Inner Speech in Action Fernández Castro, Víctor Inner Speech Attention Activity view Vehicle view Executive functions Research for this paper was funded by the Spanish Government through Research Projects FFI2011-30074-C01-C02 and the fellowship FPI BES-2012-052157 This paper assesses two different approaches to inner speech that can be found in the literature. One of them regards inner speech as a vehicle of conscious thought. The other holds that inner speech is better characterised as an activity derived from social uses of its outer counterpart. In this paper I focus on the explanatory power of each approach to account for the control of attention and behaviour in the context of executive tasks. I will argue that the vehicle view cannot capture some central cases of inner speech in executive tasks because they cannot be described as cases of bringing thought into consciousness. Then I will offer a revised version of the activity view and I will apply it to some examples so as to show that it is better posited to account for them. I end by considering two objections to the activity view and a possible way to address them. 2024-09-20T10:10:42Z 2024-09-20T10:10:42Z 2016 journal article Published version: Fernández Castro, V. (2016) Inner Speech in Action Pragmatics & Cognition 23(2): 238-258. DOI: 10.1075/pc.23.2.02cas https://hdl.handle.net/10481/94768 10.1075/pc.23.2.02cas eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ open access Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional John Benjamins