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dc.contributor.authorHeras Escribano, Manuel 
dc.contributor.authorMartínez Moreno, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-30T09:00:34Z
dc.date.available2024-07-30T09:00:34Z
dc.date.issued2024-04-25
dc.identifier.citationHeras Escribano, M. & Martínez Moreno, D. Philosophies 2024, 9, 54. [https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9030054]es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10481/93622
dc.description.abstractRadical enactivism supports radical embodied cognition (REC), which is the idea that basic or fundamental cognition (perception and action) does not need to be understood in representational, contentful terms. REC departs from the idea that the mind can be naturalized through biological functions, but rejects the idea that mental content, which is understood as having a representational nature, can be naturalized. For REC, the natural origins of content (or NOC) is a program based on the following hypothesis: first, we depart from basic cognitive processes that are target-based and guided by an Ur-intentionality or directedness toward the world, and then sociality enters in the picture when language appears into the scene, allowing for establishing full-blown semantic content in which that content is about worldly states of affairs. Here, we are going to focus on the phenomenon of directedness since there are blind spots in this picture: as many authors claim, REC takes Urintentionality as the starting point, but there is simply no explanation to date of how this directedness or Ur-intentionality is established. Therefore, how could we account for Ur-intentionality? How does this kind of intentionality emerge? We believe that we can answer this question if we invoke the best scientific evidence from ecological perceptual learning especially in regard to the role of the environment and the information for perceiving affordances in our learning processes. This allows us to offer an answer to the question of how the most basic form of cognition (Ur-intentionality or directedness) emerges in nature.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipCNS2022-136195 funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 y por la Unión Europea Next GenerationEU/ PRTRes_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipRamón y Cajal Postdoctoral Fellowship (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Spain)es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipproject “De la experiencia a los conceptos: Una reformulación del problema de Molyneux a través de la sustitución sensorial ecológica (ECOCONCEPT)”es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipAyudas a Proyectos de Investigación Científica 2022 Program of the BBVA Foundation (Spain)es_ES
dc.description.sponsorship(“Toward an Ecological Approach to the Natural Origins of Content: From Direct Perception to Social Norms (ECOCONTENT)”)es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherMDPIes_ES
dc.rightsAtribución 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectIntentionalityes_ES
dc.subjectEcological psychologyes_ES
dc.subjectContentes_ES
dc.titleThe Emergence of Ur-Intentionality: An Ecological Proposales_ES
dc.typejournal articlees_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/philosophies9030054
dc.type.hasVersionVoRes_ES


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