Regulation, Normativity and Folk Psychology

Abstract

Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk- psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines (Andrews, 2012, 2015; McGeer 2007, 2015; Zawidzki 2008, 2013). This regulative view shares with classical Dennettian intentional stance (Dennett 1981, 1991) its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, it makes sense to assess the regulative view by considering some of the classical arguments against the normative nature of the intentional stance (Goldman 2006; Fodor 1985; Stich 1981, 1990). The aim of this paper is to argue that the priority that the regulative view lays on the pluralistic and regulative character of folk psychology leaves the theory well- placed to resist these arguments. In this sense, the regulative view possesses better theoretical options to defend the normative character of human social cognition.