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Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game

[PDF] BranasGarza_UltimatumGame.pdf (279.6Ko)
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/32990
DOI: 10.1038/srep06025
ISSN: 2045-2322
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Auteur
Brañas Garza, Pablo; Espín Martín, Antonio Manuel; Exadaktylos, Filippos; Herrmann, Benedikt
Editorial
Nature Publishing Group
Materia
Evolutionary ecology
 
Human behaviour
 
Date
2014
Referencia bibliográfica
Brañas-Garza, P.; et al. Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game. Scientific Reports, 4: 6025 (2014). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/32990]
Patrocinador
FE acknowledges the post-doctorate fellowship granted by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK). Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2010-17049), the Government of Andalusia Project for Excellence in Research (P07.SEJ.02547) and the Ramón Areces Foundation (R + D 2011) is gratefully acknowledged.
Résumé
In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.
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