Board independence and GRI-IFC performance standards: The mediating effect of the CSR committee

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse the role played by independent directors and their decisions regarding the disclosure of information on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We posit that these directors (i) drive the creation of a CSR committee to advise them on social and environmental issues, and (ii) promote the use of the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines and the International Finance Corporation Performance Standards (jointly, the GRI-IFC strategy) in their CSR disclosure. The GRI-IFC strategy requires the disclosure of key indicators, and is expected to strengthen stakeholder engagement and to enhance the firm’s internal monitoring. Our analysis of an unbalanced sample of 750 international companies, spanning the period 2011-2016, in which logistic and ordinal regressions are applied to the panel data, reveals a generalised absence of direct involvement by independent directors in the adoption of the GRI-IFC strategy. However, in many cases these directors promote the creation of a CSR committee to advice the board on the voluntary implementation of the GRI-IFC strategy. Our evidence shows that the CSR committee plays a mediating role in the cause-effect relationship between independent directors and their adoption of the GRI-IFC strategy.