dc.contributor.author | Romero González, María Esther | |
dc.contributor.author | Soria Clivilles, María Belén | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-15T12:05:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-10-15T12:05:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Esther Romero and Belén Soria. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 391–419. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i3.6836 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10481/95972 | |
dc.description.abstract | It is a fact that novel
metaphorical utterances appear in natural language argumentation. It
seems, moreover, that these put forward metaphorical propositions
that can have different roles (data, warrants or claims) in argument
structure. There can even be good argumentation which is indispensably
metaphorical. However, not all metaphor theories provide an explanation
of metaphorical meaning compatible with these claims. In this article,
we explain the three main views on metaphorical meaning and show,
analysing some examples, their consequences for metaphorical
argumentation. Our analysis shows that only the cognitive view can
explain that there are arguments which can only be generated using
novel metaphors. | es_ES |
dc.description.sponsorship | Project PGC2018-098236-B-I00 | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | University of Windsor, Canadá | es_ES |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
dc.title | Metaphorical Argumentation | es_ES |
dc.type | journal article | es_ES |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | es_ES |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.22329/il.v41i3.6836 | |
dc.type.hasVersion | VoR | es_ES |