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When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
dc.contributor.author | Bensusan, Hilan | |
dc.contributor.author | Pinedo García, Manuel de | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-01-22T11:22:49Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-01-22T11:22:49Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Bensusan, H.; Pinedo, M. When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough. Theoria, 22 (1): 35-41 (2007). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912] | es_ES |
dc.identifier.issn | 0495-4548 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2171-679X | |
dc.identifier.issn | doi: 10.1387/theoria.480 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912 | |
dc.description.abstract | Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world. | es_ES |
dc.description.sponsorship | This paper has been partially funded by the MEC research project HUM2004-02330. | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Universidad del País Vasco | es_ES |
dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License | es_ES |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ | es_ES |
dc.subject | Moran, Richard | es_ES |
dc.subject | Moore's paradox | es_ES |
dc.subject | Self-knowledge | es_ES |
dc.title | When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough | es_ES |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |