Tracking the world down. How inferentialism accounts for objective truth Frápolli Sanz, María José The background of this paper is what I call “pragmatic inferentialism,” a view that I attribute to Robert Brandom. Here, I develop Brandom’s view and argue (i) that it is a kind of subject naturalism, in Price’s sense, and (ii) that the charge of idealism sometimes addressed against it is unwarranted. Regarding (i), I show that pragmatic inferentialism finds support from evolutionary psychology and developmental psychology. Regarding (ii), I present what I call “level 0 expressivism,” which I take to be the semantic counterpart of some aspects of evolutionary psychology and developmental psychology. Besides, I resort to Brandom’s defense of Hegel’s conceptual realism. The conclusion of the paper is a vindication of objective truth in the inferentialist framework. 2025-01-14T07:47:25Z 2025-01-14T07:47:25Z 2022-01-01 journal article Philosophical Topics 50 (1): 83-107 https://hdl.handle.net/10481/99038 10.5840/philtopics20225015 eng open access