Unraveling public good games Brañas Garza, Pablo Espinosa, María Paz Public good game End game effect Beliefs This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs and let us conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and they do very little updating of beliefs. 2014-05-02T09:37:24Z 2014-05-02T09:37:24Z 2008 info:eu-repo/semantics/report Brañas-Garza, P.; Espinosa, M.P. Unraveling public good games. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2008). (The Papers; 08/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31510] http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31510 eng The Papers;08/01 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica