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dc.contributor.authorRomero González, María Esther 
dc.contributor.authorSoria Clivilles, María Belén 
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-15T12:05:17Z
dc.date.available2024-10-15T12:05:17Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationEsther Romero and Belén Soria. Informal Logic, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2021), pp. 391–419. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v41i3.6836es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10481/95972
dc.description.abstractIt is a fact that novel metaphorical utterances appear in natural language argumentation. It seems, moreover, that these put forward metaphorical propositions that can have different roles (data, warrants or claims) in argument structure. There can even be good argumentation which is indispensably metaphorical. However, not all metaphor theories provide an explanation of metaphorical meaning compatible with these claims. In this article, we explain the three main views on metaphorical meaning and show, analysing some examples, their consequences for metaphorical argumentation. Our analysis shows that only the cognitive view can explain that there are arguments which can only be generated using novel metaphors.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipProject PGC2018-098236-B-I00es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherUniversity of Windsor, Canadáes_ES
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.titleMetaphorical Argumentationes_ES
dc.typejournal articlees_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.22329/il.v41i3.6836
dc.type.hasVersionVoRes_ES


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