Collusion when players take turns Corchón, Luis Carlos Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe Moreno, Bernardo Collusion Folk theorem Taking turns We present a model of two players who take turns to facilitate collusion. One of the players wins (contract, office), while the other loses by presenting a ludicrous proposal or no proposal at all. Assuming that players use grim trigger strategies, we show that it is possible to sustain agreements as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (a) for a range of discount factors below one but above zero and (b) for two disjoint intervals of the discount factor. 2026-03-09T12:31:58Z 2026-03-09T12:31:58Z 2026-05 journal article Corchón, L. C., Correa-Lopera, G., & Moreno, B. (2026). Collusion when players take turns. Economics Letters, 263(112918), 112918. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112918 https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111987 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112918 eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ open access Atribución 4.0 Internacional Elsevier