Is Testimonial Injustice Epistemic? Let Me Count the Ways
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Cambridge University Press
Almagro Holgado, M., Navarro Laespada, L., & De Pinedo García, M. (2021). Is Testimonial Injustice Epistemic? Let Me Count the Ways. Hypatia, 36(4), 657-675. doi:[10.1017/hyp.2021.56]
SponsorshipSpanish Government FFI2016-80088-P BES-2017-079933 FPU16/04185 PID2019-109764RB-I00; Junta de Andalucia B-HUM-459-UGR18; FiloLab Group of Excellence - University of Granada
Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed as a knowledge-possessor. By adopting a perspective based on Robert Brandom’s normative expressivism, we respond to this objection by arguing that there is a close connection, conceptual and constitutive rather than merely causal, between the primary and the secondary epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, such that testimonial injustice always involves both kinds of epistemic harm. We do so by exploring the logic and functioning of belief and knowledge ascriptions in order to highlight three ways in which the secondary epistemic harm caused by testimonial injustice crystallizes: it undermines the epistemic agency of the victim, the epistemic friction necessary for knowledge, and the possibility of occupying particular epistemic nodes.