and Yemen) and the threat of martial law.

The second phase, which began late in 1937, was a violent and peasant-led resistance movement that increasingly targeted British forces. During this phase, the rebellion was brutally suppressed by the British Army and the Palestine Police Force using repressive measures that were intended to intimidate the Arab population and undermine popular support for the revolt.

Official British figures covering the whole revolt, reported that the army and police killed more than 2,000 Arabs in combat, 108 were hanged, and 961 died because of gang and terrorist activities.

In an analysis of the British statistics, Walid Khalidi estimates 19,792 casualties for the Arabs, with 5,032 dead: 3,832 killed by the British and 1,200 dead because of terrorism, and 14,760 wounded. Over ten percent of the adult male Palestinian Arab population between 20 and 60 was killed, wounded, imprisoned or exiled. Estimates of the number of Palestinian Jews killed range from 91 to several hundred.

a. Origins

In the years between 1933 and 1936 more than 164,000 Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine, and between 1931 and 1936 the Jewish population more than doubled from 175,000 to 370,000 people, increasing the Jewish population share from 17 to 27 per cent, bringing about a significant deterioration in relations between Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

The events began on 15 April 1936 with an attack on a convoy of trucks on the Nablus to Tulkarm road during which the assailants shot two Jewish drivers. The next day Jewish gunmen shot and killed two Arab workers sleeping in a hut near Petah Tikva in a revenge attack. The funeral for the Jewish driver in Tel Aviv on 17 April became a turbulent nationalist event during which Jewish rioters beat Arab children and destroyed property. Between 19 and 22 April disturbances in Jaffa and Tel Aviv left 16 Jews and 5 Arabs dead. An Arab general strike and revolt ensued that lasted until October 1936.

During the summer of 1936, thousands of Jewish-farmed acres and orchards were destroyed, Jewish civilians were attacked and murdered, and some Jewish communities fled to safer areas.

b. The background

The following factors played key role in the outbreak of the Arab revolt:

✓ Economic factors

The fellahin in Palestine, the country's peasant farmers, comprised over two-thirds of the indigenous Arab population and from the 1920s onwards, were pushed off the land in increasingly large numbers into urban environments where they often encountered only poverty and social marginalization. The charismatic preacher Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who worked among the poor in Haifa, gave them the necessary encouragement in Jaffa and Haifa. The revolt was thus a popular uprising that produced its own leaders and developed into a national revolt (Gilbert 1998:80).

Furthermore, the WWI left Palestine, especially the countryside, deeply impoverished. The Ottoman Rule and the British Mandate imposed high taxes on farming and agricultural produce and during the 1920s and 1930s. All these together with a fall in prices, cheap imports, natural disasters and paltry harvests all contributed to the increasing indebtedness of the fellahin.

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Finally, the rents paid by tenant fellah increased sharply, owing to increased population density, and transfer of land from Arabs to the Jewish settlement agencies, increased the number of fellahin evicted while also removing the land as a future source of livelihood.

The problem of 'landless' Arabs grew particularly grave after 1931, causing High Commissioner Wauchope to warn that this –social peril ... would serve as a focus of discontent and might even result in serious disorders”.

AS a result, the marginalized and impoverished landless peasant farmers, who subsequently became mobile wage workers, became willing participants in nationalist rebellion

✓ **Political and socio-cultural factors**

The conflict with Zionism transformed the Palestinian Arab society to a more conservative society in cultural, social, religious and political matters, because people were highly motivated to preserve their distinct heritage and identity against the dual impact of British colonialism and Jewish innovation. Traditionally, the Arabs had elite, but not a real leadership

However, during this period new political organizations and new types of activist began to appear, marking the involvement of a far broader cross-section of the population, in particular, nationalism, which had been long-rooted in rural society began to take hold in urban society. For example, the Feminist activist Tarab Abdul Hadi organized the Palestinian Arab Women's Association. Women's organisations, active in social matters, became politically involved from the end of the 1920s, with an Arab Women's Congress held in Jerusalem in 1929 attracting 200 participants and an Arab Women's Association (later Arab Women's Union) being established at the same time.

Youth organisations (i.e. Youth Congress Party) proliferated at this time and expressed pan-Arabic sentiments.

Further, from the beginning of the 1930s new political parties began to appear (i.e. Independence Party, National Defense Party, Palestinian Arab Party, Arab-Palestinian Reform Party, National Block).

A few militant secret societies, which advocated armed struggle were formed (i.e. the Green Hand, the Organization for Holy Struggle, the Young Rebels or Avenging Youth).

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Traditional feasts (i.e. Nebi Musa) began to acquire a political and nationalist dimension and new national memorial days were introduced or gained new significance.

Finally, the expansion of education, the development of civil society and of transportation, communications, and broadcasting, facilitated these changes.

✓ **Regional political Change**

A number of political changes in neighboring Arab countries illustrated to the Palestinian Arabs what could be achieved through political pressure and negotiations:

- In Syria a general strike took place from 20 January to 6 March 1936 spreading to all the major towns. Further, political demonstrations held throughout the country allowing dynamic momentum to the Syrian national movement (Commins, 2004:113)
- In Egypt, on 2 March 1936 formal negotiations between the United Kingdom and Egypt began leading to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which granted independence to Egypt (Morewood, 2004:86-96)
- In Iraq, a general strike in July 1931 coupled with organized demonstrations in the streets, led to independence for the former British mandate territory and full membership of the League of Nations in October 1932 (Tripp 2002: 71-75)

c. The General Strike and the Peel Commission

The strike began on 19 April in Nablus, where an Arab National Committee was formed and immediately that was followed by the creation of National Committees in all of the towns and some of the larger villages.

On 21 April the leaders of the five main parties accepted the decision at Nablus and called for a general strike of all Arabs engaged in labour, transport and shopkeeping.

Khalil al-Sakakini called the revolt a "life-and-death struggle (Morris, 1999: 129).

Although the strike was initially organized by workers and local committees, political leaders became involved to help with co-ordination, leading to the formation of the Arab Higher Committee (25 April 1936).

The demands of the Palestinians were:

- ✓ the prohibition of Jewish immigration

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- ✓ the prohibition of the transfer of Arab land to Jews
- ✓ the establishment of a National Government responsible to a representative council

The Committee resolved ~~to~~ continue the general strike until the British Government changes its present policy in a fundamental manner”.

On the other side, David Ben-Gurion told mourners at a funeral held on 20 April 1936 for nine victims of rioting in Jaffa the previous day that Jews would only be safe ~~in~~ communities which are 100% Jewish and built on Jewish land”.⁴¹

One month after the general strike started, the leadership group declared a general non-payment of taxes in explicit opposition to Jewish immigration. In the countryside, armed insurrection started sporadically, becoming more organized with time having as main target the Iraq Petroleum Company’s oil pipeline that was constructed only a few years earlier to Haifa. Other attacks were on railways (including trains) and on civilian targets such as Jewish settlements, secluded Jewish neighborhoods in the mixed cities, and Jews, both individually and in groups.

The measures taken against the strike were harsh at the beginning and grew harsher as it went along involving house searches without warrants, night raids, preventive detention, caning, flogging, deportation, confiscation of property, and torture.

In June 1936 the British involved their clients in Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt in an attempt to pacify the Palestinian Arabs and on 9 October the rulers made an appeal for the strike to be ended.

The strike was called off on 11 October 1936 and the violence ceased for about a year while the Peel Commission deliberated. The Royal Commission was announced on 18 May 1936 and its members were appointed on 29 July, but the Commission did not arrive in Palestine until 11 November.

iv. Peel Commission

The Peel Commission of 1936-1937, formally known as the Palestine Royal Commission, was a British Royal Commission of Inquiry set out to propose changes

⁴¹ ~~Funeral of Nine Jewish Dead~~”, *Palestine Post*, Tuesday, 21 April 1936

to the British Mandate for Palestine following the six-month-long Palestinian general strike. It was headed by Lord Peel.

On 11 November, 1936, the commission arrived in Palestine to investigate the reasons behind the uprising. It returned to Britain on 18 January 1937. On July 7, 1937, it published a report that, for the first time, recommended partition. Although initially endorsed by the government, it was condemned by the Arabs. Following the publication of the Woodhead Commission Report in 1938, the plan for partition was declared un-implementable.

The Commission was established at a time of increased violence and serious clashes between Arabs and Jews in 1936, which lasted for three years. The Commission was charged with determining the cause of the riots, and judging the grievances of both sides.

According to the Peel Commission report, –Arab allegations regarding Jewish land purchase were unfounded. The land shortage decried by the Arabs "was due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population". However, "Endeavors to control the alienation of land by Arabs to Jews have not been successful. In the hills there is no more room for further close settlement by Jews; in the plains it should only be allowed under certain restrictions.”⁴²

The report recommended that the Mandate be eventually abolished and the land under its authority (and accordingly, the transfer of both Arab and Jewish populations) be apportioned between an Arab and Jewish state. The Jewish side was to receive a territorially smaller portion, while the Arab state was to receive territory in the south and mid-east.

The report recommended that "sooner or later there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population" and that –in the last resort the exchange would be compulsory”.

The population exchange would have involved the transfer of up to 225,000 Arabs and 1,250 Jews.

The Arab leadership in Palestine rejected the plan, arguing that the Arabs had been promised independence and granting rights to the Jews was a betrayal. The Arabs emphatically rejected the principle of awarding any territory to the Jews.

⁴² The Peel Commission Report, 1937, p.p. 100-102

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The British response was to set up the Woodhead Commission to –examine the Peel Commission plan in detail and to recommend an actual partition plan”.

This Commission declared the Peel Commission partition unworkable (though suggesting a different scheme under which 5% of the land area of Palestine become Israel). The British Government accompanied the publication of the Woodhead Report by a statement of policy rejecting partition as impracticable.

Although the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine was unsuccessful, its consequences affected the outcome of the Arab – Israeli war 1948. Historians note that the failed Arab revolt of 1936–1939 in Palestine went on to later affect the course of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war by giving crucial British Mandate support to pre-state Zionist militias like the Haganah (chiefly via training and support to them directed by British Army). On the other hand, for the local Palestinian Arab side the revolt forced the fleeing into exile of the main local Palestinian Arab leader of the period, then Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini, who had to leave Mandatory Palestine after the revolt was crushed.

vi. The Black Hand Organization

The Black Hand Organization⁴³ was an anti-British and anti- Zionist militant organization in the period of British Mandate of Palestine. It was originated in 1930 and led until his death in 1935 by Syrian-born Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam. He proclaimed jihad and attack Jewish settlers.

The idea for such a group appeared to crystallize after the 1929 riots, though one source says a decision was taken in September 1928.

Within the organization two trends had occurred: One militant group led under the leadership of Abu Ibrahim arguing for immediate terror attacks, while the other thought an armed revolt premature, and risked exposing the group's preparations.

The terror campaign began with the ambush and murder of three members of Kibbutz Yagur on 11 April 1931, a failed bombing attack on outlying Jewish homes in Haifa,

⁴³ By 1935, Black Hand had several hundred men - the figures differ from 200 to 800 - organised in cells of 5 men, and arranged military training for peasants. The cells were equipped with bombs and firearms, which they used to attack Jewish settlements and sabotage the British-constructed rail lines. Though striking a responsive chord among the rural poor and urban underclass, his movement deeply perturbed the Muslim urban elite as it threatened their political and patronage connections with the British Mandatory authorities.

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in early 1932, and several operations that killed or wounded some four members of northern Jewish settlements.

After the 1921 failed Syrian revolt, al-Qassam escaped to Haifa. According to Shai Lachman, between 1921 and 1935 al-Qassam often cooperated with Mufti of Jerusalem. Their cooperation increased

The Black Hand was preceded by a group calling itself Green Hand that existed briefly in Safad and Acre districts and which was active for a few months during the winter of 1929/1930. Al-Qassam rebellion was based on religious grounds.

Although Al-Qassam's revolt was unsuccessful in his lifetime, many organizations gained inspiration from his revolutionary example. He became a popular hero and an inspiration to later Arab militants.

As an epilogue of this period we cite Sigmund Freud's refusal to sign a petition condemning the 1929 Arab riots in Palestine⁴⁴:

—Letter to the Keren Hajessod (Dr. Chaim Koffler)

Vienna: 26 February 1930

Dear Sir,

I cannot do as you wish. I am unable to overcome my aversion to burdening the public with my name, and even the present critical time does not seem to me to warrant it. Whoever wants to influence the masses must give them something rousing and inflammatory and my sober Judgement of Zionism does not permit this. I certainly sympathize with its goals, am proud of our University in Jerusalem and am delighted with our settlement's prosperity. But, on the other hand, I do not think that Palestine could ever become a Jewish state, nor that the Christian and Islamic worlds would ever be prepared to have their holy places under Jewish care. It would have seemed more sensible to me to establish a Jewish homeland on a less historically-burdened land. But I know that such a rational viewpoint would never have gained the enthusiasm of the masses and the financial support of the wealthy. I concede with sorrow that the baseless fanaticism of our people is in part to be blamed for the awakening of Arab distrust. I can raise no sympathy at all for the misdirected piety which transforms a piece of a Herodian wall into a national relic, thereby offending the feelings of the natives.

Now judge for yourself whether I, with such a critical point of view, am the right person to come forward as the solace of a people deluded by unjustified hope. ”

⁴⁴ In February 1930 Freud was asked, as a distinguished Jew, to contribute to a petition condemning Arab riots of 1929, in which over a hundred Jewish settlers were killed.

1.3.2.4 The “Nakba” catastrophe in 1948 and its consequences in the uprising of Palestinians

i. The Nakba catastrophe (1947-1949)

The UN policy for the partition of Palestine triggered armed conflict between local Palestinians and Jewish colonists. This provided the environment in which the Zionist movement could induce massive Palestinian displacement so as to create the Jewish state.

As Nathan Krystall writes (Krystall, 1999: 93-153), in November 1947 fighting erupted in Jerusalem and other cities of Palestine. The first Palestinian village to be fully ethnically cleansed was Qisarya (Caesarea) on 15 February 1948, together with four other villages in the area.⁴⁵ The success of these operations led to the formulation and adoption of Plan D (or Plan Dalet) in March 1948 – two months before the British Mandate was set to end. The plan provided guidelines for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinian communities and was designed to achieve the military fait accompli upon which the state of Israel was to be based.”

According to Plan D, (...) operations can be carried out in the following manner: either by destroying villages (setting fire to them, by blowing them up, and by planting mines in their rubble), and especially those population centers that are difficult to control permanently; or by mounting combing and control operations according to the following guide lines: encirclement of the villages, conducting a search inside them. In case of resistance, the armed forces must be wiped out and the population expelled outside the borders of the state.”⁴⁶

Plan D resulted in the greatest outflow of refugees in April and early May 1948, before the start of the first Arab-Israeli war. A massacre of more than 100 men, women and children committed by Zionist forces in the Palestinian village of Deir Yassin on 9 April 1948 is widely acknowledged to have contributed to the fear and panic that led to the mass displacement.⁴⁷

The Zionist movement on 14 May 1948 in Tel Aviv unilaterally declared the

⁴⁵ "The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine" , Pappé, Ilan, One World: Oxford, 2006 p.75

⁴⁶ Plan Dalet p.8

⁴⁷ Leaders of Zionist militia organizations at the time reported that 245 people had been killed in the village. These reports were broadcast by Arab and foreign media. For a study of the massacre, see also Khalidi, Walid, Dayr Yassin "Friday, April 9, 1948", Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999.

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establishment of the state of Israel. This declaration coincided with the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine and the collapse of the UN partition plan.

The subsequent entry of Arab forces into Palestine marked the beginning of the first Israeli-Arab war. Palestinians fled their homes as a result of attacks on civilians by Israeli forces, massacres, looting, destruction of property and other atrocities.

At least 70 massacres took place throughout the –Nakba Massacres.” (Jawad Abdel, S., 2007: 59-127).

These atrocities were conducted beyond the immediate objective of taking control over a particular village and were designed to create an environment of terror that would result in the evacuation of the population. Villages were encircled, bombarded and surviving residents sent through openings in the line of attack, toward Arab areas. The Zionist forces encouraged the people of Palestinian villages and towns to abandon them, especially in areas deemed to be of strategic importance to the new state, or where there was local resistance. Incidents of this kind occurred in major cities such as Haifa, Jaffa, Akka, Ramle, Lydd and Jerusalem. Palestinians were also physically expelled from their villages and towns. (Benny Morris, 2004: 222-223).

Israeli military forces systematically destroyed hundreds of Palestinian villages during the war, as one of six measures included in a –Retroactive Transfer” plan approved in June 1948 by the Israeli Finance Minister and Prime Minister to prevent Palestinian refugees from returning homes.

The destruction of homes and entire villages was accompanied by large-scale looting. 750,000 to 900,000 Palestinians (55 to 66 percent of the total Palestinian population at the time) were displaced between the end of 1947 and early 1949. Half of these were displaced before 15 May 1948, when the first Arab-Israeli war began. 85 percent of the indigenous Palestinian population who had been living in the territory that became the state of Israel was displaced. Most refugees found refuge in those parts of Palestine (22% of the total area) not under the control of Israeli military forces following the cessation of hostilities.

ii. Estimates of Palestinian Property and Losses, 1948

In 1950, the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) established a sub-office, the Office for the Identification and Valuation of Arab Refugee Property, to

identify, value and compile information on refugee properties inside Israel. An initiative to identify Palestinian property, both globally and individually, was conducted based on British mandate records⁴⁸, in order to establish a comprehensive record of individual Palestinian property and so verify individual property claims.

Due to political considerations, the UNCCP decided against releasing information concerning the total value of refugee properties based on the individual valuation process. According to recent research, however, Commission records of the individual assessments as of 29 November 1947 valued total Palestinian Arab land in Israel at 235,660,250 Palestinian pounds, of which 31 million pounds worth of property was owned by Palestinians inside Israel, leaving 204,660,190 pounds worth of refugee land (Fischbach, Michael (2003).

The UNCCP estimate has served as the basis for subsequent studies applying different models of property valuation.

Estimates of Palestinian Refugee Losses in 1948 (US\$ millions)

	UNCCP (1951)	Sayigh ⁽¹⁾ (1966)	Kubursi ⁽²⁾ (1996)
1948	484	3,050	2,994 property
1998 ⁽³⁾ adjusted for inflation	3,373	21,259	20,868 property 33,198 property and human capital
1998 ⁽⁴⁾ adjusted for inflation and real rate of return	23,958	150,975	148,203 property 235,769 property and human capital

-
- 1) Yusif Sayigh, *The Israeli Economy*. Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1967.
 - 2) Atif Kubursi, *Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: The Quest for Precision*. Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1996
 - 3) The original valuations were in Palestinian pounds (LP). Currency and inflation adjustments were made utilizing an exchange rate of LP=\$4.03
 - 4) Based on changes in the U.S. Consumer Price Index for 1947 to 1998

Source: Table compiled by PRRN as part of the summary of the July 1999 workshop on compensation for Palestinian refugees. Available at: <http://www.prrn.org>.

⁴⁸ These included microphotographs of registers of title supplemented by the original registers when the microfilm was missing or defective; Registers of Deeds; Tax Distribution Lists and, failing these, taxpayers’ registers; Field Valuation Sheets, and, failing these, valuation lists and taxpayers’ registers; schedules of rights (in respect of blocks for which no registers of title had been prepared); parcel classification schedules; land registrars’ returns of depositions; and village maps and block plans. For a comprehensive study, see Fischbach, Michael, *Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*?. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

1.3.2.5 The 1949-1956 Palestinian exoduses

The 1949-1956 Palestinian exoduses were the continuation of the previous exodus of Palestinian Arabs from the territories under Israeli control, after the signing of the ceasefire agreements (Fischbach, Michael, 2003).

These agreements were interpreted differently by the signing parts:

- ✓ The Israeli government (Shlaim Avi, 2005: 57) viewed them as giving indisputable rights such as:
 - That the cease fire was binding on regular armies, irregular forces and civilians
 - That the cease fire line should be treated as an international border, pending full *de jure* recognition in a final peace agreement
 - The right to settle Jews on all the land within their territory, with the right to develop the economy without having to take into account the rights of the previous owners
- ✓ On the other side of the spectrum, the Arabs also conceived the General Armistice Agreements as granting them with rights, such as:
 - That the agreements were a truce and therefore did not end the state of war
 - That the cease fire lines were temporary and were not an international border
 - The Armistice Agreements did not cancel out the refugees right of return

This period is characterized by the forced expulsion of Palestinians during the consolidation of the Israeli State and the continuously increasing tension along the ceasefire lines.

According to historian Benny Morris (Morris, 1993), between 1949 and 1950 Israel had displaced and expelled between 30,000 to 40,000 Palestinians and Bedouin. Many villages along the cease fire lines and the Lebanon border area were also leveled; many emptied villages were resettled by new Jewish immigrants and demobilized Israeli military forces.

Israel alleged that its actions were motivated by security considerations (general and daily) linked with the border situation. Israel's main concern of the period was the

predomination over the demilitarized zones on the Syrian, Egyptian and Jordanian fronts.

The general security covered the threat of invasion while daily security was to secure Israeli territory from infiltration achieved through three processes:

- a. The transfer of Israeli Arabs away from the cease fire lines to urban areas of concentration such as Jaffa and Haifa.
- b. The resettlement of the areas cleared, mainly by mizrahim in moshavim along the cease fire lines
- c. Operating a free fire policy⁴⁹

We conclude this period with a quotation of Ghada Karmi, a prominent Palestinian writer and Academic (Karmi Ghadaa, 2008):

“When the Zionists decided in 1897 to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, the Jews of Vienna dispatched a delegation to examine the country for its suitability. The delegation reported back as follows: "the bride is beautiful but she is married to another man". They had found that Palestine to their dismay was already inhabited by another people. And this has been Zionism’s central problem ever since. How to "vanish the Palestinians" and get an empty land? The latest manifestation of this imperative is the barrier wall, which Israel is currently building to separate and enclose Palestinian towns and villages in the lands it occupied after 1967. There are those who rightly point to the wall’s illegality and infringement of human rights. And the International Court of Justice has just affirmed this view resoundingly in its ruling, passed on 9.7.04 by 14 of the 15 judges, that the wall was an illegal structure when in the occupied Palestinian territories and that Israel would have to tear it down and make restitution for the damage it has caused to thousands of Palestinians. This position is entirely valid, but critics, in my view, have missed one crucial aspect

⁴⁹ A free fire policy was adopted by the IDF. The policy included patrols, ambushes, laying mines, setting booby traps and carrying out periodic search operations in Israeli Arab villages. The "free fire" policy in the period of 1949 to 1956 has been estimated to account for 2,700 to 5,000 Palestinian Arab deaths. During anti-infiltration operations the Israeli forces sometimes committed atrocities with reports of gang rape, murder and the dumping of 120 suspected infiltrators in the Avara desert without water. Additionally the IDF carried out operations, mainly, in Jordanian held territory and Egyptian held territory. The early reprisal raids failed to achieve their objectives and managed to increase hatred for Israel amongst the Arab countries and the refugees. The disruptive and destabilizing nature of the raids put the western plans for the defense of the Middle East in jeopardy, the western powers then applied pressure on Israeli to desist.

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of the wall’s purpose, which is, to "vanish" the Palestinians, to make them so invisible that Israelis can go on pretending that there is no "other man."

Observers of Palestinian history have long been familiar with Israel’s position on this issue. But few realise how successful, subtle and far reaching this Israeli policy has been. Arriving in Haifa recently I could see how hard Israel had tried to make that wish to send the Palestinians into oblivion come true. Haifa prides itself on being the best example of a ‘mixed’ Arab-Jewish city in Israel, practicing a much-vaunted mutual tolerance and cooperation. In fact, it is overwhelmingly Jewish, the Arabs forming less than ten per cent of the population. Haifa is a picturesque city; its famous Carmel Mountain, where the city’s Arab notables used to live before 1948, overlooks a beautiful harbor.

Today, Jews inhabit those houses and the Arab minority that remained after the 1948 expulsions lives in a rundown district by the port below, segregated in all but name. The old Haifa street names have been replaced by Jewish ones. To me, an "original" Palestinian exiled in England since 1948, the place was ineffably depressing. Beneath the phony friendliness in public there was no disguising the unequal relationship between the two sides: the menial jobs in which Arabs are concentrated, the discrimination in housing, jobs and education, implicit rather than legislative, and the aversion to meaningful social contact. One woman described her struggle to buy into the exclusive Carmel district. People had said Arabs in the neighborhood would depress property prices, rather as blacks are said to do in some Western countries.

Israeli Jews look down on Arabs. Even recently arrived Ethiopian "Jews", themselves fighting discrimination, affect to despise Arabs. Walking along Haifa’s streets, a disturbing hybrid of modern European and old Arab, I had a sense of a city gutted and soulless, its true past barely discernible beneath the new constructions. People showed me where my uncle’s house had once stood; it is now a municipal car park, demolished by the authorities in 1983. The vanishing process I could see was well advanced here. It had started with the Zionist slogan of Palestine as ‘a land without a people’, to which end the Israelis expended much effort. In 1948, a majority of Palestine’s population was expelled (my family amongst them) and was never allowed to return. A campaign to eradicate the Palestinian presence swiftly followed. Over 500 Palestinian villages were demolished and replaced with Israeli settlements; Hebrew place names were substituted for the previous Arabs ones; the country’s

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history was re-written to claim that Palestine had been a wasteland, home to a few wandering Bedouin tribes. Israeli schoolchildren were reared for decades on this mythology. Palestinian customs were appropriated as "Israeli", and the minority of Palestinians that remained became invisible.”

1.3.2.6 The 1967 war and the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza

–The former Commander of the Air Force, General Ezer Weitzman, regarded as a hawk, stated that there was 'no threat of destruction' but that the attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria was nevertheless justified so that Israel could 'exist according the scale, spirit, and quality she now embodies.'...Menahem Begin had the following remarks to make: 'In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him’ (Noam Chomsky, 1999).

The 1967 Six–Day War, also known as the June War, was fought between June 5 and 10, 1967 by Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt (United Arab Republic), Jordan and Syria.

The war began on June 5 with Israel launching surprise bombing raids against Egyptian air-fields after a period of high tension that included an Israeli raid into the Jordanian-controlled West Bank in response to sabotage acts aimed at Israeli targets, Israeli initiated aerial clashes over Syrian territory, Syrian artillery attacks against Israeli settlements in the vicinity of the border followed by Israeli response against Syrian positions in the Golan Heights and encroachments of increasing intensity and frequency (initiated by Israel) into the demilitarized zones along the Syrian border and culminating in Egypt blocking the Straits of Tiran and ordering of the evacuation from the Sinai Peninsula of the U.N. buffer force.

Within six days, Israel had won a decisive land war. Israeli forces had taken control of the Gaza strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria

The 1967 war, which lasted only six days, established Israel as the dominant regional military power. The speed and thoroughness of Israel’s victory discredited the Arab

regimes. In contrast, the Palestinian national liberation movement emerged as a major actor after 1967 in the form of the political and military groups that made up the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Israel established a military administration to govern the Palestinian residents of the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

Under this arrangement, Palestinians were denied many basic political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of political association. Palestinian nationalism was criminalized as a threat to Israeli security, which meant that even displaying the Palestinian national colors was a punishable act. All aspects of Palestinian life were regulated, and often severely restricted by the Israeli military administration. For example, Israel forbade the gathering of wild thyme (za_tar), a basic element of Palestinian cuisine.

Israel has built hundreds of settlements and permitted hundreds of thousands of its own Jewish citizens to move to the West Bank and Gaza, despite that this constitutes a breach of international law.

Israel has justified the violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and other international laws governing military occupation of foreign territory on the grounds that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not technically “occupied” because they were never part of the sovereign territory of any state. Therefore, according to this interpretation, Israel is not a foreign “occupier” but a legal “administrator” of territory whose status remains to be determined. The international community has rejected the Israeli official position that the West Bank and Gaza are not occupied, and has maintained that international law should apply there. But little effort has been mounted to enforce international law or hold Israel accountable for the numerous violations it has engaged in since 1967.

The UN partition plan advocated that Jerusalem become an international zone, independent of both the proposed Jewish and Palestinian Arab states. In the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel took control of the western part of Jerusalem, while Jordan took the eastern part, including the old walled city containing important Jewish, Muslim and Christian religious sites. The 1949 armistice line cut the city in two. In June 1967, Israel captured East Jerusalem from Jordan and almost immediately annexed it. It reaffirmed its annexation in 1981.

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Israel regards Jerusalem as its –eternal capital.” Arabs consider East Jerusalem part of the occupied West Bank and want it to be the capital of a Palestinian state.

i. Consequences of the 1967 War

The 1967 six-day war brought about the following consequences:

a. Territorial Consequences

By the end of the 1967 war, Israel had occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula.

b. Economic consequences

The war had positive economic consequences for Israel, for it gained control over the petroleum resources in the Sinai desert, until the spring of 1982.

Israel also gained complete control over the water resources in the Golan Heights and inside the Palestinian Territories. Moreover, it had access to a relatively cheap market of labor, as well as a market for Israeli products, after occupying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

c. Humanitarian Consequences

The war initially left little physical destruction in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. However, after the fighting ended the Israeli forces deliberately destroyed Palestinians' houses in several parts of the OPT –without the cabinet approval, though most probably with Dayan's approval trying to repeat the experience of 1948, to drive the Palestinians into exile and demolish their homes.

House demolitions, the sweeping away of complete villages and air raids were carried out by the Israeli Occupation Forces. Additionally, there is evidence that the Israeli soldiers traveled around Palestinian villages ordering people on loudspeakers to leave their homes and go to Jordan. They were also taken by buses to the Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) on the Jordan River and were forced to sign papers stating that they left willingly.” (Morris Benny, 2001: 327-328).

The war resulted in the displacement of more than 300,000 Palestinians being driven out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Moreover, about 30% of the displaced persons of 1967, that is around 175,000 UNRWA registered refugees, were refugees of 1948 and their descendants, forced to flee for a second time.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 237 of June 4, 1967, attempted to resolve the second wave of refugees. The resolution called upon the government of

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Israel to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.”⁵⁰

However, Israel did not abide by this and only a small number of those who applied to return actually were allowed to come back.

ii. Execution of Unarmed Egyptian Prisoners Of War in Al Arish

During the 1967 war, the Israeli forces had seized Al Arish, north of Sinai, and had used the local airport as camp for 'Prisoners Of War'. In this camp, the Israeli forces executed 1,000 unarmed Egyptian and Palestinian prisoners of war. —The Egyptian prisoners of war were ordered to dig pits and then army police shot them to death.” (St. Clair Jeffre, 2003).

iii. Nasser's Resignation

Egyptian President Abdel Nasser was one of the millions of the Arab population, who felt the bitterness of the defeat, and therefore, in the evening of June 9, 1967, he resigned. His statement was broadcast live on Egyptian radio and television announcing:

—I have taken a decision with which I need your help. I have decided to withdraw totally and for good from any official post or political role and to return to the ranks of the masses performing my duty in their midst like any other citizen... This is a time for action not grief... My whole heart is with you and let your hearts be with me. May God be with us – hope light and guidance in our hearts.”⁵¹

iv. Khartoum Summit

The Khartoum Summit was one of the consequences of the 1967 war⁵². The loss of war was a wake up alarm to the Arab Nations, so a summit was held in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and came up with resolutions and policies: to continue war against Israel, to end all Arab disputes and emphasize the Arab unity, and to provide economic assistance to Egypt and Jordan.

⁵⁰ The United Nations Security Council Resolution 237

⁵¹ Al Ahram Newspaper.

After the statement was broadcasted, millions flocked onto the streets in mass demonstrations not only in Egypt, but across the Arab world, rejecting Nasser's resignation, chanting, "We shall fight"

⁵² The summit is also known as The Famous Three No's: —a peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with it”

v. UNSC Resolution 242

Following the June 1967, Six-day War, the situation in the Middle East was discussed by the UN General Assembly, which referred the issue to the Security Council. On November 22, 1967, the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, presented a final draft for a Security Council resolution. It was adopted on the same day. This resolution established provisions and principles which would lead to a solution to the conflict. Although Resolution 242 did not receive many takers in the beginning, it was to become the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming decades. This resolution implied the trading of territory for peace and no longer focused on armistice agreements.

The resolution was adopted unanimously, and accepted by the parties of the conflict in later years.

1.3.2.7. The unification under one ethnocentric Jewish state after 1967 to 1987, the uprising of 1987-1991, the Oslo years 1992-2000

i. The 1973 Yom Kippur war

Unable to regain the territory they had lost in 1967 by diplomatic means, Egypt and Syria launched major offensives against Israel on the Jewish festival of the Day of Atonement or Yom Kippur. The clashes are also known as the Ramadan war.

Initially, Egypt and Syria made advances in Sinai and the Golan Heights. These were reversed after three weeks of fighting. Israel eventually made gains beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines.

Israeli forces pushed on into Syria beyond the Golan Heights, though they later gave up some of these gains. In Egypt, Israeli forces regained territory and advanced to the western side of the Suez Canal.

The United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations all made diplomatic interventions to bring about ceasefire agreements between the combatants.

Egypt and Syria jointly lost an estimated 8,500 soldiers in the fighting, while Israel lost about 6,000.

The war left Israel more dependent on the US for military, diplomatic and economic support. Soon after the war, Saudi Arabia led a petroleum embargo against states that

supported Israel. The embargo, which caused a steep rises in petrol prices and fuel shortages across the world, lasted until March 1974.

iii. UN Security Council passed resolution 338/1973

In October 1973 the UN Security Council passed resolution 338, which called for the combatants ~~to~~ cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately(...) [and start] negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East”⁵³.

In this part of the chapter, it is worth mentioning Yasser Arafat’s first UN appearance, where he condemned the Zionist project, but concluded: "Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand" thus mooting a peaceful solution and proclaiming the nonviolent struggle.

The speech was a watershed in the Palestinians' search for international recognition of their cause.

A year later, a US State Department official, Harold Saunders, acknowledged for the first time that ~~the~~ legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiating of an Arab-Israeli peace”.

1.3.2.8 Nonviolent Resistance during the first and second Intifadas

i. The course of events

The first Intifada (also known as “Intifada” or “intifadah”) was an unarmed Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. The first Intifada lasted from December 1987 until the Madrid Conference in 1991. Some date its conclusion to 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords.

“Israel's drive into the occupied territories had occasioned spontaneous acts of resistance, but, the administration, pursuing an "iron fist" policy of deportations, demolition of homes, collective punishment, curfews and the suppression of political institutions, was confident that Palestinian resistance was exhausted. The assessment that the unrest would collapse proved to be mistaken.

On 8 December 1987, an Israeli army tank transporter crashed into a row of cars containing Palestinians returning from working in Israel, at the Erez checkpoint. Four

⁵³ UNSC Resolution 338 of 1973

Palestinians, three of them residents of the Jabalya refugee camp, the largest of the eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, were killed and seven others seriously injured. The incident was witnessed by hundreds of Palestinian laborers returning home from work. The funerals, attended by 10,000 people from the camp that evening, quickly led to a large demonstration. Rumors swept the camp that the incident was an act of intentional retaliation for the stabbing to death of an Israeli businessman, killed while shopping in Gaza two days earlier. Following the throwing of a petrol bomb at a passing patrol car in the Gaza Strip on the following day, Israeli forces, firing with live ammunition and tear gas canisters into angry crowds, shot one young Palestinian dead and wounded 16 others.

On December 9, several popular and professional Palestinian leaders held a press conference in West Jerusalem with the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights in response to the deterioration of the situation. While they convened, reports came in that demonstrations at the Jabalya camp were underway and that a 17 year youth, who was to become the first victim of the intifada, had been shot to death after throwing a petrol bomb. Protests rapidly spread into the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Youths took control of neighborhoods, closed off camps with barricades of garbage, stone and burning tires, meeting soldiers who endeavored to break through with petrol bombs. Palestinian shopkeepers closed their businesses, and laborers refused to turn up to their work in Israel. Israel defined these activities as 'riots', and justified the repression as necessary to restore 'law and order'. Within days the occupied territories were engulfed in a wave of demonstrations, commercial strikes on an unprecedented scale. Specific elements of the occupation were targeted for attack, military vehicles, Israeli buses and Israeli banks. None of the dozen Israeli settlements were attacked and there were no Israeli fatalities from stone-throwing at cars at this early period of the outbreak. Equally unprecedented was the extent of mass participation in these disturbances: tens of thousands of ordinary civilians, including women and children. The Israeli security forces used the full panoply of crowd control measures to try and quell the disturbances: cudgels, nightsticks, tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and live ammunition. But the disturbances only gathered momentum.

Soon there was widespread rock-throwing, road-blocking and tire burnings throughout the territories. By 12 December, six Palestinians had died and 30 had been injured in the violence.

The Israeli response to the Palestinian uprising was deadly. Since 60% of stone-throwers were children under between the ages of 6 and 14, Yitzhak Rabin adopted a fallback policy of 'might, power and beatings'. The IDF killed many Palestinians at the beginning of the Intifada, the majority killed during demonstrations and riots. Palestinian protests were unpredictable and often violent and IDF troops were untrained in controlling them. Israel used mass arrests of Palestinians, engaged in collective punishments like closing down West Bank universities for most years of the uprising, and West Bank schools for a total of 12 months. Round-the-clock curfews were imposed over 1600 times in just the first year. Communities were cut off from supplies of water, electricity and fuel. At any one time, 25,000 Palestinians would be confined to their homes. Trees were uprooted on Palestinians farms, and agricultural produce blocked from being sold. In the first year over a 1,000 Palestinians had their homes either demolished or blocked up. Settlers also engaged in private attacks on Palestinians. Palestinian refusals to pay taxes were met with confiscations of property and licenses, new car taxes, and heavy fines for any family whose members had been identified as stone-throwers.”

The **Second Intifada (also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada)** was the second Palestinian uprising, a period of intensified Palestinian-Israeli violence. It began in September 2000 and ended around 2005. The death toll, including both military and civilian, is estimated to be over 3,000 Palestinians and around 1,000 Israelis (Jews and Arabs), as well as 64 foreigners. B'Tselem's figures indicate that through April 30, 2008, 35.2% of the Palestinians who were killed directly took part in the hostilities, 46.4% "did not take part in the hostilities", and 18.5% where it was not known if they were taking part in hostilities.⁵⁴

On the Israeli side, of the casualties 31.7% were security force personnel and 68.3% were civilians.

ii. Background

Under the Oslo Accords, Israel committed to the phased withdrawal of its forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and affirmed the Palestinian right to self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Authority.

⁵⁴ B' Tselem: The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

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For their part, the PLO formally recognized Israel and committed to adopting responsibility for internal security in population centers in the areas evacuated. Palestinian self-rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated. However, the realities on the ground left both sides deeply disappointed with the Oslo process.

In the five years immediately following the signing of the Oslo accords, 405 Palestinians and 256 Israelis were killed, which for the latter represented a casualty count higher than that of the previous fifteen years combined (216, 172 of which were killed during the First Intifada)

In the 1996 elections, Israelis elected a right-wing coalition led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who was followed in 1999 by Ehud Barak.

While Peres had limited settlement construction at the request of US Secretary of State, Netanyahu continued construction within existing Israeli settlements, and put forward plans for the construction of a new neighborhood, in East Jerusalem. However, he fell far short of the Shamir government's 1991–92 level and refrained from building new settlements, although the Oslo agreements stipulated no such ban.

Though construction within existing settlements was permitted under the Oslo agreements, Palestinian supporters contend that any continued construction was contrary to its spirit, prejudiced the outcome of final status negotiations, and undermined confidence in Barak's desire for peace. The Palestinians not only built in areas A & B that Israel ceded, but throughout area C administered by Israel.

Some have claimed that Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) had pre-planned the Intifada. They often quote a speech made in December 2000 by Imad Falouji, the PA Communications Minister at the time, where he explains that the violence had been planned since Arafat's return from the Camp David Summit in July, far in advance of Sharon's visit. He stated that the Intifada "was carefully planned since the return of (Palestinian President) Yasser Arafat from Camp David negotiations rejecting the U.S. conditions.”⁵⁵

Support for the idea that Arafat planned the Intifada comes from Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar, who said in September 2010 that when Arafat realized that the

⁵⁵ –PA: Intifada was Planned”, *The Jewish Week*. December 20, 2000.

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Camp David Summit in July 2000 would not result in the meeting of all of his demands, he ordered Hamas as well as Fatah and the Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, to launch "military operations" against Israel (Toameh, 2010).

Arafat's widow Suha Arafat (2012) reportedly said on Dubai television that her husband had planned the uprising.

~~“~~Immediately after the failure of the Camp David [negotiations], I met him in Paris upon his return.... Camp David had failed, and he said to me, “You should remain in Paris.” I asked him why, and he said, “Because I am going to start an intifada. They want me to betray the Palestinian cause. They want me to give up on our principles, and I will not do so,”” the research institute [MEMRI] translated Suha as saying.”⁵⁶

In September 13, 2000, Fatah carried out a number of attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets in violation of the Oslo Accords.

In the Mitchel Report (the investigatory committee set up to look into the causes behind the breakdown in the peace process), the government of Israel asserted that:⁵⁷

~~“(.....) the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the "widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse. In this view, Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative.”~~

The Mitchell report concluded:

~~“The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited.~~

~~We have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the [Government of Israel] to respond with lethal force.”~~

The July 11–25, 2000 Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David was held between United States President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and

⁵⁷ The George Mitchell report, April 30, 2001

P.A. Chairman Yasser Arafat. The talks ultimately failed with both sides blaming the other. There were four principal obstacles to agreement:

✓ **Territory**

The Palestinian negotiators indicated they wanted full Palestinian sovereignty over the entire West Bank and the Gaza Strip, although they would consider a one-to-one land swap with Israel. They maintained that Resolution 242 calls for full Israeli withdrawal from these territories, which were captured in the Six Day War as part of a final peace settlement. In the 1993 Oslo Accords the Palestinian negotiators accepted the Green Line borders for the West Bank but the Israelis rejected this proposal and disputed the Palestinian interpretation of Resolution 242. Israel wanted to annex the numerous settlement blocks on the Palestinian side of the Green Line, and was concerned that a complete return to the 1967 borders was dangerous to Israel's security. The Palestinian and Israeli definition of the West Bank differs by approximately 5% land area due to Palestinian definition including East Jerusalem (71 km²), the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 km²) and the area known as No Man's Land (50 km² near Latrun) while the Israeli definition does not.

Based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, Barak offered to form a Palestinian State initially on 73% of the West Bank (that is, 27% less than the Green Line borders) and 100% of the Gaza Strip. In 10–25 years, the Palestinian state would expand to a maximum of 92% of the West Bank (91 percent of the West Bank and 1 percent from a land swap). From the Palestinian perspective this equated to an offer of a Palestinian state on a maximum of 86% of the West Bank.

According to the Jewish Virtual Library, Israel would have withdrawn from 63 settlements. According to Robert Wright, Israel would only keep the settlements with large populations. Wright states that all others would be dismantled, with the exception of Kiryat Arba (adjacent to the holy city of Hebron), which would be an Israeli enclave inside the Palestinian state, and would be linked to Israel by a bypass road. The West Bank would be split in the middle by an Israeli-controlled road from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea, with free passage for Palestinians, although Israel reserved the right to close the road to passage in case of emergency. In return, Israel would allow the Palestinians to use a highway in the Negev to connect the West Bank with Gaza. Wright states that in the Israeli proposal, the West Bank and Gaza Strip would

be linked by an elevated highway and an elevated railroad running through the Negev, ensuring safe and free passage for Palestinians. This highway would be under the sovereignty of Israel, and Israel reserved the right to close the highway to passage in case of emergency.

Israel would retain around 9% in the West Bank in exchange for 1% of land within the green line (1949 armistice line). The land that would be conceded included symbolic and cultural territories such as the Al-Aqsa Mosque, whereas the Israeli land conceded was unspecified. Additional to territorial concessions, Palestinian airspace would be controlled by Israel under Barak's offer. The Palestinians rejected the Halutza Sand region (78 km²) alongside the Gaza Strip as part of the land swap on the basis that it was of inferior quality to that which they would have to give up in the West Bank.

Additional grounds of rejection were that the Israeli proposal planned to annex areas which would lead to a cantonization of the West Bank into three blocks. Settlement blocks, bypassed roads and annexed lands would create barriers between Nablus and Jenin with Ramallah. The Ramallah block would in turn be divided from Bethlehem and Hebron. A separate and smaller block would contain Jericho. Further, the border between West Bank and Jordan would additionally be under Israeli control. The Palestinian Authority would receive pockets of East Jerusalem which would be surrounded entirely by annexed lands in the West Bank.

✓ **Jerusalem and the Temple Mount**

A particularly vicious territorial dispute revolved around the final status of Jerusalem. Leaders were ill prepared for the central role the Jerusalem issue in general and the Temple Mount dispute in particular would play in the negotiations. Barak instructed his delegates to treat the dispute as "the central issue that will decide the destiny of the negotiations" whereas Arafat admonished his delegation to "not budge on this one thing: the Haram (the Temple Mount) is more precious to me than everything else." At the opening of Camp David, Barak warned the Americans he could not accept giving the Palestinians more than a purely symbolic sovereignty over any part of East Jerusalem.

The Palestinians demanded complete sovereignty over East Jerusalem and its holy sites, in particular, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, which are located

on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif), a site holy in both Islam and Judaism, and the dismantling of all Israeli neighborhoods built over the Green Line. The Palestinian position, according to Mahmoud Abbas, at that time Arafat's chief negotiator: "All of East Jerusalem should be returned to Palestinian sovereignty. The Jewish Quarter and Western Wall should be placed under Israeli authority, not Israeli sovereignty. An open city and cooperation on municipal services."

Israel proposed that the Palestinians be granted "custodianship," though not sovereignty, on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif), with Israel retaining control over the Western Wall, a remnant of the ancient wall that surrounded the Temple Mount, the most sacred site in Judaism outside of the Temple Mount itself. Israeli negotiators also proposed the Palestinians be granted administration, but not sovereignty, over the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the Old City, with the Jewish and Armenian Quarters remaining in Israeli hands. Palestinians would be granted administrative control over all Islamic and Christian holy sites, and would be allowed to raise the Palestinian flag over them. A passage linking northern Jerusalem to Islamic and Christian holy sites would be annexed by the Palestinian state. The Israeli team proposed annexing to Israeli Jerusalem settlements within the West Bank beyond the Green Line, such as Ma'ale Adumin, Givat Ze'ev, and Gush Etzion.

Israel proposed that the Palestinians merge certain outer Arab villages and small cities that had been annexed to Jerusalem just after 1967 to create the city of Al-Quds, which would serve as the capital of Palestine. The historically important Arab neighborhoods such as Sheikh Jarrah, Silwan and At Tur would remain under Israeli sovereignty, while Palestinians would only have civilian autonomy. The Palestinians would have civil and administrative autonomy over the outer Arab neighborhoods. Israeli neighborhoods within East Jerusalem would remain under Israeli sovereignty. The holy places in the Old City would enjoy independent religious administration.

Palestinians objected to the lack of sovereignty and to the right of Israel to keep Jewish neighborhoods that it built over the Green Line in East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians claimed block the contiguity of the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

✓ **Refugees and the “Right of Return”**

Due to the first Arab-Israeli war, a significant number of Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes inside what is now Israel. These refugees numbered approximately 711,000 to 725,000 at the time. Today, they and their descendants number about four million, comprising about half the Palestinian people. Since that time, the Palestinians have demanded full implementation of the right of return, meaning that each refugee would be granted the option of returning to his or her home, with property restored, or accept compensation instead. Israel rejected the calls, fearing that the sheer number of refugees would demographically overwhelm the country.

Israelis asserted that allowing a right of return to Israel proper, rather than to the newly created Palestinian state, would mean an influx of Palestinians that would fundamentally alter the demographics of Israel, jeopardizing Israel's Jewish character and its existence as a whole. The Israelis also argued that a larger number of Jewish refugees had fled or were expelled from Arab countries since 1948, were never compensated, and that most of them ended up in Israel.

At Camp David, the Palestinians maintained their traditional demand that the right of return be implemented. They demanded that Israel recognize the right of all refugees who so wished to settle in Israel, but to address Israel's demographic concerns, they promised that the right of return would be implemented via a mechanism agreed upon by both sides, which would try to channel a majority of refugees away from the option of returning to Israel. According to U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, some of the Palestinian negotiators were willing to privately discuss a limit on the number of refugees who would be allowed to return to Israel. Palestinians who chose to return to Israel would do so gradually, with Israel absorbing 150,000 refugees every year.

The Israeli negotiators denied that Israel was responsible for the refugee problem, and were concerned that any right of return would pose a threat to Israel's Jewish character. In the Israeli proposal, a maximum of 100,000 refugees would be allowed to return to Israel on the basis of humanitarian considerations or family reunification. All other people classified as Palestinian refugees would be settled in their present place of inhabitation, the Palestinian state, or third-party countries. Israel would help fund their resettlement and absorption. An international fund of \$30 billion would be set up, which Israel would help contribute to, along with other countries, that would

register claims for compensation of property lost by Palestinian refugees and make payments within the limits of its resources.

✓ **Israeli security concerns**

The Israeli negotiators proposed that Israel be allowed to set up radar stations inside the Palestinian state, and be allowed to use its airspace. Israel also wanted the right to deploy troops on Palestinian territory in the event of an emergency, and the stationing of an international force in the Jordan Valley. Palestinian authorities would maintain control of border crossings under temporary Israeli observation. Israel would maintain a permanent security presence along 15% of the Palestinian-Jordanian border. Israel also demanded that the Palestinian state be demilitarized with the exception of its paramilitary security forces, that it would not make alliances without Israeli approval or allow the introduction of foreign forces west of the Jordan River, and that it dismantle terrorist groups. One of Israel's strongest demands was that Arafat declares the conflict over, and makes no further demands. Israel also wanted water resources in the West Bank to be shared by both sides and remain under Israeli management.

On September 13, 2000, Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Legislative Council postponed the planned unilateral declaration of an independent Palestinian state.

The ending date of the Second Intifada is disputed, as there was no definite event that brought it to an end. Some commentators consider the intifada to have ended in late 2004 (sickness and then death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004)

Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, announced in June 2004 completed in August 2005, is also cited, as signaling the end of the intifada.

Finally, some others consider as 'official' end of the Second Intifada the Palestinian President's Mahmoud Abbas declaring the end of violence and Ariel Sharon's agreement to release 900 Palestinian prisoners and to withdraw from West Bank towns.

iii. The Gaza conflict

Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas have been engaged in a decades-long conflict over Gaza, which Israel occupied from the Six-Day War in 1967 until 2005. Israel evacuated its settlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and withdrew its forces,

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ending almost four decades of military occupation. However, after the militant Islamic group Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007, Israel intensified its economic blockade of the Strip.

In June 2008 Egypt negotiated a six-month cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. Hamas agreed to stop firing rockets into Israel. In exchange, Israel would allow limited trade into and out of Gaza.

A military assault on Gaza (“Operation Cast Lead”) was launched at the end of 2008 in order to halt cross-border rocket attacks. More than 200 Palestinians were killed in the first 24 hours of the operation.

During January 2009 the conflict escalated with Israel launching air strike attacks (including against the UN Headquarters) and a ground offensive in Gaza surrounding Gaza City (at least 30 people were killed, including a number of children). By the end of January 2009, Israel withdrew its troops from Gaza. The three-week conflict left more than 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead.

During November 2012, the conflict escalated again until a new ceasefire was announced.

1.3.3 The Historical Perspective of nonviolence in Palestine

“I object to violence because, when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary, the evil it does is permanent.”

M. K. Gandhi

Identifying nonviolence with certain historical experiences, such as the independence process in India or the collapse of Apartheid in South Africa is a connecting point to the historic perspective of the nonviolent uprisings in Palestine. The purpose of the following generic reflections to the historic experience is to make evident a dual point: On the one hand, the active strategic nonviolent campaigns are far more successful in the long run of the militant pure violent intercourse.

On the other hand, nonviolence activities based on socio-economic practice and socio-political struggle trigger social and political change.

1. The contemporary struggles for liberation and independence from autocratic rules (either inside dictators or outside rules) have exemplified the nonviolent way of

liberation movements from the grip of totalitarian empires. Taken together, the scale of the nonviolent liberation movements can only be compared to India’s drive for independence, led by Mohandas Gandhi.

Such liberation movements have clearly confirmed that there is an alternative to violent and military-driven social change. The attention of scholars has been drawn to nonviolent action as an effective, nondestructive type of ~~w~~weapons system.”

Gandhi was among the first national leaders to show both in theoretical analysis and practical action that nonviolent struggle is a positive force that can be successfully used in conflict. He was convinced that nonviolent action provided means of action incomparably superior to those of violence.

Gandhi had noted that rulers and the ruled are ultimately bound by a relationship of partnership and mutual dependence rather than by one of force: ~~In~~ politics, [the use of nonviolent action] is based upon the immutable maxim that government of the people is possible only so long as they consent either consciously or unconsciously to be governed” (Sharp, 1979: 14-15).

This proposition can be held as the axiom of the theory of nonviolent action. The idea is not something entirely new since it was clearly stated by the sixteenth century writer Étienne de la Boetie, and later by Locke, Montesquieu and other classical representatives of political liberalism.

Yet, with Gandhi and the contemporary liberation movements practice, we see this axiom applied on a nearly unconceivable scale for national liberation.

Historical studies of the development and dynamics of nonviolent action can offer unique insights into this form of social, economic, and political power.

On the other hand, civil resistance, nonviolent action against such challenges as dictatorial rule, racial discrimination and foreign military occupation is a significant feature of world politics.

Especially through the peaceful revolutions of 1989, it has helped to shape the world we live in.

Civil Resistance and Power Politics covers most of the leading cases, including the actions of Gandhi, the US civil rights struggle in the 1960s, the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the 'people power' revolt in the Philippines in the 1980s, the campaigns against apartheid in South Africa, the various movements contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989-91, and the 'color revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine.

There is complex interrelationship between civil resistance and other dimensions of power. The crucial question is whether civil resistance should be seen as potentially replacing violence completely, or as a phenomenon that operates in conjunction with, and modification of, power politics keeping in mind that in several instances (including Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kosovo and Georgia) civil resistance movements were followed by the outbreak of armed conflicts.

In some other instances nonviolent campaigns were repressed as in China 1989 and Burma 2007.

2. Perhaps the greatest change of the 20th Century was the dismantling of colonial empires, under the leadership of national liberation movements.

As early as Marx’s age, national liberation has been considered an important part of revolutionary struggle. It must be waged on two fronts: by workers in the home country and by those oppressed in the colonies. Conceiving the idea of national liberation in 1916, Lenin wrote, “The Socialists of the oppressed nations ... must particularly fight for and maintain complete, absolute unity (also organizational) between the workers of the oppressed nation and the workers of the oppressing nation (...) Marx, having in mind mainly the interests of the proletarian class struggle in the advanced countries, put into the forefront the fundamental principle of internationalism and socialism, viz., that no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations.”⁵⁸

The American Revolution of the 18th Century is considered as one of the first successful national liberation movements.

As a matter of fact, Ho Chi Minh’s Declaration for the independence of Viet Nam in 1945 begins with lines from the Declaration of Independence which launched the American Revolution.

However, national liberation possesses a dual nature. On the one hand it is a psychological and cultural struggle, while on the other hand it is a militant struggle.

Most national liberation movements have partially utilized armed struggle as is the historical evidence we witnessed in the Palestine’s struggle for independence and self-determination.

⁵⁸ Lenin Archives, www.marxist.org/archive/lenin

“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”

However, the great movement for the liberation of India from British colonialism, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, relied on active nonviolence providing a model of uprising through nonviolent means.

By the end of the 20th Century, the non-aligned Movement⁵⁹, representing the victory of national liberation struggles around the world, had become a powerful political force. Speaking on their behalf at the United Nations in 1979, the Cuban leader Fidel Castro said:

—We are 95 countries from all the continents representing the vast majority of humanity. We are united by determination to defend cooperation among our countries, free national and social development, sovereignty, security, equality and self-determination. We are associated in the endeavor to change the current system of international relations based on injustice, inequality and oppression. We act on international policy as a global independent factor.”⁶⁰

3. Another live example of the historic perspective of nonviolence is the Movement of Independence in India. Gandhi is undoubtedly the most influential non-violent leader of the 20th century. His influence can be seen throughout numerous countries and decades. His mass, peaceful resistance movement in India is undoubtedly the largest contributing factor to the end of British rule in India.

The inert power of Gandhi’s *satyagraha* (his term for nonviolent struggle) lies in the fact that while it is based on a firm ideological dedication to the ethics of nonviolence, it is also practical.

Morality, for Gandhi, had no meaning unless it governed life in every way. Furthermore, campaigns of *satyagraha* were undertaken with both strong ethical foundations and strategically targeted methods.

The basis of *Satyagraha*, developed by Gandhi over a long period of time, is —Truth”. Indeed, one of the translations of the word is —insistence on truth.” In Gandhi’s own words:

—Truth alone triumphs. There is no dharma [duty] higher than Truth. Truth always wins.” (Rudrangshu Mukherjee, 1993) .

⁵⁹ The history of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Government of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/>

⁶⁰ www.newhumanist.com

This commitment to Truth defined Gandhi’s life and philosophy excludes the use of violence.

This is the second essential, and directly related, basis of *satyagraha*: the notion of *ahimsa*, usually translated as nonviolence. Gandhi rejected this translation, arguing that *ahimsa* is ~~not~~ merely a negative state of harmlessness but it is a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evil-doer (...)” and that ~~(...)~~ there is no way to find Truth except by the way of nonviolence.” (Rudrangshu Mukherjee 1993).

At final analysis, the theory of *satyagraha* articulates clearly defined, strategic steps and actions, as well as a strict code of conduct. This code of conduct includes:

- ✓ self-reliance
- ✓ personal initiative’s
- ✓ propagation of objectives
- ✓ strategy, and tactics
- ✓ constant analysis and progression of the movement
- ✓ examination of weaknesses
- ✓ persistent attempts to reach a compromise (including possible reduction of demands) but a refusal to surrender essentials
- ✓ insistence on full agreement upon a settlement

~~Dis~~content in India had been growing for several years before the *satyagraha* campaign of 1919. India had been a huge supporter of the Allied forces in the First World War, supplying massive amounts of money, materials, weapons, and manpower. In exchange, Britain promised that Dominion Status would be granted, and most believed this effort would be the ticket to home-rule in India. The end of the war however, saw an entirely different reality. India was denied any part of the war booty, was refused entry to the League of Nations, and, most insulting of all, Britain reneged on her promise of Dominion Status. Furthermore, Indian soldiers were returning from the trenches of Europe with tales of horrible mistreatment and discrimination.

With the war boom over, unemployment skyrocketed, and wages were reduced. Members of every caste and class were seething with a rage that threatened to boil over at any moment.

Sensing this great discontent, Britain passed the Rowlatt Act in an attempt to quell any uprisings. These laws reduced, and in some cases eliminated, the rights to free

speech, free press, and freedom to assemble. It also authorized the arrest and imprisonment of any person deemed “dangerous to the state” (allowing for the use of preventative detention) for an indefinite period, without trial, and without possibility of appeal.” (King, 1999: 42).

Gandhi had campaigned strongly for support of the British in the war and felt personally responsible for misleading the Indian people into the trap of British duplicity. Feeling the force of the people’s harassment, Gandhi called upon the country to offer a *satyagraha*. Demonstrations, meetings, and protests were held throughout the country.

The British government responded with mass arrests, vicious beatings, and the imposition of martial law in some areas.

The massacre of Jallianwala Bagh, in which 1,500 peacefully assembled Indians were slain, also occurred during this time. In reaction to such violence, protester’s nonviolence broke down in many places after the first few days of the campaign.

Buildings were burned, telegraph lines cut, and both English and Indian officers were killed.

Less than a month into the *satyagraha*, Gandhi demanded an end to the campaign and went on a fast to repent for his failure.

After one year of continued almost exclusively nonviolent activities, Lord Irwin announced a meeting in London to discuss possible constitutional reforms in India. Gandhi was invited, negotiations began, and the resulting Gandhi-Irwin pact included modifications to the salt regulations, amnesty to those convicted of offenses involved with civil disobedience, withdrawal of restraining ordinances that had been implemented during the movement, and restoration of confiscated properties.

The settlement also made references to a further discussion on constitutional reforms to be held at a later date.

Nevertheless, the Gandhi-Irwin pact went unfulfilled and resistance resumed.

The success of the *satyagraha* of 1930-1931 should not be judged by the failure of the Great Britain to meet its commitments. The important aspect of the pact is that it was signed out of the British desire and need, to end the effective and immense resistance nonviolent movement that was taking place in India.

4. In the case of the **Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa**, nonviolent resistance was ~~pr~~probably the largest grassroots eruption of diverse nonviolent strategies in a single struggle in human history.” (Walter, 1987).

The struggles of this nonviolent movement and the strategies used by its leaders were a direct continuation of Gandhi’s methods.

The South African movement in many ways was ~~the~~ “the other side of the coin” of the resistance movement in India, establishing an emerging pattern in the conditions leading up to successful opposition movement and the factors contributing to that success. As the case in India, the first campaign was unsuccessful campaign in the 1950s to be followed by a later and successful one.

The organizational structure of the first movement, the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign, was influenced by Gandhi’s methods. The responsible body for the nonviolent campaign of resistance was the Joint Planning Council, an appointed committee. The course of actions included:

- ✓ Issuance of an ultimatum
- ✓ Establishment of set and significant start date
- ✓ Rigid organizational structure
- ✓ Selection of one highly symbolic act to defy
- ✓ Strategic assessment and selecting of other specific laws to defy
- ✓ 3 step plan of action:
 - selected and trained persons in large city centers
 - increased participants and locations
 - finally mass action on a countrywide scale

On June 26th, 1952 volunteers, under the supervision of trained leaders, committed various of acts of civil nonviolent uprisings, including entering locations without permits, defying curfew, and sitting in or entering ~~white-only~~ or ~~European-only~~ railway seats, waiting rooms, and post offices.

By October, the first stage of the resistance was complete, groups throughout the large city centers had defied the laws, and the movement had already spread to some smaller towns.

Within the first hundred days of the campaign, six thousand volunteers defied apartheid laws, and by the end 8,500 had volunteered and been arrested. (David Welsh, 2009: 110)

However, the participation levels varied from region to region. Overall, however, the movement seemed to be showing great promise and growth.

At that time a series of violent riots broke out. While no direct connection can be made between these riots and the resistance movement, the Government used the riots to justify a brutal crackdown to suppress the nonviolent campaign. Conservative estimates give thirty-four Africans dead following a series of four riots across the country.

In March 1960, two peaceful rallies, organized by the Pan Africanist Congress (the PAC), ended in tragedy. (In Sharpeville, a huge demonstration at a police station ended in 69 deaths and nearly 200 injured and in Langa, the police attacks left 3 dead).

The Government passed quickly through Parliament the Unlawful Organisations Act, banning both the ANC and the PAC. These events convinced many resistance leaders that the time for nonviolent methods of resistance had passed and Umkhonto we Sizwe (commonly referred to as MK), a militant wing of the ANC, was established.

The MK embarked on a violent, militant crusade against the institution of apartheid, mostly through bombings of government buildings. However, this violent campaign proved to be even more ineffective than the earlier nonviolent one. Leaders were quickly caught and imprisoned and, as several scholars have pointed out, the armed struggle ~~may~~ have harmed the movement, weakening the nonviolent campaigns... and justifying the repression of all resistance efforts.” (Lester Kunz, 2010).

While the militant campaign was designed to supplement nonviolent actions, it served only to undermine them, ~~inviting~~ further government repression [and resulting] in a loss of support by some Africans as well.” (Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz and Sarah Beth Asher, 1999).

At the same time that these violent campaigns were proving their ineffectiveness, nonviolent resistance leaders were working to improve conditions in the townships by organizing local councils, rallies, and strikes to protest grievances such as rent and service cost hikes. The Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO) succeeded in canceling rent hikes and preventing metered water charges in one township, while a boycott threat in another prevented the leveling of the Walmer Township. These are just a few of the many local nonviolent resistance campaigns that took place throughout the country during the 60s and 70s.

During the 1980s, a far more successful nonviolent resistance campaign was launched, which was characterized by a consolidation of leadership, the building of alternative institutions, and mass, popular noncooperation. Boycotts, strikes, “stay-away,” mass demonstrations, marches, flag burning, graffiti, worship services, memorials and anniversaries, singing and slogans, symbolic clothing (colors of the banned ANC), funeral marches and orations as occasions for protest, alternative press and advertising, public declarations (such as The Freedom Charter), and student movements were all used during this campaign. (Lester Kunz, 2010).

Initially, the government met these new resistance techniques with a combination of brutal repression and superficial concessions. They declared states of emergencies, deployed military personnel into the townships to terrorize and intimidate protesters, arrested thousands of participants, banned organizations and leaders, and censored any media coverage of the resistance. Even as they installed these new measures of oppression, they also tried to pacify black rage. New houses, apartment buildings and schools were constructed, and a few roads were paved. But as the then Chief of Police Intelligence later recalled, “People just didn’t want apartheid anymore (...). They were not prepared to be suppressed any longer.” (Ackerman and DuVall, 2000: 363).

Eventually, the regime crumbled to internal and external pressure exerted by nonviolent resistance methods and the apartheid system came to an end.

Building on the work of Gandhi, the resistance campaigns in South Africa proved that nonviolence could be successful as a pragmatic approach to ending oppression.

1.4 Conclusions

–In the American Jewish community, there is little willingness to face the fact that the Palestinian Arabs have suffered a monstrous historical injustice, whatever one may think of the competing claims. Until this is recognized, discussion of the Middle East crisis cannot even begin.”

Chomsky (1974)

–Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French...What is going on in Palestine today cannot be justified by any moral code of conduct...If they [the Jews] must look to the Palestine of geography as their national home, it is wrong to enter it under the shadow of the British gun. A religious act cannot be performed with the aid of the bayonet or the bomb. They can settle in Palestine only by the goodwill of the Arabs... As it is, they are co-sharers with the British in despoiling a people who have done no wrong to them. I am not defending the Arab excesses. I wish they had chosen the way of non-violence in resisting what they rightly regard as an unacceptable encroachment upon their country. But according to the accepted canons of right and wrong, nothing can be said against the Arab resistance in the face of overwhelming odds.”

Mahatma Gandhi (1938)

1. The historical paradigms referred in the previous section, clearly point out the fact that nonviolence as a method of activism does not guarantee automatic and unfailing success. In fact, no method of conflict resolution does. For the pessimistic views about the ability of nonviolence to resolve conflicts, Naess sums up Gandhi's probable response with the words:

–Have you tried? I have, and it works” (Arne Naess, 1965: 78).

Ultimately, enemies of ideological nonviolence argue, it works because it seeks to deal with the causes, rather than the symptoms, of conflict. The rationale, then, for the use of nonviolence as the preferred method of political activism or philosophy of life rests on the twin convictions that it 'works' instrumentally and that it is 'right' ethically.

2. The historic facts laid down in the previous parts of the Chapter, have proved that unarmed civil resistance in Palestine has already had a long, and too often overlooked or even ignored, history. As Palestinian human-rights attorney Jonathan Kuttub notes in the Kaufman-Lacusta book, "Palestinians have perfected the language of the armed struggle, but not the actual *practice* of armed struggle, while all the time practicing nonviolence without calling it by that name, without following the proper path of nonviolence, and without claiming that what they are doing is nonviolent resistance." As a result, even though ~~the~~ vast majority of the Palestinian people have never participated in armed struggle except through songs, slogans and rhetoric," the image in the West continues to be that of ~~the~~ Palestinian as a terrorist or, at best, as a 'liberation fighter' with a gun in his hand, fighting for freedom to liberate his land". Further, unlike armed resistance, an elite vanguard organized in underground cells, against foreign military occupation, unarmed resistance can utilize virtually the entire population.

3. Nonviolent methods of resistance have great strategic advantages. Even more than in most cases of colonialism and conquest, large numbers of Israelis believe their own propaganda: that it is they who are victims of aggression and that their violence is always defensive, whereas violent resistance by the people they are subjugating is ~~terrorism~~." Threats by neighboring Arab states in the early years of the conflict to destroy the new state of Israel and the centuries of genocide and persecution against the Jews in Europe have made it easy for the Israeli government to convince its people that the conflict is a zero-sum game, a matter of ~~us~~ versus them." Despite the far greater violence inflicted by Israel against Arab civilians, the use of violent means of resistance by the Palestinians — particularly if targeted at civilians — has only made the Israelis more intransigent and has increased support both at home and abroad for further violence and repression.

4. Conquest, colonization and expansion are by their nature violent and require violence to maintain it. By contrast, those resisting such aggression have more options at their disposal. The false dichotomy of moral but ineffective nonviolence versus amoral but effective violence must be rejected. Instead violent resistance by Palestinians has long been used as ~~justification~~ to brutalize the population, further uproot us and destroy our homes and lands". Israel, by monopolizing state power and

the instruments of repression, leaves the Palestinians with "little hope of containing the cancerous growth of colonial settlements on their own land by violent methods" In particular, –Resistance by violent means has far more constraints and is more likely to fail than popular resistance because it requires much for logistical support (arms, etc.), secrecy, killing of armed combatants, difficulty in establishing geographic areas for armed control and much more”. Occasionally, nonviolent resistance was subjected to brutal repression. However, it is far less devastating in terms of both people killed and social and economic disruption.

5. The nonviolent resistance during the waning days of the Ottoman period, that successfully limited land acquisitions by early Zionists, despite being hampered by Turkish-Arab rivalries and the feudal structures within Palestine, has been overlooked

6. Under the British Mandate, though faced with divide-and-rule policies from Mandatory authorities and factionalism within the Arab-nationalist movement, large-scale armed and nonviolent resistance came to the fore during revolts in 1920-21, 1929 and 1936-39 before fading in the face of collective punishment and preferential treatment to armed Jewish settlers by the British, and the machinations of local reactionaries and Arab regimes

7. Following the Israeli conquest of the remaining parts of Palestine in June 1967, a dynamic movement in the West Bank centered on creating alternative institutions that challenged not only Israeli control but the lingering conservative influence of Jordan's King Hussein and his royalist supporters. Within Israel, the first Land Day demonstrations in Galilee in 1976 marked renewed activism among Palestinian citizens of Israel faced with confiscation of their property and ongoing discrimination.

8. In the case of the Palestinian uprisings during the first Intifada, the Israelis, as we have already stated in the previous parts, responded viciously to these new methods of resistance. Demonstrations were dispersed with tear gas and live ammunition, all schools and universities were closed, curfews were implemented, and shops participating in strikes were broken into and trashed. Palestinians wearing watches running on the alternative time had their wrists broken. These brutal

punishments, instead of breaking the will of the Palestinians, gain them support from the international community and increased internal solidarity and further development of the resistance. For example, instead of looting shops the army had broken into, volunteer welders would come to fix the locks and groups of young boys would bring the shop owner new keys.

As Gene Sharp estimates, “for the first two and a half years of the uprising, the movement remained almost entirely nonviolent and approximately 85 percent of the resistance was nonviolent. The other 15 percent was largely “limited violence” such as stone throwing or petrol bombs (...)” (Sharp, 1989: 3-13).

The later years of the Intifada, this tendency shifted in. Nonviolent methods were gradually abandoned and the resistance evaded in the early 1990s.

A full analysis of the First Intifada must mention the various advances that were made as a result. Firstly, channels of dialogue were opened. The United States began a cautious, yet still significant, relationship with the PLO. In 1991, Palestinians and Israelis sat down together to discuss a resolution for the first time in the history of the conflict, and by 1993, the Oslo Accords, then seen as extremely promising agreement, had been reached. One reason for Israel’s new willingness to negotiate can be at least partly attributed to another accomplishment of the resistance: the increased cost of occupation. As Palestinian Scholar Mazin Qumsiyeh points out:

“The cost of the uprising to Israel was huge. Even by May 1988, it was estimated that in the first three months of the uprising government revenues declined by 30 percent compared to the similar period the year before, expenses rose dramatically(...) tourism plummeted and Israeli exports tumbled (...)” (Qumsiyeh, 2011)

And lastly, the Intifada turned international attention to the severity of the problem in the Occupied Territories. The uprising put the Palestinian issue back on the global agenda.

9. The second Intifada began nonviolently in 2000 but became increasingly violent, and therefore ineffective, in response to growing Israeli repression. Subsequent years, however, have brought an unprecedented degree of international solidarity, a growing array of nonviolent tactics, the widespread use of the Internet to mobilize and educate Palestinians and others about the resistance, and other innovations

10. The vast majority of the civil resistance originate bottom up from the grassroots. Political parties and leadership are usually taken off-guard by the start of new uprisings and the inventions of new resistance methods. Occasionally movements may evolve into political initiatives but most of the time they simply influence existing political formulations to perform differently

Instead of epilogue, two examples of successful nonviolent campaigns are quoted:

i. The nonviolent resistance of Beit Sahour

Beit Sahour, is a Palestinian town of 13,000 with a Christian majority and a Moslem minority. It engaged in a different kind of Intifada. It took up the flag of nonviolent civil disobedience against the Israeli occupation.

Civil disobedience in Beit Sahour began with the idea of "home economy." Well-off families adopted a regime of self-imposed austerity, while a group of Beit Sahourians opened a nursery and gave guidance on how to grow one's own vegetables. The security forces, however, did not like the idea. To them, dispersing violent demonstrations is child's play compared to fighting "the battle of the vegetables." Some of the group was put in jail, but the tomatoes went on growing in the small gardens, and the chickens went on laying fresh eggs. In May 1988 the story of tax disobedience started. Taxes were a heavy burden on Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (O.T.). They felt that all taxes collected from the O.T. should come back to its administration. So when the Unified Leadership asked the people to stop paying taxes, it represented the will of the people. This request was not something imposed on the residents of Beit Sahour. They immediately responded and began refusing to pay taxes to the Israeli Civil Administration. The Occupation Authorities began an all-out campaign to crush the tax resistance with widespread raids, arrests, curfews and the confiscation of commercial and private properties of the people of Beit Sahour. The Defense Minister of Israel said that he would break the Beit Sahour tax resistance at all costs even if it meant keeping the town under curfew for two months.

Something had to be done. The next morning there was a whisper all over the town calling Beit Sahourians to gather at the municipality to discuss the possible means of

retaliation. Nobody knew how it started, but a process of delivering the identity cards started in order to send them back to the Military Governor. Giving back the identity cards was the best answer for what the Military Occupation had initiated in the town. It was a reaction fitting perfectly with the idea of civil disobedience. For the ID was a main symbol of oppression: It was the first thing requested by the military when they stopped people. They used it for harassment, for anyone caught without it was subject to beating, humiliation and possible detention. So "let us throw it away, let us get rid of this symbol of our oppression," the residents of Beit Sahour said. Subsequently Beit Sahour had to live for two weeks under curfew. The reaction of the residents was a challenge to the military occupation. At the same time it created a new, courageous image of the Beit Sahourians which helped to keep the tax collectors away for several months.

During 1989, the military and tax officers began inspecting the possibilities for raiding Beit Sahour again. The first wave started during June. Groups of old people were arrested. The military kept them at detention centers, trying to figure out the reaction of the residents of Beit Sahour. They also wanted to infiltrate the population through these groups. However, the military failed to do so as a perfect system of support was created in Beit Sahour expressing solidarity to all families of those who were detained. Both sides, Beit Sahourians and the Military, prepared themselves for the battle to come.

The Military decided to move further. The Defense Minister declared that he was going to teach Beit Sahour a lesson. On September 19, 1989, the town was sieged. All entrances were blocked, and thousands of soldiers accompanied by tax officers started the biggest taxation raid in recent history. The town was denied any access to medical or food supply. The supplies of anyone coming from Bethlehem and caught at the border were confiscated. The soldiers helped the tax officers to take over a building and to make it into their headquarters. They started to wake up people at night, taking them from their houses to the military detention center in Bethlehem. The next morning the tax officers would confiscate the contents of the people's houses or their businesses. Most of the people were taxed twice, for the value added tax and for the income tax.

After three weeks of tax raids, some people who were waiting for their turn became nervous: "Why isn't my turn coming? Something is wrong." So they would wait for

officers in the armored cars to pass, stop the car and ask the officers: “Listen my name is (...) I am on your list. I have been waiting for you, tell me, when are you coming?” The officers would become furious and start beating them.

The Beit Sahourians were offered to get everything back for one shekel, but the soldiers couldn't find a single person willing to give them one shekel. It was a matter of principle. At one house when they started driving away after having finished the dirty work, they heard a voice calling them to stop. A wicked smile appeared on their faces: “Finally someone will pay.” The lady who called carried something in her hand and without hesitation, with full confidence and courage; she threw the remote control at them and shouted: —“You forgot this.”

The curfew lasted for forty-five days. In the last days of the raid, a resolution was introduced in the United Nations Security Council, calling upon Israel to stop the tax raids and to return all the confiscated goods. The resolution was vetoed by the United States. The institutions of Beit Sahour, including religious, social and cultural centers, sent a letter to President Bush asking him —“Why Mr. President...? We were proud to raise the same slogan of the American Revolution against the British, 'No Taxation without Representation', the same slogan of the Boston Tea Party.”

ii. Bil'in Struggle

Bil'in is a Palestinian village that is struggling to exist. Since early 2005, the state of Israel has annexed close to 60% of our land for Israeli settlements and for the construction of Israel's apartheid wall. Bil'in is fighting to safeguard our land, our people, and our liberty.

Bil'in's Popular Committee and village residents, supported by Israeli and international activists, have peacefully demonstrated every Friday since February 2005 in front of the —“work-site of shame” in opposition to the presence of the Apartheid Wall. The Israeli army has consistently responded with teargas, sound bombs, clubs, rubber-coated steel bullets, and live ammunition.

Bil'in is a symbol of what is happening across all of Palestine. By participating in the conference in Bil'in, you help everyone in Palestine continue their struggle for liberty. On Tuesday, 6 September 2007 the Israeli high court decided in favor of a petition drawn up by the Palestinian villagers of Bil'in in the occupied West Bank to change the current route of the illegal apartheid wall which encircles the small village. For

years, residents of Bil‘in, along with international and Israeli activists, have led nonviolent resistance actions every week against the encroaching wall and the illegal settlement colonies that expand on a daily basis on their land. Villagers and activists have been tear-gassed, shot at, arrested, and beaten by Israeli occupation soldiers during direct confrontations against the wall and the continued theft of Bil‘in land, but the resistance presence has grown into what organizers and Palestinian leaders call a force to be reckoned with. Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi, Palestinian legislator and secretary-general of Al Mubadara, the Palestinian National Initiative, stated that Tuesday’s court ruling was a direct result of the steadfast resistance movement in Bil‘in.

Though the court decision ruled that the illegal apartheid wall should be moved somewhat, there is still a significant amount of village land that will remain on the other side of the wall.

Additionally, the court ruled that dozens of existing buildings in the illegal settlement colony of Modiin Illit should not be demolished despite the fact that the colony sits on Bil‘in land, owned by several Palestinian families.

The fact that the illegal wall will be altered in its course is definitely a significant relief to the villagers, the land-owners and the dedicated resistance activists who have stood in defiance of the wall and the soldiers, but is by no means an outright triumph for the movement. The wall is still eating up land at an accelerated rate, and the settlement colonies have been given the green light by the current court ruling to continue the status quo: creating facts on the ground in direct contravention to international law. Settlers still get to keep their illegal, spreading colonies and apartheid matrix systems that slice up the West Bank, as any realization of a so-called “viable Palestinian state” remains an elusive and illogical pipe dream.

In 2004, the International Court of Justice ruled that the apartheid wall is illegal and must be dismantled, that Palestinians receive appropriate reparations and that all states that respect the Fourth Geneva Convention are under obligation ~~not~~ to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.” Yet Israel has outright scoffed at the ruling, and no foreign state has come forward to denounce Israel’s practices of apartheid and land theft as mandated by the ICJ decision.

What happened in Bil‘in is certainly a step forward, following in the path of several villages that have stood firm against the increasing colonization of their land. Budrus, a small village near Bili‘in, won a court battle that pushed the route of the apartheid wall back to the so-called “Israeli” side of the invisible green line — marking the internationally recognized boundary between Israel and the West Bank — in 2005, but received little attention in the media. And community leaders inside Budrus were not quick to claim total victory; the wall still looms on the horizon and continues to make life completely impossible for their neighbors.

Chapter two: Nonviolent Resistance definition and conceptualisation

2.1 Introduction

Identifying nonviolence in a generic manner, free from its philosophical, ideological or ethical-political semantics, allows us to uncover its presence throughout history. The connection of the concept with certain historical experiences permits our research to reveal examples of action and forms of thinking and interpretation of the world which, nowadays, can be qualified as nonviolent or which share certain characteristics with those which we have denominated as nonviolent. Furthermore, many of these historical paradigms allow us to view nonviolence from a different perspective and observe many previously inconceivable facts, in light of the rule of minimising levels of suffering and damage as much as possible.

Our historical overview of nonviolence as well as a conceptual morphosyntax in this chapter serves a twofold purpose:

On the one hand, to evidently demonstrate that the concept of nonviolence has evolved over a long period of time and that the ideas have been stemmed from different historic periods and different cultures.

On the other hand, to gradually set the framework for the contemporary popular resistance actions in Palestine as a driving force for the reinforcement of the culture of nonviolence with its socio-economic implications, which constitutes our next chapter main focus.

2.2 Historical Overview of Civil Resistance

2.2.1 Historical revelation of civil resistance

The concept of civil resistance has evolved over a long period of time. Ideas drawn from different periods of history and from different cultures have contributed to its evolution. The idea that there is a law that transcends the laws of the state is found in Socrates or in some of the classical Greek tragedies (Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* and Sophocles’ *Antigone*), and in the Indian concept of dharma (duty).

In these traditions, the individual had the obligation to disobey the laws of the state, once the higher law and the laws of the state come into conflict.

Campaigns of civil resistance have been practiced throughout history, at least as far back as 449 B.C.E., when Roman plebs organized a general strike, abandoned the city, and set up camp until the political elite gave in to their demands for political rights.

In the following part of the chapter we briefly present these traditions:

i. Ancient classical era and Civil Resistance

The notion of civil resistance is evident in the very first democracy of Athens. It was expressed by the poet Sophocles.

Antigone’s behavior exemplifies the classic case of civil resistance. In Sophocles’ tragedy, Antigone chose to obey her conscience and violate the state law against providing burial for her brother, who had been proclaimed a traitor. When the dictator Creon found out that Antigone had buried her fallen brother, he confronted her and reminded her that there was a mandatory death penalty for this deliberate disobedience of the state law. Antigone replied, “Nor did I think your orders were so strong that you, a mortal man, could overrun the gods’ unwritten and unfailing laws.” Antigone was not testing the validity of the law in the hope that eventually she would be sustained. Appealing to the judgment of the community, she explained her action to the chorus. After all, she did not act secretly, since the burial of her brother was open and public. She was neither violent nor did she trespass on another citizen’s rights. And finally, she accepted without resistance the death sentence-the penalty for violation. By voluntarily accepting the law’s sanctions, she was not a revolutionary denying the authority of the state.

Socrates, being a philosopher, argued the concept of working through the system to produce a favorable change. Socrates main argument lies in the dialogue of Crito where he states that all laws are just however it is the people that are unjust. Having this as starting point, Socrates further argues that persuasion is the most effective means of civil disobedience. If you can change the minds of the people that are sentencing you or the opinions of the majority, then you can prevent injustice from occurring. Socrates also maintains that the rule by law, a sacred obligation for Athenians, should never be violated. The laws are for all intentional purposes made for people to obey. Socrates says that all citizens are obligated to the country and the laws because the laws provide for the citizen's welfare, their arrangements, their safety and order. Thus without order, the institution of law and order becomes null and everything falls apart. Socrates also argues that if you cannot persuade your country or the people, then you must do what they order and accept their punishment. The laws are what keep the society running; however, the laws are not what convict you to your punishment, it is the people. So persuasion is the best method of civil resistance, to try and reason with the people why you are not at fault.

However, the notion of Justice is not merely right determination and adjudication of disputes and enforcement of Law, but also it comprehensively takes within its meaning the whole of political, social, juristic and moral idealism. It is so, because Justice has reference to the whole of human existence which is realized by our thought, will and action. The very essence of Justice cannot be completely unraveled by reason, logic or language. It reflects the human inside, the soul.

To Plato, Justice is realization of ‘Good’ which can be achieved in society by doing one's own duty according to one's station in life otherwise; Justice achieves ‘Good’ by retribution. On the other hand, for Aristotle Justice generally means ‘righteousness’. In its particular meaning it means proper or equitable distribution of the goods of existence, correction of wrongs and exchange of goods. It has thus distributive, corrective and commutative functions.

Therefore, trying to conceive Socrates notion of Justice and connect it with the concept of civil disobedience, we could assume that the Laws are to be respected because they keep order and they help make sure that absolute Hobbesian chaos does not prevail, and therefore culture, knowledge and civilization can be cultivated. The laws help protect the citizen from injustice and if he/she breaks the laws unjustly, then it is wrong.

However, since laws are to be respected, the citizen must seek to work within the system (Judicial, Legislative etc.) in order to help expose the underlying cause of injustice in the law and then correct it.

How had Socrates practiced civil resistance?

Socrates asserts multiple times in *“Crito”* that he is a man who follows the Law. His entire motif behind not escaping from the prison when he could is that he is obliged to not disrespect the law. Coming from such a person, why would he practice civil resistance the basis of which is to knowingly go against a law?

In *“The Apology”* Socrates questions the social order because he believes it is not right. Socrates says *“When you wished to try the generals, who did not rescue their men after the battle, in a body which was against the law, as you all came to think afterwards, my tribe held the presidency. On that occasion I alone of all the presidents opposed your illegal action, and gave my vote against you.”*⁶¹ Socrates is civilly resistant in the sense that he does not conform to the masses.

His motif for civil resistance is the fact that there exist an unjust set of laws that are not in conjunction with *“natural laws”*, which the masses seem to be following due compulsion and lack of question. Thus Socrates is civilly resistant in principle that he also refused to conform to the popular laws and instead favor what Socrates says is *“Truth”*.

In conclusion, Socrates is civilly resistant. To quote Socrates *“That government with all its power did not terrify me into doing anything wrong.”*⁶²

To give an example we will try to view Socrates ideal from a contemporary case in Darfur region in Sudan. The government that is supposed to uphold the laws of the land started to systematically kill off its own citizens and commit atrocities that can be safely termed as *“genocide.”* Now if we use Socrates’ philosophy, how are the people of Darfur going to uphold the law while *“persuading”* their killers to stop the killings? In this case, Socrates’ argument fails to generate an effective solution to the injustice and hatred within this society.

On the other hand, we will try to view Socrates ideal from another case of the monks in Burma. By utilizing nonviolent methods the government or their persecutors had no

⁶¹ The Apology, 32a

⁶² Ibidem 32e

chance to use unnecessary force because they would look foolish in the eyes of the world and they would defeat their own argument. The reason that makes civil disobedience effective is its appeal to the better part of the human nature, human sympathy, human love and humanity’s bond to one another.

ii. Hinduism Dharma

Dharma is a key concept with multiple meanings in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism⁶³. Hinduism describes dharma as the natural universal laws whose observance enables humans to be contented and happy, and to save themselves from degradation and suffering.

Dharma is the moral law combined with spiritual discipline that guides one's life. Hindus consider dharma the very foundation of life. It means "that which holds" the people of this world and the whole creation. Dharma is the "law of being" without which things cannot exist.

In ancient India the concept of Dharma was the synthesis of law, religion and morality. It represented the reality itself and the whole of Right and Truth of human life. It was the spirit of Justice and the Victory of good over evil.

Dharma refers to the religious ethics as propounded by Hindu gurus in ancient Indian scriptures (Kalupahana, 1996).

Tulsidas, author of *Ramcharitmanas*, has defined the root of dharma as compassion. This principle was taken up by Lord Buddha in his immortal book of great wisdom, *Dhammapada*. The *Atharva Veda* describes dharma symbolically as follows:

- *Prithivim dharmana dhritam*, that is, "this world is upheld by dharma". In the epic poem *Mahabarata* the Pandavas represent dharma in life and the Kauravas represent adharma.

According to the *Bhagavat Purana*, righteous living or life on a dharmic path has four aspects:

⁶³ Encyclopedia Britannica 2007.

In Hinduism dharma is the religious and moral law governing individual conduct and one of the four ends of life, to be followed according to one’s class, status, and station in life. It constitutes the subject matter of the dharmastras, religious manuals that are the earliest source of Hindu law.

In Buddhism, dharma is the doctrine, the universal truth common to all individuals at all times, proclaimed by the Buddha.

In Jaina philosophy, dharma, in addition to being commonly understood as moral virtue, also has the meaning—unique to Jainism—of an eternal –substance” (dravya)) the medium that allows beings to move.

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- Austerity (*tap*)
- Purity (*shauch*)
- Compassion (*daya*)
- Truthfulness (*satya*)

An adharmic or unrighteous life has three vices:

- Pride (*ahankar*)
- Contact (*sangh*)
- Intoxication (*madya*).

The essence of dharma lies in possessing a certain ability, power and spiritual strength. The strength of being dharmic also lies in the unique combination of spiritual brilliance and physical prowess.

Manusmriti, written by the ancient sage Manu, prescribes 10 essential rules for the observance of dharma:

- Patience (*dhriti*)
- Forgiveness (*kshama*)
- Piety or self-control (*dama*)
- Honesty (*asteya*)
- Sanctity (*shauch*)
- Control of senses (*indraiya-nigrah*)
- Reason (*dhi*)
- Knowledge or learning (*vidya*)
- Truthfulness (*satya*)
- Absence of anger (*krodha*).

Manu further writes, “Nonviolence, truth, non-coveting, purity of body and mind, control of senses are the essence of dharma”. Therefore dharmic laws govern not only the individual but all in society (W.A. Borody, 2011: 189-196).

iii. Thomas Aquinas “Natural Law”

In the middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) defended the natural-law view that unjust laws did not bind the citizen in conscience.

In contrast to some earlier Catholic thinkers (like Augustine), who stress divine grace and human inability to live justly, T. Aquinas takes a more positive view of human nature.

To him, if you just take the time to reason things out with the gifts God has given you, you can form a just society with good laws.

T. Aquinas on Law

In order to understand his discussion of law we need to put it in the context of his work as a whole.

In this "First Part of the Second Part" he is discussing human acts. The "end" or goal (Aristotle uses the term "telos") of human life is happiness, and human reason is the means to move us to that end. Therefore, the acts we pursue lead us to that end.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas divides reason into:

- Speculative, which investigates necessary truths, such as the mathematical axioms or laws of nature and
- Practical, that is concerned with contingent realities, such as arranging a society, forming laws, etc.

He calls both reason and law a "rule and measure of acts." That is, both reason and law not only tell us what is required so that we can attain happiness, but they measure how we are doing in getting there.

Law, for Aquinas, is one of the two "extrinsic" means God has established to bring us to happiness. It is extrinsic because it is "out there," meaning it is outside of ourselves. The other is divine grace. There are "intrinsic" means to bring us to happiness, like virtue and habits, but they don't concern us here.

So, his discussion of law takes place in the context of the external means God uses to lead us to happiness.

How Natural Law Operates: The essence and types of law

Aquinas defines law as "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated"

There are four kinds or types of law:

- Eternal, which seeks to locate a sort of "form" of law in the mind of God. We don't have direct access to the eternal law, but we see its traces in the world, through "laws" that are behind the way nature operates. But, most significant for

our purposes, we partake ~~–~~“somewhat” of the eternal law of God by its being “imprinted” on us. From this humans receive their ~~–~~respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends”

- Natural. “This participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. And, the basic principle of natural law is that ~~–~~good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided”
- Human
- Divine

Therefore, the thing that anchors us to this earth—our commitment to do good and avoid evil, is something that is ~~–~~“imprinted” on us by the eternal law of God.

The principles of natural law are discoverable by humans and they ~~–~~are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason”. These principles are self-evident and discoverable by reason, even though the fact that something is self-evident doesn't mean that all can discern it.

Speculative reason focuses on being, while Practical reason is concerned with action and this action is the good. Therefore, the first principle of natural law—that good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided.

Aquinas argues for a common human morality, that is a morality grounded in the fact that our natural inclination to do the good and avoid evil is actually imprinted on us by the eternal mind, a mind which, in this case, happens to be the Christian God On the relating issue of the cultural difference even though we all share the same imprint of the eternal law, Aquinas says, ~~–~~“The practical reason...is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned; and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.” And, continuing: ~~–~~“But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all”.

He further says ~~–~~“Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects form the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law”

For Aquinas there are three principles of natural law:

- i. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided

ii. We pursue procreation and the education of offspring (Pertaining to the similarity we share with animals)

iii. Humans have an inclination to know the truth about God and to live in Society

Then Aquinas pursues the question of whether or not the natural law is the same in all people.

Since all humans are naturally inclined to act according to reason it would seem that natural law would be the same for all.

Speculative reason is busied with "necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are.

"But, practical reason is busied with contingent matters, and "consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects."

In matters of action, which natural law encompasses, "Truth and or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to general principles (...)" Neither is "truth or rectitude" the same for all nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all.

He then gives the example of a principle that seems to be universal-that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. "Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore, unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country". And, as the principle descends to more and more detail (regarding guarantees or security that must be given for goods held in trust) there will be more and more disagreement.

This is not an argument against the universality of natural law: it only suggests that as you get further and further away from the basic principles, there will be more and more difference in opinion.

"Can the natural law be changed?" Thomas bores in on the question and answers that natural law may be added to but not subtracted from. To be more specific, natural law can be subtracted from only in its "secondary principles", but not in its "first principles." Natural law may be added to "for the benefit of human life" and is seen to be supplemented "both by the Divine law and by human laws."

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He explains that *“By the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatsoever”* as when God commanded Abraham to slay Isaac or told the prophet Hosea to take a *“wife of fornication.”*

Aquinas on Disobedience

A very important issue in understanding the philosophy of civil disobedience, is, *“What is the obligation of a citizen with respect to obeying an unjust law?”*

Aquinas speaks of a *“tyrannical law.”* Because a tyrannical law is not according to reason it is *“not a law, absolutely speaking but rather a perversion of law,”* yet because it is in the nature of a law, *“it aims at the citizens' being good”*

As such it should be obeyed by citizens, and it aims to make them good, *“not simply, but with respect to that particular government.”*

Therefore, Aquinas gives the impression that onerous bad laws are to be obeyed, and that this indeed is virtue since it is done in respect to the particular government.

iv. Liberal Tradition

a. John Locke

“Wherever law ends, tyranny begins(...) and the people are absolved from any further obedience. Governments are dissolved from within when the legislative [chamber] is altered. When the government [becomes](...) arbitrary disposers of lives, liberties and fortunes of the people, such revolutions happen(....).”

John Locke (1632 to 1704) set out his political philosophy in *“The Second Treatise of Government”*, originally published in 1689, but almost certainly written during late 1682 and early 1683.⁶⁴

He assumed that people found it crucial to establish political societies when differences began to arise within the body of the consisting members (people) concerning the question of ownership and distribution of material goods.

⁶⁴ An excellent historical and contextual analysis is to be found in John Marshall's *John Locke, Resistance, Religion and Responsibility*, Cambridge 1994 and Ruth W. Grant's *John Locke's Liberalism*, Chicago 1987, Chapter 3 Legitimate and Illegitimate Power: Practical Tests for the Normative Theory, pp. 99 to 155.

He also accepted that people have the freedom, and consecutively the right, to dispose of, within the bounds of the laws of nature, those properties which are intrinsic to their personalities, their lives, and liberties.

In that sense, the fundamental justification of government lies in its capacity to preserve the natural rights of its citizens and, particularly, their independent enjoyment of their lives, liberties and property.

Locke, in the *Two Treatises of Government*, not only defends the lawfulness of resistance, as a natural right, but goes beyond to locate the authority to resist within the body of the people even with ~~any~~ single man, if deprived of their right” (Singer, 1978: 328-329, 338,347).

His basic claim is that any ruler who subverts the law, as a clearly defined legal authority, asserts and exercises both absolute and arbitrary power and deliberate action for private ends.

Lawful action is that which is reasonable, based on consensus, and taken exclusively for the preservation of the public good.

He further emphasised that tyranny includes any violation of right; however, not all violations of the law are necessarily tyrannical. His thesis is that no positive law is valid unless it accords with the natural law, when legislative actions are taken to advance or enhance private interests, at the expense of the public good, then such action is referred to not as 'tyrannical law', but as an act of war.

Then, law alone authorises the use of government power and at the same time defines the scope and extent of that power.

Therefore, tyranny can be equated with illegality to the extent that the laws of society may be equated with the public good, and to that extent only.

For Locke tyranny and arrest comprise all examples of the exercise of unlawful power, where the principles of legitimacy are grounded in preservation and consent, and where each principle if connected to a fundamental law.

No person has the right to change the forms and the rules of government, established by the fundamental positive law, because to do so is an illegitimate expression of power which transcends right and is, therefore, by definition a form of tyranny, despite the fact that such a change might, in the most advantageous circumstances, prove to be conducive to good government, and in all other respects be similarly beneficial.

Therefore, unauthorised and unlawful change to the constitution of government appears to have the effect of combining tyranny with arrest described as a double evil.

When a society establishes a government through mutual agreement, then all of members of society are bound by duty to obey the authorized governors, because an agreement is not an agreement if its terms and conditions are fluid, and therefore subject to change at any time. the constitution of government may not be changed by the will of society and, for the same reason, the allegiance of the individual may not be dissolved at will, because that allegiance is based on the principle that consent, once freely given, is binding and cannot be retracted.

The legislators may not of their own volition change or amend the nature of the legislative power, because that power is a trust. The legislators do not own that power, they are not its proprietors, and therefore it is not theirs to give away. They have been entrusted and authorized to make laws but they are not given the authority to create lawmaker's.

The authority of lawmaking is solely dependent on the consent of the people, and without that consent, and the authority that it entails, any laws enacted [illegitimately] cannot be binding.

The first and fundamental positive law is equivalent to the natural law whose imperative demand is that society is to be preserved. The authority or legitimacy of the legislative is not merely dependent upon good government, because a competent or benevolent usurper who produces or establishes good government is not, on that account, a legitimate ruler. He is not a ruler who can thereby rightly demand the allegiance and obedience of those who are his temporary or permanent subjects.

Locke is insistent that a judge with executive power is not sufficient to establish legitimate government, because the source of the authority of the judge is to be found only in the consent of men who are by nature free.

The bonds of obligation, firmly established through consent within political communities, can only be dissolved as a direct result of the various forms of illegitimate action discussed in this essay.

We do not owe an obligation to those who seek to rule either without the consent of the people, or contrary to the public good, but this does not mean that action which lacks authority leads immediately and inevitable to the dissolution of the bonds of government, because Locke is not seeking to express perfection, or even excellence. He

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recognizes that a government that is less than perfectly just can be tolerated to a degree, and that trivial and inconsequential infringements of the constitution of government, or the positive law, should not lead to revolution and hence to immediate anarchy. Those who violate the standards of legitimacy — conquerors, violators, and tyrants can, as a consequence of their actions, be justifiably resisted.

In concluding, according to Locke’s political philosophy, when the individual joins a political community or society, by his own freewill, then he enters into a form of contract which involves a calculated risk, since he enters the contract with the expectation that it will prove to be at his benefit. If at a later date, he finds that it is not to his benefit, then he is not free to change his mind due to the fact that the contract is permanent, and is seen as a moral obligation.

Locke's theory of resistance does not depend on the 'legal fiction, of direct majority rule. It evolves from the right of society to institute a government which is authorised by the consent of the majority, places legitimate obligations on all members of society, and operates or functions for public good.

b. Thoreau⁶⁵

Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also in prison.

Henry David Thoreau, *"Civil Disobedience"*

“Thoreau was a great writer, philosopher, poet, and withal a most practical man, that is, he taught nothing he was not prepared to practice in himself. He was one of the greatest and most moral men America has produced. At the time of the abolition of slavery movement, he wrote his famous essay “On the Duty of Civil Disobedience”. He went to gaol (jail) for the sake of his principles and suffering humanity. His essay has, therefore, been sanctified by suffering. Moreover, it is written for all time. Its incisive logic is unanswerable.”

(Gandhi, M.K. 1907)

⁶⁵ For more extensive reading on Thoreau’s work see also Furtak, Rick Anthony, "Henry David Thoreau", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/>

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Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862) an American philosopher, poet, and environmental scientist, took the philosophical ideas and notions of nonviolence and civil resistance and developed them into a strategy named “civil disobedience” for solving society’s injustices, seeking to revive a conception of philosophy as a way of life, not only a mode of reflective thought and discourse. First proclaiming it in protest against the Mexican War, he then turned it to use against slavery. For refusing to pay taxes that would help pay the enforcers of the fugitive slave law he went to prison. In Thoreau’s words, “If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison or to give up slavery, the state will not hesitate which to choose.”

His ideas on the subject are found in the celebrated lecture that he delivered in 1848 to the Concord Lyceum in Massachusetts, under the title “On the Relation of the Individual to the State.” It was first published in printed form in 1849 under a different title, “Resistance to Civil Government, ~~in~~ *Aesthetic Papers*, a volume edited by Elizabeth Peabody. It first appeared under the title “Civil Disobedience” only in 1866, four years after Thoreau's death, in a volume of his writings entitled *A Yankee in Canada with Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers*.

Two are the main principles underling Thoreau's notion of civil disobedience:

- The first is that the authority of the government depends on the consent of the governed.
- The second is that justice is superior to the laws enacted by the government, and the individual has the right to judge whether a given law reflects or flouts justice. In this case the individual has the duty to disobey the law and accept the consequences of the disobedience nonviolently.

Thoreau Major Themes

- **The right to resistance**

Thoreau affirms the absolute right of individuals to withdraw their support from a government whose policies are immoral or unjust. He takes issue with the brand of moral philosophy that weighs the possible consequences of civil disobedience against the seriousness of the injustice. The methods of resistance Thoreau condones in his essay are pacifist and rely principally on economic pressure; for example, withholding taxes in order to drain the State of its resources and hence its ability to continue its

unjust policies. The ultimate goal of civil disobedience is not to undermine democracy but to reinforce its core values of liberty and respect for the individual.

- **Individual conscience and morality**

Only an individual can have and exercise a conscience. By definition, both the State and corporations are impersonal, amoral entities that are nonetheless composed of individuals. ~~It~~ has been truly said, that a corporation has no conscience; but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience.” An individual has a right and an obligation to "do at any time" what he deems right, to exercise his own conscience by refusing involvement or complicity in a government that enforces unjust policies. Civil disobedience is a necessary expression of individual conscience and morality, an attempt to reconfigure the relationship between the individual and the State by making the latter more equitable and less burdensome in its treatment of the former. While supportive of democratic principles, Thoreau does not believe in settling questions of fundamental moral importance by majority opinion.

- **Limited government**

The most ideal form of government is one which exercises the least power and control over its citizens. Thoreau believes that government is an inherently intrusive force that stifles the creative enterprise of the people. His avowed faith in ordinary citizens stands in contrast to the entrenchment of an elite political class that Thoreau perceives as incompetent and ineffectual. His libertarian leanings are, however, tempered with limited support for some government initiatives, such as public education and highway maintenance. Democracy is not the last stage in the evolution of the State, as there is still greater room to recognize the freedom and rights of the individual. Thoreau pushes this line of thinking to its logical limit by envisioning a society in which government is eliminated altogether because men have the capacity to be self-regulating and independent.

The originality in Thoreau's idea was that he insisted that society react. Thoreau saw civil disobedience as a whole entity, where punishment was at least as important as the action of breaking the law. This made civil disobedience a very special form of action. Punishment-or overcoming the power of punishment-is the very foundation of civil disobedience. Thoreau had asserted that ~~action~~ from principle, the perception

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and the performance of right,” is above the law, and fundamentally revolutionary. (Thoreau, 1975).

A country's government is powerless without the cooperation and obedience of its citizens.

Another original aspect of Thoreau is that his resistance was directed toward obedient citizens, not toward the government which instigated what he saw as unjust deeds. It was citizens that made and make up the most important target group for civil disobedience. Thoreau considered the “most conscientious supporters” of injustice and “the most serious obstacles” to reform to be the people, those who, in spite of being opposed to the government, “yield to it their allegiance and support”. He assumed that there were enough people to put a stop to war and slavery if they moved from having opinions to active disobedience.

c. John Rawls

As we have already mentioned, the idea of civil disobedience was introduced to the modern Western political theory by David Thoreau. Since that time civil disobedience has been considered as a mechanism of working democracy, one of the ways of expression of citizens' disagreement with the authorities and a minorities' disagreement with a majority, a mode of citizens' inclusion into the functioning of democracy.

Currently, this concept was profoundly developed by another American - John Rawls in his fundamental book —“Theory of Justice”. (Rawls, 1971:333-391)

According to Rawls, civil disobedience is “a politically-motivated public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government”.

Civil disobedience is a temporal, public and demonstrative suspension of commonly accepted social rules and regulation under the assumption of some prior agreements in the society and in the context of everyday and usual obedience. It is evident that this

notion of civil disobedience is correlated with another basic concept which depicts democratic political order and civil society, the concept of social contract.⁶⁶

The Features of civil disobedience⁶⁷

According to the above mentioned definition, the features of CD are the following:

- **Conscientiousness**
Acts of civil disobedience are undertaken out of sincere moral conviction, and not out of self-or group-interest. They’re often undertaken with the best interests of society at heart
- **Political motivation**
According to Rawls, only certain conscientious motivations qualify a disobedient act as an act of civil disobedience. In particular, the motivations must be “political” in nature. In Rawls’ view, agents engaged in civil disobedience must be appealing to a “common conception of justice” that establishes the conditions of fair and equal social cooperation, and that underlies the constitution
- **Aimed at changing the law**
Civil disobedience, according to Rawls, must aim at changing the law. In this way it is a method of political engagement: its goal must be to bring the law into conformity with the requirements of justice
- **Publicity**
Dissent cannot be addressed to the conception of justice of the majority or aim at changing the law unless it is public

⁶⁶ The theories of social contract are as old as social theories in general. The elements of such theories can be found in the ancient European philosophy since Sophists. According to Plato a contract was the basis of relations between the Ruler and the strata within the framework of political order.

In the early Modern political thought the conception of social contract was to broaden the theory of state in general. For Hobbes: as well as H. Grotius, B. Spinoza, J. Locke, S. Puffendorf, J-J Rousseau and I. Kant, social contract was not just an agreement within the framework of the existing order but the basis of legitimacy of civil community in general.

The idea of social contract as the prerequisite of the state and society was criticized by Shaftesbury and D. Hume.

Kant argued that the concept of social contract was not about the origin of the state, but about the law and principle of the state as they should be.

Nietzsche was not the first who manifested that the social contract theory had become out of date. Who can rule, he argued, who dominates "by nature", who is violent in actions and gestures, does not care about contracts.

⁶⁷ For further readings on Rawls work see also Andreas Follesdal (1982), *Essay on John Rawls’s Theory of Civil Disobedience*, University of Oslo, p.p. 75-137

- Nonviolence
Acts of protest that are violent are not, on Rawls view, cases of civil disobedience (though they may, nonetheless, sometimes be justified)
- Acceptance of the legal consequences (arrest and punishment)
Dissenters engaged in civil disobedience want to communicate conscientiousness and sincerity, and also fidelity to law, in general. After all, on Rawls' view, acts of CD aim to defend the principles of justice that establish the conditions for fair and equal social cooperation, of which the law is supposed to be a manifestation.

Justifying Civil Disobedience

Rawls' recognises four conditions of justified civil disobedience:

- All other ordinary avenues towards changing the law have been closed off
- Acts of civil disobedience should usually target only substantial and clear violations of justice – particularly violations of equal liberty and equality of opportunity – and not just any bad law
- Acts of civil disobedience should be restricted to those cases where the dissenter allows that anyone else subjected to similar injustices would have a right to disobey in a similar way

Rawls argues that civil disobedience, if it is engaged in only when justified, will be a stabilizing force on society. Its aim is to make that society more just, and justice is a stabilizing influence. This thought informs his views about when civil disobedience is justified

- Any act of disobedience meeting the first three conditions is one a dissenter has a right to engage in. However, Rawls points out, a dissenter should exercise this right only when dissent is likely to be an effective means of achieving his ends. Effectiveness of protest does not establish the right to protest, but once that right is independently established, protest should be engaged in only if it will be effective

The role of civil disobedience in a democracy

According to Rawls, civil disobedience is not difficult to justify in an unjust regime, in a country whose government does not follow the will of the majority. Problems arise,

however, in a nearly just regime. His theory implies that those who practice civil disobedience belong to a minority that has turned against the will of the majority.

According to Rawls, it is not possible to justify civil disobedience by pleading religious or private views. Instead, one must appeal to the society's sense of justice. He assumes that in a nearly just regime the citizens have a general understanding of justice. Civil disobedience then provides a minority with a method that makes the majority reflect upon whether the validity of the act of civil disobedience is in accordance with its sense of justice or not. An action functions in this case as an appeal.

He emphasizes that it is up to the individual to decide when it is right to practice civil disobedience.

Each and every person is responsible for his or her actions. This does not mean that we can make any decision we want to. To be a responsible citizen means to heed the political principles that make up the legal foundation for our kind of democracies. Civil disobedience is, writes Rawls, an action that is public, nonviolent, conscientious, political, and illegal.

The goal of civil disobedience is usually to change the law or change a government's decision. An action appeals to the majority's sense of justice, and its message is that the principles of social cooperation between free and equal people have not been respected. Rawls makes even one more distinction, that "direct" civil disobedience should be aimed at the law that is broken. It is this law that must change. "Indirect" civil disobedience, on the other hand, is aimed at a different law or decision from the one that should change.

v. The concept of Civil Disobedience broadened

a. Mohandas K. Gandhi

Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869-1948), a political activist, worked first in South Africa, addressing the needs of Indian expatriates in that then racially segregated nation, and later in India. While being in India, Gandhi served for a time as the head of the Indian National Congress, and confronted British rule with public campaign of non-violent non-cooperation.

Gandhi urged Indians to dry their own salt (to bypass the British salt tax) and to spin yarn and weave their own cloth (to bypass British and Chinese mills and create Indian employment).

Gandhi broadened the scope of civil disobedience and internationalized its practice. Gandhian civil disobedience originated in 1906, in South Africa, as part of his campaign for the defense of the civil rights of the vulnerable Indian immigrants.

Gandhi took Thoreau’s civil disobedience as his strategy to wrest Indian independence from England. The famous salt march against a British imperial tax is his best-known example of protest.

On his return to India in 1915, he made civil disobedience the primary moral force behind his leadership of the Indian nationalist movement.

Gandhi’s idea of civil disobedience drew from a wide variety of intellectual sources. Plato's *Apology of Socrates* was one of them. In 1908 he published a paraphrase of it under the title *–The Story of a Soldier of Truth–*. The Sermon on the Mount (*Sermo in monte*)⁶⁸ had a profound influence on him, especially as interpreted by Leo Tolstoy (1893) in his *The Kingdom of God Is within You*.

Patanjali's *Yogasutra* and the *Bhagavad Gita* also guided the development of his thoughts on nonviolence as it applied to civil disobedience.

The course of events

On March 12, 1930, Mohandas K. Gandhi, Indian independence leader, began an aggressive march to the sea in protest of the British monopoly on salt, his boldest act of civil disobedience yet against British rule in India.

Britain's Salt Acts prohibited Indians from collecting or selling salt, a staple in the Indian diet. Citizens were forced to buy the vital mineral from the British, who, in addition to exercising a monopoly over the manufacture and sale of salt also exerted a heavy salt tax. Although India's poor suffered most under the tax, Indians required salt. Defying the Salt Acts, Gandhi reasoned, would be an ingeniously simple way for many Indians to break a British law nonviolently. He declared resistance to British salt

⁶⁸ The Sermon on the Mount is a collection of sayings and teachings of Jesus, which emphasizes his moral teaching found in the Gospel of Matthew (chapters 5, 6, and 7). It is the first of the Five Discourses of Matthew and takes place relatively early in the Ministry of Jesus after he has been baptized by John the Baptist and preached in Galilee.

The Sermon is the longest piece of teaching from Jesus in the New Testament, and has been one of the most widely quoted elements of the Canonical Gospels. It includes some of the best known teachings of Jesus, such as the Beatitudes, and the widely recited Lord’s Prayer. To most believers in Jesus, the Sermon on the Mount contains the central tenets of.

See also Cross, F. L. ed. (2005) *Sermon on the Mount*, The Oxford dictionary of The Christian Church, New York: Oxford University Press

policies to be the unifying theme for his new campaign of *satyagraha*, or mass civil disobedience.

On March 12, Gandhi set out from Sabarmati with 78 followers on a 241-mile march to the coastal town of Dandi on the Arabian Sea. There, Gandhi and his supporters were to defy British policy by making salt from seawater. All along the way, Gandhi addressed large crowds, and with each passing day an increasing number of people joined the salt *satyagraha*. By the time they reached Dandi on April 5, Gandhi was at the head of a crowd of tens of thousands. Gandhi spoke and led prayers and early the next morning walked down to the sea to make salt.

He had planned to work the salt flats on the beach, encrusted with crystallized sea salt at every high tide, but the police had forestalled him by crushing the salt deposits into the mud. Nevertheless, Gandhi reached down and picked up a small lump of natural salt out of the mud--and British law had been defied. At Dandi, thousands more followed his lead, and in the coastal cities of Bombay and Karachi, Indian nationalists led crowds of citizens in making salt. Civil disobedience broke out all across India, soon involving millions of Indians, and British authorities arrested more than 60,000 people. Gandhi himself was arrested on May 5, but the *satyagraha* continued without him.

On May 21, the poet Sarojini Naidu led 2,500 marchers on the Dharasana Salt Works, some 150 miles north of Bombay. Several hundred British-led Indian policemen met them and viciously beat the peaceful demonstrators. The incident, recorded by American journalist Webb Miller, prompted an international outcry against British policy in India.

In January 1931, Gandhi was released from prison. He later met with Lord Irwin, the viceroy of India, and agreed to call off the *satyagraha* in exchange for an equal negotiating role at a London conference on India's future. In August, Gandhi traveled to the conference as the sole representative of the nationalist Indian National Congress. The meeting was a disappointment, but British leaders had acknowledged him as a force they could not suppress or ignore.

In order to better comprehend Gandhi's argument on *satyagraha*, we cite his own preaching from his work *“Civil Disobedience”*

“There are two ways of countering injustice. One way is to smash the head of the man who perpetrates injustice and to get your own head smashed in the process. All strong people in the world adopt this course. Everywhere wars are fought and millions of

people are killed. The consequence is not the progress of a nation but its decline. Soldiers returning from the front have become so bereft of reason that they indulge in various anti-social activities. One does not have to go far for examples. In the Boer War, when the British won a victory at Mafeking, the whole of England, and London in particular, went so mad with joy that for days on end everyone did nothing but dance night and day! They freely indulged in wickedness and rowdiness and did not leave a single bar with a drop of liquor in it. The Times, commenting, said that no words could describe the way those few days were spent, that all that could be said was that "the English nation went amafficking (a- Mafeking)". Pride makes a victorious nation bad-tempered. It falls into luxurious ways of living. Then for a time, it may be conceded, peace prevails. But after a short while, it comes more and more to be realised that the seeds of war have not been destroyed but have become a thousand times more nourished and mighty. No country has ever become, or will ever become, happy through victory in war. A nation does not rise that way, it only falls further. In fact, what comes to it is defeat, not victory. And if, perchance, either our act or our purpose was ill-conceived, it brings disaster to both belligerents.

But through the other method of combating injustice, we alone suffer the consequences of our mistakes, and the other side is wholly spared. This other method is satyagraha. One who resorts to it does not have to break another's head; he may merely have his own head broken. He has to be prepared to die himself suffering all the pain. In opposing the atrocious laws of the Government of South Africa, it was this method that we adopted. We made it clear to the said Government that we would never bow to its outrageous laws. No clapping is possible without two hands to do it, and no quarrel without two persons to make it. Similarly, no State is possible without two entities (the rulers and the ruled). You are our sovereign, our Government, only so long as we consider ourselves your subjects. When we are not subjects, you are not the sovereign either. So long as it is your endeavor to control us with justice and love, we will let you do so. But if you wish to strike at us from behind, we cannot permit it. Whatever you do in other matters, you will have to ask our opinion about the laws that concern us. If you make laws to keep us suppressed in a wrongful manner and without taking us into confidence, these laws will merely adorn the statute-books. We will never obey them. Award us for it what punishment you like, we will put up with it. Send us to prison and we will live there as in a paradise. Ask us to mount the scaffold and we will do so

laughing. Shower what sufferings you like upon us, we will calmly endure all and not hurt a hair of your body. We will gladly die and will not so much as touch you. But so long as there is yet life in these our bones, we will never comply with your arbitrary laws” (Gandhi, 1930).

When in 1906 he started the civil rights campaign in South Africa, Gandhi did not know what term to use to describe it. Some called the new campaign passive resistance, in comparison with the British Passive Resistance Movement against the Education Act of 1902. However, Gandhi was unhappy with the comparison for two reasons:

- The fact that British passive resistance did not forbid violence as a means of achieving its goal
- Passive resistance did not require its practitioners to be free from hatred of their political opponents

Gandhi called his practice "satyagraha," a Gujarati word meaning "firmness in adhering to truth." Satyagraha, free of the defects of passive resistance, introduced six elements into the theory and practice of civil disobedience:

- First, its moral basis was grounded in truth, a basis much deeper than that provided by the theory of consent. To be binding, laws had to be truthful. All untruthful laws had to be resisted, though civilly—that is, by truthful means.
- Second, civil disobedience presupposed the obligation to obey the state: only those had the right to practice civil disobedience who knew "how to offer voluntary and deliberate obedience" to the laws of the state.
- Third, commitment to nonviolence was an essential component of civil disobedience. The commitment in question could be either moral or tactical, depending on the moral aptitude of the practitioner.
- Fourth, the practice of civil disobedience required a minimum degree of moral fitness, to be acquired by the exercise of such virtues as truthfulness, nonviolence, temperance, courage, fearlessness, and freedom from greed.
- Fifth, a practitioner of civil disobedience had to accept the punishment consequent to the disobedience voluntarily, and without complaint.
- Finally, engagement in civil disobedience had to be complemented by engagement in organized social work.

For Gandhi, it was not enough to seek to improve the state; it was equally necessary to seek to improve civil society. To assist Indians to combine civil disobedience with voluntary social work, he wrote *Constructive Programme* (Gandhi 1941, revised in 1945). It identified the major social evils prevalent in Indian society:

- Religious intolerance
- Caste violence
- Discrimination against the untouchables, minorities, and women

The Principles of Satyagraha

According to Gandhi Satyagraha contains the following principles (Gandhi, 1961: 37):

- Nonviolence
- Truth (includes honesty, but goes beyond it to mean living fully in accord with and in devotion to that which is true)
- Non-stealing
- Chastity (includes both sexual chastity & subordination of other sensual desires to the primary devotion to truth)
- Non-possession (not the same as poverty)
- Body-labor or bread-labor
- Control of the palate
- Fearlessness
- Equal respect for all religions
- Economic strategy such as boycotts
- Freedom from untouchability

The essence of Nonviolence in Gandhi’s ideal

We quote the essence of nonviolence in Gandhi’s philosophy:

–Nonviolence is the law of the human race and is infinitely greater than and superior to brute force. In the last resort it does not avail to those who do not possess a living faith in the God of Love. Nonviolence affords the fullest protection to one’s self-respect and sense of honor, but not always to possession of land or movable property, though its habitual practice does prove a better bulwark than the possession of armed men to defend them. Nonviolence in the very nature of things is of no assistance I the defense of ill-gotten gains and immoral acts.

Individuals and nations who would practice nonviolence must be prepared to sacrifice (nations to the last man) their all except honor. It is therefore inconsistent with the possession of other people's countries, i.e. modern imperialism which is frankly based on force for its defense.

Nonviolence is a power which can be wielded equally by all-children, young men and women or grown up people, provided they have a living faith in the God of Love and have therefore equal love for all mankind. When non-violence is accepted as the law of life it must pervade the whole being and not be applied to isolated acts.

It is a profound error to suppose that whilst the law is good enough for individuals it is not for masses of mankind” (Harijan, 1936).

Further, in “Young India” (10-3-1920 and 8-10-1925), Gandhi reflected on nonviolent resistance as follows:

–My goal is friendship with the whole world and I can combine the greatest love with the greatest opposition to wrong.

Nonviolence is _not a resignation from all real fighting against wickedness‘. On the contrary, the non-violence of my conception is a more active and real fight against wickedness than retaliation whose very nature is to increase wickedness. I contemplate a mental and therefore a moral opposition to immoralities. I seek entirely to blunt the edge of the tyrant's sword, not by putting up against it a sharper-edged weapon, but by disappointing his expectation that I would be offering physical resistance. The resistance of the soul that I should offer would elude him. It would at first dazzle him and at last compel recognition from him, which recognition would not humiliate him but would uplift him. It may be urged that this is an ideal state. And so it is.”

The removal of these social evils by voluntary work was as important as the removal of unjust laws by civil disobedience. According to Gandhi, –evil disobedience without the constructive program will be like a paralyzed hand attempting to lift a spoon.”

India's independence was finally granted in August 1947. Gandhi, nevertheless, continued to work toward peace between Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu fundamentalist less than six months later.

In concluding, Gandhi moved beyond individual civil disobedience realizing that nonviolent resistance could be carried out in collective campaigns to confront societal injustices, from the local to the national level.

“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”

He further introduced greater attention to strategy and tactics in campaigns of mass confrontation and emphatically moved beyond the pragmatic use of nonviolent resistance as practiced in nationalist and labor struggles, making a clear and conscious association between mass political action and the ideal of nonviolence.

b. Martin Luther King Jr.

—During my early college days I read Thoreau's essay on civil disobedience for the first time. Fascinated by the idea of refusing to cooperate with an evil system, I was so deeply moved that I re-read the work several times. I became convinced then that non-cooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good. No other person has been more eloquent and passionate in getting this idea across than Henry David Thoreau. As a result of his writings and personal witness we are the heirs of a legacy of creative protest. It goes without saying that the teachings of Thoreau are alive today; indeed, they are more alive today than ever before. Whether expressed in a sit-in at lunch counters, a freedom ride into Mississippi, a peaceful protest in Albany, Georgia, a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, it is an outgrowth of Thoreau's insistence that evil must be resisted and no moral man can patiently adjust to injustice.” (Martin Luther King, 1962: 43).

—After contemplation, I conclude that this award which I receive on behalf of that movement is profound recognition that nonviolence is the answer to the crucial political and moral question of our time -- the need for man to overcome oppression and violence without resorting to violence and oppression.” (King, 1962).

Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929-1968) was an American clergyman, social activist, and leader in the African-American Civil rights Movement. He is best known for his role in the advancement of civil rights using nonviolent civil disobedience.

The course of events

He led the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott and helped found the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957, serving as its first president. With the SCLC, King led an unsuccessful struggle against segregation in Albany, Georgia in 1962, and organized nonviolent protests in Birmingham, Alabama that attracted national attention following television news coverage of the brutal police response. King also helped to organize the 1963 March on Washington, where he delivered his speech → have a

“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”

dream”. There, he established his reputation as one of the greatest orators in American history. He also established his reputation as a radical, and became an object of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's for the rest of his life. FBI agents investigated him for possible communist ties, recorded his extramarital liaisons and reported on them to government officials, and on one occasion, mailed King a threatening anonymous letter that he interpreted as an attempt to make him commit suicide.

On October 14, 1964, King received the Nobel Peace Prize for combating racial inequality through nonviolence.

In 1965, he and the SCLC helped to organize the Selma to Montgomery marches and the following year, he took the movement north to Chicago. In the final years of his life, King expanded his focus to include poverty and the Vietnam War, alienating many of his liberal allies with a 1967 speech titled "Beyond Vietnam". King was planning a national occupation of Washington, D.C., called the "Poor People's Campaign".

M.L. King was assassinated on April 4, 1968 and his death was followed by riots in many cities in U.S.A. Allegations that James Earl Ray, the man convicted of killing King, had been framed or acted in concert with government agents persisted for decades after the shooting, and the jury of a 1999 civil trial found Loyd Jowers to be complicit in a conspiracy against King.

King was posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the Congressional Gold Medal.

M.L. King contributed greatly to the development of the practice of civil disobedience by making civil disobedience the distinguishing feature of the civil rights movement in the United States. In this he was deeply influenced by Gandhi's methods. But he was also influenced by Christian humanism, as is evident in his "Letter from Birmingham Jail" (1963). The letter has been called the most widely read and discussed manifesto on civil disobedience since Thoreau's essay. Addressed to his fellow African-American clergymen, it explained why immediate, direct, nonviolent action was a duty incumbent upon every American who wished to rid the nation of segregationist laws. Here King faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the law had by 1954 declared segregation to be unconstitutional, yet on the other it also tolerated segregationist practices in certain states.

The previously referred conscientious law breaking of Gandhi and Thoreau is to be distinguished from the conscientious law testing of Martin Luther King, who was not a civil disobedient. The civil disobedient withholds taxes or violates state laws knowing he is legally wrong, but believing he is morally right. While he wrapped himself in the mantle of Gandhi and Thoreau, Dr. King led his followers in violation of state laws he believed were contrary to the Federal Constitution. But since Supreme Court decisions in the end generally upheld his many actions, he should not be considered a true civil disobedient.

On the question on how one could advocate breaking some laws while obeying others, King contended, because one had the right to judge each law on its own merit. And the criterion he recommended for making such Judgement was drawn from Christian humanism.

King’s Argument

In “Letter from Birmingham Jail”, King’s argument can be condensed into a sentence can be stated as “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.” It seems that here Martin Luther King goes a step further suggesting a four step action method to combat injustice. The first is the gathering of facts to see if injustice does really exist. This allows for ample room for a platform to be developed, and identifies a clear fault society that you want to correct. Then, negotiations follow. Through negotiations, you try to work within the system to try and correct the error. Once and if that fails, then self-purification and direct action methods come. Self-purification allows one to get ready for the mental and physical difficulties that one will face once they start their struggle against injustice and direct action involved non-violent protests, sit-in and other disruptive behavior that violates the unjust law. King argues that “nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored.” In that respect, King is trying to generate a positive “tension” within the society to prove that unwarranted injustice is present in the community and non-violent direct action does just that.

King contributed greatly to making civil disobedience a respected tradition of American politics. In that sense, he marks an advance on Thoreau, who seemed to appeal mostly to New England intellectuals. Therefore, King actualized the potential that was in Thoreau.

Basic Principles of Nonviolence

King lays out the basic principles of nonviolence in his book *Stride Toward Freedom* (King, 2010)⁶⁹:

–First, it must be emphasized that nonviolent resistance is not a method for cowards; it does resist. If one uses this method because he is afraid or merely because he lacks the instruments of violence, he is not truly nonviolent. This is why Gandhi often said that if cowardice is the only alternative to violence, it is better to fight ... while the nonviolent resister is passive in the sense that he is not physically aggressive toward his opponent, his mind and emotions are always active, constantly seeking to persuade his opponent that he is wrong. The method is passive physically, but strongly active spiritually. It is not passive nonresistance to evil; it is active nonviolent resistance to evil”.

–A second basic fact that characterizes nonviolence is that it does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and understanding. The nonviolent resister must often express his protest through noncooperation or boycotts, but he realizes that these are not ends themselves; they are merely means to awaken a sense of moral shame in the opponent (...) The aftermath of nonviolence is the creation of the beloved community, while the aftermath of violence is tragic bitterness.”

–A third characteristic of this method is that the attack is directed against forces of evil rather than against persons who happen to be doing the evil (...). We are out to defeat injustice and not white persons who may be unjust”.

–A fourth point that characterizes nonviolent resistance is a willingness to accept suffering without retaliation, to accept blows from the opponent without striking back.”

–Rivers of blood may have to flow before we gain our freedom, but it must be our blood,' Gandhi said to his countrymen. The nonviolent resister ... does not seek to dodge jail. If going to jail is necessary, he enters it 'as a bridegroom enters the bride's chamber (...)”.

–A fifth point concerning nonviolent resistance is that it avoids not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. The nonviolent resister not only refuses to shoot his opponent, but he also refuses to hate him. At the center of nonviolence stands the principle of love (...).”

–A sixth basic fact about nonviolent resistance is that it is based on the conviction that the universe is on the side of justice. Consequently, the believer in nonviolence has deep faith in the future. This faith is another reason why the nonviolent resister can accept suffering without retaliation. For he knows that in his struggle for justice he has cosmic companionship (...).”

2.3 Nonviolence, Nonviolent Resistance and Conceptual Clarifications

2.3.1 Nonviolent Resistance

In the 19th century nonviolent resistance campaigns emerged as a substantial political force. Women’s movements, for example, engaged in nonviolent action. Moreover, methods of nonviolent action were increasingly used as a means to struggle against injustice and oppression where in the past violent rebellion or war would have seemed the only appropriate or viable response.

Nonviolent resistance, to an extent, was increasingly used as a functional equivalent to violent resistance. Modern mass-based campaigns of nonviolent resistance were paradigm in the nationalist and labor struggles. The basic difference between these two trends was the means utilized by their advocates:

- The women’s movements relied largely on protest and persuasion and attempted to transform their opponents
- The nationalist and labor struggles involved mass-based non-cooperation and nonviolent coercion.

To give some examples, the nationalist struggles, such as Hungarian resistance to Austrian rule from 1849 to 1867, Finnish resistance to Russian rule from 1899 to 1906 and the Egyptian general strike against British occupation in 1919, were sustained efforts to promote political transformation through collective nonviolent resistance. In labor struggles, such as in Belgium 1893 and 1902, in Italy in 1904, Spain in 1919,

Britain in 1926, and in France in 1968 general strikes were a compelling weapon of working class protest.

From the mid-20th century onward nonviolent resistance was implemented across the globe in diverse struggles. (Costain, 2013: 175-180).

Major episodes of civil resistance from the second half of the 20th century onward include the civil rights movements that challenged racial segregation and discrimination in the American South (1955–68), numerous protest movements in more developed countries in the late 1960s, such as the student and anti-Vietnam war movements in the USA and Australia, and the student and worker insurrection in France in 1968, and a wave of pro-democracy movements from the 1980s into the 21st century that challenged dozens of non-democratic regimes throughout the world.

Nonviolent resistance contributed to notable regime transitions in the Philippines in 1986, Chile in 1988, Poland in 1989, South Africa in 1994, Serbia in 2000, and Tunisia and Egypt in 2011.

Various social movements have been almost exclusively nonviolent. Women’s movements have advocated nonviolent methods and social relations, adopting nonviolent action as both a tactical choice and a framing element, and cultivating a social critique of violence, from domestic violence to militarization and war (Costain, 2013: 175-180).

Women’s movements have made significant contributions regarding creative methods, addressing the root causes of violence and developing nonviolent group processes. Historically, labor movements have depended on methods of non-cooperation, especially the strike, to force concessions from capitalists and the state.

–New social movements” that emerged in the West after World War II, such as the environmental and peace movements, have been almost exclusively nonviolent.

In the global South many indigenous people’s movements have been primarily nonviolent, and in recent years powerful land rights movements have adopted nonviolent resistance to prevent land dispossession and promote land reform.

Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) revealed that large-scale campaigns of civil resistance with maximalist political objectives occurred with greater frequency across the 20th century due to the increasing disparity in the means of violence between citizens and the state in most countries, the cross-national diffusion of methods of nonviolent action, the cross-national transfer of generic knowledge about nonviolent action, the processes of

learning, and an increasing recognition of the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance and the relationship between means and ends.

Before we turn to some characteristic examples of nonviolent campaigns of resistance, it is worthwhile mentioning that all these campaigns were mainly inspired and influenced by the political philosophy, the speeches, the writings and practice of Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr. and recently by Gene Sharp, a scholar who began publishing scientific works on nonviolent resistance in the 1950s.

Gene Sharp's three volume work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* provided a boost in the analysis of nonviolent resistance (Sharp, 1973).

In part one of *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Sharp presents a theory of power specifying that rulers depend upon the consent or acquiescence of the ruled. If people withdraw their consent or cooperation, then a regime's capacity to rule begins to lessen. A key insight is that violence is not required to topple powerful and repressive regimes. If a sufficient number of people refuse to obey or engage in actions that support the regime for a sufficient amount of time, then its power may be undermined and perhaps eliminated.

In part two of *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Sharp identifies 198 methods of nonviolent action and classifies them into three main classes:

- Protest and persuasion
- Noncooperation
- Intervention

Each method is illustrated with historical examples. A key insight is that throughout history a vast array of methods of nonviolent action have been implemented to promote social change.

In part three of *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Sharp presents a model of stages for a successful campaign of nonviolent resistance. The stages include:

- Laying the groundwork
- Challenge that leads to repression
- Maintaining solidarity and nonviolent discipline
- Political jiu-jitsu
- Mechanisms of change
- The redistribution of power

We will, now, turn to some prominent examples of nonviolent resistance campaigns the latter part of the 20th century and the early years of the 21st.

i. The Civil Rights Movement in the United States

The fight against internal oppression of a black minority demonstrates the incogitable power of nonviolent resistance. The African American Civil Rights movement in the United States in the 1950s and 60s utilized many of the most successful tactics that had been used in India to end segregation and gain basic civil rights for African Americans.

The course of events

As previously mentioned, drawing mainly on Gandhian philosophy and methodology, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. led African Americans in one of the most effective and efficient nonviolent struggles in history. Indeed, his techniques are still replicated throughout the world.

The movement began in the 1950s, and while not completely unsuccessful, did not affect the scale of change that was hoped.

During the 1960s the movement matured, and adopted a more “militant” approach to nonviolence, and overall growth and development throughout all aspect of the operations.

The resistance campaign of the 1950s began by focusing most of its efforts on legal tactics. The most obvious example, of course, is *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (1954), in which the Supreme Court ruled that “separate but equal” schools were unconstitutional, overturning a prior Supreme Court ruling. This was a significant and symbolic win for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) lawyers and many felt hopeful that the strategy of legal suits against segregation could be effective in ending Jim Crow laws. However the Supreme Court ruling encountered massive resistance by white southerners and the desegregation of schools proved to be easily delayed. Indeed, apart from a few dramatic incidents in the later year of the 1950s, desegregation in Southern schools played a small role even in the resistance movement of the 1960s. In fact, in Alabama, no school desegregation of any kind would occur until 1963, nearly a decade after the *Brown* ruling, when 21 black students (of a pool of 293,476) attended their first class with whites (Lewis, 2009).

However, in the same state’s capital city, Montgomery, legal action was combined successfully with a mass direct action campaign to effect policy change at a local level. The NAACP was careful about the cases it chose to represent, often selecting only those that it felt had the greatest chances for a victory. This meant that clients were carefully vetted and disputes originating in rural areas (where white resistance was strongest) were avoided.

So when Rosa Parks, a distinguished, well-educated, black woman, a –Southern lady” (George Hendrick and Willene Hendrick, 2005) in every respect - except for her color” was arrested in the bustling urban center of

Montgomery for refusing to give up her seat on a bus to a white person on December 1st, 1955, the NAACP saw their chance for an ideal test case against the Southern segregated bus system. Less than one year later, in November of 1956, the Supreme Court ruled that bus segregation in state and local laws was unconstitutional. However, during that one-year battle in the courts, a simultaneous battle was being undertaken in the streets of Montgomery, led by a charismatic leader Martin Luther King Jr.

While not singularly responsible for the victory of bus desegregation in the city, the Montgomery bus boycott was nonetheless effective both in its strategic use of nonviolent methods and as convincing evidence for the strength of such methods. The bus boycotts was, in many ways, a model nonviolent campaign. However, although there were a few replications throughout the country, the boycott movement failed to take hold on a broader scale during the 1950s. This was, in part, due to the fact that the boycotts –did not work well where blacks were a small part of the population with little collective purchasing power or against business that relied little on black dollars. And since they needed universal participation to be effective, boycotts were unsuited to places without strong-community wide organizations (i.e. churches).” (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000)

New forms of direct action, ones that did not rely on the economic influence of whites or total community support, had to be developed in order for the influence of the movement to spread.

In the beginning of 1960, in Greensboro, North Carolina, four students participated in an act of noncooperation that would change the course of history. At the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University this small group of black students decided

to sit at a “whites only” lunch counter. They would ask to be served and when refused and asked to leave, would remain in their seats. This act was called a “sit-in.” What these four young men did not know was that groups of students across the South had been discussing the possibility of similar activities, and training was being carefully conducted to prepare for action. When news spread about the incident in Greensboro, the leaders of the resistance movement moved quickly. Soon, sit-ins were being staged across the country with thousands of students participating and many being arrested.

Soon after the sit-in movement began, a new tactic was devised and implemented, namely the freedom rides.

This act of nonviolent resistance was actually not an act of defiance against any law, but an exercise in a legally mandated right. In 1946, the Supreme Court had ruled that segregated seating on interstate bus lines was unconstitutional. However, this decision had never been enacted, and these lines remained racially separated. In true Gandhian fashion, a notice and ultimatum was delivered to the Justice Department, FBI, President, and Greyhound and Trail ways Bus Companies, demanding that the law be implemented and explaining the plan to seat blacks in white seating areas on these buses if the demand was not met. This was yet another new element in the resistance campaign, as it presented a direct challenge to the federal government. The bus routes were carefully planned; housing and legal aid was arranged at various points, and mass meetings were held to inform people about nonviolence and what to expect in areas that the buses would pass through (James H. Laue, 1989).

This method of protest was a further development, in that it was dramatic and received huge amounts of media attention, especially once white extremists began attacking the buses and their passengers. The cross-state routes of the rides also served to dramatize the action.

Lastly, the most dramatic tactic of all was implemented: **mass marches**. Used periodically throughout the movement in the 1960s (as in Nashville in 1960), the popularity of marches grew rapidly, culminating in two massive rallies:

- The March on Washington in 1963 and
- The March from Selma to Montgomery in 1965

In 1963, in response to an increase in assassinations and bombings of civil rights leaders, a quarter of a million people marched through the center of the nation’s capital calling for freedom and equality.

The scale of this event was boosted by the intense media coverage it received. Over five hundred cameramen and correspondents from the major networks covered the event.

The latter march, while not as heavily attended, was significant not only for its symbolism but also for the national response to it. Dr. King and 250 other demonstrators were arrested on the first of February 1965. Thousands protested the lock up of the new Nobel Peace Prize notable, and police responded with a vicious arrests and violence. Stimulated by the police brutality, King called for a 54-mile march from Selma to Montgomery, using as example Gandhi’s Salt March. Severe abuses by the police against the marchers on the first day, well documented by the media coverage arranged by the resistance leaders, mobilized the masses. When, two days later, a second march began, solidarity marches sprang up around the country, and over 1000 protesters picketed in front of the White House. This second march was also stopped, and a white minister who was participating in the marches received a lethal blow to the head. The death of a white pastor shocked the nation and forced the President into action.

The President issued a televised statement to Congress that black voting laws had to be changed and signed an executive order dispatching nearly 2,000 member of the Alabama National Guard to protect the marchers in their third attempt. Thousands joined as the procession made its way along the route and by the time the protesters reached the state capitol building in Montgomery, around 25,000 people had gathered there.

The effectiveness of the nonviolent campaign

The civil rights movement in America was one of the most effective and efficient nonviolence campaigns in history. Drawing on successful techniques from the past and applying strategically planned methods to the unique situation, leaders in 1950s and 60s were able to design a campaign tailored to the circumstances of the African Americans and directed at the weaknesses of the Southern segregationists. Having the charismatic Martin Luther King, Jr. was important, but it was the dedication, perseverance, and accurate organization of the movement and its leaders that truly set apart the struggle for civil rights in the United States.

ii. The Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa

In the case of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa, nonviolent resistance was ~~probably~~ “probably the largest grassroots eruption of diverse nonviolent strategies in a single struggle in human history” (Wink, 1987).

The struggles of this nonviolent movement and the strategies used by its leaders were a direct continuation of Gandhi’s methods.

The South African movement in many ways was ~~the~~ “the other side of the coin” of the resistance movement in India, establishing an emerging pattern in the conditions leading up to successful opposition movement and the factors contributing to that success. As the case in India, the first campaign was unsuccessful campaign in the 1950s to be followed by a later and successful one.

The organizational structure of the first movement, the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign, was influenced by Gandhi’s methods. The responsible body for the nonviolent campaign of resistance was the Joint Planning Council, an appointed committee. The course of actions included:

- ✓ Issuance of an ultimatum
- ✓ Establishment of set and significant start date
- ✓ Rigid organizational structure
- ✓ Selection of one highly symbolic act to defy
- ✓ Strategic assessment and selecting of other specific laws to defy
- ✓ A 3 step plan of action:
 - Selected and trained persons in large city centers
 - Increased participants and locations
 - Mass action on a countrywide scale

On June 26th, 1952 volunteers, under the supervision of trained leaders, committed various of acts of civil nonviolent uprisings, including entering locations without permits, defying curfew, and sitting in or entering ~~white-only~~ “white-only” or ~~European-only~~ “European-only” railway seats, waiting rooms, and post offices.

By October, the first stage of the resistance was complete, groups throughout the large city centers had defied the laws, and the movement had already spread to some smaller towns.

Within the first hundred days of the campaign, six thousand volunteers defied apartheid laws, and by the end 8,500 had volunteered and been arrested (Welsh, 2009).

However, the participation levels varied from region to region. Overall, however, the movement seemed to be showing great promise and growth.

At that time a series of violent riots broke out. While no direct connection can be made between these riots and the resistance movement, the Government used the riots to justify a brutal crackdown to suppress the nonviolent campaign. Conservative estimates give thirty-four Africans dead following a series of four riots across the country.

In March 1960, two peaceful rallies, organized by the Pan Africanist Congress (the PAC), ended in tragedy. (In Sharpeville, a huge demonstration at a police station ended in 69 deaths and nearly 200 injured and in Langa, the police attacks left 3 dead).

The Government passed quickly through Parliament the Unlawful Organisations Act, banning both the ANC and the PAC. These events convinced many resistance leaders that the time for nonviolent methods of resistance had passed and Umkhonto we Sizwe (commonly referred to as MK), a militant wing of the ANC, was established.

The MK embarked on a violent, militant crusade against the institution of apartheid, mostly through bombings of government buildings. However, this violent campaign proved to be even more ineffective than the earlier nonviolent one. Leaders were quickly caught and imprisoned and, as several scholars have pointed out, the armed struggle ~~may~~ have harmed the movement, weakening the nonviolent campaigns... and justifying the repression of all resistance efforts” (Kurtz, 2010).

While the militant campaign was designed to supplement nonviolent actions, it served only to undermine them, ~~inviting~~ further government repression [and resulting] in a loss of support by some Africans as well” (Zunes, Kurtz and Asher, 1999: 204).

At the same time that these violent campaigns were proving their ineffectiveness, nonviolent resistance leaders were working to improve conditions in the townships by organizing local councils, rallies, and strikes to protest grievances such as rent and service cost hikes. The Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO) succeeded in canceling rent hikes and preventing metered water charges in one township, while a boycott threat in another prevented the leveling of the Walmer township. These are just a few of the many local nonviolent resistance campaigns that took place throughout the country during the 60s and 70s.

During the 1980s, a far more successful nonviolent resistance campaign was launched, which was characterized by a consolidation of leadership, the building of alternative institutions, and mass, popular noncooperation. Boycotts, strikes, ~~stay-aways,~~ mass

demonstrations, marches, flag burning, graffiti, worship services, memorials and anniversaries, singing and slogans, symbolic clothing (colors of the banned ANC), funeral marches and orations as occasions for protest, alternative press and advertising, public declarations (such as The Freedom Charter), and student movements were all used during this campaign (Kurtz, 2010).

Initially, the government met these new resistance techniques with a combination of brutal repression and superficial concessions. They declared states of emergencies, deployed military personnel into the townships to terrorize and intimidate protesters, arrested thousands of participants, banned organizations and leaders, and censored any media coverage of the resistance. Even as they installed these new measures of oppression, they also tried to pacify black rage. New houses, apartment buildings and schools were constructed, and a few roads were paved. But as the then Chief of Police Intelligence later recalled, “People just didn’t want apartheid anymore (...). They were not prepared to be suppressed any longer” (Ackerman & Duvall, 2000).

Eventually, the regime crumbled to internal and external pressure exerted by nonviolent resistance methods and the apartheid system came to an end.

Building on the work of Gandhi, the resistance campaigns in South Africa proved that nonviolence could be successful as a pragmatic approach to ending oppression.

iii. The First Palestinian Intifada

Although isolated incidents of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation have occurred since the shift in conditions following the 1967 War, these efforts did not take the form of a mass, organized movement until the late 1980s, when the first Intifada was launched. The pick of the uprising was the years 1988 to mid-1990. During this two and a half year period, innovative and effective nonviolent tactics were utilized.

Several factors contributed to the adoption of a nonviolent approach in the late 1980s in Palestine.

Scholar Mary King identified three developments that led to the first Intifada:

- A strengthening of civil society prepared the way for popular involvement
- A group of intellectual activists introduced innovative symbols through joint Israeli-Palestinian committees, ideas of coexistence, and a view that both Israelis and Palestinians have rights over the land they contest

- External influence led to a reexamining of the reasoning and methods for challenging military occupation (Mary King, 2007).

Much of the spread of the ideals and tactics of nonviolence can be attributed to the work of Mubarak Awad (although many others were working for the same cause), a Palestinian activist and intellectual who founded the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence. Awad was very active in the years leading up to the start of the first Intifada, conducting workshops and lectures and distributing handouts and pamphlets throughout the West Bank.

Despite the preparations for nonviolent resistance, “[t]he uprising began spontaneously, with no central organizing element” (Shalev, 1991).

In response to a series of violent events that took place at the end of the year 1987, mass demonstrations broke out throughout the occupied territories.

Although the catalyst of the uprising is often purported to be an auto collision that occurred in the Gaza strip on December 9, 1987, any number of violent episodes in the last month of that year could be considered the start of the uprising. What was remarkable was the speed and extent to which the demonstrations spread. Indeed, according to the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) Spokesperson Department, from the year 1988 to 1989, the number of “contentious events” (including stone throwing, demonstrations, mass gatherings, and tire burning and excluding incidents of firearms, bombs, firebombs, arson, grenades, etc.) nearly doubled (Alimi, 2007).

Following in the footsteps of Gandhi, the organizers of the uprising released a document, often referred to as “The Jerusalem Paper,” in February 1988, outlining the steps to be taken during the campaign. Listed in ascending order according to the severity of expected punishment, the document “(…) calls for a progression of nonviolent action steps moving from methods of protest or persuasion, such as conferences, marches, sit-ins, and demonstrations, to more severely punishable methods of noncooperation, such as strikes and boycotts, and finally proceeding to nonviolent interventions, such as refusal to submit to Israeli bureaucracy- in the form of disobeying orders, resigning from jobs, withholding taxes and payments for water and electricity- establishing underground printing presses, and most serious, burning the identity cards that were obligatory to pass through Israeli checkpoints.” (Mary King, 2007).

The paper continues by advocating Gandhian ideals such as self-sacrifice, appeals to the morality of both the oppressor and the international community, and the need for careful planning, training, and organization.

During the years 1988 and 1989, the Palestinians used both traditional and new forms of nonviolent resistance. Strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations were frequent, organized on a wide scale by the United National Command of the Uprising (UNCU), as well as on a smaller scale by the local committees. Nonpayment of taxes and resignations from posts also occurred. The Palestinians utilized innovative methods of resistance such as the renaming of streets and schools, the use of donkeys and mules when roads were blocked, and the use of graffiti, children’s games, music, poetry, dance, and puppetry. In one particularly brilliant campaign, the Palestinians attempted to implement a different time zone from their Israeli neighbors.

The Israelis responded brutally to these new methods of resistance. Demonstrations were dispersed with tear gas and live ammunition, all schools and universities were closed, curfews were implemented, and shops participating in strikes were broken into and trashed. Palestinians wearing watches running on the alternative time had their wrists broken. Far from breaking the will of the Palestinians, these brutal punishments garnered them support from the international community and increased internal solidarity and further development of the resistance. For example, instead of looting shops the army had broken into, volunteer welders would come to fix the locks and groups of young boys would bring the shop owner new keys.

For the first two and a half years of the uprising, the movement remained almost entirely nonviolent. Gene Sharp estimates that approximately 85 percent of the resistance was nonviolent.

The other 15 percent was largely –limited violence, such as stone throwing or petrol bombs (...)” (Sharp, 1989).

This shifted in the later years of the Intifada. Nonviolent methods were gradually abandoned and the resistance drained out in the early 1990s.

A thorough analysis of the First Intifada must mention the various advances that were made as a result:

- Channels of dialogue were opened
- The United States began a cautious, yet still significant, relationship with the PLO

- In 1991, Palestinians and Israelis sat down together to discuss a resolution for the first time in the history of the conflict, and by 1993, the Oslo Accords, then seen as extremely promising agreement, had been reached.
- One reason for Israel’s new willingness to negotiate can be at least partly attributed to another accomplishment of the resistance: the increased cost of occupation.

As Palestinian activist Mazin Qumsiyeh points out:

–The cost of the uprising to Israel was huge. Even by May 1988, it was estimated that in the first three months of the uprising government revenues declined by 30 percent compared to the similar period the year before, expenses rose dramatically (...) tourism plummeted and Israeli exports tumbled (...)” (Mazin B. Qumsiyeh, 2001).

- The Intifada turned international attention to the severity of the problem in the Occupied Territories. The uprising put the Palestinian issue back on the international agenda

iv. Nonviolent Campaigns in Australia

In Australia even minor disturbances at demonstrations tend to become the focus of the attention of the news media, often to the exclusion of any meaningful discussion about the original reasons for the protest. Therefore, it is argued, the surest way to cumulate public support for the real issues is to remain nonviolent, especially in the face of State repression.

The Franklin River Campaign

The most notable campaign in recent years which utilised nonviolent action was the Franklin River campaign. The decision to conduct nonviolent actions at various locations adjacent to the proposed Gordon River dam site and in the major cities of Australia reflected the realisation by the (then) Tasmanian Wilderness Society that lobbying the Tasmanian and Federal Governments was not proving effective. It was decided to use various nonviolent actions, and most notably the blockade on the Gordon River (of which the Franklin is a tributary), in order to raise awareness of the issue and to put more pressure on the federal parliamentary parties in the run up to the federal

election in 1983. In effect, nonviolent action was seen as the most effective means of coercing concessions from the Government.

In this campaign there were many different perspectives on the meaning of nonviolent action (among activists located at the base camps and up river) reflecting the usual diversity of views regarding such issues as secrecy and sabotage. Despite these differences there was a broad understanding that the purpose of the campaign was to pressure the parliamentary parties to –save the Franklin”. Campaign direction and activist effort was focused on this short-term goal. Even so, it should be noted, some longer term issues were raised by such factors as the emergent community appreciation of wilderness, and, in the context of the blockade itself, the utility of mass arrest as a nonviolent tactic. In the end, the dam was stopped following the election of a new government and a High Court decision.

Other Campaigns

Other campaigns, both before and after the Franklin, have also utilised approaches to nonviolent action. The well-known campaigns of recent years include:

- The anti-Vietnam war movement
- The civil liberties struggle in Queensland
- The women’s ANZAC Day actions
- Various forest campaigns such as those to save the Daintree, the forests of New South Wales and East Gippsland
- The uranium actions in South Australia and the Northern Territory
- The Animal Liberation duck rescue teams; the campaigns against the US bases (Pine Gap, North West Cape and Nurrungar)
- The ‘_Don’t Celebrate 1988’ campaign in the year of Australia’s white bicentenary
- The campaigns against visiting nuclear warships and
- Various campaigns by workers for improved conditions.

In addition, there have been many nonviolent actions conducted throughout Australia’s history by Kooris (Aborigines), women, workers, students and local community action groups.

In each of these campaigns, the choice of nonviolent action has usually been a direct response to the failure of more conventional means, such as lobbying.

v. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine⁷⁰

The Challenge

The 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine were damaged by election fraud and voter intimidation.

The key participants⁷¹

Nonpartisan exit polls during the presidential runoff election between Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko gave the latter a strong lead. Yet when the official results were released, Yanukovich had apparently won the elections by 2.5%.

Ukrainian citizens quickly realized these results were fraudulent. Independent, nonpartisan election-monitoring organizations confirmed their suspicions. Making matters worse, the mainstream media appeared unable to transparently report on the fraud committed in the elections.

Viktor Yushchenko called for citizens to join him at Maidan, Kyiv’s Independence Square, to express their outrage.

The coordination of demonstrations was initiated by a pro-democracy group known as Pora.

Pora had been monitoring the elections and using the internet as a platform for generating awareness.

The tools and tactics

In November 2004, Ukraine had an estimated six (6) million distinct internet users out of a population of 48 million. Despite this relatively low internet penetration rate, members of Pora and Maidan, another pro-democracy group, initially convened online to share information and ideas. They then moved actions from the web to text

⁷⁰ Orange Revolution in Ukraine Electronic Sources:
Movements Org, The Orange Revolution In Ukraine, [online] available from <http://www.movements.org/case-study/entry/the-orange-revolution-in-ukraine/> [29 January 2014]
The Government Begins to Shut Down Internet and Television In Ukraine [online] <http://intellihub.com/government-begins-shut-internet-television-ukraine/> [29 January 2014]
Belfast Telegraph, —Ukraine riots: What's going on in Kiev? <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-riots-whats-going-on-in-kiev-29951597.html/> [29 January 2014]

⁷¹ The presentation of the historical events is adapted from Nehanda Radio electronic publication “Notes from Orange Revolution in Ukraine”, Aug. 8, 2013

messaging to communicate with more people. Alternative media also aided in the sharing of information, as the government didn't shut it down at any point.

Pora, already experienced in organizing demonstrations, quickly sprang into action. More and more Ukrainians began sending text messages to friends, encouraging them to come out and protest. The demonstrations, which became known as the Orange Revolution, were carried out over a week and a half.

The use of SMS was critical to maintaining momentum and planning logistics. Participants did not converge on Kiev Central Square at the same time; instead, text messages were used to coordinate shifts.

Pora had brought out nearly 1,500 tents, which were scattered around the outskirts of the main square for participants to sleep in. This resulted in the leveling of a constant pressure on Parliament.

The absence of campaign-altering obstacles in these events can be attributed to the strong planning and organization of the pro-democracy groups that spurred the protests. A large mass of people swarming on the city's main square could have turned violent and gotten out of hand, but the members of Pora and other groups were committed to nonviolent protest and worked with the crowds to make sure they stayed calm and orderly. The organizers also made sure to work with security forces to prevent any outbreaks of violence on either side. According to USIP reports:

–The organizers also made concerted efforts to dissuade the security forces from resorting to violence. Intense coverage by independent media ensured that any violence against the protestors would be broadcast worldwide, giving credibility to the claim that individuals within the security forces would be held responsible for any bloodshed. The organizers sent clear messages of their nonviolent intent to the security forces, according to the experts. In Ukraine in particular, networks were established between military and opposition leaders, and private connections and assurances were made.”

The role of already existing, durable organizations in sustaining the campaign cannot be overstated. However, without Pora and Maidan, the demonstrations may have died down much earlier.

The outcome

As the movement gained strength, Ukrainian military and security forces began to deplete. This helped maintain peace in Kiev and other cities where demonstrations were

held. Segments of Ukraine’s official Security Service chose to cooperate with the Yushchenko camp and not use force on the protesters.

The demonstrations-carried out over 17 days-ultimately resulted in new, legitimate elections being held that brought Yushchenko to power.

The events of the Orange Revolution (named after the orange-colored shirts protesters wore to express their solidarity) underscore the impact of technology on democracy, but only if citizens are upset enough to withstand bitter cold temperatures while protesting, capable of using technology more effectively than the government, and activists lay out strong groundwork for protests.

vi. The Arab Spring of 2011

The course of events

Tunisia: Government overthrown on Jan. 14, 2011. President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali flees into exile. Elections for a Constituent Assembly held on Oct. 23, 2011.

Egypt: Government overthrown on Feb. 11, 2011. President Hosni Mubarak steps down, faces charges of killing unarmed protesters. Elections held on Nov. 28, 2011. Protests continue in Tahrir Square.

Libya: Anti-government protests begin on Feb. 15, 2011, leading to civil war between opposition forces and Moammar Gadhafi loyalists. Tripoli was captured and the government overthrown on Aug. 23. Gadhafi was killed by transition forces on Oct. 20.

Syria: Protests for political reforms have been ongoing since Jan. 26, 2011 with continuing clashes between the Syrian army and protesters. On one day in July, 136 people were killed when Syrian army tanks stormed several cities.

Yemen: Ongoing protests since Feb. 3, 2011. President Ali Abdullah Saleh is injured in an attack on June 4. On Nov. 23, he signs a power-transfer agreement ending his 33-year reign.

Other nations: Protests and uprisings related to the Arab Spring also took place in other countries as well, including: **Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Oman.**

The Arab Spring was a revolutionary wave of both violent and nonviolent demonstrations, protests, riots, coups and civil wars in North Africa and the Middle East that began on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia with the Tunisian Revolution. The events in Tunisia were triggered when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire after claiming he was slapped by policewoman Fedia Hamdi. The Tunisian Revolution effect was spread

strongly to five other countries: Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Iraq where the regimes were toppled or major uprisings and social violence occurred, including civil wars or insurgencies. Sustained street demonstrations took place in Morocco, Bahrain, Algeria, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Sudan. Minor protests occurred in Djibouti, Mauritania, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and the Western-Sahara (Malise, 2016: 63).

This uprising in the Arab World has created a great divide in cultural tradition and rigid tribal mentalities. Feelings that governments intimidated its citizens have degraded Arabs and Moslems alike and have caused unrest in the streets. Mismanagement of funds and economic stratification has created resentment and a feeling of hopelessness for a better future. Youth graduating from college cannot find jobs. They have begun realizing that their four years of college is a waste of time. Military personnel are getting into big business while college graduates have no jobs.

As scholars of nonviolent civil resistance pointed out, in the first months the most significant movements displayed some of the classic characteristics of such resistance. In the longer term, however, many of the movements have failed to fulfill their initial promise, overtaken by armed civil war (as happened quickly in Libya and more gradually in Syria), or failing to achieve their initial democratic promise – most notably in Egypt.

The wave of initial revolutions and protests faded by mid-2012, as many Arab Spring demonstrations were met with violent from authorities as well as from pro-government militias and counter- responses demonstrators. These attacks were answered with violence from protestors in some cases.

In some instances (Syrian Civil War, Iraqi insurgency and Civil War, Libyan crisis and Crisis in Yemen) large conflicts followed.

However, while leaderships changed and regimes were held accountable, power went up for grabs across the Arab world. Ultimately it came down to a contentious battle between a consolidation of power by religious elites and the growing support for democracy in many Muslim-majority states (Justin, 2016: 186-209).

The early hopes that these popular movements would end corruption, increase political participation, and bring about greater economic equity, quickly collapsed in the wake of the counterrevolutionary moves of the deep state in Egypt, the regional and international interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the destructive civil wars in Syria and Libya.

Condition of Arab states⁷²

Each Arab state has its own agenda and the resource of the land becomes family owned resources which results in a few wealthy families while their countrymen struggle. The authoritarian states, corruption, human rights abuses and violations, inflation, sectarianism, unemployment, and the influence of religion in politics have created unfavorable conditions for the citizens. Additionally, leaders are often willing to ignore the constitution or change them to put their children in positions of power without any consideration of the will or the vote of the people. These factors have resulted in public frustration, lack respect for government, lack of democracy and corruption. In some areas there has been a push to enforce Sharia Law with lack of regard to women’s rights. There has been an increase in the prominence of Islamic fanatics that hide behind religion in order to pursue their own narrow will on others in the name of Islam.

Promises of Nonviolent Action

The people in the streets have no military training or weaponry. Nonviolent Resistance Methods can give them power, especially in numbers against the state regimes. Citizens can make civil resistance a part of their strategy. Techniques include mass defection from government jobs or the army, and massive demonstrations which refuse to disperse for many days. Citizens have the ability to communicate with each other faster than the government through the internet and cell phones. The people need to create an atmosphere which makes it clear that we are not happy; we need change and we will not leave. We are even willing to die for our freedom. The Arab Spring is not a conflict between nations. It is a conflict between the people and their own government. The Arab Spring took the regime by surprise. Governments have chosen to use the army against civilians rather than negotiating with their own people, resulting in unnecessary loss of life.

⁷² Adapted from “The Arab Spring, Religious Dimensions of Democratization, Processes in Muslim-Majority Nations” *Yale University, New Haven, CT Saturday, September 29, 2012, The 41st Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS), on Nonviolence International* available at <http://nonviolenceinternational.net/wp/spark-of-the-arab-spring/>

The Initial uprisings and the Nonviolent Strategy

The Arab uprisings were never strictly nonviolent; but the methods used of strikes, civil disobedience and in particular occupation of key symbolic spaces and mass demonstrations were typical of nonviolent resistance, and many of the demonstrations did reflect an ethos of self-discipline, mutual friendliness and cooperation between many different sectors of urban society. Women were quite prominent, students and intellectuals mixed with workers and artisans, and in Tahrir Square in February 2011 Coptic Christians were welcome alongside Muslims.

Even in Syria, where the regime rested on support from religious minorities – notably the Alawites, but also the Druze and the Christians – the nonviolent protesters tried in their slogans and symbolism to create links across religious divides.

The unfolding of the uprisings also initially achieved a key goal of nonviolent resistance strategy:

- Refusal by the security services to implement a crackdown (Tunisia and Egypt) and defections by members of the armed forces.

However, it soon became clear that religious and political divides would undermine prospects for a smooth transition to more democratic regime. Even in Tunisia, the first and most successful movement for regime change, tensions between the more secular liberal groups and Islamists seeking a more Islamic state, have created problems for the new ‘democracy’. In Egypt the lack of agreement among the secular opposition groups and their deep division with the Muslim Brotherhood (together with the unconstitutional actions by the elected President Morsi) have proved disastrous, opening the way in 2013 to a reassertion of de facto military rule. The refusal of the Egyptian military to crush the 2011 uprising and save Mubarak, ambiguous at the time, now suggests a long-term commitment to maintain underlying military control of the regime through tactical adjustments.

Defections by sections of the armed forces before the uprising had developed sufficient societal unity and leverage for nonviolent change led to civil war in Libya and western military intervention. In Syria soldiers did begin to flee Syria, and to cross over to the rebels – at risk of execution, but Nepstad, writing in 2011, argued that because only a very small proportion of the military had defected, Assad was able to block the uprising. Some officers and soldiers who changed sides formed the Free Syrian Army, which over time has turned the conflict into an armed struggle, and given the intransigence of

the Assad regime and their recruitment of Hizbollah fighters from Lebanon, created conditions for external forces to turn the conflict into a destructive war between ruthless extremists.

Arab Spring and Nonviolence

Very interesting connotations of the Arab Spring to the nonviolence concept, especially in relation to the social-economic implications, are found in Metcham Quinn’s (2014) article in Washington Post. We quote:

–The Arab uprisings of 2010-2011 provided a major shock that led to the rapid evolution of Islamism in the Arab world. While it was clear at the outset that the shock to Islamist movements would be large, how Islamist movements would internalize that shock and the direction in which they would evolve were highly contingent on the evolution of the Arab political systems. Since the initial uprisings, Islamist movements have evolved dramatically due to a several key trends that have defined and redefined their experience in the new Arab political (dis)order. These trends must be understood in the context of the opportunities Islamist movements faced in initial uprising period.

Although most Islamist movements, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, were initially slow to lead popular mobilization against autocratic Arab regimes, they recognized that they could benefit from changes in the post-uprisings political landscape. As it became apparent in many Arab countries that new elections could translate popular support for Islamist movements into political power, many Islamist groups supported the electoral process and launched aggressive campaigns to define society’s needs and capture votes.

These visions, championed by diverse Islamist groups such as Ennahda in Tunisia, Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups in Egypt, Islah in Yemen and the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco, as well as Islamist groups in Libya, Jordan and Kuwait, saw the 2011-12 period as a potential renaissance for Islamist participation in governance. They clumsily entered into political competition with other actors who also sought to redefine the emerging political order. In a large number of countries experiencing political turmoil (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Yemen and Kuwait) Islamist groups found new levels of political prominence. Importantly, however, they were

actively repressed by the state in Syria, and often had only limited access to key domains of state power (in Libya, Egypt and the monarchies).

Since their initial experience with mass mobilization and the political openings in 2011-12, four main trends have affected Islamist movements in the Arab world that have dramatically shifted their perceived political opportunities. These trends have led to the rapid evolution and devolution of Islamist groups, often in deeply defining ways that will leave a long-term organizational legacy for Islamist groups far into the future” (Quinn, 2014).

He finally points out the following trends:

- Repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, not only in Egypt by the military and courts following the forcible removal of Morsi from office in 2013, but also by Saudi Arabia and a number of Gulf countries.
- Rise of Islamist “State-Building” where “state failure” has taken place—most prominently in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. The norms of governance in these Islamist areas are militia-based, and the governed submit to their authority out of fear, loyalty, other reasons, or some combination.
- Increasing sectarianism (primarily Sunni-Shia) at least in part from Proxy Wars.
- Increased caution and political learning in countries such as Algeria and Jordan where Islamists have chosen not to lead a major challenge against their governments.

Future Prospects

Those movements that suffered initial defeat or failed to gain momentum may now have better prospects than some that overthrew their dictators. Although the Bahrain government, backed by the reactionary Saudi Arabian government, quickly crushed the uprising, protests there continue, including celebrations of the anniversary of the uprising in both 2012 and 2013, and there have been some signs of possible regime concessions. Not only regional but international power relations have been unhelpful to the Bahrainis, as the USA has a large naval base there and gives more weight to its strategic interests than to its professed ideal of democracy in this context. Nevertheless,

the factors that encouraged the 2011 uprisings still create a context for further popular pressure, not only in Bahrain but in Jordan and Morocco, where protests on both political and socio-economic issues continue.

Unfortunately, however, the fallout from Libya – which remains politically very unstable and is now exporting Islamic extremism to Tunisia – and the even more worrying prospects of Syrian disintegration, do not indicate prospects of peaceful democracies in the region.

Gradually, the mass unarmed displays of people power and calls for greater political freedom, democratic choice and governmental accountability took the initiative away from violent jihadists committed to an authoritarian Islamic future. The fighting in Syria has brought Al Qaeda and similar groups back into the political frame.

2.4 Conceptual morphosyntaxis

In this part of the chapter we attempt to clarify the different elements of the concept of nonviolence since by its very nature it includes a wide range of interpretations and theoretical features. Further, as a dynamic concept, its content and meaning depends on the historic time-place context it entails being therefore susceptible to diverse academic postures and perspectives as well as to cultural, political and practical interpretations.

i. The concept of nonviolence

Nonviolence is the practice of being harmless to self and others under every condition. It comes from the belief that hurting people, animals or the environment is unnecessary to achieve an outcome and refers to a general philosophy of abstention from violence based on moral, religious or spiritual principles.⁷³

The origin of the term can probably be attributed to the Italian thinker Aldo Capitini⁷⁴, who, in 1931, began to use it to refer to the ethical-religious concept of *ahimsa*, in

⁷³ A clarification of this and related terms will appear in Gene Sharp (2012), *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts*, Oxford University Press, New York.

⁷⁴ In the history of nonviolence in Italy, Capitini was the main protagonist, being defined “the Italian Gandhi”. Capitini approached nonviolence in the late twenties and in 1931 Gandhi visited Italy for a few days. Capitini drew many lessons from Gandhian philosophy. He developed an overarching

addition to those struggles undertaken by Gandhi and his followers, identifying the term nonviolence with that of satyagraha or the search for the truth, invented by the Gandhi. With this analysis, Capitini intended to reduce the strong dependence of the concept on the term “violence”. Consequently, he wanted to emphasise the importance in identifying nonviolence with a humanist conception, of a being spiritual opening for conflictive human relations. Capitini, on composing the term nonviolence, intended to introduce a dual connotation of the concept. He wanted to characterise it not only as a collection of techniques and procedures which renounce the use of arms and violence, but also as a constructive and open programme of a type of ethical-political, social and economic emancipation proposing the reduction of human suffering to the minimum. For some, the philosophy of nonviolence is rooted in the simple belief that God is harmless. Therefore, to more strongly connect with God, one must likewise be harmless. Nonviolence also has ‘active’ or ‘activist’ elements, in that believers accept the need for nonviolence as a means to achieve political and social change. For example, the Gandhian *ahimsa* is a philosophy and strategy for social change that rejects the use of violence, but at the same time sees nonviolent action (also called civil resistance) as an alternative to passive acceptance of oppression or armed struggle against it. In modern times, nonviolent methods of action have been a powerful tool for social protest and revolutionary social and political change (Kurtz and Turpin, 1999: 557).⁷⁵

perspective where nonviolence became the source of inspiration for many of its activities and achievements. His work was also inspired by the concept of persuasion and openness. For Capitini the term persuasion, in the sense of complete conviction, indicated faith, and the deep belief in certain values and commitments. He believed that individual acts, according to the criteria of its profound consciousness, can create value and find something that is worth more than material existence and formal spirituality.

Persuasion, a word which Capitini took from the philosopher Carlo Michelstaedter of Gorizia, is the ability to pursue one’s own ideals with tenacity, and the power of nonviolence, a gentle power, however determined. The opening is the opposite of the conservative and authoritarian vision of Fascism; it is the elevation of the soul toward God. For Capitini, individuals have to open to ‘all human beings, to all people, even to things’. In some way, he wished that society, the Church and, traditions were opened up to a dimension of freedom and a gift to all. First of all, through the idea of nonviolent non-cooperation he found the strength to refuse the card for entry to the fascist party, losing his job at the University. Initially he developed the concept of omnocracy, the power for all, meaning that each person has the right to participate in government and control of public power through meetings, assemblies, and meetings with politicians and those who held institutional roles. These meetings had to be public, informing people what was happening and what decisions were being taken.

⁷⁵ Lester R. Kurtz, Jennifer E. Turpin (1999), *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, p.557.

“In the West, nonviolence is well recognized for its tactical, strategic, or political aspects. It is seen as a powerful tool for redressing social inequality” and

Further, there have been two different kinds of Nonviolent Resistance practiced by the Freedom Movement of the 1960s:

- Philosophical Nonviolence.

Those who were philosophically nonviolent did try to love their enemies and did try to refrain from any form of violence in all aspects of their lives. Politically they were pacifists and deeply studied in Gandhian creed. Luther King, John Lewis, John Lawson, Bernard La Fayette, and others belonged to this group. The heart of philosophical nonviolence was taking action to oppose injustice and winning over one’s enemies through love and redemptive suffering. Yet, despite the media myths, philosophical nonviolents were always a small minority of the Civil Rights Movement.

- Tactical Nonviolence.

Those who were tactically nonviolent used Nonviolent Resistance as a tool for building political power – in demonstrations, as an organizing technique & style, and as a political strategy to achieve specific goals. But it was a tactic, not a philosophy of life. And in other situations – both personal and political — other strategies and tactics might be used.

By 1963 the great majority of Freedom Movement activists in CORE, SNCC, NAACP, and even SCLC, were tactically nonviolent rather than philosophically nonviolent.

These two views were not hostile to each other — they were just different. Both groups worked well together, simply agreeing to respectfully disagree. Luther King made it quite clear that he was not demanding that others adopt his personal philosophy of nonviolence, and we who were tactically nonviolent respected the courage and commitment of the philosophical. The two views were not antagonistic because both encompassed the fundamental premise that nonviolence is about active resistance – not passivity.

The term “nonviolence” is often linked with or even used as a synonym for peace, passivity and pacifism.

Mark Kurlansky, “Nonviolence: The History of a Dangerous Idea”, Foreword by Dalai Lama, p. 5-6, *Modern Library* (April 8, 2008), “Advocates of nonviolence — dangerous people — have been there throughout history, questioning the greatness of Caesar and Napoleon and the Founding Fathers and Roosevelt and Churchill” and Ronald Brian Adler, Neil Towne (1999) *Looking Out/Looking In: Interpersonal Communication*, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, p. 416. “In the twentieth century, nonviolence proved to be a powerful tool for political change.”

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However, there are differences among these notions as M. Gandhi clearly stated:

Satyagraha is the ‘force’ of truth and love	Duragraha is the “force of bias.” Passive resistance
Goal: End antagonism without harming the antagonists by transforming the antagonist.	Goal: End antagonism even if that means harassing the antagonists without personal transformation of truth and love
Means & End: Truth and love	Means & End: Selfish Obstinacy
Focus: Moral power	Focus: Physical Power

Forms of nonviolence

Advocates of nonviolence believe cooperation and consent are the roots of political power: “all regimes, including bureaucratic institutions, financial institutions, and the armed segments of society (such as the military and police), depend on compliance from citizens” (Sharp, 1973).

On a national level, the strategy of nonviolence seeks to undermine the power of rulers by encouraging people to withdraw their consent and cooperation. The forms of nonviolence draw inspiration from both religious or ethical beliefs and political analysis.

- ✓ Religious or ethically based nonviolence is sometimes referred to as principled, philosophical, or ethical nonviolence
- ✓ Nonviolence based on political analysis is often referred to as tactical, strategic, or pragmatic nonviolence.

Commonly, both of these dimensions may be present within the thinking of particular movements or individuals.⁷⁶

Methods

Nonviolent action generally comprises three categories:

- ***Acts of Protest and Persuasion***

⁷⁶ Two Kinds of Nonviolent Resistance ~ Civil Rights Movement Veterans

Nonviolent acts of protest and persuasion are symbolic actions performed by a group of people to show their support or disapproval of something. The goal of this kind of action is to bring public awareness to an issue, persuade or influence a particular group of people, or to facilitate future nonviolent action. The message can be directed toward the public, opponents, or people affected by the issue. Methods of protest and persuasion include speeches, public communications, petitions, symbolic acts, art, processions (marches), etc.

- ***Noncooperation***

Noncooperation involves the purposeful withholding of cooperation or the unwillingness to initiate in cooperation with an opponent. The goal of non-cooperation is to halt or hinder an industry, political system, or economic process. Methods of non-cooperation include labor strikes, economic and other boycotts, civil disobedience, tax refusal, and general disobedience

- ***Nonviolent Intervention***

Nonviolent intervention is a more direct method of nonviolent action. Nonviolent intervention can be used defensively—for example to maintain an institution or independent initiative—or offensively- for example, to drastically forward a nonviolent struggle into the opponent’s territory. Intervention is often more immediate and effective than the other two methods, but is also harder to maintain and more taxing to the participants involved.

Gene Sharp, a political scientist and nonviolence activist, has written extensively about methods of nonviolence. In his book *Waging Nonviolent Struggle* he describes 198 methods of nonviolent action.

ii. Non violence

The meaning of the term “non violence”, can easily be confused with situations, states, relations or conditions “without violence” of a physical or direct kind, or with *a-violence*. Similarly, as a collective, there may certainly exist many examples of these types of situations in everyday life.

However, these have to be clearly differentiated from and, inclusively, identified with another distinct concept so as not to lead to confusion of identifying this with an ethical-political theory, or with an assortment of activities and procedures of pressure or struggle.

iii. Non-Violence

Non-violence (with a hyphen) refers more specifically to the absence of violence and is always the choice to do no harm or the least harm, and passivity is the choice to do nothing.

The version “non-violence” owes its origin to the interpretation which the British Colonials made in reference to the forms of protest and remonstrance of Gandhi’s followers in India and South Africa. The British detected clear links between what was armed resistance and mere acquiescence or collaboration with London. The forms of boycott, passive resistance, non-cooperation, etc., culminated in being diagnosed as the term non-violence, as it consisted neither in the pure absence of violence, nor pure political obedience. This manner of referring to the term was utilised extensively in the historiography of social movements and changes in the typology of struggle (by, for example, Joan Bondurant, Clarence Case, Richard Gregg, etc.) for a long time, and is still used even now, as it is clearly distinguished from the previous term, “non-violence”.

Sometimes non-violence is the same as being passive, and other times it isn’t. So for example, if a house is burning down, the most harmless appropriate action is to put the fire out, not to sit by and passively let the fire burn. There is considerable confusion and contradiction written about non-violence, harmlessness and passivity. A person may advocate nonviolence in a specific context while advocating violence in other contexts. For example, someone who passionately opposes abortion as a life-saving practice may concurrently advocate violence to kill an abortionist (Roberts, 2009).

2.5 Conclusions

The 20th century, the most violent century of political conflict in human history, was the century in which nonviolent resistance was transformed from a relatively unorganized, spontaneous, and non-strategic concept to an organized, collective, and strategic method of struggle.

By the 21st century, nonviolent resistance has become recognized as a powerful method of struggle even more effective than violence or military power.

Decades ago Gene Sharp stated that –Until very recently no overall conceptual system existed to reveal relationships between diverse and apparently dissimilar historical events which are now grouped as cases of nonviolent action (. . .). For the many forms of military struggle an overall conceptual tool has long existed, and this itself may have contributed to the detailed attention which wars have received. Attention to war has included historical and strategic studies which could help future wars. But until very recently, nonviolent action has had no comparable self-conscious tradition. Such a tradition would probably have brought attention to many of these neglected struggles and might well have provided knowledge to be used in new cases of nonviolent action.” In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of people around the world who have taken part in nonviolent political activities. It is clear, however, that there is considerable debate about the precise meaning of nonviolence.

For some, nonviolent action is an expedient technique for dealing with conflict or bringing about social change.

For others, nonviolence is a moral imperative or even a way of life.

On the one hand, many reasons can be offered for the employment of nonviolence:

- It is a ‘weapon’ available to all
- It is least likely to alienate opponents and third parties
- It breaks the cycle of violence and counter-violence
- It leaves open the possibility of conversion
- It ensures that the media focus on the issue at hand rather than some tangential act of violence
- It is the surest way of achieving public sympathy
- It is more likely to produce a constructive rather than a destructive outcome
- It is a method of conflict resolution that may aim to arrive at the truth of a given situation (rather than mere victory for one side)
- It is the only method of struggle that is consistent with the teachings of the major religions

On the other hand, nonviolence can also be the basis for a way of life:

- It is consistent with a belief in the underlying unity of humankind
- It is the only method of action, interpersonal or political, that does not block that path to what has often been called ‘self-realization’.

As referred in the previous parts of this chapter, by attracting widespread popular support through protests, boycotts, civil disobedience and other forms of nonviolent noncooperation, the nonviolent resistance campaigns broke repressive regimes and brought major new changes for justice and peace.

The validity of our argument is further supported by the authors Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, who offer evidence through a number of specific case studies, in their book *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* that the power of nonviolent civil resistance for positive social change works and cannot be denied.

For more than a century, from 1900 to 2006, campaigns of nonviolent resistance were ~~more~~ more than twice as effective as their violent counterparts in achieving their stated goals,” the authors conclude.

Nonviolent resistance presents ~~fewer~~ fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment, and that higher levels of participation contribute to enhanced resilience, greater opportunities for tactical innovation and civic disruption (and therefore less incentive for a regime to maintain its status quo), and shifts in loyalty among opponents’ supporters, including members of the military establishment.”

Contrary to popular belief ~~violent~~ violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds (...) nonviolent resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies, which are less likely to regress into civil war.”

While only one in four violent campaigns succeed, about three out of four nonviolent campaigns succeed.

Chapter three:

Popular resistance in the reinforcement of the culture of nonviolence as driving force for social change

3.1 Introduction

–Armed insurgencies impose great human costs. Nonviolent “people power” movements succeed by calling attention to official repression and winning support from the undecided.”

(Zunes 2009:4)

Chapter three constitutes the empirical basis of the Thesis argumentation that nonviolent, popular resistance activities have proven to constitute not only preferable and effective means of resistance against Israeli repressive actions, but also a solid ground for the reinforcement of the culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian society as a whole.

Furthermore, the current chapter endeavors to reveal the correlation between the Palestinian nonviolent conflict paths to social change through these popular, nonviolent resistance activities.

The chapter’s argumentation is based on three main points:

- a. Nonviolent popular resistance is a consciously-defined and well-organised collective action of both individuals as well as collective entities (popular organisations)
- b. Nonviolent popular resistance directly connected to social change, as empirical research and case studies demonstrate
- c. Nonviolent popular resistance constitutes effective means of driving significant political and social change as historical evidence proves

In this chapter, the focus will be placed on the Palestinian nonviolent popular resistance as consciously defined and well-organized collective action among individual Palestinians as well as among popular committees and organizations as a way to feedback the popular will to keep resistance in nonviolent ways.

Moreover, these activities depict the “new” role that popular nonviolent resistance is playing in the building up of the culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian and Israeli societies and in the international public opinion as well as in constituting a driving force to social change.

The virtual villages and the Palestinian Popular Committees (PPC) are a way to achieve these goals in a collective action as they intend to summon scholars, community leaders, students, and local officials, among others, to participate in the struggle the way that everyone knows better.

The main scope of the chapter is to conduct field research among the participants of such activities, Palestinians members of international organisations and committees, in order to back up and validate the above arguments with concrete evidence of tangible life events.

Chapter three consists of three parts. More specifically:

- The first part incorporates an analysis on the roots of nonviolence within the Palestinian society as well as the role and contribution of the Popular Committees (Palestinian and international) to the understanding and organisation of collective actions in keeping resistance in nonviolent ways.
- The second part presents a thorough field research via the conduct of surveys among the participants of several nonviolent virtual villages’ attempts, namely members of the international and Palestinian Popular Committees, members of peace organisations, and Palestinian individuals.
- The third part presents the ideas of conflict-driven social change as formulated by Ibn Khaldun and through historical references, as presented by contemporary scholars (i.e. Kurt Schock, Richard A. Dello Buono, etc.) connecting of the nonviolent virtual villages’ attempts as significant means to drive and promote political and social change.

3.2 Part I: Searching the roots of contemporary nonviolent activities in Palestine

As mentioned above, the contemporary nonviolent activities portray the “new” role that popular resistance plays in building up a nonviolence culture in the Palestinian society as a whole.

The virtual villages and the Palestinian Popular Committees (PPC) are a way to achieve these goals through collective action as these organizations try to gather all societal strata to participate in an organised nonviolent struggle.

3.2.1 The Palestinian nonviolent popular resistance in context

The reflections exposed in this chapter are centered on the volume of the constituent elements that characterize the experiences of civil disobedience and the popular resistance while, at the same time are differentiated from other social movements.

Reviewing its origins, debates took place to set up the meaning of popular resistance with the backing of theories that address collective actions on the ethical ground, legally, politically, and philosophically to uncover the meaning of the term “popular resistance” as well as the implications of its civil features, its contradictions, its possibilities and its limitations.

Without overlooking the fact that this kind of resistance is so common worldwide, it is also important to locate the contextual factors in which these social expressions are registered, for instance the dynamics of the Israeli policy not only in the occupying territories but also in all the Middle East region or the disappointed sensations of the Palestinian people toward the Arabic leaders for being careless about the Israeli actions in Palestine.

As we mentioned in the first chapter of our Thesis, the Arabic revolt of 1834 in Palestine against the Ottomans was a good example of popular resistance in the context of the first seed of Palestinian patriotism and the idea of a Palestinian nation, but the will to reach the national goals has changed as time passed and circumstances of the surrounding world changed.

Mario Lopez (2012) neither describes nonviolence actions as part of total struggle, as another kind of violence that would put the occupying force in an embarrassing situation in front of other nations and other people disclosing and unmasking its real intentions. He added:

“Nonviolence is not peace, neither is it war, but it is the opposite thing of the one and the other. It has its own meaning and claimed its own space between one and the other. Its methods seem that they are very similar to those of the war but have no negative effects like death, suffering, injury (...) etc. and precisely for this matter, is

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not like peace, because it is the battle in the midst of violence to prevent it or to reduce it”.

In other words he stated that civil defense –entails not only a set of methodologies and morphologies resistance, but also a concept of conflict and defense against foreign aggression in a short set of variables that would determine the alternative model of security-defense against conventional types”.

Mario Lopez (2015) in his essay: *–Más de medio siglo de insurrecciones no armadas (1950-2014). El papel histórico y político de la diplomacia civil en un mundo globalizado”*, emphatically tries to establish a third element in the human reaction against the enemy as an independent response with its own parameters which entails certain methods and strategies of resistance, without heel over neither to the passive reaction nor to the violent reaction.

Here, it is crucially important to highlight that the culture of peace throughout the participants of these struggles was cultivated in the Palestinian society in order to understand and accept the civil resistance in its revolutionary framework. The Palestinian society in its diverse ideologies and thoughts should know that the collective actions against injustice and tyranny are not only a registered mark of some ideology; many civil actions throughout history took diverse political and social traits like Islamic, Christian, Communist, Socialist, etc.

Likewise, it should also be highlighted that the Palestinian society is mainly tribal, Arabic, and Islamic, especially in the West Bank and some parts of the Gaza strip and this could have been a handicap in accepting an idea of a secular struggle that must be distant from religious and traditional values.

A struggle based on collective actions where boys and girls, men and women, scholars and peasants should have the same goals without social status denotations gather together people in front of one common objective.

3.2.2 The culture of nonviolence struggle: The Palestinian social idiosyncrasy

“All this implies greater and better appreciation of the role that civil society can perform in the field of defense, as well as a commitment to build a society whose highest values are installed on peace and development.

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That society must put closely in means and goals, tools and targets regarding this issue (...) hence, these measurements are not utopian, but fundamentally pragmatic and applied to bet for life and human reproduction, and not for the defense of more or less specific interests of certain human groups, but for the interests of the society as a whole, that means the society of human species.”

Mario Lopez (2012)

In the sciences of biology, evolution, and anthropology, we can find a lot of examples that could give us scientific explanation of human reactions against threats, even in the wild life.

The social idiosyncrasy of human groups would not defer from one to another, if we consider some simple and basic terms of survival livelihood like water, food, freedom of travel (...) etc.

Hence, these factors could initiate the will to a collective organizational resistance against the occupying force in violent or nonviolent terms to protect or to obtain these simple life elements.

The Palestinian society in that case had the initiative to go through that adventure of civil disobedience in collective way but may be in different aspects than the Indian society or the South African society depending on every cultural value and every perspective to deal with the alien force. The behaviorism in psychological terms could explain the alteration of the soldier or the policeman reaction who intended to fight against a certain civil group who fight for the minimum terms of human rights.

There are many examples reported that Israeli soldiers or pilots rejected to go through military actions against Palestinian civilians and preferred imprisonment rather than bombing or beating women, children and old men.

On the other hand, the minimum basic elements of livelihoods mentioned above could be considered in cultural terms as an indivisible part of the Palestinian culture if we mention for instance the olive tree and what this tree deeply means to the Palestinian culture.

Marwan Darweish (2012:185) contributed greatly to understand meaningfully the Palestinian culture of the olive harvest and what does that mean if somebody could alter this value:

—The olive tree and the olive harvest season represent a social, religious and family feature for the Palestinians; the social cohesion of one or more family is plain when they gather in the harvest months of September to January singing Palestinian folk songs while collecting olives means a lot to that tradition. Festival and public celebrations are organized by local government and cooperatives. These kinds of celebrations and their political meaning have been taken into account by some popular Committees, especially after the separation wall construction (...). Olive trees and harvest has political, economic and cultural importance to Palestinian society, it symbolises connection to the land and manifestation of social values and traditions. In addition to the economic value and contribution to livelihoods it supported the resilience of the farmers to stay in their land and resist to occupation ”

He added the role of the popular committees could play in this aspect:

—(...) for instance one member of ‘Stop the wall campaign committee’ SWC explained that they have supported some few olive festivals in the area of Nablus to in 2009 to celebrate the end of the harvest season and encourage farmers steadfastness in the face of attacks of Jewish settlers”.

We consider three basic reasons in the culture of nonviolent popular resistance that were and could be shared by all people in Palestine nation-wide, configuring the common will to fight tyranny and injustice without taking into account the idiosyncrasy of every single people and the cultural influence in the nonviolent resistance against the enemy:

i. The struggle for dignity and self-determination

The experiences throughout the history of Palestine clearly point out justifications in terms of ethical and moral issues to oppose all these actions that could violate the principles of recognition and respect to all relationships between men and women, and could violate the dynamics between social groups, countries and communities. This justification of social struggle and civil disobedience is supported by the UN charter to give a sense to all people nation-wide to fight for their rights and freedom. Controlling the local economy of other people, their forms of government, and confiscate their lands are among other reasons that legitimize and give meaning to the nonviolent popular resistance.

ii. Poverty and social exclusion

On the collective level, many Palestinian Popular Resistance Committees claim to be a part of political, cultural, economic and social features of the Palestinian political daily life. They defend the Palestinian society not only against the Israeli policy, but also against the social context of the consequences of any oppressive policy such as unbearable taxes, limitation of movement of Palestinian citizens, limitation of exportation of Palestinian goods to avoid competition with Israeli goods). The social exclusion is a reality in the Palestinian territories especially if we refer to the West Bank or Gaza where the Israeli policy of the construction of separation wall is the most outstanding feature of this exclusion.

iii. Creation of an alternative society

The alternative society must be considered through diversity and tolerance with other different groups thinking about improving the quality of life of its citizens. Thus, the collective actions, based in regional self-sufficiency, and more horizontal relationships, allow the full exercise of democracy in the same practice of a certain popular committee⁷⁷.

Mazen Qamsiyeh (2011) justified the civil resistance allegedly on what the Israeli writer Hanz Libiertek stated in his book *Palestinians between past and present*:

–According to the International law, every people has the right to fight against any occupation force, this right is based apart from other reasons to the guidelines established in Nuremberg tribunal settled after the Nazi crimes (...). The legal justification is based on article 2 of the indictment lists regarding all transgressions in a certain war, In Nuremberg tribunal this was based on the Dun-Hog International treaty of 1907, we must say that the article 6-b from Nuremberg tribunal was based on the articles 1 and 2 from Dun-Hog treaty that justifies the popular resistance against occupation whether it is out or in-occupied-land”.

The conceptualization of popular resistance in a framework of “nonviolence” should be considered as a cultural term where a certain nation or a people must consider many points before they feel able to go into the organized action against the enemy, as the case of Palestine illustrates.

⁷⁷ La resistencia civil: Estrategias de acción y protección en los contextos de guerra y globalización- Marta N. Bello- Universidad nacional de Colombia,
<http://www.temarium.com/wordpress/wp-content/documentos/Salazar - La-resistencia-civil.pdf>

In this part of the chapter is worthwhile to further clarify the cultural aspects of nonviolent struggle in Palestine by presenting the conception of what Mario Lopez (2015) perceives as nonviolent actions in philosophical terms:

- a. Nonviolence struggle as a method of conflict intervention. It is a set of procedures and techniques to manage, transform or even resolve certain conflicts or at least to reduce to minimum levels the presence or the use of violence in any conflict (whether family, intergroup, intergenerational, international, etc.) On the other hand try to build bridges of dialogue and understanding among all parties in a conflict.
- b. Nonviolence actions as a method of struggle in terms of social and political aspects is a form of non-armed struggle and non-invasive actions against many expressions of injustice (inequality, oppression, land confiscations, exploitation, building fences and walls, and other forms of violence or human cruelty). It should be comprehended that the main point of nonviolence struggle is to renounce the use of violence to obtain justice, but accepting that there may be many forms of social and political action, as well as techniques and tactics prepared to form a strategy objectives and hence these actions are intended to open doors to negotiations, commitment and constructive work with the counterpart.
- c. Nonviolence struggle is the humanization of politics, ever since it is considered as one of the most interesting and important components of it in its ethical-political and theoretical-practical dimension. These concepts are worthy to be considered in the culture of every nation who has the ability and the readiness to steer its notion of struggle in a non-bloody way of fighting the enemy.
- d. Nonviolence as a philosophy and world perspective of human being, also of humanity and nature, a conception and understanding of its meaning leads to changes and transformations, with capacity to structure out its rationality and sensibility.
- e. Nonviolence as opposed to physical violence. We have to understand physical or direct violence as the use of brute force, the way it is meant as classical violence, that which causes harm, suffering and even death in people: murder, kidnapping, torture, wars, in its various forms of expression.

- f. Nonviolence conception as opposed to cultural violence. It should be understood by all those aspects of civilization, education and socialization exposed and presented in Icons, religion, language, art, ideology, science, books etc., which can serve to justify and legitimize the use of direct violence or the existence of structural violence.

Mary Elisabeth King (2007), forwarding the argument one step further, emphasised that every struggle must be converted into political gains arguing that every resistance actions must be followed by political gains, in the case of the Palestinians, the political meaning of the Intifada would lead to face to face negotiations that would maintain the nonviolent character of the claimings. Less violence would enable the Palestinians to dedicate their energies to the political course of their claiming.

It is further illuminating to cite here, the philosophical structure of the nonviolent actions as re-built by Mario Lopez (2015) in terms of its ethical-political and theoretical-practical dimensions, where the leaders of every popular movement should consider the necessity to regard every action in terms of well-defined steps that must suit the goals of a certain community.

Mario Lopez further insists in the deep meaning of the nonviolent struggle, that it is not a simple set-in or a simple protest or hunger strike or boycott to the enemy's commercial goods as well, but rather the perseverance in protesting. As in the case of Palestinian nonviolent resistance manifests, the very message to send to the occupying force and to the world, is to sacrifice of oneself to smooth the way to the other generations; to thorough analyse and reconsider the accumulated mistakes of prior experiences; to rethink new ways to act according to the very skillfulness and manageability of the occupying force.

The nonviolent resistance of the Palestinian Popular Committees constitutes a collective technique to join the popular resistance against the occupation. The cultural overtone meaning of this kind of resistance would be conceived in different ways according to the cultural, religious, and geographic aspects of every single people and nation.

In the Palestinian case the popular resistance is conceived mostly as a religious resistance, where mosques play an important role in organizing the demonstrations and the strike actions. We should not forget the secular aspect of this resistance showed in the Palestinian Popular Committees, especially those orchestrated and sponsored by the PLO, PFLP, and other Christian movements.

In the Islamic world the mosques are not only a holy place where everyone goes to pray and meditate. Historically speaking, the mosque was used as a place where people used to discuss their social affairs, their community problems and their plans to face the enemy in the war. This was not an exception in the Palestinian society where the Islamic tradition is well-rooted.

M. Qumsiyeh (2012) in his book, *Popular resistance in Palestine: A history of hope and empowerment*, lays out the basic principles of the popular resistance in Palestine in three main fields:

- Religious resistance through demonstrations, strikes and charity actions.
- Organized resistance by funding committees, and other political movements.
- Resistance based on development where many projects have to be considered to support the daily life of the Palestinian peasants and shepherds.

The main goals could vary from one certain community to another depending on its own visions and perspectives. The popular resistance in South America for instance has many spotlights like the racial, the economic and the colonial aspects. On the other hand, many of these popular resistance movements have had a leftist aspect turning against the capitalist system and its many unjust aspects in a certain country (the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua for instance, has been turned into a political party).

The people rebel against the capitalism and its allies like the Catholic Church, the landowners, the USA meddling in South America’s policy, etc. This feature by itself could change some aspects of the perspectives on how to fight or to resist in popular terms. The foreign army forces physically present in a certain region like Palestine for instance could change the strategy of resisting as if we consider a certain despotic political model with a corrupt structure but not with foreign members like mostly happens in African and South American countries.

Qumsiyeh (2013) underlined that the main goals of the popular resistance in Palestine are:

“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”

- Press on the enemy to reach all rights, making him aware from what he’s doing in his occupying policy.
- This pressure should be continuous and persistent to weaken the enemy.
- Support the society to be aware about all kind of unfair measurements of the occupying forces.
- Support the people to bear the oppression actions by giving all kinds of logistics and compensations.
- Try to reach the self-sufficiency and the welfare of the people under the occupation.

If we take a look at every point of these goals we would find it compatible with the Palestinian traditions in philosophical and religious terms.

According to the historical documents, the popular resistance is not antagonistic with the Palestinian traditions. It is profound that this form of resistance is greatly effective within a regular and well-organized actions and steps with the participation of all the Palestinian strata men and women. These deeds of conscientious nonviolent actions would bear fruits and expected results in the future.

3.2.3 The role of the Popular Committees to the successful definition and organisation of collective nonviolent activities

The Palestinian issue started to have a deep impact in international peace activists by the 80s and 90s throughout many civil rights organisations, which intended to fight for freedom and democracy in those parts of the world where there’s a lack of respect for human rights.

Popular Committees across the Occupied Territories present a unique form of community-based resistance. The grassroots struggle offers the most significant alternative to the ongoing violence, and has the intrinsic potential for a civic transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

From the villages of Bil’in, Ni’ilin to al-Ma’asara, through the many villages of the Jordan Valley and elsewhere, all Palestinians resist the various aspects of the occupation through an essentially nonviolent people’s mobilization. According to a policy paper by the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, published in

September 2010⁷⁸, between a thousand to two thousand people are mobilized every week around the villages, organizing different actions against settlement expansion and the Wall.

Local popular committees have been formed in different locations across the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The popular struggle emerged in the affected villages in a move to protect their rights and their land, and prevent the destruction of their livelihoods and communities.

Popular committees lead community resistance in various forms ranging from marches to strikes, demonstrations, direct actions and legal campaigns, as well as supporting boycott, divestment and sanctions.

In this part of the chapter we will attempt to shed some light to the foundation of the Popular Committees (International and Local) and their contribution to the successful definition and organisation of collective nonviolent activities

3.2.4 Global Civil Society Groups

The Global Civil Society (GCS) groups as many other international human rights groups started actions to benefit local social movements to protect them from violence and facilitate their initiative in nonviolent struggles. While references to ‘civil society’ go back to the sixteenth century, talking about ‘global civil society’ has emerged only in the 1990s as a part of multi-literalism and globalization in its different social, economic and universal meaning that started to spread out especially in the nineties of the twentieth century.

As Jan Aart Scholte (1999: 2-3) stated in his essay ‘Global civil society-Changing the world’:

‘Civil society groups are not formally part of the state apparatus; nor do they seek to gain control of state office. It is generally agreed that civil society lies outside the ‘public sector’ of official governance’. Scholte added as a part of a much more precise definition of this term:

‘Civil society is not the market: it is a non-commercial realm. Civil society bodies are not commercial companies or parts of firms; nor do they seek to make profits. Thus

⁷⁸ The Non-Violent Resistance in Palestine after the agreement of Oslo Declaration of Principles, Bil’in and Nil’in as Models, Awesi, Salah Mustafa

the mass media, the leisure industry and cooperatives would, as business enterprises, not normally be considered part of civil society”.

What Scholte intend to clarify is that the GCS lies out the private sector of the market economy and is excluded from the state affairs. It is important to distinguish and to draw a visible line between those public or private institutions that have their own objectives and interests well underlined.

In terms of internal structure civil society encompasses enormous diversity where it includes some bodies that are very generously resourced with offices and trained staffs and others that struggle for survival without fund or experience and obviously without success. Some of the social and professional collectives are academic institutes, business associations, community-based organisations, consumer protection bodies, criminal syndicates, development cooperation groups, environmental campaigns, ethnic lobbies, foundations, farmers’ groups, human rights advocates, labour unions, relief organizations, peace activists, professional bodies, religious institutions, women’s networks, youth campaigns and much more.

In terms of actions many of these civil society organizations try to mobilise the general public through symposia, rallies, set-inns petitions, letter-writing campaigns, and boycotts.

In terms of using new technologies and internet some civic associations are users of the mass media (even hiring professional communications consultants for this purpose), while others rely wholly on face-to-face contacts. Some of them make a good use of the Internet including servers and websites as well as person-to-person e-mail messages.

However, in the Arab world attitudes towards GCS continued to be shaped by the particular ideologies and political outlook of various streams of thought as Mohamed El Sayed (2004) stressed in his essay –Global Civil society: An Arab perspective”:

–Liberals and humanists welcomed the rise of global civil society as a promise of liberation from both the suffocating domestic environment and external pressures. On the other hand Nationalists and radicals conceived it as a dialectical antithesis to the hegemony of Western civilisation and, because they are more concerned with national identity, they could not share the high hopes placed on global civil society by liberals

and democrats. Globalisation is conceived of as another cycle of the constant imposition and expansion of Western civilisation”.

For a long time, the struggle of the Palestinian people for their historical and political rights found little understanding at the grassroots level in the Western world. Palestinians felt they were alone in their struggle for national rights, particularly after the signing of the Camp David Accords in the US in 1978. As Israel’s rejection of their national rights continued, Palestinians felt they had to take matters into their own hands rather than rely on the rest of the Arab world for salvation.

During the first Intifada the sense of isolation and letting-down was clearly patent, but a turn-over in the international perspective toward the Palestinian issue even from some NGOs started to take place especially in those issues related with land confiscations, illegal detentions and house demolitions. El Sayed (2004) insisted that this shift in the international handling of the Palestinian issue has influenced Israel’s attitude towards the recognition of some rights. Many major international NGOs have promoted Palestinian rights by establishing a direct or indirect presence in the Occupied Territories, particularly in the wake of the Oslo Accord in 1993.

During the second Intifada things went worse for the global activists of peace in Palestine where the blowback in the peace process and the brutality of the Israeli army was clearer. We have to say that GCS did little to stop the violence or even to salvage the civil rights of the Palestinian people.

With the beginning of 2002 the situation in the occupied territories started to improve insomuch as many international activists began to form human shields in front of Israeli bulldozers (Rachel Corrie case)⁷⁹. However, the degree of solidarity given to

⁷⁹ The Rachel Corrie’s case refers to the death of a Westerner activist who was killed by an Israeli bulldozer in 2005 in the Gaza Strip trying to prevent the demolition of Palestinian homes. The description is adapted from the Guardian, Friday April 8, 2005.

There is a particular entry in Rachel Corrie’s diary, probably written some time in 1999, four years before she was killed by an Israeli bulldozer in the Gaza Strip trying to prevent the demolition of Palestinian homes. She is aged 19 or 20. "Had a dream about falling, falling to my death off something dusty and smooth and crumbling like the cliffs in Utah," she writes, "but I kept holding on, and when each foothold or handle of rock broke I reached out as I fell and grabbed a new one. I didn't have time to think about anything - just react as if I was playing an adrenaline-filled video game. And I heard, 'I can't die, I can't die,' again and again in my head." The article continues:

—Last year, I was asked by the Royal Court theatre to edit the writings of Rachel Corrie into a drama with Alan Rickman, who was also directing. I had read the powerful emails she sent home from Gaza, serialised in G2 in the days after her death, and I'd read eye-witness accounts on the internet. But I didn't know that Rachel's early writing - before she even thought of travelling to the Middle East, from her days as a schoolgirl, through college, to life working at a mental-health centre in her home town of Olympia, Washington - would be similarly fascinating, and contain such elements of

Palestinians by global civil society organisations remains much less than is needed to end the Palestinians’ sense of isolation.

El Sayed (2004) took into account the increasing sympathy of international activist toward the Palestinian plight due to the war on Iraq. He stated that the activists found a new opportunity in the Iraqi war and the American invasion to topple Saddam Hussein from power: –Therefore, the magnitude of opposition to the war on Iraq offered pro-Palestinian groups an exceptional opportunity to make their voices heard. A number of global civil activists were thus motivated to take up the Palestinian cause of ending the Israeli occupation as an important goal. Neither Palestinians nor other Arabs appreciated the immense sacrifices made by some global peace heroes”.

3.2.5 Global and Local Civil Society Groups in Palestine

- **GCS in Palestine:** The main goal of these organizations is to:
 - i. Implement actions in a certain way (nonviolent) to protect Palestinian peasants against Israeli forces.
 - ii. Empower and support the actions of those vulnerable communities threatened to abandon their properties.
 - iii. Defend Palestinian shepherds against Israeli settlers and their aggression on Palestinian lands
 - iv. Escort Palestinian Kids in their way to school.

- **The BDS campaign as part of International solidarity**

BDS stands for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions. In the Israel-Palestine context, BDS refers to a call issued by over 170 Palestinian organizations in 2005 asking that the international community implement boycott and divestment initiatives to bring change in Israel and Palestine. The initial Palestinian call was signed by a broad

chilling prescience. Nor did I have a sense of the kind of person Rachel Corrie was: a messy, skinny, Dali-loving, list making chain smoker, with a passion for the music of Pat Benatar. I discovered all that later.

Rachel was killed, aged 23, on March 16 2003, by a Caterpillar D-9 bulldozer, a vehicle especially built to demolish houses. Three decades before, her father had driven bulldozers in Vietnam for the US army. Her death was the first of a string of killings of westerners in Gaza in spring 2003, as the war was taking place in Iraq: Briton Tom Hurndall, 22, shot on April 11; another Briton, cameraman James Miller, 34, shot on May 16. She and Hurndall were activists in the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), an organisation set up "to support Palestinian non-violent resistance to Israel's military occupation". Rachel was killed only two days before the start of the assault on Baghdad while the world was mostly looking elsewhere.”

coalition that included unions, academics, political parties, cultural groups, and civil society organizations.

BDS is a form of economic activism that is premised on the idea that violations of Palestinians’ rights result not only from Israeli government policies and actions, but also from corporate and institutional policies and actions that support and sustain Israel’s occupation and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Boycott and divestment actions therefore target institutions and companies (Israeli and international) that profit from or are complicit in the violation of Palestinian rights with the goal of changing corporate/institutional and Israeli actions. In all cases, BDS actions target institutions—not individuals—for their complicity in Israel’s occupation and/or human rights abuses.

The Palestinian BDS call requests that international civil society groups and individuals target Israel using boycott, divestment, and sanctions tactics until Israel meets its obligation under international law to recognize the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and other goals are considered:

- i. Israel ends its occupation of all Arab lands and dismantles the Wall
- ii. Israel recognizes the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens to full equality
- iii. Israel respects, protects, and promotes the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194

The “BDS movement” is made up of an informal coalition of international, national, and local groups that include faith-based organizations, peace groups, solidarity and student activists, and other coalitions of concerned individuals. Supporters of the Palestinian BDS Call hold in common a commitment to using nonviolent boycott, divestment, and sanctions tactics until Israel ends its occupation and complies with the rights outlined above.

BDS campaigns take many different forms. Groups around the world have organized street protests, board room lobbying, shareholder actions, lawsuits, strikes, teach-ins, and other actions to call attention to corporate and institutional complicity in occupation. Among others, targets have included arms manufacturers, agricultural exporters, cosmetic manufacturers, cultural groups, investment firms and academic institutions. What links these disparate campaigns is their common goal of ending

corporate and institutional complicity in Israel’s occupation and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

It could be argued that the BDS campaign was controversial and less effective as well as that this campaign was leading to anti-Semitism. However, the BDS campaign intended to move toward a strategy to force the Israeli government to change its policy throughout the construction of an International movement to exert pressure economically, politically that would isolate Israel as the same campaign did in South Africa.

- **International Solidarity Movement**

The International Solidarity Movement (ISM) is a Palestinian-led movement committed to resisting the long-entrenched and systematic oppression and dispossession of the Palestinian population, using nonviolent, direct-action methods and principles. Founded in August 2001, ISM aims to support and strengthen the Palestinian popular resistance by being immediately alongside Palestinians in olive groves, on school runs, at demonstrations, within villages being attacked, by houses being demolished or where Palestinians are subject to consistent harassment or attacks from soldiers and settlers as well as numerous other situations.

The four guiding principles that the movement was founded upon, are as follows:

- i. **Palestinian-led** – ISM’s role is to support the Palestinian popular struggle. When invited, we join actions initiated by Palestinian communities and groups engaged in grassroots activism.
- ii. **Nonviolence** – ISM believes that nonviolent actions are a powerful tool in fighting oppression, occupation and apartheid, and are committed to the principles of nonviolent resistance.
- iii. **Consensus** – ISM uses consensus in all decisions. Though the consensus process takes effort and time, this way of working leads to full participation, and ensuring that the actions are group actions, and no one is forced to be a part of any action they disagree with.
- iv. **Anti-oppression** – ISM opposes any form of bigotry and supports full equality of all people.

- **Palestinian Popular Committees (PPCs)**

A single committee is a group of persons who gathers themselves to realize a certain project or action, and that what they did all those many Palestinians throughout their modern history resisting the occupation.

At first instance, we would say that organizational changes affecting Palestinian civil society during the Israeli occupation began to take place after the 1967 war. More specifically, M.E King (2007) described this first seed of the popular action in a manner to approach the essential meaning of these popular committees as small non-military institutions based on the conviction that local governance and the organizing of civilian communities' entities were a necessary preparation for independence which took root in 1969 when the Palestinian communist party violated Israeli prohibitions on such activities. As a result, the formation of thousands of committees and groups into network of popular mobilization as a direct result of the conditions of occupation had the effect of creating a civil society.

The awareness of the idea that the occupation endure by the time is due to the submission of the occupied people started to spread out in all the Palestinian refugee camps, villages and cities in and out of Palestine.

Many intellectuals knowing well that this idea is the key to start a popular revolution started exploiting it socially, economically and culturally.

The PPCs are divided basically according to these following circumstantial and historical points:

- Popular Committees during the PLO foundation. The unions as nonviolent committees.
- Popular Committees in the refugee camps.
- Popular Committees during the first Intifada.
- Popular Committees during and after second Intifada.

From these historical phases, it is worth mentioning the emergence of Unions during the PLO foundation and their transformation to Popular Committees as well as the Popular Committees in the Refugee Camps.

a. Emergence of Unions during the PLO foundation

Since its foundation the PLO used to involve all the Palestinian strata in the struggle project against the occupation. The features of the Palestinian revolution and its different ideologies could have been influenced by the popular committees' actions

especially in the Arabic countries. The multicolour regimes of these countries that varied from leftist revolutionary countries like Libya and Syria to absolutist monarchies like Jordan, and the Persian Gulf monarchies put a lot of obstacles and hampered the actions of these committees and unions.

On the other hand, the continuing and increasing pressure over the Palestinian people in the seventies after many wars against the Israelis made the Palestinians reconsidering their situation and not to keep depending on the Arab countries policy toward Israel.

George Al-Abed (2005: 34-35) maintained that:

–The Palestinian society has not been able to respond out to the shock of occupation in the economic fields and social until the late seventies when the escalation of the Zionist challenge to the Palestinian entity reached out the threat to the very existence of the Palestinians themselves. Therefore the Palestinians responded in a certain way that could enhance their ability to withstand the escalating and destructive pressures imposed by the long-term occupation. For that reason in 1976, municipal elections were held in the occupied territories, and produced National leadership into confidence, and paved the way for a short period of time in which it gave more confidence to more organized social and political activity the deliver the –National Steering Committee” while other professional associations and unions Workers, charities and cooperative rapidly expanded its membership and services.”

Al-Abed added: –Among all this social and political conflict, the Palestinian society began to create Self-defense mechanisms with more accuracy and flexibility, so apart from the existing network of traditional organizations and NGOs, it started to begin a new generation of youth leaders organizing a wide network of committees al mostly unannounced and decentralized. The first of these committees was founded by a group of progressive women activists in 1978, which quickly spawned a number of similar committees in all parts of the West Bank, especially in the rural and refugee camps”.

One of the PLO founders Ibrahim Al-Shuqairi implemented a plan to organize the popular will opening whereby political offices in the heavily populated Palestinian

cities in the occupied territories as well as in various parts of the Arab world where the Palestinians could share in different ways the project of liberation.

On the other hand it seemed a good idea to set up sectorial organization (union syndicates) project as the only realistic alternative way to organize the Palestinians, especially because in many Arab countries sectorial and national organizations including, women, students, writers and others are a reality especially in countries like Iraq, Syria and Egypt. The first attempt to set up these Palestinian union syndicates did not succeed in 1968 by the Palestinian communities, especially after the closure of the organization’s main offices in Jerusalem in 1966, and the defeat 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

A view on this very first seed of the popular committees shows that the PLO took an important part in the coordination of these committees as an intention to share all the Palestinians in liberation project.

This is to show that the PLO has not adopted the violent armed struggle as an only way in its liberation duty, but it also included this nonviolent way as an alternative or as B plan for the armed struggle.

On the other hand, the new system of organizing these committees also adopted a supreme council of unions who could design a policy for their activities, coordinate their efforts, and assists the Popular Organization Department. The Palestinian National Council also recommended the Executive Committee of the PLO to support these unions economically and pledge all the facilities to ensure the performance of its mission, as well as to put all the legal regulations regarding the relationship between unions and the Supreme Council of the unions.

▪ **The emergence of unions and their evolution**

The Palestinian Popular Unions in all their varieties and political trends declared themselves as a part of the PLO pledging commitment to the Palestinian National chart and working with all Palestinian groups in a unified strategy to the main goal of the Palestinians, that is the Liberation of Palestine and the very return of all refugees to their legitimate homeland.

These unions also participated in international conferences to promote and coordinate with the PLO in all its factions, the participation in nonmilitary clubs and civilian movement familiarized Palestinians with parliamentary procedures balloting in

elections, groups in decision making. Therefore, these unions and other social movements have contributed in the awareness of the Palestinians to their cause, even though some of its branches in some Arab countries have been affected by the positions of those countries toward the PLO policy.

The main goals of these Unions were to:

- i. Create the first tissue of the Guild society institutions of the future Palestinian state.
- ii. Take care of the interests of the economic and social conditions of their members, as well as to improve their living conditions, promote labor insurance to them in accordance to the conditions throughout agreements with the government of those Arab countries where those Palestinians live.
- iii. Try to contribute in introducing the Palestinian workforce in those Arab countries where they could be useful and effective.

The Unions tasks were based on the following points:

- a. Political mobilization of the Arab masses, and the members of the union throughout many activities in a framework nonviolent message.
- b. Training political cadres and prepare them to work leadership.
- c. Execute the actions of democracy in traditional mass regulatory frameworks.
- d. Contribute to know the public problems and try to resolve them within their competitions.
- e. Representing the masses in the National Assembly in a way to post and guide the active and real participation in the national project.

Many of the following unions supported the armed struggle of the PLO at the beginning, insomuch as many of their duties were focusing more on the violent than nonviolent struggle. However, with the passing of time, the majority of these unions declared the nonviolent actions as the best way to make the Palestinians reach their goals.

It has to be mentioned here that the PLO insisted in having popular organization circles as a main condition to contribute in founding these unions.

A list of the most active Unions follows:

- a. General Union of Palestinian Women
- b. General Union of Palestinian Workers
- c. General Union of Palestine Students

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- d. General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists
- e. General Union of Palestinian Fine artists:
- f. General Union of Palestinian expressive artists
- g. General Union of Palestinian Economists:
- h. General Union of Palestinian Teachers
- i. General Union of Palestinian Jurists
- j. General Union of Palestinian physicians and pharmacists

Some common contributions of these unions are worth to be mentioned:

- Highlighting the Palestinian figure, especially through the enrollment into domestic and international fellow unions so this could be as support to the Palestinian revolution.
- Consolidating the idea of popular and union actions to attract the attention of the masses and the leaders, and to consolidate the democratic practice within these unions and committees.

The representation of these unions in the Palestinian National Assembly has been reflected positively on the existence of these committees and organizations and their role in solving problems.

b. Popular Committees in the Refugee Camps

There is no doubt that the Palestinian refugee camps are one of the most important cultural elements in the contemporary national discourse of all the Palestinian politicians and activists. The refugee camp is not a simple physical site where all the Palestinians from the diaspora took shelter after the expelling of 1948 and 1967, it is a cultural base of the will of return, it is a symbol of the tragedy of one people as well. On the other hand, the importance of the refugee camps lies in its features as the first incubator and most important tributary of the Palestinian liberation movement whether it is located in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria or the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank.

Sociologists argue that the refugee community became more acceptable to modernist structures represented by the political parties and the Palestinian organizations especially after the falling of the traditional Palestinian society represented in these village and city communities.

Despite all the odds, the refugee community reflecting the magnitude of their cultural weight of representing the loss of land and dignity became the right place to nourish

the national action and the political parties, which led the national movement since the Palestinian Nakba.

In the occupied West Bank it is not much different. The camp was the most important social places in the process of building a national movement locally, and strengthening the role of the first PLO seed resistance in the occupied territory. In the West Bank, and by the major popular uprising in 1987, Israel and Jordan fought with the PLO to dominate the process of the «political culture». While Jordan has relied on traditional and tribal features in order to keep control of the occupied territories, Israel adopted in addition the colonial military force and structures similar to the beneficiaries of the occupation and colonialism who live in the villages like the Mukhtars (village representatives) and the exclusion of the city and the camp of representatives because of their strong links with the PLO.

In this context, the PLO has worked to break the domination through the building of local institutions and the activation of the national mass action from which to focus.

In the camp youth centers (youth sports social institutions) were established by UNRWA and supported until the mid-eighties and constituted the first step of which a lot of young people went through the national and social work. That was one of the elements to break the colonial domination and the Arab guardianship as, for instance, Jordan intended to do.

The plan of the PLO makes the centers at risk of closure by the Israeli occupation forces since the early eighties. Luckily came the eighties and nineties with the Oslo accords and the step by step re-opening of a lot of youth centers in the refugee camps. For instance, in 1992 the Federation of youth centers was created as the first overarching and collective framework. Although the sport actions were a key element in the definition of the federation, the history of struggle for the youth organizations in the refugee camp has been considered as a new way of collective struggle for the PLO intentions in the refugee camps.

Within less than two years since the establishment of the Federation of youth centers, the Palestinian Authority was formed as a product of the Oslo agreement, and the refugee issue and their returning right to their home land has been postponed to the last steps of the negotiations.

In this context, refugee camps and other refugee communities have suffered many changes socially and politically, so that they became a kind of social unit carrying a political issue and a social message. For instance, the 1995 event can be mentioned as the first popular movement for the protection of the right to return. This event, called Al-Fareah conference, can be considered as the first conference of the refugees and the first act of serious demand for the right of return. This conference was also based on what took into account in the federation of youth.

We would say that this conference carried out a symbolic action, inasmuch as it were carried out in Al-Fareah detaining camp, as well as it was held in memory of the first popular uprising as a sign to keep on for continuity of national action, the centrality of the right of return, the struggles of the youth camps, and as the symbolism of the detainee camp itself.

In the following year of Al-Fareah experience, another popular conference held in the Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem focusing on the same issue, describing the process of ignoring the refugees from the central issue and insisting on considering the newborn Palestinian authority as a hosting entity basically for the refugees.

The Palestinian authority tried to give these popular committees in the refugee camps the same status as the local governance, the committees considered this attempt as a way to include the camps in a new form of naturalization in the new reality of living as to ignore their status as refugees. The PLO tried to adopt and include the protest of these committees against the PA intention to naturalize the refugees. Many considered this as a way to delete the identity of the refugees and their status.

Since the foundation of the popular committees in the refugee camps, this name has been considered as the People's Committees by the Palestinians and committees activists themselves, while the UNRWA used to call them as Services Committees. The difference in the naming designation is not as a result of chance, but it is the expression of a specific political context or an ideology of the activists themselves.

In the first intifada, the popular committees' expression conveyed the indication of autonomy and self-ruling in many Palestinian regions as opposed to the Israeli occupying administration.

This expression was carrying connotations to aim the struggle against the occupation by organizing demonstrations and sit-ins and implementation of a unified national leadership decisions as well.

Ala Ezzah (2011) stated:

—I interviewed one activists of these committees and he told me that without omitting the real goal of their reason to be, that is the right to return to their lands, they also intend to be pragmatic with the day-by-day situation, that is to play the intermediary role with all relief agents especially with the UNRWA to deliver all the goods to the camps inhabitants. He also added that they play the social role as a link sometimes with the inhabitants and the political role that they never forget in their reason to be in the Palestinian conflict”.

Alaa Ezzah added that after the formation of the PNA the committees find themselves in a new disjunction or dilemma between the new Palestinian authority that nourish itself from the PLO project and the UNRWA relief agency as a legal representative of the refugee status in Palestine. They had to deal bilaterally with the two entities as the representation of the Palestinian people in different aspects, the human aspect and the political one.

Finally, it could be safely argued that the popular movement for refugees in the occupied territories since the formation of the Palestinian Authority was the context in the process of forming popular committees or services committees.

However, these committees have contributed to the creation of the culture of the right of the Palestinian people to return rhetorically and at-site by the nonviolent actions.

These committees also contributed to the elaboration of the non-compromise culture counterfacing any intention to deal with the enemy to give up some main points on the legitimate right on the land.

3.3 Part II: The role of contemporary Popular Resistance actions in the reinforcement of the culture on nonviolence in the Palestinian society: An empirical study

3.3.1 The Survey Questionnaires

i. Introduction

The questionnaires were aiming at defining nonviolence activities as:

- Forms of socio-economic structure
- Driving forces of social change
- Diving forces of political change
- Dominant factors for struggle and pressure:

They were to be conducted for opinion surveys at:

- Participants/individuals in Bab Al Shams and other Protest/virtual Villages
- Members of the International Committees

ii. Methodology

For the conduct of the questionnaires the following methodology was adapted:

- Step 1: Preparation of the structured questionnaires (designing)
- Step 2: Distribution of the questionnaires (data distribution)
- Step 3: Collection and Evaluation of the questionnaire (data collection and assessment).

For the assessment of the results of the questionnaires, the Stochastic Project Scheduling Simulation System (SPSS)⁸⁰ was utilised.

The target groups (respondents) will include both sexes and various ages.

⁸⁰ Stochastic Project Scheduling Simulation (SPSS) is a software application, a methodological tool developed to measure the probability to complete a project/task in a certain time specified by the user. To deliver a project/task by a completion date, a number of activities need to be carried out. The time that an entire project/task takes to complete and the activities that determine total duration are always questionable because of the randomness and stochastic nature of the activities' durations. Predicting a project completion probability is valuable, particularly at the time of bidding.

SPSS finds a longest path in a network and runs the network a number of times specified by the user and calculates the stochastic probability to complete the project in the specified time.

SPSS is an advanced tool that combines some previously developed tools such as Critical Path Method (CPM) and Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) for more accurate and time-bound results.

The results were analysed from a quantitative as well as from a qualitative perspective based on the collected factual data. The validity and reliability of the data was checked as follows:

- Validity of the methodological tool

The questionnaires were validated by being reviewed by the supervisor, who provided comments. These comments were incorporated into the final version of the questionnaires.

On the other hand, the validity will also be measured statistically by factorial analysis in order to examine the internal consistency of the questionnaire items.

- Reliability of the methodological tool

In regards to the questionnaires reliability, they were tested by calculating the internal consistency its sub-sectors using the split-half method.


The results of the questionnaires are presented below:

A. PARTICIPANTS IN THE BAB AL-SHAMS ACTIVITIES

PART I : GENERAL PART - PERSONAL BACKGROUND


1. SEX

Male	180
Female	120




2. AGE

Up to 20 Years Old	55
20-30 Years Old	65
30-40 Years Old	80
40-50 Years Old	70
Over 50 Years Old	30




3. EDUCATION BACKGROUND

BASIC	75
HIGH SCHOOL	135
TECHNOLOGICAL	20
UNIVERSITY	70




4. CURRENT OCCUPATION

Employed	75
Independent	175
Unemployed	50




5. DEMOGRAPHICS I

YOU LIVE IN WEST BANK	220
YOU LIVE IN JERUSALEM	80




6. DEMOGRAPHICS II

YOU ARE GROWN UP IN TOWN	90
YOU ARE GROWN UP IN VILLAGE	175
YOU ARE GROWN UP IN REFUGEE CAMP	35




7. MARITAL STATUS

SINGLE	155
MARRIED	145



8. RELIGION


MUSLIM	235
CHRISTIAN	65



PART II : SPECIFIC


9. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE MEANING OF THE NOTION “NON VIOLENT RESISTANCE”

YES	135
NO	100
DO NOT KNOW	65



10 DO YOU AGREE WITH THE NOTION THAT NONVIOLENCE IS THE SAME WITH SUBMISSIVENESS, PASSIVITY OR DEFEATISM?


STRONGLY AGREE	27
AGREE	35
DON' T AGREE	185
DON' T KNOW	53



“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”

11 SINCE THE CREATION OF ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS HAVE STRUGGLED TO RESIST OCCUPATION UTILIZING VIOLENT (ARMED) OR NONVIOLENT METHODS. WHICH METHODS DO YOU CONSIDER MORE EFFECTIVE?


	VIOLENT METHODS	NON VIOLENT METHODS
VERY EFFECTIVE	27	65
EFFECTIVE	35	120
LESS EFFECTIVE	65	35
NON-EFFECTIVE	120	27



12. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS?


12A ARMED RESISTANCE IS NECESSARY

STRONGLY AGREE	30
AGREE	32
DON' T AGREE	193
DON' T KNOW	45




12B PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE IS PREFERABLE

STRONGLY AGREE	65
AGREE	120
DON’ T AGREE	52
DON’ T KNOW	63




12C NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE COULD PROMOTE EARIER THE GENDER EQUALITY THAN THE VIOLENT RESISTANCE

STRONGLY AGREE	40
AGREE	100
DON’ T AGREE	85
DON’ T KNOW	75




12D NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WOULD MORE EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING THAN THE VIOLENT RESISTANCE

STRONGLY AGREE	40
AGREE	110
DON' T AGREE	65
DON' T KNOW	85




12E NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WOULD SUPPORT THE EDUCATION FOR PEACE FOR BOTH MALE AND FEMALE KIDS

STRONGLY AGREE	67
AGREE	106
DON' T AGREE	85
DON' T KNOW	42



13 WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR YOU?

PARTICIPATING IN NONVIOLENT ACTIONS	167
PARTICIPATING IN VIOLENT (ARMED ACTIONS)	65
DO NOT PARTICIPATE AT ALL	68




14 HAVE YOU EVER PARTICIPATED IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES

A RALLY OR PROTEST	190
A RALLY OR PROTEST DURING A CURFEW	160
DEFENDING MY NEIGHBORHOOD DURING AN ISRAELI INVASION	120
BE A PART OF A HUMAN SHIELD TO PROTECT LEADERS OR WANTED PEOPLE	120
PROTECTING SOMEONE FROM IDF (ISRAELI FORCES)	120
BRING SUPPLIES FOR PARTICIPANTS	190
BURN TIRES	70
HANG POSTERS	130
THROW STONES	55
INFORM ON A COLLABORATOR	120
JOINT MILITANT ORGANIZATION	80
AN OPERATION AGAINST ISRAELI SOLDIERS OR SETTLERS USING A GUN WHERE I WOULD NOT DIE IN THE PROCESS	60
NOT PBEYING ORDERS FROM SOLDIERS AT THE CHECKPOINT	45
DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS	170
WRITE SLOGANS	110
ELECING A BARRICADE	89
DISTRACT THE SOLDIERS	55


VISIT FAMILY OF A MARTYR

180



15 WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS YOU CONSIDER AS BEING TRUE?


I CAN RUN MY OWN BUSINESS IN PALESTINE THE PALESTINIAN SOCIETY OFFERS EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES	175
THE PALESTINIAN SOCIETY GIVES ME THE PERSONAL FREEDOM I NEED	150
I AM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE	120
I AM PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE	155



16. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION FOR THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? THE NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WILL:


16A PROMOTE EMPLOYMENT

STRONGLY AGREE	37
AGREE	148
DON' T AGREE	62
DON' T KNOW	53




16B REDUCE POVERTY

STRONGLY AGREE	40
AGREE	145
DON' T AGREE	62
DON' T KNOW	53




16C INCREASE DEVELOPMENT

STRONGLY AGREE	40
AGREE	145
DON' T AGREE	62
DON' T KNOW	53




16D IMPROVE HEALTH CONDITIONS

STRONGLY AGREE	48
AGREE	97
DON' T AGREE	60
DON' T KNOW	95




16E PROMOTE FAMILY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

STRONGLY AGREE	67
AGREE	118
DON' T AGREE	62
DON' T KNOW	53




16F INCREASE THE PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL FUNCTIONS

STRONGLY AGREE	70
AGREE	115
DON' T AGREE	60
DON' T KNOW	55




16G PROMOTE SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND COHESION

STRONGLY AGREE	70
AGREE	115
DON' T AGREE	60
DON' T KNOW	55




16H INCREASE ACTIVISM

STRONGLY AGREE	85
AGREE	100
DON' T AGREE	60
DON' T KNOW	55



16 I UPGRADE THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF PALESTINIANS

STRONGLY AGREE	75
AGREE	110
DON' T AGREE	70
DON' T KNOW	45




B. PARTICIPANTS IN POPULAR COMMITTEES & ORGANISATIONS

PART I : GENERAL PART - IDENTIFICATION DATA

MAIN ACTIVITIES


Health Care	23
Education	15
Refugee Camp	17
Orphans centres	15
Legal assistance	13
Government connection and coordination	12



PART II : SPECIFIC


5. IS YOUR ORGANISATION FAMILIAR WITH THE MEANING OF THE NOTION “NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE”?

YES	95
NO	0
DO NOT KNOW	0



6. DOES YOUR ORGANISATION AGREE WITH THE NOTION THAT NONVIOLENCE IS THE SAME AS SUBMISSIVENESS, PASSIVITY OR DEFEATISM?

STRONGLY AGREE	0
AGREE	0
DON'T AGREE	85
DON'T KNOW	10




7. WHICH METHODS OF RESISTANCE DOES YOUR ORGANISATION CONSIDER MORE EFFECTIVE?

7.1 VIOLENT (ARMED) METHODS

VERY EFFECTIVE	0
EFFECTIVE	0


“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”

LESS EFFECTIVE	5
NON-EFFECTIVE	90



7.2 NONVIOLENT METHODS


VERY EFFECTIVE	45
EFFECTIVE	50
LESS EFFECTIVE	5
NON-EFFECTIVE	0



8. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS?


8.1. ARMED RESISTANCE IS NECESSARY

STRONGLY AGREE	0
AGREE	0
DON'T AGREE	95
DON'T KNOW	5




8.2. PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE IS PREFERABLE

STRONGLY AGREE	45
AGREE	50
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	5




8.3. NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE COULD PROMOTE EARLIER THE GENDER EQUALITY THAN THE VIOLENT RESISTANCE

STRONGLY AGREE	40
AGREE	55
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	5




8.4 NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WOULD MORE EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING THAN THE VIOLENT RESISTANCE

STRONGLY AGREE	40
AGREE	55
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	5



8.5. NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WOULD SUPPORT THE EDUCATION FOR PEACE FOR BOTH MALE AND FEMALE KIDS

STRONGLY AGREE	60
AGREE	35
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	5



9. WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR YOUR ORGANISATION?

PARTICIPATING IN NONVIOLENT ACTIONS	95
PARTICIPATING IN VIOLENT (ARMED) ACTIONS	0
DO NOT PARTICIPATE AT ALL	5




10. HAS YOUR ORGANISATION EVER PARTICIPATED IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES?

A rally or protest	55
A rally or protest during a curfew	45
Defending my neighborhood during an Israeli invasion	85
Be a part of a human shield to protect leaders or wanted people	55

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
Protecting someone from the IDF (Israeli Forces)	55
Bring supplies for participants	82
Burn tires	0
Hang posters	0
Throw stones	0
Inform on a collaborator	74
Join militant organization	0
An operation against Israeli soldiers or settlers, using a gun, where I would not die in the process	0
Not obeying orders of soldiers at the checkpoint	0
Distributing leaflets	87
Write slogans	0
Erecting a barricade	0
Distract the soldiers	0
Visit a family of a martyr	77



**14. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION FOR THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS?
THE NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WILL:**


14.1. PROMOTE EMPLOYMENT

STRONGLY AGREE	40
AGREE	40
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	15




14.2. REDUCE POVERTY

STRONGLY AGREE	45
AGREE	50
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	5



14.3. INCREASE DEVELOPMENT


STRONGLY AGREE	45
AGREE	50
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	5



14.4. IMPROVE HEALTH CONDITIONS

STRONGLY AGREE	45
AGREE	50
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	5


**14. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION FOR THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT?
THE NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WILL:
14.4. IMPROVE HEALTH CONDITIONS**



14.5. PROMOTE FAMILY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS


STRONGLY AGREE	40
AGREE	50
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	10

**14. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION FOR THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT?
THE NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WILL:
14.5. PROMOTE FAMILY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS**




14.6. INCREASE THE PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL FUNCTIONS

STRONGLY AGREE	30
AGREE	55
DON'T AGREE	5
DON'T KNOW	10




14.7. PROMOTE SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND COHESION

STRONGLY AGREE	45
AGREE	55
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	0



14.8. INCREASE ACTIVISM


STRONGLY AGREE	45
AGREE	50
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	5



14.9. UPGRADE THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF PALESTINIANS

STRONGLY AGREE	45
-----------------------	-----------

AGREE	40
DON'T AGREE	0
DON'T KNOW	10



3.3.2 CONCLUSIONS

A. PARTICIPANTS IN BAB AL-SHAMS AND VIRTUAL VILLAGES AND OTHER PROTEST INCIDENTS

PART I: GENERAL PART – PERSONAL BACKGROUND

In the General Part, for the respondents to the distributed questionnaires we found the following:

1. The gender distribution was almost equal, with the male respondents slightly more (60%)
2. Almost half of the respondents were between 20-40 years of age. Only 10% of the respondents are over 50 years of age
3. The participants in Bab Al-Shams and other protest virtual villages and incidents are educated 68% having finished High School and University
4. The vast majority of the participants declared as working independently (58%) and employed 25%

5. The majority of the participants come from West Bank and were brought up in villages with one third living in towns
6. The participants were divided in half as far as the civil status was concerned
7. The vast majority (78%) are Muslims

In concluding the profile of the participant in the Bab Al-Shams and other protest virtual villages was man or woman, relatively young, educated and employed, brought up in villages, living in West Bank and Muslim.

PART II: SPECIFIC PART

For the specific questions of the respondents participated in the Bab Al-Shams virtual Villages and other Protest Incidents, we found the following:

1. The majority of the respondents (over 50%) were aware of the idea of nonviolent resistance with peaceful means.
2. Two thirds of the respondents disagreed with the idea that nonviolence is equivalent to passivity, submissiveness or defeatism
3. The majority of the respondents considered that the violent methods of resistance (armed) against Israeli violence and occupation are not effective. While the nonviolent methods, such as the Bab Al-Shams protest are more effective
4. Two thirds of the respondents considered the armed resistance as unnecessary and they believe that a peaceful solution to the Palestinian cause is preferable
5. Half of the respondents believed that nonviolent resistance could promote the gender equality than the violent resistance
6. The majority of the respondents believed that the nonviolent resistance contributes greatly to the intercultural understanding than the violent means of resistance
7. The majority of the respondents believed that the nonviolent resistance could positively promote the peace education among male and female kids
8. The vast majority of the respondents considered participating in nonviolent activities is more important than participating in violent actions. Only 22%

of the respondents considered as more important participating in violent (armed) activities.

Even though, 28% of the respondents were in favor of not participating in any activity

9. The majority of the participants have participated in nonviolent activities such as:

- A rally or protest
- Bring Supplies to participants
- Visit a family of a martyr
- Distributing leaflets
- Rally or protest during curfew

The minority of the respondents have participated in more offensive activities such as:

- Burn tires
- Joint militant organisation
- Throwing stones
- Distracting Israeli soldiers

10. Almost half of the respondents were pessimistic about the future, while the other half is optimistic. At the same time 2/3 of the respondents replied that they can run their own business in Palestine.

11. Half of the participants believed that the Palestinian society offers equal opportunities, while only one third believes that the Palestinian Society provides the personal freedom.

12. The majority (2/3) of the respondents believed that the nonviolent resistance will:

- Promote employment
- Reduce poverty
- Increase development
- Improve health conditions
- Promote family and social relations
- Increase the participation in political functions
- Promote social solidarity and cohesion

- Increase activism
- Upgrade the educational level of Palestinians

In concluding, the responses of the participants in the questionnaires show that the majority of them were aware of the idea of the nonviolent resistance and they do not consider it as passivity or submissiveness. On the contrary, they believed that the nonviolent methods are more effective and preferable than the violent (armed) ones against the Israeli oppression and occupation and they considered that participating in nonviolent activities is positive.

Finally, the majority of the respondents believed that nonviolent resistance promotes social, political, cultural and economic change, even though they were not very much optimistic about the future and only one third considered that Palestinian society offers personal freedom.

B. PARTICIPANTS IN POPULAR COMMITTEES (PALESTINIAN – INTERNATIUNAL) AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS

PART I: GENERAL PART – IDENTIFICATION DATA

In the General Part, identification dada, we found the following:

- The main activities of the respondents/members of the Popular Committees or other organisations were:
 - Health Care
 - Refugee Camps
 - Education
 - Orphans Centres
 - Legal assistance
 - Government connection and coordination

PART II: SPECIFIC PART

For the specific questions of the respondents, members of Popular Committees and other Organisations, we found the following:

1. All organisations were familiar with the meaning of the concept of ~~non~~nonviolent resistance”
 2. The vast majority of the respondents (90%) did not agree with the idea that nonviolence is synonymous with submissiveness, passivity or defeatism
 3. All organisations considered the violent (armed) methods as non-effective.
 4. On the other hand, they considered the nonviolent methods very effective (45%) or effective (50%)
 5. They disagreed (95%) with the notion that armed resistance is necessary and they considered the peaceful solution to the Palestinian case as preferable
 6. They considered (95%) that the nonviolent resistance could promote gender equality earlier and contribute to the creation of intercultural understanding than the violent resistance as well as to support the education for peace for both male and female kids
- 3.3 All respondents replied that their organisations consider as more important to participate in nonviolent activities
- 3.4 The organisations have participated in the following nonviolent activities (indicatively):
- Defending my neighborhood during an Israeli invasion
 - Bring supplies for participants
 - Distributing leaflets
 - Visit a family of a martyr
- 3.5 The organisations have not participated in the following violent activities (indicatively):
- Throw stones
 - Not obeying orders of soldiers at the checkpoint
 - Burn tires
 - Hang posters

3.6 The majority (95%) of the respondents expressed the opinion that the nonviolent resistance will:

- Promote employment
- Reduce poverty
- Increase development
- Improve health conditions
- Promote family and social relations
- Increase the participation in political functions
- Promote social solidarity and cohesion
- Increase activism
- Upgrade the educational level of Palestinians

In concluding, the responses of the participants in the questionnaires show that all organisations were aware of the idea of the nonviolent resistance and they did not consider it as passivity or submissiveness. On the contrary, they believed that the nonviolent methods are more effective and preferable than the violent (armed) ones as means to fight against the Israeli oppression and occupation.

Finally, the vast majority of the respondents (95%) believed that nonviolent resistance promotes social, political, cultural and economic change.

3.3.3 Case study (Bab Al Shams-Virtual Village)

Palestinian Nonviolent Popular Resistance through the Experience of Bab Al Shams Virtual Village

i. Introduction

—The Palestinian people arose from the ashes of each onslaught to engage in novel forms of civil resistance.”

(Qumsiyeh, 2011)

Among political scientists and scholars, the prevailing view is that opposition

movements often select violent methods because such means are more effective than nonviolent strategies at achieving policy goals (Pape, 2005). Despite these assumptions and taking into account the dynamics of international historical processes (i.e. the peace movement during the Cold War), organized civilian populations successfully employed nonviolent methods in the last decades including boycotts, strikes, protests, and organized noncooperation (Sharp, 1973) to challenge established power and obtain political benefits⁸¹, as well as innovative forms of civil diplomacy (Ruiz Jiménez, 2004). Some outstanding examples of nonviolent campaigns in the 21st century are Serbia (2000), Madagascar (2002), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004–05), Lebanon (2005) and Nepal (2006), as presented by Maria J. Stefan and Erica Chenoweth (Stefan and Chenoweth 2008). We refer to nonviolent methods as “the specific means of action within the technique of nonviolent action” as defined by Robert L. Helvey (2004: 147).

Since the second Intifada, the Palestinians started to feel that there were no tangible results on the political arena related to their long term struggle against Israeli oppression and injustice initiated more than seventy-five years ago. The negative results of the armed second Intifada, which entailed hundreds of human casualties and the stimulation of the previously started construction of the separating wall, made the Palestinians think about new forms of nonviolent resistance inasmuch as the armed resistance led to nothing against the Israeli war machinery, as acknowledged by Tabar and Ezzeh:

—Therefore, the armed struggle has to be ended and we must return to negotiations. On the other hand, there were local attempts to oppose the process of the construction of the wall. These efforts began with local groups of activists and non-governmental institutions thinking about the mechanisms of this confrontation. Initially, small civil defense groups had been formed to face the Israeli separation wall project. These groups were organized under a common umbrella organization named Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (CWRC) put themselves into action, but the intensified Israeli military incursions in the occupied territories made it difficult, and big challenges faced

⁸¹ Gene Sharp in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, vol. 2, lists 198 methods of nonviolent action and gives historical examples of each method.

these groups when these new formed committees were searching for new resistance mechanisms, specifically against the wall separation.”

(Tabar and Al-Ezzeh, 2014:2)

According to the political activist Abeer Qubti (2013) a new form of resistance is starting to arise after the failure of the second Intifada’s main goals.⁸² Jacob Høigilt (2015: 637) also backed Qubti’s point of view stating that in the recent years “the Palestinian society has depicted a revival of nonviolent of resistance after the second Intifada despite repression and general atmosphere of frustration, apathy and demobilization among the Palestinian population”.

According to what Qubti wrote in her essay, the second Intifada was disorganized with a lot of sacrifices and without concrete results. Qubti added that, during the second intifada almost all the money invested went to expenses for legal issues to defend detainees and to compensate family victims with PLO finance without any substantial results in other fields, especially when the PLO lifted up the finance support.

The civil insurrections that overthrew long–entrenched dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt —and have threatened the survival of autocratic regimes in Yemen, Bahrain and Syria— have brought increased attention to the power of strategic nonviolent actions. These successful nonviolent paradigms shaped up new ideas among the Palestinians to try similar nonviolent means to liberate themselves from Israeli occupation. This has led to increasing calls in liberal circles in the West for Palestinians.

⁸² In 27th of September 2004, Mahmoud Abbas commented on the failure of the Second Intifada in the Jordanian newspaper *Al Rai* interview under the title “The whole Intifada Was a Mistake”:

“I think now that that the *Intifada* in its entirety was a mistake and it should not have continued, and in particular what is called 'the militarization of the *Intifada* (...) If we were to sum up where we have ended up after four years of the *Intifada*, [we would find that] there are three opinions: the first opinion is that after the killing of 1,000 Israelis in the *Intifada*, Israel would collapse, as would Sharon; the second opinion is that the armed *Intifada* would liberate the homeland; the third opinion is that the *Intifada* would bring the settlements to a halt. An examination [of the matter] shows that Sharon did not fall. On the contrary, he has become the most popular [leader] in the history of Israel, after having been subjected to condemnations in Israel. On the same note, all of the Palestinian lands are now occupied and vulnerable, and the settlements have nearly doubled. We damaged our relations with the Americans and with Israeli public opinion; the latest statement from the Quartet is an additional indication of what has become of us (...). The fourth opinion says: stop the 'militarization' of the *Intifada*. Let us fulfill our obligations as they appear in the Road Map and in the Basic Law, and let us convince the world that we have fulfilled our obligations and that Sharon must fulfill his (...)”

Lopez Martinez (2013) defines, refines and details the methods of nonviolent action, distinguishing those that could be classified as armed and violent means of struggle or cruel, inhuman and degrading methods (which cause injury, suffering and death), but most importantly, Martinez also differentiates democratic procedures and alternative means of conflict solution from specifically nonviolent methods. Both concepts have often been mixed up, creating theoretical and practical confusions.

In *Refusing to Be Enemies, an interview-based study*, Maxine Kaufman-Lacusta (2013) emphasizes the strategic advantage of nonviolent methods of resistance. She gives to over one hundred nonviolent activists and scholars, virtually all Palestinian or Israelis, a forum to speak on their own involvement in nonviolent resistance against the occupation, as well as about the strategies and tactics employed by Palestinian and Israeli organizations, both separately and in joint initiatives. She further highlights case studies of effective nonviolent campaigns as well as the many obstacles encountered. In her viewpoint, these nonviolent actions counterbalance the Israeli doctrine which is plainly trying to gain time and to manage the struggle according to its own interests without seeking a mutually satisfying end. This strategy is intended to collapse the Palestinian popular will and therefore make Palestinians surrender and hand over more legitimate rights of their own.

There is no doubt that the Israeli occupation measures have largely contributed to the emergence of innovative models of resistance, especially in light of an increasing level of severe Israeli practices such as house demolitions, land confiscation, prevention of building licenses, the separation wall, and collective punishments against the Palestinians (Checa Hidalgo, 2016). Nevertheless, the Palestinians had to find new ways to face the repeated attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians with military backing and a plethora of other practices visible throughout the West Bank and Gaza, such as the use of repression materials like rubber bullets, gas, and no conventional weapons as well as the utilization of the international media in order to convey their message to the world as the victims of this struggle.

The Islamic feature of many resistance movements and uprisings related to many other events like the 9/11 attacks on New York, the 2004 Madrid attacks, the 2015 Paris attacks, or the more recent 2016 Brussels terrorist attacks as well as the identification of terrorism and Islam have distorted the very heart and essence of the Palestinian struggle for freedom and land usurpation, without overlooking their own

responsibilities by undertaking violent means to counterbalance Israeli oppression and injustice.

However, nonviolent techniques are not to be confused with nonviolence as a religious or ethical believe, but what will be discussed in this article is nonviolent action as a form of struggle. For instance, popular nonviolent resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was a prominent part of the first Palestinian Intifada from 1987 to 1993, which was both a success and a failure.

This article presents a new form of collective popular resistance against Israeli occupation through the Bab Al-Shams virtual village experience, which could be regarded as a significant development in the history of popular resistance against Israeli occupation. The activists chose the location carefully to build up this virtual village as a symbol of resistance against the ongoing land confiscation policy of the Israeli government⁸³. This paper explores and analyses this new model of resistance embodied in the construction of a virtual village in the E1 area, currently located close to the part of Jerusalem under Israeli control, near the Israeli settlement of Ma‘ale Adummim.

The virtual village might be considered as a turning point in the Palestinian nonviolent resistance against the Israeli occupation policy in the Palestinian lands of the West Bank. On the one hand, this tactical modification in the previous Palestinian Doctrine would re-guide the public opinion on international as well on Arabic and Palestinian levels.

On the other hand, the Bab Al-Shams set-in sets the path to a novel nonviolent method that should be considered as a new tool to expand the culture of nonviolence in the region. This experience depicts a new form of showing the occupying force that the Palestinian people could go through new forms of nonviolent ways that could get the attention of the Israeli people and the international media as well.

I believe that the paragraph is unnecessary. I’d delete it. The initiative was born from the very deep will of the local committees of Popular Resistance in Palestine, which are nongovernmental groups (some with political links to PLO) that offer support to

⁸³ This zone, legally-owned land by Palestinian peasants, is constantly threatened for confiscation allegedly because it is located beside a military zone and it is in the midway between Jerusalem and Jericho. The activists selected the land meticulously because they were aware of the consequences of the Israeli government retaliation.

the Palestinian villagers, peasants and many others through the organization of demonstrations, set-ins, legal counseling and media information.

We have to note here that the Palestinian Authority (PA) has received pressures from several Arab regimes to be more flexible and to welcome new solutions giving up some historical demands, which made the Palestinian themselves feel lonely in this tedious and never-ending struggle in their demands.

In this article, we will try to highlight the most outstanding points of this new tactic of resisting the occupation. We shall try to provide a new model for the development of the collective consciousness of the Palestinian people in relation with popular resistance. The study intends to understand the reasons behind the development of this new form of popular resistance and the meaning of teamwork for the participants and those who made it possible. On the other hand, it will set up a base for awareness of this significant issue that might constitute a “new” core concept of the Palestinian-Israeli struggle. This work is mostly based on interviews and bilateral and collective conversations with the activists and other simple inhabitants of the region.

We will try to expose this state-of-the-art experience explaining the details, challenges, positive and negative aspects, as well as its national, international and political dimension, designing it in an academic outline as one form of new global model of nonviolent resistance. This new form of resistance is so unique and innovative that few written direct references are exposed in the bibliography; being most of the information collected in this article achieved among the personal reflection of the participants. Despite this lack of abundant bibliographical sources, the, we count on the rich information collected during our visits to the virtual village, which gave us the chance to gather information from the activists themselves at-site with even more sentiments and details than other bibliography resources could do. We also had the chance to work through the social networks, mainly Facebook, which was the main tool that some of the activists use to profusely exchange information and ideas, organize themselves and engage in interesting internal debates, all being available in the personal profiles of the activists. This source has been a priceless mean to get to understand this nonviolent experience in detail thanks to the bounteous information posted on it. Certainly, not having Facebook as a source of information would have substantially impoverished this article. Indeed, it would have been

impossible to fairly reflect what the experience meant for those involved, as there is not yet any written alternative to get to the daily life core of this nonviolent action.

The above mentioned fact will not make us forget the many authors that wrote their reflections after an analytical study about the nonviolent resistance in general and Bab Al-Shams in particular.

In this regard, we should note that the article has paid particular attention, among others, to Gene Sharp, the founder of the Albert Einstein Institution, known for his extensive writings on nonviolent struggle, which have influenced numerous anti-government resistance movements around the world; the researcher in political sciences Professor Mazin Qumsiyeh, who has written several books on the Palestinian struggle and popular resistance in Palestine; and finally, Abeer Qubti, a Palestinian writer, journalist, political activist and media coordinator for the Popular Resistance Coordination Committee, who has written numerous essays in the art of popular resistance in the Palestinian struggle.

ii. Methodology

a. Research Hypothesis and methodology

We argue that, through the experience of building the Bab Al Shams village, nonviolent resistance may have a strategic advantage over violent resistance for two main reasons:

First, the repression of nonviolent campaigns leads to great support for them both internally and externally with the power of the contemporary media techniques and social networks where the spread out of the news are much easier.

Second, the nonviolent resistance initiatives appear to be more open to negotiation and bargaining because they do not threaten the lives or well-being of the targeted occupying force.

The above research hypothesis could be established with these following research questions about this new experience of popular struggling:

- What impact it had on the Palestinian consciousness?
- What impact it reached on the media and did this form of resistance raise international awareness?
- How effective it was against occupation policy?
- What were the Israeli public and authority reaction and opinion?

These questions could be some of the many posed questions that we can pull out of

this innovative experience.

Concerning research methodology and design, the article is connected to a doctoral dissertation based on the actions of popular resistance committees and the nonviolent struggle in the Palestinian territories in general. The research is based on collected information from structured questionnaires (interviews) addressed to members of these committees. The thesis also focuses on their in-site experiences like clashes with the Israeli authorities, their different points of views on how to set up and initiate the project, etc.

This first hand ground information is backed with desk research based on articles, books reviews, social media references, websites, etc.

b. The Questionnaire

The interviews were held to 90 interviewees in a way to know the motivation of the participants in the set-in, their intentions, their reflections and their predisposition to go through this new way of popular resistance. The interviews were held with to the following groups:

- 20 Peasants.
- 25 Students.
- 5 Palestinian authorities, local representatives and teachers.
- 20 Refugee camp inhabitants.
- 5 Palestinians from 1948 land.
- 10 Local inhabitants from neighboring villages
- 2 Civil Israeli citizens (pacifists)
- 3 International foreign pacifists.

c. Questionnaire contents

The questionnaire contains the following questions:

- Do you believe in the nonviolent methods as a strategy against Israeli occupation?
- What would you change or improve in this experience? Give another kind of nonviolent methods.
- What was your own role in the sit-in?
- Did you feel completely satisfied with what you did in this set-in? (Personal

question).

- Do you think that the experience is worth being repeated?
- Do you think that the Israeli authorities have been overwhelmed by this kind of pacific protest?
- Are you afraid of the consequences (Israeli retaliation or reprisals)?
- Did the set-in give the desirable outcomes?
- Did the media catch the right piece of message that every participant intended to send?

We must underline that we tried to include all kind of activists in the interviews according to their social status and ages, but some of them were not willing to give us their points of view or even their names due to their fear of Israeli retaliations (i.e. fines, administrative arrest, legal cases, etc.)

The collected information is applied and compared to similar theoretical field studies together with the experience gained through attending conferences and debates about the concept of nonviolent resistance. For instance, the second Palestinian congress for popular resistance held in Hebron in July 2012 exposed some nonviolent resistance methods as well as the forth Palestinian congress for popular resistance held in Ramallah 2014, where emphasis was made on forming a unified national leadership for the popular resistance

Moreover, the steps and endpoints of the experience are sequenced in a way that properly identify the needed data, as in-depth questions were asked through interviews conducted via email with a group of organizers and participants in this unique and innovated experience.

On the other hand, the impact of the event on the media and on what was published is an important tool to spread out the event with biased or non-biased intentions. This fact would lead to analyze the intentions of who steer the media and what kind of concealed intentions the media try to set up on the political arena. Yet, Abeer Qubti (2013) maintains that the experience is not an inflection point in the Palestinian resistance but a logic and natural continuity of the path of resistance with its failures and successes.

iii. Discussion

a. Implementation of the project

The Bab Al Shams set-in was an ambitious plan to be carried out. Both Palestinian

and foreigner activists were conscious about the obstacles that could be faced, so the most important factor was that the activists started to take into account what was on paper; the ~~new~~ plan of Popular Resistance”.

i. The “new plan of Popular Resistance”

The Palestinians know the Israeli idiosyncrasy so well, especially that of the Israeli authorities and the Army. The execution of the plan had to endure at least for some days to have a political impact both on the Israeli society and on the international media. The activists were aware of the power of the media and considered it as the most effective tool that could convey their message to the world, so they must take advantage of it. Therefore, the organizers had to be conscious about how to divide the roles into the group, who would take charge of the media, the logistic stuff, the transportation, the contact with the Palestinian authorities, the legal consultancy, etc. As stated by Mohammed Assaf, the Director General of Radio Mawtini and one of the activists that we met in Bab Al- Shams camp during my interview to him:

—This dramatic development in the performance of a new form of popular resistance, building residential village on a threatened land to be confiscated, attracted many international, regional and local media outlets and this coverage was echoed through political and diplomatic levels in many countries. This new and innovative experience was respected and admired worldwide.”

The Plan was aiming at basically resisting the occupation; in other words it was just like other military plans that had to be considered with total secrecy. The idea was to get the Israeli authorities overwhelmed and astonished, which would make them react high-handedly without any idea on how to face the new way of resistance.

ii. Time Selection

In media and Journalism studies, it is known that when two events coincide, the less important event turns into important when the media focus on it. The Palestinians chose the right time with the Obama visit to Israel so the event had a high impact on the media.

iii. The Location

The selection of the site ought to have political and strategic significance for the Israeli security. One of the long plans of the Israeli authorities in the West Bank is to divide the region in North and South in the Jerusalem E zone. The selection of Bab Al

Shams virtual village was consciously and carefully chosen because there is a military post beside the camp, and the land belongs to Palestinian that own documents approved by the Israeli legal authorities themselves.

In January 2013, the date that the idea was prepared for, this virtual village included 250 Palestinian and foreign activists ready to stay for two nights. These activists erected 25 tents on private Palestinian land legally registered to the Israeli authorities. To build such a village was carefully identified as something sensitive especially because it was going to be located next to one of the biggest settlements in Jerusalem, Ma’ale Adummin, a few meters away from the main police station in the area close to Anato Israeli military camp, and near an Israeli border guards headquarter. Likewise, this area is very close to the main road that connects the Jordan Valley with Jerusalem. The Israeli authorities planned to build 4000 housing units to connect Ma’ale Adummin settlement with the road that heads to Jerusalem.

iv. Legal Assistance

There were legal consultants between the activists who participated in the set-in. One day before the set-in, the lawyers went with the land owners to the Israeli court to bear and check out all the relevant documents to make sure that the confrontation with the Israelis would be astonishing and overwhelming for them legally so they would do nothing to dismantle the camp until they would receive an order from the government. According to Isabel Kershner in her article of the New York Times of JAN. 11, 2013 Muhammad Khatib (2013), a veteran member of the grass-roots Palestinian Popular Struggle Coordination Committee argued that:

“We went through a legal confrontation in the Israeli Supreme Court which revealed how racist and unjust the Court was as it yielded to the dictates and the decisions of the Israeli security forces. Actually, we didn’t fight that legal battle to recognize its legitimacy or to obtain a permit from them to stay in the ground, but to maneuver and stop the implementation of evacuation decision and to benefit from longer time to keep the village on the ground.”

(Muhammad Khatib 2013)

v. Political Issue

This activity has its great importance on the political arena insomuch as it came after the UN resolution held on 29 November 2012 to admit the state of Palestine as a non-member observer at the United Nations. That was a message to deliver to the world

that the nonviolent resistance is included in the Palestinian agenda of popular resistance.

vi. Logistics

The famous activist Marwan Bargouthi who was there in the camp told us:

–The place was inspected and the hill was chosen near the –Azz‘ayim” village to be easily accessible by participants both on foot and by vehicle. This was necessary in order to ensure logistical support for participants and to provide them their daily needs, and therefore easy to access by medical personnel and media coverage. Moreover, the location over the hill overlooked the main road which made it easier to observe any movement by the Israeli army.”

vii. Participants in the set-in

The activists insisted in that Bab Al Shams set-in was a new way of popular resistance so all Palestinian individuals from different social strata could and should take part in the project. One of these activists was Faraj who holds the position of Secretary–general of the Fatah youth movement, during our interview with him he insisted in the social variety of those who participated in the set-in:

–Most of whom were youth, college students, educated people, activists from all various cities, villages, refugee camps and Palestinians from the lands occupied in 1948. In addition, an active participation by local communities of nearby villages along with international supporters took place in the set-in. The experience was a very distinctive popular event that relied on a strong belief and faith in the concept of popular resistance that joined participants together to challenge the settlement policies. Such experience confirmed the possibility of teamwork by Palestinians despite their intellectual, political, ideological, social, religious, cultural and regional differences. They could form an integrated harmonious team with shared objectives to ensure the success of the experience.”

b. The Historic Declaration of Bab Al Shams

On the morning of Friday November 1th 2013, action started on the implementation of the plan through a public call for the establishment of a winter camp in the City of Jericho, to ensure confidentiality and to avoid any siege on the region by the Israeli

soldiers before the activists’ arrival. All things went well as prepared for. All participants arrived to Ramallah and on the next day, a core group of popular resistance committee members headed to the site at 5:00 am and built tents and all the necessary facilities.

The Lebanese writer Eilas Khoury’s novel *Gate of the Sun*, which talks about the return of Palestinian refugees, turned into a reality that came as a practical response to the Israeli settlement policies. It also proved that activists of the popular resistance could surprise the Israeli occupation through their unity, readiness and confidentiality. The element of surprise was one of the most important success factors of the experience, which obtained great importance and international recognition. The village was consciously organized from within, everyone knew his or her role and what to do, and all of them had been cautiously warned about not to clash with the Israeli army.

After all, that was the main goal of the set-in. Life started to go on in the village; nobody believed that all things were prepared in so little time. The perfect coordination of the project gave the activists a self-confidence boost. Another activist was Khawaja, he underlined during our interview with him:

—A field work committee was formed and divided into small groups, as educational, cultural and entertainment programs were designed. Also, a local council was agreed on and a health unit was built under the supervision of a participant physician.”

On January 11, 2013, the Popular Struggle Coordinating Committee (PSCC) released the following statement, the historic declaration of Bab Al Shams:

—We, more than 250 Palestinians, sons and daughters of Palestine from all throughout the land, announce the establishment of Bab Al-Shams Village. We are the people, without permits from the occupation, without permission from anyone, sit here today because this is our land and it is our right to inhabit it and build. We are sitting in the land which the Israeli occupation authorities announced several months ago that it would build 4000 settling units on it. We have resolved to build Bab Al-Shams Village to say that we will not allow any Israeli settlements construction on our own lands and to say that we do believe in resistance. We do assert that this village will survive until its owners attain

their rights to it.”

i. Israeli Reaction

As mentioned above, the plan was prepared and kept secretly to get the Israelis overwhelmed. Certainly, when the Israeli jeeps came to the village at the early morning, there were surprised about what happened there. The Israeli security has always been an important issue for the authorities, controlling almost everything and thus spending a lot of money to maintain it at the highest level. The incident posed a question to the authorities: how come that few people in the stillness of the night built up a small village near an important military base?

The Israeli security forces were really confused. Security and military institutions issued contradictory statements on how to deal with the situation, it was election time in Israel and every political party tried to gain political advantage of the situation. The Israelis tried to find out the legal pretext to start dismantling the camp.

Lopez Martinez introduces a novel approach in the nonviolence literature in relation to the reaction of the agents of state security of oppressive regimes, in the article under the title –Over half a century of unarmed insurrections” (1950-2014). He clearly reveals the historical and political role of civil resistance in a globalized world as follows:

–Among other things, the decision to repress is among the perception of threat and capabilities of the regime itself to overcome the challenge. Also, police and soldiers often tempered when they see in front of them people whose petitions are mild or they do not constitute a real danger to their status or condition. In this sense, the agents of state security may refuse to repress when considering that the orders are illegitimate, there are unlikely threats or it is counterproductive in the context of the fight, especially if they are before thousands and thousands of people whose lives they can take forever, knowing that they are unarmed”

(López, 2015:34)

Mohammed Matar, a member of the Fatah Youth Movement and political activist and witness in the set-in stated in his Facebook account:

–They even went as far as claiming that the Palestinian participants were settlers

and terrorists who had assaulted government owned land. An operation room was set under the supervision of PM Netanyahu who practiced pressure on the participants through siege and isolation and imposed military barriers on the entrances of the village before issuing an evacuation order. The Israeli army executed the order and evacuated the village before declaring it a closed military zone. The army employed extremely violent and abrupt methods to evacuate the people from the village by brutal force. The village was destroyed in a way that reminded many of the Palestinians of the Nakba experience in 1948.”

(Matar, 2013)

As Matar pointed out, the problem imposed an important setback in the Israelis‘ plan to reshape the Palestinian struggle as terrorist actions to destroy Israel. The case was so important that the Israeli Prime Minister himself intervened to resolve the problem and ordered the Israeli court in charge to solve the problem in a public holiday.

The Palestinian analyst Abeer Qubti described wisely one of the unexpected consequences of the set-in: the Palestinians started new methods to deal with the Israelis as the makers of the news. The Palestinians had also begun the action and turned the Israelis into a position of reaction, the helpless victim came into initiative maker. Qubti wrote:

–Bab Al-Shams has succeeded in occupying the world most important headlines on TV Channels and newspapers. We were the maker of the news in a different way. We, the Palestinians got out from the reaction circle as the helpless victim to the action circle. Meanwhile, the Israelis took the role in the reaction circle to what really happened in Bab Al-Shams. In other words, I would say that the media covering of the event embarrassed the Israeli authorities toward the world and uncovered their systematic apartheid policy in the occupied territories”, (Qubti, 2013:53).

ii. Palestinian Reaction

The Palestinian media and public opinion welcomed the set-in. Nevertheless, many Palestinians were surprised by the idea. They were used to hear from their citizen fellowships all kind of stories about the resistance against the Israeli occupation, but that was something new for people who were used to go through all kind of adversities like detentions, land confiscations, deportations, etc.

In every home and every village they started to talk about the experience, some of them regretted not to have participated in it, but all of them knew that this was the beginning of a new way of resisting the occupation, that this experience could be improved and spread out in all parts of the occupied territories.

Another eyewitness and activist was Thaer Anis, a member of the Popular Resistance Committees, he told us that:

–The legal support was undertaken by the Palestinian Ministry of Local Governance, which recognized the local council of Bab Al-Shams village. On the other hand, the Ministry of Transportation presented a scheme for an official transportation line leading to the virtual village. On the local level, popular resistance was brought to the foreground and Bab Al-Shams was used as a model for later attempts to build virtual villages.”

c. Evolution and scope of the Bab Al-Shams incident

–Nonviolent popular resistance is more threatening to [the state of] Israel than armed resistance. The difference between the two is that in the first all segments of society take part, including children, women and old men, while the latter is limited to a small sector of society.”

(An anonymous activist from Bil’in village, November 2011)

After having described the events of Bab Al-Shams, in this part of the article, we turn the attention to the political, cultural, historical and social reasoning behind this novel form of nonviolent resistance to the Israeli policies of land confiscations, settlement plans, water restrictions on the Palestinian peasants and use of force.

i. The reason of the selection of Bab Al Shams

The Title –Bab Al Shams” was taken from the Lebanese writer Elias Khoury’s novel that depicts the return and the hope of resistance of the Palestinian people. The goals of the activists were:

To get there and to stay for the longest possible period of time, that being more important than the goal of accessing the camp in the biggest possible number of activists. It was also paramount to confirm the legitimacy of Palestinian land owners in their own property and to prevent long term planned settlement in the region. As M. Matar, stated in his Facebook account:

–The idea of a permanent sit-in and building a virtual village of camps in the E1

area, being a highly important strategic area threatened for Israeli confiscation, was a breakthrough idea. The significance of this area is being located in East Jerusalem. This area presents dangerous consequences of implementing the Israeli settling scheme since it would severely hinder the practicability of any possible opportunity for establishing a Palestinian state in the future. Thus this strategic area represents a serious danger to the two–state solution and putting an end to the struggle.”

(Matar, 2013)

The activists always try to innovate in their methods to draw attention at what they would do and what could be their future intentions in the nonviolent popular resistance path they have chosen. As past experience has shown in many instances, violent methods always draw more attention with tragically sad outcomes at the international level, whilst the nonviolent methods of popular resistance seldom are a TV headline. Therefore, the activists had to find out the pros and cons of every action and every step. Activists have to search for secrecy, try to invent reasons to go through restricted roads, military zones, and confiscated areas. If we wanted to mention some of these difficulties, we could cite the case of one of the interviewees that had to invent a wedding parade to reach the Bab Al-Shams village after being evicted from there for the first time. We have to say that these activists belonged to different intellectual strata and had different cultural and political backgrounds and beliefs. All of them strongly support popular resistance; everyone has to offer his own point of view on how to deal with the problem and how to contribute in the Bab Al-Shams virtual village plan.

As Mario López stated: —.it is a commitment to build a society whose highest values are installed on peace and development...” (Lopez Martinez, 2013:23)

Qubti insists that there was a kind of discouragement in the Palestinian resistance in the decade of the 1990s not only because of the Oslo accords but even due to the lack of new strategies of resistance. (Qubti, 2013:44-55)

As she points out, the culture of alternative resistance must be considered in different and innovative ways. She further insists in the main reason of that discouragement after the Oslo accords as shown below:

- These accords converted the Palestinian issue from a political and self-

determination project to a social development project that depends on the international finance with no productive plans from the Palestinian society itself.

- They accomplished the division of the Palestinian identity indirectly as a result of the PLO administration of Gaza and the West Bank and the no acceptance of the posterior elections won by Hamas it seemed that some of the Oslo conditions were not accepted by whole the Palestinians, the Gaza strip were Hamas expelled Al Fatah started to have its own projects and destiny. This division affected the Palestinian identity as “one hope, one nation, and one destiny”.
- They exempted the Israeli occupation from many responsibilities, it converted the occupation from active occupation with military presence into passive occupation throughout the A zone division in the West Bank (cities), as barriers across the West Bank turned into routine on the daily basis of the Palestinian population.
- They have succeeded in finding a new way of security coordination for the sole interest of the Israelis, only being an increasing number of colons attacks on Palestinian properties and cultivated lands.

It is the strategy and the culture of nonviolence and not only one vague will and hope what can make effective plans and action among the nonviolent popular resistance. The alternative methods should be planned from within the idiosyncratic local values. The alternative methods should not be planned and carried out by some believers or dreamers that use only some instruments without knowing how to deal with them and how to indoctrinate their own people in the culture of nonviolence.

Mary Elisabeth King describes the nonviolent struggle during the first Intifada and insists in how the Palestinians began to cultivate the spirit of resistance between their own people:

–The Palestinians began to distribute between themselves literature on the theories and methods of resistance in other parts of the world, materials like experimental applications, books, and leaflets are some of these instruments distributed by the Palestinians. These new ways of awareness made the Palestinians know how to deal with all the entities in relation with the Israeli administration.”

(King 2003:44)

ii. The Unchanged Israeli Policy

The international point of view towards the Palestinian struggle has changed due to many circumstances related to several factors, especially those that deal with Jihadist terrorism. We can say that the Israeli policy in the occupied territories has never been changed except in some minor tactical moves. However, in a wide scope, it seems to be the same, with land confiscations, new settlement plans, new Jewish settlers immigration to the occupied territories in the name of the promise land dream, water restrictions on the Palestinian peasants, aggression toward their properties and plantations, etc.

It cannot be denied that the strategy of replacing the native people with Israeli settlers in order to increase the power and hegemony of Israel in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, had some positive impacts. However, the negative ones were much greater over the inhabitants with the in-force and suffocating embargo, clearly depicting the idea that Israel is seeking for a long-term outcome for its policy dealing with the Palestinians as a colonial force, mentioning for instance the sneaky and slowly ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian inhabitants to maintain the Jewish type dominance of the West Bank

It is the long-term actions that the Palestinians should consider. They must learn out about how to deal with this issue and face the reality with new strategies understanding that nonviolent methods are more effective than the violent ones that brought nothing but tragedies, suffering and a lot of human casualties. As Gene Sharp asserted:

–It is not possible to provide a comprehensive analysis or a diplomatic history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict here. Instead, the focus is on nonviolent direct action, a set of techniques that allow ordinary individuals to wield considerable power in a conflict without the use of physical violence”

(Sharp 2005:25).

The Palestinians should think about the Israeli ongoing policy in a way that Israel cannot deal with, at least immediately. The Israelis have the power to act with violence because they are powerful enough to resort to violent methods, which they consider to be effective. They use strong-arm materials such as rubber bullets, gas,

and non-conventional weapons, we can also consider the psychological violence carried out in the Israeli prisons but on the other hand, they use the international media as well to convey their message to the world as if they were the only victims of this struggle. Israel uses other international propaganda methods to produce a victimizing message as the “surviving people in the midst of the enemy who want to wipe them out of the map”, which is a popular thought spread out between the Israelis.

iii. Different aspects of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance

There are many factors that might lead to a violent behaviour as concluded in psychology literature, according to the DMS-IV (Diagnosis and Manual Statistics in Psychiatry). As mentioned in the psychiatry literature, the stressor factor plays an important role in developing aggressive behaviors, so it is not less important to consider the Israeli policy as a stress factor among the Palestinian population in Gaza and the West Bank. Maria J. Stephan (2003) contributed greatly in the psychological effect of the nonviolent “strategy” on the adversary. She underlined that:

“The strategy is a crucial determinant of success or failure for both nonviolent and violent struggles. This important finding suggests that strategic theories of renowned military strategists like Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart and Michael Howard can be used to build upon and improve strategies of nonviolent combat. Notably, these strategists emphasize the importance of targeting the opponent’s centers of gravity and using psychological tactics to undermine political will to maintain systems of oppression as part of an overall strategy of collective defense”

(Stephan, 2003:35).

On the other hand, the violent behavior is used by two parties or more, an aggressor and a victim, each one always trying to justify his or her position regarding a certain issue, each one trying to put on all the mechanisms to give legitimacy to his or her violent actions and to discredit the other party’s violent acts. When parties practice violence, they strongly believe that their purpose is great and supreme and it is difficult to persuade them that the method is wrong. Israel uses violence in the name of fighting against terrorist groups and to preserve the security of its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the Palestinians use violent methods allegedly declaring self-defense as shown in international law fighting against the aggressor force, to reach an

independent state, etc.

We cite the Part I / Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966:

→. All Nations have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”

(Human Rights declaration of UN)

Consequently, we may agree that resistance and self-defense are based on international law, as the United Nations recognizes the nations struggle against colonization and invasion as showed in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait where the United Nations gave legitimacy to the first Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Saddam’s army. Many examples in recent history proved that people of nations worldwide fought against their invaders. For instance, the Vietnamese and Algerian revolutions achieved their goals through violent resistance, while the Indian revolution was able to do it through nonviolent resistance. On the other hand, the South African experience was a combination of the two models, violent and nonviolent.

Violent and nonviolent methods, both concepts may have confusing limits and no border-line is ought to be settle out. With our structured questions asked to the activists who have participated in the Bab Al-Shams sit-in we attempted to highlight the differences between violent and nonviolent methods to fight against the occupying force finding out the right parameters to mark off the Palestinian popular resistance in terms of pacific struggle against the Israeli occupation.

On the other hand, Palestinians adopt popular resistance as a strategy which matches with the Palestinian demands. Such popular resistance is intended to widen the circle of popular participation more than other forms of resistance. Besides, it could achieve better political results and prove to be more difficult in the long run for the occupation. In addition, such resistance decreases the number of victims and mobilizes a greater level of international solidarity with Palestinian rights in the hope of eventually leading to the attainment of freedom. (Qumsiyeh, 2011:39)

The analysis itself focuses on the issue of nonviolent resistance from the point of view of the popular struggle against the invader. However, what about the Israeli occupations plans against the civil inhabitants? Whether we talk about the Israelis or the Americans in Vietnam or the British in India, we must highlight that the occupier methods are always the same: violent methods to wipe out and cut off all kind of popular resistance, in other words we would say that rarely the occupying authorities rarely try to warn the people from being face to face or to confront them, which in many times leads to clashes between two parts.

Points of weakness exist in both models of resistance whereas occupation forces use violence in most cases as it is an easy way to force people to leave their lands and to control both the land and remaining inhabitants. When the occupied people use different methods of resistance, the aggressors use systematic violence as the easiest way to suppress any form of resistance to the occupation (Qumsiyeh 2011:54).

Marwan Darwish made a good analysis of how the Israelis started to deal with the violent methods toward the Palestinians to justify their reasons:

–Jabotinsky, founder of Revisionist Zionism and father of the Israeli civil rights, argued that it is only through the establishment of military force impervious to Arab pressure that the Jewish homeland can be secured. Ben Gurion voiced the same conclusion after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1936, advocating for a gradualist strategy combined with the use of military power in order to force Arab neighbours and Palestinians to acquiesce to the establishment of a Jewish state in the “Land of Israel”. To implement such a strategy Israel has had to base its approach on the use of force, in the knowledge that Palestinians would not give up their national rights through free choice. Only through suppression could Israel impose its own will and agenda on the Palestinians and Arabs, compelling them to negotiate from a weak position. By examining the history and trajectory of the Israeli Arab conflict since 1948 we can see the success of this policy and the impact that Israel’s military supremacy has had on conflict dynamics. Israel first signed the Camp David peace agreement with President Sadat of Egypt in 1979, it also signed the Oslo agreement with the PLO in 1993, and immediately afterwards signed a peace agreement with Jordan. In all of these, Israel was the powerful party. The military imbalance of power in favour of Israel has been translated to political coercion in the form of imposing

political conditions for ~~peace~~ agreements”. Meanwhile, Israel has imposed military rule on the Palestinians who remained within the borders of Israel. It has imposed complex dual legal systems and policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967, with one system for the Jewish settlers and another for the Palestinians. The settlers enjoy civil and political rights as the state’s Jewish citizens, while the Palestinians have been denied their civil and political rights.”

(Darwish, 2013:158)

iv. Nonviolent methods versus violent methods

The violent methods have always the same fate of injury, harm, casualties, etc. We constantly talk about clashes between two parties in the Palestinian conflict with car bombs, stabbings, car-hittings, shootings, etc., but the result is almost the same with more high-handed detentions, curfew, etc. As we pointed out, the occupying forces repeatedly use the same methods to control the civil population, but in the other hand the nonviolent popular resistance has many ways to be carried out. Such nonviolent resistance (set-in, boycotts, strikes,...etc) has many positive impacts on people’s general participation and can provide them with experience in practicing such resistance, making them more confident in defying the occupation policies and its military ability of imposing its own violent methods. Nonviolent resistance is so diverse and it can reach all kind of Palestinian social strata, such as students, peasants, youngsters and elderly people. All of them have their point of views and imagination, all of them can provide the Palestinian issue with many ideas for popular resistance, collectively or separately. All in all the popular resistance is an effective way to pull in international media and social attention. Many of the most successful examples in history are known for their nonviolent struggle (Gandhi, Mandela, Luther King, etc.). However, as we stated out, it is the culture and not the methods that leads to nonviolent thought and acts, it is the education, the preparation, the idiosyncrasy, the learning from own and alien history, it is the culture of Jesus Christ as a Palestinian Jewish who educated his disciples to fight the Romans with nonviolent ways, with the message of love and hope. As somehow the culture of nonviolence emerged from the civil disobedience in a collective way, this disobedience must be forged to be more powerful than the governmental authority.

The American philosopher Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862) gave meaning to the concept of civil disobedience in his essay ‘Civil Disobedience’, published in 1849. He opposed to pay the tax fees set by the government of the United States to finance the war between Texas and Mexico and from his denial he developed a key idea for all those who followed his philosophy:

–Government should not have more power than those that citizens are willing to grant”.

Maybe the political context of Thoreau is different from that of the Palestinian issue, but civil disobedience is likely to be considered by those who sympathize with the Palestinians feelings and struggle. For instance, in the same Israeli society, the so known Israeli pacifist movement Peace Now is so active between the Israelis, especially among those of leftist ideology, that it could do more from its part to force the Israeli government to re–consider its policy in the occupied territories.

On the other hand Gene Sharp (2005) pointed out that: –Nonviolent resistance can provide a joint cooperation opportunity and can promote internal relations of resisting communities. Moreover, it can enhance the performance of independent groups and local community institutions that constitute a fundamental part of social context, besides its ability to mobilize the capacities and abilities of citizens to face brutal and suppressing measures taken by occupation forces against their freedom and dignity.”

Mainly we should point out that the results of any popular resistance are not only the personal endpoint of each member of the participants in the teamwork, but a collective project in their main goal as a group, on the other hand the proposed questions in the case of the Bab Al-Shams set-in that each activist should take into account were:

- Did the set–in give the desirable outcomes?
- Did the media catch the right piece of message that every participant intended to send?
- Did I feel completely satisfied with what I have done in this set–in? (Personal question).

The significance of nonviolent popular resistance lies in its ability to achieve remarkable results on the political and media levels. On the other hand, this nonviolent struggle must have the ability to mobilize international solidarity,

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empower the internal front and consider its affordable human costs compared to other forms of resistance.

Knowing well the Israeli policy and its ins and outs is a good beginning on how to deal with it in pacific terms of popular resistance. Since Israel has been established in 1948, the Israeli social strata has become so diverse in relation to the own Zionist concept of one land, one people. Indeed, the people that came from the diaspora were not the same in terms of culture neither language, the Sephardists being so different from the Ashkenazi, as the Ethiopian Jews differ from others, just to mention some examples.

That complex social structure should be considered by the Palestinians as a first step to their nonviolent struggle. The racism within the Israeli society is patently plain and many Israeli organizations complain from the different way of treating the Jews by the Jews themselves. In fact, the Ashkenazi controls the sensitive posts in the Israeli government, being the majority of the Israeli presidents and prime ministers from Ashkenazi origin.

When we met Aaloll who was a member of Al-Fatah party, he pointed out how this gap is taking its toll on the Israeli society:

–The Palestinian resistance compared to other global liberation movements, has some special features, the base of the Palestinian–Israeli struggle being an ideological, political, cultural and settling struggle through which Israel has aimed to establish a fascist Jewish state which practices Zionist racism in the name of ethnic nationalism. Even the Israeli society itself suffers racism through classifying its citizens according to the places they immigrated from. It is a systematic settling project whose aim from the beginning was to eliminate Palestinians from the geographic and demographic map of Palestine”

People in all its diverse strata should know that the popular resistance is not a bed of roses. Popular resistance worldwide found a lot of obstacles throughout history. These obstacles are either planned by the occupying force itself or they are logic obstacles that could meet every kind of resistance actions, and every kind of plan. To give an example of collective action, we could mention what a group of Palestinian women

did in the Dheisheh camp near Bethlehem in 1988 during the first Intifada. This camp was known as a site of frequent clashes between Palestinian refugees and Israeli soldiers and settlers. The women started to wail and shout for three nights in a row, forcing Israeli troops who had set up tents near the camp to leave. Although this was a minor retreat, it was a positive demonstration of the power of collective action

The Palestinians know that they deal with a powerful, smart and quick-witted occupying force. With the Oslo accords the Palestinians started to find out that the Israelis were trying to find new solutions for being rounded up in a new way of resistance shaped out in the first Intifada also known as the stones uprising. The Bab Al Shams set in as a brand new popular resistance sent a message to the world: a new way of resistance was coming through the Palestinian modern society, a nonviolent resistance where all kind of people with different ages were coming through that state of the art resistance. It was stones against bullets, slingshot against tanks. Although this resistance could not be merely identified as nonviolent resistance, it was nevertheless a shared resistance of all the Palestinian social strata.

As many Palestinians considered the Oslo accords as a truce, the Intifada, coupled with the change in the prevailing internal and international circumstances, forced the Israelis to go through that truce and to sit down face to face to talk about all the issues that concern the Palestinians and the Israelis themselves. Maybe it was not that total victory because it reshaped the participation of the various sectors of the Palestinian society members insomuch as the participation in the popular resistance of the Intifada has been decreased due to the new concepts of the conflict brought by new circumstances imposed by the Oslo accords, but it sent a clear message to the world about an important issue that deals with the will of a whole people who wanted to live freely, a people who shared in the resistance against the occupation with all its members.

The Bab Al- Shams set-in has the genuine intention to innovate in popular resistance and collective actions, but still take the whole action of all the Palestinian people into account. Mary Elisabeth King brilliantly described in her book:

—The Palestinians started to figure out that non-violent actions is almost less costly to them while it would be an everlasting struggle for the Israelis and hence, more costly to a state with high expenses in security and that would force the Israelis to set down to negotiate. In fact the Israelis at beginning of the

Intifada considered it as a violent movement and lately started to see it as a political and social phenomenon that smooth out the road to Oslo. On the other hand the Palestinians gradually began to be aware of the Israeli military power after many military failures of the PLO (the last one in South Lebanon) and other Arab countries. In these turbulent years of the seventies and the eighties where many armed confrontations between the PLO and the Israeli forces were carried out, the Israelis didn't intend to distinguish between non-violent and violent actions of the Palestinians, so this was a good issue to be exploited by the Palestinians in their non-violent actions. Other reason worthy to be pointed out is that of addressing the world of their cause in a non-violent way no less important than others occurred in India, Czechoslovakia or South Africa.”

(King, 2007:63)

Aallol pointed out on his Facebook that those changes in the popular resistance in the Palestinian history during the Israeli occupation led to the evolution of the concept and methods of popular resistance as a means of confronting the settlement problem and ever growing dispossession of Palestinian land. Every form of resistance has its own historical, geographical and political context, and this form was subject to several factors, internal and external, both regional and international. This is where the popular resistance roots lie deep in the march of the Palestinian resistance, having begun since the early stages of the occupation of Palestine. The popular resistance movement has undergone various circumstantial changes during the long years of struggle which has led to the elaboration of the idea of the collective consciousness towards the concept and methods of popular resistance (Aallol, 2013).

v. Creativity in the Popular Resistance

The Palestinian people have been creative in developing different models and forms of popular resistance as we saw in the first Intifada. So, we should mention the execution of general strikes, the holding out of local elections that challenged the rule of the Israeli Military Administration in the West Bank, and the first popular uprising itself, which echoed throughout the world.

On the other hand, the employment of actions of protest and noncooperation throughout popular marches, folklore festivals, confronting the apartheid wall, incursions to Israeli commercial centers and raising the Palestinian flag therein, the

shutting down of bypass streets, economic boycott campaigns and academic boycotts, were effective tools to face the Israeli policy in terms of civil disobedience, inasmuch as many of them disregard the Israeli laws of curfew, military zones...etc. Most recently, the National Week of Palestinian Youth that was organized at the end of 2012 gave boost to the development of the concept and performance of popular resistance, and expanded the circle of popular participation, especially seeing that it coincided with the Palestine Independence Day on November 15th. Tens of thousands of Palestinians and international supporters went out to the streets raising the Palestinian flag on all occupied Palestinian land, and closed roads to Israeli settlers. All this came as a response to the will of the Palestinian people and in accordance with the UN resolution to recognize an independent Palestinian state, as stipulated in resolutions of international legitimacy.

We will not forget the ultimate techniques in social network and Internet (Facebook, Twitter, What's app....etc.) in gathering the activists in certain places to demonstrate or to protest nonviolently against a definite unjust decision from the Israeli authorities. On the other hand Internet forums start to be shaped as virtual rallies for the activists to discuss their needs and their plans to go through a specific popular action in certain villages. In the previous part of this study we presented some interviews carried out by certain activists that showed us Internet as an efficient method to go through their demands and their protests in Bab Al- Shams set-in, to clear up this idea, it is known that Israel always try to hide information from the very site of the event, the activists in Bab Al Shams tried to reflect purely what was happening there using their phone camera and recording message voices and send them instantaneously from the site of the event .

The documentation of the experience of this nonviolent action against the Israeli occupying forces put in an academic context the experience and enriched it with detailed discussion, evaluation, criticism and inquiries in a manner of academic research, making this one of the international experiences of nonviolent resistance worth studying.

—The brutality of the occupation, revealed in the media, polarized Israeli society and damaged Israel's international standing. Even the traditionally cohesive and non-critical American Jewish community began to launch protests, expressing pain and outrage at what Israel was perpetrating in the Occupied Territories in

the name of Jews around the world. A powerful moral dimension had been injected into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the first time. By the third year of the Intifada, the Israeli government was compelled to reconsider its techniques. Criticism of the occupation, including the high economic costs of maintaining a vigilant occupying presence in the West Bank and Gaza and defending Israeli settlements in the territories, became mainstream in Israel and in the international community.”

(Stephan, 2003:161)

d. Results of the Experience

In light of this article, we addressed the experience of Bab Al-Shams virtual village throughout the experience of those who implemented and participated in it in order to benefit from such experience and put it in an academic outline for further nonviolent resistance studies. The Bab Al-Shams experience represented hope and confidence in Palestinian popular resistance through an innovative model for those who seek freedom and justice throughout nonviolent methods of struggling. This nonviolent experience could be seen as successful as the goal was to get there and to stay for the longest possible period of time, which was more important than the numbers of activists to access the camp. Other goals were the confirmation of the legitimacy of land owners in their own property, to the prevention of long term planned settlement in the region, the creation of networks by socializing the culture of nonviolence among a groups of diverse geographical as well as cultural and social origins, to build more permanent structures, and to take the initiative of offensive nonviolence.

On the other hand, this experience showed another way of participation for all kind of people in Palestine, especially civilians who believe in their role as strugglers for their rights and freedom. Civilians who are victims of land confiscations, illegal detentions, and illegal fines shared this experience to show the whole world that they can fight tyranny with different methods.

Nevertheless, there were of course some aspects which could have been performed better and factors which may be classified as failures in the experience such as the following:

First, all participants should have thought that popular resistance in nonviolent ways is serious endeavor and should be considered with all its plans and methods.

Second, every activist should have been conscious about his own role in the struggle.

Third, the selection of the participant activists should have been more cautious related to what everyone could and could not do in personal capabilities terms.

Fourth, the experience should have had a scientific follow-up in social forums and media in order to set up an example and be improved in future initiatives.

Fifth, the activists should have cared to send a message to the Palestinian educators to deepen the culture of nonviolence among the education plans over the next generations.

Moreover, the law experts should keep on studying the Israeli rules to find out new legal loopholes, so future experiences can be adopted in a way to embarrass the Israeli authorities again.

We should also take into account all these aspects, analyze them and find out all that went right and wrong in this set-in. We should note here that we could have extended the sample of the interviews, but the limitation of movements imposed by the Israeli forces in the West Bank was a major obstacle to do that.

e. Conclusions

The experience of Bab Al Shams set-in shaped a novel way of fighting the Israeli occupation through popular resistance. Among the findings of this study, some points ought to be considered:

- This experience showed a new way of resisting against the occupation in Palestine through the collective will of all Palestinian social strata.
- Popular resistance is not an arbitrary struggle; it needs conscious planning and the right selection of a head staff that could move according to all needs from logistics such as medical caring and internet connection, to the selection of the right moment to start the action, etc.
- Well-planned action would secure continuous impact and results especially on the international scene.
- The Bab Al-Shams experience was a profound message to the leaderships of both Palestinian and Israeli authorities urging them to find a new ways of negotiating, since it forms a part of an ongoing nonviolent struggle while at the same time the Palestinian Society has to be patient and deal with the shortcomings of freedom, land confiscation, illegal detention, etc.
- At the same time, the participants and the activists from all parts of the

occupied territories should draw lessons from failures and successes of this experience to further improve new ways of nonviolent resistance. These actions of nonviolence have to be a part of nonviolence culture and not to constitute isolated actions. As the culture of nonviolence has its values and principles (patience, planification, team work, believe in long term results, etc.), the Palestinians could find innovative nonviolent techniques that would give more tangible results.

- This culture of nonviolent resistance should be adopted by all Palestinians and not only by the Activists, since the creed of nonviolence is not something to deal with in a simplistic way, but it is the culture of many generations. It should be the culture of the mass and not the action of a small group of activists who try to use alternative ways to fight the powerful Israeli military machinery.
- The nonviolent methods could penetrate the international opinion more than violent methods and the Palestinians must deliver further messages to the Israeli public opinion notifying them that their struggle is not headed toward them as civilians, but toward the unfair policy of their government.

Some more conclusions stem from the opinions expressed by the interviewees-participants in this unique experience:

- As an overall analysis of these interviews, it could be maintained that the majority of the activists (80, 6%) would prefer nonviolent actions.
- Most of the respondents (90, 23%) insisted on legal consultation as a previous way to start the actions, because they viewed the legal battles employed by the Israeli authorities as an overwhelming method against these nonviolent initiatives. On the other hand, the rest insisted in giving political meaning to the experience, so that the international community would understand the issue in political terms rather than as a legal battle over disputed territories.
- To improve the project, some activists focused on repeating the experience from other perspectives using previously destroyed Palestinian villages such as the Bab Al Karama tent (20 January 2013), the Jenin protest village (26, January 2013), the Nablus protest village (3, February 2013), the Canaan protest village (10, February 2013), thus increasing the impact on international

opinion through the media against these Israeli activities.

- The majority of the interviewees (63.5 %) insisted on the importance of social networking by using network websites and social networks as a way to spread out every project between the popular committees.
- The majority of the interviewees (over 65%) had the opinion that secrecy is a good factor to initiate a well-coordinated plan.
- The vast majority of the interviewees (79.2 %) did not care about the Israeli retaliation against them, because they considered that these actions were the most effective way to resist occupation.

On the other hand, the questions posed in the interviewees could be interpreted in the light of the experience itself.

- Did Bab Al Shams set-in reach its impact on the Palestinian consciousness?

Many Palestinians saw this experience as a new way of popular resistance that has managed to overwhelm the Israeli Authorities. However, a lot of work has to be done in the future to improve these practices. The Palestinian strata in total must realise that the armed struggle is not the only way to reach the goals that would lead to freedom and dignity.

- Did Bab Al Shams set-in reach its impact on the media?

Only one third of the interviewees (33%) were aware of the impact of the event on the media maintaining that the experience reached the European media and changed the idea of many Europeans about the “violent” people of Palestine.

Nevertheless, the future organizers should draw lessons of this experience shaping their future plans.

- Was Bab Al Shams set-in effective against occupation policy?

The effectiveness against the Israeli occupation policy started becoming more evident since the Israeli authorities were surprised by the experience

and even the legal authorities in the Israeli courts did not know how to act. This could result in a gradual change of the Israeli policy against the Palestinian resistance as very well depicted in one of the interviewees opinion, who mentioned to us that an Israeli officer in the police station told him that with this experience there could be some changes in the Palestinian way of struggle, and this could change the Israeli perspective to avoid embarrassment in the International media.

- How the Bab Al Shams set-in influenced the Israeli public and authority's reaction and opinion

The experience of Bab Al-Shams was showed in the Israeli media and this would have changed, in the long run, the perspective of many Israelis who would like to have peace with the Palestinians and build new bridges of understanding between them (peace lovers).

This could be an obvious tool to be used in similar future initiatives gaining support from the Israeli people in Israel.

It should not be overlooked that Israelis, as all human beings, fight to have social stability and welfare to their families and that these stabilities come through the good coexistence with their neighbours.

- Did this form of resistance of Bab Al Shams set-in mobilize international awareness?

It is profound that the Bab Al Shams experience and its consequences reached the international media. However, these experiences must be repeated avoiding previous shortcomings and learning from the successes and failures. Perseverance is important in this kind of nonviolent resistance. Furthermore, it is a continuous learning process and try to learn from mistakes and enrich positive experiences. The Bab Al-Shams virtual village was a collective action of different parts of the Palestinian strata, different thoughts and different hopes, but with one intention: being

determined to keep struggling against injustice in a way that could change the local, Israeli and international understanding of the Palestinian issue.

- How to distinguish this form of resistance from previous campaigns?
Demonstrations, boycotts, Intifada, and other initiatives are known forms of nonviolent resistance to the Israeli authorities, as they dealt with them before. However, if popular organisations and the peace groups (international and local, who defend nonviolent methods, keep innovating in nonviolent popular resistance, the occupying force would get overwhelmed.

Finally, the Bab Al Shams experience has proven that more must be done by the Palestinians in order to maintain these nonviolent initiatives as a manifestation of a new “culture” and not a simple isolated plan carried out by overexcited individuals without any future long term plans.

These experiences must be culture generating tools, taught in the schools, written in the textbooks of the next-coming generations to promote a culture of nonviolence and not only as a method of fighting against the occupying forces. It is the experience itself and not only the goal; it is the way of thinking of a whole people, as a whole nation; it is the international solidarity with these people in new forms of fighting where the technology of information widens and improves the struggle in all social networks (i.e. Viber, Skype, Facebook, Twitter and other platforms).

3.4 Part III: Nonviolent resistance as driving force of social change

3.4.5 Introduction

In recent years the everyday practice reveals how ordinary people, within mass mobilizations of protests and different kind of resistance manage to overthrow governments, without using violent means (armed forces). We have witnessed how racist dictatorships have fallen (as in South Africa), as well as communist authoritarian regimes (as in Easter Europe and former Soviet Union), and military dictatorships (as in Chile and Bolivia). We have also seen how major reforms have been implemented against structural violence and legalized injustices within liberal democracies (as racist segregation in the Southern states of USA).

Nevertheless, some of these mobilizations have encountered hard obstacles and protracted violent conflicts, with few or any achievements (as in China, Syria, Egypt, Western Sahara, Tibet).

Others have overthrown their government in sudden transitions, only to find themselves within an even worse authoritarian regime than before (as in Iran), while others have succeeded to create a fundamentally more democratic and just society after a series of smaller challenges and reforms over longer periods (as in Scandinavia).

In this part of our Thesis and based on the conclusions of our surveys in the previous section (3.3.1 and 3.3.2), we argue that nonviolent activities in the forms of ‘nonviolent direct action’, ‘people power’, ‘unarmed insurrection’, ‘color revolution’ could drive wide change in the societies (political, economic, social, cultural, etc.). In other words, the well-organized, strategic and mass mobilized popular resistance brings about change and challenges domination.

3.4.6 Social Change

Social change could be described with various terms such as:

- Social Change in a broader sense encompassing a wide range of social and civic outcomes from awareness to increased civic participation and policy change
- Social Justice is described as a structural change that increases the opportunities of the least well off politically, economically, and socially. Social justice is grounded in the values and ideals of equity, access, and inclusion for

all members of society, particularly for poor communities and communities of color that historically and structurally have experienced social inequities

- Social Activism is described as activity which strives to bring about change that ensures inclusion, equity, fairness, and justice.
- Civic Engagement refers to the many ways in which people participate in civic, community, and political life and, by doing so, express their engaged citizenship.
- Civic dialogue refers to dialogue in which people explore matters of civic importance and consider the dimensions of a civic or social issue, policy, or decisions of consequence to their lives, communities, and society.
- Community Development seeks to empower individuals and groups of people by providing these groups with the skills and resources they need to effect change in their own communities.
- Cultural Development referring to activities that endeavor to express identity, concerns, and aspirations through the arts and communications media.
- Community Engagement refers to activities that strive to engage citizens and civil society organisations in order to align organizational goals, programs, and services with community interests and needs

3.4.7 Constituents of Social Change

The constituents of Social change are the following:

- ✓ Knowledge
What people know (Awareness, understanding)
- ✓ Discourse
How people communicate (Deliberation, dialogue, media)
- ✓ Attitudes
What people think and feel (Values, motivation, vision)
- ✓ Capacity
What people have and can do (Social capital, leadership, creative skills, civic engagement)
- ✓ Action
What people do (Participation, mobilization)

✓ Policies

What change is sustained (Systems, conditions, access, equity)

3.4.8 Conflict-Driven Social Change

3.4.8.1 Historical Perspective

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a North African Arab historiographer and historian, considered as the founder of the notions of conflict and resistance, explicated the need for a critical approach to social change. In his most famous work *Al Muqaddimah* or *Prolegomena* (introduction)⁸⁴ Ibn Khaldun formulated an early conflict approach to social change designed to universally apply across all societies.

Khaldun's ideas took new essence five centuries later in the critical thought of Karl Marx and Frederik Engels as they laid the basis of the contemporary understanding of conflict driven social change in their alternative system of political economy rooted in the historical and dialectical analysis of exploitation of human labor.

The working class resistance to the structured relations of capitalist exploitation was re-conceptualised as a key for the social change.

The crisis of Western Capitalism and the failure of the much promising prospects of the Communist ideological prophecies dashed with the implosion of the Soviet Union during the last decades of the 20th Century.

As the Cold war had left the organised labor and leftish forces in shambles, the centre of gravity for systemic resistance in many advanced capitalist countries had shifted towards the race and gender-based civil rights struggles.

At the same time a large number of new social movements such as environmental, anti-repression, anti-interventionist and other new forms of transnational, solidarity building organisations were becoming established.

The dynamics of mass immigration, a defining characteristic of Western Capitalist industrialization and the 21st Century global Capitalist crisis that followed, had emerged as a central contradiction. This brought about the linkage between state repression, State crime and criminalization of diverse forms of resistance in the new world order, the Palestinian nonviolent resistance being one of them.

⁸⁴ For Ibn Khaldun writing see also Franz, Rosenthal (1958), *The Muqaddimah: an introduction to history; in three volumes*, Princeton University Press.

The “Third Millennium” accompanied by a diverse array of nonviolent resistances from the Zapatista-led indigenous committees in Mexico to more compartmentalized forms of resistance such as the environmental movements or social practices that resist the exploitative impact upon affected vulnerable groups of societies.

3.4.8.2 Nonviolent resistance and Social Change: Contemporary

Examples & the cases

Nonviolent resistance and conflict transformation strategies share a common commitment to “social change and increased justice through peaceful means” (Lederach 1995, 15). As a matter of fact, the discipline of conflict management/resolution originally arose from peace movements and social justice activism (Dukes 1999, 169).

In this part of the Thesis, we will try to reveal the connection between nonviolent resistance initiatives and the involvement of all social strata explaining how the complex interactions between state and non-state actors decisively affect the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. Furthermore, historical data proves that nonviolent campaigns have long played an important transformative role in local, national and global politics promoting democracy, human rights and social justice.

We finally argue that nonviolent action remains a very effective means of achieving significant social and political change⁸⁵.

Kurt Schock (2015) in his book *Civil Resistance Today* examines the historical origins of nonviolent resistance (Gandhi, US Civil Rights) and the numerous recent movements, including both resistance to political oppression and movements for economic and social justice (e.g. occupy). He further analyses the causes of resistance and reasons for success or failure.

⁸⁵ The collection of works focusing on cutting-edge approaches to conflict-driven social change by The connection between Social change and nonviolent resistance by Richard A. Dello Buono and David Fasenfest in their book *Social Change, Resistance and Social Practices*, emphasises the role played by contemporary social movements such as environmentalists, migrant organizations, world social forum activists and others, these studies grapple with diverse forms of organized resistance in the 21st Century. From homeless peoples displaced by Hurricane Katrina to young Muslim women refusing to shun their veils in French schools, the logic of a new generation of protest is deciphered with an eye to learning from as well as informing new social forces demanding progressive change. The result is an affirmation of the continuing relevance of critical sociology in analyzing key social contradictions in the United States, Mexico, and beyond.

From this book we adapt the following indicative cases proving our above mentioned argument that nonviolent action remains a very effective means of achieving significant social and political change:

a. Popular Resistance in Communist Regimes:

• The Soviet Block between 1950s and 1970s

There were several major national movements against Soviet Communist Party rule in Eastern Europe. The death of Stalin in March 1953 precipitated an unarmed uprising in the GDR led by the trade unions, whilst the growing resistance to Communism/Stalinism in both Poland and Hungary was given new impetus by Khrushchev’s February 1956 ‘Secret Speech’ to the 20th CPSU Congress denouncing Stalin’s crimes.

In Poland the opposition among workers and intellectuals combined with significant unrest at higher levels of the Communist Party resulted to accomplishing a peaceful transfer of power in October to Gomulka (a former leader who had been a victim of Stalinist repression) and to prevent the threatened Soviet military action. This was essentially a significant example of civil resistance which, nevertheless, included some riots and the burning down of Communist Party headquarters in Poznan in June 1956.

In Hungary, a student-led uprising in October 1956 promoted another anti-Stalinist Communist leader, Imre Nagy. But the movement began demanding withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. That led the Soviet tanks (briefly withdrawn) to return and enter Budapest. As a result, the Hungarians took up arms and Imre Nagy was executed in 1958. His reburial in 1989 attracted a mass demonstration.

In Czechoslovakia, the next significant national movement for major political reforms – ‘socialism with a human face’ – developed in 1967 and 1968. The famous Prague Spring was formally inaugurated by the new Communist Party leader Aleksander Dubcek, but was pushed from below by students, intellectuals and journalists. Workers joined in much later. As the Soviet Union under Brezhnev feared that the movement was out of control, the Warsaw Pact invaded in August 1968, when the Czechs and Slovaks improvised impressive unarmed resistance that lasted for months.

In East Germany in 1953, the German Democratic Republic was the first European Communist state to respond to Stalin’s death, organizing a huge general strike in June 1953. The strike was smashed by the tanks. The intellectuals responded again in 1956 to the uprisings in Poland and Hungary, but this ‘revisionism’ was subsequently crushed.

Hungary, suffered under the brutal Stalinist regime of Rakosi until 1953 and after Stalin’s death, some sections of the Party leadership (supported by the Soviets) moved towards reform. Imre Nagy, the central figure in the reform, became Prime Minister in 1953 and allowed political debate to re-emerge. However, the hardliners made a comeback in 1955 and ousted Nagy, leading to a bitter struggle in 1956 between different factions of the Party.

Following Khrushchev’s February 1956 attack on Stalin’s crimes, intellectuals and students engaged in campaigns for change, gathering in mass demonstrations demanding greater democracy, a new

Protests erupted into fighting outside the radio building after security police fired on the crowd, and crowds also attacked the secret police stations. As a result, the government declared martial law and invited the Soviet troops triggering violent (armed) resistance by many Hungarians.

Bitter fighting followed the declaration of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and new troops moved into Hungary and attacked Budapest. However, during that period, the industrial workers, who had been at the forefront of the fighting, began to organize independent workers’ councils and to call brief general strikes.

In Poland during the period 1953-1956, there were moves within the Party for change. After the June 1956 rebellion in Poznan, students, intellectuals, workers and Catholics joined in the nonviolent resistance activities. Gomulka (who became Party Secretary in early October 1956) managed to negotiate with Khrushchev to prevent Soviet troops suppressing the popular nonviolent movement.

- The Soviet Block 1980 to 1991

During this period, the civil resistance movements in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Mongolia, the so-called the “velvet revolutions”, led to the demise of Soviet-style Communism and of the military, political and

economic bloc dominated by the USSR, and to the disintegration of the USSR itself.

The process was initiated by the 1980-81 Solidarity Movement in Poland, the most significant of recent movements of civil nonviolent resistance.

Under threat of Soviet military action, in December 1981 General Jaruzelski declared martial law. Solidarity weathered a period of severe repression, and in 1988 entered ‘round table’ negotiations with Jaruzelski, who offered to hold ‘semi-free’ elections in June 1989. Solidarity won all 35% of the seats it was allowed to contest, and – while Jaruzelski remained president – a non-Communist became Prime Minister.

In Hungary the (relatively reformist) Communist regime had allowed a degree of pluralism and dissent, including the formation of opposition parties in 1988. The mass nonviolent movements in the German Democratic Republic (GDR-East Germany) and Czechoslovakia toppled their hard line regimes, and there were less dramatic reverberations in Bulgaria.

An uprising in Romania began with nonviolent protests in Timisoara in December 1989, but soon spread to Bucharest, where armed clashes broke out, the head of state, Nikolai Ceausescu, and his hated wife were shot, and the secret police played a sinister role in overthrowing the regime.

The 1989 revolutions were greatly assisted by Mikhail Gorbachev becoming General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985 and launching a process of ‘glasnost’ (openness) and ‘perestroika’ (transformation) culminating in 1989 elections to the Soviet that offered an unprecedented opportunity for autonomous participation and choice of candidates. Alongside his internal reform programme, Gorbachev initiated a major change in relations with the West, encouraging detente and arms control. As a result the threat of Soviet military intervention – which had ended the 1956 Hungarian Uprising and (eventually) the 1968 Prague Spring – was no longer a factor in 1989. On the contrary, Moscow helped to restrain the GDR politburo from using armed force to stem the growing resistance.

The easing of controls from above in the USSR encouraged growing protests from below relating to a range of issues including human rights, the environment, opposition to nuclear power (after the Chernobyl reactor

explosion) and peace. In many non-Russian republics, such as Armenia, Georgia and the Ukraine, nationalist demands (expressed earlier in forms of dissent that was often suppressed) were strongly re-asserted.

The growing momentum of movements for independence in the three Baltic republics posed a particular challenge to Gorbachev, uncertain how far to use force to prevent secession. The likelihood of nationalist secessions was one factor in the abortive coup attempt in August 1991 by hard line party officials and figures in the military and security services. The defeat of the coup, which included popular resistance and the role of the Russian republic under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, precipitated the dissolution of the USSR.

b. Popular Resistance in other areas of the world:

• **Baltic States 1987-1991**

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, despite distinct languages and cultural and religious differences, are closely linked not only by geography, but by common interests and historical experience. All three were incorporated into the Tsarist Empire, all three enjoyed a period of independence after the First World War, and all three were annexed by the Soviet Union under the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, then occupied by the Germans and returned again to Stalinist domination from 1944. Russian immigration and policies of Russification began after 1945, and substantial Russian minorities complicated later moves towards national autonomy.

There was a degree of continuing resistance to Moscow rule after 1945, at first primarily through guerrilla warfare, and from the 1960s taking the form of nonviolent dissent. When Gorbachev's reforms opened the way to mobilization and electoral choice, all three countries moved towards greater national autonomy and then independence from 1987-1991.

• **Mongolia 1990-1991**

In Mongolia, a client state of the Soviet Union until 1990, a significant movement, sparked initially by young intellectuals demonstrating for perestroika on Human Rights Day in December 1989, by January 1990 drew much larger crowds and other sectors of the population, and developed into

successful demands for regime change. The Communist Party did, however, win the first multi-party election.

- **Tibet**

Tibet has a long history as an effectively independent Buddhist state, but was claimed as part of China by the Chinese Communists, who occupied Tibet in 1950. Under the 1951 Agreement, signed by the Dalai Lama, the Chinese promised to respect the role of Buddhism and the authority of the Dalai Lama. Since then Chinese policy has reflected its internal politics. Since fleeing to India in 1959, the Dalai Lama has been the key figure in exile and engaged in negotiations with the Chinese government. The Dalai Lama himself is strongly committed to nonviolence, but some of the exile organizations advocate violent revolt. Resistance inside Tibet has at times been violent, as in the 1959 uprising, but has also included nonviolent protests by monks and nuns.

- **China**

Although the Communists came to power in 1949 after decades of guerrilla warfare in rural areas, there is also a significant tradition of nonviolent resistance in China.

Merchants shutting down their businesses as a political protest dates back at least to the 18th, and national consumer boycotts against Japanese oppression took place in 1908, 1915 and 1919.

Students and workers demonstrated and went on strike to demand national independence from foreign colonial intervention in 1919 (during the May the Fourth Movement) and again in 1925.

During the period of Civil War from 1945-1949, protests occurred by intellectuals, students and workers against the increasingly corrupt regime of Chiang Kai-shek.

Since the Communist takeover of 1949, there have been three periods of significant dissent and protest followed by a Party crackdown on all opposition:

- ✓ **1956-57**

During 1956, when mass unrest swept through parts of Eastern Europe, there were some nonviolent resistance activities in China, such as strikes and withdrawals from agricultural cooperatives. Perhaps to

defuse unrest, or to engage intellectuals in the next stages of socialist development, the Party leadership, in particular Mao, encouraged intellectuals to speak out in this period, and many cautiously began to do so. This apparent sanctioning of dissent encouraged students also to protest and many workers to start asserting their demands through petitions, marches, hunger strikes, sit-ins and strikes. Mao and the Party responded in mid-1957 by suppressing all dissent and hundreds of thousands of intellectuals were blacklisted, students expelled, and many sentenced to manual labour or exile.

✓ **1976-79 : Democracy movement**

After Mao died in September 1976, there was a struggle at the top of the Party between ardent Maoists who had instigated the Cultural Revolution and officials anxious to promote stability. The emerging new leader Deng Xiaoping also sponsored economic (market) reforms. In this context there was a groundswell of political activity from below, first manifested in April 1976 in a popular ceremony of traditional mass mourning in Tiananmen Square for Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (viewed as a moderate), which was seen as a pro-Deng demonstration. This was the first expression of the Democracy Movement that blossomed in late 1978. Although students and intellectuals were predominant there were also peasant protests. The authorities started to arrest individual dissidents early in 1979 and closed down the Democracy Wall in December that year, but underground publishing continued.

✓ **May-June 1989 : Tiananmen mass protests**

There were signs of unrest before 1989: students in Heifei demonstrated in December 1986 against the Party's role in elections to the Peoples' Congress, and student protests spread to Shanghai and other cities. Simmering unrest continued, encouraged by conflict at the top of the Party between hardliners and those more sympathetic to intellectuals. But the spark for the mass protests of April to June 1989 was the death of the former General Secretary Hu Yaobang, forced out of office by hardliners for alleged responsibility for the protests of

December 1986. Students massed in Tiananmen Square in April to lay wreaths to Hu, and the protest rapidly developed through marches, occupation of the Square, boycott of classes and formation of autonomous student unions. The demonstrations won support from workers and other Beijing residents and spread to other parts of the country. Some Party leaders tried to conciliate the students, but in May the rise of a more radical student leadership and the launching of a hunger strike, coinciding with the visit of President Gorbachev, led most of the Politburo to endorse the imposition of martial law. This met widespread popular resistance. Numerous collections of documents and accounts of both protest and repression were compiled at the time. The sources selected here seek to give an overall perspective on events.

Secret Party papers leaked to the west provide details of the meetings, negotiations and communications between the top leaders about how to deal with the protests, and the triumph of the hardliners over Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary of the Party, who wished to be conciliatory. Western scholars generally accepted the papers as authentic.

- ✓ **A fourth period** began in the 1990s, when the increasing emphasis on the market combined with cautious steps towards political liberalization have allowed wider dissent, which is still continuing.

In China since 1990, there has been a gradual but unpredictable relaxation of controls over freedom of speech and publication and some evidence of a developing civil society. The abandonment of former socialist policies has increased the wealth of some but encouraged corruption, and left many workers, peasants and those dependent on state benefits economically insecure. As a result there has been a dramatic increase in worker unrest, public protests by pensioners, and some criticism of economic globalization. In particular, the displacement and environmental problems caused by China's massive hydropower programme, beginning with the Three Gorges Dam, has met with opposition. There is in addition evidence of

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rising rural unrest over sale of land to developers, local corruption and destruction of the environment. Campaigners are both putting up candidates in local elections and demonstrating. The government admitted that there had been 74,000 ‘mass incidents’ in 2004.

3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

–The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world’.

Hannah Arendt (1969, 80)

The history of 20th century reveals nonviolent and violent (armed) resistance struggles against unjust power systems, dictators or external occupation. The use of violent resistance methods is likely to generate further violence (as seen, for example, in the Russian and Chinese revolutions or decolonisation wars in Africa and Asia).

Nonviolent resistance activities are widely known for their successes as the Gandhian freedom struggles in India or the Martin Luther King Jr.’s civil rights campaign in the US. However, many others are still largely ignored by the wider public and research community.

Nonviolent resistance has proven to be a very strategic tool in the hand of marginalised communities to redress structural imbalance and claim rights to justice or self-determination.

The future of nonviolent resistance is well depicted in an interview with Jonathan Cook (2009), a Nazareth based journalist who writes extensively on the Middle East and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict:

–The media often represent this as a battle between young hot-headed Palestinian stone-throwers and over-excited Israeli soldiers. That's largely a fiction. On the Palestinian side are to be found a cross-section of the resisting community, including its leaders and many middle-aged villagers who have families to support. It takes a great deal of bravery to stand off regularly against heavily armed Israeli teenagers, a significant number of them Jewish religious fanatics raised to believe they are fighting a holy war and many of the others raised to believe that the "Arabs" are a primitive, barbaric people.

As for the question of effectiveness, the answer is that the protests have undoubtedly been successful. The naked violence that Israel is forced to unleash against the protesters, and the subsequent raids to arrest the protest organizers, indicate just how much of a concern they are to Israel. In the case of Bil’in and elsewhere the protests have successfully led to a change in the route of the wall that has restored to the

villages some of their desperately needed farmland. The protests are also an important way for ordinary Palestinians to feel they have some agency in the conflict, both against Israel and in forcing a different agenda on to their corrupt national leadership. If Israel deepens its apartheid rule in the West Bank, such campaigns of civil resistance are almost certainly the face of the future.”

This part of our Thesis presents the following overall concluding remarks:

1. The historical paradigms referred in the three chapters, clearly point out the fact that nonviolence as a method of activism does not guarantee automatic and unfailing success. In fact, no method of conflict resolution does.

Ultimately, enemies of ideological nonviolence argue that it works because it seeks to deal with the causes, rather than the symptoms, of conflict. The rationale, then, for the use of nonviolence as the preferred method of political activism or philosophy of life rests on the twin convictions that it 'works' instrumentally and that it is 'right' ethically.

2. The historic facts laid down in our analysis have substantiated that unarmed civil resistance in Palestine has already had a long, and too often overlooked or even ignored, history.

As a result, even though the vast majority of the Palestinian people have never participated in armed struggle except through songs, slogans and rhetoric, the image in the West continues to be that of "the Palestinian as a terrorist or, at best, as a 'liberation fighter' with a gun in his hand, fighting for freedom to liberate his land.

Further, unlike armed resistance, which is organised by an elite vanguard in underground cells against foreign military occupation, unarmed resistance can utilize virtually the entire population.

3. Nonviolent methods of resistance have great strategic advantages. Even more than in most cases of colonialism and conquest, large numbers of Israelis believe their own propaganda: that it is they who are victims of aggression and that their violence is always defensive, whereas violent resistance by the people they are subjugating is "terrorism." Threats by neighboring Arab states in the early years of the conflict to destroy the new state of Israel and the centuries of genocide and persecution against the Jews in Europe have made it easy for the Israeli government to convince its

people that the conflict is a zero-sum game, a matter of "us versus them." Despite the far greater violence inflicted by Israel against Arab civilians, the use of violent means of resistance by the Palestinians — particularly if targeted at civilians — has only made the Israelis more intransigent and has increased support both at home and abroad for further violence and repression.

4. The 20th century, the most violent century of political conflict in human history, was the century in which nonviolent resistance was transformed from a relatively unorganized, spontaneous, and non-strategic concept to an organized, collective, and strategic method of struggle.

By the 21st century, nonviolent resistance has become recognized as a powerful method of struggle even more effective than violence or military power.

5. In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of people around the world who have taken part in nonviolent political activities. It is clear, however, that there is considerable debate about the precise meaning of nonviolence.

For some, nonviolent action is an expedient technique for dealing with conflict or bringing about social change.

6. By attracting widespread popular support through protests, boycotts, civil disobedience and other forms of nonviolent noncooperation, the nonviolent resistance campaigns broke repressive regimes and brought major new changes for justice and peace.

7. The vast majority of the civil resistance originate bottom up from the grassroots. Political parties and leadership are usually taken off-guard by the start of new uprisings and the inventions of new resistance methods. Occasionally movements may evolve into political initiatives but most of the time they simply influence existing political formulations to perform differently.

8. The results from the survey questionnaires among the participants in Bab Al-Shams and other protest incidents show that their profile is man or woman, relatively

young, educated and employed, brought up in villages, living in West Bank and Muslim.

Further, the majority of them are aware of the idea of the nonviolent resistance and they do not consider it as passivity or submissiveness. On the contrary, they believe that the nonviolent methods are more effective and preferable than the violent (armed) ones against the Israeli oppression and occupation and they consider as positive to participate in nonviolent activities.

Finally, they believe that nonviolent resistance promotes social, political, cultural and economic change, even though they are not very much optimistic about the future and only one third considers Palestinian society offering personal freedom.

9. The results from the survey questionnaires among the participants in Popular Committees and other organisations show that all organisations are aware of the idea of the nonviolent resistance and they do not consider it as passivity or submissiveness. On the contrary, they believe that the nonviolent methods are more effective and preferable than the violent (armed) ones as means to fight against the Israeli oppression and occupation.

Finally, the vast majority of the respondents (95%) believe that nonviolent resistance promotes social, political, cultural and economic change.

10. The experience of Bab Al Shams set a novel way of fighting the Israeli occupation through the popular resistance. Among the findings of this study, some points ought to be considered:

- This experience showed a new way of resisting against the occupation in Palestine through the collective will of all kind of persons who belong to different parts of the Palestinian social strata.
- Popular resistance is not an arbitrary struggle; it needs conscious planning and the right selection of a head staff that could move according to all needs from logistics such as medical caring and internet connection, to the selection of the right moment to start the action, etc. Well-planned action would avoid the adventure meaning of the experience and would avoid exposing it on the media as a “bubble event”, where everybody would get excited, however, as

soon as the bubble disappears, and the mark of the action does too.

- The Bab Al-Shams experience was a good message to both the Palestinian and the Israeli authorities urging them to find a new way of negotiating as it forms a part from an ongoing nonviolent struggle insomuch as the Palestinian civilians have to be patient and deal with the existing limitations of freedom, land confiscation, illegal detention, etc.
- Among this state-of-the-art experience, activists from all parts of the occupied territories should draw lessons from failures and successes of this experience to further improve new ways of nonviolent resistance. Palestinians should know that these nonviolent actions must arise from a culture of nonviolence and not from isolated actions. The culture of nonviolence has its values and principles (patience, planification, team work, believe in long term results...etc), among these values the Palestinians could find innovative nonviolent techniques that would give more tangible results.

The activists used nonviolent methods as an alternative tool to fight the Israeli policy; nevertheless, this is still not enough for the majority of the Palestinians who have the will to act this way. This culture of nonviolent resistance should be adopted by all Palestinians, since the creed of nonviolence is not something to deal with in a simplistic way, but it is the culture, the education of one, two and more generations. It should be the culture of the mass and not the action of a small group of dreamers who try to use alternative ways to fight the so powerful Israeli military machinery they have in front of them. Therefore:

- The nonviolent methods could soak through into the international opinion more than violent methods, especially if those are innovative and draw international attention and support including NGOs, Governments, UN, etc.
- The Palestinians must send further messages to the Israeli public opinion to let them know that their struggle is not headed toward them as civilians but toward the unfair policy of their government.

11. It is evident that more must be done by the Palestinians in order to maintain these nonviolent initiatives as a manifestation of a new “culture” and not a simple isolated plan carried out by overexcited individuals without any future long term plans. The Bab Al Shams experience must be taught in the schools, must be written in

the books of the next-coming generations to promote a culture of nonviolence and not only as a method of fighting against the occupying forces; it is the experience itself and not only the goal, it is the way of thinking of a whole people, as a whole nation, as well as the international solidarity with these people in this new form of fighting where the technology of information widens and improves so the struggle is not carried out by the Palestinians only but through Viber, Skype, Facebook, Twitter and other platforms, where all good-willing people world-wide can participate in this enterprise.

12. Finally, the presented examples of contemporary cases from various countries (Richard A. Dello Buono and David Fasenfest 2010) prove the connection between nonviolent resistance initiatives and the involvement of all social strata and explain how the complex interactions between state and non-state actors decisively affect the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns.

Furthermore, as the nonviolent campaigns promote democracy, human rights and social justice, they have long played an important transformative role in local, national and global politics and remain a very effective means of achieving significant social and political change.

Instead of epilogue, we quote Jakob Høigilt (2015: 636-648) concluding remarks in his article “Nonviolent mobilisation between a rock and hard place: Popular resistance and double repression in the West Bank”, cited in the Journal of Peace Research:

—(...) During the Israeli assault on Gaza in 2014, something quite remarkable happened in the West Bank. Young protest organizers managed, without assistance from any of the political factions, to gather at least 10,000 people for a peaceful march against the Qalandiya checkpoint near Ramallah to protest against the occupation (Sherwood, 2014).

It was the first time in many years so many people turned out for a demonstration. At the same time, the event showed the difficulties faced by young activists. They desperately appealed to leaders of the various political factions to adopt the initiative and secure that the momentum was being upheld, but they all refused to do.

(...) Despite the difficult hurdles it faces, nonviolent Palestinian grassroots activism has proven able not only to survive, but to bring more and more pressure to bear on the Palestinian elite and the Israeli state which it challenges.

Nonviolent Palestinian activism is certainly between the rock of occupation and the hard place of Palestinian authoritarianism, but by renewing the repertoire of contention and developing alternative networks activists seem to have been able to find a soft spot».

Finally, Mohammed Khattib of Bil'in echoes these sentiments and calls out for the world to take note:

–Several months ago we were warned by Israel's occupation forces that they intended to crush the popular struggle. Why has the Israeli government decided now to increase the suppression of demonstrations and to break the spirit of protest leaders? Maybe because they realize that the nonviolent struggle is spreading, that more and more villages have created popular committees that are organizing demonstrations. Perhaps the crackdown is a result of their concern and the growing international movement for the boycott of companies and businessmen such as Lev Leviev who are involved in Israel's land grab. Or maybe they fear that the new American government could learn through our demonstrations that Israel's wall is a means to annex land for the growing settlements, and that nonviolent Palestinian protests are being brutally suppressed. Israel's actions suggest that it is intimidated by people struggling for their rights in a nonviolent manner. The Israeli government seems to believe that Palestinians who struggle while partnering with Israeli activists endanger Israel's occupation and that tearing down human walls is a dangerous act. Perhaps what the state of Israel fears most of all is the hope that people can live together based on justice and equality for all”.

In order to allow the Palestinians to speak for themselves, the only respectful and empowering conclusion is this:

Let their nonviolent popular resistance voices be echoed, magnified, and heard.

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APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF TERMS⁸⁶

ACCOMMODATION: A mechanism of change in nonviolent action in which the opponents resolve, while they still have a choice, to agree to a compromise and grant certain demands of the nonviolent resisters. Accommodation occurs when the opponents have neither changed their views nor been nonviolently coerced, but have concluded that a compromise settlement is desirable. The accommodation may result from influences which, if continued, might have led to the conversion, nonviolent coercion, or disintegration of the opponents' system or regime.

AHIMSA: The Hindi word for non-injury, or nonviolence made popular by Gandhi as the central value of his beliefs and leadership.

AUTHORITY: The quality of leadership which enables the judgments, decisions, recommendations, and orders of certain individuals and institutions to be accepted voluntarily as prudent or wise and therefore should be implemented by others through obedience or cooperation. Authority is a main source of political power, but is not identical with it.

BOYCOTT: Refraining from patronizing a service, buying a product, having contact with certain people, or having transactions with certain institutions or businesses.

CIVIC ABSTENTION: A synonym for acts of political noncooperation.

CIVIC ACTION: Nonviolent action by civil society conducted for political purposes.

CIVIC DEFIANCE: Assertive acts of nonviolent protest, resistance or intervention conducted for political purposes.

CIVIC RESISTANCE: A synonym for nonviolent resistance by civil society with a political objective.

CIVIC STRIKE: A shut-down of economic and social space conducted for political reasons. Not only workers may go on strike, but importantly students, professionals, shopkeepers, white-color workers (including government employees), and members of upper classes can participate.

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: A deliberate peaceful violation of particular laws, decrees, regulations, ordinances, military or police orders, and the like.

The act of openly disobeying an unjust, immoral or unconstitutional law as a matter of conscience, and accepting the consequences, including submitting to imprisonment if necessary, to protest an injustice.

⁸⁶ Source: Gene Sharp (2003), *There are Realistic Alternatives*, Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, pp. 31-38. Some modifications have been made to Sharp's definitions.

These are usually laws which are regarded as inherently immoral, unjust, or tyrannical. Sometimes, however, laws of a largely regulatory or morally neutral character may be disobeyed as a symbol of opposition to wider policies of the government.

CONVERSION: A change of viewpoint by the opponents against whom nonviolent action has been waged, such that they come to believe it is right to accept the objectives of the nonviolent group. This is one of four mechanisms of change in nonviolent action.

DISINTEGRATION: The fourth mechanism of change in nonviolent action, in which the opponents are not simply coerced, but their system or government is disintegrated and falls apart as a result of massive noncooperation and defiance. The sources of power are restricted or severed by the noncooperation to such an extreme degree that the opponents' system or government simply dissolves.

ECONOMIC SHUT-DOWN: A suspension of the economic activities of a city, area, or country on a sufficient scale to produce economic paralysis. The motives are usually political. This may be achieved with a general strike by workers while management, business, commercial institutions, and small shopkeepers close their establishments and halt their economic activities.

FREEDOM (POLITICAL): A political condition which permits freedom of choice and action for individuals and also for individuals and groups to participate in the decisions and operation of the society and the political system.

GRAND STRATEGY: The broadest conception of how an objective is to be attained in a conflict by a chosen course of action. The grand strategy serves to coordinate and direct all appropriate and available resources (human, political, economic, moral, etc.) of the group to attain its objectives in a conflict.

Several more limited strategies may be applied within a grand strategy to achieve particular objectives in subordinate phases of the overall struggle.

GRIEVANCE GROUP: The general population groups whose grievances are issues in the conflict, and are being championed by the nonviolent resisters.

HUMAN RESOURCES: A term that is used here to indicate the number of persons and groups who obey "the ruler" (meaning the ruling group in command of the state), cooperate with, or assist the ruling group in implementing their will. This includes the proportion of such persons and groups in the general population, and the extent, forms, and independence of their organizations.

A ruler's power is affected by the availability of these human resources, which constitute one of the sources of political power.

MATERIAL RESOURCES: This is another source of political power. The term refers to property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication,

and modes of transportation. The degree to which the ruler controls, or does not control, these helps to determine the extent or limits of the ruler’s power.

MECHANISMS OF CHANGE: The processes by which change is achieved in successful cases of nonviolent struggle. The four mechanisms are conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration.

METHODS: The specific means of action within the technique of nonviolent action. Nearly two hundred specific methods have thus far been identified. They are classed under three main classes of nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation (social, economic, and political), and nonviolent intervention.

NONCOOPERATION: A large class of methods of nonviolent action that involve deliberate restriction, discontinuance, or withholding of social, economic, or political cooperation (or a combination of these) with a disapproved person, activity, institution, or regime.

The methods of noncooperation are classified in the subcategories of social noncooperation, economic noncooperation (economic boycotts and labor strikes), and political noncooperation.

NONVIOLENCE (RELIGIOUS OR ETHICAL): Beliefs and behavior of several types in which violent acts are prohibited on religious or ethical grounds. In some belief systems, not only physical violence is barred but also hostile thoughts and words. Certain belief systems additionally enjoy positive attitudes and behavior toward opponents, or even a rejection of the concept of opponents.

Such believers often may participate in nonviolent struggles with people practicing nonviolent struggle for pragmatic reasons, or may choose not to do so.

NONVIOLENT ACTION: A general technique of conducting protest, resistance, and intervention without physical violence.

Such action may be conducted by (a) acts of omission — that is, the participants refuse to perform acts which they usually perform, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; or (b) acts of commission — that is, the participants perform acts which they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from performing; or (c) a combination of both.

The technique includes a multitude of specific methods which are grouped into three main classes: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

NONVIOLENT COERCION: A mechanism of change in nonviolent action in which demands are achieved against the will of the opponents because effective control of the situation has been taken away from them by widespread noncooperation and defiance. However, the opponents still remain in their official positions and the system has not yet disintegrated.

NONVIOLENT CONFLICT: A conflict in which at least one party uses nonviolent action as its means to wage the conflict.

NONVIOLENT INSURRECTION: A popular political uprising against an established regime regarded as oppressive by use of massive noncooperation and defiance.

NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION: A large class of methods of nonviolent action which in a conflict situation directly interfere by nonviolent means with the opponents' activities and operation of their system. These methods are distinguished from both symbolic protests and noncooperation. The disruptive intervention is most often physical (as in a sit-in) but may be psychological, social, economic, or political.

NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND PERSUASION: A large class of methods of nonviolent action which are symbolic acts expressing opposition opinions or attempting persuasion (as vigils, marches or picketing). These acts extend beyond verbal expressions of opinion but stop short of noncooperation (as a strike) and nonviolent intervention (as a sit-in).

NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE: The waging of determined conflict by strong forms of nonviolent action, especially against determined and resourceful opponents who may respond with repression.

NONVIOLENT WEAPONS: The specific methods of nonviolent action.

PILLARS OF SUPPORT: The institutions and sections of the society which supply the existing regime with the needed sources of power to maintain and expand its power capacity. Examples are the police, prisons, and military forces supplying sanctions, moral and religious leaders supplying authority (legitimacy), labor groups and business and investment groups supplying economic resources, and similarly with the other identified sources of political power.

POLITICAL DEFIANCE: The strategic application of nonviolent struggle in order to disintegrate a dictatorship and to replace it with a democratic system. This resistance by noncooperation and defiance mobilizes the power of the oppressed population in order to restrict and cut off the sources of the dictatorship's power. Those sources are provided by groups and institutions called "pillars of support." When political defiance is used successfully, it can make a nation ungovernable by the current or any future dictatorship and therefore able to preserve a democratic system against possible new threats.

POLITICAL JIU-JITSU: A special process that may operate during a nonviolent struggle to change power relationships. In political jiu-jitsu negative reactions to the opponents' violent repression against nonviolent resisters is turned to operate politically against the opponents, weakening their power position and strengthening that of the nonviolent resisters. This can operate only when violent repression is met with continued nonviolent defiance, not violence or surrender. The opponents' repression is then seen in the worst possible light.

Resulting shifts of opinion are likely to occur among third parties, the general grievance group, and even the opponents' usual supporters. Those shifts may produce both withdrawal of support for the opponents and increased support for the nonviolent resisters. The result may be widespread condemnation of the opponents, internal opposition among the opponents, and increased resistance. These changes can at times produce major shifts in power relationships in favor of the nonviolent struggle group.

Political jiu-jitsu does not operate in all cases of nonviolent struggle. When it is absent the shift of power relationships depends highly on the extent of noncooperation.

POLITICAL POWER: The totality of influences and pressures available for use to determine and implement official policies for a society. Political power may be wielded by the institutions of government, or in opposition to the government by dissident groups and organizations. Political power may be directly applied in a conflict, or it may be held as a reserve capacity for possible later use.

SANCTIONS: Punishments or reprisals, violent or nonviolent, imposed either because people have failed to act in the expected or desired manner or imposed because people have acted in an unexpected or prohibited manner.

Nonviolent sanctions are less likely than violent ones to be simple reprisals for disobedience and are more likely to be intended to achieve a given objective. Sanctions are a source of political power.

SATYAGRAHA: Hindi for “truth force,” a term coined by Gandhi to emphasize the power of unadorned truth and love in a social struggle.

SELF-RELIANCE: The capacity to manage one's own affairs, make one's own judgments, and provide for oneself, one's group or organization, independence, self-determination, and self-sufficiency.

SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE: A source of political power. The ruler's power is supported by the skills, knowledge and abilities that are provided by persons and groups in the society (human resources) and the relation of those available skills, knowledge and abilities to the ruler's needs for them.

SOURCES OF POWER: These are origins of political power. They include: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources and sanctions. These derive from the society. Each of these sources is closely associated with and dependent upon, the acceptance, cooperation, and obedience of the population and the society's institutions. With strong supply of these sources the ruler will be powerful. As the supply is weakened or severed, the ruler's power will weaken or collapse.

STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE: Nonviolent struggle that is applied according to a strategic plan that has been prepared on the basis of analysis of the conflict situation, the

strengths and weaknesses of the contending groups, the nature, capacities, and requirements of the technique of nonviolent action, and especially strategic principles of that type of struggle. See also: grand strategy, strategy, tactics, and methods.

STRATEGY: A plan for the conduct of a major phase, or campaign, within a grand strategy for the overall conflict. A strategy is the basic idea of how the struggle of a specific campaign shall develop, and how its separate components shall be fitted together to contribute most advantageously to achieve its objectives.

Strategy operates within the scope of the grand strategy. Tactics and specific methods of action are used in smaller scale operations to implement the strategy for a specific campaign.

STRIKE: A deliberate restriction or suspension of work, usually temporarily, to put pressure on employers to achieve an economic objective or sometimes on the government in order to win a political objective.

TACTIC: A limited plan of action based on a conception of how, in a restricted phase of a conflict, to use effectively the available means of action to achieve a specific limited objective. Tactics are intended for use in implementing a wider strategy in a phase of the overall conflict.

VIOLENCE: Physical violence against other human beings which inflicts injury or death, or threatens to inflict such violence, or any act dependent on such infliction or threat. Some types of religious or ethical nonviolence conceive of violence much more broadly. This narrower definition permits adherents to those beliefs to cooperate with persons and groups that are prepared on pragmatic grounds to practice nonviolent struggle.

“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”

APPENDIX II

QUESTIONNAIRS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS OF NONVIOLENT ACTIVITIES AND MEMBERS OF POPULAR COMMITTEES

1. Introduction

The current questionnaires are prepared within the frame of the thesis –“Strategies of Popular Resistance and their role in the reinforcement of the Culture of nonviolence in the Palestinian Society”.

They are aiming at defining nonviolence activities as:

- Forms of socio-economic structure
- Driving forces of social change
- Diving forces of political change
- Dominant factors for struggle and pressure:

They are to be conducted for opinion surveys at:

- Participants/individuals in Bab Al Shams and other Protest/virtual Villages
- Members of the International Committees

2. Methodology

For the conduct of the questionnaires the following methodology will be adapted:

- Step 1: Preparation of the structured questionnaires (designing)
- Step 2: Distribution of the questionnaires (Data distribution)
- Step 3: Collection and Evaluation of the questionnaire (data collection and assessment).

For the assessment of the results of the questionnaires, the Stochastic Project Scheduling Simulation System (SPSS) will be utilised.

The target groups (respondents) will include both sexes and various ages.

The results will be analysed from a quantitative as well as from a qualitative perspective based on the collected factual data. The validity and reliability of the data will be checked as follows:

- Validity of the methodological tool

The questionnaires will be validated by being reviewed by the supervisor, who will provide comments. These comments will be incorporated into the final version of the questionnaires.

On the other hand, the validity will also be measured statistically by factorial analysis in order to examine the internal consistency of the questionnaire items.

- Reliability of the methodological tool

In regards to the questionnaires reliability, they will be tested by calculating the internal consistency its sub-scales using the split-half method.

3. Questionnaires

The questionnaires would have the following structure and content:

QuestionnaireS

.....Date

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

One of the most critical and decisive tasks which researchers have been working on over the last two decades is to study the changes which have taken place over the process of the resistance action in recent years and its profound impact on the life of Palestinians.

In this context, the current research attempts to assess a significant stage in the life of the Palestinian People through making a review of the popular nonviolent resistance strategies in general and the changes they brought forward on the cultural structure of the Palestinian society in particular.

The current questionnaire will enable us to assess the above mentioned changes and their implications to the social, economic and political and international environment and finally, to the everyday life of the Palestinians.

However, the success of our attempt relies on your willingness to participate by filling in the following questionnaire.

Preservation of Confidentiality

Your answers to questions given below shall be confidential. No information will be kept that relates to your answers on this form.

IMPORTANT NOTES:

- In completing your questionnaire, you may find that some questions do not relate to your personal characteristics. In that case, please write in N/A (not applicable).
- Before completing this questionnaire, it is strongly recommended that you read the entire document. This will help you understand the overall intent of the questionnaire and make it easier to answer the individual questions.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTICIPANTS IN BAB AL SHAMS AND OTHER PROTEST VILLAGES/INCIDENTS

PART I: GENERAL PART – PERSONAL BACKGROUND

<p>1. SEX : Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>2. AGE: Up to 20 Years Old <input type="checkbox"/> 20-30 Years Old <input type="checkbox"/> 30-40 Years Old <input type="checkbox"/> 40-50 Years Old <input type="checkbox"/> Over 50 Years Old <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>3. EDUCATION BACKGROUND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Basic <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> High School <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Technical <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> University <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (indicate) <input type="checkbox"/> </p>	<p>4. CURRENT OCCUPATION: Employed <input type="checkbox"/> Independent <input type="checkbox"/> Unemployed <input type="checkbox"/> Other (indicate) <input type="checkbox"/> </p>
<p>5. DEMOGRAPHICS I: You live in: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> West Bank <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jerusalem <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (indicate) <input type="checkbox"/> </p>	<p>6. DEMOGRAPHICS II: You are grown up in: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Town <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Village <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Refugee Camp <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (indicate) <input type="checkbox"/> </p>
<p>7. MARITAL STATUS: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Single <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Engaged <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Married <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Divorced <input type="checkbox"/></p>	<p>8. RELIGION: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Muslim <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Christian <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (indicate) <input type="checkbox"/> </p>

PART II: SPECIFIC PART

9. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE MEANING OF THE NOTION “NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE”?

- YES
- NO
- DO NOT KNOW

10. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE NOTION THAT NONVIOLENC IS THE SAME WITH SUBMISSIVENESS, PASSIVITY OR DEFEATISM?

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

11. SINCE THE CREATION OF ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS HAVE STRUGGLED TO RESIST OCCUPATION UTILIZING VIOLENT (ARMED) OR NONVIOLENT METHODS. WHICH METHODS DO YOU CONSIDER MORE EFFECTIVE?

VIOLENT (ARMED) METHODS

VERY EFFECTIVE

EFFECTIVE

LESS EFFECTIVE

NON-EFFECTIVE

NONVIOLENT METHODS

VERY EFFECTIVE

EFFECTIVE

LESS EFFECTIVE

NON-EFFECTIVE

12. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS?

ARMED RESISTANCE IS NECESSARY

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

➤ **PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE IS PREFERABLE**

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

➤ **NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE COULD PROMOTE EARIER THE GENDER EQUALITY THAN THE VIOLENT RESISTANCE**

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

➤ **NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WOULD MORE EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING THAN THE VIOLENT RESISTANCE**

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

➤ **NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WOULD SUPPORT THE EDUCATION FOR PEACE FOR BOTH MALE AND FEMALE KIDS**

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

13. WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR YOU?

PARTICIPATING IN NONVIOLENT ACTIONS

PARTICIPATING IN VIOLENT (ARMED) ACTIONS

DO NOT PARTICIPATE AT ALL (PURSUING INDIVIDUAL GOALS)

OTHER (indicate)

.....

14. HAVE YOU EVER PARTICIPATED IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES? (You can check as many as you want)

- A rally or protest
- A rally or protest during a curfew
- Defending my neighborhood during an Israeli invasion
- Be a part of a human shield to protect leaders or wanted people
- Protecting someone from the IDF (Israeli Forces)
- Bring supplies for participants
- Burn tires
- Hang posters
- Throw stones
- Inform on a collaborator
- Join militant organization
- An operation against Israeli soldiers or settlers, using a gun, where I would not die in the process
- Not obeying orders of soldiers at the checkpoint
- Distributing leaflets
- Write slogans
- Erecting a barricade
- Distract the soldiers
- Visit a family of a martyr

15. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS YOU CONSIDER AS BEING TRUE?

- I CAN RUN MY OWN BUSINESS IN PALESTINE
- THE PALESTINIAN SOCIETY OFFERS EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
- THE PALESTINIAN SOCIETY GIVES ME THE PERSONAL FREEDOM I NEED
- I AM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE
- I AM PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE

**16. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION FOR THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS?
THE NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WILL:**

PROMOTE EMPLOYMENT

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

REDUCE POVERTY

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

INCREASE DEVELOPMENT

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

IMPROVE HEALTH CONDITIONS

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

PROMOTE FAMILY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

INCREASE THE PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL FACTIONS

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

PROMOTE SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND COHESION

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW


INCREASE ACTIVISM

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

	UPGRADE THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF PALESTINIANS
<input type="checkbox"/>	STRONGLY AGREE
<input type="checkbox"/>	AGREE
<input type="checkbox"/>	DON'T AGREE
<input type="checkbox"/>	DON'T KNOW

III. COMMENTS

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Thank you very much for your cooperation

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTICIPANTS OF POPULAR COMMITTEES AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS

PART I: GENERAL PART – IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. TITLE OF THE COMMITTEE AND LEGAL STATUS	2. YEAR OF FOUNDATION 3. REASONS OF FOUNDATION:
4. MAIN ACTIVITIES: ✓ Health Care () ✓ Education () ✓ Refugee Camp () ✓ Orphans centres () ✓ Legal assistance () ✓ Government connection and coordination () ✓ Other type (indicate) ()	

PART II: SPECIFIC PART

5. IS YOUR ORGANISATION FAMILIAR WITH THE MEANING OF THE NOTION “NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE”? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> DO NOT KNOW
--

--

6. DOES YOUR ORGANISATION AGREE WITH THE NOTION THAT NONVIOLENCE IS THE SAME WITH SUBMISSIVENESS, PASSIVITY OR DEFEATISM?

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

7. WHICH METHODS OF RESISTANCE DOES YOUR ORGANISATION CONSIDER MORE EFFECTIVE?

VIOLENT (ARMED) METHODS

- VERY EFFECTIVE
- EFFECTIVE
- LESS EFFECTIVE
- NON-EFFECTIVE

NONVIOLENT METHODS

- VERY EFFECTIVE
- EFFECTIVE
- LESS EFFECTIVE
- NON-EFFECTIVE

8. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS?

➤ **ARMED RESISTANCE IS NECESSARY**

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

➤ **PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE IS PREFERABLE**

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

➤ **NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE COULD PROMOTE EARIER THE GENDER EQUALITY THAN THE VIOLENT RESISTANCE**

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

➤ **NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WOULD MORE EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING THAN THE VIOLENT RESISTANCE**

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

➤ NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WOULD SUPPORT THE EDUCATION FOR PEACE FOR BOTH MALE AND FEMALE KIDS

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

9. WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR YOUR ORGANISATION?

PARTICIPATING IN NONVIOLENT ACTIONS

PARTICIPATING IN VIOLENT (ARMED) ACTIONS

DO NOT PARTICIPATE AT ALL

OTHER (indicate)

.....

10. HAS YOUR ORGANISATION EVER PARTICIPATED IN ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES? (You can check as many as you want)

- A rally or protest
- A rally or protest during a curfew
- Defending my neighborhood during an Israeli invasion
- Be a part of a human shield to protect leaders or wanted people
- Protecting someone from the IDF (Israeli Forces)
- Bring supplies for participants
- Burn tires
- Hang posters
- Throw stones
- Inform on a collaborator
- Join militant organization
- An operation against Israeli soldiers or settlers, using a gun, where I would not die in the process
- Not obeying orders of soldiers at the checkpoint
- Distributing leaflets
- Write slogans
- Erecting a barricade
- Distract the soldiers
- Visit a family of a martyr

11. WHAT IS THE CONTRIBUTION OF YOUR ORGANISATION IN SUPPORTING NON VIOLENT RESISTANCE AGAINST OCCUPATION IN PALESTINE?

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12. WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER AS GOALS ACHIVED AND WHICH ARE THE ONES STILL TO BE ACHIEVED?

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.....

13. HOW DO YOU CONSIDER THE COORDINATION AND COLLECTIVE WORK AMONG INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS?

.....
.....
.....

16. WHAT IS YOUR ORGANISATION'S FOR THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS. THE NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE WILL:

➤ PROMOTE EMPLOYMENT

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

➤ REDUCE POVERTY

- STRONGLY AGREE
- AGREE
- DON'T AGREE
- DON'T KNOW

➤ INCREASE DEVELOPMENT

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

IMPROVE HEALTH CONDITIONS

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

PROMOTE FAMILY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

INCREASE THE PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL FACTIONS

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

PROMOTE SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND COHESION

STRONGLY AGREE

AGREE

DON'T AGREE

DON'T KNOW

INCREASE ACTIVISM

STRONGLY AGREE

<input type="checkbox"/>	AGREE
<input type="checkbox"/>	DON'T AGREE
<input type="checkbox"/>	DON'T KNOW
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	UPGRADE THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF PALESTINIANS
<input type="checkbox"/>	STRONGLY AGREE
<input type="checkbox"/>	AGREE
<input type="checkbox"/>	DON'T AGREE
<input type="checkbox"/>	DON'T KNOW

III. COMMENTS

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Thank you very much for your cooperation