Conceptions of the mind... that do not loose sight of logic

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29901
ISSN: 0495-4548
ISSN: 2171-679X
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Autor
Acero Fernández, Juan José
Editorial
Universidad del País Vasco
Materia
Logic
 
Phylosophy of mind
 
Computationalism
 
Interpretativism
 
Naive naturalism
 
Psychology
 
Fecha
2003
Referencia bibliográfica
Acero Fernández, J.J. Conceptions of the mind... that do not loose sight of logic. Theoria, 18(1): 17-25 (2003). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29901]
Resumen
Which is the relation between logic and philosophy of mind? This work tries to answer that question by shortly examining, first, the place that is assigned to logic in three current views of the mind: Computationalism, Interpretativism and Naïve Naturalism. Secondly, the classical debate between psychologism and antipsychologism is reviewed –the question about whether logic is or not a part of psychology- and it is indicated in which place of such debate the three mentioned conceptions of mind are located.
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