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dc.contributor.authorBensusan, Hilan
dc.contributor.authorPinedo García, Manuel de
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-22T11:22:49Z
dc.date.available2014-01-22T11:22:49Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationBensusan, H.; Pinedo, M. When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough. Theoria, 22 (1): 35-41 (2007). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912]es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0495-4548
dc.identifier.issn2171-679X
dc.identifier.issndoi: 10.1387/theoria.480
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912
dc.description.abstractRichard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipThis paper has been partially funded by the MEC research project HUM2004-02330.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherUniversidad del País Vascoes_ES
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Licensees_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es_ES
dc.subjectMoran, Richardes_ES
dc.subjectMoore's paradoxes_ES
dc.subjectSelf-knowledgees_ES
dc.titleWhen my own beliefs are not first-personal enoughes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES


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