Broad, subjective, relative: the surprising folk concept of basic needs
Metadata
Show full item recordEditorial
Springer Nature
Materia
Basic needs Experimental philosophy Normative theory
Date
2023-12-21Referencia bibliográfica
Pölzler, T., Tomabechi, T. & Hannikainen, I.R. Broad, subjective, relative: the surprising folk concept of basic needs. Philos Stud 181, 319–347 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02080-9
Sponsorship
Open access funding provided by Austrian Science Fund (FWF).; Austrian Science Fund, P33169; Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, PE21001; Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, PID2020-119791RA-I00Abstract
Some normative theorists appeal to the concept of basic needs. They argue that
when it comes to issues such as global justice, intergenerational justice, human
rights or sustainable development our first priority should be that everybody is able
to meet these needs. But what are basic needs? We attempt to inform discussions
about this question by gathering evidence of ordinary English speakers’ intuitions
on the concept of basic needs. First, we defend our empirical approach to analyzing
this concept and identify a number of its potential features. Then we present
three preregistered empirical studies that were conducted to investigate the extent
to which ordinary speakers endorse these features. The studies yield convergent
evidence for the following three claims: (1) ordinary speakers sometimes apply the
concept of basic needs to necessities for a flourishing (not just a minimally decent)
life, (2) most ordinary speakers attribute at least some degree of subjectivity to the
concept, and (3) most ordinary speakers attribute at least some degree of relativity to
the concept. We discuss the implications of these findings for philosophical analyses
of basic needs.