Tesis Doctoral

EFECTOS EMOCIONALES DEL PODER SOCIAL

EMOTIONAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL POWER

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A todos y todas que en un mundo lleno de jerarquías asumen el reto de tratar de que sus relaciones con los/as demás sean igualitarias

Index of Contents

Resumen 21

Overview 27

Chapter 1 39

Social Power vs. Personal Power 41

Defining Social Power 42

Correlates and Antecedents of Social Power 44

Empirical Evidences about the Effects of Social Power 46

Moderators of the Effects of Power 49

Theoretical Insights and Explicative Mechanisms of the Effects of power 51

Conclusions 57

References 58

Chapter 2 69

Power and Positive and Negative Affect 72

Power Social Motives and Discrete Emotions 75

When Powerless Individuals Express "Powerful" Emotions: The case of anger 79

Conclusions 84

References 90

Chapter 3 105

Abstract 108

Introduction 109

STUDY 1 113

Method 113

Results and Discussion 115

STUDY 2 117
Method 117
Results and Discussion 121
General Discussion 123
References 127
Chapter 4 133
Abstract 136
Introduction 137
STUDY 1 141
Method 142
Results 146
Discussion 151
STUDY 2 152
Method 153
Results 155
Discussion 157
General Discussion 158
References 161
Chapter 5 171
Abstract 174
Introduction 175
STUDY 1a 179
Method 179
Results 182
Discussion 186

STUDY 1b ... 186
Method ... 187
Results ... 188
Discussion ... 191
STUDY 2 ... 192
Method ... 193
Results ... 195
Discussion ... 199
General Discussion ... 200
References ... 203
Chapter 6 ... 215
¿Cómo se relaciona el poder social con la supresión emocional? ... 217
¿Expresan los poderosos todas las emociones negativas? ... 218
¿Es la ira una emoción que expresan fundamentalmente los poderosos? ... 220
Implicaciones ... 223
Limitaciones y Futuras Direcciones ... 225
References ... 229

Resumen

El poder social se define como la capacidad de las personas de tener influencia o control sobre los demás y repartir recompensas y castigos (Fiske y Berdahl, 2007; Keltner, Gruenfeld, y Anderson, 2003). Las diferencias de poder son uno de los aspectos más importantes de la vida social de las personas, y el impacto que tienen sobre su forma de pensar, actuar o sentir ha sido investigado desde la psicología social (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, y Magee, 2003; Guinote, 2007; Smith, Dijksterhuis, y Wigboldus, 2008; Willis, Rodríguez-Bailón, y Lupiáñez, 2011), utilizando diferentes niveles de análisis (e.g., intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergrupal, ideológico; Bourhis y Brauer, 2006). Esta tesis doctoral se centra principalmente en un nivel interpersonal y trata de explorar cómo el poder afecta a la expresión emocional de las personas.

Desde la teoría de aproximación/evitación (Keltner, Gruenfeld, y Anderson, 2003), el alto poder está asociado con un mayor acceso a recompensas y una mayor desinhibición conductual, mientras que el bajo poder está asociado con amenazas y castigos, y por tanto con una mayor inhibición conductual. Además, se ha encontrado que las personas poderosas están menos limitadas por las normas sociales y por tanto pueden expresar sus emociones más libremente que las personas no poderosas (Hecht y LaFrance, 1998). Partiendo de estas ideas, en la primera parte empírica de esta tesis doctoral se estudió la relación entre el poder social y la supresión emocional y se mostró que el poder disminuye la tendencia de las personas a suprimir sus emociones.

En la segunda parte empírica, se estudiaron los efectos de poder sobre la expresión y supresión de emociones específicas. Para abordar este tema nos basamos, por un lado, sobre la teoría de las funciones sociales de las emociones, y por otro lado, sobre la literatura relacionada con las metas y las motivaciones de las personas poderosas y no poderosas.

Según la teorías sobre las funciones sociales de las emociones, la expresión de las diferentes emociones evoca señales sociales a los receptores de dicha expresión y ayuda al que las expresa a conseguir diferentes metas sociales; por ejemplo, las emociones pueden crear distancia social entre los individuos, pero también pueden crear vínculos afectivos entre ellos (Fischer y Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, y Manstead, 2010). La expresión directa de la ira se considera un signo de dominancia y aumenta la distancia social. Por su parte, la expresión de la tristeza transmite señales de debilidad y promueve la cercanía y la afiliación (Fischer y Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef y cols., 2010).

En cuanto a las motivaciones relacionadas con el alto y el bajo poder, la literatura ha mostrado que los no poderosos están más motivados para afiliarse con los demás; en cambio, los poderosos están más motivados para incrementar la distancia social entre ellos y los demás (Case, Conlon, y Maner, 2015; Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, y Otten, 2008; Magee y Smith, 2013; Van Kleef y cols., 2008). Así pues, en la segunda línea de investigación encontramos que las personas poderosas, al estar menos motivadas a acercarse a los demás, tienden a suprimir aquellas emociones que cumplen una función afiliativa, como por ejemplo la tristeza.

En la tercera serie experimental nos enfocamos en la emoción de la ira y examinamos cómo el poder afecta a su expresión. Además, exploramos los motivos que subyacen a la expresión de la ira por parte de las personas poderosas y no poderosas. Tratamos este tema basándonos en la literatura que apoya que dicha emoción se puede expresar tanto de formas directas como indirectas (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, y Meulders, 2004; Linden y cols., 2003). Los resultados mostraron que las personas no poderosas (en comparación con las poderosas) anticipan que la expresión de su ira de manera directa puede tener más consecuencias negativas, y por tanto optan en menor medida por expresar su ira de esta forma. Sin embargo, estas personas optan más por expresan su ira de manera

indirecta, compartiéndola con los demás. Este efecto del poder sobre la expresión de ira indirecta fue mediado por la motivación de las personas no poderosas para obtener control sobre la persona que les provocó la ira. Consideramos que estos resultados son importantes porque amplían el conocimiento previo sobre los efectos emocionales del poder social, y destacan el papel mediador que tienen los motivos sociales en la relación entre el poder y la expresión emocional.

Overview

In this doctoral dissertation, we aim to examine how having or lacking social power shapes individuals' emotional expression. This general objective could be split into several more specific ones: We first aimed to explore the relation between power, emotion expression, and suppression. Secondly, we focused on the effect of power on negative emotions as well as explored the role of the dispositional power as a potential moderator of this effect. Third, we conceptualized emotions beyond their valence, looked at the effects of power on two different negative emotions (sadness and anger), and explored the possible mediators of these effects. Finally, we further qualified the effect of power on anger by studying how power shapes the different types of expressing this emotion (direct vs. indirect anger expressions).

In order to address these issues, we brought insights from different theoretical perspectives on power and emotions (Chapters 1 and 2). Our starting point was the approach-inhibition theory of power that associates high power with greater disinhibition and the experience and expression of positive emotions as well as powerlessness with greater inhibition and negative emotions (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). In Chapter 3, we first empirically explored the relation between social power and emotional suppression. We considered that one of the signs of powerful individuals' disinhibition is their reluctance to suppress emotions. There is some literature supporting this idea and suggesting that powerful individuals have greater freedom to express their internal states (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998). We then investigated the effect of power on the suppression of negative emotions. We focused on negative emotions because their relation with powerlessness is still uncertain (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Smith & Bargh, 2008). Furthermore, focusing on negative emotions allowed us to contrast two alternative hypotheses that could be formed based on the previous literature. On the one hand, given the association of powerlessness with negative affect, it could be predicted that powerless

individuals suppress less this kind of emotion than powerful ones. On the other hand, given that powerlessness increases inhibition, the opposite could also be predicted. Additionally, based on previous literature that highlights the importance of considering individuals' dispositions and traits (Chen, Langner, & Mendoza-Denton, 2009; Schmid Mast & Hall, 2004), in Chapter 3 we also explored whether dispositional power moderates the effect of social power on the suppression of negative emotions.

Once we explored how power affects negative emotions in general, we next analyzed its effects on the expression of specific negative emotions. It has been suggested that specific emotions serve different social functions. Some emotions help individuals get closer with other people (i.e., they serve an affiliative function); other emotions tend to distance individuals from others (i.e., they serve a social distancing function; Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). It has also been suggested that having power influences individuals' motives and goals. Thus, high power increases individuals' social distancing motivation, whereas the experience of powerlessness increases their desire to get closer to others and affiliate (Case, Conlon, & Maner, 2015; Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013). By combining the social functional perspective of emotions and the literature that links power with social distance, we predicted a positive relation between power and emotions that serve a social distancing function, but a negative relationship between power and the affiliative emotions. We tested these predictions in Chapters 4 and 5. For this purpose, we focused on the most representative emotions among the affiliative and social distancing ones: sadness and anger (Fischer & Manstead, 2008).

To our knowledge there is no evidence showing how power shapes sadness expression, thus Chapter 4 is intended to fill this gap in the literature. Previous studies on other affiliative emotions supported the idea that holding power decreases the expression

of these emotions. For instance, powerful individuals were found to be less willing to affiliate with others and, as such, they responded with less compassion than powerless individuals to other people's distress (Van Kleef et al., 2008). Building on these notions, we predicted that powerful individuals would express less sadness than powerless ones, and we expected their reduced motivation to affiliate with other to account for this effect.

Regarding the effects of power on anger expression, the scarce research on it is still inconclusive. Some scholars have considered anger expression as a privilege of powerful individuals, thus supporting the positive association of power with this emotion (Averill, 1983; Taylor & Risman, 2006). However, other findings have contradicted this idea: powerless individuals were found to experience and express more anger than powerful ones (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006). While trying to clarify these inconsistences, in Chapter 5 we argued that these inconsistences could be solved by distinguishing between direct and indirect types of anger expression (i.e., social sharing; Rime, 2009).

Previous studies showed that people express anger directly toward low status individuals but indirectly toward high status ones (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004). Moreover, studies on gender differences in emotional expression showed that men express anger directly to a greater extent than women (Fischer & Evers, 2011; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). We therefore predicted that powerful individuals would express their anger directly more than powerless ones. By contrast, we expected powerless individuals to share their anger with others more than powerful individuals; said otherwise, we expect them to express more indirect anger. In Chapter 5, we tested these ideas and, additionally, we delved into the motives that instigate powerful and powerless individuals' anger expression. In particular, we explored the role of control-based motives and negative social appraisals—the anticipated social costs related to others' reactions (Evers, Fischer,

Mosquera, & Manstead, 2005; Manstead & Fischer, 2001)—as mediators of the effect of power on anger expression.

Throughout the studies, we approached our aims using different methodologies. We manipulated power in some of them by assigning our participants to powerful and powerless roles (i.e., we used the leader-subordinate paradigm), whereas in others we asked participants to read a vignette and identify with the powerful or powerless main character in it. Regarding the emotional inductions, we used multiple and variable emotional stimuli such as pictures, fragments of films, and emotional eliciting scenarios depending on the objectives of each study. Finally, both subjective and objective measures were used in order to measure our main dependent variable (emotion expression).

We would finally like to apologize for the inevitable redundancy and repetition of the concepts, ideas, and definitions across the different chapters of this doctoral dissertation. This is due to the fact that the chapters were written as separate papers with the intention to be submitted for publication. Additionally, in order to fulfill the requirements of the international PhD program at Granada University, the last chapter is written in Spanish whereas the rest are written in English.

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Introduction

Chapter 1:

Social Power

Social Power vs. Personal Power

Power differences are a pervasive phenomenon of social interactions. People hold powerful and powerless roles in their workplace, with their family, and even in their intimate relationships. We may also realize that we can shift from a high to a low power position and vice versa during the same day depending on the role that we carry out in each context. The ubiquitous nature of social power has captured the interest of many theorists and researchers attempting to reach an accurate definition of this concept as well as dealt with the antecedents and consequences of this phenomenon.

In order to better understand what social power is, it would be useful to first distinguish this concept from the one of personal power. The main distinctive feature is the relational nature of the former. That means that high social power cannot be conceived independently from low social power, as a powerful person or a group must be the complement of a powerless one (Magee & Smith, 2013; Schmid Mast, 2010; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

By contrast, personal power reflects individuals' ability to provoke desirable effects in their environment and is associated with a sense of personal agency, independency, and autonomy, and individuals do not require anyone else in order to exert it. In other words, personal power refers to the *power to* do something and social power refers to the *power over* someone (Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009; Overbeck, 2010; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). Given that social power often brings independence and autonomy, it may be an important source of personal power. In fact, it has been argued that striving for social power might not be the end but rather a means to enhance one's own personal power (Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006), although there are other means to enhance personal power, for instance, by increasing perceived competence and self-efficacy (Overbeck, 2010).

Given that our main focus of interest is *power over* rather than the *power to*, we will next deepen in the concept of social power and how it has been conceived within the social psychology field. Throughout the following chapters, for the sake of brevity, when we mention power, we will be referring to social power.

Defining Social Power

The definitions of social power revolve around two crucial elements: influence and resource control (Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010). On the one hand, social power has been defined as the control over resources and valued outcomes or the capacity to administer rewards and punishments (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Fiske, 1993; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). On the other hand, social power has been conceived as the ability to influence and persuade other people to act in accordance with one's own desires or plans (Russell, 1938; Simon, 2006; Turner, 2005; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003).

When power is conceptualized as the control of resources, influence is conceived as an effect of social power and not power *itself* (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). By contrast, for the influence-based definitions, influence constitutes the essence of social power whereas control of resources is one of its consequences (Turner, 2005). Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses and have received some criticism. Influence-based definitions have been reproached for putting aside the structural features of power such as resource distribution. Instead, these definitions have considered that power depends on powerless individuals' volition to comply or not, which in turn leads to an oxymoron (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Resource-based definitions have been criticized for conceiving social power as a form of coercion derived from resource control and for not leaving space to a conceptualization of social power as a constructive force (Overbeck, 2010; Simon & Oakes, 2006; Turner, 2005).

Both resource- and influence-based definitions have undoubtedly contributed to a deeper understanding of what social power is. However, the relevance and contribution of each definition may depend on the level of the analysis (e.g., interpersonal or intergroup levels) and the purposes of a given research (Brauer & Bourhis, 2006; Doise, 1986).

Researchers who study leadership in an intragroup level of analysis have commonly used influence-based definitions, as they consider that a leader's power is not a matter of resource control but rather a matter of influence based on identification processes (French & Raven, 1959; Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Hogg, 2001; Turner & Haslam, 2001). Furthermore, given that the "power as influence" definition considers power as an emergent property of social interactions, it may seem useful for researchers who study social power in an intergroup level in order to explain processes of social change. For example, it might help to explain the conditions in which a low power group gains influence and support against a high power group that has control of the resources (Turner, 2005).

Definitions of power as control over resources and outcomes have become popular among researchers who deal with power differences in interpersonal interactions (e.g., Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Langner & Keltner, 2008). This is partly due to the fact that influence is a less tangible concept, whereas the allocation of either material (e.g., money) or social (e.g., knowledge) resources can be easily manipulated in the laboratory (Overbeck, 2010). In addition, this definition of power has the advantage of avoiding confounds with correlates of social power such as status and dominance that will be treated in the next section (Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998).

In short, in this doctoral dissertation, we consider that influence, either as a precondition or a result of social power, is a feature inexorably linked to it and required for a deeper understanding of this concept. But we also acknowledge that structural features,

as resource allocation, are important sources of power. Thus, as other authors have done before, we opt for a conciliatory definition considering social power as the capacity to either influence others or exert control over their outcomes[1] (Guinote, 2007b; Guinote & Vescio, 2010; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009; Schmid Mast, 2010).

Correlates and Antecedents of Social Power

When studying social power, it is inevitable to make reference to other related constructs such as status, dominance, and gender. In this section we will define them and highlight that, despite the commonalities between them, these constructs should not be treated as being equivalent.

Status refers to a social position that enjoys others' esteem and respect or is associated with belonging to a prestigious social group (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Schmid Mast, 2010; Spears et al., 2010). Given that status may be an antecedent of social power and vice versa, these constructs are normally highly correlated (Spears et al., 2010). However, it has been pointed out that it is important to treat them as non-identical concepts because they do not always go hand in hand (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011; Keltner et al., 2003; Spears et al., 2010). For instance, someone may have a good reputation but limited control over resources (e.g., a spiritual mentor) and someone may control other people's outcomes, but he or she may not enjoy their respect and admiration (e.g., a tax collector). In fact, Fragale et al. (2011) orthogonally manipulated the power and status of the target and showed that the interaction between these variables shapes individuals' judgments about these targets. For instance, high power/low status individuals were perceived as cold, whereas high power/high status targets were evaluated as high in warmth.

[1] In most of the studies presented in this dissertation, we manipulated power using a resource control paradigm because of the advantages that we have previously mentioned.

A second important antecedent of social power is trait dominance: individuals' differences in their need to dominate others and in their predisposition to look for mastery and power (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003; Schmid Mast, 2010). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that trait dominance and power are again different constructs given that individuals high in trait dominance do not always hold power positions. In this vein, Chen et al. (2009) highlighted the importance of considering individuals' traits and dispositions when studying social power: matching between individuals' power position and trait dominance increases their self-expression, and the congruence between the way people judge themselves and the way they are perceived by others.

Demographic characteristics such as gender have also been related to power (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Women traditionally carried out more domestic and care-giving roles whereas men were considered to be jobholders (Eagly, 1987). In addition, socialization practices make men more concerned about gaining status and power and women more concerned with social relationships (Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). These differences in roles and socialization practices have been misattributed to men's and women's dispositions and traits (Eagly, 1987).

Thus, men are perceived to be more competent, hierarchical, and dominant and, therefore, more suitable for leadership and powerful positions. In reverse, women are perceived to be more egalitarian, sociable, suited to nurturing roles, and less suited to holding power (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Schmid Mast, 2001, 2004). Such stereotypical beliefs influence peoples' willingness to confer power to men and women, thereby increasing the current gender power differences (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Schein, 2001).

Empirical Evidences about the Effects of Social Power

The cognitive, behavioral, and emotional effects of social power have been studied by numerous social psychologists and have been approached through different theoretical perspectives. Given that the present doctoral dissertation focuses on the emotional effects of social power, we will devote the next chapter to presenting a review of the effects of power on emotional processes. Thus, in the present section we will focus on empirical evidence of its cognitive and behavioral effects.

One of the most well studied effects of power relates to impression formation. It has been suggested that powerful individuals do not need, want, or even cannot attend to information related to their subordinates and, therefore, they automatically (by default) stereotype them. Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, and Yzerbyt (2000) empirically tested and confirmed this hypothesis. In addition, in their studies they found that powerful individuals also stereotype *by design,* which means that they deliberately attend more to information that is consistent with stereotypes because they need to confirm their previous stereotypical judgments and expectations.

However, subsequent studies did not always support these results and showed that power affects individuals' cognitive and attentional processes in a more complex way. Overbeck and Park (2006) assigned their participants to the role of supervisor and showed that they individuated their subordinates more when they were given a people-oriented goal than when they were given a product-oriented goal. Similarly, in another study, male leaders in a masculine domain paid more attention to negative stereotypes about female employees when these stereotypes were relevant for their goals (Vescio et al., 2003). It was therefore concluded that powerful individuals do not always stereotype others. Whether they stereotype people or not depends on their goals and interests.

However, powerful individuals do not only use stereotypes instrumentally. It has been proposed that they also perceive their interpersonal relationships in instrumental terms. Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee and Galinsky (2008) in six studies, demonstrated that power increases objectification—the perception of others as "tools" that may help them to achieve their goals (Keltner, Gruenfeld, Galinsky, & Kraus, 2010; Nussbaum 1999). For example, in a simulation of a hiring decision situation, 72% of powerful individuals against 52% of powerless ones selected the candidate that best matched their organizational goals (Study 2). Moreover, powerful male participants primed with a sex goal were found to be more willing than powerless male participants to work with an attractive female partner (Gruenfeld et al., 2008).

Power also influences empathy and perspective taking. Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, and Gruenfeld (2006) showed that participants primed with high power (vs. low power) misinterpreted other people's comments because they did not take into account that those people did not possess the same information as they did (Study 2)[2]. In another study they suggested that high power reduces accuracy in perceiving others' emotions (Galinsky et al., 2006). However, a recent meta-analysis showed that results in this field are quite heterogeneous and highlighted the need to look for potential moderators of this effect (Hall, Schmid Mast, & Latu, 2015; Schmid Mast et al., 2009).

Powerful individuals' reduced perspective taking and empathy seem consistent with these individuals' proclivity to prioritize self over others in social interactions (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). More recent studies revealed some additional manifestations of powerful individuals' self-prioritization. Powerful individuals were faster

[2] It is noteworthy that the effect of power on perspective taking was included in the Many Labs 3 project (Ebersole et al., in press), in which different research groups tried to replicate these effects using bigger samples. All in all, the results of this study did not support Galinsky et al.'s (2006) conclusions, showing that there were no differences in perspective taking between the powerful and the powerless. Thus, these results should be treated with caution.

in detecting unfairness committed against themselves than an unfair result committed against others (Sawaoka, Hughes, & Ambady, 2015, Study 2), and they draw more inspiration from themselves and their own experiences than from others (Van Kleef, Oveis, Homan, Van der Lowe, & Keltner, 2015).

Possessing or lacking power also affects individuals' social behavior. People have various beliefs and expectations about how powerful and powerless individuals behave. For instance, people think that powerful individuals speak louder, they do not keep eye contact when others speak (or even interrupt them), they have more open bodily postures, they touch others more, and they gesture more, etc. (Dovidio & Ellyson, 1985; Hecht & LaFrance, 1998; Keltner et al., 2008; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Although some of these expectations do not correspond to reality (e.g., other-touching), others do reflect powerful individuals actual behavior (see Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005, for a meta-analysis). For instance, Guinote, Judd and Brauer (2002) showed that people perceive powerful individuals and members of high status groups as behaving in a more variable way because they actually do.

One of the most studied behavioral effects of social power relates to disinhibition. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee, (2003) found that a higher proportion of powerful participants choose "to hit" on a black jack game, compared to both powerless and control groups. Also, participants primed with high power were more likely than participants primed with low power to remove an annoying fan. Later, Anderson and Galinsky (2006) showed that elevated power (compared to low power) also increases the willingness to take risky decisions (Study 2) or to get involved in risky behaviors such as having unprotected sex (Study 4). This might be because powerful individuals are more disinhibited but also because they tend to be more optimistic about the future than powerless individuals (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2011).

Finally, elevated power was found to be associated with more effective goal-oriented behavior (Guinote, 2007a, 2007c). Powerful participants took a faster decision about their preferred plan of action and initiated a goal directed action earlier than powerless participants. Furthermore, participants assigned to a powerful role were more persistent in their goal and seized opportunities for goal-directed action better (Guinote, 2007c). Similarly, Schmid, Schmid Mast, and Mast (2015) found that in dual-tasking contexts, powerless individuals tend to focus on both goals simultaneously. However, powerful individuals appear to be more flexible. When the tasks are easy, they deal with them as powerless individuals do, but when the tasks are demanding, they prioritize one goal over the other. Furthermore, it was found that, even after a failure or an undesirable outcome, powerful individuals have increased self-focused counterfactual thoughts that may guarantee the improvement of their performance and their goal-oriented behavior in the future (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014).

In this section we reviewed the most important results related to the cognitive and behavioral effects of power. Some of them appear to be conclusive whereas others require further research in order to clarify them. Some of the contradictory results have been explained by taking into account moderator variables. In the next section, we discuss further some of the most important moderators that contribute to a better understanding of the psychosocial consequences of power. We will then refer to the moderating role of the legitimacy, the operationalization of power, and the culture.

Moderators of the Effects of Power

The legitimacy of social power has traditionally been one of the primary concerns of the theorists that deal with social power. French and Raven (1958), in their classical work on the bases of power, referred to legitimate power as one of the most important types of power. They considered that cultural values, social structure, and legitimizing

procedures constitute important sources of legitimate power. More recently, legitimacy was defined as the perception that a social order, in this case, a power relationship, is just and appropriate because is based on competence and merit or because it is formed through fair means and procedures (Spears et al., 2010; Tyler, 2006) .

Empirical studies on social power revealed that legitimacy is an important moderator of some of the most established effects of social power, including studies on disinhibition, goal pursuit, stereotyping, and social distancing (Lammers et al., 2012; Rodriguez Bailon, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Willis, Guinote, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010). Rodríguez-Bailón et al. (2000) showed that the effect of power on stereotyping occurs in the case of illegitimate but not in the case of legitimate power. Moreover, legitimate powerful individuals showed more disinhibited behavior than legitimate powerless individuals and this effect disappeared or was even inverted when power was experienced illegitimately (Lammers et al., 2008). Similarly, although legitimate powerless individuals were found to be less persistent during goal striving compared to a control group, the illegitimate powerless individuals persisted as much as the later group (Willis et al., 2010).

Other authors emphasized the motives that make people strive for power or the goals that are associated with a given power position. They suggested that in some cases people are instigated by self-oriented goals, whereas in others they look for social power in order to achieve pro-social goals. Building on this idea, they proposed that social power can be construed either as opportunity and self-interest or as responsibility (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003; Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012).

Importantly, it has been shown that the different ways that power is operationalized may result in different effects. Chen et al. (2001) demonstrated that when power activates communal goals, rather than self-interest goals, powerful individuals show greater social desirability and responsibility; for example, they adjust their opinions more to the

prevailing norms and values. Moreover, power construed as responsibility (e.g., an empathic leadership style) led to greater interpersonal sensitivity than did power construed as self-interest (e.g., an egoistic leadership style; Schmid Mast et al., 2009).

Finally, culture is also an important but often disregarded factor that moderates the effects of power (Park et al., 2013; Zhong, Magee, Maddux, & Galinsky, 2006). As mentioned above, powerful individuals were found to be more action oriented (Galinsky et al., 2003). However it has been suggested that this effect is true only in Western cultures whereas in Eastern cultures, power would cause more restraints.

Given that culture is an umbrella term that encompasses norms, goals, and values and that influences the way people perceive themselves and their social relationships, it also shapes the operationalization of power per se (Zhong et al., 2006). People in Western cultures perceive themselves as more independent and their goals and values are more individualistic (i.e., related to self-promotion); people in Eastern cultures, on the other hand, construe themselves through their social relationships and seek more collectivistic goals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003). Thus, in Western cultures, power is operationalized in terms of self-interest, whereas in Eastern ones, it is operationalized in terms of responsibility.

Once we have discussed the situations and conditions that could make the effects of power disappear or even become reversed, we will next review the proposed theories about the mechanism through which power operates.

Theoretical Insights and Explicative Mechanisms of the Effects of power

One of the first theoretical approaches aimed at explaining the consequences of social power was the power as control model (PAC), which mainly spelled out the effects of power on stereotyping (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996;). This model was based on the notion that control is a core motivation in an individual's social life. Hence, it suggests

that powerless individuals, because of being control deprived, seek more diagnostic information and form more individualized impressions about others as a way to increase or restore their sense of control. By contrast, powerful individuals' independence and their increased social control enables them to stereotype others *by default* and *by design* and this tendency in turn helps them to maintain their control and superiority.

This model constituted a cornerstone for later theories that attempted to offer a theoretical framework for the effects of social power. Following a chronological order, the most important ones are: the approach inhibition theory of power, the situated focus theory of power, and the social distance theory of power. Each one of them focused on different specific elements (e.g., basic cognition, motivation) and offered a different explicative mechanism for the effects of power.

From a motivational point of view, the approach inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) attempted to provide a broader explicative mechanism for many of the effects of power by referring to the behavioral approach (BAS) and the behavioral inhibition systems approach (BIS; see Gray, 1994). Given that powerful individuals act according to their will and live in a rich reward environment, their behavior and affect are driven by the activation of BAS. In contrast, the increased constraints and punishments associated with a lack of power activate BIS, which in turn leads to inhibited behavior and negative emotion (see Figure 1).

Trying to explain power's cognitive effects, the approach inhibition theory accepted the association of elevated power with automatic social cognition and decreased accuracy in social judgments. Conversely, it associated low power with a more controlled and complex cognitive processes. However, it is nuanced in that these effects may be moderated by the valence and content of the judgment. For instance, when judgments are

about rewards, powerful individuals should be expected to show a more controlled cognition (Keltner et al., 2003).



Figure 1. Explicative mechanisms of the effects of power proposed by the approach inhibition theory of power (adapted from Keltner et al., 2003).

This theory has attracted the attention mainly of researchers who deal with the behavioral and emotional effects of social power. Studies that explored the effects of power on individuals' propensity to act (Galinsky et al., 2003) or their willingness to get involved in risky behaviors (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) provide empirical support for the assumptions of the approach inhibition theory of power. These studies confirmed that power indeed increases disinhibited and approach-related behavior. Authors that explore the emotional effects of power also confirmed the association of high power with positive affect (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006). However, the association of low power with increased negative affect or with behavioral disinhibition have not received empirical support yet (Smith & Bargh, 2008)[3].

[3] The explicative value of the approach inhibition theory about the emotional effects of power will be further discussed in the next chapter

Following a purely social-cognitive perspective, the situated focus theory of power (Guinote, 2007a) was developed later. Like the PAC model (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Fiske, 1993), this theory claimed that given the fact that powerful individuals have a level of control over their environment, they do not need to pay close attention to that environment. However, this is not the case with powerless individuals, who need to attend to all available environmental stimuli in order to increase their sense of control. In contrast to the approach inhibition theory, the situated focus theory of power shifts the attention from the content of the stimulus (i.e., rewards or threats) to how the information is processed (Guinote, 2007a, 2007b).

More specifically, it proposes that powerful individuals' independence gives them the possibility to attend only to stimuli they consider relevant and to ignore stimuli they consider irrelevant; they can do this because their attention is more flexible and selective. In contrast, powerless individuals are not able to ignore peripheral information, and the interference of such distractions means that their attention is less focused (Guinote, 2007a, 2008; Willis, Rodríguez-Bailón, & Lupiáñez, 2011).

The claims of the situated focus theory have been supported in several studies. In one of these studies, participants primed with high and low power were given a picture of a line framed by a square. They were then given a second square frame, smaller than the first one, and were asked to draw a line inside it with the same length as the original line in either absolute terms (the absolute task) or proportional terms (the relative task). Results revealed that powerless participants performed worse in the absolute than in the relative task. By contrast, powerful participants performed equally well in both tasks, which demonstrated that their attention was more flexible and was focused on the contextual information only when the task demanded it (Guinote, 2007b, Study 1). Powerful individuals' greater attentional focus made them more able to adapt to the needs, goals, and

priorities activated by the situation, and this, therefore, explained their advantage in goal pursuit and goal-oriented behavior (Guinote, 2007c).

Magee and Smith (2013) proposed an alternative explicative mechanism for the effects of power on goal pursuit as well as for many of the other effects of power. By combining both motivational and cognitive elements, they formed the social distance theory of power. This theory emphasized the relational nature of social power and claimed that when individuals have asymmetrical access to resources their experiences of social distance are also asymmetrical.

Thus, high power individuals' independence and increased access to resources also boosts their experience of social distance from their powerless counterparts, making them less motivated to affiliate with them. On the contrary, powerless individuals are more dependent on powerful people in order to achieve resources and desirable outcomes. Therefore, they are also more motivated to decrease social distance and seek closeness with them. This increased or decreased motivation for social distance, in turn, affects the way powerful and powerless individuals construe different stimuli (objects, goals, people, etc., see Figure 2).

Powerful individuals define stimuli by means of a high construal level—that is, using central and superordinate features—whereas powerless individuals define stimuli using peripheral and subordinate features (i.e., a low construal level). Given that the goals that are central in a given situation are represented in a higher construal level, high power individuals are able to detect them, organize their means, and act consequently. In contrast, powerless individuals' lower construal level does not help them to distinguish between applicable and inapplicable goals.

Thus, according to the social distance theory of power, powerful individuals' higher construal level, and not their focused attention, accounts for their advantage in goal

selection and goal pursuit. The higher construal level also explains the way they form impressions about others: they perceive others based on stereotypes when these are goal-relevant, or they focus on the defining features and traits when stereotypes are not applicable. Given that both stereotypes and traits are abstract constructs, they both require a high construal level (Smith & Trope, 2006).

More importantly for the present work, as it can be seen in Figure 2, social distance not only operates indirectly through its effects on construal level but also has some direct effects. For instance, the motivation to increase or decrease social distance affects powerful and powerless individuals' emotion expression (Van Kleef et al., 2008). This issue will be further discussed in the next chapter.



Figure 2. Explicative mechanism of the effects of power proposed by the social distance theory of power (adapted from Magee & Smith, 2013).

Conclusions

In the present chapter, we first discussed the concept of social power. We distinguished this concept from personal power, and we discussed their most commonly used definitions. We then referred to other related constructs that could either be considered as important antecedents of social power (e.g., personality dominance, gender) or different facets of it (e.g., illegitimate power, power as responsibility). We highlighted the need to treat them as different constructs to better explore their independent effects or their roles as moderators.

In the next section, we reviewed the most relevant findings of the studies that dealt with the cognitive and behavioral effects of power (e.g., impression formation, goal pursuit, and risk taking). Finally, we presented three of the most important theories that have offered different explicative mechanisms for these effects. In summary, for the approach inhibition theory, power operates through the activation of the behavior approach system; for the situated focus theory, power's effects on basic attentional processes account for its more complex effects (e.g., goal pursuit); and for the social distance theory, the experienced or desired social distance—or the construal level associated with it—explain the differences in how powerful and powerless individuals think, feel, and behave.

In conclusion, despite the great amount of research conducted on the effects of power until now, we consider that there is still lot of work to be done. Compared to the behavioral and cognitive effects of power, as will be shown in the next chapter, the emotional effects have received less attention, and existing findings are less conclusive.

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Chapter 2:

The emotional side of Power(lessness)

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Power differences are a pervasive phenomenon of social life. Power has been considered to have different bases (French & Raven, 1959; Overbeck, 2010; Schmid Mast, 2010) and has been commonly defined as the capacity to influence and control others or to administer rewards and punishments (Fiske, 1993; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Turner, 2005). At an interpersonal level of analysis—which is the main focus of this chapter— social power changes how individuals think, feel, and act during their interactions with one or more partners (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote & Vescio, 2010; Schmid Mast, 2010). However, although considerable research has been performed on the effects of social power on behavioral and cognitive processes (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a; P. K. Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & Van Dijk, 2008; Willis, Rodríguez-Bailón, & Lupiáñez, 2011), its emotional consequences have been less explored and the existing literature shows less conclusive results.

Our aim with this chapter is threefold. First, we will summarize research findings on how possessing or lacking social power affects individuals' moods and emotional states. Second, we will review the literature on the relation between social power, social motives, and specific emotions. We will argue that applying a perspective based on the social functions of discrete emotions, rather than a valence-based perspective, can provide clearer and more informative results about powerful and powerless individuals' emotional expression as well as about the motives that underlie this expression (i.e., social distancing vs. affiliative motives). Third, we will closely discuss the case of anger in order to show an example of how power shapes emotional expression. We will argue that although this emotion is often associated with high power, powerless individuals also express it, but they do it in an indirect way. Finally, we will discuss some possible moderators (e.g.,

legitimacy) of the effect of power on emotional processes and open up possibilities for new predictions on the effects of social power on other emotions.

It should be noted that along this chapter we mention findings on both power and status differences. Given that these constructs are strongly correlated (Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010) we think that existing findings on how status hierarchies affect emotion could be taken as a valuable framework for researchers dealing with the emotional effects of power. However, this does not mean that we consider power and status as equivalent constructs (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011). Rather, it should be taken as an invitation to test the similarities and differences of power and status effects on emotion.

Power and Positive and Negative Affect

The approach/inhibition theory of power proposes that both power and powerlessness influence affective processes (Keltner et al., 2003). It states that low power individuals are more exposed to environmental constraints and threats, which leads them to develop more negative mood and greater experience and expression of negative emotions. By contrast, powerful individuals, who are more exposed to opportunities and environmental rewards, tend to show more positive affect (Keltner et al., 2003). However, empirical evidence supporting these predictions is not so clear, especially regarding low power individuals.

Trait dominance has been found to be negatively correlated with the experience of negative affect and positively correlated with positive affect, supporting the claims of the approach/inhibition theory (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). However, priming participants with power or powerlessness has not been found to influence individuals' positive or negative affect (Galinsky et al., 2003; P. K. Smith & Bargh, 2008). By contrast, using interaction paradigms in which participants are randomly assigned to powerful and

powerless roles has been found to support the predicted effects of power on positive affect, but has not shown that powerlessness leads to negative affect (e.g., Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Langner & Keltner, 2008).

Berdahl and Martorana (2006) asked their participants to discuss a controversial topic such as poverty in groups composed of one leader and two subordinates. Leaders, in comparison to subordinates, were found not only to experience but also to express more positive emotions. However, as it has been said, the association between powerlessness and increased experience and expression of negative emotions was not confirmed, as powerless participants did not differ from powerful participants in the experience and expression of negative emotions.

Later, Langner and Keltner (2008) asked powerful and powerless participants to tease each other and measured positive and negative affect during this interaction. Their results revealed that individuals' influence within a romantic relationship as well as participants' perceived power after the experimental role assignment were positively correlated with the degree of positive affect but was not correlated with the degree of negative affect.

Taken together, these results suggest that social power increases positive affect but it should be measured during meaningful interactions (e.g., teasing interaction, controversial discussion) between powerful and powerless individuals that leave space for intense emotions to be raised (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Langner & Keltner, 2008). Yet, the causal effect of powerlessness on negative affect has not received the same degree of support (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Langner & Keltner, 2008; Petkanopoulou, Willis, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2012; P. K. Smith & Bargh, 2008).

Although the experience and expression are two components of emotion that tend to be correlated, this is not always the case (Gross, John, & Richards, 2000). For instance,

it has been suggested that powerless individuals are more limited by social norms and their emotion expression —especially when they interact with a powerful target— does not always correspond to their internal moods and states (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998). Therefore, considering the emotion expression as the observable outcome of individuals' real inner feelings could lead to misleading conclusions about the emotional effects of powerlessness.

A second possible explanation for the unclear effects of powerlessness on negative emotions could be that they were studied from a valence-based perspective. However, it was supported that a discrete emotion approach seems more useful to have a better understanding of the emotional effects of having or lacking social power (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). This is because discrete negative emotions are accompanied by different appraisals and action tendencies (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991), and serve different social goals related to cooperation or competition (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2010). Therefore, powerful and powerless individuals, because of their differences in the goals they pursue, may express two different negative emotions differently, such as for example anger and sadness.

Thus, we shall next predict the effects of power and powerlessness on discrete emotions by reviewing the literature and considering the findings of two different lines of research. On the one hand, we will provide evidence that shows that social power influences social motives and goals (Case, Conlon, & Maner, 2015; Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012; Van Kleef et al., 2008). On the other hand, we will follow a social-functional perspective of emotions and show that specific social functions and goals are accomplished with the expression of some discrete emotions (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2010). Although a direct relationship between power—or powerlessness—and specific emotions has not been clearly proven yet (for exceptions, see Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2008), we believe that considering

these two different lines of research can improve our understanding about the relation between power and affective processes.

Power Social Motives and Discrete Emotions

It has been established that social power affects individuals' motives and goals (Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2007b). The better objective circumstances of powerful individuals make such individuals more biased towards goals that serve to enhance and maintain their privileged position (Willis & Guinote, 2011). This bias may makes them more prone to pursue self-serving goals (Kipnis, 1976; Winter, 1973). Along these lines, Keltner, Gruenfeld, Galinsky, and Kraus (2010) argued that power-holders choose to pursue personal goals rather than goals that serve their subordinates, and Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee and Galinsky (2008) showed that the powerful think more of what others can do for them than of what they can do for others.

Similarly, given that the powerful have greater control over their own and others' outcomes (Fiske, 1993), they have a greater sense of independence and self-sufficiency (Guinote, 2007b; Lammers et al., 2012). This in turn may increase social distance toward others, making such individuals less willing to maintain close relationships (Magee & P. K. Smith, 2013; P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006). This idea is consistent with the finding that powerful individuals prefer working alone rather than in teams and are less willing to make decisions that favor communal welfare (Lammers et al., 2012).

Conversely, powerless individuals are more motivated to affiliate with others and aim to increase closeness and cohesion in their relationships (Case et al., 2015). Partners who reported having lower power in their romantic relationship have been found to try to adjust to the emotional experience of high power individuals (Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003). Moreover, studies that explicitly measured affiliative motivation have confirmed that powerless individuals' greater willingness to connect with others led them to generate

greater reciprocal and complementary responses to other people's distress (Van Kleef et al., 2008).

In short, this line of research suggests that high power increases social distance motives, whereas low power is associated with social affiliative motives (Case et al., 2015; Lammers et al., 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013). Consequently, from a social functional perspective (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2010), the powerful and the powerless should be more prone to express the emotions that help them satisfy such motives.

Fischer and Manstead (2008) argued that emotions mainly serve two broad social functions that are crucial for people's interactions: an affiliative and a social distancing function. Thus, some emotions such as sadness, shame, and guilt help people to get closer to others and affiliate with them; other emotions such as anger and pride create social distance and promote competition for status (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). In the same vein, Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa (2000) suggested using the terms "engaging" and "disengaging" emotions. The experience of the former motivates people to establish harmonious social relationships and perceive themselves as interdependent and connected to others. By contrast, disengaging emotions motivate people to perceive themselves as independent and disengaged from others (Kitayama et al., 2000).

Emotions such as sadness and disappointment are elicited when people face a loss or a threat and are associated with appraisals of lack of control and withdrawal action tendencies (Ellsworth & C. A. Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1986; Frijda et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991). The expression of these emotions, by conveying signals of vulnerability and neediness, triggers empathetic emotional responses and invites the recipient to attend to and support the person who expresses them. Therefore, expressing sadness and disappointment serves people's affiliative goals (Clark & Taraban, 1991; Fischer &

Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2010). The same type of goals can be achieved with the expression of the “moral emotions” of shame and guilt, which are associated with a motivation to repair the damage caused and convey signs of appeasement to the receiver (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Gausel & Leach, 2011; Shariff & Tracy, 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2010). Moreover, affiliative emotions are usually associated with displays of low status and powerlessness (Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, Van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998), and it has been found that individuals are assessed as being less dominant when they express these emotions (Hareli, Shomrat, & Hess, 2009).

By contrast, anger has been characterized as the most prototypical “powerful emotion” (Fischer et al., 2004; Timmers et al., 1998). Anger is elicited by appraisals of goal blockage and is associated with high coping potential, approach and even aggressive action tendencies (Averill, 1983; Berkowitz, 1993; Frijda, 1986). Although some studies have shown that anger can help people to get closer in the long term, it seems that this emotion serves a social distancing function in the short term (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Fischer & Roseman, 2007). By expressing anger people convey signs of toughness, high status and dominance (Knutson, 1996; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens, 2001) and aim to control the behavior of the person they are angry at (Fischer & Evers, 2011; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006).

Another social distancing emotion is pride (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). Pride is accompanied by a high coping potential, personal agency about positive outcomes, and a positive self-evaluation (Ellsworth & C. A. Smith, 1988; K. M. Lewis, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 2003). Participants who were induced to feel proud, in comparison with a neutral state, showed more dominant behavior and their counterparts also perceived them as such during a group problem-solving task (Williams & Desteno, 2009). Furthermore, studies

have found a strong implicit association between displays of pride and high status. This association has been found to be stronger than the association between other emotions (e.g., happiness, anger) and status (Shariff, Tracy, & Markusoff, 2012; Shariff & Tracy, 2009).

The relation between status and discrete emotions has been found to be bidirectional (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). Participants not only attributed high status to characters who were presented as being proud and angry, and low status to characters who were presented as being appreciative, sad and guilty, but also the other way round. That is, participants expected high status individuals to respond with pride and low status individuals to respond with appreciation when positive outcomes occurred. As a way to cope with negative results, participants expected low status individuals to feel sad and guilty and high status individuals to feel angry (Tiedens et al., 2000).

Given that power increases social distance motives, whereas powerlessness increases social affiliative motives, the powerful should be more likely to express emotions such as anger and pride, whereas the powerless should be more likely to express emotions such as sadness, shame, and guilt, confirming the existing stereotypes mentioned above (Tiedens et al., 2000).

However, for several reasons such results may not be as straightforward as predicted. First, various factors related to the social context in which the emotions appear, or related with how power is perceived or operationalized may act separately or jointly as moderators of the effect of power on individuals' motivation and consequently on their emotional expression. Second, the social motives that underlie individuals' emotional expression are often mixed and even contradictory. For example, in a given situation individuals may be motivated to distance themselves from others and gain relative status over them, but at the same time they may be motivated to act in accordance with social

rules and maintain harmonious relationships. Thus, individuals' emotional expression may be the outcome of the balance between different and even competing social motives.

Finally, individuals' emotional expression depends not only on the evaluation of the emotion-eliciting situation or on their own social motives. It also depends on the anticipated consequences related to the reactions of others to one's own emotional expression, that is, on people's social appraisals (Evers, Fischer, Mosquera, & Manstead, 2005; Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Although various types of motives may induce people to express certain emotions, they may finally avoid expressing them directly if they anticipate that this expression could lead to detrimental consequences (i.e., negative social appraisal, see Evers et al., 2005).

The best example to further understand these processes might be anger, which is considered to be a "powerful" emotion. Given that expressing anger may have important implications for maintaining or changing the hierarchy, this emotion has caught the interest of many scholars who study emotions in an intergroup domain and have compared the emotional experience and expression of members of powerful and powerless groups (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). However, evidences about the expression of this emotion in an interpersonal domain are more scarce and less clear (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Tiedens et al., 2000). In the next section we will further discuss the effect of power on anger expression, as well as the social factors that may moderate either the relation between power and social motives, or the relation between social motives and emotional expression.

When Powerless Individuals Express "Powerful" Emotions: The case of anger

As stated above, the expression of anger is aimed at changing the behavior of and controlling the person toward whom it is addressed and helps people gain social distance

and relative status (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Therefore, this emotion has been considered appropriate for powerful individuals. For example, it has been claimed that anger has an "authority entry requirement", as individuals who have power and authority are more entitled or licensed to express this emotion (Averill, 1997). Other authors have described anger as a privilege possessed by people with a superior social and structural position (Taylor & Risman, 2006).

However, in other cases, empirical evidence has contradicted this positive association between power and anger, demonstrating that powerless and low status individuals express more anger than powerful individuals. For instance, Berdahl and Martorana (2006) showed that powerless (and not powerful) participants were the ones who experienced and expressed more anger during a group discussion.

These apparently contradictory results might be explained by the fact that although low power and status is related to an affiliative motivation, this motivation is not stable. Various factors, such as the way that power is construed in a given social context, or individuals' perceived illegitimacy or stability of power, could play an important moderating role by affecting the social motives of powerful and powerless individuals.

It has been argued that social power may activate different goals depending on the social context or on individuals' dispositions and traits. Thus, in some cases power is perceived in terms of self-interest and opportunity, whereas in others may activate communal goals and be construed as a responsibility (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Sassenberg, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012). In this second case, high power increases interpersonal-sensitivity as well as individuals' tendency to behave in social desirable ways (Chen et al., 2001; Schmid Mast et al., 2009). In a similar vein, it could be expected that when power is operationalized as responsibility and activates the idea of *noblesse oblige,*

powerful individuals would be less motivated to distant themselves from others and more reluctant to express anger than powerless individuals.

Another factor that may influence powerless individuals' motives to express anger is the evaluation of their powerless situation as being legitimate or not. Although powerful individuals are motivated to maintain their power and reinforce the status quo, individuals who lack power may also be motivated to restore their power and enhance their status (Fiske & Dépret, 1996). Especially when individuals think that they deserve power but lack it, they tend to perceive their situation as illegitimate and are more resistant to the loss of their power and more motivated to regain it and to increase the social distance between themselves and others (Lammers et al., 2012; Willis, Guinote, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010). Such individuals may therefore express anger for this purpose.

Summing up, these results reveal that although anger expression is associated with elevated power, under certain conditions this effect may be inverted and powerless individuals may be more willing to express it. However, it has been emphasized that, although emotions are functional, they do not always fulfill the goals that are supposed to serve (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). For example, the fact that anger expression aims to distance oneself from others and gain relative power over them does not mean that this goal is always achieved. Thus, when powerless individuals express anger toward a powerful counterpart they may fail to accomplish their goal (Fischer & Manstead, 2008) because they are constrained by their counterpart's higher ability to administer punishment (Keltner et al., 2003).

Results obtained in the context of negotiations where both opponents are instigated by a competitive motivation and therefore aim to force a desirable change on the other individual's behavior have revealed that expressing anger helps powerful negotiators to fulfill this goal but this is not the case for powerless negotiators (Van Kleef et al., 2010).

Anger expressed by a powerful negotiator toward a powerless opponent has been found to elicit complementary fear responses in the recipient that lead to a favorable subsequent offer (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012). However, opponents with good alternatives (i.e., high bargaining power) have been found at best to remain unaffected by their opponent's emotional expression, and in some cases even to react with reciprocal anger responses to their powerless counterparts' anger and consequently with detrimental behavioral reactions (Lelieveld et al., 2012; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006).

This illustrates that the effectiveness of anger expression depends on individuals' ability to assess their own goals together with the goals and appraisals of others, and accurately anticipate their reactions (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Fischer & Manstead, 2011). Therefore, there are situations in which, despite being motivated to express anger, powerless individuals may anticipate that by doing so they could get in trouble and thus strategically avoid expressing this emotion directly toward a powerful target. In a study, Dutch women involved in traditional relationships, in which power differences were salient, were found to anticipate more negative consequences (i.e., negative social appraisals) than men as a result of expressing anger. These negative social appraisals led them to express less direct anger than men, although they reported being angrier than them (Fischer & Evers, 2011).

However, expressing anger directly toward the person someone is angry at is not the only way to cope with this emotion. It has been suggested that people can address this emotion in more indirect and subtle ways (Linden et al., 2003). Timmers et al. (1998) manipulated the object-target relationship, where the object is the person who caused the anger and the target is the person toward whom the anger is expressed. They showed that women, compared to men, expressed less anger directly toward the person they were angry

at (object-target same), but they expressed more anger in a context in which the object of their anger was not present (object-target different), a type of indirect anger expression (Timmers et al., 1998). Although this study did not directly deal with the emotional effects of power, it has been suggested that gender differences in anger expression could be explained by the differences in power and status held by men and women (Fischer & Evers, 2011; Schmid Mast, 2010; Timmers et al., 1998).

Along the same lines, it has been found that people express their anger in a more overt and direct way toward low status individuals, but when their anger is directed toward a high status individual, they either suppress it or choose to express it indirectly by sharing it with others (P. Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004).

It has been supported that emotional sharing has beneficial effects for relationships, as it brings people closer and strengthens the bonds between them (Rimé & Zech, 2001; Rime, 2009). It is also worth noting that in some cases sharing emotionally relevant situations elicits group-based appraisals and emotions as well as a sense of a common group identity and helps people to form coalitions and coordinate their actions (T. Kuppens, Yzerbyt, Dandache, Fischer, & Van der Schalk, 2013; Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011; Peters & Kashima, 2007; Yzerbyt & T. Kuppens, 2012). Thus, expressing anger indirectly through social sharing seems to play a double function for powerless individuals: on the one hand, it may trigger nurturing responses in others and satisfy their need to affiliate (P. Kuppens et al., 2004; Rimé & Zech, 2001; Rime, 2009); on the other hand, it may give rise to group processes (Peters & Kashima, 2007; Yzerbyt & T. Kuppens, 2012) that may help powerless individuals to counter their disadvantage and restore their power and control. This idea is in line with findings showing that the lack of personal control motivates individuals to restore such control through their groups—they strive for group based control (Fritsche et al., 2013).

In sum, all these results suggest that powerless individuals are aware that expressing anger directly may imply negative consequences for them (Fischer & Evers, 2011). However, this does not prevent them from expressing anger at all they instead choose to do so in an indirect way by sharing their anger with others or venting their anger with them in the absence of the powerful object of their anger (P. Kuppens et al., 2004; Timmers et al., 1998). In other words, powerless individuals express their anger in such a way that they can guarantee the functionality of this emotion.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have attempted to provide an overview of the literature that deals with the relation between social power and emotion. We first reviewed the studies that aimed to verify the statements of the approach/inhibition theory that associate powerlessness with the experience and expression of negative emotions and the decreased experience and expression of positive ones (Keltner et al., 2003). We concluded that, although the latter has received considerable support, the former is still uncertain (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Langner & Keltner, 2008). We recognize the relevance of the empirical evidence provided through the approach/inhibition theory, and the contribution of researchers that examined the effect of power on individuals' moods and states. However, we consider that following the notion based on specific emotions and their functions (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2010) may be useful to clear up ambiguities on the emotional effects of power. This is because it can provide with additional information about the motives and goals that instigate powerful and powerless individuals' emotional responses.

We adopted a social functional perspective that is based on the idea that specific emotions help people to either affiliate or distance themselves from others and gain relative status and power over them (Fischer & Manstead, 2008) and we reviewed the evidence that

associates low power with the experience and expression of affiliative emotions, such as sadness and guilt, and high power with social distancing emotions such as anger and pride (e.g., Schmid Mast et al., 2009; Tiedens et al., 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2008).

Finally, we explored in greater depth the effect of power on anger, considered as a typical powerful emotion, and we showed some evidence supporting the argument that this emotion is also associated with powerless individuals (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006). We showed that when the context favors competition (e.g., negotiation), or when powerless individuals perceive their disadvantaged position as illegitimate, such individuals are also motivated to increase the distance with others and gain relative power and status.

However, studies mainly conducted in the context of social negotiations have provided good explanations to understand why expressing anger directly in some cases may be ineffective for powerless individuals, who seem to be aware of this (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2012). In this regard, we think that social appraisals (Manstead & Fischer, 2001) could determine the way powerless individuals cope with their anger. We also reviewed empirical evidence that demonstrated that avoiding a direct expression of anger does not mean being passive since anger can be expressed using indirect ways that may be more effective to fulfill powerless individuals' goals (P. Kuppens et al., 2004).

In summary, as it can be seen in Figure 1, based on the research reviewed in this chapter, we suggested powerful and powerless individuals' affiliative and social distancing motives respectively, as well as their social appraisals, as possible mediators of the effect of power on emotion expression. We also proposed that the different ways that power and powerlessness are construed and experienced are possible moderators of this effect.



Figure 1. Moderators and mediators of the relation between power and emotion expression.

Although an important part of this chapter is devoted to anger, we consider that the effects of power on other specific emotions also deserve further study. We dealt with anger in detail because this allowed us to fulfill two goals: first, to show that the motivation of powerless individuals to affiliate is not unconditional and stable but rather is influenced by contextual features and by powerless individuals' evaluation of their position (i.e., as legitimate or illegitimate); second, to highlight the need to go beyond the expression-suppression dualism and consider a broader spectrum of emotion-related responses in order to better understand the emotional side of powerlessness.

We consider that similar processes may take place with other emotions. For instance, sadness is an affiliative emotion and a signal of weakness (Van Kleef et al., 2010), and we could expect powerless individuals to express this emotion more than powerful ones. However, powerless individuals who perceive their position as illegitimate may be more motivated to distance themselves from their powerful counterparts rather than

affiliate with them. Therefore, they may suppress sadness and similar emotions in front of their illegitimate powerful counterparts as a way of avoiding presenting themselves as vulnerable. Instead, illegitimate powerless individuals may opt for expressing emotions that help them enhance their status. Presenting themselves as proud in the eyes of their powerful counterparts might be a good option for them given that displays of pride signal high status and dominance and, contrary to what happens with anger, may not imply negative consequences.

In this chapter we presented the different ways that power is construed (e.g., power as responsibility vs. self-interest) and perceived (legitimate vs. illegitimate power) as possible moderators of the emotional effects of power. Nevertheless, we consider that other moderators need to be explored. Cultural norms and values could be one of these moderators. For instance culture was found to affect the way that power is operationalized and people's beliefs related to powerful individuals' emotional expression (Mondillon et al., 2005; Zhong, Magee, Maddux, & Galinsky, 2006).

Furthermore, in this chapter we suggested that the social distancing and affiliative motivations might act as potential mediators of the emotional effects of power. However, exploring the explicative value of other factors could be also helpful in order to understand better how the possession or the lack of power shapes individuals' emotion expression. For instance, powerless individuals' need for control restoration (see Bukowski & Kofta, in press) could lead them to express emotions that help them to enhance their sense of control.

Finally it is noteworthy that the effects of social power can be studied at different levels of analysis (i.e., intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, and ideological; Bourhis & Brauer, 2006). Belonging to either a structurally advantaged or a disadvantaged group also affects individuals' group-based emotions (i.e., emotions that people experience and

express on behalf of their group; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Given the main focus of this chapter, we did not refer to the emotional effects of power and powerlessness at an intergroup level. Literature on this field suggests that there could be some similarities between these effects of power at both interpersonal and intergroup levels. In this chapter we suggested that in interpersonal relationships the expression of anger is associated with powerful individuals, however we argued that perceived illegitimacy may reverse this effect. In a similar vein, at an intergroup level it was found that perceiving the in-group as stronger predicts the expression of anger toward the out-group (Mackie et al., 2000). However this emotion is also experienced and expressed by members of minority or structurally disadvantaged groups who perceive their situation as illegitimate (Van Zomeren et al., 2012, 2004).

However, despite possible similarities, there are several reasons why we consider that the emotional effects of power and powerlessness at an intergroup and at an interpersonal level should be treated separately. First, emotions may serve different social functions at each level (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). For example, at an intergroup level the experience of the affiliative emotions of guilt and pity by members of advantaged groups may be accompanied by benevolent reactions and finally help them to maintain their superiority (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Furthermore, there are several factors that are not applicable to interpersonal relationships, and that could be important moderators or mediators of the emotional effects of power at an intergroup level, such as group-identification or perceived identity threat (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, & Bruder, 2009; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). For those reasons we delimited the literature reviewed in this chapter to the interpersonal level of power.

In conclusion, we aimed to provide an overview of the main studies so far on the relation between social power and emotion and to raise new questions for future research

on this topic. For these purposes, we considered literature on the social functions of emotions, the social motives related to power, and appraisal processes. We are convinced that bringing together insights from these different research areas can open possibilities for new predictions and contribute to a better and more complete understanding of the effect of power on emotion.

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Empirical Studies

Chapter 3:

Controlling Others and Controlling Oneself:

Social Power and Emotion Suppression

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Controlling Others and Controlling Oneself:

Social Power and Emotion Suppression

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Abstract

Power is associated with living in reward-rich environments and causes behavioural disinhibition (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Powerful people also have greater freedom of emotional expression (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998). Two studies were conducted with the aim of: a) analyzing the effect of dispositional power on emotion suppression, and b) exploring the simple and interaction effects of dispositional and situational power on emotion suppression. In a first correlational study, the power of individuals was found to be negatively correlated with emotion suppression. In a second experimental study, participants were assigned to a powerful or powerless position and negative emotions were induced with pictures. Participants were asked to regulate their emotions during the presentation of the pictures. Participants' emotion suppression was measured using the suppression subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). Results showed that dispositionally powerless participants suppressed their emotions more than dispositionally powerful participants only when they were assigned to a low power position. These results are discussed.

Keywords: dispositional power, emotion suppression, situational power.

Introduction

Social power (i.e., the capacity to control other's outcomes, Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Fiske, 2010; Keltner et al., 2003) is a complex construct and has been considered as a multifaceted aspect of social life. Power has been operationalized using different dimensions to characterize it (e.g., French & Raven, 1959). The permanent and dispositional character of power has been differentiated from the situational character of power, among others. Situational power is specific, can be locally and temporally constrained, and refers to a person's role or position *vis a vis* another person (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998). In contrast, dispositional power is related to individual differences in the need for power or personal dominance (Gough, 1987; Schmid Mast, Hall, & Mast, 2003). Dispositional power is measured by various personality measures such the Personal Sense of Power Scale (Anderson, John, & Keltner, in press; Chen, Langner, & Mendoza-Denton, 2009) and trait dominance measures (e.g., Cassidy & Lynn, 1989; Goodwin et al., 1998).

Personal sense of power refers to people's dispositional beliefs about their capacity to influence others (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Chen et al., 2009), whereas trait dominance refers to some people's predisposition to acquire power or dominate others (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Gough, 1987). In other words, high dispositional power individuals may desire, prefer or enjoy controlling other people or believe that they are able to do so, whereas situational powerful individuals only have power in a specific context and not necessarily in others (Anderson et al., in press; Goodwin et al., 2000; Gough, 1987).

The effects of both situational and dispositional power on behavioral and emotional processes have been examined in several studies. On the one hand, it has been established that the powerful behave in more disinhibited and organized ways than powerless

individuals (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote, 2007a, 2007b). For instance, power primed individuals tend more to turn off an annoying fan or “to hit” in a simulated blackjack game compared to the powerless individuals (Galinsky et al., 2003). On the other hand, and regarding its emotional consequences, it has been argued that power decreases the experience and expression of negative affect (Keltner et al., 2003). For example, Langner and Keltner, (2008) asked powerful and powerless individuals to tease each other, and then measured the experienced affect during the interaction. Results showed that the powerful felt less negative affect than the powerless after being teased.

Altogether, these results raise an important question: when individuals are induced negative affect, does power increase or decrease its expression? In other words, does the greater behavioral inhibition of powerless individuals make them more prone to suppress their negative affect? Or does their frequent experience of negative affect make them less likely to suppress it? This paper addresses this question by exploring the consequences of both situational and dispositional power on the extent to which negative emotions are expressed and controlled; that is, it analyzes the effects of power (measuring both situational and dispositional power) on emotion regulation.

Emotion Regulation

When individuals are faced with a stimulus or a situation, they do not only experience emotions but also express them in their social interactions (Reis & Collins, 2004). By doing so, they provide certain information that can be very useful in social interactions (Van Kleef, 2009). Expression is thus a very important social clue for observers or individuals who interact with someone to infer that person’s emotions, attitudes, and intentions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Yet, the emotional experience is often so intense that it has to be managed to respect certain social rules (Gross, Richards, & John,

2006). Emotion regulation refers to all the strategies used by individuals to influence their emotions. Such strategies can be automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious, and imply controlling positive or negative emotions (Gross et al., 2006; John & Gross, 2004).

Emotion regulation can be achieved in different ways such as attentional deployment, cognitive change (reappraisal), situation selection and modulation of the emotional response (Gross, 1998, 2001). The last strategy involves trying to regulate emotions after the emotional response is elicited. One way of modulating the emotional response is through suppression, that is, inhibiting an emotional response once it has been produced (Gross, 1998, 2001). This paper explores powerful and powerless people's emotion suppression.

The Effects of Social Power on Affective Processes

One of the theories that deal with the effects of power on emotions is the approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003). This theory explains the differences in emotional expression through the activation of two different systems. Based on a biological and motivational approach, the theory distinguishes between: the Behavioral Approach System (BAS), activated by rewards, whose ultimate goal is to reach a desired state, and the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), related to the threats of the environment and punishment. The BIS serves as an alarm for individuals.

Given that having power is associated with living in more reward-rich environment, having power activates the BAS. One of the consequences of the activation of the BAS is that it generates a positive mood while allowing individuals to experience a greater variety of positive emotions such as joy, enthusiasm, desire, pride, or fun, even with greater intensity (Keltner et al., 2003). In contrast, lacking power is associated with living in conditions of greater scarcity and being more susceptible to environmental threats. Thus, lacking power activates the BIS and leads to a negative mood and greater experience and

expression of negative emotions such as anxiety, humiliation, fear, shame, or guilt (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Keltner et al., 2003).

From a different perspective, the expressivity demand theory states that people with high power have greater freedom to express their emotions (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998; LaFrance, Hecht, & Paluck, 2003). This in turn leads to greater agreement between their internal emotional experience and its external emotional expression (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). In contrast, powerless individuals are more limited by cultural rules of expression and therefore experience a lower fit between their experience and their expression of emotions.

Importantly, the expressivity demand theory converges with another premise of the approach/inhibition theory of power: power makes people act in less inhibited ways, whereas powerlessness makes individuals behave in more constrained ways (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky et al., 2003). Empirical findings show that powerful individuals are more prone to express their attitudes and opinions (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Berdahl & Martorana, 2006), they show a more intense facial expression, talk louder, make more gestures when they talk, and are less inclined to hide their disagreement than powerless (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998; Schmid Mast, 2010). Given that power allows individuals to break free from behavioral constraints, it can be predicted that powerful individuals will suppress their emotions less than powerless individuals.

To sum up, building on the results that show that powerful individuals are more independent, are less bounded by social rules (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998), and act in less inhibited ways (Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003), our main hypothesis was that they would use suppression as an emotion regulation strategy less than powerless individuals.

In addition, we also aimed to study the relationship between power and suppression by taking into account not only individuals' dispositional power but also the power given to them in a situation. In fact, it has been argued that dispositional and situational power do not always have the same consequences (Chen et al., 2009; Schmid Mast, 2010; Willis & Guinote, 2011). Therefore, it is important to study their separate effects on emotion suppression.

Two studies were performed to test our hypotheses. In Study 1, a questionnaire was used to analyze the relationship between the dispositional power of individuals and the suppression of emotions in their everyday lives. In Study 2, an experimental design was used to explore whether situational power moderates the relation between participants' dispositional power and their tendency to suppress their emotions predicted in Study 1.

STUDY 1

Study 1 analyzed the relationship between the power participants felt they had in their real life and their tendency to suppress emotions. In this study, dispositional power was measured using two scales: the Personal Sense of Power Scale (Anderson et al., in press), which measures people's sense of influencing others in their close environment, and the Scale of Expectations of Control and Responsibility (Frese, Erbe-Heinbokel, Grefe, Rybowiak, & Weike, 1994), which measures people's desire to have positions of power, control, and responsibility. The tendency to regulate emotions was measured with the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003).

Method

Participants

This study was performed at Granada airport (Spain) using incidental sampling. A total of 203 participants (81 males and 122 females) took part in the study. An adult

sample was used, aged between 18 and 65 years old. The mean age of participants was 36.17 years (*SD* = 11.01). Participation in the study was voluntary.

Instruments

Participants completed a questionnaire that included the following measures:

Socio-demographic measures

The questionnaire included a number of socio-demographic questions. Participants' sex and age were collected. In addition, participants were asked about their monthly income using a Likert-type scale from 1 to 9 (1= less than 650 Euros; 9 = more than 5200 Euros).

Personal Sense of power

The study used the Spanish translation of the Personal Sense of Power Scale (Anderson et al., in press). The eight items of the scale asked participants about the experience of their own power in their interpersonal relationships (e.g., "I think I have a great deal of power"). Responses were given on a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (completely agree). The reliability of the scale was adequate ($\alpha = .68$).

Expectations of control and responsibility

The study used an adaptation to a Spanish sample of the Scale of Expectations of Control and Responsibility (Frese et al., 1994) validated by Bañuelos, Palací-Descals, and Agulló-Tomás (2008). The 6 items of the scale asked participants about their expectations of control and responsibility. Participants were asked to agree or disagree with statements such as "I only do what I am told to do. Then nobody can reproach me for anything" on a Likert-type scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (completely agree), $\alpha = .84$. Scores on this scale were inverted so that higher scores meant higher expectations of control. After that

reversal, both the Personal Sense of Power Scale and the Scale of Expectations of Control and Responsibility were coded in the same way and higher scores reflected participants' higher dispositional power.

Emotion suppression

The subscale measuring suppression of the Emotional Regulation Scale by Gross and John (2003) was translated into Spanish for the current study. This subscale included eight items, such as "I keep my emotions to myself," through which participants were asked to what extent they suppress the emotions they experience. Participants were asked to show their degree of agreement on a Likert-type scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (completely agree). The scale proved to be reliable, $\alpha = .81$.

Procedure

Participants responded to the questionnaire in the waiting room of the airport at the request of the person in charge of the study. All participants answered the questionnaire individually and took 20 minutes on average to complete it.

Results and Discussion

A correlation analysis was performed to measure the relationship between the variables of interest (i.e., power, control expectations, and emotion suppression regulation) (see Table 1).

As predicted by our main hypothesis, sense of power and control expectations showed a significant negative correlation with emotion suppression, $r(199) = -.213$, $p = .003$ and $r(199) = -.210$, $p = .003$ for sense of power and control expectations respectively. As expected, the analysis showed that the lower the control expectations of participants, the more they tended to suppress their emotions. Conversely, the higher the

power participants had in their life or expected to have, the less they tended to suppress their emotions.

Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between the variables of interest in Study 1

	Sense of power	Control expectations	Suppression	Sex (Male = 0; Female = 1)	Age	Income
Sense of Power	-	.39**	-.21**	.04	-.06	.21**
Control Expectations		-	-21**	.10	.11	.25**
Suppression			-	-.30**	.11	-.06
Sex				-	-.12	.01
Age					-	.08
Income						-
Mean	4.78	2.80	2.78		36.17	
SD	11.01	1.38	.85		11.01	

Note. ** p< 0.01

The main hypothesis regarding the use of suppression as a self-regulatory strategy depending on the power experienced by participants and participants' expectations of power was explored in greater depth. This was done by performing a multiple regression analysis with suppression as the criterion variable and participants' sense of power and expectations of control as predictor variables. Variables related to participants' level of income and sex were also introduced to control for their effects. In line with the results explained above, the regression analysis (F (4, 190) = 8.92, p < .001, R^2 = .14) showed that sense of power was a significant predictor of suppression, β = -.168; t(190) = -2.29, p

= .023; the lower the sense of power of participants, the more they used suppression as a strategy to control their emotions. Expectations of control also tended to predict emotion suppression, β = -.125; $t(190) = 1.67$, $p = .096$, although marginally. Participants' income did not predict use of suppression as an emotion regulation strategy, β = .007; $t(190) = .102$, *ns*. Yet, the variable sex (Women = 1; Men = 0) was found to be associated with emotion suppression, β = -.299; $t(190) = -4.42$, $p < .001$: women tended to suppress their emotions less than men. This result is consistent with previous results that show that women are more prone to communicate their feelings (Dindia & Allen, 1992) and certain emotions such as fear, sadness, or disappointment. This may be because they are not worried about being considered sensitive, unlike men (Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). However, as predicted by the hypotheses, even when the effect of participants' sex and level of income was controlled for, sense of power significantly predicted to what extent participants used emotion suppression as a self-regulation strategy.

STUDY 2

Study 1 found that the lower the dispositional power of individuals, the more they tended to suppress emotions. Study 2 was designed to explore the effects of dispositional and situational power of participants on emotion regulation.

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 82 students of the University of Granada: 64 females and 15 males (three participants did not indicate their sex), aged between 17 and 41 years (M = 19.43, SD = 3.76), who properly completed all measures. Participants who did not complete a measure for technical reasons (six participants) were not included in the sample. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions.

Materials

The pictures used to activate the different emotions were shown using E-prime software (Schneider, Escaman & Zuccolotto, 2002). Emotional stimuli consisted of eight pictures selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1999) adapted and validated for Spanish samples by Moltó et al. (1999) and Vila, Sánchez, Ramirez, Fernández, Cobos et al. (2001,CSEA-NIMH). Eight pictures were selected to elicit negative emotions according to their valence scores (M = 2.12, SD = .24, for a range from 1 to 9).

Measures

In this study the following measures were used.

Dispositional power

The study used a Spanish translation of the Personal Dominance Subscale of the Achievement Motivation Scale by Cassidy and Lynn (1989). The seven items of the dominance subscale asked participants about their desire to lead or to be in a position of dominance (e.g., "I think I would enjoy having authority over other people"). Responses were given on a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (completely agree). The reliability of the scale was α = .79.

Suppression measure

The following three items of the suppression subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire by Gross and John (2003) translated into Spanish and adapted for the present study were used to measure emotion suppression; e.g. "I kept my emotions to myself," "I controlled my emotions by not expressing them", and "When I was feeling negative emotions I was making sure not to express them." Participants were asked to report to what extent they suppressed the emotions they experienced during the

presentation of negative pictures using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (completely agree). The scale was reliable ($\alpha = .85$).

Pleasantness of the pictures

The pleasantness of the pictures was measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely).

Negative emotions

Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt the following negative emotions during the presentation of the pictures: anger, sadness, fear, and anxiousness (answers were given on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = completely).

Procedure

The experiment was performed in the laboratory in sessions of a maximum of 6 participants that lasted about 30 minutes. At least one day before they took part in the study, participants were asked to fill out the Personal Dominance Subscale of the Achievement Motivation Scale (Cassidy & Lynn, 1989). This was used as the measure of dispositional power.

Once participants arrived at the laboratory, they were told they were going to participate in a study on leadership and teamwork. After that, participants were randomly assigned to play the role of either a leader or a subordinate in an allegedly upcoming task. They were told their assignment to their roles was based on their leadership skills assessed by the questionnaire that they had previously filled out.

In the powerful condition, participants were told that they would lead the subordinate they worked with and evaluate his/her performance in several tasks. They were also told they were the ones who could determine whether the subordinate could win extra course credits or not. In contrast, participants in the powerless condition were told that

their contribution would be limited to following the instructions given by their leader. They were also informed that the leader would determine whether they could also win or not extra course credits.

After that, participants were asked to participate in an allegedly different study while the experimenter was preparing the material for the following leadership and teamwork task. To do so, they were told that a series of pictures would appear on the screen and they were asked to regulate the emotions elicited by them. They were also informed about possible strategies they could use to regulate their emotions (e.g., they were said that they could adapt a neutral attitude, deploying their attention away from the pictures and thinking about issues that are not related with them, or alternatively, they could adopt a neutral facial expression trying to keep a straight face).

Pictures were shown in two different blocks, one of which included only negative pictures while the other only included positive ones. The block with positive pictures was always the last one with the purpose of re-establishing the emotional state of participants.

Participants were exposed to each picture for 8.5 milliseconds. Before and after the presentation of each picture, a beep warned participants about the beginning and the end of its presentation. After each picture, participants had to answer about its pleasantness and about the negative emotions they felt during the presentation of the pictures.

When the presentation of the pictures finished, participants completed the suppression subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). At the end of the experimental session, the experimenter debriefed and thanked the participants.

Results and Discussion

Manipulation checks

The power manipulation checks showed that the manipulation was effective. A *t*-test for independent samples revealed that participants assigned to the powerful condition (M = 4.85; SD = 1.00) believed they had more control over their partner than powerless participants (M = 3.02; SD = 1.20), $t(80) = 2.06$, $p < .001$. In addition, participants assigned to the powerful condition (M = 5.30; SD = 1.23) believed they could act more independently during the task than powerless participants (M = 4.07; SD = 1.43), $t(80) = .76$, $p < .001$.

Emotion suppression

The data were analysed using a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) to explore the joint effects of participants' situational power and their dispositional power on emotion suppression. In Step 1 of the regression equation, participants' mean scores in the dispositional power (standardized) and situational power condition (coded: 1= powerful, -1= powerless) were introduced as predictor variables, and the emotion suppression score was introduced as the criterion variable. In Step 2, the interaction between dispositional and situational power was entered into the equation. Given that participants showed variability in their emotional experience during exposure to negative pictures, and this variability considerably influenced their emotion suppression ($\beta = .342$; $t(81) = 3.25$, $p = .002$), the score of negative emotions felt by participants was also introduced to control for its effects.

The regression analysis showed that neither situational power ($\beta = -.035$; $t(81) = -.34$, *ns*) nor dispositional power ($\beta = -.074$.; $t(81) = -.70$, *ns*) significantly predicted

emotion suppression. However, the effect of the interaction of both variables on emotion suppression was significant β = .208; *t*(81) = 2, *p* = .049.

Conditional regression equations were calculated separately for participants assigned to the low situational power and the high situational power conditions (see Aiken & West, 1991). These analyses showed that, in the low situational power condition, low dispositional power participants (one SD below the mean) suppressed their emotions more than high dispositional power participants (one SD above the mean), β = -.283, *t*(81) = -1.88; *p* = .063. Conversely, the analysis of participants assigned to the high situational power condition did not reveal any difference between those with high and those with low dispositional power (β = .134, *t*(82) = .91, *ns*) (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. Emotion suppression as a function of situational and dispositional power.

Results obtained in Study 1 showed that the lower the dispositional power of individuals, the more they tended to suppress emotions. However, the findings of Study 2 showed that the effect found in Study 1 was moderated by situational power: the effect of

dispositional power on emotion suppression found in Study 1 was replicated only when participants had low situational power. Conversely, high situational power overrode the effects of dispositional power and no differences were found in emotion suppression between individuals with high and low dispositional power.

General Discussion

This paper analyzed the relationship between power and emotion suppression. As predicted by our hypotheses, Study 1 showed that the higher the power of individuals, the less they tended to suppress their emotions in their everyday lives. Study 2 took a step further from these correlational results and showed that the effect of people's dispositional beliefs about their power or the desire of power on their emotion regulation was moderated by situational power.

The results of Study 1 are consistent with the fewer constraints and the greater social freedom that the powerful experience. Compare to powerless individuals, the powerful have greater social resources, live in an atmosphere of abundance and have higher self-esteem and more independence in decision-making (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003). This translates into behavioral disinhibition, and in the present results such a lack of inhibition is reflected on an emotional level. In contrast, the higher inhibition of emotions experienced by powerless individuals could be interpreted as being consistent with these individuals' greater tendency to inhibit their behavior due to the constant threats and social constraints such individuals are exposed to (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003). In fact, powerless individuals' tendency to suppress their emotions may be a further example of their adaptation to and conformity with social norms. These results are also consistent with other approaches that refer to the greater freedom of people with high power to express their emotions and the limitations of powerless people to do so (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998).

Study 2 showed that participants high in dispositional power in the powerless position suppressed their emotions less than participants low in dispositional power assigned to the same condition. However, when participants were assigned to the high power position, having high or low dispositional power did not lead to any differences in their emotion suppression. The difference between participants high and low in dispositional power in the powerless position may be due to the phenomenon that dispositionally powerful people who lack situational power seem to have a special motivation to change their powerless situation and obtain more power (Schmid Mast, 2010). This motivation, which does not affect individuals low in dispositional power, leads them to behave like situational powerful people do. These results are congruent with other studies that have shown that dispositional power predicts performance and behavioral dominance better when individuals hold a powerless position (Schmid Mast & Hall, 2003, 2004).

In addition, the present results underline the importance of bearing in mind that social power is a complex concept that can be operationalized in different ways based on dispositional or situational aspects. Considering both these operationalizations can increase the explanatory value of these studies by indicating possible moderators of the relationship between dispositional power and individuals' emotion suppression and thus can help understand social power in a more comprehensive and holistic way that is closer to real-life situations.

Limitations and Future Research

As in most cases, the studies presented here also have some limitations. One of them may be that they focused mainly on the strategy of suppressing emotions felt but not on other emotion regulation strategies. Yet, as described in the literature, suppression does not prevent emotional experience but tries to manage the various emotional responses that

appear continuously (Gross & Levenson, 1993). Thus, such strategy has cognitive, physiological, and social costs. On a cognitive level, it uses cognitive resources and reduces the individual's ability to remember social information such as names, events, and conversations (Richards, 2004; Richards & Gross, 2000). Consequently, people do not always use suppression to regulate their emotions but use other strategies such as reappraisal or attentional deployment, among others (Gross et al., 2006). Future studies will be able to explore whether the costs of emotion suppression differ between powerful and powerless individuals, as well as the effects of power on such strategies and how often they are used by powerful and powerless individuals.

Moreover, it has been argued that different emotions have different social functions; depending on the context and the person who expresses them, they can either facilitate cooperation and have an affiliative function or be a sign of aggression and competition (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). Future studies could adopt a perspective based on the social functions of specific emotions and explore the differences between powerful and powerless individuals in the emotion regulation of specific emotions as a result of their various intentions and the goals they aim to achieve.

On the other hand, future studies should explore the effects of power on emotion regulation when individuals have an emotion regulation goal. Taking into consideration the effects of power on attentional focus (Guinote, 2007b, 2008), it could be expected that when powerful individuals intend to suppress their emotions, they are better at suppressing them than powerless individuals.

In conclusion, the results of the present studies suggest that people's dispositional traits and beliefs about their power and the power that people have in a specific situation affect emotions and specifically individuals' tendency to suppress their emotions. Such

results raise questions on the different motives that dispositionally powerful and powerless individuals have to express or suppress their emotions, as well as on the way that these motives change depending on the power position that people have in different situations.

Finally, these studies generate questions on how these effects of power on emotion regulation may contribute to maintaining and perpetuating hierarchical relations and which factors may moderate such effects. Conditions such as those that become salient when power is perceived as illegitimate (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008; Willis, Guinote, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2010; Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2011), unstable (Sligte, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011), or when it is associated with social responsibility (Overbeck & Park, 2006), may eliminate these consequences and lead to social change.

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Chapter 4:

Social Power and Emotional Expression:

Power Decreases the Expression of Sadness

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Abstract

Anger is a social distancing emotion, whereas sadness is an affiliative one. Across two studies, we examined how power shapes the expression of these emotions. In Study 1, power was manipulated by assigning participants to a leader or a subordinate role in an upcoming task. In the control condition, no power differences were induced. Next, the participants watched a film that elicited the same degree of anger and sadness, and expressed these emotions to their counterparts. External observers assessed the participants' emotion expression. The observers perceived powerful participants as expressing less sadness than the powerless and control participants. In Study 2, using a vignette, participants were assigned to a powerful or a control condition and had sadness induced. They were then asked about their intention to express this emotion. Affiliative motives were also measured. The results provided evidence about the mediating role of these motives in the relationship between power and sadness expression.

Keywords: power, anger, sadness, emotion expression, affiliation

Introduction

On the 5th of December 2011, Elsa Fornero, the Italian minister of Welfare breaks down in tears while announcing the new austerity measures in the Italian Parliament. Her emotional speech makes the news in the national and international media. How common is for people who are in power positions to express this kind of emotions? Is this incident one of the exceptions that proves the rule? In the present research we illuminate these issues by exploring how social power—the capacity to control others by administering rewards and punishments (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003)—shapes individuals' emotional expression.

Past research has shown that powerful individuals are less likely than their powerless counterparts to suppress their emotions (Petkanopoulou, Willis, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2012) and more likely to show expressive behaviour that is consistent with their emotional experience (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998). The approach-inhibition theory associates elevated power with greater experience and expression of positive emotions, and low power with greater experience and expression of negative emotions.

Similarly, powerful individuals have been found to experience and express more positive emotions than negative, and more positive emotions than powerless individuals (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Keltner et al., 2003; Langner & Keltner, 2008). However, previous studies have not provided clear evidence of a causal relation between power and negative affect (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Langner & Keltner, 2008; P. K. Smith & Bargh, 2008).

Interestingly, when the effects of power were analysed separately for specific negative emotions, it was found that low power (vs. High power) led to increased experience and expression of anger (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006)—a negative emotion. This illustrates the importance of studying discrete emotions rather than positively or

negatively valenced emotions (Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). However, the effect of power on discrete emotions has hardly been explored until now (for an exception, see Van Kleef et al., 2008b).

The aim of the present research is therefore to deepen our understating about the emotional consequences of social power by examining its effects on discrete emotions. We focussed on the expression of two negative emotions—anger and sadness—because they have been characterised as powerful and powerless emotions, respectively (Fischer & Evers, 2011; Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, Van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). We also aimed to go a step further and explore the role of affiliative motives as a possible mediator of the emotional effects of power.

Social Functions and Signals of Anger and Sadness

According to the social functional perspective, emotions inform the target about the expresser's feelings, motives, and intentions, as well as help individuals to achieve social goals (Fischer, Rotteveel, Evers, & Manstead, 2004; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Thus, by expressing emotions, people attempt to cooperate or compete with others, gain power over them, or create social bonds. In short, emotions are thought to serve one of the two broad social functions: they increase or reduce social distance between people (Fischer & Manstead, 2008).

Anger is an emotion that is experienced when an important goal has been unfairly blocked (Averill, 1983; Frijda, 1986). An angry person usually wants to change the behaviour of the person who is to blame for the situation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007), and expressing this emotion generally requires the possession of power (Averill, 1997). Anger expression not only elicits inferences of greater status, dominance, and toughness (Hareli, Shomrat, & Hess, 2009; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), but also leads to status conferral (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008; Tiedens, 2001). Thus,

anger promotes competition for power and serves a social distancing function (Fischer & Manstead, 2008).

By contrast, sadness typically results from a significant loss being attributed to circumstances (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1986). When people express sadness, they are perceived as powerless and weak, so the expression of this emotion tends to elicit help from others (Clark & Taraban, 1991; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1993). With supplication being the signal conveyed by sadness, this emotion increases proximity and strengthens social bonds, serving an affiliative function (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Gray, Ishii, & Ambady, 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2010).

Power, Social Distance, and Affiliation

The greater control over resources and the independence that powerful individuals enjoy increase the distance between themselves and others, making them less willing to maintain close relationships (Magee & Smith, 2013; P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006). Powerful individuals therefore prefer working alone rather than collaborating, and they are less willing to make decisions that favour communal welfare (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012).

Powerful individuals are also less likely to converge emotionally with their partners (Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003) and are less motivated to affiliate with others, which lead them to respond with less compassion when others share painful experiences with them (Van Kleef et al., 2008). These individuals seem motivated to maintain their power, showing goal biases that serve to maintain and enhance hierarchies (Willis & Guinote, 2011).

Given that sadness has an affiliative function and anger has a social distancing one, it could be expected that powerful individuals' reduced motivation to affiliate leads them

to diminished sadness responses, whereas the expression of anger serves their motivation to distance themselves from others.

The Present Research

The present research examines the effects of power on anger and sadness. Studies on emotional stereotypes have shown that people expect low status individuals to feel sad in a negative situation, whereas they expect high status individuals to feel angry (Tiedens et al., 2000). Is this social perception of powerful individuals as angry and powerless individuals as sad reflected in reality? Berdahl and Martorana (2006) found that powerless individuals experienced and expressed more anger than powerful individuals during a group discussion, which is clearly inconsistent with the previously mentioned stereotypes. This, together with the fact that this study (like others; see Langner & Keltner, 2008) did not include a control condition—thereby leaving open the question of whether any effects of power on emotion expression were due to high or low power—suggests that there is scope for further research on this question. Moreover, there has been little research on the effects of power on sadness. Although previous studies have examined other affiliative emotions, such as compassion (Van Kleef et al., 2008), to our knowledge no research has directly examined the effects of power on sadness expression. The present research was intended to fill these gaps in the literature.

We addressed these issues across two studies. In Study 1, we examined the effects of power on the expression of sadness and anger. A control condition was also included to explore whether the possible effects of power on emotion expression were due to high or low power. In Study 2, we focussed on the emotion of sadness and further explored the motives that underlie its expression. In both studies, our focus was the effect of power on emotional expression. However, we were aware that power might also influence individuals' experience after an emotion-eliciting event and not just the expression of

different emotions. Therefore, we also measured emotional experience to control for its potential effects.

STUDY 1

In Study 1, we aimed to create a strong emotional induction by using a stimulus known to elicit equivalent levels of anger and sadness. The powerful, powerless, and control group participants were asked to communicate these emotions to the participant with whom they had ostensibly been paired. They did this by speaking to a camera, in the belief that their message would be relayed to their counterpart.

Building on the literature suggesting that sadness has an affiliative function and signals weakness, whereas anger signals dominance and serves a social distancing function (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2010), and on the evidence that different motives underlie powerful and powerless individuals' behaviour (Lammers et al., 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013), we predicted an interaction effect between power and expressed emotion, such that the powerful participants would express less sadness than the powerless or control condition participants.

We did not have a clear prediction concerning the differences between powerful and powerless individuals' expression of anger. On the one hand, given that anger increases social distance and is considered to be a powerful emotion (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Timmers et al., 1998), powerful individuals might be expected to express this emotion to a greater extent than powerless ones. On the other hand, Berdahl and Martorana (2006) found that powerless individuals expressed more anger than powerful ones. We therefore assessed the effect of power on anger expression with these alternative possibilities in mind.

Method

Participants

Seventy undergraduate students of a Spanish university participated in exchange for course credits. Four participants were excluded from the data analyses because they had major problems with following the experimenter's instructions. The final sample consisted of 66 participants (54 women) aged between 18 and 39 years (M = 19.92, SD = 3.42).

Materials

Two clips were selected from the Spanish validation of an emotion-eliciting set of films by Fernández Megías, Pascual Mateos, Soler Ribaudi, and Fernández-Abascal (2011). One clip had neutral content—it was a scene extracted from the Spanish film *El amante*; the other clip was a scene from the film *Schindler's List* and was used to elicit equivalent intensities of anger and sadness. The films were selected according to the valence, arousal, and discrete emotion scores reported by Fernández Megías et al. (2011). As these authors concluded, the Spanish version of this emotion-eliciting instrument did not manage to differentiate between sadness and anger induction. Given this limitation, we opted to examine the effects of power on emotion expression when similar levels of anger and sadness are evoked. This is coherent with real-life situations, in which people usually experience blends of emotions (Carrera & Oceja, 2007; Scherer & Tannenbaum, 1986; Van Kleef et al., 2010).

Procedure

The participants were told that they were going to participate in a study about emotions in dyadic interactions. At least 24 hours before taking part in the study, they completed a questionnaire on leadership skills. They participated individually in sessions that lasted about 30 min. Before starting, the participants gave informed consent and were

reminded that they could withdraw from the study without any penalty if they felt uncomfortable.

The participants were informed that the study consisted of two parts. In the first session, they would be working individually, whereas in the second session, they would work together with a partner. They were then randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. Participants assigned to the powerful or powerless condition were told that they would have to play the role of either a leader or a subordinate in the upcoming task, and that their assignment to their role was based on their leadership skills, as assessed by the questionnaire that they had previously completed.

In addition, they were informed about their duties during the upcoming task. Leaders were to give instructions and evaluate a subordinate's performance on several tasks. Conversely, subordinates would be limited to following a leader's instructions. Also, leaders would receive extra course credit and would get to decide whether the subordinate also deserved the extra course credit. Participants in the control condition were simply told that they would work with a partner during the upcoming task.

Next, the participants were asked to proceed with the first (individual) task. They were told that this task aimed to provide them with information about their partners' emotional reactions in different situations. This information would facilitate the coordination between the partners and their performance during the upcoming task.

The participants then viewed two clips. After each clip, they were given the following instructions: *"Turn your face to the video camera and describe what you have seen in this clip. What happened? How did you feel?"* The participants' messages were video-recorded. They were informed that their message would be sent to their partners and that they would have the opportunity to view their partner's video-recorded message before the second session started.

All of the participants first viewed the neutral clip, in order to start the study with a neutral emotion as a baseline, and then the emotion-eliciting one. We also used an amusing clip at the end of the study to prevent participants from leaving the experiment in the negative emotional state induced by the second clip. Finally, the participants were thanked and debriefed.

Measures

After each clip, the participants completed measures in the order in which they are described below.

Manipulation check

We first asked them whether they expected to have control over their partner and then whether they expected their partner to have control over them. The responses were given on a scale running from 1 (not at all) to 7 (totally).

Mood

A Spanish version of the discrete emotions questionnaire used by Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007) was used to evaluate the participants' mood after the power manipulation and before the emotional induction. This instrument consists of 18 emotional words (e.g., anger, anxiety, surprise, happiness, pride, sadness, etc.). The participants had to report the extent to which they felt each of these emotions on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 8 (totally). Based on a factor analysis, emotions were grouped into two subscales: positive ($\alpha = .91$) and negative ($\alpha = .85$). The emotion of surprise was dropped from further analysis because it did not load on either factor.

Valence and arousal

The participants rated each of the clips for pleasantness and arousal using the valence and arousal subscales of the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994), as validated for Spanish samples (Moltó et al., 1999).

Communication of emotions

The participants were asked about their intention to communicate the emotions elicited by the clip to their partners. Six items were used to measure anger (angry, irritated, outraged, $\alpha = .78$) and sadness (sad, pity, depressed, $\alpha = .83$). The order in which the anger and sadness emotions were presented was counterbalanced. Answers were given on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 8 (totally).

Emotional experience

The participants were also asked to rate their emotional experience while they viewed the clip. For this, we used the same six items that were used to measure the participants' willingness to communicate emotions. In this case, the participants were encouraged to report what they had actually felt. It was made clear to them that their answers would not be seen by their partner ($\alpha = .89$ and $\alpha = .82$ for anger and sadness, respectively)[1]. The participants answered on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 8 (totally).

[1] Three additional items in both self-reported measures of experience and expression were included to measure fear responses (frightened, scared, and terrified). We included these items because we wanted to be sure that the clip induced anger and sadness to a significantly greater degree than it did other negative emotions. Our analysis confirmed that this was indeed the case, and the participants reported experiencing less fear ($M = 3.74$; $SD = 2.21$) than either sadness ($M = 6.25$, $SD = 1.63$, $p < .001$), or anger ($M = 6.26$, $SD = 1.76$, $p < .001$); $F(2, 130) = 85.81$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .57$. Furthermore, no effects of power were found on the experience, $F(2, 63) = 2.78$, $p = .070$, $\eta^2 = .08$, or expression, $F(2, 63) = 1.50$, $p = .230$, $\eta^2 = .05$, of this emotion.

Objective measures of emotional expression (video message)

Four observers who were blind to the experimental conditions and the aims of the study assessed the video messages that the participants sent to their partners. The observers were asked to rate the extent to which the person who appeared in the video was expressing anger and sadness. The observers were then asked to make two ratings for each emotion. The first rating was about the general emotional expression. To do this, the observers were instructed to integrate information from both the verbal and nonverbal cues of emotional expression (gestures, facial expression, etc.). The second rating was specifically about the verbal emotional expression. Their answers were made on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot).

Results

Manipulation checks

A 3 (Power: powerful, powerless, control) x 2 (Target: I have control, my partner has control) ANOVA, with the second factor as the within-participants variable, was performed to test whether our power manipulation was effective. This analysis revealed a Power x Target effect, $F(2,63) = 7.71$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .19$. Pairwise comparisons showed that the powerful participants reported they would have more control ($M = 4.71$, $SD = .85$) than their partner ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 1.45$), $F(1,63) = 5.75$, $p = .019$, $\eta^2 = .08$. The opposite was true for the powerless participants, who expected their partner to have more control ($M = 4.71$, $SD = 1.35$) than them ($M = 3.52$, $SD = 1.08$), $F(1,63) = 8.98$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .13$. The participants in the control condition did not perceive any control differences between themselves and their partners during the upcoming task, $p = .738$.

Self-report measures

Then, we examined the effects of power on the following measures:

Mood

A one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate power differences in the participants' moods after the power manipulation. This analysis did not reveal any effect of power on the participants' moods, $F(4,126) = 1.44$, $p = .223$, $\eta^2 = .04$; Pillai's trace = .09.

Valence and arousal

As expected, all of the participants' ratings of the emotional clip's pleasantness were quite low. However, we found an unexpected effect of power on valence, $F(2, 63) = 3.62$, $p = .032$, $\eta^2 = .10$. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that the participants in the powerless condition rated the clip as more pleasant ($M = 1.66$, $SD = .96$) than did the participants in the control condition ($M = 1.12$, $SD = .33$), $p = .031$. No significant differences were found between the powerful participants ($M = 1.28$, $SD = .64$) and the participants in the other two conditions. The powerful ($M = 6.23$, $SD = 1.99$), powerless ($M = 5.66$, $SD = 2.00$), and control ($M = 6.58$, $SD = 1.90$) participants all reported similar levels of arousal while watching the clip, $F(2, 63) = 1.22$, $p = .300$, $\eta^2 = .04$.

Emotional experience

A 3 (Power: powerful, powerless, control) x 2 (Emotion: anger, sadness) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on ratings of emotions experienced while viewing the emotional clip, with power as a between-participants factor and the type of emotion as a within-participants factor. This showed a main effect of power, $F(2, 63) = 7.28$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .19$. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that powerless participants reported less emotional experience in general ($M = 5.37$; $SD = 1.62$) than either the powerful ($M = 6.45$, $SD = 1.16$, $p = .034$) or control participants ($M = 6.86$, $SD = 1.23$, $p = .001$). Given this unexpected effect of power on emotional experience, this variable was introduced as a

covariate in all of the subsequent analyses. As expected, the main effect of emotion was not significant, $F(1, 63) = .00$, $p = .987$, $\eta^2 = .00$. The clip elicited equivalent levels of anger ($M = 6.26$, $SD = 1.76$) and sadness ($M = 6.25$, $SD = 1.63$). The interaction effect was not significant either, $F(2, 63) = 1.02$, $p = .368$, $\eta^2 = .03$.

Communication of emotions

The same 3 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on participants' intention to communicate emotions to their partners. This analysis revealed no main or interaction effects, ps > .10.

Objective measures

The inter-observer agreement found for ratings of general expression ($\alpha = .62$, $\alpha = .67$) and verbal expression ($\alpha = .86$, $\alpha = .85$) for anger and sadness, respectively, was acceptable. The four observers' ratings for each emotion were averaged to form an index. Two repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to assess the effects of power and type of emotion on the rated intensity of emotional expression; power (powerful, powerless, control; between-participants) and emotion (anger, sadness; within-participants) were the two factors. The dependent variables in the first analysis were the general level of anger and sadness expressed by participants, as rated by the observers. The dependent variables in the second analysis were the anger and sadness communicated verbally by participants to their partner, as rated by the observers.

General emotion expression

The analysis revealed a main effect of power, $F(2, 62) = 3.41$, $p = .039$, $\eta^2 = .10$. The powerful participants expressed less emotion in general ($M = 2.38$; $SD = .60$) than the participants assigned to the control condition ($M = 3.04$; $SD = 1.00$), $p = .012$. No other

comparisons were significant, and the main effect of emotion was not significant either, $F(2, 62) = 2.63, p = .110, \eta^2 = .04$.

Table 1. Means of the general emotion expression as rated by observers (standard deviations in parentheses).

Power condition	Emotion	
	Sadness	Anger
Control	3.65_a (1.37)	2.44_b (1.02)
Powerless	3.22_a (.92)	2.07_b (.88)
Powerful	2.54_b (.80)	2.21_b (.84)

Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly ($p < .05$).

In addition, and as predicted, there was a significant Power x Emotion interaction, $F(2, 62) = 3.44, p = .038, \eta^2 = .10$[2]. The relevant means are shown in Table 1. For sadness expression, there was a main effect of power, $F(2, 62) = 5.68, p = .005, \eta^2 = .16$. On the one hand, pairwise comparisons showed that the powerful participants expressed less sadness than did their counterparts in the powerless, $F(1, 62) = 4.64, p = .035$, or control, $F(1, 62) = 10.76, p = .002$, conditions. The difference in expression of sadness between the powerless participants and those in the control condition was not significant, $p = .386$. On the other hand, pairwise comparisons did not reveal an effect of power on anger expression, $F(2, 62) = .31, p = .739, \eta^2 = .01$.

[2] The Power x Emotion interaction effect on general emotion expression, as well as the pairwise comparisons, is significant, even without introducing emotional experience as a covariate, $F(2, 63) = 3.56, p = .034, \eta^2 = .10$. The same, even marginally, is true for verbal emotion expression, $F(2, 63) = 3.04, p = .055, \eta^2 = .09$.

Verbal emotional expression

The main effect of power was significant, $F(2, 62) = 3.30$, $p = .043$, $\eta^2 = .10$. Powerful participants were rated as expressing less emotion ($M = 2.65$; $SD = 1.01$) than the participants in the control condition ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.28$, $p = .044$) and powerless participants ($M = 3.24$ $SD = 1.07$; $p = .025$). No other comparisons were significant.

Table 2. Means of the verbally expressed emotion as rated by observers (standard deviations in parentheses).

Power condition	Emotion	
	Sadness	Anger
Control	4.12_a (1.74)	2.72_b (1.80)
Powerless	4.25_a (1.30)	2.30_b (1.40)
Powerful	2.77_b (1.75)	2.53_b (1.54)

Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly ($p < .05$).

The Power x Emotion interaction approached significance, $F(2, 62) = 3.05$, $p = .055$, $\eta^2 = .09$. As expected, and consistent with the results on general emotion expression, we found an effect of power on sadness expression, $F(2, 62) = 6.28$, $p = .003$, $\eta^2 = .17$. Pairwise comparisons again showed that the powerful participants were rated as verbally communicating less sadness than both the powerless participants, $F(1, 62) = 10.99$, $p = .002$) and the participants in the control condition, $F(1, 62) = 6.74$, $p = .012$ (see Table 2). Again, pairwise comparisons did not show an effect of power on verbal expression of anger, $F(2, 62) = .07$, $p = .932$, $\eta^2 = .00$.

Discussion

This study provides evidence that powerful and powerless individuals express their emotions differently. The observers' ratings of emotional expression showed that the powerful participants expressed less emotion than their counterparts in the control condition, and when the type of emotion was taken into account, this was true only for sadness—not for anger. Furthermore, the powerful participants were perceived as expressing less sadness than the powerless participants did. Thus, the observers' ratings confirmed our hypothesis that powerful individuals would seek to avoid expressing the "powerless" emotion of sadness. However, these individuals were not found to express the "powerful" emotion of anger more than the powerless and the control condition participants.

A question that arises is why this result was not echoed in the self-reported measure of sadness expression, despite the fact that powerful individuals regulated their expression of sadness. We think that this might be because emotions were expressed about a film clip and not about a personal issue. Such an emotion induction—in which the participants were not personally involved—may have increased their tendency to communicate emotions through the self-reported measures. Furthermore, given the content of the stimulus (crimes committed by Nazis), the answers in the self-reported measures may have been influenced by the participants' social desirability concerns and their desire to manifest their emotions about the situation described in the clip. Indeed, the participants' ratings in the self-reported measures about their intentions to communicate emotions were quite high for sadness and anger, $M = 6.28$, $SD = 1.63$, and $M = 6.14$, $SD = 1.63$, respectively. The objective measures of the participants' emotional expression may have been less influenced by these concerns; therefore, they may have been more sensitive in detecting the differences in sadness expression across groups.

By including a control condition, we were able to conclude that having power resulted in less expression of sadness (measured by the objective measures), but that holding a powerless role did not result in more expression of sadness. Because sadness may reduce social distance and serve an affiliative function, this finding could be explained by the fact that powerful individuals are less motivated to affiliate with others (Lammers et al., 2012; Van Kleef et al., 2008). In Study 2, we further tested this potential explicative mechanism by exploring whether power influences sadness expression through powerful individuals' reduced motivation to affiliate with others.

STUDY 2

In Study 2, we only focussed on the effect of power on sadness expression, given that power did not affect anger expression in Study 1. In the present study, our goals were twofold: First, we aimed to measure affiliative motivation in order to explore its potential mediator role. Second, given that we did not find an effect of power on self-report measures of sadness expression in Study 1, we tested whether inducing sadness with a different paradigm that is less prone to social desirability effects could also make powerful individuals express less sadness on self-report measures.

In this study, we therefore used a vignette in order to induce sadness and assign our participants to a high power or a control condition. Although this methodology only allows us to measure sadness expression through self-report, it enabled us to use a more relational context in which sadness is experienced because of an (imagined) personal loss, instead of being elicited by a film. We consider this type of sadness induction as more appropriate because the affiliative motivation becomes more relevant in such a relational context.

We expected the powerful participants to be more reluctant to express sadness than the control group participants. Furthermore, we predicted that the powerful participants

would be less motivated to affiliate than control group participants, and that this reduced affiliative motivation would influence their sadness expression.

Method

Participants

The sample of this study consisted of 95 undergraduate students (56 women) aged between 18 and 44 years (M = 22.78, SD = 4.48) from the same university, who participated in exchange for course credit. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions: powerful versus control.

Materials

All of the participants read a vignette. They were asked to identify with the main character and imagine that the situation described had actually happened to them. In the high-power condition, the participants were asked to identify with a boss of a store, whereas in the control condition, they were just informed that the main character works in a store, without making any reference to the power position. In both conditions, the participants were informed that the main character was on his/her way to work and was sad because he/she just broke up the relationship with his/her partner (sadness induction). At the end of the vignette, the participants read that the main character arrives at the workplace and meets his/her employee or colleague (for the high power and control conditions, respectively), who asks him/her how he/she is (see Appendix A).

Measures

After reading the vignette, the participants completed a questionnaire that included the following measures.[3] For all of the answers, we used a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *totally*.

Sadness experience

The participants were asked about the extent to which they would feel sad if they were in the situation described by the vignette.

Sadness expression

Seven items were used to measure the participants' sadness expression (e.g., I would openly express my sadness; I would try not to express my sadness to my employee/colleague, reversed; α = .92).

Perceived actual closeness

A pictorial item of the Perceived Interpersonal Closeness measure (Popovic, Milne, & Barrett, 2003) was used to assess the participants' perceived actual closeness.

Affiliative motivation

A pictorial item of ideal closeness (Popovic et al., 2003) and two additional items—I would like to feel closer to my employee/colleague, and I would like to befriend to my employee/colleague (see Van Kleef et al., 2008)—were averaged for our measure of affiliative motivation (α = .82).

[3] Four items were also included to measure the participants' self-presentation motives (e.g., I would like to be seen as strong). However, given that this measure had low reliability (.62), it was excluded from further analysis.

Manipulation checks

The participants were asked the extent to which they had power over the employee/colleague and then the extent to which the employee/colleague had power over them.[4]

Results

Manipulation checks

The effectiveness of our power manipulation was examined with a 2 (Power: powerful, control) x 2 (Target: I have power, the other has power) ANOVA, with the second factor as the within-participants variable. This analysis revealed a Power x Target effect, $F(1,92) = 5.40$, $p = .022$, $\eta^2 = .06$. Pairwise comparisons showed a significant effect of the target in the powerful condition, $F(1,92) = 24.31$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$: the powerful participants reported that they had more power ($M = 4.79$, $SD = 1.31$) over the other person than the opposite ($M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.76$). The control group participants did not perceived any power differences between themselves and the other person, $F(1,92) = 2.70$, $p = .104$, $\eta^2 = .03$.

We then performed four ANOVAs to assess the effect of power on each of the following dependent variables.

Sadness experience

The results did not reveal any effect of power on the experienced sadness, $F(1,93) = .084$, $p = .773$, $\eta^2 = .00$; therefore, the powerful participants and participants in the

[4] A second measure composed of four adjectives (strong, assertive, empowered, and confident) was included to assess the participants' sense of power because of their identification with the main character of the vignette. The powerful participants ($M = 5.20$, $SD = .85$) tended to report greater sense of power after our power manipulation than the control group ($M = 4.85$, $SD = 1.14$), $F(1,93) = 2.79$, $p = .098$, $\eta^2 = .03$. Also, the participants were asked about the extent to which they managed to identify with the main character of the vignette. The ANOVA conducted on this measure confirmed that the participants of the two conditions did not differ in their degrees of identification, $F(1,93) = 0.75$, $p = .784$, $\eta^2 = .00$.

control condition were equally affected by the sadness-eliciting event described in the vignette.

Sadness expression

Although the powerful participants (M = 3.39, SD = 1.63) reported that they would express less sadness than control group participants (M = 3.79, SD = 1.41), contrary to our predictions, this effect of power did not reach significance, $F(1, 93) = 1.66$, $p = .201$, $\eta^2 = .02$.

Perceived actual closeness

The participants did not differ across the conditions in their perceived actual closeness with the employee/colleague, $F(1, 92) = .008$, $p = .931$, $\eta^2 = .00$.

Affiliative motivation

However, as expected, a main effect of power on the ideal closeness was found, $F(1, 92) = 5.52$, $p = .021$, $\eta^2 = .06$. In line with our predictions, the powerful participants (M = 4.19, SD = 1.20) were less motivated to affiliate with the employee than participants in the control condition with the colleague (M = 4.73, SD = 1.03).

Mediation analysis

The current approaches to mediation analysis support that the absence of a significant total or main effect is not an impediment to testing the mediation hypothesis (Hayes, 2013; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). Thus, although we found no effect of power on sadness expression, guided by theory and our predictions, we performed a mediation analysis to test whether power has a negative indirect effect on sadness expression through the affiliative motivation. The indirect effect was computed using Model 4 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013). Power (1 = powerful, 0 = control) was

introduced into the model as the independent variable, whereas the participants' reported sadness expression and ideal closeness were introduced as the dependent variable and mediator variables, respectively. We found an indirect effect of power on sadness expression, given that a bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval (95%) based on 10,000 resamples did not include zero (−.6889 to −.0681; see Figure 1). Detailed results are presented in Appendix B.



Figure 1. Indirect effect of power on sadness expression through affiliative motivation.

Discussion

In agreement with previous findings, we found that high power reduces individuals' motivation to affiliate with others (Lammers et al., 2012). As expected, we also found that powerful individuals' reduced motivation to affiliate is an important inhibiting factor that prevents them from expressing sadness (see Figure 1). These results are also consistent with previous ones—in which other affiliative emotions were examined—showing that this same factor accounts for powerful individuals' diminished complementary and reciprocal responses of compassion and distress to others' suffering (Van Kleef et al., 2008).

Although we found that power shapes individuals' sadness expression indirectly through the mediator of affiliative motivation, Study 2 did not reveal a direct effect of power on this variable. Despite the differences between the high-power and control groups

being in the expected directions, this effect was not significant. We consider that this may be due to the existence of one or several suppressor variables that weakened the total effect by its omission (Rucker et al., 2011). However, and as stated before, we did find that high power diminished individuals' affiliative motivation and their willingness to express sadness consequently. Importantly, we found this effect using self-report measures, which adding up to the effect found in Study 1 when using objective measures.

General Discussion

In the present research, we aimed to explore how power shapes the expression of two different negative emotions: anger and sadness. Study 1 showed that high power leads to decreased sadness expression. However, the results did not support the association between high power and increased anger expression. In Study 1, we found an effect of power in objective measures—participants' actual sadness expression as assessed by external observers— but not in the self-report measures. Study 2 provided evidence that affiliative motivation has a mediating role in the relationship between power and sadness expression. More specifically, it revealed that power reduces sadness expression, as measured by self-report measures, through powerful individuals' diminished motivation to affiliate.

These results appear to be inconsistent with previous research showing that powerful people are less limited by social rules and therefore have greater freedom to express their internal states (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). Rather, they suggest that powerful people avoid expressing emotions when doing so would display weakness (Van Kleef et al., 2010). These results are consistent with research done on other affiliative emotions, such as distress and compassion (Van Kleef et al., 2008), and provide support to the notion that power affects emotion expression through its effect on social distance (Magee & Smith, 2013).

Notably, in Study 1, the effect of power on sadness expression was observed in objective measures of expression but not in the self-reported ones. Additionally, in Study 2, in which sadness expression was only measured through a self-report measure, we did not find any differences between the powerful and control group participants. Despite this, we found that power affects sadness expression indirectly through affiliative motivation. These inconsistencies might represent a conflict between the motives of the powerful. On the one hand, these individuals are less motivated to affiliate, and as such, they inhibit their sadness expression. On the other hand, they might also be motivated to present themselves as sensitive and empathic leaders in the eyes of their subordinates. Future studies could explore the role of these competitive motives in the relationship between power and sadness expression.

Our findings did not support the notion that power shapes individuals' anger expression. Study 1 did not reveal any effect of power on the expression of this emotion. Given the nature of our power manipulation—that is, legitimate power in a cooperative context—a possible explanation is that our powerful participants wanted to avoid signalling dominance ahead of the joint task in order to not intimidate their subordinate (Schmid-Mast, 2010).

An alternative explanation for the null effects of power on anger expression might come from the distinction between the object and the target of the anger. In our study, the object of the anger (i.e., the emotional clip) was different from the target (i.e., the person towards whom the anger was expressed; see Timmers et al., 1998). Future studies could explore the effect of power on anger expression in a more "relational context", in which the anger is caused by the same person towards whom it is expressed (i.e., direct anger expression). In such a context, anger expression may be more associated with social distancing and power-based motives (Fischer & Evers, 2011; Fischer & Manstead, 2008;

Timmers et al., 1998) and therefore could be expressed differently by powerful and powerless individuals.

In conclusion, this research provides support for the idea that power decreases the motivation to affiliate and therefore the expression of sadness—an emotion that serves an affiliative function. Also, it highlights the need to study specific emotions, rather than positive versus negative moods, in order to achieve a deeper understanding of how emotion expression is influenced by power.

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Appendix A

[You work in a store. In this store, you have a colleague with whom you generally have a good relationship/You are the store manager. In this store, you have an employee with whom you generally have a good relationship. You supervise and evaluate his/her performance, and you take decisions about important issues for him/her, such as on his/her working schedule and salary (raises, cuts, holiday leave, etc.).]

It is a normal working day, and you are on your way to work. You are very sad, given that this same morning you talked with your partner and you decided to break up your relationship. You had been together for many years, but lately things had been going wrong. You two were always very busy and could not spend time together. Thus, the understanding and communication between you were damaged. You think that you will miss him/her a lot and that there is nothing else to do to change the situation. You feel a knot in your throat, and you feel like crying. At that moment, you are entering the store and meeting with your [colleague/employee]. He/she wishes you good morning and asks if you are doing well.

Note: Bracketed sections varied with manipulation.

Appendix B

Table 3. Indirect effect of power on sadness expression through affiliative motivation (Study 2).

		M (Affiliative motivation)				Y (Sadness expression)		
		Coeff.	*SE*	*p*		Coeff.	*SE*	*p*
X (Power)	α	-.564	.230	.016	c'	-.097	.298	.745
M (affiliative motivation)		-	-	-	b	.543	.130	< .001
Constant	i_1	4.751	.164	< .001	i_2	1.22	.652	.066
		$R^2 = .0607$				$R^2 = .1734$		
		$F(1,93) = 6.012$; $p = .016$				$F(2,92) = 9.650$; $p<.001$		

Chapter 5:

Powerless People Don't Yell but They Share:

The Effects of Social Power on Direct and Indirect Expression of Anger

Powerless People Don’t Yell but They Share: The Effects of Social Power on Direct and Indirect Expression of Anger

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Abstract

Building on the distinction between direct/indirect types of anger expression, we aimed across three studies to examine how power shapes anger expression as well as explore possible mediators of this effect. In three studies, participants were asked to identify with either a boss or an employee of a company who was angry at his or her employee/boss (in Studies 1a and 1b, a control condition was also included). In the last study, we additionally manipulated the type of anger expression. Powerless participants (compared to powerful and control participants) were found to be more willing to share their anger with others (indirect expression) but more reluctant to express their anger directly. Powerless participants' motivation to control the perpetrator and their negative social appraisals accounted for the effect of power on the indirect and direct anger expression, respectively. The last study showed that when powerless participants expressed their anger directly, they expected the perpetrator to get more angry than fearful; the opposite was true in the indirect anger condition. Powerful participants always expected their anger to elicit more fear than anger to the perpetrator.

Keywords: Social power, direct anger expression, social sharing, social appraisals, control motivation

Introduction

"... since those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the right time, and with the right people..." (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1934)

Anger is an emotion that raises when people perceive either unfair treatment or a blockage of an important goal for them, and it is accompanied by appraisals of high coping potential and other blame (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Frijda, 1986). This emotion has commonly been characterised as a "powerful" emotion, and its experience and expression have been associated with high power and status individuals (Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, Van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Tiedens, 2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). However, is anger indeed a prototypical powerful emotion that is not expressed by powerless individuals?

Distinguishing between the direct versus the indirect types of anger expression might help to answer this question (Fischer & Evers, 2011; P. Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004; Linden et al., 2003). Direct anger expression implies an overt confrontation with the person someone is angry at whereas indirect anger expression refers to more subtle ways to cope with this emotion such as discussing with others an emotion-eliciting event, which is referred to as "social sharing" (Fischer & Evers, 2011; P. Kuppens et al., 2004; Linden et al., 2003; Rimé, 2009).

We suggest that the powerful might be more prone to express direct anger, whereas the powerless may be more inclined to express anger in indirect ways. Supporting this idea, previous studies revealed that men, being the ones who are more concerned about holding power and status (Eagly, 1987), express more direct anger, whereas women express more indirect anger (Timmers et al., 1998). Similarly, P. Kuppens et al. (2004) showed that

people opt for expressing anger directly toward a low status individual, but when they are angry at a high or equal status individual, they would rather share their anger with others. However, these results are focused on status and gender differences whereas the effect of social power on direct and indirect anger expression (i.e., social sharing) has not been studied yet. Thus, the aim of the present study is to gain insight into the effects of power on the direct and indirect forms of anger expression. Furthermore, we also aim to explore the motives that underlie powerful and powerless individuals' anger expression, and whether the different ways of expressing anger are expected to be effective for them (i.e., helping them to achieve the goal that underlies their anger expression).

Social Power and Motives for Expressing and Suppressing Anger

The goal inherent to the anger experience is to change the behavior of the target of the anger (Averill, 1982; Fischer & Evers, 2011; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Lazarus, 1991). Such a control goal can be easily achieved by powerful individuals because of their capacity to administer punishments and rewards and their increased ability to control their own and others' outcomes (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). By contrast, powerless individuals are less self-sufficient and they face more constraints in their attempts to get what they want (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003). Thus, the control motivation that accompanies the experience of having been treated unfairly might be greater and more long-lasting for the powerless than for angry, powerful individuals.

Literature on anger supports the idea that possessing power and authority is an indispensable requirement for expressing anger in a direct way (Averill, 1983; Taylor & Risman, 2006). Studies in negotiations confirmed this idea as they showed that when anger is expressed directly by a powerful individual, it provokes fear responses in the powerless

target and causes a desirable change in his or her behavior (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012).

However, direct anger expression may be ineffective and counterproductive when expressed by powerless individuals. This is because either the powerful targets of the anger are immune to their powerless partners' anger expression or because they react with reciprocal anger responses and become more demanding (Lelieveld et al., 2012; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006).

Thus, although direct anger expression seems functional for powerful individuals, this is not the case for powerless ones. Powerless individuals might be aware of or even anticipate the negative impact of direct anger expression and regulate their anger accordingly. Studies on gender differences in anger expression showed that women in traditional relationships—in which power and status differences between partners are more pronounced—anticipated more negative consequences and were reluctant to express their anger in a direct way (Fischer & Evers, 2011).

Similarly, we suggest that these imagined negative social implications related to others' reactions, known as negative social appraisals (Evers, Fischer, Mosquera, & Manstead, 2005; Fischer & Evers, 2011; Manstead & Fischer, 2001), account for powerless individuals' unwillingness to express their anger directly. However, this does not mean that powerless individuals avoid expressing their anger at all. The present research suggests that they also do it but in a more subtle way, such as through sharing this emotion with others. This type of anger expression may guarantee the functionality of this emotion.

Emotional social sharing strengthens social bonds between the expresser and the people with whom the emotion is shared, and fosters cohesion between them (Fischer &

Manstead, 2008; Rimé, 2009; Rimé & Zech, 2001). This kind of emotion expression seems consistent with powerless individuals' tendency to seek closeness and affiliation (Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2008). However, apart from its nurturing function, emotional sharing was also found to help people to form coalitions and coordinate actions, leading them to be more effective in affronting threats and pursuing goals (Peters & Kashima, 2007; Yzerbyt & T. Kuppens, 2012).

Thus, sharing their anger with others could be particularly functional for powerless individuals given that it may be an alternative way for them to counter their disadvantage. Building on this idea, we propose that angry powerless individuals' motivation to obtain certain control over the target of their anger will instigate them to express this emotion indirectly, through sharing it with others.

The Present Research

The present research examined the effect of power on direct anger and indirect anger expression. In order to do this, we directly manipulated social power—as control over resources and others' desired outcomes (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003). Previous studies that dealt with this topic were mainly focused on gender differences in anger expression (Fischer & Evers, 2011; Timmers et al., 1998) or manipulated status (P. Kuppens et al., 2004), but not social power. Despite gender and status being two facets of power often positively and strongly correlated with each other, they are not identical and cannot be used interchangeably (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Schmid Mast, 2010; Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010). Furthermore, in the present studies, we explored the motives that may explain powerful and powerless individuals' anger related behavior—social appraisals and control motivation—as well as

the perceived effectiveness of these types of anger expression for powerful and powerless individuals.

We addressed these issues in a set of three studies. In Studies 1a and 1b we first tested the hypothesis that powerless individuals express less direct anger (Hypothesis 1a) but they share their anger with others more than powerful individuals (Hypothesis 1b). We also included a control condition in order to explore whether the effects on anger expression are produced by power or powerlessness. Second, we measured the motivation to control the target of the anger as well as individuals' concerns related to the impact of their anger expression (negative social appraisals). We expected that powerless individuals' negative social appraisals would prevent them from expressing their anger directly (Hypothesis 2a), but their willingness to obtain certain control over the target of the anger would lead them to express this emotion indirectly through sharing it with others (Hypothesis 2b).

Finally, in Study 3 we aimed to verify whether powerless individuals indeed expect indirect anger to be more effective than direct anger expression in order to achieve their goals. Thus, we predicted that powerless individuals would expect more positive than negative consequences after sharing their anger whereas the opposite would be true in the direct anger condition (Hypothesis 3).

STUDY 1a

Method

Participants and design

One participant was excluded from the sample for giving a wrong answer on a comprehension check question ("Who was the person who crashed your car?"). The final sample consisted of 91 participants (72 women, 19 men; M_{age} = 20.90, SD = 2.39).

Participants were randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions (High power vs. Low power vs. Control).

Procedure

We used vignettes in order to induce anger and manipulate the variable of our interest (see Appendix A). Participants first read the vignettes and they were instructed to imagine the situation as if it actually happened to them. Then, they completed a questionnaire with our dependent measures. At the end of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed. All participants in this research were undergraduate students of a Spanish university who participated in exchange for course credits.

Materials

Participants were asked to identify with the main character of a vignette who, at the end of the working day, witnessed his/her car crashed into by another car whose driver was trying to leave the parking of his/her work place. The main character was described as being angry given that the perpetrator did not show any intention to apologise or compensate for the damage caused (this was the anger induction).

Concerning the power manipulation, in the high power condition participants were asked to identify with a boss and the perpetrator was his/her employee; in the low power condition participants had to identify with an employee and the perpetrator was his/her boss. A control condition was also included, in which the main character and the perpetrator had an equal power position.

Measures

After reading the vignette, participants answered the following measures in the order they are described below. All answers were given on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *totally*.

Anger expression

In order to measure direct anger expression, we adapted the four items used by Fischer and Evers (2011; e.g., “I would say I was angry”). We also included four additional items (e.g., “I would overtly show my anger to the person who crashed my car”; “I would try not to express my anger toward the person who crashed my car,” reverse scored). The scale had a good reliability ($\alpha = .86$). Three items were used in order to assess the indirect anger expression (e.g., “I would share my anger about what happened with my colleagues”; $\alpha = .83$).

Negative social appraisals and control motivation

The items used by Fischer and Evers (2011) were adapted and extended to compose our measures of negative social appraisals (e.g., “I would be afraid that the situation get worse”; $\alpha = .84$) and the motivation to obtain control over the target of the anger (e.g., “I would try to influence the person who crashed my car”; $\alpha = .71$).

Emotional experience

Participants were asked to what extent they experienced each one of the following negative emotions that could be relevant for the scenario: anger, fear, shame, sadness, guilt, and anxiety.

Manipulation checks

Finally, we asked participants whether the person they had to identify with had control over the perpetrator and whether the perpetrator had control over him/her.

Results

Manipulation checks

First, a series of *t* tests showed the effectiveness of the power manipulation. Participants assigned to the high power condition (*M* = 5.16; *SD* = 1.37) perceived more power over the perpetrator than participants assigned to the powerless condition (*M* = 2.77; *SD* = 1.67), *t*(60) = 6.16, *p* < .001, *d* = 1.56 or control condition's participants (*M* = 2.41; *SD* = 1.70), *t*(53.77) = 6.86, *p* < .001, *d* = 1.78. Participants assigned to the powerless and control conditions did not differ in their perceived control over the perpetrator, *t*(58) = .82, *p* = .41.

Moreover, powerless participants (*M* = 5.45; *SD* = 1.65) reported that the perpetrator had more power over them than powerful participants (*M* = 2.00; *SD* = 1.18), *t*(54.40) = 9.47, *p* < .001, *d* = 2.40 and control condition's participants (*M* = 2.00; *SD* = 1.41), *t*(58) = 8.67, *p* < .001, *d* = 2.25. No differences in this measure were found between powerful and control condition participants, *t*(58) = .00, *p* = 1.00.

Afterwards, four different analysis of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted. Power was introduced as the independent variable and participants averaged ratings in the measures of direct anger, indirect anger, negative social appraisals, and control motivation as the dependent ones for each one of the ANOVAs (see Table 1 for means and Standard Deviations).

Anger expression

As expected, we found a significant effect of power on both participants' reported direct, $F(2, 88) = 16.87$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .27$ and indirect, $F(2, 88) = 9.13$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$ anger expression. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that powerless participants were less willing to express their anger directly toward the perpetrator than

both powerful and control condition participants, *p*s < .001, supporting Hypothesis 1a. The comparison between high power and control group was not significant (p = .72). A reversed pattern was found for indirect anger expression, as powerless participants reported more willingness to share their anger with their colleagues than powerful participants (p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 1b. Also, powerless participants were more willing to share their anger than control group participants (p = .095), although this difference was marginal. Again, no differences were found between powerful and control group participants (p = .140).

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of the Dependent Variables of Studies 1a and 1b.

	High Power	Low Power	Control
Study 1a			
Direct Anger Expression	5.43 (.63) $_a$	4.46 (1.17) $_b$	5.70 (.72) $_a$
Social Sharing	3.70 (1.44) $_a$	5.26 (1.03) $_b$	4.44 (1.77) $_{ab}$
Negative Social Appraisals	3.58 (1.25) $_a$	4.29 (1.12) $_b$	3.75 (1.04) $_{ab}$
Control Motivation	4.73 (1.00) $_a$	5.11 (.95) $_{ab}$	5.59 (.98) $_b$
Study 1b			
Direct Anger Expression	5.26 (1.06) $_a$	4.47 (1.24) $_b$	5.24 (.91) $_a$
Social Sharing	3.40 (1.52) $_a$	4.51 (1.61) $_b$	3.87 (1.49) $_{ab*}$
Negative Social Appraisals	3.66 (1.11) $_a$	4.24 (1.23) $_b$	3.48 (1.06) $_a$
Control Motivation	4.77 (1.15) $_a$	5.34 (1.05) $_b$	5.06 (1.00) $_{ab}$

Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly across rows (using Bonferroni correction).

* The difference between the low power and the control condition is marginally significant (p = .051).

Negative social appraisals

An effect of power was revealed on the measure of negative social appraisals, $F(2, 88) = 3.26$, $p = .043$, $\eta^2 = .069$. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed that powerless participants anticipated more negative consequences as a result of their anger expression than powerful participants ($p = .049$). No other comparisons were significant (ps > .05).

Control motivation

Taking control motivation as the dependent variable, the ANOVA revealed a significant effect of power, $F(2, 88) = 5.88$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .12$. Powerful participants reported being less motivated to control the perpetrator than control group participants ($p = .003$). Although the difference between powerful and powerless participants was in the expected direction (i.e., the powerless showed more control motivation than the powerful), this difference was not significant ($p = .385$). The difference between powerless and control group was not significant either ($p = .176$).

Emotion experience

Then, we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with power as independent factor and the six emotional states included in our measure of emotional experience as dependent variables. This analysis revealed a significant effect of power for the emotions of fear $F(2, 88) = 4.68$, $p = .012$, $\eta^2 = .096$ and anxiety $F(2, 88) = 3.96$, $p = .023$, $\eta^2 = .083$. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that powerful participants experienced less fear ($M_{fear} = 1.84$; $SD = 1.19$) than powerless participants ($M_{fear} = 2.97$; $SD = 1.58$), $p = .009$. They also experienced less anxiety ($M_{anxiety} = 4.45$; SD = 1.91) than both powerless ($M_{anxiety} = 5.32$; $SD = 1.25$), $p = .067$ and control group participants ($M_{anxiety} = 5.41$; $SD = 1.12$), $p = .040$. Importantly, no effect of power was found for the emotion of

anger, $F(2, 88) = .501$, $p = .61$; powerful, powerless, and control group participants reported having experienced the same degree of anger.

Mediation analyses

We examined the mediating role of negative social appraisals in the relation between power and direct anger expression (Hypothesis 2a). Following the procedures outlined by Hayes (2013), we computed the indirect effect using bias-corrected bootstrapping with 10.000 resamples. Given that the comparison we were interested in was the one between the high power and the low power groups, we ran this analysis comparing these two groups. This analysis confirmed our hypothesis, given that the indirect effect of power on direct anger expression through negative social appraisals was significant; the 95% confidence interval did not include zero (.0257 to .4694). In other words, as it can be seen in Figure 1, powerless participants reported more negative social appraisals than powerful participants, which led them to suppress a direct anger expression (also see Appendix B).



Figure 1. Negative social appraisals as mediator of the effect of power on direct anger expression Study 1.

A second mediation analysis was performed in which indirect anger was introduced as dependent variable and control motivation as mediator. Contrary to our predictions, this

analysis did not reveal any indirect effect of power on indirect anger through control motivation (-.5611 to .0084; 95% confidence interval).

Discussion

These results revealed powerless participants as less willing to confront the target of their anger than powerful and control group participants. However, powerless participants were found to be more willing to share their anger with their colleagues than participants of the other two conditions, although the difference between powerless and control condition was marginal. Powerful individuals reported the same direct and indirect anger expression as the control group. This indicates that it is powerlessness rather than power that affects anger expression. We also found that power affects individuals' motivation to control the target of their anger. But contrary to our predictions, we did not find any significant differences between high and low power group. However, powerful participants were found to be less motivated to control the target of their anger than control group participants. Powerful participants' reduced control motivation in comparison with control group could be attributed to their increased actual control and the fact that they can easily get what they want (Fiske & Dépret, 1996).

Finally, Study 1 provides evidence about the process that underlies the effect of power on direct anger expression. Supporting Fischer and Evers' (2011) results, we found that powerless participants anticipated more negative social implications than powerful participants (negative social appraisals), and this in turn led them to avoid expressing their anger in a direct way.

STUDY 1b

Our goal with Study 1b was twofold. First, we aimed to replicate the results of Study 1a. Second, we were interested in exploring a possible moderating role of the

presence of other people. We advanced no formal hypothesis regarding the role of the presence versus the absence of an audience, because previous theorising and research did not provide a basis for a clear prediction. On the one hand, the presence of an audience could amplify the effect of power on direct anger expression. Anger expression signals dominance and leads to grater status inferences and conferral (Tiedens, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2010); therefore, expressing anger in the presence of an audience might be a way for high-power people to assert their power in the presence of others. On the other hand, the presence of an audience could mitigate the effect of power on direct anger expression, because high-power people might be motivated to maintain a good reputation, so as to consolidate their powerful position (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). These two predictions correspond to two different pathways to social power that have been identified in the literature, namely dominance and prestige (Overbeck, 2010). Finally, it is also possible that the presence of an audience does not influence the effect of power on direct anger expression, because high power people do not consider the potential consequences of their emotional expressions. We therefore examined the potential role of the presence of an audience in an exploratory fashion. The audience manipulation was not expected to influence the indirect anger expression.

Method

Participants and design

Six participants in Study 1b were excluded from the analyses because they gave a wrong answer on one of the two comprehension check questions ("Who was the person who crashed your car?" and "Were there any other people present at the moment that your car had been crashed?"). The final sample consisted of 195 participants (157 women, 37 men—one participant did not indicate his or her sex—M_{age} = 22.99, *SD* = 4.39).

Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 3 (power: High vs. Low vs. Control) by 2 (audience: Present vs. Absent) between-participants design.

Procedure

We followed the same procedure as in Study 1a.

Materials

The scenario was similar to that of Study 1a, with one exception: An additional phrase was included to manipulate audience. Specifically, the vignette informed participants that "it was rush hour, and therefore the parking lot was full of people" (audience condition), or that "it was late, and therefore there was nobody else around" (no audience condition).

Measures

The dependent measures were the same as in Study 1a. The scales again exhibited good reliability (direct anger expression: $\alpha = .87$; indirect anger expression: $\alpha = .74$; negative social appraisal: $\alpha = .87$; control motivation: $\alpha = .75$).

Results

Manipulation checks

Our power manipulation was successful. Powerful participants ($M_{powerful} = 3.85$; $SD = 1.79$) mentioned more power over the perpetrator than participants assigned to the other two conditions ($M_{powerless} = 2.98$; $SD = 1.36$), $t(109.93) = 3.05$, $p = .003$, $d = .54$, ($M_{control} = 2.30$; $SD = 1.55$), $t(128) = 5.30$, $p < .001$, $d = .93$. Also, participants assigned to the powerless condition reported greater experience of power than control condition participants, $t(132.67) = 2.73$, $p = .007$, $d = .47$.

Four separate ANOVAs were again performed. The same four variables as in Study 1a—direct anger expression, indirect anger expression, negative social appraisals, and control motivation— were introduced as dependent variables. Power and audience were introduced as independent ones (see Table 1 for means and Standard Deviations).

Anger expression

Replicating the effects of Study 1a, the effect of power was again significant for both direct anger expression, $F(1, 189) = 11.39$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .11$ and indirect anger expression, $F(1, 189) = 8.16$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Again, powerless participants were less willing to express their anger directly toward the perpetrator than both powerful and control condition participants (both *p*s < .001). The comparison between high power and control was not significant ($p = .10$). Furthermore, powerless participants reported more willingness to share their anger with their colleagues than powerful participants ($p < .001$) and control participants ($p = .051$), although the latter effect was only marginally significant. There was no significant effect of the audience manipulation, $F(2, 188) = 2.02$, $p = .135$, $\eta^2 = .02$ and no Power x Audience interaction $F(4, 378) = .59$, $p = .665$, $\eta^2 = .00$.

Negative social appraisals

The main effect of power on the measure of negative social appraisals was replicated $F(2, 188) = 8.30$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Powerless participants anticipated more negative consequences as a result of their anger expression than powerful participants ($p = .014$), and in this study more compared to control participants too ($p < .001$). There was no main effect of the audience manipulation, $F(1, 188) = .22$, $p = .643$, $\eta^2 = .00$ and no interaction, $F(2, 188) = 1.78$, $p = .171$, $\eta^2 = .019$.

Control motivation

The last analysis of variance (ANOVA) also revealed a significant effect of power on this measure, $F(2, 188) = 4.41$, $p = .013$, $\eta^2 = .05$. In line with our prediction, powerless participants reported being more motivated to control the perpetrator than powerful participants ($p = .009$). There was no main effect of the audience manipulation, $F(1, 188) = .46$, $p = .498$, $\eta^2 = .00$ and no interaction $F(2, 188) = 1.21$, $p = .300$, $\eta^2 = .01$.

Emotion experience

Supporting the results of Study 1a, the MANOVA revealed a significant effect of power for the emotion of fear, $F(2, 189) = 18.85$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons showed that powerless participants experienced more fear ($M_{fear} = 3.78$; $SD = 1.64$) than powerful participants ($M_{fear} = 2.25$; $SD = 1.35$), $p < .001$ and more than the control group ($M_{fear} = 2.56$; $SD = 1.44$), $p < .001$. There was no main effect of the audience manipulation $F(1, 189) = .09$, $p = .771$, $\eta^2 = .00$ and no interaction $F(2, 192) = .05$, $p = .954$, $\eta^2 = .00$. Again, no effect of power was found for the emotion of anger, $F(2, 189) =.41$, $p = .662$ and no main or interaction effects of the audience manipulation (Fs < 1, ps $> .1$).

Mediation analyses

We conducted the same two mediation analyses as in Study 1a. Detailed results are presented in Appendices C and D. In line with our predictions (Hypothesis 2a) and replicating results of study 1 the first mediation analysis again revealed an indirect effect of power on direct anger expression through negative social appraisals (-.0313 to -.3856 for 95% confidence interval; see Figure 2).

The indirect effect of power on indirect anger through control motivation was significant too (-.4595 to -.0626 for 95% confidence interval). As predicted (Hypothesis

2b) powerless participants were found to be more motivated to obtain control over the target of the anger and they therefore expressed their anger more in an indirect way through sharing it with others (see Figure 3).



Figure 2. Negative social appraisals as mediator of the effect of power on direct anger expression Study 1b.



Figure 3. Motivation to control the target of the anger as mediator of the effect of power on indirect anger expression Study 1b.

Discussion

The results of Study 1b replicated the effects of power on anger expression and provided more evidence that powerlessness decreases direct anger expression but increases indirect anger expression. As in Study 1a, we found that powerless individuals mentioned more negative social appraisals than powerful individuals. However, Study 1b also revealed that powerless individuals reported more negative social appraisals than control

group as well, suggesting that low power increases individuals' concerns about the social implications of their anger expression. In addition, as in Study 1a, we found an effect of power on participants' motivation to obtain certain control over the perpetrator. Although in Study 1a powerful participants reported being less motivated to control the target of their anger than control group, in Study 1b this comparison was not found to be significant. However, in this study, powerful participants reported less control motivation than powerless ones.

The mediating role of negative social appraisals in the effect of power on direct anger expression was also replicated. Moreover, in Study 1b, consistent with our prediction, we found that powerless individuals' motivation to control the target of their anger led them to express their anger indirectly by sharing it with others. Given these results, the next question we aimed to address was whether powerless individuals consider indirect anger expression a more effective way to achieve their goals than direct anger expression.

STUDY 2

In Study 2, we manipulated power as well as the type of anger expression and we measured participants' expected consequences after having expressed their anger. It has been suggested that one of the social functions of emotions is to elicit reciprocal and complementary affective reactions in others (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011). For instance, expressing anger may elicit either complementary fear or reciprocal anger in the target (Lelieveld et al., 2012). These effects of emotion expressions are particularly important as they may lead to behavioural consequences and thus determine whether the anger expression is effective or not. For example, the perpetrator's fear reactions may lead to compliance with the expresser's demands, whereas angry reactions may lead to a desire to retaliate (Lelieveld et

al., 2012; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Building on these ideas, we assessed expected consequences of anger expression through different measures related either with positive and negative outcomes or with the emotional impact that anger expression has for the perpetrator.

Method

Participants and design

One hundred and ninety-four participants took part in this study. We again excluded from the analyses participants who gave a wrong answer in the comprehension check question. An additional filter was applied for participants who mentioned that they had recently participated in a similar study. Thus, 178 participants (124 women, 54 men; M_{age} = 21.35, SD = 3.17) were included in the sample. They were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions of a 2 (power: High vs. Low) x 2 (anger expression: Direct vs. Indirect) between-participants design.

Procedure

We followed the same procedure as in Study 1a and 1b.

Materials

The vignettes used in this study were similar to the ones of Studies 1a and 1b. Some additional information was provided to manipulate the type of the anger expression. Thus, the vignette in the direct anger condition informed participants that they expressed their anger directly and they criticised the perpetrator face to face whereas in the indirect anger condition they were informed that they did not tell anything to the perpetrator but instead they shared their anger and criticised him/her with their colleagues.

Measures

After reading the vignette, participants completed a questionnaire that included the following measures. All answers were given using a 7-point Likert scale running from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *totally*.

Anger experience

One question was included to test whether the situation described in the vignette led participants to feel angry.

Negative and positive outcomes

Seven items were used to measure expected negative outcomes after expressing anger (e.g., “I would worry that the situation would get worse”; $\alpha = .81$) and five items to measure expected positive outcomes (e.g., “I would be confident that my boss/employee would repair the damage caused”; $\alpha = .84$).

Emotional experience after anger expression

Participants were asked to assess their own emotional experience after having expressed their anger directly or indirectly depending on the condition using the following emotional labels: anger, fear, sadness, anxiety, shame, and guilt.

Expectations about perpetrator’s emotional reactions

The same six emotion labels were used to measure the expected impact that the anger expression would have on the perpetrator.

Results

Manipulation checks

Participants assigned to the role of the boss (*M* = 4.97; *SD* = 1.62) mentioned greater experience of power than participants assigned to the role of the employee (*M* = 2.31; *SD* = 1.46), $t(175) = 11.46$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.72$. Also, employees reported greater experience of powerlessness (*M* = 5.75; *SD* = 1.40) than bosses (*M* = 1.98; *SD* = 1.18), $t(176) = 19.45$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.91$.

Anger experience

This ANOVA revealed an unanticipated yet small main effect of type of anger expression on experienced anger, $F(1, 174) = 3.96$, $p = .048$, $\eta^2 = .022$, indicating that participants in the indirect anger condition (*M* = 6.36; *SD* = .78) reported feeling more angry about what happened than participants in the direct anger condition (*M* = 6.09; *SD* = 1.11). The effect of power was also significant, $F(1, 174) = 3.96$, $p = .048$, $\eta^2 = .022$. Powerless participants (*M* = 6.36; *SD* = .96) mentioned greater anger experience than powerful participants (*M* = 6.09; *SD* = .96). There was no interaction effect of power x type on anger expression.

Expectations about negative and positive outcomes

A 2 (power: High vs. Low) x 2 (type of anger expression: Indirect vs. Direct) x 2 (outcomes: Positive vs. Negative) repeated measures ANOVA, with the last variable as within groups variable on participants' expected outcomes, did not reveal any main effects of power, $F(1, 174) = 2.06$, $p = .153$, $\eta^2 = .01$ or type of anger expression, $F(1, 174) = 1.02$, $p = .313$, $\eta^2 = .01$. The main effect of outcomes was significant, $F(1, 174) = 53.93$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .24$ given that participants after expressing anger anticipated more positive (*M* = 5.24; *SD* = 1.22) than negative outcomes (*M* = 4.27; *SD* = 1.25). The power x outcomes

effect was also significant $F(1, 174) = 15.63$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .082$. After expressing anger, powerless participants ($M = 4.62$; $SD = 1.26$) expected more negative outcomes than powerful ones ($M = 3.92$; $SD = 1.13$), $F(1, 174) = 14.98$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .079$. The opposite was true for positive outcomes: powerless participants ($M = 5.07$; $SD = 1.15$) expected less positive outcomes than powerful ones ($M = 5.41$; $SD = 1.26$), although this effect was only marginally significant, $F(1, 174) = 3.59$, $p = .060$, $\eta^2 = .020$. Additionally, powerful participants, after expressing anger, anticipated more positive than negative outcomes, $F(1, 174) = 64.59$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .27$, whereas powerless participants anticipated more negative than positive outcomes $F(1, 174) = 5.68$, $p = .018$, $\eta^2 = .03$. No interaction between type of anger expression and outcomes was found, $F(1, 174) = 1.06$, $p = .31$, $\eta^2 = .01$. Contrary to our predictions (Hypothesis 3), the power x type of anger expression x outcomes effect was not significant either, $F(1, 174) = 1.38$, $p = .242$, $\eta^2 = .01$.

Emotional experience after anger expression

A MANOVA with the six emotion labels as the dependent variables revealed a significant effect of power, $F(6, 169) = 9.53$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .25$; Wilks' Lambda = .74. When dependent variables were considered separately, a main effect of power on fear was found, $F(1, 174) = 38.31$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$. Powerful participants indicated that they would experience less fear ($M = 2.26$; $SD = 1.42$) than powerless participants ($M = 3.75$; $SD = 1.76$). There was no main effect of power on any other emotion. This analysis also found a main effect of type of anger expression on the emotions of anger, $F(1, 174) = 20.25$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .10$; shame, $F(1, 174) = 5.02$, $p = .026$, $\eta^2 = .28$; and guilt, $F(1, 174) = 3.93$, $p = .049$, $\eta^2 = .022$. Participants in the indirect anger condition indicated that they would experience more anger ($M_{anger} = 5.41$; $SD = 1.40$) and less shame ($M_{shame} = 2.52$; $SD = 1.61$) and guilt ($M_{guilt} = 1.92$; $SD = 1.46$) than participants in the direct anger condition ($M_{anger} = 4.37$; $SD = 1.71$), ($M_{shame} = 3.12$; $SD = 1.94$), ($M_{guilt} = 2.39$; $SD = 1.73$).

Perpetrator's reciprocal versus complementary reactions

Given that anger and fear reactions are the most common responses to someone's anger expression, we performed a repeated measure ANOVA with perpetrator's anticipated emotion (Anger vs. Fear) as within-participants factor, and power (High vs. Low) and type of anger expression (Direct vs. Indirect) as between-participants factors on participants' expectation about perpetrator's emotional reaction. The analysis revealed a main effect of emotion, $F(1,174) = 34.51$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$. Participants expected that the perpetrator would react with more fear ($M = 4.30$; $SD = 1.98$) than anger ($M = 3.37$; $SD = 1.73$) to their anger expression. It also revealed a main effect of power, $F(1,174) = 44.24$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .20$, as powerful participants ($M = 4.41$; $SD = 1.17$) expect their anger expression to have a greater emotional impact on the perpetrator than powerless participants ($M = 3.24$; $SD = 1.18$).

Moreover, we found an interaction of Emotion x Type of Anger Expression, $F(1, 174) = 15.00$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .079$. In the indirect anger condition, participants expected the perpetrator to feel significantly more fear than anger, $F(1, 174) = 46.95$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$, whereas in the direct anger condition they expected the perpetrator to experience both emotions in the same degree, $F(1, 174) = 2.03$, $p = .16$, $\eta^2 = .01$. An interaction of Emotion x Power was also found, $F(1, 174) = 74.92$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .30$, as powerful participants expected the perpetrator to react more with fear to their anger expression than powerless participants, $F(1,174) = 129.25$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .43$. No differences were found regarding perpetrators reciprocal anger reaction, $p = .43$.

Finally, and more importantly for our predictions (Hypothesis 3), a Power x Type of Anger Expression x Emotion interaction was revealed, $F(1,174) = 7.06$, $p = .009$, $\eta^2 = .039$. For powerful participants, the interaction type of anger expression x emotion was not significant, $F(1,174) = .74$, $p = .39$ given that powerful individuals expected the perpetrator

to experience more fear than anger independently of the way they expressed anger. However, for powerless participants, the interaction Type of Anger Expression x Emotion was significant, $F(1,174) = 21.07$, $p < .001$. Pairwise, comparisons showed that, when powerless participants expressed their anger directly, they expected the perpetrator to experience more anger ($M = 4.11$; $SD = 1.60$) than fear ($M = 2.63$; $SD = 1.60$), $F(1,174) = 22.44$, $p < .001$. However, when they shared their anger with others, they tended to expect the perpetrator to experience more fear ($M = 3.40$; $SD = 1.69$) than anger ($M = 2.81$; $SD = 1.53$), $F(1,174) = 3.32$, $p = .070$ (see Figure 4).

Also, powerless participants expected the perpetrator to react with more anger when they expressed their anger directly than when they did it indirectly, $F(1,174) = 13.33$, $p < .001$. The opposite pattern was found about the emotion of fear: Powerless participants anticipated that the perpetrator would react with more fear in the indirect than in the direct anger condition, $F(1,174) = 5.89$, $p = .016$.



Figure 4. Participants' expectations about perpetrator's complementary and reciprocal reaction depending on expresser's power and type of anger expression.

Discussion

In Study 2 we showed that after expressing anger, powerless participants experience more fear and they anticipate more negative and less positive consequences than powerful participants. More interestingly for our hypothesis, we found that powerful participants always expected their anger expression to cause more fear than anger to the powerless perpetrator. This was also the case for powerless participants in the indirect anger condition. However, when powerless participants expressed their anger directly, they expected the perpetrator to experience more anger than fear. In other words, powerless participants expressing anger directly expected the perpetrator to react in a reciprocal way and their anger expression to backfire. A complementary reaction of fear could be taken as a subtle indicator of expected effectiveness of the anger expression, whereas an expected reciprocal angry reaction could be a sign of an inefficient anger expression (Lelieveld et al., 2012).

A question that arises at this point is why there was an interaction effect only on the measure of anticipated emotional impact and not on the one of anticipated positive and negative outcomes. Powerless individuals did not anticipate more positive than negative outcomes in the indirect anger condition as it was predicted. A possible explanation is that perpetrators' emotional reaction is a more immediate effect of the anger expression and therefore it is easier to be anticipated. By contrast, our measure of expected outcomes referred to more long-term consequences and they may also depend on other factors. For example, for indirect anger expression, the positive outcomes might depend on the reaction of the people with whom the emotion is shared. Therefore, the expected outcomes are more difficult to anticipate.

General Discussion

The current research aimed to shed more light on how power shapes individuals' anger expression. Based on the distinction between direct and indirect anger expression, we showed that powerlessness is associated with decreased direct and increased indirect anger expression—social sharing of the anger. Furthermore, we provided some evidence about the motives that underlie powerful and powerless individuals' anger expression. On the one hand, we showed that powerless individuals are more motivated to control the target of the anger[1] and this motivation leads them to express their anger indirectly through social sharing. On the other hand, we found that these individuals are less willing to express their anger in a direct way and their negative social appraisals accounted for this effect. These results are congruent with previous ones that associate high status with direct anger expression and low status with indirect anger expression (Kuppens et al., 2004). Furthermore, they are consistent with results that revealed that women in traditional relationships suppress their direct anger because they anticipate more social costs (Fischer & Evers, 2011).

Previous results converge on the idea that the lack of power makes individuals more prone to affiliate with others (Anderson et al., 2003; Case, Conlon, & Maner, 2015; Magee & Smith, 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2008). Our results are also consistent with these notions given that sharing one's emotion with others can be considered as another manifestation of powerless individuals' affiliative tendency. However, the indirect effect of power on social sharing, through the motivation to control the powerful target, highlights another more instrumental function of this type of anger expression. Also, it supports the idea that affiliation—in this case manifested through emotional sharing—is not the main

[1] Given the discrepancies across Studies 1a and 1b on the contrast between powerful and powerless participants in their control motivation, we conducted a meta-analysis of the two studies. This meta-analysis was conducted using the ESCI software package for Microsoft Excel. The overall effect size estimate was significant, $d = .47$, 95%, CI[.1804 to .7590], $Z = 3.182$, $p = .001$, Q (1) = .17, $p = .68$. This result confirms that—as we predicted—powerless individuals showed more control motivation than powerful ones.

objective for powerless individuals but it is rather a mean to restore their control and achieve their goals (Case et al., 2015; Emerson, 1962).

Finally, in the last study, we aimed to provide some additional evidence supporting the idea that powerless individuals express their anger indirectly because they expect it to be a more effective way to achieve their control goal. Results revealed that when powerful individuals express their anger, they expect the powerless perpetrator to experience more fear than anger. However, powerless individuals expect that their anger expression would have different consequences depending on the way they express it. When they do it indirectly, they expect the perpetrator to experience more fear than anger; when they do it in a direct way, they expect that the powerful perpetrator will react with more anger than fear. These results are in agreement with the ones found by Lelieveld et al (2012), who showed that when anger is expressed directly by a powerless negotiator, the powerful counterpart gets angry and becomes even more demanding.

At first glance, one could claim that our results contradict previous findings showing that powerless individuals expressed more anger (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006). However, Berdhal and Martorana (2006) do not distinguish between the different types of anger expression. In their study, anger was not experienced because of an injustice committed by a powerless or powerful target, but rather because participants were involved in a controversial discussion. Furthermore, powerful or powerless participants expressed this emotion in front of a group and not directly toward a powerless or powerful target. Therefore, the anger expression in the study described above might not be considered as a direct anger expression as we conceived it here.

The main limitation of our research is the use of the vignette methodology. Although this methodology has internal validity, it has been criticised for its limited ecological validity (Parkinson & Manstead, 1993). However, this methodology has been

commonly used in research on emotion (e.g., Hess, Adams, & Kleck, 2005; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Van Kleef, 2012), given that—differently to other emotional inductions (use of audiovisual stimuli)—it allows researchers to analyse emotions in a social context. Future studies should examine the effects of power on direct and indirect anger expression using different paradigms.

Moreover, this research provided first evidence about the motives that underlie powerless individuals' anger expression. However, there might be more motives that could account for these effects. For instance, future studies could explore the explicative value of hedonic or self-presentation motives (Olson, Hafer, & Taylor, 2001; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008; Timmers et al.,1998).

In conclusion, our research shows that powerless and powerful individuals differ in the way they express their anger. Powerless individuals decreased willingness to express their anger in a direct and conflicting way, and their increased tendency to share it with others should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness or as mere willingness to cover their nurturing needs. This research suggests that control-based motives instigate powerless individuals' anger-related behavior whereas their accurate social appraisals guarantee the functionality of this emotion. In other words powerless individuals may express their anger—as Aristotle said—"in the right manner, at the right time and with the right people…"

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Appendix A

[You are the boss of a company. This means that you have several employees under your supervision. You have to lead and manage them and evaluate their performance, and you have to make important decisions about their work schedule/timetable and their salary (raises, cuts of salary, holiday leave, etc.). /You work as an employee in a company. This means that you are under the supervision of a boss that continuously leads and manages you. He/she evaluates your performance and makes important decisions about your work schedule/timetable and your salary (raises/cuts of salary/holiday leave, etc.). /You work in a company, which means that you have several colleagues at the same level with whom you have the same responsibilities and rights (work schedule, holiday leave, and salary).]

After a day of work, you have just finished working, so you are going to the parking lot to pick up your car and go back home. While you are walking toward your car, you notice that the car that was parked next to yours is trying to get out of the parking lot, but the driver misestimates the space he/she has, crashes into your car, and breaks one of your back lights. There is no doubt that the driver is aware of the damage caused; however, you realise that he/she has no intention to look for the owner of the car he/she has crashed into and he/she is leaving the parking as if nothing happened. You feel very angry, your heart is beating fast, and your feel like boiling inwardly. So, you get closer to the car to see the driver and speak with him/her. When you reach the car, you can recognise behind the window that the driver of the car is [one of your employees that you supervise/your boss, the person that supervises you/is one of your same-level colleagues.]

Note: Bracketed sections varied with manipulations.

Appendix B

Table 2. Negative Social Appraisals as Mediator of the Effect of Power on Direct Anger Expression (Study 1a).

		M (Negative social appraisals)				Y (Direct anger expression)		
		Coeff.	*SE*	*p*		Coeff.	*SE*	*p*
X (Power; high = 1, low = 0)	α	-.709	.300	.022	c'	.801	.239	.001
M (Negative social appraisals)		-	-	-	b	-.240	.098	.017
Constant	i_1	4.286	.213	< .001	i_2	5.49	.451	< .001
		$R^2 = .085$ $F(1, 60) = 5.56$; $p = .022$				$R^2 = .289$ $F(2, 59) = 12.03$; $p < .001$		

Appendix C

Table 3. Negative social appraisals as mediator of the effect of power on direct anger expression (Study 1b).

		M (Negative social appraisals)				Y (Direct anger expression)		
		Coeff.	*SE*	*p*		Coeff.	*SE*	*p*
X (Power; high = 1, low = 0)	*α*	-.581	.211	.007	*c´*	.680	.203	.001
M (Negative social appraisals)		-	-	-	*b*	-.270	.084	.002
Constant	i_1	4.242	.146	< .001	i_2	5.618	.382	< .001
		$R^2 = .059$ $F(1, 122) = 7.59$; $p = .007$				$R^2 = .190$ $F(2, 121) = 14.20$; $p < .001$		

Appendix D

Table 4. Control motivation as mediator of the effect of power on indirect anger expression (Study 1b).

		M (Control motivation)				Y(Indirect anger expression)		
		Coeff.	*SE*	*p*		Coeff.	*SE*	*p*
X (Power; high = 1, low = 0)	α	-.572	.198	.005	c'	-.919	.282	.002
M (Control motivation)		-	-	-	b	.366	.125	.004
Constant	i_1	5.341	.136	< .001	i_2	2.551	.694	< .001
		$R^2 = .064$ $F(1, 122) = 8.39$; $p = .005$				$R^2 = .175$ $F(2, 121) = 12.84$; $p<.001$		

Chapter 6:

General Discussion

En esta tesis doctoral se ha explorado cómo el hecho de tener o carecer de poder afecta a la expresión emocional. Esta temática general podría concretarse en una serie de preguntas a las que intentamos contestar a través de los diferentes trabajos empíricos presentados. A continuación utilizaremos estas cuestiones como esquema para resumir los resultados principales de dichos trabajos y discutir su relevancia teórica y sus implicaciones.

¿Cómo se relaciona el poder social con la supresión emocional?

En el primer capítulo empírico (Capítulo 3) exploramos la relación entre el poder social y la supresión emocional. Tratamos esta cuestión a través de dos estudios. El primer estudio, mostró que **el poder disposicional se relaciona negativamente con la supresión emocional**. Dicho resultado es coherente con la propuesta de la teoría de la aproximación y evitación, que sugiere que el poder social conlleva una mayor desinhibición (Keltner, Gruenfeld, y Anderson, 2003). Además, también es congruente con la idea de que las personas poderosas tienen una mayor libertad para expresar sus emociones, mientras la expresión emocional de las personas no poderosas está más limitada y determinada por las normas sociales (Hecht y LaFrance, 1998).

Después de haber mostrado una relación negativa entre el poder social y la supresión emocional, en el segundo estudio quisimos poner a prueba la posible relación causal entre estas variables. Así, en un estudio experimental exploramos el efecto del poder sobre la supresión de emociones negativas. Además, diferenciamos entre el efecto del poder disposicional —el poder como diferencia individual— y el del poder situacional —el rol (Poderoso vs. No poderosos) al que los participantes fueron asignados en el experimento—. Los resultados mostraron que el poder disposicional afectó a la supresión de emociones negativas, y que este resultado fue moderado por el poder situacional. En concreto, las personas con un alto poder disposicional suprimieron menos sus emociones

que las personas con un bajo poder disposicional, pero esto fue cierto solo cuando estas personas se encontraban en una situación con bajo poder; es decir, cuando se encontraban en una situación de alto poder situacional no se encontraron diferencias en función del poder disposicional.

Estos resultados se sitúan en línea de resultados previos que también mostraron efectos de la interacción entre el poder situacional y el poder disposicional de las personas. Por ejemplo, Schmid Mast y Hall (2003) encontraron que las personas que deseaban tener una posición de alto poder pero a las que se les asignó un rol subordinado se comportaron de manera más dominante que las personas con preferencia por posiciones de bajo poder en esta misma condición. Sin embargo, la posición de poder deseada no afectó al comportamiento cuando los participantes fueron asignados al rol de líder. Estos resultados sugieren que las personas con alto poder disposicional que se encuentran en una posición de bajo poder están motivadas a incrementar o recuperar su poder y por tanto se comportan como si fuesen poderosas (Schmid Mast, 2010). En este sentido, los resultados que presentamos en el primer capítulo empírico, en la línea de algunos resultados previos, ponen en evidencia la necesidad de tomar en consideración tanto las disposiciones de las personas como el poder que experimentan en una situación determinada a la hora de explorar los efectos que éste tiene (Chen, Langner, y Mendoza-Denton, 2009; Schmid Mast, Hall, y Mast, 2003; Schmid Mast y Hall, 2004).

¿Expresan los poderosos todas las emociones negativas?

Una vez que mostramos que las personas poderosas suprimen las emociones negativas en menor medida que las personas no poderosas, nos preguntamos si esto sería cierto para todas las emociones negativas o si solo sería cierto para algunas de ellas. Se abordaron estas cuestiones partiendo de la perspectiva que diferencia entre emociones específicas a la hora de establecer sus diferentes funciones sociales (Fischer y Manstead,

2008; Keltner y Haidt, 1999), así como en las teorías y estudios previos sobre los diferentes motivos que guían el comportamiento de las personas poderosas y no poderosas (Case, Conlon, y Maner, 2015; Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, y Otten, 2012; Magee y Smith, 2013). En el Capítulo 4 tratamos esta cuestión explorando por separado el efecto del poder sobre dos emociones negativas pero que cuentan con diferentes funciones sociales: la ira y la tristeza.

La tristeza transmite señales de debilidad e informa que la persona que la expresa necesita apoyo y ayuda. Por tanto, esta emoción disminuye la distancia social entre las personas y promueve la afiliación y la cercanía entre ellas (Fischer y Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, y Manstead, 2010). Debido a que las personas poderosas están motivadas a distanciarse de los otros (Lammers y cols., 2012; Magee y Smith, 2013), en el primer estudio del Capítulo 4 predijimos y encontramos que el alto poder reduce la expresión de la tristeza. Este resultado es importante porque muestra que **no siempre el poder está relacionado con una mayor expresión emocional sino que las personas poderosas en ocasiones evitan expresar ciertas emociones negativas.** En este mismo capítulo también mostramos que efectivamente el poder reduce la motivación de afiliación, lo que a su vez puede hacer que los poderosos eviten expresar la tristeza. Estos resultados son consistentes con resultados de estudios previos que mostraron que el poder incrementa la distancia social (Lammers y cols. 2012) y tiene efectos similares sobre otras emociones afiliativas (e.g., la compasión; Van Kleef y cols., 2008).

Respecto a los efectos del poder sobre la emoción de ira, los resultados fueron menos claros que en el caso de la tristeza. Algunos estudios han mostrado que la expresión de ira señala dominancia y ayuda a las personas a distanciarse de los demás (Fischer y Manstead, 2008; Van Kleef y cols., 2010). El poder aumenta la motivación por distanciarse de los demás, y una forma de conseguirlo podría ser expresando la ira. De hecho, existe la

creencia de que la expresión de la ira está sobre todo reservada para las personas con alto poder y estatus (Averill, 1983; Taylor y Risman, 2006; Tiedens, Ellsworth, y Mesquita, 2000; Van Kleef y cols., 2010). Incluso algunos autores han calificado la ira como una emoción “poderosa” (Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, Van Vianen, y Manstead, 2004; Timmers, Fischer, y Manstead, 1998). Sin embargo, las pocas evidencias empíricas sobre la expresión real de esta emoción por parte de las personas poderosas muestra el resultado contrario: indican que son, justamente, las personas no poderosas las que expresan más ira (Berdahl y Martorana, 2006).

En el primer estudio del Capítulo 4 no conseguimos clarificar la relación entre poder e ira, ya que no encontramos diferencias entre las personas poderosas y no poderosas en cuanto a la expresión de la ira. Estos resultados motivaron nuestro interés por profundizar más en el análisis de los efectos del poder sobre la ira con un doble objetivo. Por una parte, probar si realmente existe una relación entre el poder y la expresión de ira, y por otra, analizar si existen algunos otros mecanismos, diferentes a la motivación por distanciarse socialmente de los otros, que podrían explicar estos resultados inconsistentes.

¿Es la ira una emoción que expresan fundamentalmente los poderosos?

Para contestar esta pregunta partimos de la distinción entre formas directas e indirectas de expresar la ira. Incluida entre las formas indirectas de expresión emocional, nos focalizamos en el *social sharing* de la ira, esto es, compartir esta emoción con una (o más) persona diferente a la que la provocó. A través de los dos primeros estudios presentados en el Capítulo 5 mostramos que **el hecho de ostentar poco poder disminuye la expresión de la ira de forma directa, mientras aumenta la tendencia a expresar esta emoción de forma indirecta.** Estos resultados están en la misma línea de algunos resultados de estudios previos que pusieron de relieve que cuando las personas tienen un estatus superior que el que tiene el destinatario de su ira, optan por expresarla de manera

directa; sin embargo, cuando su estatus es inferior optan por formas de expresión más indirectas (P. Kuppens, Van Mechelen, y Meulders, 2004).

Además, en este mismo capítulo mostramos algunos de los motivos que subyacen a los efectos del poder sobre la expresión de la ira. Tomando como punto de partida algunos estudios previos sobre expresión emocional y género (Evers, Fischer, Rodríguez Mosquera, y Manstead, 2005; Fischer y Evers, 2011), medimos la motivación para obtener cierto control sobre el comportamiento del destinatario de la ira como una de las posibles motivaciones instigadoras de la expresión de ira, así como la anticipación de consecuencias interpersonales negativas como posible factor inhibidor de la misma. Encontramos que la anticipación de consecuencias interpersonales negativas por parte de las personas no poderosas les hace evitar expresar su ira de manera directa. Sin embargo, estas personas también están más motivadas para obtener cierto control sobre el comportamiento del perpetrador y esto les lleva a que expresen su ira indirectamente compartiéndola con los demás. Estos resultados convergen con los resultados que provienen de estudios sobre diferencias de género que muestran que las mujeres en relaciones tradicionales —en las que tienen menos poder que los hombres— suelen expresar su ira de manera directa en menor medida que ellos (Fischer y Evers, 2011).

En el último estudio del Capítulo 5 profundizamos en una de las funciones sociales de las emociones que tiene que ver con la aparición en el receptor de emociones recíprocas y complementarias a las expresadas por el actor, que pueden determinar la efectividad o inefectividad de las funciones sociales de las emociones expresadas (Keltner y Haidt, 1999). Las reacciones recíprocas más comunes de la ira por parte del receptor suelen relacionarse con la venganza y el castigo. Si se producen estas reacciones recíprocas la expresión de la ira se considera inefectiva. Sin embargo, las reacciones emocionales complementarias de miedo hacen que el receptor se muestre conforme con las peticiones

de la persona que expresa la ira, y por tanto cumple alguno de los objetivos por los que fue expresada. En este sentido, Lelieveld y cols. (2012) mostraron que la ira suele provocar una mayor reacción complementaria de miedo cuando es expresada por una persona poderosa (que cuando es expresada por una persona no poderosa). Sin embargo, cuando la ira es expresada por una persona no poderosa provoca recíprocamente el enfado de la persona poderosa, por lo que resulta inefectiva.

En esta misma línea, nuestros resultados mostraron que cuando las personas poderosas expresan ira esperan provocar más miedo que ira en el receptor. En cambio, las personas no poderosas esperan que el receptor reaccione con más ira que miedo, aunque esto último es cierto solo cuando expresan su ira de manera directa. Cuando las personas no poderosas expresan su ira indirectamente —compartiéndola con los demás— esperan que el receptor reaccione con más miedo que ira. En nuestra opinión estos resultados pueden constituir una primera prueba de que la expresión indirecta de la ira puede resultar más funcional para los no poderosos y les pueda ayudar a conseguir sus objetivos en mayor medida que la expresión directa, evitando los costes sociales que supone una abierta confrontación.

En nuestros estudios no encontramos evidencia a favor de la idea de que el alto poder aumente la expresión de la ira directa, ya que los participantes poderosos de nuestros estudios expresaron la ira directamente de forma parecida a como lo hicieron los participantes del grupo control. Por tanto, en este caso cabría preguntarse: ¿Por qué la motivación de los poderosos por distanciarse de los demás no se vio reflejada en nuestro caso en una mayor expresión de la ira de manera directa?

Fischer y Manstead (2008) pusieron de manifiesto que aunque la expresión de la ira tiene una función de distancia social a corto plazo, a largo plazo podría también cumplir una función de afiliación, ya que la persona que expresa ira en última instancia está

interesada a mantener la relación. En esta misma línea, a nivel intergrupal, se ha mostrado que cuando la ira no está acompañada por sentimientos de desprecio y odio, y se expresa con el objetivo de comunicar una injusticia cometida, puede ser constructiva y disminuye la distancia social entre los grupos (Halperin, Russell, Dweck, y Gross, 2011). Así, aunque el alto poder no aumenta la expresión de la ira, la mayor motivación de las personas poderosas para aumentar la distancia social podría reflejarse en la expresión de otras emociones —como el desprecio y la indiferencia— que sí cumplan claramente una función de distanciamiento (Fischer y Manstead, 2008; Fischer y Roseman, 2007).

Implicaciones

Después de hacer un breve resumen de los principales resultados presentados en esta tesis doctoral, nos gustaría resaltar algunas de sus implicaciones teóricas y el avance que suponen respecto a las teorías que abordan los efectos emocionales del poder social.

En primer lugar, los hallazgos sobre la relación entre el poder y la desinhibición apoyan la propuesta de la teoría de la evitación y aproximación, que el alto poder conlleva una mayor desinhibición. No obstante, nuestra aportación va más allá de ésta al mostrar que la desinhibición de los poderosos no sólo es conductual, sino que también se manifiesta en un nivel emocional.

En segundo lugar, nuestros resultados sobre los efectos del poder en la expresión de dos emociones específicas —la tristeza y la ira— ayudan a completar la laguna existente en la bibliografía sobre este tema. En relación a la ira, consideramos estos resultados especialmente relevantes porque contribuyen a resolver contradicciones previas. Así, a pesar de las creencias y los estereotipos que apoyan la idea de que la ira se puede considerar un "privilegio" de las personas poderosas (Averill, 1983; Taylor y Risman, 2006), nuestros resultados muestran que las personas no poderosas también la expresan. Lo

que diferencia la expresión emocional de la ira de las personas con y sin poder y es más bien la forma que esta expresión adopta.

Tercero, estos resultados nos permiten —al igual que lo hicieron otros autores (Van Kleef y cols., 2010)— resaltar la importancia y la utilidad de estudiar los efectos emocionales del poder más allá de los estados de ánimo, y explorar cómo el hecho de ostentar o carecer de poder afecta la experiencia y la expresión de emociones específicas. Creemos que esta perspectiva es especialmente útil ya que permite explorar los motivos que favorecen su expresión por parte de las personas poderosas y no poderosas.

Una cuarta implicación consiste en que nuestros resultados apoyan empíricamente que la motivación de distancia social es el mecanismo a través del cual el poder influye sobre la experiencia y la expresión de diferentes emociones (Case y cols., 2015; Lammers y cols., 2012; Magee y Smith, 2013). En concreto nuestros resultados muestran que las personas poderosas están menos motivadas por acercarse a los demás (en comparación con las personas del grupo control) y por tanto evitan las emociones negativas que cumplen una función afiliativa como la tristeza.

Por otro lado, también se sugirió que el bajo poder disminuye la distancia social e incrementa la necesidad de afiliación de las personas no poderosas (Case y cols., 2015; Magee y Smith, 2013). Encontramos apoyo indirecto a esta idea mostrando que el bajo poder aumenta la tendencia de las personas a compartir su ira con los demás. Este tipo de expresión emocional promueve la cercanía y la cohesión entre las personas con quienes la emoción está compartida y cumple una función de afiliación (P. Kuppens y cols., 2004; Rime, 2009).

La quinta implicación teórica de nuestros hallazgos consiste en resaltar diferentes aspectos de la afiliación y plantear preguntas sobre los verdaderos motivos que subyacen la afiliación de los no poderosos. La afiliación puede reflejar la necesidad de cercanía y

amistad. Pero también se puede concebir en términos estratégicos e instrumentales (Case y cols., 2015; Emerson, 1962). Desde este punto de vista nuestros resultados muestran que el poder disminuye la afiliación concebida como amistad y cercanía, mientras que el bajo poder aumenta la afiliación entendida de forma instrumental. En este segundo caso, la afiliación podría constituir una forma de “guante de terciopelo” utilizado por las personas no poderosas.

Por último, aunque esta tesis doctoral se ha centrado en los efectos del poder a nivel interpersonal, muestra ciertos indicios de que los límites entre los diferentes niveles de análisis no siempre están bien definidos. Así, los efectos del poder social a nivel interpersonal podrían desencadenar procesos intergrupales. Por ejemplo, los resultados del último artículo empírico mostraron que las personas no poderosas suelen expresar más su ira de manera indirecta compartiéndola con los demás. Estudios sobre *emotional sharing* reflejan que este tipo de expresión emocional puede facilitar una identidad común entre las personas con quienes se comparte esta emoción y desencadenar en último término procesos grupales (Peters y Kashima, 2007; Yzerbyt y T. Kuppens, 2012). Así, en el caso de los no poderosos, las emociones experimentadas de manera individual, provocadas por un problema que podría ser considerado en principio como personal, al ser compartidas podrían llegar a convertirse en emociones colectivas (para una revisión véase Van Kleef y Fischer, 2015).

Limitaciones y Futuras Direcciones

Como en la mayoría de los casos, los estudios presentados en esta tesis doctoral cuentan con algunas limitaciones. La primera de ellas está relacionada con los estímulos que se utilizaron en algunos de los estudios para inducir emociones. El uso de imágenes o videos nos permitió contar con instrumentos de inducción emocional previamente usados y validados en muestras españolas. Además, nos dio la posibilidad de medir la expresión

emocional de los participantes a través de medidas objetivas, grabando sus reacciones emocionales ante estos estímulos. Sin embargo, este método de inducción emocional se podría criticar por ser poco realista, y porque la expresión emocional se lleva a cabo en un contexto relativamente seguro y libre de los costes sociales que pueda tener le expresión de emociones durante las interacciones interpersonales.

Con el objetivo de solventar este problema en algunos de los estudios incluidos en la presente tesis doctoral inducimos emociones presentando a nuestros participantes diferentes situaciones imaginarias. Este tipo de inducción emocional nos permitió proporcionar detalles sobre el contexto de la interacción y sobre la relación con la persona hacia quien la emoción está expresada, recreando situaciones mucho más parecidas a la realidad cotidiana en la que viven los participantes. Sin embargo, este tipo de metodología también cuenta con algunas desventajas, entre ellas, que no consigue inducir experiencias emocionales parecidas a las que tienen las personas en la vida real, sino que más bien activan la representación que ellas tienen sobre sus emociones y sus reacciones emocionales (Parkinson y Manstead, 1993). También nos limitó a usar medidas de auto-informe para medir nuestras variables dependientes de interés, las cuales recogen las intenciones de las personas para expresar emociones, pero que pueden discrepar de su expresión real.

Con el objetivo de superar estas limitaciones, para futuros estudios se podría contemplar la posibilidad de recrear situaciones de laboratorio más realistas en las cuales los participantes interactúen entre sí. Esta metodología nos permitiría estudiar las emociones reales provocadas en dichas interacciones. También nos permitiría evaluar la expresión emocional de los participantes de manera objetiva a través de su observación (en vivo o video-grabada) durante dicha interacción.

La segunda limitación está relacionada con las manipulaciones del poder social. En algunos de los estudios manipulamos el poder en un contexto laboral y pedimos a nuestros participantes que se identificasen con un jefe o un empleado de un negocio o una empresa. Este tipo de manipulación podría suponerle cierta dificultad a nuestros participantes —principalmente estudiantes universitarios— para identificarse con el jefe protagonista de la viñeta debido a su falta de experiencia desempeñando este tipo de roles.

Teniendo en cuenta este problema, en algunos de los estudios medimos el grado de identificación con el protagonista de la historia y comprobamos que nuestros participantes se identificaron por igual con los poderosos y los no poderosos. Sin embargo, aun así sería útil que futuros estudios utilizasen muestras no universitarias con experiencia en contextos laborales, lo que facilitaría la identificación con las situaciones descritas por las viñetas. Otra alternativa sería estudiar los efectos emocionales del poder en contextos reales y con personas que estén viviendo relaciones interpersonales jerárquicas (e.g., se podría comprar la expresión emocional de personas que ostentan un puesto de alto y bajo poder).

A pesar de estas limitaciones consideramos que los estudios presentados en esta tesis doctoral aportan resultados interesantes que contribuyen a un mejor conocimiento de los efectos emocionales del poder social y llevan a plantear nuevas preguntas de investigación. Creemos que nuestros resultados dan lugar a que se desarrollen al menos dos diferentes líneas de investigación.

En primer lugar, siguientes estudios podrían explorar como las diferentes motivaciones de las personas poderosas y no poderosas afectan a la expresión de otras emociones específicas positivas y negativas (e.g., orgullo, desprecio). También podrían explorar los posibles moderadores de estos efectos como por ejemplo las diferentes maneras que el poder se percibe y se operacionaliza.

Por otro lado, dado que nuestros estudios mostraron evidencias sobre las consecuencias que las personas poderosas y no poderosas anticipan al expresar su ira de manera directa e indirecta, siguientes estudios podrían explorar las consecuencias interpersonales reales de la ira en función del poder y del tipo de expresión. Hasta ahora dichas consecuencias interpersonales se han evaluado a través de las reacciones emocionales y comportamentales del destinatario de la ira (Lelieveld y cols., 2012). En siguientes estudios sería útil evaluar las consecuencias de la expresión de la ira a través del impacto que tiene en terceras personas que no están directamente implicadas, pero que son participes de la situación (e.g., observadores, personas con quien la ira se comparte, etc.). En estos estudios se podría medir la identificación, la empatía y la solidaridad con la persona que expresa ira.

Por último nos gustaría destacar que las emociones no se experimentan ni se expresan en un vacío social, sino que su experiencia y expresión depende de diferentes factores sociales y del contexto en el que aparecen. Con el presente trabajo hemos puesto de manifiesto cómo un factor social, como es el poder, que permea la mayoría de nuestras relaciones sociales, influye tanto en el grado como en la manera en que expresamos nuestras emociones.

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