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dc.contributor.authorChica Serrano, Manuel
dc.identifier.citationManuel Chica, Juan M. Hernández, Francisco C. Santos, Cooperation dynamics under pandemic risks and heterogeneous economic interdependence, Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Volume 155, 2022, 111655, ISSN 0960-0779, []es_ES
dc.descriptionM.C. is supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, An-dalusian Government, and ERDF under grants SIMARK (P18-TP-4475) , RYC-2016-19800, PPJIA2020-09 (TURCOMPLEX) , and Jose Castillejo program (CAS19/00090) . J.M.H. is supported by the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria under grant COVID-19 04. F.C.S. acknowledges the support from FCT-Portugal (grants UIDB/50021/2020, PTDC/MAT-APL/6804/2020, and PTDC/CCI-INF/7366/2020) . Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Granada/CBUA.es_ES
dc.description.abstractThe spread of COVID-19 and ensuing containment measures have accentuated the profound interdepen- dence among nations or regions. This has been particularly evident in tourism, one of the sectors most affected by uncoordinated mobility restrictions. The impact of this interdependence on the tendency to adopt less or more restrictive measures is hard to evaluate, more so if diversity in economic exposures to citizens’ mobility are considered. Here, we address this problem by developing an analytical and com- putational game-theoretical model encompassing the conflicts arising from the need to control the eco- nomic effects of global risks, such as in the COVID-19 pandemic. The model includes the individual costs derived from severe restrictions imposed by governments, including the resulting economic interdepen- dence among all the parties involved in the game. By using tourism-based data, the model is enriched with actual heterogeneous income losses, such that every player has a different economic cost when ap- plying restrictions. We show that economic interdependence enhances cooperation because of the decline in the expected payoffs by free-riding parties (i.e., those neglecting the application of mobility restric- tions). Furthermore, we show (analytically and through numerical simulations) that these cross-exposures can transform the nature of the cooperation dilemma each region or country faces, modifying the position of the fixed points and the size of the basins of attraction that characterize this class of games. Finally, our results suggest that heterogeneity among regions may be used to leverage the impact of intervention policies by ensuring an agreement among the most relevant initial set of cooperators.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipSpanish Ministry of Science, An-dalusian Governmentes_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipEuropean Commission SIMARK (P18-TP-4475) RYC-2016-19800es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipJose Castillejo programes_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversity of Las Palmas de Gran Canariaes_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipPortuguese Foundation for Science and Technology European Commission UIDB/50021/2020 PTDC/MAT-APL/6804/2020es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversidad de Granada/CBUA PPJIA2020-09 CAS19/00090 COVID-19 04 PTDC/CCI-INF/7366/2020es_ES
dc.rightsAtribución 3.0 España*
dc.subjectCollective risk dilemmaes_ES
dc.subjectEconomic interdependencees_ES
dc.subjectPandemic riskses_ES
dc.subjectEvolutionary game theoryes_ES
dc.titleCooperation dynamics under pandemic risks and heterogeneous economic interdependencees_ES

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Atribución 3.0 España
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