DESAFIANDO LA DESIGUALDAD SOCIAL:
Distintas formas de resistirse a la legitimización del endo-grupo

CHALLENGING SOCIAL INEQUALITY:
Different routes to resistance in the face of in-group legitimization

Gloria Jiménez Moya

Tesis Doctoral

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Programa Oficial de Doctorado en Psicología

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
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IGUALDAD

~ ante la ley:

1. f. Principio que reconoce a todos los ciudadanos capacidad para los mismos derechos

Real Academia Española

A todos aquellos que velan por la igualdad y la justicia social,
a los que todavía creen que la lucha por un mundo más justo merece la pena.

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Overview

> Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world;
> indeed, it's the only thing that ever has.
>
> Margaret Mead

Social disadvantage has always been with us, with many negative consequences to those groups affected. The study of social disadvantage and the way in which disadvantaged groups fight it is clearly a central issue in our field. It is therefore important to understand how and why social inequality is perpetuated, but challenged under other circumstances.

In this doctoral dissertation we are focused on situations in which the disadvantaged group accepts and legitimizes its own disadvantage (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). What is the best course of action to achieve justice and equality under this circumstance? When even the disadvantaged group accepts its discrimination as fair and deserved, achieving social equality is likely to be especially difficult. However, previous research has shown that not everyone accepts such in-group norms (Crane & Platow, 2010; Packer, 2008). Paradoxically, those who highly identify with the in-group often disagree, but with the aim of benefiting or protecting the group (Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007; Packer & Chasteen, 2010). This hints that there is scope for social change when social disadvantage is justified even by the discriminated groups.

Based on previous research (Packer, 2008) and on the theoretical framework of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we have developed a line of empirical research to examine when and how high identifiers contest group disadvantage when it is legitimized by other in-group members. Specifically, we test the idea that the high identifiers' reactions go beyond the mere non-conformity and that they challenge the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage, not least by perceiving the in-group itself as able and willing to overcome the disadvantaged situation.

The thesis is structured in seven chapters. The first chapter provides a review of the most relevant theoretical concepts with regard of social disadvantage, group identity and the potential ways of dealing with in-group disadvantage. The second chapter includes the main goals of this thesis, as well as our hypotheses. The reader will find the

empirical part of the dissertation from Chapter 3 onwards. Across four chapters (papers) we examine how individuals deal with disadvantage when it is legitimized by the in-group, and test the effect of group identification as well as other factors that we predict have an effect on this process. Finally, in the seventh chapter, we discuss the main findings and comment on implications, limitations, and some ideas for future research.

Note that the papers presented in Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 were written with the aim of being submitted for publication, therefore, certain explanations of some concepts and theories inevitably appear several times. Additionally, in order to fulfill the requirements of the International PhD program at the University of Granada some chapters were written in Spanish (Chapter 1) and others in English (Chapters 2 onwards).

Capítulo I – Introducción

Chapter I – Introduction

La desigualdad social es un hecho que ha acompañado a la humanidad a lo largo de su historia. Ya en las primeras civilizaciones no todos los individuos disfrutaban de los mismos privilegios, sino que aquellos que destacaban por su autoridad religiosa o militar o por la posesión de tierras, gozaban de un mayor estatus en comparación con quienes se dedicaban a la artesanía o al comercio. Desde entonces, la historia nos ha dejado numerosos periodos en los que determinados grupos sociales han estado en desventaja con respecto a otros colectivos. Las personas afroamericanas vivieron durante casi un siglo continuas vejaciones por parte de un sector de la sociedad norteamericana de la época. Esta desigualdad racial se veía reflejada, por ejemplo, cuando tenían que ceder sus asientos en el autobús a los ciudadanos blancos o cuando no les era permitido acudir a las mismas escuelas que ellos. Del mismo modo, la desigualdad entre hombres y mujeres ha existido durante siglos. Fue tan solo hace algunas décadas (en 1931, con la Constitución de la II República Española) cuando se aprobó por primera vez en España el sufragio femenino, que permitía a las mujeres españolas ejercer el derecho al voto al igual que los hombres. Unos años antes en Nueva York ciento veintinueve mujeres murieron en un incendio en la fábrica textil en la que trabajaban. Al parecer, habían sido encerradas allí para evitar que se unieran a una huelga que exigía jornadas de trabajo más cortas, salarios justos y el derecho a unirse a los sindicatos, ventajas con las que ya contaban los hombres trabajadores.

Por lo tanto, es indiscutible que los grupos que se encuentran en una situación de desventaja en comparación con otros sufren consecuencias negativas que merman sus posibilidades de éxito y limitan sus opciones de mejora, no solo como grupo, sino también como individuos. Así, el estudio de la desventaja social y de cómo los grupos la afrontan es primordial cuando asistimos a cambios en una sociedad como la nuestra, marcada por las desigualdades y las diferencias ente grupos.

A pesar de que tanto las personas afroamericanas como las mujeres de todo el mundo se encontraban en una situación de desventaja social respecto a otros grupos,

fue posible conseguir algunos cambios a favor de una sociedad más justa e igualitaria. ¿Cómo se propiciaron estos cambios a favor de la igualdad? La historia muestra que determinadas personas o grupos de personas fueron los encargados de prender la chispa y comenzar a defender ideas que más tarde provocarían cambios en pro de la igualdad social. Así, Martin Luther King lideró el movimiento por los derechos civiles para los ciudadanos afroamericanos, o la política española Clara Campoamor fue la principal impulsora del sufragio femenino y gran defensora de los derechos de las mujeres en España.

Por lo tanto, aunque muchas desigualdades sociales se han mantenido intactas e incluso han aumentado, otras se han reducido a lo largo del tiempo. Sin embargo, es importante resaltar que no todos los individuos están dispuestos a luchar de la misma forma en contra de las desventajas sociales que experimentan. ¿Qué fue lo que llevo a personajes como Martin Luther King o Clara Campoamor a desafiar el orden social establecido y luchar contra la desventaja social? ¿Qué caminos siguen los miembros de grupos desfavorecidos para enfrentar la situación de discriminación? Esta tesis se ocupa de estudiar de qué forma los grupos se enfrentan a su posición de desventaja, y quiénes son los miembros que están más dispuestos a luchar por una sociedad más igualitaria y justa a pesar de que, en muchas ocasiones, la desigualdad social sea justificada y defendida hasta por los grupos desaventajados. En consonancia con esto, la literatura muestra que los grupos de bajo estatus pueden llegar a legitimar y aceptar un sistema social injusto a pesar de que pueda perjudicarlos (ver Crocker y Major, 1994; Jost y Banaji, 1994; Sidanius y Pratto, 1999), con el objetivo de justificar el orden social establecido (Jost, Banaji, y Nosek, 2004). Bajo este tipo de circunstancias en las que incluso el propio grupo discriminado percibe la desventaja que experimenta como justa ¿cuál es el camino para conseguir una sociedad igualitaria?

El objetivo principal de esta tesis es estudiar de qué forma y bajo qué circunstancias los miembros de grupos desfavorecidos se oponen a la desventaja social cuando dicha situación es justificada y aceptada por el propio grupo. Para ello, este trabajo se centra en la percepción de legitimidad que tienen los propios grupos discriminados respecto a su propia situación de desventaja y en cómo reaccionan ante ella.

¿Quién dicta lo que es justo e injusto?

Podemos definir la legitimidad como la creencia en que las autoridades, las instituciones y el orden social establecido son correctos, apropiados y justos (Tyler, 2006). En otras palabras, la legitimidad es concebida como el grado en que las personas o los grupos perciben su posición en el entramado social como justa y merecida.

A pesar de que las diferencias de poder entre los grupos son las que ponen de manifiesto las desigualdades sociales, es sobre todo la percepción de que dichos desequilibrios son justos o injustos lo que provoca que los individuos respondan a ellos. De hecho, en ocasiones los efectos del poder pierden protagonismo y en situaciones de desigualdad, el factor más relevante resulta ser la legitimidad atribuida a las relaciones de poder establecidas (Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, y Hogg, 2003). Por lo tanto, la percepción de que una situación es justa o injusta es un factor muy relevante en la aceptación o el rechazo que los individuos pueden llegar a mostrar hacia las desigualdades sociales (Tajfel y Turner, 1979). En este sentido, la legitimidad percibida guía las actitudes y los comportamientos de las personas, ya que cuanto más legítima y justa se perciba una situación desigual, menos esfuerzo emplearán los individuos para buscar la igualdad. Así, las personas podrían aceptar una posición de bajo estatus cuando consideren que dicha posición es el resultado legítimo de un procedimiento justo (ver Ellemers, 1993; Tyler, 2000). En estos casos en los que las diferencias de estatus son percibidas como justas, los individuos evitarán las comparaciones sociales entre grupos de alto y bajo estatus, presumiblemente porque ambos tipos de grupos serán percibidos, en esencia, diferentes (Yzerbyt, Corneille, y Estrada, 2001).

Sin embargo, cuando las desigualdades sean percibidas como injustas, los individuos estarán más dispuestos a luchar contra dichos desequilibrios (Tajfel y Turner, 1979). En estos casos las relaciones entre grupos pueden llegar a ser más hostiles, ya que las diferencias de poder ilegítimas aumentan el sesgo endo-grupal mostrado tanto por los grupos de bajo como por los de alto estatus (Turner y Brown, 1978). Además, este sesgo viene provocado por la degradación del exo-grupo y no tanto por un aumento de solidaridad entre los miembros del endo-grupo (Hornsey, et al., 2003). Las percepciones de ilegitimidad hacen que otras alternativas diferentes al orden social establecido se perfilen como posibles (para una demostración empírica ver Caddick,

1982), y por lo tanto la situación de desventaja será rechazada en mayor medida por los miembros del grupo de bajo estatus cuando perciban que la situación es inestable, susceptible de cambio, ilegítima e injusta (Ellemers, Wilke, y Van Knippenberg, 1993; Tajfel y Turner, 1979).

Sin embargo, una pregunta importante que cabe plantearse es quién define qué es legítimo o ilegítimo. Con total seguridad, para un individuo afroamericano que estuviera a favor de los derechos civiles un mensaje que favoreciera la supremacía de la raza blanca no tendría el mismo efecto si proviniera de un ciudadano de raza blanca que si fuera respaldado por otra persona afroamericana. La mayoría de la literatura previa ha concebido la percepción de legitimidad como un concepto único, al margen de su procedencia y, en este sentido, los trabajos previos no especifican el origen de la percepción de legitimidad del orden social (e.g., Doosje, Spears, y Koomen, 1995; Rodríguez-Bailón, Moya, y Yzerbyt, 2000). Es decir, hasta ahora se ha obviado que la perspectiva de legitimidad podría ser distinta en función de quiénes la definan. En oposición a ello, recientemente Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, y Sweetman (2010) proponen que no debemos asumir que, aunque la realidad social o los procedimientos aceptados por ella conciban las relaciones entre grupos externamente legítimas, esta opinión será aceptada internamente por todos los miembros de los grupos desfavorecidos sin oponerse a ella. Siguiendo esta reflexión, en este trabajo abordamos la cuestión de la procedencia de la legitimidad, y distinguimos entre dos tipos de legitimidad en función de su origen: por un lado, la *legitimidad externa* que se refiere a la perspectiva que el exo-grupo tiene sobre la situación de un grupo ajeno a él. Por otro, la *legitimidad interna*, que hace referencia al juicio de legitimidad emitido por un grupo en cuestión respecto a su propia posición en la jerarquía social. Volviendo al ejemplo de la imposibilidad de las mujeres de ejercer el derecho al voto, la legitimidad externa vendría dada por la opinión (hasta qué punto la situación es justa o injusta) de los hombres en relación al hecho de que otro grupo (i.e., las mujeres) no pueda ejercer su derecho al voto; mientras que la legitimidad interna sería el punto de vista de las propias mujeres sobre dicha situación de desventaja. A pesar de que el origen de la legitimidad es un factor que ha sido poco estudiado hasta ahora, la opinión del propio grupo sobre su situación de desventaja es un factor muy relevante que afecta al grado en que las relaciones inter-grupales se preservan o, por el contrario, son desafiadas (Spears, et al.,

2010). En este sentido, se ha demostrado que la percepción de legitimidad de un grupo respecto a su situación, influye en la manera en la que reaccionan los individuos miembros del grupo con respecto a dicha situación (Hersby, Jetten, Ryan, y Schmitt, 2011; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, Garza, y Mewse, 2011). Específicamente, Hersby y colaboradores (2011) encontraron que cuando el grupo conceptualizaba la discriminación que sufría como injusta e ilegítima, los participantes estaban dispuestos a realizar más comportamientos en pro de la mejora y el progreso de los miembros del grupo cuando dicha discriminación era generalizada, en comparación a cuando ésta era poco común. Sin embargo, este efecto de la generalización de la discriminación sufrida no afectó a las intenciones de los participantes cuando el grupo concibió la discriminación como legítima.

Parece lógico el hecho de que cualquier grupo discriminado percibirá que la situación de desventaja que sufre es injusta. En este caso, es más probable que se lleve a cabo una lucha activa por alterar el orden social establecido (Tajfel y Turner, 1979), y así mejorar su situación. Sin embargo, la historia muestra que los grupos desfavorecidos no siempre rechazan el sistema que les perjudica. Cuando en 1931 se celebró en las Cortes españolas un debate para decidir si las mujeres debían ir a las urnas, una conocida diputada, Victoria Kent, se posicionó en contra de otorgar el voto a las ciudadanas españolas de forma inmediata, argumentando que las mujeres no tenían aún la concienciación social y política necesarias para ejercer este derecho responsablemente. Aunque, según ella, esta actitud estaba destinada a evitar un resultado político extremadamente conservador, lo cierto es que no estaba más que justificando y perpetuando la desventaja que sufrían las mujeres españolas de la época. En esta misma línea de aceptación de la desventaja, Jost (1997) encontró en uno de sus estudios que las mujeres participantes creían merecer sueldos más bajos que los participantes hombres por el mismo trabajo realizado.

Por lo tanto, en ocasiones los grupos de bajo estatus pueden justificar sus propias desventajas, llegando incluso a rechazar alternativas más igualitarias al estatus quo establecido (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, y Sullivan, 2003). Este fenómeno puede ser explicado en términos de la teoría de la justificación del sistema (Jost y Banaji, 1994; ver también Jost, et al., 2004), la cual postula la existencia de una motivación general para justificar el orden social establecido que es especialmente fuerte entre los más

desfavorecidos, provocando así que los grupos desaventajados internalicen justificaciones ideológicas de su propia desventaja.

Este trabajo versa sobre los efectos de la aceptación del propio grupo de su condición de desventaja. Es decir, en él se analiza el efecto de la legitimidad interna cuando el grupo desaventajado percibe su desventaja como merecida y legítima. Sin embargo, nos preguntamos si aún en estos casos no será posible propiciar un cambio social en pro de la igualdad y la equidad. Como sabemos, la historia nos ha dejado numerosos ejemplos de cómo los cambios sociales han sido posibles incluso bajo circunstancias en las que se ha percibido que la discriminación era justificada. Estos cambios han venido dados gracias a que determinados miembros de los grupos desfavorecidos cuestionaron la legitimidad de la situación a pesar de (o quizás debido a) la norma social establecida, como fue el caso de Martin Luther King o Clara Campoamor. Pero, ¿qué propicia que estos individuos persigan el cambio social por la igualdad en lugar de asumir la desventaja como justa, al igual que el resto de miembros del grupo desfavorecido? Un factor que parece jugar un papel importante para explicar que algunos miembros de los grupos discriminados no piensen y actúen de la misma forma que el resto de su grupo es su identificación con el grupo.

Yo soy, nosotros somos: La relevancia de la identificación grupal

Desde un punto de vista socio-psicológico, un grupo es concebido como un conjunto de individuos que se perciben a sí mismos como miembros de una misma categoría social determinada (Tajfel y Turner, 1986). Es decir, las personas no necesitan interactuar con todos los miembros del grupo o tener objetivos interdependientes para incluirse dentro de un determinado grupo, lo relevante es su percepción de que forman parte de él.

Aunque en algunas circunstancias las personas actúan a nivel individual, la pertenencia a los grupos afecta a sus actitudes y comportamientos, y a la forma en la que perciben la realidad social. Esta idea ha sido elaborada en algunas de las teorías más influyentes en el campo de la Psicología Social (e.g., teoría de la identidad social, Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel y Turner, 1979; teoría de la categorización social, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, y Wetherell, 1987). En concreto la teoría de la identidad social desarrollada por Tajfel y Turner se ocupa de describir bajo qué circunstancias los individuos se

comportan en términos grupales y en qué situaciones actúan como individuos independientes. Estos autores introducen el término de *identidad social* para hacer referencia a la parte del auto-concepto que proviene de las categorías sociales o grupos a los que cada individuo pertenece (Tajfel y Turner, 1979). Se asume que los individuos se esfuerzan por mantener un auto-concepto positivo y por preservar su autoestima. Por lo tanto, si los grupos de pertenencia contribuyen a la imagen que uno tiene de sí mismo, es de esperar que una evaluación positiva de dichos grupos mejore la identidad social. Al contrario, una evaluación negativa de los grupos a los que se pertenece favorece la aparición de un auto-concepto más negativo, y por lo tanto no deseado. Es decir, para la consecución de una identidad social positiva es necesario que el individuo evalúe los grupos a los que pertenece de forma positiva. Para llevar a cabo estas evaluaciones, las personas realizan comparaciones entre sus grupos y otros exo-grupos. Las comparaciones que resultan positivas para el propio grupo producen un estatus más alto con respecto a otros grupos, y por tanto un mayor bienestar para los miembros que lo componen; por el contrario, las comparaciones que favorecen al exo-grupo y perjudican al endo-grupo, proporcionan un estatus y un prestigio grupal más bajo, que contribuye negativamente a la identidad social del individuo. Por lo tanto, la búsqueda de una distinción positiva con respecto a otros grupos se convierte en un objetivo en sí mismo, encaminado a mantener una identidad social que contribuya a conservar un auto-concepto positivo. Siguiendo esta lógica, el hecho de formar parte de un grupo desaventajado es una situación indeseada, que contribuirá negativamente a la auto-estima de sus miembros, quienes intentarán cambiar dicha situación a través de diversas estrategias (Tajfel y Turner, 1979).

Es importante señalar que no todos los grupos a los que se pertenece tienen el mismo peso en el auto-concepto de cada individuo. El nivel de identificación social o grupal varía en función de las personas y los grupos, y viene determinado por aspectos como la satisfacción y los sentimientos positivos que el grupo provoca en el individuo, o la solidaridad y el compromiso que se siente hacia los demás miembros del grupo, entre otros (Leach, et al., 2008). Así, podemos distinguir entre aquellos miembros que se identifican con el grupo en mayor medida (altos identificados) y los que lo hacen en un menor grado (bajos identificados). Los individuos altamente identificados están más motivados para alcanzar una imagen positiva de su grupo (Tajfel, 1981) y, en general,

actúan persiguiendo los mejores intereses para el colectivo, aunque esto implique perjudicar a sus intereses personales (Haslam, et al., 2006; Van Vugt y Hart, 2004).

La literatura muestra que el nivel de identificación grupal determina también el tipo de respuestas que los individuos dan ante distintas situaciones inter-grupales. Por ejemplo, Ellemers, Spears, y Doosje (1997) mostraron que en comparación con las personas que se identificaban en menor medida con el grupo, los altamente identificados percibían al endo-grupo como más homogéneo y estaban más dispuestos a luchar por él. La diferencia en la homogeneidad grupal percibida dentro del grupo también se aprecia entre los más y menos identificados en los grupos de bajo estatus (Doosje, Ellemers, y Spears, 1995). Estas diferencias en la percepción de la composición del grupo pueden reflejar las estrategias escogidas por los individuos para hacer frente a una situación desfavorecida que experimente su grupo. Mientras que los menos identificados apuestan por estrategias de creatividad social individual que les permiten alejarse psicológicamente del grupo y diferenciarse de los otros miembros que lo componen (la percepción de heterogeneidad grupal implica que se percibe variabilidad entre los miembros del grupo, por lo que el bajo estatus puede venir provocado por los atributos negativos de algunos miembros en concreto, pero no de todos ellos), aquellos que se identifican en mayor medida con el grupo apuestan por una estrategia colectiva, que enfatiza el que todos los miembros se encuentran en la misma situación de desventaja ("estamos todos en el mismo barco") y que es beneficiosa para todo el grupo en su conjunto. Además, sabemos que la identificación grupal predice la participación en acciones colectivas (e.g., Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodríguez, y de Weerd, 2002; Van Zomeren, Postmes, y Spears, 2008), y que los individuos menos comprometidos con el grupo están menos dispuestos a participar en este tipo de acciones (Ellemers, Spears, y Doosje, 1999).

La literatura también muestra que aquellas personas más identificadas con el grupo están más influenciadas por él que los bajos identificados (Turner, 1991). De hecho, numerosos trabajos muestran que la medida en la que los individuos aceptan y siguen las normas del grupo es contingente con el nivel de identificación grupal (Jetten, Spears, y Manstead, 1996; McAuliffe, Jetten, Hornsey, y Hogg, 2003; Postmes, Spears, y Lea, 2000). De hecho, según Leach y colaboradores (2008) uno de los componentes de la identificación grupal es el grado de protopicalidad o estereotipicidad que los individuos

se atribuyen a sí mismos, y no hay miembro más prototípico que el que acepte y comulgue con las normas del grupo.

Por lo tanto, si aquellos que muestran los niveles de identificación grupal más altos son los que siguen las normas grupales en mayor medida, podríamos esperar que estos individuos acataran la percepción de legitimidad que viene dada por el propio endo-grupo, aunque dicha percepción justificara la situación desaventajada del grupo. Sin embargo, recordemos que estos individuos son también los que velan por los intereses del grupo en mayor medida (e.g., Ellemers, et al., 1997; Spears, Doosje, y Ellemers, 1997) y están más dispuestos a luchar por una mejor posición en la jerarquía social (Stürmer y Simon, 2004). En esta situación, se presenta una encrucijada para los altos identificados en la que entran en conflicto distintitas motivaciones e intereses. La cuestión entonces es si estos miembros, normalmente muy leales al grupo, aceptarán la norma y asumirán la desventaja grupal cuando el propio grupo así lo haga o si, por el contrario, rechazarán la legitimidad interna cuando se justifique la desventaja que el grupo sufre.

Aceptando la norma del grupo, ¿a cualquier precio?

A pesar de que aquellos individuos que se identifican altamente con el grupo tienden a seguir las normas de éste en mayor medida, la literatura muestra que los altos identificados también pueden desviarse de la norma establecida bajo determinadas circunstancias (e.g., Morton, Postmes, y Jetten, 2007). Específicamente, Morton y colaboradores mostraron que los individuos altamente identificados con el grupo se comportaban presumiblemente de forma estratégica al apoyar a otros miembros que se desviaban de la norma, cuando dicha desviación podría suponer un beneficio para el grupo. De hecho, la literatura muestra que la no conformidad con el grupo puede conllevar consecuencias positivas (e.g., De Dreu, 2002; Postmes, Spears, y Cihangir, 2001), y que la expresión de opiniones divergentes está positivamente relacionada con el compromiso hacia el grupo (e.g., Crane y Platow, 2010; Packer, 2008; Roccas, Klar, y Liviatan, 2006).

En esta línea, el modelo del conflicto normativo (Packer, 2008) señala la importancia de la identificación grupal en el proceso de desviación de las normas grupales, y trata de explicar bajo qué condiciones los altos identificados rechazan la norma grupal en lugar de aceptarla. En concreto, Packer propone que los altos

identificados pueden llegar a desviarse de la norma cuando perciban una incoherencia entre dicha regla y sus creencias respecto a cómo el grupo debe comportarse, dando lugar así a un *conflicto normativo* que el individuo debe solventar. Este conflicto surge al percibir una discrepancia entre la norma grupal y otros aspectos de la identidad del individuo, como por ejemplo sus valores personales. Según el modelo, esta inconsistencia da lugar a una valoración negativa de la conducta del grupo, y promueve comportamientos que se alejan de la norma grupal.

Además, el modelo propone que los altamente identificados no conciben las normas grupales como meras guías comportamentales, sino que están motivados para juzgar cuales serán las repercusiones de dichas normas, y se opondrán a ellas cuando sean evaluadas como perjudiciales para el grupo. Por lo tanto, es la intención de proteger y mejorar el grupo lo que lleva a los individuos a dejar de comportarse como miembros prototípicos que siguen las reglas grupales, y a desafiar la norma establecida. Es decir, cuando los altos identificados conciben que una norma grupal no es consistente con los intereses del grupo, estarán motivados para no aceptar dicha norma y oponerse a ella. En esta línea, algunos estudios han mostrado que los miembros altamente identificados con el grupo están más dispuestos a desafiar una norma grupal tras pensar las razones por las cuales dicho estándar podría ser dañino para el grupo (Packer, 2007; Packer y Chasteen, 2007). Además, Packer y colaboradores mostraron que los altos identificados aceptaban la norma del grupo en menor medida cuando ésta era percibida como perjudicial para el grupo (Packer y Chasteen, 2010).

Es importante resaltar que la no conformidad de los altamente identificados con el grupo tiene como objetivo beneficiar al grupo (Packer, 2008; Packer y Chasteen, 2010), y es necesario distinguir este tipo de desviaciones de la norma de otras relacionadas con la desvinculación del grupo. En este sentido, Packer y Miners (2012) mostraron que la no conformidad expresada por los altos identificados no implicaba un menor compromiso con el grupo a pesar de que la norma grupal estaba siendo desafiada. Sin embargo, la desviación de la norma por parte de los miembros menos identificados con el grupo, sí implicó un alejamiento del grupo.

Por lo tanto, la disconformidad mostrada por quienes se encuentran altamente identificados persigue el objetivo de mejorar el grupo desde dentro, y es concebida como un acto de lealtad hacia él. De hecho, el modelo del conflicto normativo predice

que los altos identificados se muestran dispuestos a desafiar cualquier norma cuando es percibida como dañina para el grupo en general, pero es menos probable que muestren desacuerdo con ella por razones únicamente personales (Haslam, et al., 2006; Zdaniuk y Levine, 2001). Esta predicción fue confirmada por Packer y Chasteen (2010) al encontrar que las expresiones de desacuerdo con el grupo por parte de los altos identificados no estaban relacionadas con sus intereses personales, mientras que sí lo estaban con los intereses del grupo.

En resumen, el modelo del conflicto normativo expone que la relación entre la identificación grupal y la aceptación de la norma grupal se revierte cuando dicha norma es perjudicial y dañina para el grupo.

Sin embargo, en los estudios empíricos que se han llevado a cabo para poner a prueba las predicciones de este modelo (e.g., Packer y Chasteen, 2010; Packer y Miners, 2012) las normas grupales con las que los altos identificados mostraban disconformidad eran reglas relacionadas con aspectos internos del grupo, que no afectaban a otros grupos (por ejemplo, las actitudes permisivas hacia el plagio o hacia el consumo de alcohol entre estudiantes universitarios). Es decir, estas normas afectaban al funcionamiento interno del grupo y a la imagen que el grupo ofrecía de sí mismo al resto de la sociedad, pero no afectaban directamente a sus relaciones con otros grupos.

Sin embargo, cuando hablamos de legitimidad interna nos referimos a una norma grupal sobre la aceptación o rechazo de la desventaja de un grupo. Por lo tanto, dicha norma está relacionada no sólo con la justicia con la que se percibe la posición de dicho grupo en la jerarquía social, sino también con la percepción que se tiene de la estructura social en general. En este caso, la norma grupal está relacionada con otros grupos diferentes al propio, ya que al percibir por ejemplo que la desventaja de un grupo es injusta, se puede cuestionar la legitimidad de los privilegios de los que gozan otros grupos de mayor estatus. Además, en este caso la disconformidad con la norma podría implicar intentos de luchar contra el orden social establecido, lo que afectaría directamente a los grupos aventajados.

En este trabajo, trasladamos el modelo del conflicto normativo (Packer, 2008), a un contexto inter-grupal en el que la norma grupal a desafiar por parte de los altamente identificados con el grupo, hace referencia a la legitimidad con la que se percibe la posición del grupo en el entramado social. Siguiendo las predicciones del modelo del

conflicto normativo, esperamos que quienes se identifican en gran medida con el grupo rechacen la norma de legitimidad interna, esto es, cuando el propio grupo justifica la desventaja social que sufre. Esta justificación convertida en un estándar grupal, iría claramente en contra de los intereses grupales y sería dañina para ellos, ya que asume que la situación desfavorecida del grupo podría ser merecida por sus miembros. Por esta razón, también es lógico pensar que los altamente identificados con el grupo muestren su disconformidad con esta norma. Más importante aún, esta tesis se ocupa de algunas de las consecuencias de dicha disconformidad. En este caso, esperamos que el desacuerdo con la norma se traduzca en intentos de cambiar el orden social establecido, liderados por aquellos individuos que se identifiquen con el grupo en mayor medida. El objetivo de estas conductas será acabar con la situación desfavorecida en la que se encuentra el grupo, desviándose así de la norma grupal que parece asumir y aceptar la desventaja, lo que sería claramente perjudicial para el propio grupo.

Según la teoría de la identidad social (Tajfel y Turner, 1979), los individuos altamente identificados con su grupo podrían seguir distintas vías para luchar por una sociedad más igualitaria y conseguir así una mejor posición para el grupo en la jerarquía social.

Tras el cambio social: de la disconformidad a la acción

El desacuerdo expresado por los altamente identificados para mostrar su oposición a una norma que perjudica al grupo valdría de poco si no se hiciera algo al respecto para alterar dicha situación. Basándonos en la literatura previa (e.g., Packer, 2008; Packer y Chasteen, 2010), predecimos que en condiciones de legitimidad interna, cuando un grupo en desventaja acepta su condición de desaventajado, los altamente identificados con él podrán mostrar su disconformidad con dicha aceptación, embarcándose en comportamientos dirigidos a alterar el orden social establecido, con el objetivo de otorgar al grupo con una posición más ventajosa. ¿Qué caminos pueden seguir estos individuos para provocar este cambio?

La movilidad individual

Tajfel y Turner (1979) proponen que los miembros de grupos desfavorecidos pueden seguir dos tipos de estrategias para enfrentarse a una identidad social negativa:

las individuales y las colectivas. Según estos autores, las percepciones de los individuos de las propiedades y características de la estructura social dictarán, junto con otros factores, la medida en que se comportarán de forma individual o colectiva. Aunque la teoría de la categorización social (Turner, et al., 1987) apuesta más por una respuesta a nivel grupal provocada por la saliencia del grupo en situaciones de comparación social, siguiendo lo expuesto por la teoría de la identidad social (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel y Turner, 1979), los individuos intentarán en primer lugar actuar aisladamente y al margen del grupo para alcanzar una identidad social positiva. Así mediante la *movilidad individual* un individuo que forma parte de un grupo de bajo estatus puede acceder a otro de un estatus mayor, siempre de forma individual. El estatus del grupo permanece intacto, es el individuo el que se disocia y des-identifica con el grupo, pasando a formar parte individualmente de otro grupo de mayor estatus.

La competición social

Sin embargo, en muchas ocasiones los límites de los grupos pueden no ser permeables, por lo que la movilidad individual no es posible por razones estructurales. En estos casos, la única forma de mantener una identidad social positiva será a través de la mejora del estatus del grupo cómo un todo. Tafjel y Turner (1979) se refieren a la *competición social* como una estrategia dirigida a revertir las posiciones del endo-grupo y el exo-grupo que goza de un mayor estatus. Esta estrategia, generará conflicto y antagonismo entre el grupo dominante y el subordinado. Éste último considerará ilegítima su situación de desventaja y comenzará una lucha por los recursos.

Una de las formas más directas para acabar con la discriminación del endo-grupo es a través de la realización de acciones colectivas, acciones que están dirigidas a mejorar las condiciones de un grupo en su totalidad (Tajfel y Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, y Moghaddam, 1990). Dichos actos pueden tomar distintas formas e ir desde acciones moderadas y pacíficas acordes con las normas sociales aceptadas, como la recogida de firmas o las manifestaciones pacíficas; hasta actos más radicales y que infringen dichas normas, como por ejemplo algunas acciones violentas o el terrorismo (Wright, et al., 1990).

A pesar de ser uno de los caminos más directos para alcanzar el cambio social, la literatura muestra que los individuos no siempre están dispuestos a llevar a cabo

acciones colectivas para protestar por los problemas que les preocupan y afectan (e.g., Klandermans, et al., 2002), y que tan solo un pequeño porcentaje de la población participa en acciones colectivas (Rucht, 1994; Walsh y Warland, 1983). Por lo tanto, las variables que impulsan a los ciudadanos a llevar a cabo este tipo de acciones, han sido objeto de numerosas investigaciones (e.g., Blumer, 1939; Klandermans, 1997) y en la actualidad contamos con numerosos trabajos que se hacen eco de cuáles son los factores estructurales y psicológicos que motivan a los individuos para actuar colectivamente en favor del grupo (para una revisión ver Klandermans, 1997; para un meta-análisis ver Van Zomeren, et al., 2008). A pesar de que los primeros trabajos especificaban que las acciones colectivas surgían como respuesta a situaciones reales y objetivas de desventaja (e.g., McCarthy y Zald, 1977), los estudios posteriores resaltaron la importancia de aspectos más subjetivos (e.g., la visión particular o la percepción de los individuos sobre la realidad social), aunque dichas apreciaciones no siempre estén en consonancia con las condiciones objetivas (e.g., Major, 1994; Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, y Young, 1999).

En este sentido, uno de los modelos que analiza el papel de ciertos factores subjetivos es el modelo de las dos rutas (dual path model; Van Zomeren, et al., 2008; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, y Leach, 2004), modelo integrador que trata sobre la influencia de las percepciones de justicia con respecto a la situación del grupo y del apoyo social recibido desde el grupo para llevar a cabo acciones colectivas. Dichas percepciones de justicia reflejan hasta qué punto la posición que ocupa el grupo es percibida como legítima y merecida, mientras que el apoyo social hace referencia a las percepciones de la valoración que el grupo hace de la situación por un lado, y de su disposición a participar en acciones colectivas por otro. Concretamente, este modelo distingue entre dos rutas complementarias que predicen la realización de estas acciones. Una de ellas está relacionada con la emoción grupal de ira provocada por la desventaja en la que se encuentra el grupo, variable que se ve influida a su vez por las percepciones de justicia y la valoración que el grupo hace de dicha situación. La segunda ruta se relaciona con la percepción subjetiva de la capacidad del grupo para alcanzar una mejor posición en la escala social, esto es con la eficacia grupal. Este factor se ve afectado por la disposición percibida del grupo a realizar acciones colectivas.

En un trabajo posterior, Van Zomeren y sus colaboradores resaltan además la gran influencia en este proceso de la identificación grupal en el modelo de la identificación social para las acciones colectivas (social identification model of collective action, Van Zomeren, et al., 2008). A través de un trabajo meta-analítico, estos autores muestran que el nivel de identificación grupal no solo afecta directamente a la participación en acciones colectivas, sino que también predice otros factores antecedentes de las acciones colectivas, como son la justicia con la que se percibe la situación que experimenta el grupo, o la eficacia grupal para cambiar la situación que se le atribuye al propio grupo.

Más recientemente, el modelo dinámico de las dos rutas (dynamic dual path way model, Van Zomeren, Leach, y Spears, 2012) expone que al enfrentar la desventaja colectiva, los individuos llevan a cabo una evaluación primaria para conocer si dicha desigualdad es relevante o no para ellos. Si la respuesta es afirmativa, se lleva a cabo una evaluación secundaria en la que se detecta el agente culpable de la situación de desventaja, además de que se evalúa el potencial del grupo para hacer frente a dicha situación desaventajada. Según los autores, estamos ante un proceso dinámico ya que no solo las evaluaciones que los individuos hacen afectan a cómo afrontan la desventaja, sino que a su vez el afrontamiento llevado a cabo retroalimenta las re-evaluaciones que los individuos hacen de la situación. Es decir, los intentos y los resultados de enfrentarse a la desventaja inciden en las re-evaluaciones primarias y secundarias que llevan a cabo los individuos. Así, en línea con Lazarus (1991), el afrontamiento de la desventaja se concibe como un proceso dinámico y continuo de evaluaciones y re-evaluaciones.

En este trabajo, este marco teórico nos permite examinar cómo y a través de qué ruta, (la basada en la emoción de ira grupal o en la percepción de eficacia grupal) quienes se encuentren altamente identificados con el grupo mostrarán disconformidad con la norma de legitimización de la desventaja y, en consecuencia, intentarán alterar el orden social establecido para acabar con la situación que desfavorece al grupo.

Las estrategias de creatividad social

A pesar de que la competición social es la forma más directa de luchar contra la desventaja social, en ocasiones los individuos no se encuentran en las condiciones más adecuadas para involucrarse en este tipo de actos y, sin embargo, también se embarcan

en la búsqueda de una distintividad positiva. Las estrategias *de creatividad social* consisten en alterar y redefinir los elementos de la comparación inter-grupal que está proporcionando la situación de bajo estatus al grupo. Así, cuando se emplean las estrategias de creatividad social la posición que el grupo ocupa en la estructura social no se ve afectada de forma objetiva pero, al alterar los componentes de la comparación, el grupo se aleja de la posición desfavorecida que ocupa.

Una de estas estrategias consiste en comparar al grupo con otros grupos en una nueva dimensión en la que el endo-grupo es superior. Ya los trabajos pioneros de Lemaine (1966) mostraban que los grupos de niños que obtenían comparaciones desfavorables al comparar la cabaña que habían construido con la de otros grupos (debido a que se les habían asignado materiales de construcción de peor calidad), buscaban otras dimensiones de comparación en las que sí eran superiores a los otros grupos, como otros edificios construidos en los alrededores de la cabaña. Así, se ha puesto de manifiesto en numerosos trabajos que estas estrategias se emplean frecuentemente ante la percepción de desigualdad. Un posible problema que podría presentarse en este caso es la valoración y legitimización que se le otorga a esta nueva dimensión de comparación. Otra estrategia de creatividad social hace referencia al cambio de valoración de determinados atributos asignados al grupo, de forma que aspectos que eran percibidos como negativos pasan a evaluarse de forma positiva. Por ejemplo, se puede ser un individuo afroamericano y seguir teniendo la piel de color, pero rechazar y revertir el sistema que establece que la piel de color es un atributo negativo.

Por último, otra estrategia de creatividad social consiste en hacer comparaciones con otros grupos que ocupan una posición en la sociedad aún más desaventajada que la del endo-grupo, y evitar así las comparaciones con grupos de alto estatus. En esta línea, Rosenberg y Simmons (1972) encontraron que cuando los individuos de raza negra se comparaban a sí mismos con otros individuos de la misma raza, su autoestima era más alta que cuando las comparaciones se realizaban con personas de raza blanca.

La presente tesis

Los individuos que pertenecen a grupos desfavorecidos pueden utilizar diversas vías para enfrentar la desventaja a la que su grupo se ve sometido. En este trabajo nos

centramos en las estrategias grupales para afrontar la desventaja social. Específicamente, estudiamos la forma en que los miembros de grupos desaventajados se enfrentan a dicha situación cuando la desventaja es justificada incluso por los miembros del propio grupo, aceptando y asumiendo así que la situación desigual es justa y legítima.

Para ello, creamos unos escenarios de desventaja ficticios en los que el grupo se encuentra en una situación claramente desfavorecida con respecto a otros grupos, y manipulamos la legitimidad interna de dicha situación. Es decir, manipulamos la legitimidad con la que dicha situación de desventaja es percibida por el propio grupo (legítima vs. ilegítima) con el objetivo de comprobar cómo dicha percepción grupal afecta a las actitudes y conductas de los miembros de dicho grupo. Nuestra hipótesis central es que aquellos miembros que se identifiquen altamente con el grupo, no aceptarán la norma grupal cuando implique la legitimización de la desventaja del grupo, ya que esto supondría una situación perjudicial y dañina para el colectivo. En este caso, paradójicamente los individuos altamente identificados con el grupo no aceptarán la norma grupal con el propósito de proteger al grupo. Además, la no aceptación por parte de quienes están altamente identificados se traducirá en la realización de estrategias grupales para desafiar el orden social establecido y alcanzar una posición más ventajosa para el propio grupo. Adicionalmente, se planteará como otro objetivo analizar las condiciones bajo las cuales esta actitud de lealtad y protección al grupo puede presentar limitaciones, ya que cuando la lucha por la igualdad se considere un reto inalcanzable, los altamente identificados no tendrán otra salida que aceptar la situación de desventaja y no presentar mayor oposición

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Chapter II

Aims Of The Research

The main goal of this doctoral dissertation is to study empirically how individuals deal with social inequality. Specifically, we focus on the circumstances in which the disadvantaged group *itself* legitimizes and accepts its discrimination. Our main goal then is to get a better understanding of when and how individuals contest group disadvantage that is justified even by the own in-group. We take into account group identification in this process, in order to study its role when facing an internally accepted disadvantage by the in-group. Note that previous results have shown that following the in-group norm is contingent on group identification (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996, 1997; McAuliffe, Jetten, Hornsey, & Hogg, 2003; Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000). As a consequence we could expect that high identifiers would follow the in-group norm of justification of the disadvantage. However, the normative conflict model (Packer, 2008) establishes that high identifiers can dissent from the in-group norm when it is detrimental for the group (Packer & Chasteen, 2010; Packer & Miners, 2012). Importantly, this deviance is framed as aimed at getting a group benefit and it does not imply any disengagement from the group (Packer, 2008; Packer & Chasteen, 2010).

Developing this line of argument, we predicted that the motivation of protecting the in-group overrides the urge to follow the in-group norms at any costs. One of our aims is to test this prediction empirically by measuring but also manipulating group identification, in order to make causal inferences about its role when dealing with a disadvantage accepted by the in-group.

We go beyond previous work on in-group dissent by studying *how* high identifiers cope with discrimination in the face of an in-group norm which legitimizes the disadvantage. We experimentally test the idea that high identifiers will show intentions to fight for equality to a greater extent than low identifiers but also grounded in a belief that the in-group, despite the evidence, is willing to support this quest. Thus, across the studies presented in this doctoral dissertation, we measure different ways of contesting social disadvantage. Our predictions are that high identifiers will be more likely than low identifiers to use a range of resistance strategies when confronting the in-group justification of the disadvantage. Therefore, a central aim of this dissertation is to study **different routes of resisting the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage as a function of identification**.

First, we focus in one of the most direct and straightforward ways of challenging the prevailing social order, namely (moderate) collective action. Previous research shows that high identifiers are precisely those people most willing to engage in such actions (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Therefore, in Chapter 3 we test the prediction that high identifiers will be more willing than low identifiers to support moderate collective action, but especially when faced with the acute threat of the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage.

Second, in Chapter 4 we focused on more extreme action, namely radical collective action. Our aim in this case is to explore how group identification relates to this less common and socially accepted form of action. To our knowledge, this is the first time that group identification has been related to radical action, and the predictions are not straightforward. It can be argued that high identifiers will support this type of action to the benefit of the in-group. This should be true especially when the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage takes place, given that these are the more threatening circumstances, and high identifiers are expected to show their loyalty in such threatening conditions. However, taking radical action can damage the in-group image in the eyes of society, and also the in-group itself, thus high identifiers might feel reluctant to using extreme actions.

Third, the goal of Chapter 5 is to study more subtle ways of contesting the disadvantage, that is, to focus on social creativity strategies (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978). These strategies are not directly aimed at achieving actual change in the social structure, but at adding some positive value for the in-group in a context where it is clearly devalued. Therefore this is another way of contesting the situation used by the high identifiers when dealing with disadvantage.

In this doctoral dissertation we also acknowledge that there should be factors that inhibit or foster high identifiers' reactions when dealing with disadvantage. Therefore, the second set of goals of the dissertation is related to **the factors that constrain and facilitate high identifiers in particular when fighting disadvantage.**

First, in Chapter 3 we test the idea that the type of arguments used to justify the in-group disadvantage are a relevant factor in eliciting or repressing high identifiers' responses towards the disadvantage. Specifically, we study the effect of justifying arguments related to the in-group self-identity and self-worth in comparison with

justifications of the disadvantage based on more objective and external arguments. We predict that the identity-based stereotypic arguments would be more contested by high identifiers. Our rationale is that arguments based on the in-group identity should be more threatening for high identifiers as using these arguments implies that the in-group deserves its disadvantage. In addition external arguments may be seen as more objective and constraining, thus difficult to contest.

Testing different forms of social constraints, in Chapter 3 and 5 we also analyze the relevance of another form, namely the sample size that endorses the in-group norm legitimizing the disadvantage. We argue that when a large in-group sample legitimizes the disadvantage, it should be more difficult to contest, even for the ones who are very motivated to protect the in-group (i.e., high identifiers), as the social constraint is stronger. However, if the message justifying the disadvantage comes from a small in-group sample, high identifiers should find easier to dispute this norm.

In addition, in Chapter 3 we test the idea that the content of group identity is another factor that moderates the high identifiers' resistance to the disadvantage. Specifically, we compared two types of identity content based in different principles. One is unambiguously focused on the fight for a better in-group position (e.g., feminism), while the other can also endorse a more traditional point of view (e.g., women), implying the acceptance of the disadvantage. We expect that high identifiers from groups that promote the fight for equality should be more motivated to contest the disadvantage even when other in-group members accept it, compared to other identities whose content and principles are less oriented to contesting the disadvantage. In line with this rationale, in Chapter 6 we also test the idea that certain in-group stereotypes can either foster or inhibit the intentions of fighting for equality. Specifically, we explore the difference between stereotypes that can be related to dominance and arrogance (e.g., high status groups) in comparison with stereotypes associated with shyness and introversion. We argue that an in-group stereotype that is dominant and arrogant in character, and moreover endorsed by the in-group, may make it particularly difficult for high identifiers to support action contesting this, lest this confirms a negative image of the group. Therefore, we focused on a traditional high status group with a dominant/arrogant stereotype, that is incidentally in a disadvantaged position and

examine whether high identifiers would deal with disadvantage in the same way as traditional low status groups from earlier work.

In addition, in Chapter 4 we acknowledge that inter-group relations can also affect the extent to which high identifiers will contest the disadvantage. Specifically, we explore the high identifiers' willingness to challenge the established social order when the advantaged group has some power over the disadvantaged in-group, as situations in which the outcomes of the disadvantage depend on the advantaged group. Building on the "nothing to lose" effect (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006), we expect that individuals contest the disadvantage using more radical actions in the more desperate circumstances, when the situation is hopeless and the out-group has high power over the in-group outcomes. However, under circumstances of non-dependency, the need for taking radical action is less justified. Following the same rationale as in Chapter 6, in this case high identifiers will avoid radical action strategies, as it could produce a negative in-group image in the eyes of others as well as the in-group, especially under conditions in which the disadvantage is legitimized by other fellow members.

To achieve our aims, we study different social groups in different contexts that are (experimentally) disadvantaged compared to other groups. We recreate fictitious scenarios to manipulate the in-group disadvantage and both other in-group and out-group members' opinion towards it. We measure diverse variables to tap into the different ways that high identifiers might contest the situation. We also measure (and manipulate) group identification as a central factor in confronting group disadvantage.

In conclusion, the main question to answer in this doctoral dissertation is how individuals deal with group disadvantage when it is legitimized by the own in-group. We focus on the role of group identification in this process, and study the ways in which individuals differing in the identification with the in-group might contest social inequality. We also analyze the factors that can facilitate or constrain this process of challenging the legitimization of the disadvantage.

Chapter III

Collective Resistance Despite Complicity:

High identifiers rise above the legitimization of disadvantage by the in-group

Collective resistance despite complicity:

High identifiers rise above the legitimization of disadvantage

by the in-group

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Abstract

The relevance of legitimacy when dealing with group disadvantage is well known (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this research we distinguish between external legitimacy (the out-group justifying in-group disadvantage) and internal legitimacy (when the in-group endorses this justification; see Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010). Building on the normative conflict model (Packer, 2008), we expect high identifiers not only to reject the internal legitimacy, but to assert that the group is actually able and willing to contest the disadvantage by collective means. We confirmed this hypothesis across four studies, using three different intergroup contexts, and by manipulating as well as measuring group identification. These results show that even when a disadvantaged group appears to accept its situation, high identifying in-group members will still contest this and, moreover, expect other in-group members to support them in this endeavor.

Keywords: legitimacy, social disadvantage, group identification, group efficacy, collective action

It is well known that groups can reject in-group exemplars that seem to cast the in-group in bad light (e.g., the so-called "black sheep effect", Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). However, what happens when the in-group as a whole (or at least a large sample) seems to espouse views that damage our group's image and interests? What do we do then? Surely we cannot easily reject the group's view, especially if we identify strongly with it. Imagine a situation in which a highly identified women who feel that they deserve to have equal career opportunities as men, find out that a survey shows that most women support traditional roles (e.g., to stay at home and do house work). We argue that high identifiers are paradoxically motivated to contest in-group legitimization of disadvantage (Packer, 2008). Going further, we argue that they will engage in action to protest the inequality despite, but also because, of the in-group's apparent legitimation of its disadvantage. The main goal of the current paper is thus to examine whether and how different group members deal with in-group disadvantage when other in-group members accept the discrimination as fair.

Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), proposes that unequal status relationships can be characterized by a series of dimensions namely stability, permeability, and legitimacy. In particular, the legitimacy of status relations refers to the subjective perception of the (un)deservedness of an (un)favorable intergroup position. Status differences between groups can foster intergroup conflict if the disadvantaged group starts perceiving the differences as illegitimate. However, as long as group members agree to characterize the differences in status as fair and justified, members of both the high and the low status groups will tend to avoid social comparison (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), presumably, because the two groups are conceived as essentially different (Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001).

Who defines legitimacy?

We argue that the legitimacy judgment of a group's position can be made by different sources, with potentially different consequences. For the women who think that it is fair that men and women have equal career opportunities, a message that favours gender inequality will probably not have the same meaning or effect if it comes from men as when it is endorsed by other women. However, so far, most of the research on legitimacy has ignored the source of legitimacy (e.g., Doosje, Spears, & Koomen,

1995; Rodríguez-Bailón,Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000). In the present research we address this question distinguishing different sources of legitimacy. Based on Spears and colleagues (2010) we differentiate between *external legitimacy*, which refers to the opinion of an out-group regarding an in-group disadvantage, and *internal legitimacy*, which relates to the in-group view towards its own disadvantage (Spears et al., 2010). It has been shown that legitimacy appraisals by the in-group towards its position have especially important consequences for the in-group's reactions (Hersby, Jetten, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2011; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, Garza, & Mewse, 2011). One could expect that members of a disadvantaged group would want to frame their own disadvantage as unfair. However, low status groups may sometimes consent to the disadvantage and assume their own failings (see Crocker & Major, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), perhaps in an attempt to legitimize the prevailing social order (Jost & Banaji, 1994; but see Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). The remaining question then is whether all in-group members accept and follow the in-group norm of perceiving their disadvantaged situation as fair? History provides us with many examples of cases where people resist rather than accept their in-group disadvantage even when many in the in-group seemed to accept it (women's suffrage is but one example). Who are the individuals that seek positive changes, instead of accepting the in-group disadvantage, even when endorsed by other group members?

The role of group identification: The normative conflict model

Group identity becomes especially salient when the in-group is disadvantaged (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), and under these negative circumstances, those who highly identify with the in-group tend to "stick together" and are more likely to show collective responses that embrace rather than avoid group identity (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). In addition, the social influence literature shows that high identifiers typically tend to listen to the in-group and are more influenced by its message than low identifiers (Turner, 1991). In fact, it has been shown that following the in-group norm is contingent on group identification (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996, 1997; McAuliffe, Jetten, Hornsey, & Hogg, 2003; Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000). We could expect, then, that high identifiers will also accept the message from the in-group

legitimating the disadvantage that the group is experiencing. However, this does nothing to resolve the threat to the in-group. Recent research shows that high identifiers can also sometimes deviate from group norms for strategic reasons, to protect or promote it (Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007). Therefore, one could also expect that high identifiers do not always accept an internally legitimate in-group perspective that it goes against group interests.

In line with this, the normative conflict model (Packer, 2008), highlights the importance of in-group identification in the prediction of norm deviations by in-group members, and distinguishes it from other forms of deviation linked with disengagement from the group. Specifically, the model proposes that deviations by high identifiers occur when they perceive a conflict between the group norm, and their beliefs about how the group *should* behave (*normative conflict*). Packer points out that high identifiers are able to judge what the outcomes of the norms endorsed by the in-group will be, and they are in a good position to oppose them, when they evaluate them as detrimental for the group (Packer & Chasteen, 2010). Importantly, high identifiers engage in this non-conformity behaviour with the aim of benefiting the in-group (Packer, 2008; Packer & Chasteen, 2010). The dissent is thus aimed at improving the in-group's position and as a consequence, is motivated and framed as an act of loyalty.

To our knowledge, the normative conflict model has been tested when the in-group norm to be challenged does not involve an out-group and is just in relation to (intra)group factors, such as the existence of a pro-alcohol norm among university students (Packer & Chasteen, 2010). In the current paper we go beyond this work by using a clear intergroup context, in which external and internal legitimacy become relevant. In this case the high identifiers' deviation from the internally legitimate perspective (i.e., the in-group norm) may mean that they do not accept the prevailing views about the group's disadvantaged status. This can then have relevant consequences at the intergroup level beyond the expression of the disagreement, as proposed by the normative conflict model.

Building social change: From disagreement to action

A pessimistic but realistic reaction to internal legitimacy for group disadvantage could be that, although they dissent from the group norm, high identifiers should resign

themselves to the view that the in-group is against progressive change. In contrast, we argue that dissent should be just the start of a longer and larger process of resistance, in which opposing the in-group norm that legitimizes the disadvantage might foster attempts at social change. Specifically, driven by the motivation of improving the in-group's position, the high identifiers' dissent may turn into intentions aimed at ending the disadvantage. Indeed, we argue that high identifiers may even resist the very idea that the in-group, despite the evidence to the contrary, are themselves against change. Such recalcitrant beliefs are perhaps necessary to provide the hope and motivation that change is possible.

In this paper we therefore extend previous work and test the idea that high identifiers not only show dissent from the in-group norm (Crane & Platow, 2010; Packer, 2008), but actively dispute the norm itself through not only their own willingness to contest the situation, but through their belief that other in-group members are also actually willing to join them in this endeavor. Perhaps the most direct ways to do this is by taking collective action against the discrimination. We therefore now consider the processes involved in driving collective action.

There are many explanations of collective action but a recent attempts to integrate the various principles and processes involved provide a useful starting point (Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2004) and provides a framework in which we can examine the antecedents of collective action under internal legitimate circumstances. Specifically, based on the coping framework of Lazarus (1991), the dual path model (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) describes two different routes that lead to collective action through different patterns, namely an emotion-focused and a problem-focused coping route. The emotion route delineates a group-based anger pathway which is affected by the perceived injustice of the situation and the perceived opinion social support (corresponding to other members' appraisals of the shared circumstance). In the problem-focused route, the perceived action social support (corresponding to other members' willingness to participate in collective action) predicts group efficacy, which leads to collective action. In addition, we take into account the effect of group identification on collective action tendencies, as it has been shown that this factor not only directly affects collective action (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, 2004), but it also influences the perceived injustice and

group efficacy perceptions (e.g., the social identification model of collective action; Van Zomeren et al., 2008).This theoretical framework will allow us to examine if any resistance to social disadvantage, particularly when faced with internal legitimacy, might occur.

To summarize, in the current studies we examine how individuals deal with a group disadvantage when there is evidence that it is accepted by the in-group (i.e., under internal legitimacy conditions). We argue that going beyond the dissent predicted by previous literature (Packer, 2008), high identifiers will actively promote the in-group's cause despite this internal legitimacy. In this case, accepting the in-group norm will be overridden by a motivation to improve the in-group situation, not least because the lack of support from the group means that their own resistance is all the more important. We predict that this dissent will translate into attitudes and potential behaviors aimed at contesting the in-group disadvantage, such as enhanced group efficacy and potential resulting collective action. Note that this prediction goes beyond mere personal dissent, as it hints that the in-group is more prepared to act against the disadvantage than the in-group norm reflects. This could be because they see the norm as biased or unrepresentative (Doosje, Spears et al., 1995), or if representative, open to dispute or political persuasion. Thus high identifiers might be arguing that the in-group norm, even if currently true, is not a fixed fact ("being") but could be contested and changed ("becoming"; see Spears et al., 2001). In contrast, under internally illegitimate conditions, when the in-group does not accept the disadvantage, it is not necessary to contest the in-group norm, as it is already aligned to group goals and interests.

The present research

We tested our hypotheses in four studies, using three different intergroup contexts: regional relations in Spain, women vs. men in the UK, and in an experimental setting with artificial groups. Secondly, we introduced different boundary conditions across studies that could moderate the hypothesized internal legitimacy effect. In Study 1 we manipulated the type of arguments used by the in-group (Andalusians citizens in Spain) to legitimate the disadvantage (economic vs. stereotypic arguments). In the second study we examine the internal legitimacy effects and the influence of the sample size of the source of legitimacy, as a social reality constraint factor that could limit the high

identifiers' resistance. In Study 3 we test the role of different types of identification (feminist vs. women) and manipulated both internal and external legitimacy orthogonally, to compare the effect of different sources of legitimacy on resistance strategies used by British women (vs. men). Finally, in Study 4 we tested our main hypothesis in a more controlled lab context, with minimal groups in which we manipulated rather than measured group identification.

Study 1

We predict that if a group justifies its own disadvantage, members who highly identify with the in-group, will contest this internal legitimacy. Further, we argue that when justifying the disadvantage, arguments that are related to in-group self-esteem and self-worth will be more harmful for high identifiers than other arguments based on more objective factors. Thus, justifications based on the in-group's identity such as negative stereotypes, could be especially threatening for the in-group (Corneille & Leyens, 1996; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), as it could imply that they deserve the ensuing disadvantage (e.g., women should stay at home and do housework, as they are not as competent as men). By contrast, arguments based on external and more objective factors such as economic or financial reasons for disadvantage should not necessarily elicit the urgency to contest the internal legitimacy by high identifiers, as they do not posit a direct threat to in-group's identity (e.g., women have to stay at home, as the unemployment rate is high nowadays and there are no jobs for anyone).

The purpose of Study 1, then, is to analyze the influence of internal legitimacy grounded in economic vs. stereotypic justifications of discrimination towards the in-group, on participants' attitudes towards their unfavorable situation. We predict that when the in-group legitimates its disadvantage, high identifiers will contest the internal legitimacy and will show resistance to the in-group norm, but this effect will be stronger when the in-group uses stereotypic arguments than when economic explanations are adopted to justify the status imbalance between groups.

In order to test this hypothesis, a fictitious scenario was developed using a real and socially relevant issue: the allocation of economic resources among regions by the Spanish Government. The cover story described a disadvantaged economic situation for the region of Andalusia (where our study was conducted). Specifically, we stated that

this region was receiving a smaller economic investment than other Spanish regions. Internal legitimacy justifying this situation was based on two different types of arguments: economic vs. stereotypic. The first one was based on the financial situation of the region. The stereotypic argument was related to the well-known Andalusian stereotype of high warmth and low competence (Morales, García, Rodríguez-Bailón, & Moya, 2004; Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2008).

Method

Participants, design and procedure

Participants were 103 Andalusian undergraduates (55 women; mean age 20.73) at the University of Granada, who received course credit for their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in a 2 (Economic legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) x 2 (Stereotypic legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) between participants factorial design. Group identification was conceived as a moderator in this design (4 items, α = .82, adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995, e.g., *I see myself as an Andalusian*).

Participants read an extract from an allegedly recent report related to the planned regional economic resource distribution made by the Spanish Government for the coming year, which stated that their own region (Andalusia) would receive less economic funding compared to other Spanish regions. The text also included the point of view from a sample of Castellano-Manchegos (out-group), as well as Andalusians' opinions (in-group) on this issue. We chose this out-group because it has a similar status as the in-group and there is no explicit dispute between these two regions based on economic or political reasons that could affect the results.

Legitimacy manipulation

We maintained constant external legitimacy across conditions. Thus all of the participants read that the out-group justified and legitimized the disadvantage of Andalusia's situation based on both economic and stereotypic reasons (e.g., *The budget cuts are understandable because in recent years, Andalusia received more investment than other regions/Andalusian workers are less competent than those from other regions).* Further, we independently manipulated internal legitimacy: all participants

were presented with both kinds of arguments, however they were either used to justify or dispute discrimination towards the in-group. Thus, in the economic legitimate condition, the in-group justified the disadvantage using economic arguments (e.g., *If we (Andalusians) received more investment than other regions in recent years, this budget cut is understandable*), but refused such arguments in the economic illegitimate condition *(e.g., Although in recent years our region received more investment than others, this does not justify this year receiving less money than them).* In the same way, in the stereotypic legitimate condition, participants read that the in-group endorsed the Government economic allocation using stereotypic arguments (e.g., *We are less competent than those from other regions, thus it is understandable that the Government is investing less money in Andalusia),* whereas in the stereotypic illegitimate condition, the in-group rejected the stereotypic reasons to justify the disadvantage (e.g., *We are as competent as other region's workers, thus we deserve exactly the same investment as they do*). After reading the text, participants spent proximately 15 minutes in completing a questionnaire comprising the dependent variables. Upon completion the task, they were thanked for their participation. Some weeks later they were debriefed via email.

Dependent variables

Opinion social support was measured with three items referred to the perceived appraisals of the shared disadvantaged situation (α = .64, e.g., *I think other Andalusians disagree with this economic resource allocation*). *Action social support* was measured with one item, related to the perceived other in-group members' willingness to stop the disadvantage (i.e., *I think other Andalusians are willing to do something against the current situation*). Participants were asked to answer these items as well as the following, using scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).

Group Efficacy. We measured group efficacy perceptions with five items adapted from Van Zomeren, et al. (2008) (α = .89, e.g., *I think together we are able to change this situation*).

Collective Action. We measured to what extent participants would approve collective action to change the economic allocation with nine items (α =. 78, e.g., *I would approve the fact that other Andalusians sign a petition to establish an equal economic allocation between regions*) adapted from Tausch, et al. (2011). In this case, participants

were asked to answer using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 11 (very much), in order to have good response variability.

Results

In order to test our main hypothesis regarding the effect of different kinds of internal legitimacy, a MANOVA with economic and stereotypic legitimacy as factors was conducted on perceived opinion and action social support, group efficacy and collective action as dependent variables. We introduced group identification as a (centered) continuous predictor (previous analysis showed no effect of the manipulation on this factor). There was a significant overall effect of group identification, stereotypic legitimacy and the interaction of both factors (λ = .88, F (4, 90) = 3.19, p = .02; η^2 = .12; λ = .88, F (4, 90) = 3.02, p = .02, η^2 = .12; λ = .90, F (4, 90) = 2.45, p = .05, η^2 = .10, respectively). Univariate significant effects for every dependent variable are described below.

Results showed that group identification positively predicted group efficacy and, In line with previous research (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2004), collective action (F (1, 93) = 12.26, p = .001; η^2 = .12; F (1, 94) = 4.54, p = .04; η^2 = .04, respectively). Although we found no effect of economic legitimacy in any of the dependent variables, analysis showed a main effect of stereotypic legitimacy on opinion social support, group efficacy and collective action (F (1, 93) = 3.93, p = .05; η^2 =.04; F (1, 93) = 4.42, p = .04; η^2 = .04; F (1, 94) = 4.36, p= .04; η^2 = .04, respectively). In the stereotypic illegitimate condition, participants perceive higher levels of opinion social support and group efficacy, and showed a greater approval of collective action than in the stereotypic legitimate condition (M = 4.11 vs. 3.84; M = 4.08 vs. 3.79; M = 6.41 vs. 5.95, respectively). In other words, participants perceived more scope for a social change when the in-group framed the disadvantage as unfair.

More interesting, analysis showed the predicted interaction between group identification and stereotypic legitimacy for opinion social support and collective action, and marginal for group efficacy (F (1, 93) = 6.21, p = .01; η^2 = .06; F (1, 93) = 4.00, p = .05; η^2 = .04; F (1, 93) = 2.93, p = .09; η^2 = .03, respectively). Simple slopes analysis showed a positive effect of identification only under stereotypic legitimate conditions (β = .36, t(93) = 2.40; p = .02; β = .41, t(94) = 2.74; p = .007; β = .46, t(93) = 3.15; p = .002,

respectively; see table 1 for further details). That is, compared to low identifiers, highly identifiers perceived higher levels of opinion social support and group efficacy, and approved collective action to a greater extent. These results show that high identifiers resisted accepting the in-group norm legitimizing the discrimination.

Table 1. Means, standard deviations and effects of group identification per condition in Study 1

	Economic legitimacy		Economic illegitimacy	
	Stereotypic legitimacy	Stereotypic illegitimacy	Stereotypic legitimacy	Stereotypic illegitimacy
Opinion social support	3.87	3.93	3.80	4.29
	(1.01)	(.82)	(.76)	(.65)
	.32	-.09	.33	-.24
Action social support	3.80	3.76	3.61	3.54
	(1.13)	(1.06)	(.89)	(.86)
	.01	.08	.39†	.23
Group efficacy	3.75	4.11	3.83	4.04
	(1.13)	(.73)	(.93)	(.67)
	.16	.21	.63**	.25
Intention to approve CA	5.71	6.34	6.17	6.47
	(1.51)	(1.01)	(1.53)	(.80)
	.15	.09	.48*	-.12

Note. Standard deviation between brackets
$^{\dagger}p < .10.$ $*p < .05.$ $**p < .01.$

Discussion

According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), when the differences between groups are framed as illegitimate by low status group members, they are more likely to contest the inequality (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel, 1978). In line with this, the main effects found indicate that participants perceived higher levels of group efficacy and opinion social support under internal illegitimate circumstances; showing that individuals think their group is more able to deal with a disadvantage when the members frame the situation as illegitimate. However, we go one step further by showing that when the in-group perceives its disadvantage as legitimate, there is still scope for resistance. Results showed that, compared to low identifiers, high identifiers perceived higher levels of opinion social support, group efficacy and endorsed collective

action to a greater extent when the in-group legitimized the disadvantage. Therefore, we found support for our hypothesis of high identifiers confronting internal legitimacy, but only when stereotypic arguments were used to justify the situation. This could be due to the fact that: 1) high identifiers only rejected the in-group justification of the disadvantage when it implied that a negative in-group image (e.g., a negative stereotype associated to the in-group) was being confirmed, and 2) objective justifications of the disadvantage are more constraining, therefore there is less scope for resistance.

Our results are similar to the normative conflict model (Packer, 2008). However, rather than just disagreeing with the submissive group norm, high identifiers seem to reject it, to the extent that they perceive the grounds for resistance and collective action. So, we go beyond showing that the high identifiers' simply disagree with the in-group norm. Those who highly identify were willing to contest the disadvantage, and it seems they believed that many other group members would support them, regardless of the in-group apparent acceptance of the discrimination.

One strategy that high identifiers could use when the in-group accepts the group disadvantage is thus to doubt and reject this information. One way to do this is by assuming that not all the in-group members necessarily legitimize the discrimination, but perhaps relatively few, unrepresentative members. This implies that high identifiers do not accept the in-group norm, or challenge its representativeness. In this case, high identifiers have the motivation, and also the opportunity, of contesting the inequality, as they may still be able to count on the support of many members. However, if it is clear that a large in-group sample legitimizes the disadvantage, even individuals who are motivated to protect the in-group (i.e., high identifiers), might decide to accept the general group opinion, as the opportunity to successfully contest against such a strong opposition is low. In order to test this hypothesis, in Study 2 we manipulate a social reality constraint that may make high identifiers resistance more difficult. Specifically, we manipulated the size of the in-group sample that provides the basis for internal legitimacy.

Study 2

It is well known that larger samples are more reliable. Thus larger samples from the in-group displaying internal legitimacy should be more difficult to contest than the ones

coming from smaller samples (Doosje, Spears et al., 1995; Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). In Study 2 we therefore manipulated the sample size of the in-group members who agreed with the in-group unfavorable position. Our goal was to test the joint effects of sample size, internal legitimacy and group identification on participants' reactions to the disadvantaged situation. We argue that the social reality constraint will be higher if a large in-group sample agrees that the in-group discrimination is legitimate and, consequently, the message will not so easily be dismissed. In this case even the high identifiers would be constrained by the opinion of other in-group members. In contrast, when just a small in-group sample perceives the disadvantaged in-group position as legitimate, it should be easier to dispute. In Study 2, we focused only on stereotypic arguments used to justify the group disadvantaged for our manipulation of internal legitimacy as this proved to be the most crucial in promoting participants' responses in Study 1.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

Participants were 73 Andalusian undergraduates (50 women; mean age 22.92), who received course credit for their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in a 2 (Sample size: large vs. small) x 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) between participants factorial design. Group identification was measured with the same items as Study 1 plus three more to enhance the sensitivity of the measure (α = .92), and introduced as a moderator. The procedure and the fictitious scenario was similar as Study 1, but we used recent (anonymized) Andalusian politician public statements (i.e., *Spanish Government makes decisions that harm Andalusia)* to strengthen the plausibility of our cover story.

Sample size manipulation

In the large sample condition participants were informed that a large and varied sample of Andalusians were surveyed about the situation of the region. By contrast, in the small sample condition participants were told the information they read about came from just a small number of Andalusians surveyed.

Legitimacy manipulation

As Study 1, the out-group legitimated the in-group disadvantage across conditions (constant external legitimacy), and we manipulated internal legitimacy.

Dependent variables

To check the effectiveness of the manipulations, participants rated the sample size of the in-group members surveyed (1 = very small, 7 = very large), and the extent to which that sample thought the situation was just (1 = very unfair and undeserved, 7 = very fair and deserved). We used the same items as Study 1 to measure opinion social support (α = .53, although reliability of this scale was relatively low, the analysis of the separate items showed similar effects), action social support (α = .86, we added two more items to those used in Study 1 to obtain a more reliable measure), group efficacy (α = .91) and the approval of collective action (α = .83). We also included a new variable, namely *participants' willingness to take part themselves in collective action* (eight items, α = .88, e.g., *I would sign a petition to establish an equal allocation between regions*). Participants used a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) to answer the dependent variables, except for collective action items in which they used a scale up to 11.

Results

Manipulation checks

To test our manipulations, we ran an ANOVA with sample size and legitimacy as factors on the legitimacy check, that showed a main effect of legitimacy, $F(1, 69) = 238.63$, $p < .001$. Participants in the legitimate conditions reported that the in-group members perceived the situation as fairer ($M = 6.03$) than individuals in the illegitimate conditions ($M = 1.44$). We ran the same analysis on the sample size check, finding a main effect of the sample size factor, $F(1, 69) = 31.90$, $p < .001$, supporting the effectiveness of our manipulation. Participants in the large sample size conditions perceived the sample size larger ($M = 4.05$) than participants in the small sample conditions ($M = 1.58$).

Main results

In order to test the combined effect of sample size, legitimacy and group identification on participants' attitudes, a MANOVA with sample size and legitimacy as

factors and group identification as a (centered) continuous predictor was conducted on opinion and action social support, group efficacy and the two measures of collective action. Wilks' Lambda showed a significant overall effect of group identification and legitimacy, (λ = .72, F (5, 61) = 4.63, p = .001, η^2 = .27; λ = .73, F (5, 61) = 4.45, p = .002, η^2 = .27, respectively), and an interaction Sample size x Group identification, that was qualified by a significant 3-way interaction effect of Legitimacy x Sample size x Group identification (λ = .81, F (5, 61) = 2.76, p = .03, η^2 = .18; λ = .78, F (5, 61) = 3.46, p = .008, η^2 = .22, respectively). Univariate effects are described below.

In line with the results of Study 1, we found a positive effect of group identification on action social support, group efficacy and the approval and willingness to take part in collective action (F (1, 65) = 4.76, p = .03, η^2 = .07; F (1, 65) = 9.93, p = .002; η^2 = .13; F (1, 65) = 14.25, p < .001, η^2 =18; F (1, 65) = 9.08, p = .004, η^2 = .12, respectively). Analysis also showed a main effect of sample size on action social support, F (1, 65) = 4.04, p =.05, η^2 =.06, indicating that participants perceived higher levels of action social support when the social constraint was weak (i.e., small sample size, M = 5.19), than in the large sample size condition (M = 4.49).The legitimacy manipulation had an effect on opinion and action social support, on (marginally) group efficacy and the approval of collective action (F (1, 65) = 17.06, p <.001, η^2 =.20; F (1, 65) = 10.13, p = .002, η^2 =.13; F (1, 65) = 3.18, p = .08, η^2 =.05; F (1, 65) = 4.91, p = .03, η^2 =.07, respectively). As in Study 1, in the illegitimate conditions participants perceived higher levels of opinion and action social support and (marginally) higher levels group efficacy, and approved collective action to a greater extent than participants in the legitimate conditions (M = 6.17 vs. 5; M = 5.32 vs. 4.86; M = 5.28 vs. 4.45; M = 8.09 vs.7.39, respectively). Therefore it seems participants perceived that a change would be more likely when the in-group framed the disadvantage as unfair.

In addition, group identification interacted with the factors manipulated. We found a 2-way interaction between sample size and group identification on the willingness take part in collective action, F (1, 65) = 5.66, p = .02, η^2 =.08, indicating that, compared to low identifiers, high identifiers showed greater levels of engagement in collective action under small sample conditions, β = .59, t(65) = 3.56; p = .001.

We found the same pattern for action social support and the willingness to approve collective action but, interestingly, in this case these effects were qualified by legitimacy

(see below). In addition, replicating the results of Study 1, analysis also showed an legitimacy by group identification 2-way interaction on group efficacy, F (1, 65) = 7.06, p = .01, η^2 =1; showing a positive effect of group identification in the legitimate condition, β = .73, t(65) = 4.19; p < .001. This replicates results from Study 1 and indicates that, compared to low identifiers, those who highly identified perceived higher levels of group efficacy when the in-group accepted the disadvantage.

Table 2. Means, standard deviations and effects of group identification per condition in Study 2

	Large sample		Small sample	
	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy
Opinion social support	4.78 (1.04) -.29	6.20 (.93) -.34	5.23 (1.47) .00	6.14 (1.22) .34
Action social support	4.20 (1.18) -.29	4.84 (1.43) .38	4.72 (1.52) .46*	5.72 (1.13) .33
Group efficacy	4.68 (1.39) .76**	5.29 (1.17) .07	5.05 (1.38) .36	5.35 (1.41) .06
Intention to approve CA	7.29 (1.42) -.17	8.43 (2.34) .30	7.50 (1.96) .71***	7.74 (2.35) .50*
Intention to take CA	6.46 (2.32) -.01	7.29 (2.23) .20	6.55 (2.20) .57*	6.70 (2.70) .55*

Note. Standard deviation between brackets
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Finally, we found the predicted 3-way interaction Sample size x Legitimacy x Group identification on action social support and on the willingness to approve collective action (F (1, 65) = 5.50, p = .02, η^2 =.08; F (1, 65) = 4.55, p = .04, η^2 =.01, respectively). In order to analyze these interactions, we decompose them by the legitimacy factor. Only in the legitimate condition did we find a 2-way interaction between sample size and group identification (F (1, 35) = 6.76, p = .01, η^2 =.16; F (1, 35) = 18.03, p < .001, η^2 =.34, for action support and the willingness to approve collective action, respectively). Simple

slope analysis showed that high identifiers perceived higher levels of action social support and were more willing to approve collective action than those who identified less ($\beta = .60$, $t(35) = 2.35$; $p = .02$; $\beta = 1.04$, $t(30) = 4.69$; $p < .001$, respectively) in the small sample condition, that is, when the social constraint was weak (see Table 2 for further details).

The overall pattern was in line with our predictions regarding action social support and the intention to approve and take part in collective action. However, we found an unexpected reliable positive slope of identification in the large sample/legitimacy condition (see Table 2), that could be seen as a stronger form of contesting the disadvantage among high identifiers. Therefore, in general, results showed that the sample size factor qualifies the effect previously found, given that high identifiers resisted the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage only when the source of legitimacy might be conceived as unrepresentative.

Discussion

The results found are consistent with those of Study 1 and confirm our main predictions. The main effects for group efficacy and social support indicate that, in general, participants perceived the in-group as more able to contest the disadvantageous situation under illegitimate conditions (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Moreover, results showed that high identifiers perceived more scope for change (i.e., higher levels of action social support and more willingness to approve and participate in collective action) than low identifiers when the social constraint was weak, and, in line with Study 1, under circumstances where the in-group legitimized its own disadvantage (i.e., higher levels of group efficacy). Interestingly the interaction of sample size, legitimacy, and group identification revealed more about how participants faced the in-group disadvantage. Specifically, results showed that compared to low identifiers, high identifiers perceived higher levels of action social support and approved collective action when the legitimization of the disadvantage came from a small in-group sample. However, when a larger in-group sample accepted the disadvantage, by and large (with one exception on group efficacy) high identifiers did not differ from low identifiers. We argue that in this case the social reality constraint is stronger and more binding, as a more reliable sample from the in-group justifies the in-group disadvantage. Under these

circumstances the high identifiers' dissent reported by Packer and colleagues (Packer & Chasteen, 2010; Packer & Miners, 2012), is blocked in its positive effects as the opportunity to challenge the social order is low. However, the result revealed on group efficacy in the large sample condition could be taken as a sign of even a higher resistance among high identifiers that takes place when even a large sample justifies the disadvantage.

Thus, as it is shown in Study 1 and 2, even though high identifiers are willing to confront the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage (see the stereotypic arguments condition in Study 1 and the small sample size condition in Study 2), it seems that they do so mainly under certain conditions where this is viable (i.e., where the reality constraints permit this). By contrast, when more objective arguments are used to legitimate the disadvantage, or when (in most of the cases) a large in-group sample justifies it, high identifiers are more resigned to accept the discrimination.

With knowledge of the fact that the high identifiers' non-conformity presents some boundary conditions, the aim of the next study was to test whether certain types of group identity might also act as a restriction on resistance. Specifically, in Study 3 we argue that different kinds of group identity (i.e., politicized vs. non-politicized) would have different effects on the resistance process shown by high identifiers. We argue that the effects found in the previous studies will only appear when the content of group identity is clearly in favor of the interests of the group, and the in-group convictions unambiguously promote in-group improvement in an intergroup context. In addition, a second aim of Study 3 was to explore the effects of external legitimacy in combination with internal legitimacy.

Study 3

In order to test the effect of the identity content in the rejection of the internal legitimacy, in this study we measure two kinds of group identities related to the in-group (British women), namely identification with women and identification with feminists. Feminist identity has a relatively more cohesive and consistent content than women's identity, being specifically oriented to the unfairness of women's disadvantaged situation. By contrast, the content of women's identification is more diffuse and heterogeneous because it may comprise at least two types of contrasting ideological

agendas within this broad category: traditional women, who identify with gender roles and accept discrimination, and progressive women (i.e., feminists) whose identity is built in the idea of opposing and challenging the status quo (Condor, 1984). Therefore, whereas feminists are by definition more unambiguously progressively oriented towards equality and rights for women, the content of women's identity is broader, and contains different subtypes, including more traditional or conservative views of women. Thus, we predict that the high identifiers' resistance to internal legitimacy will occur primarily when taking into account feminist identification (Becker & Wagner, 2009), but not women's identification in general. This prediction is also in line with the idea that politicized identities (i.e., identification with a social movement organization) are more relevant in predicting the participation in social movements' activities than non-politicized identities (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

In this study we also orthogonally manipulated internal and external legitimacy. In the previous studies we did not compare the independent or interactive effects of external and internal legitimacy (holding external legitimacy constant). In the current study we test the prediction that internal (vs. external) legitimacy would have stronger effects on participants. This is because 1) individuals are most influenced by in-group members (Turner et al., 1987; Wright, 1997), and 2) out-group justifications of in-group disadvantage will be more expected and also less threatening than justifications from within the in-group.

As previous studies, we presented a fictitious cover story in which the in-group (British women) was in a disadvantaged situation compared with an out-group (British men). Specifically, we told participants about The Big Lottery Fund (BIG, a grant-making body in the UK created by the Government to administer the funding of "good causes" following the creation of the National Lottery), and specified that there was an imbalance in the allocation of the BIG funding between institutions, such that women's causes received less funding compared to men's.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

Participants were 117 women undergraduates from Cardiff University (mean age: 19.26), who received course credits for their participation. Participants were asked to

read an excerpt from a recent report related to the current economic resource distribution of the BIG fund and other women and men opinion about the issue. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in a 2 (External legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) x 2 (Internal legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) between participants factorial design. In this case both women (α = .83) and feminist identification (α = .95), were measured with the same items as Study 2 and introduced as moderators.

Legitimacy manipulation

We manipulated both external and internal legitimacy based on the traditional women stereotype of low competence (compared to men). In the external legitimate condition participants were told that men previously surveyed seemed to justify the discriminatory situation for women regarding the BIG allocation (e.g., *Women are less efficient and experienced in managing financial responsibilities than men*). By contrast, in the external illegitimate condition, men surveyed showed their disagreement with the discrimination (*Women would be able to manage the financial resources just as well as men*). We followed the same procedure as in previous studies to manipulate internal legitimacy. Participants were thanked and debriefed upon completion the task.

Dependent variables

We checked the effectiveness of the manipulation with two items referring to the external and internal legitimacy (i.e., *Most of the British men/women asked agreed with the BIG allocation*), on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). We used the same items and scales as in Study 2 to measure opinion and action social support (α =.72; α = .86, respectively), group efficacy (α = .92), and the approval and willingness to engage in collective action (α =. 90; α =. 92, respectively).

Results

Manipulation checks

We removed one participant from the analysis who told the experimenter that she had worked for BIG and that her view was biased by that fact.

An ANOVA with external and internal legitimacy as factors was conducted on the external legitimacy check. We found a main effect of external legitimacy, F (1, 107) = 365.11, $p < .001$, showing that participants in the external legitimate condition perceived that the out-group agreed more with the BIG economic distribution (M = 6.21) than participants in the external illegitimate condition (M = 2.27). The same analysis on the internal legitimacy check showed a main effect of internal legitimacy, F (1, 107) = 262.29, $p < .001$. Participants in the internal legitimate condition perceived the in-group agreed more with the BIG allocation (M = 5.89) than participants in the internal illegitimate one (M = 2.12).

Main results

In order to test the impact of both internal and external legitimacy in combination with feminist and women's identification, a MANOVA with external and internal legitimacy as factors and feminist and women's identification as (centered) continuous predictors was conducted on opinion and action social support, group efficacy and collective action. Wilks' Lambda showed a significant overall effect of feminist identification and internal legitimacy (λ = .86, F (5, 101) = 3.23, $p = .01$, η^2 = .14; λ = .75, F (5, 101) = 6.71, $p < .001$, η^2 = .25, respectively). Analysis also showed significant overall effects of the interaction Internal legitimacy x Feminist identification, that was qualified by external legitimacy (λ = .87, F (5, 101) = 2.92, $p = .02$, η^2 = .13; λ = .87, F (5, 101) = 3.09, $p = .01$, η^2 = .13, respectively). Univariate effects for each variable are described below.

Replicating results from Studies 1 and 2 and previous research (Stürmer & Simon, 2004), analysis showed that feminist identification positively predicted group efficacy, and the willingness to approve and engage in collective action *(F* (1, 105) = 5.03 $p = .03$, η^2 = .05; F (1, 105) = 5.10, $p = .03$, η^2 = .05; F (1, 105) = 11.96, $p = .001$, η^2 = .10, respectively). The results also revealed a main effect of internal legitimacy on opinion social support, F (1,105) = 26.77, $p < .001$, η^2 = .20. Participants in the illegitimate condition perceive higher levels of opinion social support (M = 5.47) than participants in the internal legitimate condition (M = 4.54).

In addition, we found that both types of legitimacy interacted on the perception that the in-group would be able to change the disadvantage. That is, we found an

interaction between external and internal legitimacy on group efficacy, F (1, 109) = 3.82, p = .05, η^2 =.03. Simple effect analysis showed no significant differences between conditions, but participants tended to perceive higher levels of group efficacy when both the in-group and the out-group framed the disadvantage as illegitimate. The out-group's legitimacy appraisals in combination with feminist identification also had an effect on participants' reactions: results showed a 2-way interaction between external legitimacy and feminist identification on the approval of collective action, F (1, 105) = 4.29, p = .04, η^2 = .04, showing that feminist identification positively predicted participants' approval of taking collective action only in the external legitimate condition, when British men perceived women discrimination as deserved, β = .42, t(105) = 3.21; p = .002. In addition, internal legitimacy together with feminist identification seemed to play an important role with more dependent measures than external legitimacy: in line with our predictions, we found a 2-way interaction between internal legitimacy and feminist identification on opinion social support, group efficacy and the willingness to approve collective action (F (1, 105) = 3.95, p = .05, η^2 = .04; F (1,105) = 8.32, p =.005, η^2 = .07; F (1, 105) = 5.76, p = .02, η^2 = .05, respectively). Conceptually replicating the results of Study 1 and 2, participants in the internal legitimate condition who highly identified with feminists, perceived higher levels of opinion social support, group efficacy, and were more prone to approve action (β = .38, t(105) = 3.08; p = .003; β =. 26, t(105) = 2.31; p = .02; β = .38, t(105) = 3.13; p = .002, respectively), compared to those who identified to a lesser extent as feminists.

Also interestingly, we found a 2-way interaction of Internal legitimacy x Women's identification on group efficacy, F (1,105) = 10.20, p = .002, η^2 =.09. In this case simple slopes analysis showed a marginal effect of identification with women in both legitimate and illegitimate conditions. However, the effect of identification was negative in the legitimate condition, and positive under illegitimate circumstances (β = -.23, t(109) = -1.71; p = .09; β = .21, t(109) = 1.67; p = .09, respectively). It seems that when identification with women get into the play, high identifiers' tended to accept the disadvantage to a greater extent than low identifiers under legitimate conditions, but in the illegitimate condition, they tended to perceive the in-group as more able to fight the situation than those who identified less (see Table 3 for further details).

Table 3. Means, standard deviations and effects of group identification (feminist and women) per condition in Study 3

	External legitimacy		External illegitimacy	
	Internal legitimacy	Internal illegitimacy	Internal legitimacy	Internal illegitimacy
Opinion social support	4.48	5.60	4.60	5.34
	(1.07)	(.71)	(1.24)	(.84)
Effect of feminist id	.17	-.02	.32†	-.11
Effect of women id	.19	-.10	-.05	.10
Action social support	4.45	4.64	4.46	4.70
	(1.24)	(.93)	(1.25)	(.93)
Effect of feminist id	.02	.29	.29	-.30
Effect of women id	-.35†	.27	.05	-.10
Group efficacy	5.05	4.82	4.92	5.16
	(1.08)	(.84)	(1.15)	(.97)
Effect of feminist id	.46*	.09	.32†	-.03
Effect of women id	-.29	.05	-.12	.43*
Intention to approve CA	7.52	8.07	7.90	7.55
	(2.37)	(1.95)	(1.58)	(1.84)
Effect of feminist id	.48*	.21	.29	-.21
Effect of women id	-.11	-.15	-.14	.00
Intention to take CA	5.52	6.67	5.96	5.04
	(2.65)	(2.24)	(2.27)	(2.24)
Effect of feminist id	.44*	.40*	.35†	.13
Effect of women id	.08	-.06	-.04	.29

Note. Standard deviation between brackets
†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$.

Finally, we found that the two factors manipulated together with group identification interacted on participants' perceptions towards the disadvantage. Specifically, we found a 3-way interaction of External legitimacy x Internal legitimacy x Feminist identification on action social support $F(1, 105) = 4.98$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .04$. To decompose this interaction, we split the data by the external legitimacy factor and calculated regression equations separately for participants who were assigned to the internal legitimate and illegitimate conditions. In the external illegitimacy conditions only a 2-way interaction between internal legitimacy and feminist identification was significant, $F(1, 55) = 5.25$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .09$. Supporting the results showed in Study 1 and 2, simple slopes analysis showed a marginal effect of feminist identification in the

internal legitimate condition, β = .32, t(55) = 1.86; p = .07. When the out-group did not support the women's disadvantage but the in-group did, high feminist identifiers tended to perceive greater levels of action social support, compared to low identifiers.

Discussion

To our knowledge, this is the first time that it has been empirically demonstrated that internal and external legitimacy are not equivalent concepts and that their effects are also quite different in relation to group identification. As predicted, whereas external legitimacy had almost no differential effects on participants, internal legitimacy elicited the predicted resistance to in-group opinion among high identifiers. This could be understood as evidence that confirms individuals are most influenced by in-group members (Turner et al., 1987; Wright, 1997), but also more threatened when they seem to go against in-group interests.

In line with results of Study 1 and 2, high feminist identifiers did not accept the in-group legitimacy norm when it justified the disadvantaged in-group position. According to our hypothesis, under internal legitimacy conditions participants who reported high levels of identification with feminists, perceived more group efficacy and instrumental social support than those who felt less identified. In this case, even when the in-group did not reject the disadvantage, high feminist identifiers still maintain that the group was willing to challenge the unfair situation, and they were also more willing to approve collective action to stop the disadvantage. High feminist identifiers showed a greater approval of collective action under both external and internal legitimacy conditions, which is consistent with previous findings by Becker and Wagner (2009), and with the idea that politicized identity is related to a stronger inner obligation to take part in collective action (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). By contrast, those who identified more strongly with women, perceived lower levels of group efficacy than low identifiers under internal legitimate circumstances, but tended to perceived higher levels of group efficacy to act collectively in the internal illegitimate condition. We could say that participants who firmly identified with women saw more scope for a change just when the in-group framed the disadvantage as unfair; but resigned to the discrimination when the rest of the in-group did so. To sum up, Study 3 replicates the previous results but it also points out the relevance of the identity content in the process of opposing the in-

group justification of the disadvantage. Specifically, it shows that the in-group values and beliefs will affect the extent to which high identifiers will be willing to deviate from the group.

Study 4

Even though we have shown the relevance of group identification across three studies with two different groups, our designs do not allow us to make causal inferences about group identification as this was measured not manipulated. In Study 4, we go one step further by experimentally manipulating group identification with the aim of testing its causal effects on perceived social support, group efficacy and collective action tendencies. Using a quasi-minimal group paradigm, in this study participants were categorized as inductive (vs. deductive) thinkers, and we manipulated the level of group identification and internal legitimacy towards an in-group disadvantage.

In line with the results of studies 1, 2, and 3, we predict an interaction between group identification and legitimacy: participants categorized as high identifiers should not endorse the internal legitimacy when it comes to accepting the in-group disadvantage. Therefore, under internal legitimacy conditions they should show higher levels of social support, group efficacy, and willingness to take part in collective action than low identifiers. Following the previous findings, we expect few or no differences between low and high identifiers under internal illegitimate conditions, when the in-group refuses the fairness of the disadvantage.

Method

Participants, design and Procedure

Participants were 78 Psychology students (51 women; mean age 18.29) at the University of Granada, who received course credit for their participation. Participants were received at the lab individually, and randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in a 2 (Identification: high vs. low) x 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) between participants factorial design. They were told that the study required that their style of thinking, as inductive vs. deductive thinkers, would be assessed. With this aim, they completed a bogus test, and were informed to which group they belonged. All

participants were assigned to the inductive thinkers group (see Doosje, Spears et al., 1995).

Identification manipulation

According to the aim of the study, it was also necessary to manipulate to what extent each participant identified with their group. To achieve this, participants were asked to answer a bogus personality inventory composed by ten items designed for this study. Furthermore, using a bogus pipeline procedure (see Doosje, Ellemers et al., 1995 for a similar procedure), participants were told that the level of a certain hormone, cortisol, had been related to the degree in which individuals identify with their group, and specifically that high levels of cortisol reflected high levels of identification. After answering the inventory, the experimenter took a saliva sample from each participant, ostensibly to check the levels of cortisol. Some minutes later, all the participants saw how their saliva sample turned pink when in contact with a reagent. In the high identification conditions, participants were told that the staining showed that their levels of cortisol were relatively high, and participants in the low identification condition were informed that this color change was indicative of the absence of cortisol. The experimenter fed the result of the cortisol measure into the computer, to combine this feedback with participants' responses to the personality inventory. After some seconds, the screen showed to participants whether their level of identification was high or low. Once they knew their level of identification, participants read about the existence of unequal relations between the members of both groups of thinkers in which, according to empirical studies, inductive thinkers (i.e., the in-group) were treated in a discriminatory way by the deductive thinkers (see Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998, for a similar procedure, albeit directed at the perpetrator group). In order to make the cover story more credible, it was also indicated that the general population was not aware of these inequitable interactions given that this information was not accessible to them, as they did not know the distinction between both types of thinkers (cf. Doosje et al., 1998). However, it was specified too that the negative treatment described above had subtle but adverse consequences and a negative impact for inductive thinkers in their everyday life. After reading the text participants answered

some questions on the computer related to the information they had read about. Upon completion the task, they were thanked for their participation and debriefed.

Legitimacy manipulation

As Study 1 and 2, external legitimacy (the deductive thinkers' justification of the disadvantage) was constant across conditions, and internal legitimacy was manipulated based on a bogus in-group stereotype of low competence and high warmth.

Dependent variables

To check that the manipulations worked, participants rated their level of identification according to the inventory and the cortisol measures (1= low, 7 = high), and the extent to which inductive thinkers perceived the situation described as fair and legitimate (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). In order to assess to what extent participants had internalized the manipulation of the level of identification with the group, we also measured group identification with the same items as in Study 1 (α = .81). We used the same items and scales as the previous study to measure opinion and action social support (α =.54; α =.84. respectively), group efficacy (α = .89), and the approval and the willingness to engage in collective action (α =.86; α =.91, respectively).

In this study a measure of participants' perception of discrimination (1 = not discriminatory at all, 7 = very discriminatory) regarding the interactions between the inductive and the deductive thinkers was included (i.e., *To what extent the situation described could be seen as a discriminatory situation?*). We thought that by introducing a less relevant in-group, the situation could be perceived as a less discriminatory context than those presented in the other studies with natural groups, with which they actually identified. Therefore, only participants who actually framed the scenario as discriminatory were expected to show the results revealed in the previous studies. With this in mind we also added new measures related to individuals' *personal commitment* with the situation, aimed at measuring a more subtle way of resistance the status quo (i.e., *I think the situation described is a serious/long term problem, It is necessary to do more research about this issue, I would like to receive more information about the coming studies via email/be informed about the new studies on this issue through the social networks)*. We conceive this as an indirect way of resisting the disadvantage, more feasible when it is towards artificial groups. Participants responded to these items using

a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Finally, we also measured the willingness to collaborate voluntarily in a follow-up study without receiving any course credit by asking participants to write down their names in a list; and the number of pamphlets about the issue that participants took from the lab to distribute among their acquaintances. Participants' responses to each item were included as dependent variables.

Results

Manipulation checks

We removed one participant from the analysis who told the experimenter who suspected the cortisol measure was fake.

To test the effectiveness of our identification manipulation, an ANOVA with identification and legitimacy was conducted on the identification check and the group identification measure. Results showed a main effect of identification on both variables (F (1, 73) = 150.17, $p < .001$, η^2 = .67; F (1, 73) = 6.96, p = .01, η^2 = .09, respectively). Participants in the high identification condition reported that, according to the measurements taken, their level of identification was higher and they also reported higher levels of group identification (M = 6.35 vs. 2.57; M = 3.99 vs. 3.31, respectively) than participants in the low identification condition. This result shows that, with the absence of any previous experience or knowledge about the in-group, participants based their answers on the identification feedback received from the experimenter, and also seemed to internalize this to a significant extent. We ran the same analysis on the legitimacy check, showing a main effect of legitimacy, F (1, 73) = 84.42, $p < .001$, η^2 = .54. In the legitimate condition, participants reported that their in-group framed the situation as more just (M = 5.20), than participants in the illegitimate condition, (M = 1.60).

Main results

The requirement that participants view the situation as discriminatory or disadvantaged (in line with previous studies) was addressed in 2 key ways: 1) by using perceived discrimination as a continuous moderator (none of the manipulations had an effect on this variable), and 2) in a second step, by using perceived discrimination (i.e., a minimum thereof) to determine a cut-off. We first ran a MANOVA with identification

and legitimacy as factors, and the perception of discrimination as a (centered) continuous predictor on opinion and action social support, group efficacy and the two scales of collective action. Wilks' Lambda showed a significant overall effect of the perception of discrimination, and legitimacy (λ = .56, F (5, 65) = 10.33, p < .001, η^2 = .44; λ = .75, F (5, 65) = 4.23, p = .002, η^2 = .25, respectively). Showing the relevance of the perception of discrimination, analysis also showed a significant overall effect of Identification x Legitimacy x Perception of discrimination, λ = .81, F (5, 65) = 3.09, p = .01, η^2 = .19. We repeated the same analysis including each personal commitment item as a dependent variable. In this case we found a significant overall effect of the perception of discrimination and the interaction legitimacy x Perception of discrimination (λ = .50, F (7, 63) = 8.99, p = .001, η^2 = .50; λ = .76, F (7, 63) = 2.77, p = .01, η^2 = .23, respectively). Univariate effects are described below.

Analyses revealed that the perception of discrimination was related to participants' attitudes towards the disadvantage. Specifically, results showed that this factor positively predicted action and opinion social support, group efficacy, and the willingness to approve and undertake collective action (F (1, 69) = 22.52 p <.001, η^2 =.25; F (1, 69) = 7.53, p =.008, η^2 =.09; F (1, 69) = 18.73, p <.001, η^2 = .21; F (1, 69) = 22.12 p <.001, η^2 =.24; F (1, 69) = 20.31, p <.001, η^2 =.23, respectively). Participants' discrimination perceptions also affected the more subtle ways of resisting the disadvantage, given that it had an effect on the perception that the issue described was a serious and a long term problem, on the perception that more research on the topic was needed, and on participants' willingness of being informed about this issue through the social networks (F (1, 69) = 48.33, p <.001, η^2 =.42; F (1, 69) = 14.87, p <.001, η^2 =.18; F (1, 69) = 18.94, p <.001, η^2 =.21; F (1, 69) = 4.30, p =.04, η^2 =.06.). Analyses also showed that group identification positively predicted the number of pamphlets than participants took, F (1, 69) = 6.65, p =.01, η^2 =.09; participants in the high identification condition took more pamphlets (M = 2.27), than those who were in the low identification condition (M = .97). Regarding the legitimacy manipulation, we found a main effect of legitimacy on the perception that the situation described was a long term issue, F (1, 69) = 3.76, p =.05, η^2 =.05. Participants in the illegitimate condition perceived to a greater extent that the in-group disadvantage was a long term problem (M = 5.32) than participants in the legitimate condition, (M = 4.69). Further, the level of discrimination

perceived interacted with the factors manipulated. First, we found a 2-way interaction Identification x Perception of discrimination on the approval of collective action and the number of pamphlets than participants took from the lab ($F (1, 69) = 3.99$, $p =.05$, $\eta^2 =.05$; $F (1, 69) = 5.82$, $p =.02$, $\eta^2 = .08$, respectively). Analysis showed a positive effect of the discrimination perceived just for the high identifiers ($\beta = .68$, $t(69) =5.79$; $p < .001$; $\beta = .43$, $t(69) = 3.38$; $p = .001$, respectively), indicating that those who perceived the situation as more discriminatory approved collective action to a greater extent and took more pamphlets from the lab. Second, analysis also showed a 2-way interaction of Legitimacy x Perception of discrimination on the prolongation of the problem, $F (1, 69) = 9.61$, $p =.003$, $\eta^2 =.12$. Simple slopes analysis showed that only under legitimate conditions the discrimination perceived positively predicted the extent to which participants framed the negative situation as a long term issue, $\beta = .76$, $t(69) = 5.12$; $p < .001$.

More interesting, we found that the interaction of both factors manipulated and the perception of discrimination played a role in participants' reactions. Specifically, we found a 3-way interaction of Identification x Legitimacy x Perception of discrimination on group efficacy, the willingness to engage in collective action, and the perception that more research on the issue described was needed ($F (1, 69) = 10.05$, $p =.002$, $\eta^2 = .13$; $F (1, 69) = 5.13$, $p =.03$, $\eta^2 =.07$; $F (1, 69) = 4.20$, $p =.04$, $\eta^2 =.06$, respectively).

In order to decompose these interactions, we focused on participants who framed the scenario as discriminating at least to some extent, thus we ran the analysis for participants who scored 5 or more (i.e., above the scale midpoint in a scale ranged from 1 to 7, N = 45) in the perception of discrimination scale. As stated earlier, it makes sense to take into account participants who perceived the events described as in-group discrimination in order to recreate the same situation as in the previous studies (i.e., a perception of discrimination/disadvantage). We then ran ANOVAs with identification and legitimacy as factors on the key measures. As predicted, and replicating again the results from Study 1, 2 and 3, results showed 2-way interactions between identification and legitimacy on group efficacy, (marginally) on the willingness to take collective action and on the perception that more investigation was needed, ($F (1, 41) = 4.24$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2 =.09$; $F (1, 41) = 2.99$, $p =.09$, $\eta^2 =.07$; $F (1, 41) = 5.75$, $p =.02$, $\eta^2 =.12$, respectively). Simple effects analysis showed that participants in the legitimate condition who were

categorized as high identifiers, perceived higher levels of group efficacy (albeit in this case the differences between conditions were not significant), they were more prone to take collective action, and expressed that was necessary to do more research about the in-group disadvantage than low identifiers in the legitimate condition (M = 6.11 vs. 5.45; M = 6.82 vs. 5.01; M = 6.54 vs. 5.54; respectively).

Table 4. Means and standard deviations per condition in Study 4, for participants who scored high (≥5) in the "discrimination perceived" item

	High identification		Low identification	
	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy
Opinion social support	4.64 (.87)	5.69 (.69)	4.33 (1.16)	5.36 (.76)
Action social support	5.97 (.95)	5.96 (.83)	4.91 (1.10)	5.75 (.64)
Group efficacy	6.11 (1.17)	5.62 (.74)	5.45 (.91)	6.08 (.76)
Intention to approve CA	7.10 (2.07)	6.40 (1.61)	5.54 (1.69)	6.25 (1.16)
Intention to take CA	6.82 (2.00)	5.67 (2.07)	5.01 (1.99)	5.82 (1.50)
Serious problem	6.36 (.81)	5,27 (1.49)	5.55 (1.04)	6.00 (1.04)
Long term problem	5.36 (1.43)	4.91 (1.30)	5.18 (1.40)	5.83 (.83)
More research on the issue	6.54 (.82)	5.54 (1.37)	5.45 (1.44)	6.08 (.79)
Receive information via email	6.45 (.69)	5.00 (2.05)	5.36 (1.69)	5.58 (1.68)
Receive information via social networks	5.82 (1.08)	5.18 (2.13)	5.64 (1.80)	5.33 (1.23)
Willingness to participate	91 (.30)	.82 (.40)	.91 (.30)	.67 (.49)
Pamphlets taken	3.64 (4.43)	2.82 (4.02)	1.00 (.77)	-92 (.29)

Note. Standard deviation between brackets

Discussion

The aim of this study was to replicate the results found across the three previous studies in a more controlled setting. We created an artificial group in the lab and succeeded in manipulating participants perceived level of identification (high vs. low) with this group. The results obtained replicated the findings of the studies 1, 2 and 3 in a controlled lab setting using minimal groups: those who were highly committed to the in-group perceived that the group disadvantage could be contested, even though other in-group members legitimated it. Compared to those who were classified as low identifiers, those assigned to the high identification condition perceived higher levels of group efficacy and were more willing to take collective action against the discrimination, despite being told that other members of the in-group accepted their disadvantage. We found similar patterns of results with other measures that were not aimed at directly fighting the disadvantage, but could be taken as a more personal or subtle ways of coping with the discrimination. Therefore, in this fourth study we showed the causal role of group identification in the process described in this paper.

Furthermore, this study shows that high identifiers are still involved in contesting the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage when it comes to a new and unknown group, created in an artificial lab context. High identifiers confront the internal legitimacy message and perceive the in-group as able to counter the disadvantaged situation, even when they have no previous knowledge about the in-group and no relevant past experiences with it. Thus, high identifiers appear motivated to confront the in-group justification of the situation and believe that they can overhaul the discrimination, even when the disadvantaged group does not play a central role in their lives.

General Discussion

In the present research, we point out the relevance of taking into account the source of legitimacy when judging a group position in the social hierarchy, in fighting for justice for one's group. Specifically, we found that the in-group evaluation of the disadvantage (internal legitimacy) significantly influenced individuals' reactions and willingness to challenge the social order.

Further, in line with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we found that participants perceived the group as more able to fight its disadvantage when the discrimination experienced is framed as unfair and undeserved by other in-group members. However, we focused primarily on the situations in which the disadvantage is seen as just by the discriminated group itself. Across four studies, we showed that when the in-group seems to accept its disadvantage, high identifiers resist the in-group view and are still willing to challenge the social hierarchy, with the help (perhaps paradoxically) of the in-group. Specifically, we found that in a context of discrimination for the in-group, high identifiers perceived higher levels of social support and group efficacy, and were more willing to take part in collective action to change the situation than low identifiers, when the rest of the group framed the situation as just and legitimate. Interestingly, this process takes place even when it occurs with artificial groups created in the lab, as the induced high identifiers behaved in the same way as high identifiers of real groups when facing the internal justification of the in-group disadvantage (Study 4).

Therefore, when a group seems to accept its own disadvantage, this does not mean that *all* members of the in-group are necessarily ready to submit passively to the situation. This finding is consistent with the normative conflict model (Packer, 2008), which establishes that high identifiers dissent from the in-group norm when it harms the group. However, the results showed in the current arguably work go beyond the normative conflict model and other findings related to the high identifiers' non-conformity (Crane & Platow, 2010; Packer & Chasteen, 2010), as they imply consequences well beyond the mere expression of discontent or dissent. Specifically, when it comes to legitimizing the own disadvantage, high identifiers directly challenge the in-group norm by being more willing than low identifiers to fight for a better in-group position, but apparently spurred on by the in-group itself (i.e., in terms of group efficacy and action support in particular). Importantly, when opposing the internal norm of legitimization, the high identifiers' deviation has consequences for the inter-group agenda, as they are also contesting the established social hierarchy. We argue that the high identifiers' dissent is just the first step of a process of resistance, in which they are willing to directly dispute the in-group norm, at least when it comes to tolerating discrimination. Under internally illegitimate circumstances by contrast, we generally

found few differences between high and low identifiers. As we expected, this situation should be less threatening, as the in-group already shows dissatisfaction with the disadvantaged situation and there is no special need to contest the in-group norm, given it supports the group's claims.

However, we also have shown that there are factors that prevent high identifiers from confronting the in-group norm under certain circumstances. Sometimes, they do assume the in-group's perspective even when it supports the disadvantage, as the motivation to protect the in-group is overcome by other factors. Specifically, in Study 1 we showed that the kind of arguments used by the in-group to explain the disadvantage plays a relevant role. If the in-group discrimination is justified by a negative in-group stereotype, high identifiers will contest the discrimination to a greater extent, compared to low identifiers. However, when the discrimination is justified with more external arguments (e.g., economic reasons) there was no effect of group identification. We argue that the economic argument represents less of a threat to the in-group image and, or at least a threat more difficult to dispute as it is based on more objective factors that are more constraining. Thus, high identifiers did not confront the in-group harmful standard when it did not affect the in-group image deeply or when they could not easily contest it. Following up this last point, Study 2 shows that when the in-group legitimacy source is reliable and representative, high identifiers also seem forced to accept the in-group point of view, surrendering to the constraints of social reality. In this case, if high identifiers' aim is to pursue a social change but it is clear that most of the members accept the situation, maybe it is not possible to escape capitulation of the in-group. However, if they have no explicit information of how many members accept the discrimination, they can still believe that the internally legitimate message is not representative of the group and that many other in-group members would join them in the fight for social equality.

We also pointed to the relevance of the identity content when confronting in-group acceptance of the disadvantage. Specifically, in Study 3 we showed that high feminist identifiers contested the internal legitimacy of the disadvantage but that those who highly identified with women in general tended to accept the (pessimistic) in-group perspective. But, why do high identifiers, referring to the same group (i.e., women) engage in such different strategies to deal with the disadvantaged in-group situation?

Women and feminists seem to endorse distinct values, ideologies and thus the content of their identity is different for them. What seems correct for a traditional (British) woman might not be right for a typical (British) feminist. For the first, accepting the in-group norm even when it implies a potential threat for the in-group, would be the appropriate way of acting as it is consistent with traditional gender stereotypes. However, for a woman highly identified as a feminist, the goal would be to fight for women's rights, even when other women do not evaluate the situation as threatening or problematic.

This research also sheds new light of the relation between group identification and group efficacy. Recently, Van Zomeren, Leach and Spears (2010) showed that perceiving higher levels of group efficacy increases group identification through collective action tendencies. However, our results also suggest the opposite path, namely that group identification might increase (at least perceived) group efficacy. Individuals who highly identify with the in-group perceive higher levels of group efficacy and social support, thus high identifiers perceive the group more able to change the situation and contest the disadvantage, even under internally legitimate conditions. It could be that group identification predicts group efficacy because the former empowers low status individuals (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999).

Limitations and future lines of research

We should also acknowledge some limitations of our research. First of all, we have focused on disadvantaged groups that possess a certain type of stereotype related to the low status groups, namely high warmth but lower competence. It could this be that confront the justification of in-group disadvantage shown by high identifiers is confined to groups associated with this stereotypic profile. Although such groups may be more likely to be disadvantaged (this is the typical stereotypic profile of many lower status groups, after all) what would happen for disadvantaged groups that holds a different stereotype content (e.g., high competence, low warmth)? It could be that high identifiers of a high status group display different forms of coping with the internal legitimate message from the group (see (Jiménez-Moya, Spears, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2013; Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, 2013)

Furthermore, in the fictitious scenarios presented the groups involved were independent from each other in the sense that they did not need to work together. However, in society sometimes groups need to collaborate to achieve a common goal. In these situations in which a pleasant inter-group relation is desired, perhaps the disadvantaged high identifiers would prioritize the achievement of a shared goal instead of challenging for social change. They might also confront the inequality to a greater extent when their situation is already really hopeless compared to other groups (see Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006). More research is needed to address these questions, in order to study how different inter-group circumstances affect high identifiers' reactions when facing internal legitimacy.

In addition, future research should focus on the process that leads high identifiers to insist that the group is ready to challenge the discrimination, despite the discouraging message that comes from within. It would also be interesting to examine the goals of the high identifiers when contesting the group. It sounds logical that their aim is to improve the group's position, and that is why under more constrained circumstances (e.g., when a large section of the in-group accepts the discrimination or when more objective arguments support the disadvantage) they do not differ from low identifiers, as the chances of success are low. However, it also possible that the high identifiers' aim is just to express their values, influence third parties (Hornsey et al., 2006), or just to protect the in-group image, regardless its position in an inter-group context (note that in Study 1, high identifiers did not contest the in-group norm when it was legitimated with objective and external arguments which did not damage significantly the in-group's image).

Conclusion

We have shown how individuals do not always accept the in-group point of view when judging the legitimacy of their own discrimination. On the contrary, we found that when the in-group accepts its disadvantage as fair, high identifiers are more willing than low identifiers not only to contest the in-group norm, but also the prevailing social order to get a better position for the in-group. Under these circumstances, the differences found across four studies between high and low identifiers show how high identifiers

commit to the in-group even when the rest of the group seems to give it up by accepting the unfavourable situation. This phenomenon is observed in reality, when resistance movements start with a few activists who oppose the disadvantaged position, even if this implies contesting the in-group norm, until they get the overwhelming support of their group. Then, they could succeed in influencing the rest of the in-group to perceive the situation as unfair and will be able to fight together against the in-group discrimination. In short, turning internal legitimacy into illegitimacy is a central goal of high identifiers.

Chapter IV

By Any Means Necessary?
When and why low group identification
paradoxically predicts radical collective action

By any means necessary? When and why low group identification paradoxically predicts radical collective action

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Abstract

In this research we focus on the antecedents of radical collective action and evaluate findings from previous research on the "nothing to lose" hypothesis, showing that group efficacy negatively predicts radical actions (Tausch et al., 2011), and that group-based fear is a positive a predictor (Kamans, Spears, Otten, Gordijn, & Livingstone, 2013). Results from three studies confirm these predictions. Furthermore, we show that group identification, paradoxically, negatively predicts such radical group behaviour. High identifiers were less willing than low identifiers to endorse radical action, especially when the in-group legitimized the disadvantage. We argue that high identifiers are more aware of the fact that radical actions could damage the in-group's image, given that these actions are non-normative. However, low identifiers are less concerned about this issue.

Keywords: group identification, legitimacy, radical collective action, group efficacy, group-based fear.

Social inequalities seem to be ever present in our society and, although such inequalities are sometimes perpetuated, the members of the disadvantaged groups have also fought against them. The gender gap in salaries and job opportunities has narrowed, the gay movement has made clear progress in legalizing same-sex marriage, at least in many Western countries, and the *indignados* have called into question the current economic system and social inequality in general. But how do discriminated groups fight against such inequalities? Research shows many routes that individuals from discriminated groups can follow to deal with group disadvantage, ranging from individual mobility to group strategies (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). One of the most direct strategies to alter the social order is to engage in direct social competition, by means of collective action. Such actions are defined as acts aimed at improving the conditions of an entire group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990), and can take diverse forms, varying from normative and peaceful acts which are in line with general social norms (e.g., signing petitions, pacific demonstrations) to more radical and non-normative behaviors such as violent acts and terrorism (Wright, 1997). The present research is focused on the antecedents of radical action, given that this form of resistance has received far less attention (Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009).

Collective action can be seen as essential for social change but members of disadvantaged groups are not always prepared to take it as such action involves risks and costs (Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodríguez, & de Weerd, 2002; Olson, 1968; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This is especially true of radical action that is anti-normative and often illegal. Indeed, only relatively small numbers of people from disadvantaged groups participate in collective action (Rucht, 1994; Walsh & Warland, 1983). Therefore, the factors that explain when people will engage in collective action have been a frequent research question among researches (e.g., Blumer, 1939; Klandermans, 1997).

What leads to collective action?

Early work on collective action pointed out the relevance of objective factors (e.g., Davies, 1962; McCarthy & Zald, 1977), whereas later studies showed that the subjective perceptions of disadvantage are decisive in the way that individuals respond (e.g., Crosby, 1976; 1982; Folger, 1986; 1987; Walker & Smith, 2002), and suggested that

these perceptions do not always match the objective conditions (Major, 1994; Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, & Young, 1999) Recent research on collective action integrates the different approaches and explanatory mechanisms underlying support for collective action, and specifically those of illegitimacy, efficacy and social identity (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). The dual path model of van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach (2004) also provides an attempt to integrate such factors while taking into account the role of group-based emotions deriving from appraisals of illegitimacy (e.g., anger). This model provides a basis for our own analysis, although because this approach does not explicitly address the explanation of radical action this is no more than a starting point (cf. Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012).

The dual path model (Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008) describes two different and complementary paths than can lead to collective action: an emotion-focused coping and a problem-focused coping route. The emotion-focused coping route analyses the effects of group-based anger in motivating protest. It builds on inter-group emotion theory (IET, Smith, 1993), which proposes that when individuals categorize themselves as members of a group, the group-related events elicit group-based emotions and the action tendencies tied to them. This anger pathway is driven by an appraisal of the unfairness of the group's situation. In addition, the appraisal that other members of the group share one's opinion of the group situation (opinion social support) can further validate this evaluation and the resulting group-based anger (Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

In contrast, the problem-focused coping strategy is related to the resources available to act (e.g., group strength, efficacy). Perceptions of group efficacy refer to the extent to which the group is capable of solving the disadvantage by joint group efforts, and it is influenced by action social support, which relates to the perceived readiness of fellow group members' to engage in collective action.

The dual path model (Van Zomeren, Postmes et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2004) establishes that both group-based anger and group efficacy positively predict moderate (normative) collective action. However, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) showed that although support for moderate and radical action are two correlated factors, they are relatively independent, suggesting that they are driven by a different set of concerns and appraisals. In particular Tausch and colleagues (2011) showed that, in general, group

efficacy was *negatively* related to support for radical collective action (i.e., in contrast to the positive relation for moderate action). This negative link suggests that the engagement in radical action takes place when individuals perceive that the group is not powerful enough to solve the injustice by other means. In line with this argument, it has been shown that low status groups support extreme actions when their disadvantaged position is stable rather than unstable (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Spears, Scheepers, Van Zomeren, Tausch, & Gooch, 2013). This has been conceptualized as a *nothing to lose* strategy that occurs under the most desperate circumstances, given that there is nothing left to lose as the situation is unlikely to change by doing nothing. These findings show that relatively high levels of group efficacy are not always necessary to motivate collective action. Under desperate circumstances (i.e., low status, disadvantaged positions) the group efficacy route seems to work in the opposite direction, as individuals are willing to support radical action, even when the appraised group efficacy is low. Nevertheless, the effects found by Tausch and colleagues (2011) were not as strong or reliable across studies as the more consistently positive link between efficacy and moderate collective action. Therefore one of the aims of this paper is to further test and replicate the negative relation between group efficacy and radical collective action for disadvantaged groups.

In addition, Tausch et al. (2011) suggest that specific emotions predict diverse types of collective action. Specifically, while group-based anger experienced was a better predictor of moderate actions, group-based contempt positively predicted radical action tendencies. In the present research we examine the role of another emotion, namely group-based fear. We propose that group-based fear could also lead individuals to support radical collective action, and some recent research by Kamans and colleagues (2013) seems to support this possibility. Fear is experienced when confronting a situation that is not controllable and so may be similar to the experience of having low levels of group efficacy (i.e., insufficient coping resources). Although fear generally leads to avoidance and escape action tendencies (Blanchard, Hynd, Minke, Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001; Epstein, 1972), threat responses can comprise a combination of avoidance (flight) and attack (fight) (e.g., Blanchard & Blanchard, 1988; Griskevicius et al., 2009; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003). Therefore, we argue

that in a threatening inter-group context, group-based fear could lead to support for radical action.

The role of group identification

Research shows that the level of group identification predicts the participation in moderate collective action (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren, Postmes et al., 2008) and that individuals less committed to the group are less likely to undertake such actions (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). However, all this previous research to our knowledge has been focused on the prediction of *moderate or normative* collective action. A key and novel focus of the current paper is therefore to consider how group identification might predict more radical collective action, or moderate other key predictors of such action.

Our previous work show that group identification positively predicts support for moderate collective action especially under conditions of *internal legitimacy*, that is, when the in-group legitimizes the disadvantage (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, Spears, & de Lemus, 2013). One question for the present research then is whether the relation between group identification and support for radical action replicates this earlier finding or whether the relationship is different. Given the finding that the relationship between group efficacy and collective action reverses for radical compared to moderate action (cf. Tausch et al., 2011), this prediction might also not be obvious or straightforward.

On the one hand, extrapolating from previous research (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Van Zomeren, Postmes et al., 2008), we could predict that high identifiers will be more prone than low identifiers to support radical action (as they do moderate normative action), as this is, after all, designed to advance group interests. In line with our previous work, this effect could be especially strong under internal legitimate conditions (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013) given that circumstances where the in-group accepts its inferiority are those in which the group is most in need, and high identifiers are the most sensitive to the group's problems. Therefore, in these internal legitimate situations high identifiers might be the ones most aware that the in-group situation needs to be addressed.

On the other hand, it could be the case that low identifiers will be more likely to endorse radical action than high identifiers, given that the nothing to lose strategies have been related to the efficacy route (Kamans et al., 2013) and previous research suggests that low identifiers are precisely more sensitive to this route when it comes to moderate action (see Van Zomeren, Postmes et al., 2008). Moreover, assuming that high identifiers are motivated to protect the in-group's image, it may be particularly important for them to maintain a positive conception of the group in the eyes of others, but also of themselves (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Supporting radical collective action might damage the in-group reputation given that such behaviors typically transgress socially accepted rules and norms. Therefore, similar to what happens when high status groups avoid radical action because this could undermine their prestige (Kamans et al., 2013), the high identifiers who are concerned about the image of the group, may well have *something to lose* when taking radical action, because the group could be accused of extremism or immorality.

An important point here is that we should not assume people who identify strongly are necessarily more radical *per se*. For example, in political parties moderate and mainstream factions with the left or right wing parties can be embarrassed by what they conceive as extremist postures within their parties, undermining their image to the broader electorate, and the prospects of electoral success. Thus taking extreme actions that are seen as unacceptable by the rest of society could harm the group image. This may be particularly the case when the in-group does not even contest the disadvantage (i.e., internal legitimacy), implying little support and even in-group disapproval of radical collective action. However, because they are by definition less invested in the group, low identifiers should be less affected by these concerns, thus they might be more willing to take radical action. Based on these theoretical arguments we could alternatively predict that, compared to low identifiers, high identifiers will be less willing to take radical action against group disadvantage, especially if the in-group legitimizes the discrimination. Because the effect of identification can be argued either way, we leave this issue open for empirical test in the first instance.

The current research

To summarize, in the present work we try to replicate the negative effect of group efficacy on support for radical collective action previously demonstrated by Tausch et al. (2011). In addition, we test the idea that group-based fear positively predicts radical action (cf. Kamans et al., 2013). To this end, we adapt the dual path model (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) by introducing group-based fear as a predictor of radical action alongside anger. Further, we examine the role of group identification in the endorsement of radical actions with both positive and negative relations to radical action possible. We also distinguish between *external legitimacy*, related to an out-group justification of the in-group's disadvantage*,* and *internal legitimacy*, which refers to the in-group's endorsement of its own disadvantage (Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010, see also Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013). In this work, we are focused on internal legitimacy effects, as our previous work shows that this factor has more relevant consequences on individuals' reactions towards in-group disadvantage (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013).

These predictions were tested with two different intergroup contexts. We developed two fictitious scenarios in which the in-group held disadvantaged positions compared to an out-group. We manipulated internal legitimacy and measured group identification, group efficacy, group-based emotions and collective action. Although this research is primarily concerned with the explanation of radical action, we also report the effects of support for moderate collective action, reported in a separate paper for comparative purposes (see Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013). Given that the studies described were aimed at answering other research questions (see Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013), in the three studies presented we also manipulated the arguments on which the internal legitimacy was based, which is of less theoretical relevance here (i.e., the content and size of samples pertaining to internal legitimacy and whether the in-group depended on an out-group, respectively in studies 1, 2 and 3). However, we argue that these factors could also become relevant when it comes to radical collective action and may interact with the internal legitimacy factor, as shown in our previous work (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013).

Study 1

Study 1 is the same as Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al. (2013, Study 1) but here focuses on measures pertaining to support for radical collective action. This study created a disadvantaged in-group situation, in which the in-group (Andalusia) received less economic subsidy than other Spanish regions. We manipulated internal legitimacy (legitimate vs. illegitimate) and the type of arguments used to support the in-group disadvantage. These manipulations were carried out for reasons related to the aim of another paper (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013), where we expected that different types of justifying arguments (based on economic or stereotypic reasons) would have different effects. Specifically, arguments related to the group identity (i.e., in-group stereotype) could be more threatening (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) as they imply that the group deserves the unfavourable position because of the way they are. However, justifications of the in-group disadvantage based on more objective situational factors that are not related to the in-group identity (i.e., economic/financial arguments), could be less threatening for those who identify highly with the group. In addition, the arguments based on objective factors should be more constraining, thus more difficult to contest. Therefore, in this study we explore the effect of the type of arguments that justify the disadvantage shown in previous research (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013), and test for the predicted effect of group identification and group-based fear on support for radical action.

Design and Procedure

Participants were 103 Andalusian undergraduates (55 women; mean age 20.73), who received course credit for their participation and were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in a 2 (Economic legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) x 2 (Stereotypic legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) between participants factorial design. We maintained external legitimacy (Castellano-Manchego's view towards the in-group disadvantage) constant across conditions and manipulated internal legitimacy, namely whether the in-group justified (legitimate condition) or not (illegitimate condition) its own disadvantage. Further, we manipulated the types of arguments used by the in-

group to justify (or reject) the disadvantage, namely economic vs. stereotypic arguments.

We measured *group identification, group efficacy* and the *approval of moderate collective action* (for further details see Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013, Study 1). In addition, we measured the *approval of radical action* with five items (α = .80, e.g., *I would approve other Andalusians blackmailing member of the Government who endorses the current economic allocation*). To measure group-based emotions, participants were presented twice with a list of ten emotions and answered how they felt when reading that the other Andalusians justified the in-group disadvantage based on either/both economic and stereotypic arguments (i.e., *How do you feel regarding the fact that some Andalusians justify the inequality based on economic/stereotypic arguments?*). To check our hypothesis, we created two emotion factors, namely anger (*α* = .76, i.e., I feel irritated, angry, displeased), and fear (*α* = .74, i.e., I feel scared, afraid, inferior).

Results

Path model analyses[1]

A path analysis was performed with AMOS 19.0 statistical software to model the relationship between the main variables as based on the dual path model (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) (see Figure 1). Results obtained showed that group efficacy positively predicted group-based anger, (B = .27, p = .004), and the approval of moderate collective action, (B = .46, p <.001). In line with Tausch and colleagues (2011) the model also showed a negative relation between group efficacy and the approval of radical action, (B = -.26, p = .004). We also found the expected relation between group-based fear and the willingness to approve radical action aimed at stopping the disadvantage, (B = .28, p = .002), showing that the fear experienced positively predicted radical action.

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[1] We found similar effects including in the analysis the emotions elicited by the stereotypic justifications of the disadvantage and the ones related to the economic justifications. However, data reported refers to the first set of emotions, as the adequacy of the fit was more appropriate in this case.

Figure 1. Model proposed for the variables of interest in Study 1

χ^2 = 5,948, df = 4, p = .240; χ^2/df = 1.375; $RMSEA$ = .060 ($PCLOSE$ = .362), CFI = .970, NFI = .922.
**p < .01. ***p < .001.

Group identification and internal legitimacy effects

In order to check for effects regarding the influence of the type of justification (economic vs. stereotypic) for the internal legitimacy, and in-group identification on the inclination to take radical action, a MANOVA with economic and stereotypic legitimacy as factors and group identification as a (centered) continuous predictor was conducted on radical collective action. Analysis showed just a *negative* effect of group identification on the approval of radical action, F (1, 94) = 5.63, p = .02, η^2 = .06.

Discussion

Results were in line with the dual path model (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) and the findings by Tausch and colleagues (2011), given that group efficacy was positively related to moderate collective action, but negatively predicted the radical action. This supports the nothing to lose hypothesis (Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2013): when participants perceive that the in-group will not be able to successfully fight the discrimination by conventional means, support for radical forms of collective behavior increases. Group efficacy positively affected group-based anger, which had no significant effect on moderate actions. More importantly, we found that group-based fear

positively predicted support for radical collective action. This result confirms our hypothesis that the experience of fear would lead individuals to endorse more radical forms of action (see also Kamans et al., 2013).

Our results showed that group identification *negatively* predicted the approval of radical action. Therefore, those who identify with the group to a lesser extent were more willing to endorse radical action than did high identifiers. We had argued that such extreme behaviors could damage the in-group image, an issue with which high identifiers are typically more concerned. Therefore, the high identifiers motivation to improve the in-group situation at all costs seems to be overridden by the concern to protect its image, and perhaps pursue change by more moderate means (see Figure 1 and Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013). However, we did not find any effect of our legitimacy manipulation on radical collective action. This is perhaps not so surprising: because these manipulations relate to the rationale for a study designed for other purposes, participants probably did not perceive the in-group justifications of the disadvantage as relevant to radical collective action. In the next study, also derived from Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al. (2013), in which we manipulated the sample reliability of the legitimacy feedback, we make a stronger a priori case that these manipulations could affect the relation between identification and radical action, while at the same time testing for the same effect as in the previous study.

Study 2

In Study 2, we introduced a new factor that could affect the effects of internal legitimacy, namely the sample size that endorses the legitimacy perspective towards their disadvantage. Individuals are aware that they can make more trustworthy predictions from larger samples (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986) and the relevance of the sample size information in generalization and stereotyping processes has also been established (e.g., Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995). Building on the negative effect of group identification on radical action found in Study 1, we argue that if a large section of the in-group frames the disadvantage as deserved, by making the sample more reliable and representative, high identifiers may well be more reluctant than low identifiers to support radical action that could negatively reflect on the in-group's image. Note that this effect is different to the relation between group identification and moderate

collective action under conditions of internal legitimacy (cf. Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013) but the crucial difference here is that radical action could be seen as risky and damaging to the in-group image and interests. On this basis, we expect that group identification may have the negative effect on support for radical action found in Study 1, but primarily where the in-group sample supporting their disadvantage (i.e., internal legitimacy) is large and constraining, rendering radical action particularly problematic for the group image.

This study is the same as Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al. (2013, Study 2) but now primarily focusing on the measures related to support for radical action. Like in Study 1, the in-group (Andalusia) received less economic resources than other Spanish regions.

Design and Procedure

Participants were 73 Andalusian undergraduates (50 women; mean age 22.92), who received course credit for their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in a 2 (Sample size: large vs. small) x 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) between participants factorial design. We maintained external legitimacy constant and manipulated the sample size of the in-group, and internal legitimacy (based on stereotypic arguments). Specifically, in the large sample condition, participants were told that the internal legitimacy appraisal came from a large in-group sample, while in the small sample size condition the in-group sample was smaller. Internal legitimacy was manipulated as in Study 1.

We checked the effectiveness of our manipulations and measure group identification, group efficacy and the approval of moderate collective actions (for further details see Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013, Study 2). We measure the approval of radical collective actions as in Study 1 (α = .84), and used the same items to test the *willingness to take radical action* (α = .90). Participants also rated 16 emotions regarding how they felt towards the fact that other in-group members legitimized (or not) the in-group disadvantage (i.e., *How do you feel when reading that other Andalusians justify/do not justify the current economic allocation?*). As Study 1, we created two factors namely anger (α = .91) and fear (α = .80).

Results

Manipulation checks

To check the effects of our manipulations, we ran a 2 (Sample size: large vs. small) x 2 (legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) ANOVA on the legitimacy check. Results showed a main effect of legitimacy, $F(1, 69) = 238.63$, $p < .001$, indicating that participants in the legitimate conditions perceived that the in-group members framed the situation described as fairer ($M = 6.03$) than participants in the illegitimate conditions ($M = 1.44$). We ran the same analysis on the sample size check. The main effect found, $F(1, 69) = 31.90$, $p < 0.01$, showed that participants in the large sample size conditions perceived the sample size larger ($M = 4.05$) than participants in the small sample conditions ($M = 1.58$).

Path model analyses

As in Study 1, a path analysis was performed with AMOS 19.0 statistical software, based on the dual path model (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). In line with previous research (e.g., Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999), results showed that internal legitimacy negatively predicted group-based anger ($B = -.35$, $p = .002$). In addition, and in line with the results of Study 1, group efficacy tended to predict group-based anger, ($B = .16$, $p = .098$), and the approval of moderate collective action[2] ($B = .20$, $p = 08$). In this case, there was no significant effect of group efficacy on the approval of radical action. However, in line with our predictions, we found an effect of group-based fear on the willingness to approve radical action aimed at stopping the disadvantage, ($B = .37$, $p = .001$).

Group identification and internal legitimacy effects

In order to test our predictions regarding the effects of sample size, legitimacy and group identification on the willingness to take part in radical collective action, we ran a MANOVA with sample size and legitimacy as factors and group identification as a centered continuous predictor, on the two measures for radical collective action. Analysis showed a significant interaction between legitimacy and sample size, and a 3-way interaction of Legitimacy x Sample size x Group identification ($\lambda = .84$, $F(2, 64)$

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[2] In studies 2 and 3 results for the path analyses were similar when replacing the participants' approval of radical action with their willingness to take radical collective action.

=6.05, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .16$; $\lambda = .83$, $F (2, 64) = 6.38$, $p = .003$, $\eta^2 = .17$. Univariate effects are described below.

Figure 2. Model proposed for the variables of interest in Study 2

$\chi^2 = 5,096$, $df = 4$, $p = .278$; $\chi^2/df = 1.274$; $RMSEA = .062$ ($PCLOSE = .366$), $CFI = .974$, $NFI = .91$.
$^\dagger p <.10$. $^{**}p < .01$.

We found a two-way interaction between sample size and legitimacy on the approval and willingness to take radical action ($F (1, 65) = 12.19.$, $p < .001$; $F (1, 65) = 6.65$, $p = .012$, respectively). Although results from simple effects analysis were not significant, participants tended to approve, and be willing to engage in radical collective actions most under internal illegitimate circumstances.

We also found a three-way interaction, Sample size x Legitimacy x Group identification on both radical action measures ($F (1, 65) = 12.85$, $p = 001$; $F (1, 65) = 7.10$, $p= .01$; respectively). In order to further analyze this result, we split the data by the legitimacy factor. In the legitimate conditions, a two-way interaction between sample size and group identification emerged ($F (1, 35) = 6.29$, $p = .017$; $F (1, 35) = 8.19$, $p=.007$). Under legitimate conditions, simple slopes analyses showed that group identification negatively predicted the approval and the willingness to participate in radical collective action when the sample was large ($\beta = -.67$, $t(35) = -3.81$; $p=.001$; $\beta = -.73$, $t(35) = -4.30$; $p <.001$; respectively). This effect was not significant when the legitimate message came

from a small in-group sample. Therefore, high identifiers rejected radical action when a large sample of the group showed its acceptance of the disadvantaged situation (internal legitimacy). Further, in the illegitimate conditions, we also found a two-way interaction of sample size and group identification on the approval of radical action, F (1, 30) = 7.59, p = .01. This interaction showed that identification negatively predicted the approval of radical collective action when just a small in-group sample rejected the disadvantage, β = -.48, t(30) = -2.06; p =.048. In the large sample condition, we found a marginal effect of identification in the opposite direction, β = .42, t(30) = 1.83; p =.077.

Table 1. Means, standard deviations and effects of group identification per condition in Study 2

	Large Sample		Small Sample	
	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy
Intention to approve radical CA	2.06	2.29	1.85	2.00
	(1.83)	(2.32)	(1.26)	(1.77)
	-.65**	.37	.08	-.55*
Intention to take radical CA	1.1	1.98	1.33	1.7
	(1.69)	(2.26)	(.93)	(1.84)
	-.67**	.31	.11	-.17

Note. Standard deviation between brackets

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Discussion

We did not find the expected negative relation between group efficacy and radical action, although as reported also in Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al. (2013) this factor positively predicted moderate action, in line with the previous literature (Van Zomeren, Postmes et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). More relevant here, group-based fear emerged as predictor of radical action, as we proposed.

In general, participants tended to endorse radical action more under internal illegitimate circumstances (i.e., where there is more in-group support for this) and when, in addition, this illegitimate perspective came from a large in-group sample. Further, the relation between the legitimacy and the size of its source was qualified by group identification. Specifically, and in line with Study 1 and our predictions, results indicated that high identifiers endorsed radical collective action to a lesser extent than low

identifiers, especially when a large in-group sample accepted and legitimized the disadvantage (and a similar pattern was obtained when a small in-group sample perceived the situation as illegitimate). Said differently, without in-group support, high identifiers did not dare to support action that could be perceived as inappropriate, especially by the in-group. By contrast, those participants who had lower levels of identification were more prone to endorse radical action, regardless of the in-group legitimacy perspective on the disadvantage. Interestingly, when a large in-group sample framed the disadvantage as illegitimate, the relation between group identification and radical action reversed, from negative to positive. Although this effect is only a trend, it might show that radical action could become acceptable, even for high identifiers, when there is clear in-group consensus on the perceived injustice.

The aim of Study 3 is to examine further the predictors or radical collective action, and the role of group identification in another study, in which we also manipulate the power relation between of the disadvantaged and the advantaged group.

Study 3

Disadvantaged groups often depend on higher status groups, which can have more power and control over their resources. Previous work shows that precisely the most disempowered and disadvantaged groups are the ones who respond by means of offensive actions, especially when they are provoked (Kamans et al., 2013; Tausch et al., 2011). In particular, low power/low status groups exhibit a greater tendency to act antagonistically, compared to low power/high status groups (Kamans et al., 2013). The rationale here is that in this case the disadvantaged group still has *something to lose* (i.e., status, prestige), so they will be less likely to endorse a nothing-to-lose strategy. Following this rationale, we think that as a form of power relation, the level of dependency on a higher status group might be a factor that affects the process by which disadvantaged groups can challenge the *status quo*. Therefore, in Study 3 we examined the role of dependency/power on the willingness to support radical collective action in order to challenge the disadvantage. We maintained constant low in-group status and manipulated a type of power that a group can have over another. Specifically we manipulated the outcome dependency of the disadvantaged group on the advantaged out-group.

Our rationale is that if a group is dependent on another group, the situation will be more threatening and desperate than when there is no dependency between the groups, which might lead to nothing to lose strategies (Scheepers et al., 2006). Under dependency conditions individuals might perceive the in-group as less able to fight the disadvantage by conventional means, given that they depend on an out-group, making them more likely to resort to radical action (cf. Tausch et al., 2011). Thus we expect that radical collective action will become relatively more acceptable under dependency conditions, as these are the most desperate circumstances. In these more threatening conditions, even high identifiers might consider the idea of endorsing radical action to challenge the inequality. Therefore, in this case we predict fewer differences between high and low identifiers under dependency conditions. However, when the group is not dependent regarding its outcomes, the prospect is less negative (the group is disadvantaged, but it still has power over its outcomes), and high identifiers will still have *something to lose*, reputation-wise (Kamans et al., 2013) by taking radical action. Thus, we expect that, particularly in the non-dependency conditions, high identifiers will show less endorsement of radical action than low identifiers.

Design and Procedure

Participants were 117 Psychology students (97 women; mean age 18.80) at the University of Granada (UGR), who received course credits for their participation. They were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions in a 2 (Dependency: dependency vs. non-dependency) x 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) factorial design. We created a fictitious scenario regarding the UGR's annual investments for each faculty, and manipulated the in-group dependency on the out-group. Specifically, in the dependency condition, both Psychology and Medicine students (i.e., together the health sciences) were in charge of deciding how to invest the money that was exclusively designated for Psychology students from the UGR. Because the medical faculty is bigger than Psychology this rendered Psychology dependent on the power of the Medical students who could outvote them in terms of how the money was allocated (and against the Psychology students interest for a conference on potential future careers for health science students). By contrast, in the non-dependency conditions only Psychology students themselves decided how they would invest their funding. As in previous

studies, we created a disadvantaged in-group situation namely that Psychology students had received a smaller investment than Medicine students. Once again we maintained constant external legitimacy (the Medicine students' perspective) and manipulated whether Psychology students legitimized (internal legitimacy) or not (internal illegitimacy) the disadvantage using stereotypical reasons, based on the Psychology students stereotype, which was pre-tested prior to running study (N = 23).

To check our manipulations, participants rated on a scale from 1 to7 to what extent they agreed (totally disagree/totally agree) with the fact that Psychology students were independent from other students when deciding about their funding (two items, r = .93); and whether they accepted their disadvantaged situation.

Dependent variables were measured with the same scales as in the previous studies. We used the same items as in Study 2 to measure group identification (α = .87), group efficacy (α = .95), the willingness to approve moderate and radical action (α = .85; α = .64, respectively), and participants' readiness to participate in both types of action (α = .88; α = .72, for moderate and radical action respectively). Participants rated sixteen emotions regarding how they felt towards the disadvantage itself (i.e., *How do you feel regarding the unequal economic allocation made by the UGR?).* Note that in this case, participants' emotions were not related to other members' justifications of the disadvantage, but to the disadvantaged situation *per se*. In order to test our predictions, we created anger (α = .82) and fear measures (α = .70).

Results

Manipulation checks

To test the effect of our manipulations, we ran a 2 (Dependency: dependency vs. non-dependency) x 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) ANOVA, including as dependent variable the average of the two dependency checks. Analysis showed a main effect of dependency, F (1, 109) = 321.35, p < .001, revealing that participants in the non-dependency conditions perceived that the in-group was more independent on the out-group (M = 6.38), than participants in the dependency conditions (M = 2.11). We ran the same analysis on the legitimacy check, finding a main effect of legitimacy, F (1, 110) = 442.88, p < 001, that confirmed the effectiveness of our manipulation. Participants in

the legitimate condition reported that the in-group framed the disadvantage as just to a greater extent, (M = 6.17) than participants in the illegitimate condition (M = 1.49).

Path model analyses

A path analysis was performed with AMOS 19.0 statistical software based on the dual path model. Analyses showed that internal legitimacy negatively predicted group efficacy (B= -.22, p =.02). In addition, replicating the results in Study 1 and 2, group efficacy predicted group-based anger, (B = .30, p < .001), and the approval of moderate collective action (B= .21, p = .009). Furthermore, replicating Tausch et al. (2011) findings and Study 1, group efficacy negatively predicted the willingness to approve radical action (B= -.33, p < .001). We also found a positive effect of group-based anger on moderate action (B = .47, p < .001), and, as predicted, an effect of group-based fear on radical action (B = .18, p = .04).

Figure 3. Model proposed for the variables of interest in Study 3

χ^2 = 2, 578, df = 4, p = .631; χ^2/df = .644; $RMSEA$ = .0 ($PCLOSE$ = .741), CFI = 1, NFI = .97.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Group identification and internal legitimacy effects

To test the effect of the manipulations on the support of radical collective action, a MANOVA with dependency and legitimacy as factors and with group identification as a

centered continuous predictor was conducted on the willingness to approve and engage in radical action. Wilks' Lambda showed a main effect of identification, λ = .94, F (2, 104) =3.33, p = .04, η^2 = .06. Analysis did not show any significant effect on the willingness to approve radical action, but it did show significant results on the willingness to take part in radical action. Specifically, we found a main effect of group identification, F (1,105) = 6.43, p = .01, on this factor, indicating that the level of identification *negatively* predicted the willingness to take radical action. We also found a marginal two-way interaction between the factors manipulated, dependency and legitimacy, F (1,105) = 3.58, p = .06. Although we found no significant differences in the non-dependency condition, simple effects analysis showed that in the dependency situation, participants under an illegitimate in-group perspective were more willing to engage in radical collective action (M = 1.52) than individuals in the legitimate condition (M = 1.22).

Table 2. Means, standard deviations and effects of group identification per condition in Study 3

	Dependency		Non-Dependency	
	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy
Intention to approve radical CA	1.85	2.01	1.77	1.54
	(1.15)	(1.26)	(.93)	(.76)
	.12	-.24	-.35*	-.61**
Intention to take radical CA	1.22	1.52	1.27	1.13
	(.67)	(1.06)	(.71)	(.52)
	.18	-.32†	-.46**	.72***

Note. Standard deviation between brackets
$^{\dagger}p$ <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Furthermore, analysis also showed a marginal two-way interaction, Dependency x Group identification, F (1,105) = 3.64, p = .06. Simple slopes analysis showed a marginal negative effect of identification in the dependency condition which was significant in the non-dependency condition (β = -.26, t (105) = -1.90; p = .06; β = -.40, t (105) = -3.34; p = .001, respectively). This indicated that low identifiers were more willing than high identifiers to engage in radical action, but that this effect was stronger under non-dependency conditions. This interaction was further qualified by the legitimacy factor, as analysis showed a three-way interaction Dependency x Legitimacy x Identification, F

(1,105) = 4.02, *p* = .05. We split the data by the dependency factor and we found that under dependency conditions the high identifiers were less willing than the low ones to take radical action, when the in-group rejected the disadvantage, (β = -.31, t (25) = -2.08; *p* = .04). There was no effect of identification in the legitimate conditions. In addition, in the non-dependency conditions, the level of group identification negatively predicted willingness to engage in radical action, albeit more strongly in the legitimate than in the illegitimate condition, (β = -.77, t (53) = -3.32; *p* = .002; β = -.46, t (53) = -3.54; *p* = .001, respectively). Therefore, in the non-dependency conditions those who identify with the group to a lesser extent were more willing to endorse engagement in radical collective action than high identifiers, especially when the in-group saw the disadvantage as legitimate.

Discussion

Results confirmed again the negative relation between group efficacy and radical action. Importantly, fear positively predicted radical action. Both results give strength to Study 1 and 2 and previous literature.

In addition, this study shows that the dependency on an out-group interacts with the internal legitimacy factor and group identification when confronting a disadvantage by means of radical actions. Specifically, we found that participants were more prone to support radical action when the in-group conceived its own disadvantage as unfair and at the same time were in a low power position, as they depended on an out-group to make relevant decisions. Given that the group outcomes depend on an out-group, the situation seems to be desperate enough to adopt radical action, and importantly, this is reinforced by the fact that the situation is clearly perceived as illegitimate by the own in-group.

Low identifiers were, in general, more willing than the high identifiers to participate in radical action challenging the in-group disadvantage, but the difference was larger under non-dependency conditions, when the in-group was independent and able to take its own decisions. In this less threatening situation it could be argued that high identifiers had something to lose (cf. Kamans et al., 2013), as acting radically might not be necessary and it could harm the in-group image. Therefore, in line with the results of studies 1 and 2 and our predictions, group identification was negatively related to

radical action. Consistent with this, the three-way interaction found shows that low identifiers were more willing to take radical action than high identifiers almost in every condition, except for the condition where the in-group depended on the out-group and legitimized the disadvantage. Thus, only under the most constraining circumstances they showed no differences with high identifiers. This might suggest that only in this case do low identifiers assume that resistance to the disadvantage is futile.

To sum up, in line with our hypothesis this study shows how those individuals who identify to a lesser extent with the in-group are, paradoxically perhaps, more in favor of taking radical collective action. Further, the dependency on the out-group and the internal legitimacy of the situation affects this effect, showing that the differences between low and high identifiers are reduced when the in-group depended on the out-group and accepted the disadvantage as deserved.

Additional studies

In a further study, German students studying at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands) were presented as the disadvantaged group (for further details of this study, see Jiménez-Moya, Spears, & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2013). In this case, we only manipulated internal legitimacy and measure the dependent variables used in the previous studies. However, group identification was measure with a hierarchical multicomponent scale (Leach et al., 2008) composed by five factors. Results showed that the homogeneity component of group identification (r = .84, e.g., *German students have a lot in common with each other*) negatively predicted the willingness to take radical action, F (1,125) = 5.03, p = .03. This result is in line with our previous findings and show that high identifiers are less willing than low identifiers to participate in radical action when the in-group legitimizes the disadvantage. However this finding was not replicated in a different study in which we created artificial groups. In this case we manipulated instead of measuring group identification (for further details see Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013) and internal legitimacy. None of our manipulations showed significant effects on radical actions tendencies.

General Discussion

In this research we replicated previous findings that showed group efficacy to be a negative predictor of radical action (Tausch et al., 2011). Study 1 and 3 replicated these results, suggesting that the problem-focused route of collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) works in the opposite direction when it comes to radical action, as we show that precisely when individuals perceive reduced ability to contest the situation, the support for radical action increases. This result is in line with the nothing to lose effect that shows that individuals are willing to adopt more extreme methods under more hopeless circumstances (Scheepers et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2013).

Further, we also show that group-based fear is related to the endorsement of radical collective action (cf. Kamans et al., 2013). Specifically, in the three studies group-based fear led to the endorsement of radical ways of fighting the in-group disadvantage. These results are similar to those found in an as yet unpublished study by Kamans et al. (2013), and are among the first to show the role of fear as a predictor of radical action.

In perhaps the most novel aspect of the current research we tested the effect of group identification and internal legitimacy on radical actions. We found that those members who identify with the in-group less strongly were (paradoxically perhaps) more willing to endorse radical action than high identifiers. One explanation for this is that extreme actions could damage the in-group social image, as they reflect less socially acceptable forms of behavior. We argue that for this reason, high identifiers, who are more committed to the group and more concerned about its standing, have *something to lose* when taking radical action. Consequently they seem less willing to support this anti-normative type of group behavior. One reason we did not find similar results with a minimal group may be because members of such groups are less likely to concern about the in-group image (the group will typically be less central or important to all group members, see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997), and thus the something to lose motivation will also be weaker. Nevertheless, it seems that the low identifiers' support for radical action have also some limitations as there were no effects of identification under the more constraining situations, when the in-group is least likely to succeed (Study 2 and 3).

The tendency of high identifiers to avoid radical action more than low identifiers is moderated by several factors. First, the in-group view towards the disadvantage plays a role here: under internal illegitimate conditions, there was no significant effect between low and high identifiers. Nevertheless, when the in-group clearly justified and legitimized the disadvantage, high identifiers were less willing than low identifiers to endorse radical action. Interestingly, this effect of identification was found when a large and thus reliable sample of the in-group agreed with the fact that the disadvantage was fair and deserved, but disappeared when the justifying message came only from a small and less reliable sample of in-group members. Therefore, we could say that when the in-group frames the disadvantage as legitimate, high identifiers seem to be more reluctant to go against the in-group and support radical action, whereas low identifiers, who are less bound by in-group norms and group image concerns, have no such compunction and support the radical action.

However, we have also shown that high identifiers might endorse radical actions under certain circumstances. For instance, we found a positive trend among the high identifiers to support radical actions when a large in-group sample showed its discontent towards the disadvantaged position (Study 2), thus where they clearly can rely on the in-group support. In addition, we found that the differences between low and high identifiers were reduced when the in-group has a low power position. This finding reinforces the nothing to lose effect (Scheepers et al., 2006) showing that even the high identifiers may support more extreme strategies under more desperate and hopeless circumstances.

In general, this work once again shows the importance of internal legitimacy (cf. Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013) . Specifically, when the in-group accepted and justified its disadvantage, high identifiers were less willing than low identifiers to endorse radical action aimed at challenging the inequality. However, our previous research (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013) shows that these high identifiers act in the opposite direction when it comes to more accepted ways of contesting the disadvantage. Specifically, under internal legitimate conditions high identifiers were more likely than low identifiers to endorse moderate forms of collective action. Taken together, this shows that the effect of the in-group legitimacy appraisals on the high

identifiers' reactions depends to a great extent on the chosen method for fighting the disadvantage.

Conclusion

This work shows group efficacy is negatively related to radical action and that group-based fear leads to the endorsement of these extreme actions when fighting for a better situation for the group. Further, those individuals who highly identify with a group are more reluctant than low identifiers to endorse radical action aimed at fighting the disadvantaged situation. This is especially evident under circumstances in which the in-group legitimizes the disadvantage and when the situation is not desperate enough to justify extreme action. We should appreciate also that these people were also given the option to consider more moderate and normative forms of collective action (see also Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón et al., 2013). However, high identifiers might become more willing to approve such a radical action when the group situation becomes more hopeless, and/or when the in-group clearly frames the disadvantage as illegitimate and underserved. We argue that this happens because high identifiers are presumably more interested in protecting the in-group image in the eyes of others and therefore only risk taking such actions under more ideal circumstances.

Taken together, these results show that lower levels of group efficacy, experiencing group-based fear and identifying less with a group predicts the endorsement of radical collective action. Therefore, individuals will fight against social disadvantages by any means necessary but paradoxically those less invested in the group may be more likely to support radical forms of resistance.

Chapter V

Dealing With Powerlessness:
The strategic use of in–group stereotypes

Dealing with powerlessness:

The strategic use of in-group stereotypes

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Abstract

Several studies have shown the impact of legitimacy on dealing with group power disadvantage. In the present paper we focus on the impact of internal legitimacy (i.e., the in-group's appraisal of the fairness of its own powerless position) on the in-group stereotype as a way of contesting the power disadvantage. Results show that especially in the internal legitimate conditions (i.e., when the in-group seems to accept the low status position), participants reacted by way of overemphasizing the positive stereotypic dimension (warmth, Study 1), or contradicting the negative in-group stereotype (perceiving the in-group as less incompetent, Study 1 and 2). The last strategy was used especially by those highly identified with the in-group, and when the legitimate/illegitimate argument is supported by a small in-group sample (i.e., low social constraint, Study 2). Such responses can be understood as a social creativity strategy to contest the in-group's disadvantaged and powerless position.

Keywords: in-group stereotype, internal legitimacy, power, status.

Resumen

Diversos estudios han mostrado la importancia de la percepción de legitimidad ante situaciones de bajo poder endogrupal. En el presente trabajo nos centramos en el impacto de la legitimidad interna (referida al punto de vista de los miembros del endogrupo sobre su propia posición de bajo poder), sobre el estereotipo del endogrupo como un medio que puede ser utilizado por los miembros del grupo para rechazar la situación de bajo poder de éste. Los resultados muestran que, especialmente ante condiciones de legitimidad interna (cuando los miembros del endogrupo aceptan y justifican la situación de bajo poder), los participantes destacan la dimensión positiva del estereotipo (i.e., sociabilidad, en el Estudio 1), o rechazan el estereotipo negativo del endogrupo (percibiendo al endogrupo como menos incompetente, Estudios 1 y 2). Esta última estrategia es utilizada sobre todo por los participantes con un alto grado de identificación con el grupo y cuando solo una pequeña parte del endogrupo percibe como legítima o ilegítima la discriminación que sufre éste (Estudio 2). Estas respuestas pueden ser concebidas como una forma de creatividad social encaminada a hacer frente a situaciones de bajo poder grupal.

Palabras clave: estereotipo endogrupal, legitimidad interna, poder, estatus.

Group status (i.e., the relative position of groups on valued dimensions of comparisons), and power (i.e., the ability to control outcomes and resources) constitute crucial socio-structural variables which contribute to the development of intergroup behaviours. Low in-group power and status usually entail predominantly negative intergroup comparisons. At the intergroup level, the degree of power and status a group has might be judged as fair and legitimate or as unfair and illegitimate. Legitimacy refers to the belief that social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just (Tyler, 2006). But judged by whom? Recently Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus and Sweetman (2010) distinguished between *external legitimacy*, in which the group disadvantage is perceived as fair by the out-group, and *internal legitimacy*, where the in-group itself perceives the disadvantage as fair and just. From this point of view, the internal legitimacy is conceived as a key but sometimes neglected aspect of the power groups hold that can influence the extent to which intergroup relationships are maintained or contested (Spears et al., 2010). In this line, it has been shown that members of a group which occupies a disadvantaged position relative to an out-group, might appraise this disadvantage as legitimate or illegitimate, which in turn might have different consequences on people's reactions. (Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, Garza, & Mewse, 2011). In this paper, we focus on the effects of internal legitimacy on the perception of the in-group stereotype as a response to powerlessness in the context of Spanish regional stereotypes and its associated political agenda.

Social psychological research has examined situations where the in-group accepts the discrimination, and their own disadvantage is perceived as deserved (see Crocker & Major, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, system justification theory proposes that some individuals are motivated to justify the existing reality, even if it harms their in-group (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Social identity theory (SIT) has also proposed that groups will not try to challenge their disadvantage collectively when it is perceived as legitimate and stable (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However legitimacy is not always accepted. It should not be assumed that, just because social reality or fair procedures render the prevailing intergroup power relations legitimate to the powerful out-group, this will necessarily be accepted by in-group members without a fight. It is well established that when a group rejects their disadvantage as illegitimate it will be motivated to challenge this through direct strategies such as social competition and

collective action (e.g., Hersby, Jetten, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2011; Jetten et al., 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). But what do group members do when the rest of their group seems to accept the disadvantage as legitimate (i.e., internal legitimacy)? This is particularly relevant, especially given that individuals are most influenced by in-group members (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Wright, 1997). Following Spears et al.'s rationale (2010), we argue that even when the powerless in-group legitimizes the prevailing intergroup relations, this might not be necessarily accepted by in-group members passively. Here one cannot rely on the in-group to support such direct action. In such cases we argue that more subtle and less direct forms of resistance will be necessary. In this paper we examine how members of disadvantaged groups confront these more difficult and constraining situations.

One alternative option available to protect the group image under these conditions is to adopt a social creativity strategy (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978). One of such social creativity strategies is to re-evaluate the group's negative image (e.g., "Black is beautiful", Tajfel & Turner, 1979). We argue that one way to deal with the threatening internal legitimacy of a status or power disadvantage is thus to contest any negative in-group stereotypes and affirm any positive dimensions of the in-group stereotype. Stereotyping could be used in a functional way to contest and resist to group low status and disadvantage when even members of the in-group do not see their own disadvantage as illegitimate (de Lemus, Spears, Bukowski, Moya, & Lupiáñez, 2012; Greenwood & Spears, 2007; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, & Doosje, 2002). However, reinforcing existing positive stereotypes, especially in the case of the warmth dimension, could be interpreted as a way of perpetuating the *status quo*, as this does little to challenge a status disadvantage (Kay et al., 2009). Nevertheless, such strategies may reflect and perhaps even increase commitment to the in-group which may be a valued goal in itself, especially for high identifiers (see Spears et al., 2010). In the present research we examine the strategic use of the in-group stereotype as a way of contesting disadvantage depending on perceived internal (il)legitimacy.

In general, we argue that individuals who are more involved with the in-group (i.e., high identifiers) will be more motivated to protect the image of the group and, consequently, they will employ social creativity strategies to a greater extent than the individuals who identified less. In line with this argument, it has been shown that

individuals who highly identify with the in-group perceive a more positive in-group stereotype (Matera, Giannini, Blanco, & Smith, 2005), especially when status is threatened (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997).

To summarize, our main prediction is that when the in-group's unfavourable position is appraised as legitimate by the in-group (as well as the out-group members), individuals will develop stereotype related strategies in order to contest the discrimination. In the legitimate condition participants will show social creativity strategies such as contesting the traditional negative in-group stereotype, or accentuating the in-group stereotype on positively valued dimensions. Moreover, high identifiers are likely to be particularly motivated to use such strategies to defend the in-group's image. However, in the illegitimate condition these strategies are not necessary as, at least, the own in-group show they do not accept the disadvantage, thus the situation is less threatening for the in-group image.

The present research

We test these predictions in a Spanish context. Spain comprises seventeen regions with status and power imbalances among them. Moreover, every region has its own stereotype in the eyes of most Spaniards. Consistent with the stereotype literature, the vast majority of these stereotypes map onto the two dimensions related to the competence and warmth of the group (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). This is the case of the Andalusian stereotype, which depicts Andalusians as less competent but warmer than other regions' citizens (Morales, García, Rodríguez-Bailón, & Moya, 2004; Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2008). Sometimes these Andalusian stereotypes are used to justify that Andalusia deserves fewer opportunities and economic resources than other Spanish regions. Many Andalusians have the opinion that Spanish Government (regardless of the political orientation of the party in power) often makes decisions that benefit other regions, whose citizens are perceived as more skilled and business-oriented.

In this context, our aim is to study how members of the in-group (Andalusians) deal with their relatively powerless position in the Spanish social system when their in-group justifies and supports (or not) the inequality between them and the other regions of Spain. We expect that participants will be influenced by internal (il)legitimacy, when external legitimacy for the disadvantage is constant and salient as background

information. Thus, we predict Andalusian participants in the internal legitimacy condition (that is, where the members of the in-group accepts the basis for the discrimination) will show greater social creativity, using the in-group stereotype to confront the in-group powerlessness. We conceived this condition as more threatening than others, as even the in-group seems to justify its own powerless situation. Accordingly, we expect that participants, and especially high identifiers (who are more motivated to protect the image of the group), in the internal legitimacy condition will be more reluctant than those in the internal illegitimacy condition to accept the discrimination in an attempt to protect the group identity. The internal illegitimate condition, that is, when the in-group condemns the discriminatory situation, seems to be less harmful for the in-group, as at least in-group members view the powerlessness situation as underserved.

To test these hypotheses, our main dependent measure in two studies was the Andalusians' perception of the in-group stereotype. We expect that participants who think the in-group justifies the disadvantaged situation (legitimate condition) will either challenge the traditional status-defining Andalusian stereotype (i.e., showing lesser acceptance of the established negative competence stereotype), or else enhance the positively valued in-group stereotype (on the warmth dimension). We also tested for the possibility that all these effects would be stronger among high identifiers, who should be more motivated to use these social creativity strategies.

In Study 1 we analyze the type of arguments used to support this (il)legitimacy. Specifically, we examine the relevance of stereotype-related arguments as a basis to legitimize power differentials (e.g., *Andalusians are incompetent but warm*) in interaction with resource-related economic arguments (e.g., *Andalusia has developed industry that does not require large investments*). That is, we are interested in the interplay of economic and stereotypical in-group justifications of the disadvantage. Economic justification is by definition less constraining of the in-group's stereotype than the stereotypical justification *per se*, hence, when discrimination is legitimized on an economic basis, we predict that this may lead to more free use of social creativity on the stereotypic dimensions of warmth and competence. Furthermore, we expect stereotypical arguments will lead to less free use of social creativity. In this case challenging the negative competence stereotype might be more difficult (because of the

negative relationship between power-status and competence, Fiske et al., 2002), than the warmth dimension. Therefore, we predict that when the power disadvantage is legitimized by the in-group based on stereotypical arguments, participants will react reinforcing the positive stereotypical dimension of warmth (but not competence dimension) independently of whether economic reasons are used, whereas economic arguments might only influence the use of stereotypes when the disadvantaged situation is not legitimized based on stereotypical arguments.

In Study 2, we further analyze the stereotypical justification in the context of another social reality constraint that may make the social creativity strategy more difficult: the sample size of the in-group members who provide the basis for internal (il)legitimacy.

Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the influence of appraisals of internal (il)legitimacy about the in-group powerless position and economic vs. stereotypic justifications of group discrimination on participants' perceptions of the in-group stereotype. In order to do this, a fictitious situation which described a disadvantaged situation for Andalusia, was developed using a socially relevant issue involving the allocation of economic resources among regions by the Spanish Government.

Method

Participants, Design and Procedure

Participants were 103 Andalusian undergraduates (55 women; mean age 20.73), who received course credits for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions and were told they had to read an excerpt from a recent report related to the planned regional economic resource allocation made by the Spanish Government for the coming year, and people's opinion about this on an independent survey. Specifically, the fragment described that their region (Andalusia) would receive fewer economic resources compared to other Spanish regions. The text also included the opinions of Castellano-Manchegos (citizens of a different Spanish region, out-group), as well as Andalusians (in-group) on this issue. We chose this out-

group because it is similar in status to the in-group used in the study, and there is no explicit conflict between inhabitants of these two regions based on economic or political reasons that could influence or contaminate the manipulation and results, as would be the case with other regions in Spain.

Measures

Legitimacy manipulation

External legitimacy was constant across conditions, thus all of the participants read that the out-group justified the disadvantage of Andalusia's situation based on stereotypical, and economic reasons. However, we manipulated internal (il)legitimacy appraisals in relation to these two dimensions, namely whether the in-group agreed with these two types of arguments for the in-group economic disadvantage, thus all conditions included both types of arguments. In the stereotypically legitimate condition, the in-group justified the disadvantaged situation using stereotypical arguments (e.g., *We, Andalusians, are less competent, and more sociable, than those from other regions, thus it is understandable that the Government is investing less money in Andalusia)*, while in the stereotypically illegitimate condition, the in-group rejected such stereotypical reasons to justify the unequal resource allocation (e.g., *We are as competent as other region's workers, thus we deserve exactly the same investment as they do)*. In the same vein, participants in the economically legitimate condition read that Andalusians who had been surveyed supported the Government economic allocation using economic arguments (e.g., *If Andalusia received more investment than other regions in the last years, this budget cut is understandable).* Finally, in the economically illegitimate condition, participants were told the in-group rejected such economic arguments (e.g., *Although in recent years our region received more investment than others, this does not justify the fact that during this year we are going to receive less money than other regions).* Economic and stereotypical motives were manipulated orthogonally in a 2 (Economic arguments: Legitimate vs. Illegitimate) X 2 (Stereotypical arguments: Legitimate vs. Illegitimate) factorial design.

After reading the text, participants completed a questionnaire comprising the following measures. Some weeks later they were debriefed via email.

Group identification

We used four items (α = 0.82; e.g., "I feel strong ties with other Andalusians"; "To what extent it is important for you to be Andalusian?") similar to the ones used by Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears (1995). Participants were asked to answer the items using a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much).

In-group stereotype

Participants were asked to what extent twenty competence and warmth related traits were features of Andalusian people (Willis & Rodríguez-Bailón, 2008), on a scale from 1 (non-stereotypical at all) to 5 (very stereotypical).

Data seemed to be suitable for factor analyses (*KMO* statistic = 0.82; Bartlett statistic: χ^2 = 725.15; *p* < .001). We obtained 3 main factors. The first one included 5 low-competence traits (e.g., lazy, conformist), and explained 28.86% of the variance (α = .83). The second one involved 5 high-competence traits (e.g., competent, intelligent), and explained 14.52% of the variance (α = .77). The third factor was composed by 4 warmth traits (e.g., sociable, friendly) and explained 6.89% of the variance (α = .63). The mean scores of the items comprised in each of the 3 factors were used as dependent variables in the analyses.

Evaluation of the traits

Participants were asked to evaluate the valence of the twenty traits used in the previous measure on a scale from -3 (very negative) to +3 (very positive). We computed the averages of valence for the three in-group stereotype factors: evaluation of high competence, evaluation of low competence and evaluation of warmth traits.

The measures above mentioned were part of a questionnaire which also included other dependent variables that are not reported because they are not related to the goal of this paper.

Results

Correlational analyses were performed to test the relation between group identification and the three in-group stereotype factors. The analyses show positive correlations between group identification and high competence (*r* = .47, *p* < .01), and warmth (*r* = .38, *p* < .01). Correlational analysis also revealed a negative correlation between group identification and low competence (*r* = -.36, *p* < .01).

Regarding the in-group stereotype measure, a 2 (Economic arguments: Legitimate vs. Illegitimate) X 2 (Stereotypical arguments: Legitimate vs. Illegitimate) MANOVA with Identification as a continuous predictor (as previous analysis showed no effect of the manipulation on it) was conducted on low competence, high competence and warmth as dependent variables. Evaluation of high competence, evaluation of low competence and evaluation of warmth were introduced as covariates, as the valence of the words used to measure stereotypes could contaminate the test of our predictions. Although we did not find any effect on high competence, analysis of the in-group stereotype measures revealed a main effect of economic arguments on the low competence factor, $F (1, 93) = 4.07$, $p = .05$, which showed that, as predicted, the in-group was perceived as less incompetent in the legitimate economic condition ($M = 2.51$, $SD = .72$) than in the illegitimate one ($M = 2.87$, $SD = .84$).

The analysis also showed a two way interaction between economic arguments and stereotypical arguments on warmth, $F (1, 93) = 4.95$, $p = .03$, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Level of in-group warmth perceived by participants as a function of the stereotypical and economic arguments

Post-hoc analysis (Sidak) were not significant in the stereotypically legitimate condition ($F<1$, n.s.). When the disadvantaged situation is justified by the in-group using stereotypical arguments, participants tended to perceive the in-group as warm, and

there were no differences between conditions based on the economic arguments. However, when the in-group did not support the stereotypical arguments to explain their unfavorable situation (stereotypically illegitimate condition), post-hoc analysis (Sidak) showed a marginal effect (F (1, 85) = 3.16, p = .08), thus perceived warmth tend to vary depending on the economic arguments used. Finally, there was no evidence that group identification moderated the effects of our (internal) legitimacy manipulation on in-group stereotypes.

Discussion

The correlational pattern found between group identification and group stereotypes suggest a stronger in-group bias for those who feel more committed to their group. Participants who were highly identified with the in-group perceived it as warmer and more competent. This result is consistent with the goal of keeping a positive image of the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and with previous findings in Spanish samples (Matera et al., 2005).

The results showed the effects of the internal (il)legitimacy on participants' perceptions of stereotypical traits that define the in-group. As we predicted, social creativity strategies were more prominent in the internal legitimate condition. Results also showed legitimate economic arguments from the in-group had more consistent effects on stereotypic ratings (notably reduced incompetence) than the stereotypic justification. It seems that these economic arguments were less constraining than the stereotypic ones allowing participants more freedom for social creativity.

However both factors interacted on the warmth ratings. The interaction suggests that if the in-group justifies the situation using stereotypical justifications, participants perceived the in-group as highly and equally warm, independently of the (legitimate or illegitimate) economic motives used. That is, the stereotypical justification of the disadvantage was enough to trigger the use of warmth stereotypes also depicting the in-group in a more positive way (i.e., *Maybe we are less competent, but we are also more sociable than others*). As noted before, this could be taken as a social creativity strategy to restore a positive image of the in-group, after knowing that other members of the in-group legitimized the disadvantaged situation using negative in-group stereotypes.

In the illegitimate stereotypical conditions, however, the pattern seems to be different as a function of the economic legitimacy. For these conditions it seems like participants perceived the in-group as relatively less warm when economic arguments are used to justify the discrimination (internal legitimate) than when these are disputed (illegitimate). Under internal economic legitimacy circumstances, warmth may be less positive and functional and could reinforce the economic justification they are trying to contest. Thus, accentuating warmth may undermine their claims to competence, and might also reinforce the acceptance of the economic arguments (*We should not be difficult and accept the economic arguments*).

Although identification was related to positive stereotyping, we found no evidence that identification moderated the legitimacy effects. This might be due to the fact that identification was measured after the manipulation. Participants' responses to this measure might have been influenced by the salience of the intergroup context made explicit in the cover story. This might have increased homogeneity of the responses (and therefore, reduced the variance). This is addressed in Study 2 where identification was measured *before* the cover story. The aim of Study 2 was to study how individuals react under more constrained circumstances, that is, when just stereotypic motivations are given to justify in-group powerlessness, which also gave us the opportunity of testing whether group identification plays a more important role under these conditions.

Study 2

In Study 1 we showed that the opinion of the in-group, which perceives its own disadvantaged situation as legitimate, can trigger a reaction in individuals to strengthen the in-group identity by using the in-group stereotype to cope with the situation. However, this creativity strategy seemed to be stronger when the internal legitimacy did not constrain these stereotypic claims (i.e., when it reflected economic not stereotypic arguments). But will individuals use creativity strategies to deal with the disadvantaged situation when the in-group uses just stereotypic arguments to legitimize it? In the second study we focus only on the stereotypic arguments to manipulate internal legitimacy. Also, we manipulate the sample size of the in-group members who provide the basis for internal (il)legitimacy, another social reality constraint that may make the

social creativity strategy more difficult, with the aim of investigating whether group identification has more of a moderating effect in this case.

Previous research has shown the importance of the sample size information in stereotype formation (e.g., Doosje, Spears & Koomen, 1995). The logic of this argument is that the social constraints will be stronger, and consequently a message will be more accepted when it comes from a representative, trustworthy source (i.e., a large sample). In this sense, a hopeless message that is supported by a large sample of the in-group will be more threatening than a similar message that is endorsed only by a few members. Therefore, in this second study our aim was to examine the combined effect of sample size and internal (il)legitimacy on participants' reactions to the disadvantaged powerless situation, together with the possible role of group identification on these effects. High identifiers are the most motivated to maintain bonds with the in-group and restore the in-group's image. We expect that high identifiers will show social creativity strategies in order to restore their devalued social identity by means of the in-group stereotype. This will happen especially when the in-group accepts the disadvantaged situation (following the predictions of the previous study), but when the social constraint is weaker (i.e., small sample size), providing more scope for creativity. By contrast, we predict that, in general, low identifiers will use these strategies to a lesser extent.

Method

Participants, Design and Procedure

Participants were 73 Andalusian undergraduates (50 women; mean age 22.92), who received course credit for their participation. The procedure was the same as in the previous study. However, in this case participants' group identification was measured prior to the manipulation.

Measures

Legitimacy manipulation

We employed recent Andalusian political news as a background to reinforce the credibility of our cover story. Before reading the fictitious situation, participants read the statements from an Andalusian politician, whose message was in line with the situation presented (*Spanish Government makes decisions that harm Andalusia*). As in Study 1, we

kept constant the external legitimacy across conditions and manipulated just the internal legitimacy. In this case we only used the stereotypical arguments to justify (or not) the powerless in-group situation.

Sample size manipulation

In the large sample condition participants were told the information they read about came from a large and varied sample of Andalusians. In contrast, in the small sample condition participants were informed that just a small number of Andalusians were surveyed about the powerless situation of their region.

This resulted in a 2 Internal legitimacy (Legitimate vs. Illegitimate) x 2 Sample size (Large vs. Small) factorial design, with participants randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions.

Group Identification

We used the same four items as in Study 1, but adding two more in order to improve the sensitivity of the measure (α = .92). Participants were asked to answer the items using a scale from 1 to 7.

In-group stereotype

After the manipulation, participants completed the same in-group stereotype measure used in Study 1, on a scale from 1 to 7. A factor analysis on the whole 20 items scale was run (*KMO* statistic = .83; Bartlett statistic: χ^2 = 804.54; *p* < .001) which revealed 3 main factors very similar to the ones in Study 1. The first one included 4 high-competence traits (e.g., competent, intelligent), and explained 32.55% of the variance (α = .84). The second one involved 6 low-competence traits (e.g., lazy, disorganized), and explained 16.46% of the variance (α = .82). The third factor was composed by 4 warmth traits (e.g., sociable, close), and explained 7.39% of the variance (α = .69). The mean scores of the items comprised in each of the 3 factors were used as dependent variables in the analyses.

Evaluation of the traits

As in Study 1, participants were asked to evaluate the valence of the twenty traits used, on a scale from -3 to +3.

Manipulation checks

Participants were asked to rate the sample size of in-group members surveyed (from 1, very small to 7, very large), and to what extent the sample surveyed thought

the situation was fair or not (from 1, very unfair and undeserved, to 7 very fair and deserved).

The measures above mentioned were part of a questionnaire which also included other dependent variables that are not reported because they are not related to the goal of this paper.

Results

Manipulation checks

A 2 (Internal Legitimacy: Legitimate vs. Illegitimate) x 2 (Sample size: Large vs. Small) MANOVA on the sample size and internal legitimacy manipulation checks was conducted. We found a main effect of the sample size factor on the size manipulation check, $F (1, 72) = 31.90$, $p < .01$, showing that participants in the large sample size conditions perceived the sample size larger ($M = 4.05$, $SD = 2.28$) than participants in the small sample conditions ($M = 1.58$, $SD = 1.25$). Furthermore, the analysis showed a main effect of internal legitimacy on the legitimacy manipulation check, $F (1, 72) = 238.63$, $p < .01$. Participants in the legitimate conditions thought the in-group members perceived the situation more fair ($M = 6.03$, $SD = 1.46$) than individuals in the illegitimate conditions ($M = 1.44$, $SD = 1.05$).

Main results

In the same vein as Study 1, results showed a positive correlation between group identification and high competence ($r = 0.39$, $p < 0.01$), and warmth scores ($r = .35$, $p < .01$). Correlational analysis also revealed a negative correlation between group identification and the low competence score ($r = -.47$, $p < .01$).

Mean scores on high competence, low competence and warmth were analyzed in a 2 (Internal Legitimacy: Legitimate vs. Illegitimate) X 2 (Sample size: Large vs. Small) MANOVA, with group identification as a continuous predictor. Average evaluation score of high competence, low competence, and of warmth traits were introduced as covariates, as the valence of the words used to measure stereotypes could contaminate the test of our predictions.

We did not find any significant effects of the manipulation on warmth. However, we found an interaction between sample size and group identification on high competence,

F(1, 56) = 5.84, *p* = .02. Simple slopes analysis showed an effect of group identification on both small and large sample conditions. However, the effect was stronger in the small sample condition (*β* = .48, *t*(56) = 2.89; *p* < .01) than in the large sample one (*β* = .31, *t*(56) = 2.10; *p* = .04), which means that identification predicted in-group competence more strongly when the sample was small.

Results also showed an interaction between internal legitimacy and group identification, *F*(1, 56) = 5.63, *p* = .02 on low competence. Simple slopes analysis showed the effect of group identification was stronger in the internal legitimacy condition (*β* = -.579, *t*(56) = -3.35; *p* < .001), than in the internal illegitimacy one (*β* = -.420, *t*(56) = -3.14; *p* < .01). High identifiers perceive the in-group somewhat less incompetent in both conditions than participants who identify more weakly with the in-group, who were more likely to accept the internally legitimate message.

The analysis also revealed a three-way interaction between Internal legitimacy X Sample size X Group identification on low competence, *F*(1, 56) = 4.47, *p* = .04. In order to decompose this interaction we split the data by the sample size factor and calculated regression equations separately for participants who were assigned to the small or large sample conditions. In the small sample size condition, results showed a two-way interaction between internal legitimacy and group identification *F*(1, 25) = 6.83, *p* = .01. This interaction was not significant in the large sample size condition (*F* < 1, n.s.).

Figure 2. Level of in-group low competence perceived by high and low identifiers participants in the small sample condition, as a function of internal legitimacy

As shown on Figure 2, simple slope analysis for the small sample size condition showed that group identification negatively predicts low competence more strongly in the internal legitimate condition, when the in-group seems to accept the disadvantaged (β = -.76, $t(25)$ = -2.75; p = .01), than when other members from the in-group disagree with the economic allocation (β = -.41, $t(25)$ = -2.28; p = .03).

Discussion

These results suggest that sample size and group identification moderate the effects of (il)legitimacy on the tendency to use in-group stereotypes as a social creativity strategy. Specifically, high identifiers perceive the in-group as more competent when the information provided comes from a small in-group sample, regardless the internal legitimacy factor. This suggests that high identifiers simply do not accept the negative established in-group stereotype under conditions in which the in-group opinion is only represented by a few members. The social constraint is weaker in this condition, thus engaging in social creativity strategies should be more viable than when a large part of the in-group endorses the message.

Moreover, the two-way interaction between internal legitimacy and group identification shows that high identifiers assume the low competence stereotype to a lesser extent than those with lower levels of group identification. This happens especially when the in-group accepts the disadvantage as fair. In the internal legitimate condition we find the largest differences between low and high identifiers: while low identifiers accept the low competence associated to the in-group, high identifiers perceive the group in a more positive way (less incompetent). Further, the three-way interaction found indicates that this pattern of results is most evident under small sample size conditions (weak constraint). In this case, when a small sample of the in-group seems to justify the disadvantaged situation, high identifiers accept even less the negative in-group stereotype. It should be easier for those who care about the in-group to develop social creativity strategies when just a small section of the in-group approves the disadvantage.

Finally, and according to our hypothesis, when the in-group shows a discontent with the unequal resource allocation (illegitimate conditions), differences between high and low identifiers are smaller. One explanation is that an internal illegitimacy condition

could be less threatening to high identifiers, since other members of the in-group show their dissatisfaction with the group disadvantaged, thus social creativity strategies are less necessary.

General Discussion

In the current studies we created a situation where the in-group members appraised the external point of view on the deservedness of their powerless and low status position judging it as either (internally) legitimate or illegitimate. Results showed that the legitimacy of in-group appraisals moderated individuals' reactions. We found that individuals used the in-group stereotype strategically to deal with the powerless situation. Specifically, two different ways of contesting the disadvantaged situation were found. The first one consisted in rejecting the traditional status relevant stereotype (i.e., relating to competence), that is to deny the in-group is associated to the negative traits that are being used to justify the low status position (as shown in Study 1 and 2 on low competence), or to support the counter-stereotypical argument, (i.e., that the group is indeed competent, Study 2). Another way of contesting the social reality established involves highlighting the positive traits stereotypically associated to the in-group (results from Study 1 on warmth). Both ways could be understood as social creativity strategies that are used to deal with difficult circumstances. Furthermore, we examined three factors acting as moderators of these social creativity strategies: social reality constraints, as implied by the dimension of legitimacy (economic vs. stereotypic in Study 1) and the source sample size (in Study 2); and group identification. Regarding the reality constraints, it seems that stereotypical justifications of a powerless situation constrain more than a justification based on economic arguments. It is also easier for high identifiers to use social creativity strategies from a small sample of the in-group that sends the message of internal legitimacy. Under these circumstances high identifiers should be more motivated than low identifiers to contest the disadvantageous situation. Specifically, results from Study 2 suggest that, under circumstances that are probably perceived as threatening for the in-group, low identifiers distance themselves from the group by not showing any social creativity strategy to protect the in-group identity, whereas high identifiers do.

Notice that these social creativity strategies occur even and especially when the in-group seems to accept the negative situation (internal legitimate conditions). This finding is especially interesting if we take into account the fact that those who challenge the in-group opinion are the ones usually found to follow group norms most closely (high identifiers). Instead, under internal legitimate circumstances it is when the high identifiers contest what the in-group claims, albeit with the aim of protecting the in-group image. This finding could lead us to suggest a *third type* of (il)legitimacy, which is conceived at a more individual level, and as independent of internal (il)legitimacy, although very loyal to the group identity. In these studies, the *individual (il)legitimacy* is showed by those who are highly involved with the group, and it makes them resist the disadvantage apparently accepted by the in-group. Further research is needed to clarify the role of this third type of legitimacy and the underlying processes that lead to the strategic use of stereotypes as a social creativity strategy.

Our results differ from earlier research, as we found that under internal legitimacy conditions individuals can still contest the in-group opinion and show strategies to cope with the in-group powerlessness. However, previous studies (Hersby et al., 2011; Jetten et al., 2011) have shown people are more willing to fight against the low in-group status under internal illegitimate conditions. We showed that even when the in-group accepts the disadvantage as fair, individuals still develop strategies to protect the in-group, albeit ones that are more indirect and more creative than other kinds of responses (as collective actions). Future research should compare the use of different strategies (more blatant or subtle) to confront power disadvantage under internal legitimate conditions.

Chapter VI

Testing The Limits Of Resistance To Internal Legitimacy:

The role of in-group stereotypes

Testing the limits of resistance to internal legitimacy

in disadvantaged groups:

The role of in-group stereotypes

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Abstract

Previous research shows that when a disadvantaged group legitimizes its own discrimination, high identifiers still contest and fight the situation (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, Spears, & de Lemus, 2013). The aim of this work is to examine the generalizability of this pattern with an existing higher status group. In Study 1 we show that high identifiers are more willing than low identifiers to resist the discrimination but only when the in-group frames the disadvantage as *illegitimate* (contra Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013). In Study 2 we tested the idea that this different pattern relates to the stereotype content associated to the group. We argue that, when the rest of the in-group legitimates the discrimination based on the group stereotype, high identifiers are prevented from contesting the disadvantage in order to avoid confirming a negative stereotype of dominance and arrogance associated with the high status group. Therefore, the group stereotype plays a moderating role when it comes to contesting social disadvantage.

Keywords: social disadvantage, high status group, group identification, in-group stereotype, collective action, social creativity strategies,

Inequalities between groups form a recurring social problem that divides societies. Typically disadvantaged groups (e.g., women or blacks) suffer from a low status position in the social hierarchy, but high status groups can also suffer from a disadvantaged position, both incidentally but also more chronically. In this paper we investigate how high status group members' respond under disadvantaged conditions, and in particular when their own group seems to legitimizes the disadvantage, rendering the situation especially threatening and problematic.

We have previously shown that when a (low status) disadvantaged group itself legitimizes and accepts the inequality, high identifiers contest the situation by perceiving higher levels of social support and group efficacy and by showing more willingness to take moderate collective action than low identifiers (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013). Therefore, high identifiers do not accept the in-group norm of conformity regarding the disadvantaged (cf. Packer, 2008), but they seem to perceive the group as able to overcome the situation despite the in-group message of acceptance (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013).

Going beyond this, in this paper our aim is to test this finding with a traditional high status group that is incidentally in a disadvantaged position. History shows many examples of high status groups that were vulnerable due to a relative lack of power under certain circumstances. For instance, the Jews in the German Weimer Republic, who had a prominent role in arts and science life, but had to deal with a growth of political anti-Semitism among diverse political parties and organizations. In a similar vein, *Tutsis* in Rwanda held a high status and a dominant position but started to be discriminated, pursued and even killed by another ethnic group, the *Hutus.*

How these high status groups face the disadvantage? The process of fighting for equality under conditions in which the disadvantaged group cannot be considered as a typical low status group may well be different than when a traditionally low status group claims for justice. For instance, in a context of disadvantage, high status groups may pose its own problems as such groups might not expect much sympathy, solidarity or even empathy from other groups. Thus, our aim here is to test previous findings with a social group that has been traditionally considered as a high status group. In the present research we study the case of German students studying in the Netherlands.

Why might status make a difference to how groups contest a disadvantage? It is crucially important to note that the stereotype associated with high status groups (i.e., high competence, low warmth) is quite different than the stereotype typically associated with low status groups used in the previous research (i.e., low competence, high warmth; (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013). Therefore, a related aim of the current research is to test the idea that diverse group stereotypes might have different effects on individuals' willingness to contest social disadvantage. Although, generally speaking, status and prestige should be seen as positive resources that convey advantage (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we will argue that the group stereotypes associated with high status can, under some circumstances, present problems on their own, especially when the group suffers from a power disadvantage.

Legitimacy appraisals: A key to social change

Legitimacy perceptions have been defined as a key factor that affects the extent to which disadvantaged groups oppose or accept social inequality (e.g., Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) social disadvantage is more likely to be challenged when it is framed as unfair and illegitimate (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Nevertheless, an important question related to the perception of the legitimacy of the in-group disadvantage concerns the source of these legitimacy judgments. Previous research has paid little attention to this issue, taking for granted that different groups always endorse the same point of view (for an exception see Hersby, Jetten, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2011). However, we argue that different social agents might present different perspectives and that perceptions from different sources will have different meanings. Specifically, a justification of the group disadvantage is unlikely to have the same effects when it comes from an out-group member as when the source is the in-group. Following Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman (2010), we distinguish between *external legitimacy,* which is related to an out-group perspective regarding another group's position, and *internal legitimacy*, which refers to the legitimacy appraisals of a group towards its own situation.

It not surprising that members of a disadvantaged group usually frame the situation as illegitimate, and when this is the case, this perception of illegitimacy of the situation might lead to attempts to challenge the established social order (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

However, discrimination and disadvantage are not necessarily always conceived as illegitimate (see Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002 for empirical evidence). Further, research also shows that sometimes even the disadvantaged groups can legitimize and perpetuate their own discrimination (Crocker & Major, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), sometimes in order to justify the current social system (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

The high identifiers leading the way

What happens then, when a disadvantaged group frames its own discrimination as deserved and legitimate? We could argue that under these circumstances, a social change strategy aimed at equality would be unlikely to succeed, as even the disadvantaged group members apparently accept the disadvantaged situation. However, previous work shows that even when accepting the in-group discrimination is the norm, not every individual accepts the in-group perspective. Research by Packer and colleagues has shown that those who highly identify with the group often show dissent from the in-group norms when they are somehow damaging for the group (Packer, 2008; Packer & Chasteen, 2010).

In a similar vein, our previous work shows the crucial role of group identification in resisting the in-group legitimization of the own disadvantage (i.e., internal legitimacy) through different means. Specifically, we found that when the in-group legitimizes and accepts its own discrimination, high identifiers, compared to low identifiers, perceive higher levels of social support, group efficacy and are more willing to take collective action in order to fight the in-group disadvantage (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013). Furthermore, they also contest the internal legitimization by more subtle means, for instance, denying the negative and enhancing the positive aspects of the in-group stereotype. Therefore, even when other in-group members seem to give up, high identifiers are more prone to contest the disadvantage than those who identify less strongly with the group. By contrast, there is generally little or no effect of group identification under circumstances in which the in-group rejects the disadvantage. In this case, high identifiers do not need to contest the in-group norm, as it is aligned with the group interests (and low identifiers benefit from this also).

Our aim in this paper is to test whether this pattern would be replicated in a different context, specifically when a high status group suffers from a disadvantaged position. In this quest we consider the different stereotypes associated with low and high status groups. The role of the in-group stereotype has been a critical factor in eliciting high identifiers' responses when dealing with disadvantage (see Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013, Study 1). Thus different in-group stereotypes associated with high status groups might evoke a different pattern of reactions when fighting for equality. It may be that the competent, but "colder" stereotypes associated with a high status groups, like the German students in this case, may compromise attempts to mobilize for collective action, especially when there is little support for this in the in-group (i.e., internal legitimacy). However this remains an empirical question rather than a clear prediction. The goal of the current work is thus to examine whether high identifiers from high status groups resist internal legitimacy in the way that previous research on low status groups shows, and the role of the in-group stereotype in this process.

How to deal with social disadvantage?

Based on our previous findings (Jiménez-Moya, de Lemus, Rodríguez-Bailón, & Spears, 2012; Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013) in this work we examine two different strategies to deal with group disadvantage, namely direct social competition (e.g., collective action) and social creativity strategies. The more direct way of fighting social inequality is through collective action, defined as actions intended at improving the position of an entire group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Different models have addressed the factors that foster collective action (for a review see Klandermans, 1997; for a meta-analysis see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In this work, to examine how internal legitimacy appraisals affect collective action tendencies and the factors that foster them, we adapt an integrative framework that proposes two complementary routes that can lead to collective action. Specifically, the dual path model (Van Zomeren, et al., 2004), establishes that there is an emotion-focused coping route, in which group-based anger predicts collective action. Opinion social support (other members' appraisals of the shared circumstance) and the fairness with which the in-group position is perceived are

predicted to affect the levels of group-based anger. The second path is a problem-focused coping route, in which group efficacy, or the extent to which the in-group is perceived as able to achieve its goals, predicts participation in collective action. In this case, group efficacy is predicted by the action social support perceived (i.e., the perceptions of other in-group members' willingness to take collective action).

Another way of facing the disadvantage is by means of *social creativity* strategies (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978). These strategies do not necessarily imply any change in the social structure, but are aimed at deriving at least some positive value for the in-group. One such strategy is to re-evaluate the in-group's negative image (e.g., "Black is beautiful", Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In line with this, one way of coping with group disadvantage is by contesting the negative in-group stereotype, and perceiving the in-group image as more positive than the consensual stereotype (Jiménez-Moya et al., 2012). Given that these strategies are not aimed at directly addressing the disadvantage, it could be argued that at some point they help to perpetuate the *status quo* (Kay, et al., 2009). However, social creativity strategies may indicate commitment to the in-group, which can be a goal in itself, especially among high identifiers (see Spears, et al., 2010). In addition, it has been shown that stereotyping could be used in a functional way to contest and resist social disadvantage even when some members of the in-group do not perceive the inequality as unfair (de Lemus, Spears, Bukowski, Moya, & Lupiáñez, 2013; Greenwood & Spears, 2007; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, & Doosje, 2002).

The current research

Previous work has shown that high identifiers are more likely than low identifiers to contest the group disadvantage under internally legitimate conditions, namely when the in-group seems to justify their own disadvantage (Jiménez-Moya, et al., 2012; Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013). Importantly, this research was focused on disadvantaged low status groups. The aim of Study 1 is to examine high identifiers' reactions from a traditional high status group (Germans) that is in a disadvantaged position while they are guests in a foreign country (e.g., the Netherlands). As in previous work, (Jiménez-Moya, et al., 2012; Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013), we base internal legitimacy justifications on the in-group stereotype. However, note that

low status group's stereotype differs from the stereotype traditionally associated to high status groups like the German students in this case. With this in mind, in Study 2 we manipulate the content of the in-group stereotype used to legitimize the disadvantage and examine its effects. We expect that different stereotype dimensions that relate differentially to collective action will provoke different reactions in high identifiers.

Study 1

In Study 1 we examined a high status group in a disadvantaged situation. Our aim is to explore high identifiers' reactions towards the disadvantage, specifically when the in-group justifies its own discrimination. We measure factors related to the willingness to directly challenge the social disadvantage (social support, group efficacy, collective action, behavioral intentions to change the situation) and emotions (specifically, group-based anger and fear, which have been shown as predictors of collective action, Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, 2013; Kamans, Spears, Otten, Gordijn, & Livingstone, 2013; Tausch, et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, et al., 2004). In addition, we also measure other variables related to more subtle ways of resisting the disadvantage, and the in-group stereotype.

Method

Participants, Design and Procedure

Participants were 117 German undergraduates from the University of Groningen (105 women, mean age: 20.49), who received course credit for their participation. They were randomly allocated to a 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) between participants design. Participants read a text explaining that German students were being discriminated against by subtle means in the accommodation allocation process, given that most of the landlords and Dutch students looking for people to share rented property tended to choose other Dutch students to live with. Therefore, German students did not stand much chance of getting into the best accommodation. The text explained that a group of German student activists had demanded that the university conduct an investigation with the aim of clarifying the ways in which the housing was being allocated. In response to that, the accommodation office at the university had

ostensibly commissioned a group of researchers to examine students' view towards this situation. Participants read the alleged opinions on the accommodation issue in which both German and Dutch students had been surveyed. After reading the text, participants spent approximately 15 minutes in completing a questionnaire comprising the dependent variables. They were thanked for their participation and debriefed.

Legitimacy manipulation

The justifications of the disadvantage made by both the out-group and the in-group were based on the German stereotype. Specifically, the terms *serious, shy, and lacking of sense of humour*, as well as *arrogant*, *dominant*, *and pushy*, were used to explain why Dutch students preferred not to live with German students. External legitimacy was held constant across conditions; participants in every condition read that Dutch students legitimized the accommodation issue based on the German stereotype. We manipulated internal legitimacy: in the internal legitimate condition participants were told that the German students surveyed legitimized and accepted the inequality using the in-group stereotype. In the internal illegitimate condition, the German students surveyed framed the accommodation issue as unfair and undeserved*,* rejecting the stereotypic arguments.

Dependent Variables

Manipulation checks. Participants rated their agreement with two items affirming that the in-group framed the situation as fair (1 = totally disagree, 7 =totally agree). We averaged these two items (*r* = .82) and used the mean score as a dependent variable in the subsequent analyses.

Prior to the manipulations, we measured *group identification* with German students with a multicomponent scale by Leach and colleagues (Leach, et al., 2008; fourteen items; α = .88, e.g., *I feel a bond with other German students*)*.* Participants were asked to answer the items, as well as the rest of dependent variables, using a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much).

Opinion social support was measured with three items referring to the appraisals of the shared disadvantaged situation (one item was removed to improve the reliability of the scale, α = .50; e.g., *I think other German students disagree with the actual housing situation*). *Action social support* was measured with three items related to other in-

group members' willingness to stop the disadvantage (α = .74, e.g., *I think other German students are willing to do something against the current situation*).

Group Efficacy was measure with five items adapted from Van Zomeren et al. (2008) (α = .90, e.g., *I think that together German students will be able to* change *this situation*).

Collective action. We measured the willingness to support collective action against the housing situation with eight items adapted from Tausch et al., (2011) (α = .91, e.g., *I would approve the fact that other German students sign a petition to establish equal opportunities in the housing process*). The same items were used to measure the extent to which participants would participate themselves in collective action (α = .91). For collective action, participants answered the items in a scale from 1(not at all) to 11 (very much).

Behavioral action tendencies were further measured with four items (α = .76, e.g., *How likely would you be to participate in a campaign to defend German students' rights?*).

In order to measure the *emotions* provoked by the housing situation, participants were presented with a list of fifteen emotions, and they were asked to what extent experienced each of them after knowing about the housing matter (i.e., *How do you feel about the current housing situation?*). Following previous research (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013; Tausch, et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, et al., 2004) we created two factors, namely anger (I feel irritated, angry, displeased, α = .82) and fear (I feel scared, afraid, inferior, α = .76).

Perceptions towards the disadvantage. We measure participants' perceptions of the in-group opinion (four items, α = .84, e.g., *I think the opinion of the German students surveyed towards this situation is appropriate)* and towards the seriousness and the time-scale of the issue (i.e., *I think the problem with the housing is a serious issue/is a long-term problem that will affect more German students in the future)*.

Prototypicality. We also checked to what extent participants perceived themselves, the students surveyed about the housing issue, and the activists who complained to the university, as prototypical German students (three items, α = .66; α = .66; α = .81, respectively , e.g., *I define myself as a typical German student)*.

In-group stereotype. Participants were asked to what extent thirteen competence, warmth and morality related traits were features of German students. Data seemed to be suitable for factor analyses (KMO statistic = .78; Bartlett statistic: χ^2 = 507.41; *p* < .001). We obtained 3 main factors. The first one included 5 high-competence traits (e.g., skilled, competent, intelligent), and explained 23.63% of the variance (α = .78). The second one involved 6 high-warmth/morality traits (e.g., sociable, honest), and explained 21.89% of the variance (α = .76). The third factor was composed by 2 high sociable traits (e.g., outgoing, shy reverted) and explained 12.12% of the variance (α = .59). The mean scores of the items comprised in each of the factors were used as dependent variables in the analyses.

Results

Manipulation checks

In order to test the effect of our manipulation, we ran a 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) ANOVA with the averaged of the two manipulation checks as a dependent variable. It showed a main effect of legitimacy, $F_{(1, 123)}$ = 142.89, *p* < .001, η^2 = .54, indicating that participants in the legitimate condition reported that the in-group members framed the situation as more just (*M* = 4.52) than participants in the illegitimate condition (*M* = 2.10).

Main results

We test first the effect of internal legitimacy on the more action-related variables. A 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) MANOVA with group identification as a (centered) continuous predictor was conducted on opinion and action social support, group efficacy, collective action and behavioral action tendencies. This analysis showed a significant overall effect of group identification, λ = .88, $F_{(5, 117)}$ = 3.15, *p* = .01, η^2 = .12. In line with previous studies (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013), univariate effects showed that group identification positively predicted group efficacy, the approval and the engagement in collective action, and behavioral action tendencies ($F_{(1, 121)}$ = 8.87, *p* = .003, η^2 = .07; $F_{(1, 121)}$ = 5.18, *p* = .02, η^2 = .04; $F_{(1, 121)}$ = 4.44, *p* = .04, η^2 = .03; $F_{(1, 121)}$ = 5.48, *p* = .02, η^2 = .04, respectively). Further, group identification interacted with the legitimacy factor, as we found a marginal interaction

Group identification x Legitimacy on the approval of collective action, F (1, 121) = 3.46, p = .06, η^2 = .03. We analyzed this further, and simple slopes analysis revealed that only under illegitimate conditions did group identification positively predict the endorsement of collective action, β = .36, t(121) = 2.95; p = .004. Therefore, showing a different pattern than previous work (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013), high identifiers only were more willing to change the disadvantage than low identifiers when the in-group framed it as illegitimate.

Looking at emotions, we also conducted a similar analysis with anger and fear as dependent variables, which showed an overall effect of identification, λ = .94, F (3, 120) = 3.94, p = .02, η^2 = .06. Thus, group identification played a role, positively predicting anger and fear (F (1, 121) = 7.38, p = .008, η^2 = .06; F (1, 121) = 4.66, p = .03, η^2 = .04, respectively), but it also interacted with legitimacy showing an effect on anger, F (1, 121) = 4.23, p =.04, η^2 = .03. In line with the results found for the endorsement of collective action, simple slope analysis revealed an effect of group identification in the illegitimate condition, β = .41, t(121) = 3.42; p = .001, showing that only when the in-group rejected its disadvantage, high identifiers reported higher levels of anger towards the discrimination than low identifiers.

Further, we analyzed the effect of our manipulations and group identification on the subtle variables also aimed at contesting disadvantage, namely perceptions towards the in-group view and the disadvantage itself. Wilks' Lambda showed a significant overall effect of legitimacy, and an interaction between this factor and group identification, (λ = .79, F (3, 119) = 10.82, p < .001, η^2 = .21; λ = .93, F (3, 119) = 2.98, p = .03, η^2 = .07, respectively). There was an univariate main effect of legitimacy on the perception that the in-group view of the situation was appropriate and on the time-scale of the issue (F (1, 121) = 30.89, p < .001, η^2 = .20; F (1, 121) = 5.57, p = .02, η^2 = .04, respectively). Specifically, participants in the legitimate conditions perceived that in-group opinion was more adequate and that the issue would be a long-term problem (M = 4.27; M = 5.19, respectively), than participants under illegitimate circumstances (M = 3.17; M = 4.55, respectively). In addition, group identification interacted with the legitimacy factor on the perceptions that the in-group opinion view of the situation was appropriate, and the disadvantage was a serious problem (F (1, 121) = 3.75, p = .05, η^2 = .03; F (1, 121) = 5.76, p = .02, η^2 = .04, respectively)., Simple slope analyses showed an

effect of group identification only in the illegitimate conditions (β = .26, *t*(121) = 2.39; *p* = .02; β = .27, *t*(121) = 2.20; *p* = .03, respectively). Specifically, only when the in-group rejected the disadvantage, high identifiers perceived that this framing of the discriminated situation was more appropriate and that the issue was more serious than those participants who identified to a lesser extent with the in-group. In line with the more direct ways of contesting the disadvantage, group identification had an effect on the illegitimate condition.

Table 1. Means, standard deviations and effects of group identification per condition in Study 1

	Legitimacy	Illegitimacy		Legitimacy	Illegitimacy
Social opinion support	4.04 (.85) -.04	4.34 (.85) -.02	Serious issue	4.72 (1.61) .09	4.59 (1.62) .26*
Action social support	3.46 (1.10) .02	3.54 (1.13) .03	Long term issue	5.12 (1.45) -.01	4.59 (1.57) .17
Group efficacy	3.46 (1.02) .23†	3.50 (1.10) .32*	Participants' prototypicality	4.03 (.99) .55***	3.92 (1.03) .44***
Intention to approve CA	3.69 (2.03) .06	3.92 (2.18) .35**	In-group members' prototypicality	4.38 (.88) .18	4.54 (1.05) .23†
Intention to take CA	3.25 (1.92) .08	3.19 (2.00) .31*	Activists' prototypicality	4.73 (1.13) -.07	4.66 (1.27) .14
Behavioral action tendencies	2.85 1.21 .11	2.67 1.19 .33**	Competence traits	5.34 (.66) .25**	5.33 (.70) .35**
Anger	3.58 (1.41) .08	3.28 (1.55) .39**	Warmth/ Morality traits	4.60 (.82) .32**	4.70 (.64) .06
Fear	2.67 (1.24) .09	2.47 (1.29) .30*	Sociable traits	4.25 (.99) .12	4.41 (.90) .15
Appropriateness of in-group opinion	4.26 (1.12) -.05	3.16 (1.03) .31*			

Note. Standard deviation between brackets
$^\dagger p$ <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

We also checked the effects of internal legitimacy on participants' perceptions of prototypicality. Unsurprisingly, analysis showed an overall effect of group identification,

λ = .70, F (3, 119) = 17.09, p < .001, η^2 = .30. Univariate effects indicated that group identification positively predicted participants' and the students' surveyed prototypicality (F (1, 121) = 48.76, p < .001, η^2 =; .29; F (1, 121) = 4.94, p = .03, η^2 = .04, respectively).

Finally, we test the effect of our manipulations on social creativity strategies as a way of fighting the disadvantage in a more subtle way. To check the results on the in-group stereotype perception, we included as dependent variables high competence, high warmth/morality, and high sociable traits. Once more, analysis showed an overall effect of identification, λ = .87, F (3, 119) = 6.06, p = .001, η^2 = .13. Univariate effects revealed that group identification positively predicted the high competence and the high warmth/morality traits (F (1, 121) = 15.50, p < .001, η^2 = .11; F (1, 121) = 5.40, p = .02, η^2 = .04, respectively), showing that high identifiers perceived the in-group in a more positive way than low identifiers Further, group identification interacted with legitimacy on the warmth/morality traits, F (1, 121) = 3.05, p = .08, η^2 = .02. Replicating previous results, (Jiménez-Moya, et al., 2012), further analysis showed an effect of group identification under legitimate conditions, β = .36, t(125) = 2.84; p = .005. This indicated that when the in-group legitimized the disadvantage, high identifiers contested the situation by perceiving higher levels of warmth and morality associated with the in-group than low identifiers.

Discussion

Our previous work has shown that, compared to the low identifiers, high identifiers from low status groups contest social inequality and are willing to fight for a better in-group position when the group accepts its disadvantage (internal legitimacy; Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013). The aim of the current research was to examine how individuals from a traditional high status group deal with social inequality in circumstances in which the rest of the in-group justified its own disadvantage.

In line with previous research (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), participants who highly identified with German students reported higher levels of group efficacy and were more willing to act to stop the inequality. They also perceived themselves more prototypical of their group and reported higher levels of fear and anger towards the group disadvantage. In

addition, and in line with previous work (Jiménez-Moya, et al., 2012; Matera, Giannini, Blanco, & Smith, 2005), high identifiers perceived that the in-group was more competent, warm/moral and sociable, than the low identifiers.

Nevertheless, and more theoretically interesting, the effect of group identification was qualified by the internal legitimacy factor. We found that high identifiers seemed more prone than low identifiers to contest the inequality under *illegitimate* conditions. That is, when the in-group rejected the disadvantage, those members who highly identified tended to approve collective action and to show higher levels of anger than low identifiers. Furthermore, under illegitimate conditions, high identifiers also perceived that the accommodation disadvantage was a more serious issue and that the in-group view towards it was more appropriate, than low identifiers. Only when it comes to the in-group stereotype did we find an effect of group identification under legitimate conditions. This last result supports previous findings in which high identifiers perceived the in-group in a more positive way than low identifiers under legitimate conditions (Jiménez-Moya, et al., 2012). In this case, those who highly identified perceived the group as warmer and more moral than low identifiers, when the in-group accepted the disadvantage as fair.

Therefore, it seems that high identifiers reacted under legitimate conditions only through more indirect social creativity strategies; when it comes to direct behaviors aimed at stopping the disadvantage high identifiers seemed more willing to act than low identifiers under internally *illegitimate* conditions only. Thus, only when the strategies to deal with the disadvantage are not related to direct competition and social change do they react more in the legitimate conditions.

These findings are consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which establishes that disadvantaged groups will fight the discrimination when it is framed as illegitimate and unfair. However, this pattern differs from what our previous work shows with regard to the moderating role of group identification, namely that high identifiers are especially likely to challenge the disadvantage when the own in-group seems to accept it (i.e., in arguably the most difficult and challenging situation of all). In contrast here, in Study 1, participants seemed to endorse a "do not rock the boat" strategy, given that they evaluated the in-group view towards the disadvantage as more appropriate when it legitimized and accepted it. Furthermore, high identifiers were only

more willing than the low identifiers to fight the disadvantage under illegitimate conditions.

Why did participants highly indentified with German students adopt this more cautious strategy, compared to other disadvantaged groups in our previous research? We argue that the group stereotype used by both the out-group and the in-group to justify the disadvantage might have prevented high identifiers from readily contesting the disadvantage under the more constraining conditions (i.e., internal legitimacy). The group traits that were used to justify the accommodation problems of German students were related to their assumed shy stereotype but also to their arrogant character. We argue that it may have been precisely the traits related to their presupposed dominance and arrogance that restrained the high identifiers in the internal legitimacy condition, given that demanding equal rights with the Dutch students could be seen as confirming the (negative) arrogant in-group stereotype under the most vulnerable circumstances (i.e., lack of in-group support). Thus acting assertively (i.e., supporting collective action and its correlates) may confirm this negative stereotype among the high identifiers subgroup, and in contrast to the group norm of acceptance in the internal legitimacy condition. High identifiers thus seem reluctant to do take the risk of action, and the stigma it may cause stereotypically, without social support. By contrast, this negative interpretation of the stereotype is rejected by the in-group under internal illegitimacy conditions, and so the assertiveness of action does not reinforce an arrogance stereotype, and the high identifiers are not isolated and alone. Following this rationale, in Study 2 we test directly for the effect of the stereotype dimension that is used to justify the in-group disadvantage on high identifiers' reactions.

Study 2

In Study 1 we found that when dealing with group disadvantage, high identifiers were more willing to contest it than low identifiers if the in-group framed the disadvantage as illegitimate. Given that these results diverge from previous ones, in which the in-group stereotype used to legitimate the disadvantage was based on different dimensions, we investigate whether the stereotype content might be playing a critical role in explaining this difference. Whereas in the previous work, the group stereotype was related to the low competence and high warmth dimensions, in this case

the justifications were based on a more high competence and low warmth combination associated with high status groups (i.e., consistent with the arrogance and dominance mentioned in the scenarios). In our earlier research, the attempts to fight for a better in-group position could not readily have been framed as dominant or arrogant acts. However, in the present case, requesting more privileges could confirm the in-group negative stereotype related to dominance. For this reason, high identifiers may only have contested the discrimination when the in-group rejected the disadvantage and the negative in-group stereotype.

Based on this reasoning, in Study 2 we made a distinction between the two stereotypic dimensions that were used in Study 1, manipulating the stereotype dimension used to legitimate the in-group disadvantage. In one condition the traits arrogance and dominance were utilized to justify (or not) the inequality. In contrast, in the second condition the in-group traits were related to shyness and the more introverted dimension of the in-group stereotype. Following results from Study 1, we expect that high identifiers will react to the inequality when the in-group arrogant stereotype is salient only under internal *illegitimate* conditions (as in Study 1), that is when the in-group clearly rejects the disadvantage and this stereotype. By contrast, and in line with our arguments and with past research results (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013), we predict that the high identifiers will (paradoxically perhaps) contest the situation when the shy side of the stereotype is present under legitimate circumstances, because in this case they do not confirm a negative stereotype that isolates them from the group. In this case, a more cautious position, in order to not confirm a negative stereotype, should not be necessary.

Method

Participants, Design and Procedure

Participants were 67 German undergraduates from the University of Groningen (44 women, mean age: 20.75), who received course credit for their participation. The procedure and the fictitious scenario were similar to the previous study. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) x 2 (Stereotype dimension: arrogant vs. shy) between participants factorial design.

Legitimacy manipulation

As in Study 1, we maintained external legitimacy constant across conditions, but manipulated the internal legitimacy factor (legitimate vs. illegitimate).

In-group stereotype manipulation

External legitimacy was based on the "too serious" German character. Building on that, we manipulated the traits of the German stereotype that were used by the in-group to justify (legitimate condition), or reject (illegitimate condition) the disadvantage. Specifically, in the legitimate arrogant condition, German students confirmed that they can come across as a bit serious and ambitious, and they understood that this might be framed by the Dutch students as *arrogance and superiority,* but nothing about the shy dimension of the stereotype was mentioned. Similarly, in the legitimate shy condition, German students accepted that they can be a bit serious and responsible, and affirmed that this could lead to a *shy and introverted* image, but the arrogant stereotype was not mentioned. However, in the illegitimate conditions German students denied the serious character and stated that the traits associated to the in-group (respectively arrogant or shy according to condition) were just prejudice and an outdated stereotype. Therefore, in both the legitimate and illegitimate conditions German students were aware of the in-group stereotype, but in the legitimate conditions the in-group admitted that their character could lead to this negative stereotype, while in the illegitimate condition this was denied and seen as an outdated stereotype.

Dependent variables

We used the same items to measure group identification as in Study 1 (α = .86). Further, prior to the manipulation we measured the in-group stereotype with nineteen items, with the aim of controlling for the in-group stereotype that participants endorsed before the manipulation. We used the same scales and items as in Study 1 to measure the effectiveness of the legitimacy manipulation (r =.70), opinion and action social support (α = .50; α = .79, respectively), group efficacy (α = .89), the willingness to approve and engage in collective action, (α = .88; α = .90; respectively), behavioral action tendencies (α = .77), and how participants felt with regard of the housing situation (anger, α = .78; fear, α = .82). We also measured participants' view towards the in-group

opinion on the accommodation issue (α = .84), their perception of the problem itself, and the perceived prototypically of themselves, of the German students surveyed (we removed one item in order to improve the reliability of the scale), and of the German students activists (α = .71; r = .74; α = .76; respectively).

In this study, we also measured the *in-group meta-stereotype* with nineteen competence, warmth and morality related traits. (i.e., *From your point of view, to what extent do Dutch students perceive German students as …*). This measure was taken as a proxy of social creativity strategies, aimed at protecting the in-group image. Exploratory factor analysis (KMO statistic = .73; Bartlett statistic: χ^2= 609.11; p < .001), revealed 5 main factors. The first one included 6 high-competence traits (e.g., hard-working, ambitious), and explained 24.13% of the variance (α = .82). The second factor was composed by 5 high-warmth traits (e.g., sociable, kind), and explained 18.92% of the variance (α = .78). The third factor comprised 3 low warmth traits (e.g., introverted, shy) and explained 14.06% of the variance (α = .72). The fourth component was composed of 2 high morality traits (i.e., fair, honest), and explained 5.99% of the variance (α = .64). Finally, the fifth factor was formed by 2 negative traits relating to arrogance (i.e., arrogant, overconfident) and explained the 5.66% of the variance (r = .32, *p* < .01).

Lastly, to check the effectiveness of the stereotype dimension manipulation, at the end of the questionnaire participants were asked whether six traits (three items related to each dimension of the stereotype, arrogant and shy) were used by the German students surveyed to justify or reject the disadvantage. Participants answered with a yes/no/not mentioned scale. We averaged the answers of each group of traits ("no/not mentioned" answers were coded as 0, and the "yes" as 1) creating two variables (i.e., arrogant traits mentioned, shy traits mentioned) that indicated to what extent arrogant and shy traits were used to justify (or not) the disadvantage. With these checks we wanted to ensure that participants understood and remembered what side of the stereotype had been used by other in-group members to justify (or not) the disadvantage. These variables were included as dependent factors in the subsequent analysis.

Results

Manipulation checks

We checked the effect of the legitimacy manipulation with a 2 (Legitimacy: legitimate vs. illegitimate) x 2 (Stereotype dimension: arrogant vs. shy) ANOVA on the averaged of the two legitimacy checks. Results showed a main effect of legitimacy, F (1, 63) = 41.52, p < .001, η^2 = .40, confirming that participants in the legitimate condition perceived that the in-group members framed the situation as more fair (M = 4.63) than participants in the illegitimate condition (M = 2.63). Further, we repeated the same analysis on the stereotype checks. It showed a main effect of the stereotype dimension factor on the arrogant and shy traits that were mentioned by the in-group to justify or reject the disadvantage (F (1, 63) = 19.16, p < .001, η^2 = .23; F (1, 63) = 50.30, p < .001, η^2 = .44, respectively). Specifically, participants in the arrogant conditions reported that the German students surveyed used more traits related to the arrogant dimension (M = .68) than participants in the shy conditions (M = .41). In the same way, participants in the shy conditions perceived that the in-group used more traits related to the shy dimension (M = .80) to justify the disadvantage than participants in the arrogant condition (M = .41).

Main results

First, we tested the effects of our manipulations on the most direct ways of contesting the disadvantage. A MANOVA with legitimacy and stereotype dimension as factors and group identification as a (centered) continuous predictor was conducted on opinion and action social support, group efficacy, collective action and behavioral action tendencies. There were significant overall effects of group identification and legitimacy (λ = .79, F (6, 54) = 2.45, p = .04, η^2 = .21; λ = .77, F (6, 54) = 2.62, p = .03, η^2 = .22, respectively), and an interaction between group identification and legitimacy, that was further qualified by the stereotype dimension factor (λ = .71, F (6, 54) = 3.68, p = .004, η^2 = .29; λ = .73, F (6, 54) = 3.26, p = .008, η^2 = .27, respectively). Univariate effects showed main effects of group identification and legitimacy. First, confirming results of Study 1, group identification positively predicted action social support, the approval and the engagement in collective action and behavioral action tendencies to stop the disadvantage (F (1, 59) = 9.67, p = .003, η^2 = .14; F (1, 59) = 7.29, p = .009, η^2 = .11; F (1, 59) = 7.65, p = .008, η^2 = .11; F (1, 59) = 10.28, p = .002, η^2 = .15, respectively).

Second, and in line with previous results (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013), legitimacy had an effect on participants. Specifically, we found a main effect of legitimacy on opinion social support $F (1, 59) = 10.01$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .14$; unsurprisingly, participants in the illegitimate conditions reported higher levels of social support ($M = 4.41$) than participants under legitimate circumstances ($M = 3.76$). Further, the factors manipulated interacted with group identification: we found two-way interactions between Group identification x Legitimacy on action social support and group efficacy ($F (1, 59) = 6.65$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .10$; $F (1, 59) = 5.03$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .08$, respectively), and Group identification x Stereotype dimension on group efficacy, $F (1, 59) = 5.85$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .09$. These interactions were qualified by a three-way interaction Group identification x Legitimacy x Stereotype dimension on action social support and group efficacy, although the latter was marginal ($F (1, 59) = 11.06$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .16$; $F (1, 59) = 3.12$, $p = .08$, $\eta^2 = .05$, respectively).

To decompose this interaction, we split the stereotype dimension factor and looked separately at the arrogant and shy conditions for the effects shown in Study 1. In the arrogant condition, this analysis showed an effect of group identification under illegitimate circumstances ($\beta = .99$, $t(30) = 3.71$; $p = .001$; $\beta = .82$, $t(30) = 2.69$; $p = .01$, for action social support and group efficacy, respectively). Confirming our hypothesis, when the in-group did not accept the disadvantage by rejecting the arrogant stereotype of the in-group (illegitimate condition), high identifiers perceived higher levels of action social support and group efficacy in order to fight the disadvantage than low identifiers (see Figure 1). Thus, the high identifiers seemed more willing to challenge the social disadvantage directly under perceived illegitimacy. By contrast, we found no effect of identification in the shy conditions.

We also checked for the effect of the manipulations on the emotions reported by participants, but they were not affected by identification with the in-group, legitimacy or stereotype dimension factors (all Fs<1).

Figure 1. Level of action social support perceived in the arrogant conditions as a function of identification and legitimacy

In addition, we ran a similar analysis to check the effects of our manipulations on those more subtle ways of fighting the disadvantage, specifically on participants' perceptions towards the in-group view and the issue itself. Analysis showed a significant overall effect of legitimacy, $\lambda = .85$, $F(3, 57) = 3.37$, $p < .02$, $\eta^2 = .15$. Further, replicating Study 1, we also found a main effect of legitimacy on the perception that the in-group view regarding the issue was appropriate, $F(1, 59) = 8.04$, $p = .006$, $\eta^2 = .12$, showing that participants in the legitimate conditions conceived the in-group opinion more appropriate ($M = 4.18$) than participants in the illegitimate conditions ($M = 3.40$). Similarly, regarding the seriousness of the disadvantage, univariate effects showed a main effect of identification, $F(1, 59) = 5.24$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .08$, indicating that those who highly identified with the group perceive the disadvantage as more serious. Apart from the effect of identification, we found an interaction of our manipulations on this variable, Stereotype dimension x Legitimacy, $F(1, 59) = 3.99$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2 = .06$. Simple effects analysis showed significant differences in the arrogant conditions, $F(1, 59) = 5.16$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .08$, indicating that participants perceived that the group disadvantage was more a serious problem under illegitimate conditions ($M = 4.94$) than when the group accepted the disadvantage, ($M = 3.88$). Therefore the problem was seen more

serious when the arrogant stereotype was salient, threatening the in-group image, but the in-group rejected this negative stereotype. There was no difference when the dimension of the stereotype activated was shyness.

As in Study 1 we also analyzed participants perceptions of the prototypicality of themselves, the German students surveyed, and the activists, as another subtle way of contesting the disadvantage. This MANOVA showed an overall effect of group identification, $\lambda = .83$, $F (3, 157) = 4.00$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .17$. Univariate effects showed a positive effect of group identification on participants' prototypicality, $F (1, 59) = 12.41$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .17$. Further, this effect was qualified by a two-way interaction between group identification and legitimacy, $F (1, 59) = 5.28$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .08$. As in Study 1, the results showed that high identifiers perceived themselves as more prototypical in the illegitimate condition, $\beta = .62$, $t(59) = 4.20$; $p < .001$, than in the legitimate one. That is, high identifiers saw themselves more typical members when the in-group rejected its own disadvantage, which might imply that they also refused the disadvantage. Regarding the prototypicality assigned to the German student activists, we found a three-way interaction, Group identification x Legitimacy x Stereotype dimension, on the prototypicality attributed to this German student subgroup, $F (1, 59) = 5.23$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .08$. In order to disentangle this interaction we followed the same strategy as before and we split the data by the stereotype dimension factor. Simple slopes analyses showed a marginal negative effect of identification in the arrogant and legitimate condition, $\beta = -.43$, $t(30) = -1.95$; $p = .06$. That is, when the in-group legitimized the disadvantage based on an arrogant stereotype, high identifiers perceived the in-group activists as less prototypical than low identifiers. In other words, the activists were seen as less typical in-group members when the in-group accepted the disadvantage as fair but, importantly, based on the arrogant dimension of the stereotype.

Finally, we examined the idea that participants would use the in-group meta-stereotype to resist the disadvantaged, as a social creativity strategy. We tested the effect of our manipulations on the in-group meta-stereotype measures, including as dependent variables the competence, high warmth, low warmth, morality, and arrogance traits. We found an overall effect of group identification, $\lambda = .83$, $F (5, 55) = 2.31$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2 = .17$, and two significant interactions, namely Group identification x Stereotype dimension, and Legitimacy x Stereotype dimension ($\lambda = .65$, $F (5, 55) = 5.89$, p

< .001, η^2 = .35; λ = .82, F (5, 55) = 2.40, p = .05, η^2 = .18, respectively). Analysis showed main effects of group identification and legitimacy. Specifically, in line with previous results (Jiménez-Moya, et al., 2012; Matera, et al., 2005), a main effect of group identification on high moral traits was revealed, F (1, 59) = 10.99, p = .002, η^2 = .16, showing that group identification positively predicted the perception that the in-group was perceived by the out-group (i.e., Dutch students) as moral (i.e., fair and honest). In addition, legitimacy had an effect on low warmth, indicating that participants in the legitimate conditions perceived that the in-group was seen by the out-group as less warm (M =3.97) than participants in the illegitimate one (M =3.60). Further, we found that group identification interacted with the stereotype dimension on the meta-stereotype perception. Specifically, we found a two-way interaction between group identification and the stereotype dimension on the high warmth traits, F (1, 59) = 3.98, p = .05, η^2 = .06. Simple slope analysis showed that when the arrogant side of the stereotype was salient, high identifiers reported that the in-group was perceived by the out-group as warmer compared to those who identified to a lesser extent, β = .40, t(59) = 1.93; p = .06. Following the logic of the social creativity strategies this latter results can be understood as some sort of social creativity strategy in an attempt to protect the in-group image (by perceiving the group as warmer) under arrogant conditions.

Finally, there was a significant two-way interaction of the two factors manipulated, Legitimacy x Stereotype dimension on three variables: low warmth, high morality and arrogance traits, regarding the way in which the in-group was perceived by the out-group (F (1, 59) = 12.32, p = .001, η^2 = .17; F (1, 59) = 13.79, p < .001, η^2 = .19; F (1, 59) = 10.12, p = .002, η^2 = .15, respectively). Simple effects analyses showed significant differences in the shy conditions for the low warmth and high morality traits (F (1, 59) = 12.76, p = .001, η^2 = .18; F (1, 59) = 11.78, p = .001, η^2 = .17, respectively). Specifically, under legitimate conditions, participants reported lower warmth and higher morality than participants in the illegitimate conditions (M = 4.61 vs. 3.44; M = 4.56 vs. 3.53). That is, when the shy side of the stereotype was used to justify the disadvantage (i.e., legitimate shy condition), participants perceived that the group was seen as less warm but more moral, than when the shy stereotype was rejected.

Table 2. Means, standard deviations and effects of group identification per condition in Study 2

	Legitimacy		Illegitimacy	
	Arrogant stereotype	Shy stereotype	Arrogant stereotype	Shy stereotype
Opinion social support	3.71 (1.01) .38	3.82 (.89) .13	4.48 (.81) .15	4.33 (.82) .03
Action social support	3.51 (1.51) -.24	3.74 (1.29) .35	4.21 (1.32) .73**	3.56 (1.01) .29
Group efficacy	4.05 (1.09) .02	4.25 (.91) -.15	3.83 (1.03) .64**	3.68 (.60) -.05
Intention to approve CA	4.00 (2.21) .53*	4.47 (2.03) .17	4.99 (1.90) .36	4.40 (1.70) .20
Intention to take CA	3.31 (2.32) .60*	3.14 (2.16) .27	4.13 (2.05) .30	3.29 (1.35) -.02
Behavioral action tendencies	2.73 (1.26) .65**	2.77 (1.50) .35	2.77 (1.43) .35	2.65 (.92) .07
Anger	3.20 (1.40) .32	3.78 (1.30) -.05	3.52 (1.37) .14	3.51 (1.23) .06
Fear	2.57 (1.21) .07	2.45 (1.22) .41	2.31 (.85) .21	2.27 (1.30) .19
Appropriateness of in-group opinion	4.34 (0.76) -.25	4.01 (1.60) .03	3.41 (1.21) .29	3.39 (.68) -.29
Serious issue	3.88 (1.62) .45+	4.29 (1.65) .40	4.94 (1.79) .23	4.00 (1.59) .03

	Legitimacy		Illegitimacy	
	Arrogant stereotype	Shy stereotype	Arrogant stereotype	Shy stereotype
Long term issue	5.06 (1.75) .26	4.53 (1.70) .31	4.94 (1.92) -.04	4.38 (1.36) .09
Participants' prototypicality	4.08 (.95) .23	4.04 (.98) .09	3.92 (1.19) .79***	3.73 (1.40) .48+
In-group members' prototypicality	4.67 (.93) -.01	4.33 (.95) .14	4.88 (.80) .29	4.98 (.66) -.01
Activists' prototypicality	4.51 (1.09) -.40	4.84 (1.27) .24	4.56 (.78) .37	4.73 (1.44) -.21
High competence traits	5.36 (.84) .02	5.80 (.89) .10	5.51 (.66) .27	5.59 (.54) .18
High warmth traits	3.73 (.77) .47*	3.81 (.76) .01	3.82 (.90) .22	3.81 (.87) -.35
Low warmth traits	3.33 (.92) .10	4.61 (.99) .10	3.77 (.73) .18	3.78 (1.10) -.14
High morality traits	4.09 (.83) .47*	4.56 (.75) .10	4.43 (1.08) .64**	3.43 (.94) .06
Arrogant traits	5.85 (.68) .22	5.41 (1.02) -.33	5.03 (.80) .06	5.80 (.88) .43+

Note. Standard deviation between brackets
+ $p <.10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

In addition, regarding the high morality traits, we also found marginal differences in the arrogant conditions, $F(1, 59) = 3.31$, $p = .07$, $\eta^2 = .05$; showing that participants tended to report higher levels of in-group morality in the illegitimate condition, than when the in-group accepted the disadvantage, ($M = 4.47$ vs. 4.09). In other words, when the arrogant stereotype was denied by the in-group (i.e., illegitimate arrogant condition), the meta-stereotype endorsed by participants tended to present higher levels of morality, than when the arrogant stereotype was accepted by the own in-group as a justification of the disadvantage. Regarding the negative traits related to arrogance, we found significant differences in the arrogant conditions, $F(1, 59) = 8.69$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .13$; indicating that under legitimate circumstances, participants reported that the in-group was seen as more arrogant than participants in the illegitimate conditions ($M = 5.85$ vs. 4.91). Therefore, when the arrogant stereotype legitimized the disadvantage, participants perceived that the group was seen by Dutch students as more arrogant than when the arrogant side of the in-group was rejected in the illegitimate condition.

Discussion

Our aim in Study 2 was to test the idea that different stereotype contents lead to different ways of dealing with in-group disadvantage. Specifically, we expected that the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage based on an arrogant stereotype would make it difficult for high identifiers to demand equal treatment through direct collective action involving broad in-group support. Supporting the results of Study 1, in contrast, they were more likely to contest the situation when the in-group as a whole rejected the inequality. However, we expected that when the shy dimension of the stereotype was salient, the high identifiers would react more (compared to low identifiers) against the inequality even under internal legitimate conditions, in line with earlier findings (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013). Our hypotheses were partially confirmed as, in line with Study 1, we found differences in the expected direction in the arrogant conditions, but there were no reliable effects of identification in the shy conditions.

In support of the results of Study 1, we found that high identifiers reported higher levels of action social support and collective action tendencies, and that they were more willing to fight the disadvantage. In addition, they perceived the accommodation issue

as a more serious problem and viewed themselves as more prototypical in-group members than low identifiers. Further, in general terms, it seems that there was a tendency to accept the situation and only have the intention to act under illegitimate conditions. In fact, participants in the legitimate condition reported that the in-group attitude towards the disadvantage was more appropriate than participants under illegitimate circumstances.

Further, group identification also played a role in combination with the stereotype dimension. When the stereotype used to legitimize the disadvantage was related to arrogance and dominance, high identifiers perceived higher levels of social support and group efficacy in order to contest the in-group disadvantage than the low identifiers, but only under illegitimate conditions. This pattern was also true for the perception that the issue was a serious problem, a variable that could also be seen as a first proxy of contesting the situation. In other words, if the arrogant stereotype was salient, high identifiers were ready to act only if other members of the in-group clearly rejected the disadvantage. High identifiers only took this risk when the rest of the in-group perceived the situation as underserved. By contrast under arrogant and legitimate conditions, high identifiers evaluated those activists German students who complained about the accommodation issue as less prototypical in-group members.

The results found regarding the meta-stereotype showed the effect of our manipulations on participants' perceptions regarding how the in-group is seen by others. They reported that, under legitimate conditions, the in-group was perceived as more arrogant in the arrogant condition and less warm in the shy condition. Note that the arrogance factor was composed of arrogant and overconfident traits, and that the low warmth factor was formed by traits as shy and introverted. Participants' responses indicate that they believed the internal legitimate messages based on both stereotypic dimensions. Nevertheless, we argue that the effects found in the high morality factor (e.g., fair, honest) suggest the use of a social creativity strategy to deal with the disadvantage. Specifically, when the inequality was justified with the shy German character, participants perceived that the in-group was seen as more fair and honest under legitimate than in the illegitimate conditions. In contrast when the arrogant stereotype dimension was used as justification of the inequality, participants reported that the in-group was seen as more moral under illegitimate conditions. These results

are in line with our predictions that when the shy in-group stereotype is salient, individuals contest the disadvantage (by perceiving the in-group in a positive way) when the in-group legitimizes the disadvantage, but when the stereotypic dimension salient is the arrogant, participants only contest the disadvantage when the in-group clearly rejects it.

We explain the lack of significant findings when the in-group stereotype content was based on shy/introverted traits due to the fact that this stereotype content, by its very nature, may not help fighting group disadvantage, as this type of assertive reaction might not be in line with the typical characteristics of an introverted group. However, an arrogant stereotype content, especially when it is rejected by the in-group, should not inhibit assertiveness and confidence, which facilitate behavior directed at claiming justice.

General discussion

The aim of this work was to study the way in which members of a traditional high status group deal with social inequality when the rest of the in-group seems to accept the situation. Specifically, we focused on a specific social group, German students that were living in the Netherlands.

Our past work shows that in circumstances in which the disadvantaged group accepts and justifies the discrimination, high identifiers contest the situation and fight for a better in-group future to a greater extent that low identifiers. That is, it is under internal legitimate conditions where group efficacy played a role when dealing with group disadvantage. By contrast, in the present research we show that high identifiers were more willing than low identifiers to contest the inequality under internal *illegitimate* conditions. In line with social identity theory principles (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), when the in-group framed its own disadvantage as illegitimate and underserved, those who identified highly showed higher levels of group efficacy and tended to approve collective action to a greater extent than low identifiers. They also tended to report higher levels of anger, an emotion that leads to collective action (Tausch, et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, et al., 2004).

In summary, group identification played a role in directly contesting the disadvantage under illegitimate conditions. In contrast, when the in-group justified its

own disadvantage, high identifiers prefer to resort to social creativity strategies (i.e., affirming positive traits that are seen as counter-stereotypic of the group) than contesting the inequality by more straightforward means.

What are the characteristics of the present situation that makes the difference, and explains the divergence from the results of earlier studies? Note that our previous studies were focused on disadvantaged groups that traditionally held a low status position. However, in the present paper we are focused on a high status group that is incidentally in a disadvantaged situation. In line with this, the stereotype associated with low status groups is related to high warmth and low competence whereas in the present research, the stereotype associated with the group went in the opposite direction. We argue that the stereotype content is a factor that affects individuals' reactions towards the disadvantage. Specifically, the arrogant dimension of the group stereotype may prevent high identifiers from resisting under legitimate conditions. Indeed, the activists who claim justice under arrogant and legitimate conditions were evaluated by the high identifiers as less prototypical in-group exemplars and, ultimately, less loyal members.

It is important to note that if a disadvantage is legitimized by the in-group's arrogant character, demanding justice and equality could be understood as confirming the negative stereotype and group image. We argue that, for this reason, high identifiers were more likely to work for justice than low identifiers only when the in-group as a whole also contested their disadvantage (i.e., under illegitimate conditions)[3]. In this case, high identifiers were aware that the rest of the in-group members rejected the justification that legitimized the disadvantage in terms of the arrogance; thus the actions aimed at stopping the disadvantage would then not be seen as confirming this stereotype, at least in the eyes of the in-group. This finding might imply than high and low status groups face social inequality differently, but also that a high status group claiming justice could be seen in a more negative or less legitimate way than when a lower status group does so. Therefore, it could be that high status groups receive less

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[3] Exploratory analysis showed that this effect was found for those high identifiers who did not perceive the in-group as arrogant. Specifically, when we introduced in the analysis the in-group stereotype perceptions as a continuous predictor, we found that the ones who perceive higher levels of social support and group efficacy under illegitimate conditions where the ones who conceive the in-group as arrogant to a lesser extent. Therefore the arrogant stereotype activates the potency needed for contesting the disadvantage, but this is inhibited if the in-group is actually perceived as arrogant.

support and solidarity from third parties or other out-groups when fighting for equal rights, implying negative consequences for these groups. More research is needed to examine individuals' perceptions and attitudes when other low and high groups take collective action.

We expected that under the condition in which the shy and introverted dimension of the stereotype was activated, high identifiers contest the disadvantage to a greater extent than low identifiers under legitimate conditions. However, we did not find evidence to support this hypothesis. Nevertheless, results in Study 2 show that the stereotype content matters when taking into account the diverse reactions among individuals dealing with disadvantage.

Although we have shown that the in-group stereotype used differentiates this work from earlier research, it is also true that, compared to this previous work, the disadvantaged group in this case was in a more vulnerable situation. Specifically, being guests in a host country might make the chances of demanding social justice more difficult. Under such complex conditions, claiming injustice might be considered as inappropriate and unwise because it implies challenging the (albeit advantaged) host group, potentially undermining good relations. This situation might contribute to the fact that group members in general seemed to think that accepting the disadvantage would be the best course to follow; and that high identifiers in particular were only willing to contest the disadvantage when the rest of the in-group also supported this fight.

Conclusion

We have shown that members of high status, albeit incidentally disadvantaged, groups, do not follow the pattern showed in our previous research (Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013), namely that high identifiers contest group disadvantage to a greater extent than low identifiers when it is legitimized by the in-group. In the current studies we show that one of the reasons for this different way of confronting disadvantage could be the stereotype content used to legitimate the unfavorable position. Specifically, a stereotype implicating arrogant and dominant traits seemed to inhibit the high identifiers' fight under legitimate conditions, but rejecting this stereotype encourages high identifiers to take action more than low identifiers. By

contrast a stereotype related to shyness and introversion did not inhibit such action when accepted by the in-group but it did not lead to greater resistance by high identifiers either (cf. Jiménez-Moya, Rodríguez-Bailón, et al., 2013). In summary, this research shows that in-group stereotypes affect the willingness to resist social inequality, especially under the difficult circumstances where the in-group appears to accept the disadvantage.

Chapter VII

General Discussion

This doctoral dissertation studies how disadvantaged groups deal with social inequality. We show that, in general, individuals are more willing to oppose social disadvantage when the in-group frames it as illegitimate and undeserved. This result is in line with previous research in which individuals seemed to be more willing to fight against the disadvantage under pervasive discrimination (compare to rare), only when the in-group frames the situation as illegitimate (Hersby, Jetten, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2011). By contrast, individuals show lower levels of collective action intentions when discrimination is conceived as legitimate and pervasive (compared to rare discrimination; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, Garza, & Mewse, 2011). These findings together emphasize that illegitimacy perceptions make more likely that individuals fight against social disadvantage (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, in this work we focus on individuals' responses when other in-group members frame their own disadvantage as legitimate and deserved. Our main finding is that, paradoxically, those in-group members who are more committed to the group (i.e., high identifiers) contest the in-group norm of legitimacy and are more willing to fight for equality compared to low identifiers, when the group justifies its own disadvantage.

This result can be seen as counter-intuitive as high identifiers are the members who are typically those most influenced by in-group norms (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996, 1997; McAuliffe, Jetten, Hornsey, & Hogg, 2003; Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000; Turner, 1991). However, it has also been shown that high identifiers can deviate from the in-group norm under certain circumstances (Crane & Platow, 2010; Packer, 2008), sometimes in order to pursue strategic goals (Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007). In this line, the normative conflict model (Packer, 2008) establishes that high identifiers can dissent from the in-group when they perceive that certain norms are detrimental for the group. In the current work, we go beyond this and show that the high identifiers' non-conformity has more profound consequences than just the dissent reported in previous research (Packer & Chasteen, 2010). We argue that when the group disadvantage is framed as legitimate by the in-group members, high identifies are willing to challenge the situation by fighting for a better in-group position in the social hierarchy. Therefore, even when the group justifies the disadvantage, high identifiers resist to this internally legitimate message, perceiving scope for social change and presenting the intention to

act accordingly. We have replicated this main result with different groups that face different forms of discrimination and with an experimentally created group, manipulating instead of measuring group identification. Similar results across the studies presented in this doctoral dissertation support these findings described for the high identified members.

However, as in some previous research, we also report research showing that the high identifiers' resistance takes place under illegitimate conditions, when the in-group rejects the disadvantage. We argue that this result might be due to certain factors (i.e., the content of the in-group stereotype that is used to legitimize the disadvantage) that may prevent high identifiers from fighting for equality when the in-group legitimizes the disadvantage (see the discussion about this topic below).

Different routes to resisting the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage as a function of identification

We have shown that high identifying members contest the disadvantage through different strategies. One of the more direct ways of fighting the disadvantage is by means of social competition, specifically through collective action. This action is directly aimed at improving the situation of a group as a whole (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990) and takes many forms ranging from nonviolent and moderate action accepted by society (e.g., taking part in demonstrations), to violent and radical action (e.g., terrorism).

In Chapter 3, we examine to what extent high identifiers contest internal legitimacy when it justifies the disadvantage by means of moderate collective action. We took into account measures of opinion and action social support (described as other members' appraisals of the disadvantage and their willingness to participate in collective action), and group efficacy perceptions (corresponding to the perceived in-group's ability to change the disadvantage). Previous work has shown that all of these variables have been found to be predictors of collective action (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). We show that, when the in-group legitimizes its own disadvantage, high identifiers contest the situation by perceiving higher levels of opinion and action social support, group efficacy, consequently endorsing moderate collective action to a greater extent than low identifiers. Therefore, high identifiers go beyond the mere dissent

shown in earlier research (Packer & Chasteen, 2010; Packer & Miners, 2012), and challenge the group norm by perceiving the in-group as willing and able to fight for a higher status position. Importantly, whereas in previous research the high identifiers' non-conformity focused mainly on within-group effects (e.g., the existence of a pro-alcohol norm among in-group members; Packer & Chasteen, 2010), in the current results high identifiers' reactions have consequences at an inter-group level. Specifically, rejecting the in-group norm of legitimization of the disadvantage implies that high identifiers do not perceive the social hierarchy in general as fair, leading them to challenge the legitimacy of the advantaged out-group.

The rejection of the in-group norm could be due to the fact that high identifiers do not perceive the internal legitimacy as representative of the in-group as a whole, but just see it as coming from a minority. In this case high identifiers would have the motivation but also good chances of succeeding in a challenge to the status quo, as other in-group members might then join them in this quest. However, even if high identifiers frame the internal legitimacy norm as authentic, they will be aware that the lack of support from the in-group may make their resistance all the more important. Either way, high identifiers are willing to fight for a better in-group position even in the face of the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage.

The fact that individuals who highly identified with the in-group reported higher levels of group efficacy even under legitimate conditions, can be taken as a sign that they perceived the in-group as more able to stop the disadvantage, even when other in-group members legitimized it. This implies that group identification raises perceived group efficacy. This effect could be a reverse path to the one showed by Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears (2010), namely that high levels of group efficacy increases group identification through collective action tendencies.

As stated earlier, collective action can also be expressed as a form of radical and even violent action that transgresses the socially accepted rules. The question to address in Chapter 4 was whether high identifiers would also follow this path of radical action to contest the internal legitimization of the disadvantage. On the one hand, one could argue that, given that high identifiers fight for the group interests they should be more motivated than low identifiers to endorse radical action to contest the in-group disadvantage. As the results of Chapter 3 show, the high identifiers' response should be

even more important when the in-group accepts its own disadvantage (internal legitimate conditions). On the other hand, the endorsement of radical or non-normative action might damage the group's image in the eyes of others by transgressing social rules. Therefore, high identifiers could oppose this strategy driven by the motivation to protect the in-group's image, a motivation less central to low identifiers, who are less committed. Indeed, in Chapter 4 we do find that group identification negatively predicts radical action. That is, low identifies were more willing than the highly identified members to support radical action aimed at stopping the disadvantage. Contrary to the pattern shown with moderate collective action, under situations where the in-group (or a large part of it) legitimized the disadvantage, high identifiers were less willing to endorse radical action than those less identified with the in-group. Paradoxically, those who care less about the group (i.e., low identifiers) seem to be more prone to fight the disadvantage by means of radical action. We argue that driven by the motivation of protecting the in-group's reputation, high identifiers reject this type of collective action. However, in this work we also show that under certain circumstances high identifiers seem to be as likely as low identifiers to fight through by means of radical action (see next section below).

Importantly, in Chapter 4 we also show that relatively high levels of group efficacy are not always necessary to take collective action. Specifically, we show that group efficacy negatively predicts radical collective action tendencies. This finding confirms previous results (Tausch, et al., 2011), and show that the positive relation between group efficacy and collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren, et al., 2004) becomes negative when it comes to radical action. This is also in line with the "nothing to lose" effect (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Spears, Scheepers, Van Zomeren, Tausch, & Gooch, 2013), which shows that individuals endorse radical and extreme forms of action under the most desperate conditions. In this case, when the in-group is not even able to fight the disadvantage (i.e., low levels of group efficacy) individuals are more willing to endorse radical action.

In addition, we point out the role of group-based emotions as predictors of collective action tendencies. Specifically, our results support previous findings showing that group-based anger positively predicts moderate collective action tendencies (Tausch, et al., 2011; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Van Zomeren, et al., 2004)

Furthermore, we also show that group-based fear is positively related to radical action tendencies (see also Kamans, Spears, Otten, Gordijn, & Livingstone, 2013).

Apart from social comparison, individuals can deal with disadvantage through social creativity strategies (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These strategies differ from the ones previously described in the sense that they do not alter the social hierarchy. However, they are aimed at getting positive distinctiveness for the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In Chapter 5 we test if high identifiers also follow a social creativity route to facing the in-group legitimization of the disadvantage, as re-evaluating the in-group's negative image. Specifically, we examine to what extent individuals reject the negative in-group stereotype and highlight the positive dimension. According to our hypothesis, individuals used the in-group stereotype strategically to deal with the disadvantage. Specifically, high identifiers accepted the negative in-group stereotype to a lesser extent than low identifiers. This is in line with previous research, which establishes that individuals who highly identify with the in-group perceive a more positive in-group stereotype (Matera, Giannini, Blanco, & Smith, 2005), especially when status is threatened (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). But more interestingly, this happened especially under circumstances of internal legitimacy, when the in-group accepted the disadvantage. Therefore, in line with results shown in Chapter 3, high identifiers contested the disadvantage when it was legitimized by their own in-group. However, in this case they used a different strategy, less direct than collective action. This strategy is less open and explicit than collective action behaviors, but nevertheless aimed at protecting the in-group under threatening circumstances (i.e., the in-group legitimization of its disadvantage) and reflects commitment to the in-group, which might be a valued goal in itself for high identifiers (Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010).

To sum up, in this dissertation we have shown that even when the discriminated group seems to accept its own disadvantage, those members who highly identified with it, far from conforming to the in-group perspective, oppose the situation and fight for a better in-group position. Importantly, high identifiers contest the disadvantage through different means. That is, they can resist the disadvantage by direct means as engaging in collective action, but also using social creativity strategies concurrently. Thus, high identifiers can follow different but complementary strategies to contest the

disadvantage. These different ways of opposing the unfavorable situation address different goals, namely directly challenging the social hierarchy or protecting the image of the in-group respectively. Nevertheless, it is possible that the options that individuals choose to cope with the in-group disadvantage could be ordered such that when high identifiers can resist the most threatening situation (i.e., internal legitimacy) by direct means, they do so. However, if the direct means are constrained (see next section), indirect (i.e., social creativity strategies) or even more radical solutions are used. In short, there is a repertoire of resistance strategies and whether these are possible (e.g., depending on constraints) or whether an additional desperate measure is needed (e.g., "nothing to lose" effect) will depend on the features of the situation. Therefore, when studying how groups face disadvantage and its internal legitimization, an analysis of the groups and the contexts is needed in order to explain which strategies are suitable and why the most direct approach will not always be credible or possible.

The high identifiers' constraints and facilitators when fighting disadvantage

We have shown that the high identifiers' resistance to the disadvantage can be affected by different factors related to the situation. These factors influenced the extent to which high identifiers accept or contest the disadvantage.

First, in Chapter 3 we showed that the arguments used by the in-group to legitimize the disadvantage seem to play a role in the high identifiers' resistance. Specifically, when the justifying reasons were related to the in-group's identity (i.e., in-group stereotype), highly identified members presented a clear pattern of resistance towards the disadvantage compared to low identifiers. However, when the disadvantage was legitimized based on more external or objective factors (i.e., economic issues), high identifiers' reactions to the unfavorable treatment did not differ from the low identifiers'. Therefore, arguments related to the in-group self-worth encourage high identifiers' resistance to the disadvantage, whereas arguments more related to external or objective factors seem to stop them from contesting the situation more than low identifers. This is in line with the fact that justifications based on the in-group's identity such as negative stereotypes, could be especially threatening for the in-group (Corneille & Leyens, 1996; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), implying that the in-group deserves the disadvantage based on the group identity. Therefore, in this case high identifiers should

experience a more urgent need to contest the disadvantage than when an argument based on external and objective factors is used to legitimize its situation. In addition, we argue that given that group stereotypes relate to abstract concepts that can be seen as very subjective arguments, they are easier to debate compared to economic arguments, which are more constraining and difficult to dispute. In this case even the high identifiers, who are motivated to protect the in-group, should find difficulties when opposing such objective facts. Therefore, they accept the disadvantage to the same extent as low identifiers.

In addition, in Chapter 3 and 5 we pointed out the relevance of the in-group sample size that accepts or rejects the disadvantage. Previous work has shown the relevance of the sample size in stereotyping and generalization showing that homogeneous and large sample's are required for the in-group to accept a negative in-group image (Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995). In our work, we show that high identifiers are more willing than the less identified members to contest the disadvantage when the social constraints are low, namely when a small sample size justifies the disadvantage. In this case, high identifiers might count on the rest of in-group members in the fight for equality, given that only a small sample accepts the disadvantage. This is also the case when a large sample frames the disadvantage as unfair. However, we show that the differences between low and high identifiers under legitimate conditions disappear when it is explicit that a large in-group sample appraises the disadvantage as fair and deserved. Similarly to the economic arguments justifying the disadvantage, a large sample legitimizing the situation seems to be more constraining, that is, it is more difficult to contest and fight. High identifies could still have the motivation to contest the situation, but the reality constraint is higher; therefore their fight is less likely to succeed. Under these conditions, the high identifiers' reactions do not differ from the low identifiers'. Therefore, the size of the in-group sample that legitimizes the social inequality is another factor that prevents the high identifiers' from fighting the disadvantage.

Further, group identity and stereotype content can also affect the high identifiers' willingness to contest social inequality. Specifically, we show in Chapter 3 that whereas women who highly identified with feminism opposed the disadvantage more than low identifiers when it was legitimized by the in-group; high women, in contrast, identifiers

did not differ from the low identifiers under these circumstances. We argue that this difference is due to the identity content associated with each group. High identifiers from groups whose principles promote in-group improvement and challenging the status quo (e.g., feminists; Condor, 1984), should show more resistance towards the disadvantage than low identifiers. In other words, when the in-group identity and its ideals are in line with fighting for equality, the high identifiers' resistance is more likely to occur. By contrast, when the identity content and the group values endorse more conservative principles and accept the status quo (as traditional women), high identifiers will not resist the disadvantage more than low identifiers, when it is justified by the in-group. Therefore, being a high identifier with the disadvantaged group is not the only requirement to contest social disadvantage. The group identity content should be in line with the aim of challenging the status quo and fighting for an equal society. This result is also consistent with the fact that politicized identities (i.e., identification with a social movement organization) are more relevant in predicting the participation in social movements' activities than non-politicized identities (Stürmer & Simon, 2004).

Similarly, in Chapter 6 we show that the stereotype content associated to the disadvantaged group also affects the high identifiers' resistance. Specifically, when the stereotype of the in-group (e.g., German students) includes traits as dominant and arrogant, high in-group identifiers oppose the disadvantage more than low identifiers but only when the in-group also rejects it (i.e., when it is considered as illegitimate). We argue that these dominant and arrogant traits suppress the high identifiers' willingness to claim justice, given that this can be seen as confirming the negative stereotype of arrogance among the in-group members. Therefore, an arrogant and dominant stereotype seems to inhibit the high identifiers' fight when the in-group legitimizes the disadvantage; but negating this stereotype fosters their willingness to fight against the disadvantage. However, a shy and introverted stereotype does not repress such action under internal legitimate conditions, but it does not encourage a greater resistance among high identifiers either. These results show that in-group stereotype influences the extent to which high identifiers resist social disadvantage, especially under conditions in which the in-group legitimizes the discrimination.

Finally, in Chapter 4 we point out the relevance of intergroup relations and its idiosyncrasies when the disadvantage groups claim justice. Specifically, we show that

the in-group dependency on another out-group seems to reduce the high identifiers' opposition to take radical action. High identifiers are in general less willing to fight the disadvantage by means of radical behavior. However, under conditions in which the in-group outcomes depend on out-group members, the differences with the low identifiers' intentions to take radical action are reduced. Following the "nothing to lose effect" (Scheepers, et al., 2006; Spears et al., 2013), we argue that, being under desperate and extreme circumstances makes high identifiers try to solve the problem at any cost, even by means of action that could be considered as inappropriate. Thus, under the most desperate conditions, there is nothing to lose even for the high identifiers, therefore they risk taking radical action to the same extent that low identifiers.

In summary, we show that the main finding of this work, namely the high identifiers' willingness to fight against disadvantage when it is legitimized and accepted by the in-group, can be affected by multiple factors associated to the in-group itself or to specific group dynamics. Therefore, when predicting high identifiers' resistance regarding the group disadvantage, it is necessary to take into account that diverse factors can either trigger or impede the high identifiers' reactions.

Implications

This dissertation provides empirical evidence of how individuals deal with group disadvantage that could be applied to real inter-group settings. Specifically, we show evidence of the relevant role of group identification when individuals face a social disadvantage that is accepted by other in-group members.

Importantly, the high identifiers' resistance showed under legitimate conditions, implies that they are not only against the in-group norm but that they are motivated to challenge the prevailing social order, even if it is accepted by both the in-group and the out-group. Therefore, even when social disadvantage seems to be approved, there is still scope for change led by the high identifiers. These individuals believe in a social change even when the disadvantaged fellow members seem to resign and conform to the unequal situation. By doing this, we can say that those individuals who highly identify with their groups represent the way in which social disadvantage might come to an end.

However, very often social disadvantage seems to be perpetuated across long periods of time. But why do high identifiers not act sometimes? As we show, these highly identified members contest disadvantage by different means. Under certain circumstances, a direct way of contesting the situation (i.e., collective action) might not be the most appropriate strategy to follow. Therefore, it could be that high identifiers from disadvantaged groups oppose the discrimination by means of indirect tactics, as social creativity strategies. In these cases, although the resistance should have positive effects on high identifiers' collective self-esteem, the established social order would remain. Thus, in order to get a more equal society, we should get disadvantaged groups fighting the situation by means of more active action, as moderate collective action. This should improve the chances of achieving a social change, or at least should explicitly and publicly show the high identifiers' opposition to the disadvantage even when it is accepted by the in-group.

In line with the results mentioned above, in order to fight against disadvantage, high identifiers need to be not only motivated to contest the situation by direct means, but also to have an appropriate context that facilitates their task. That is, in order to fight against social disadvantage, the potential limitations and constraining factors that prevent high identifiers from contesting the inequality, should be out of the frame. By contrast, the facilitators that trigger the high identifiers' reactions should be present, in order to facilitate the high identifiers' fight for equality.

We can say that a path directed at achieving a fair and just society involves high levels of in-group identification with the disadvantaged groups. A possible way to facilitate in-group members' willingness to contest social disadvantage might be increasing the levels of group identification among members of discriminated groups. As we have seen from the results of this dissertation, in this way more members would be motivated and ready to contest the disadvantage and improve the discriminated in-group position.

To summarize, the optimistic message of this dissertation is that high identifiers' reactions to in-group disadvantage reflects that even when social discrimination and disadvantage are framed as deserved, there is still hope for social change contesting the status quo. This reflects the optimism of the high identifiers not to accept the apparent submission of their group at face value. However, this does not mean that high

identifiers totally ignore social reality and the constraints on action this can provide, as they are sensitive to the social setting in which resistance is possible. In this sense they combine the key elements of resistance in the slogan of Gramsci: "the pessimism of the intellect and the optimism of the will" (Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001).

Limitations and future research

We acknowledge some limitations of our studies. First, we should note that most of the disadvantaged groups that have been studied in this work are associated with a certain type of stereotype, namely low competence but high warmth. Although we could argue that this is the typical stereotypic profile of many low status groups, the question to address is what happens for disadvantaged groups that reflect a different stereotype (e.g., high status groups that are incidentally disadvantaged). It might be that these groups display different forms of coping with the internal justification of the disadvantage. In Chapter 6, we tried to address this issue by focusing in a disadvantaged group that presents a different stereotype (i.e., high competence and low warmth). We found that the high identifiers, in contrast to what happened in earlier studies, were more likely than low identifiers to resist under internal illegitimate conditions. However, in this case the disadvantage experienced might have different connotations as the disadvantaged group was in a foreign country, arguably adding an additional element of vulnerability. Although we showed that the difference in the group (meta)stereotype (arrogance and dominance associated with high status and competence) could account for the differences with the earlier pattern, this circumstance may also have contributed to the way in which high identifiers contested the disadvantage. More research is needed in order to disentangle the effects of the in-group stereotype and being in a vulnerable position (e.g., being abroad) when the discrimination takes place.

More generally, we are interested in the process that leads high identifiers to oppose the disadvantage when the rest of the in-group accepts it. Although we have described high identifiers' reactions, we have not focused on what leads high identifiers to perceive that the in-group is ready to contest the disadvantage, despite the pessimistic in-group message (e.g., whether they perceive a more hopeful future for the in-group, or they experience higher levels of responsibility regarding the group position and understand that something needs to be done, etc.)

It is also important to study the high identifiers' goals when opposing the in-group norm of legitimacy. One might think that the main aim should be to get a better position for the in-group. However, high identifiers could have other goals, for instance, to express their values or influence third parties (Hornsey, et al., 2006). Future research should address this question, in order to better understand high identifiers' reactions.

In addition, another limitation of this dissertation is that generally we did not measure real behavior, but rather the willingness to support or take part in collective action. We did measure a fairly low cost behavior (e.g., taking part in a future research related to the in-group disadvantage or the number of pamphlets about the in-group discrimination that participants took from the lab), which may not capture the real costs of contesting social disadvantage. It could be that the high identifiers' intentions to challenge the status quo decrease when it actually comes to making behavioral commitments. However, having said this, research shows that intentions are reliable predictor of behavior, in general but also when it comes to collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Throughout this dissertation we take into account factors that either foster or inhibit the high identifiers' reactions towards internal legitimacy, but we point out here that other many factors can play a role in the process described. Therefore, we should be aware that different disadvantaged groups might encounter a range of different settings and scenarios that could affect the strategies disadvantaged group members can employ.

Despite of the limitations described, we see these weaknesses also as potential opportunities to improve our work. We think that future research should try to address these limitations in order to better understand what happens to high identifiers' when the in-group seems to accept the group disadvantage. We consider this line of research important in order to create a more just and equal society. As social psychologists, we should be aware of the very negative consequences for low status groups that social disadvantage entails. Therefore, the study of potential ways of contesting disadvantage should be a point of interest.

The work presented in this dissertation has shown that there is scope for social change even under the most desperate conditions, namely that the disadvantaged group accepts their own disadvantage as legitimate. Our studies allow us to understand

different ways of fighting such social disadvantage, including the possibility of confronting it directly through collective action. This gives hope that social inequality and unfairness can always be challenged.

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