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Let’s tell the truth: expressive meaning and propositional quantification

[PDF] Let's tell the truth.pdf (448.0Kb)
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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10481/99044
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-25229-7
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Autor
Frápolli Sanz, María José
Editorial
Adam C. Podlakowski
Fecha
2024-09-17
Referencia bibliográfica
(2024), Truth 2020: How Global Pandemic Shaped Truth Research. Synthese Library, chapter 4.
Resumen
In this paper, I use an extension of Russell’s theory of descriptions to give further support to an analysis of truth ascriptions that stems back to Ramsey and has been further developed by Dorothy Grover and Christopher J. F. Williams. It is the view that the truth predicate vanishes in the logical form of the sentences in which it occurs in favour of a combination of quantifiers and propositional variables. I argue that Russell’s theory of descriptions can be used as a technical way of giving flesh to the sometimes-vague characterisation of truth terms as expressive. In my analysis, I assume the Fregean analysis of quantifiers, Frege’s context principle, and the Fregean distinction between grammatical structure and logical form. These three ground-breaking insights are crucial to the Russellian interpretation of denoting phrases and the analysis of truth ascriptions that I advocate. In section one, I explain the sense in which truth is a higher-level concept and which consequences follow from this claim, one of them being the linguistic flexibility of the concept of truth. In section two, I apply Russell’s insights to truth ascriptions and show that the truth predicate dissolves in their logical form in favour of propositional variables and quantifiers. The disappearance of the predicate in the logical form is the precise sense that I give to the claim that truth terms possess expressive meaning. As propositional quantification has been felt as a serious obstacle to the Ramseyian approach, I show in section three that the Quinean arguments usually addressed against higher-order quantification are weaker than the received view has taken them to be. I also address the objection that rests on the normative nature of truth. I argue in section four that the approach to truth ascriptions introduced by Ramsey provides an accurate and technically irreproachable account of the semantic expressivism associated with the concept of truth.
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