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<title>DTHE - Artículos</title>
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<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112396"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112194"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111987"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111904"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111579"/>
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<dc:date>2026-04-26T19:13:04Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112396">
<title>The museum pass problem with consortia</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112396</link>
<description>The museum pass problem with consortia
Gonçalves-Dosantos, Juan Carlos; Martínez Rico, Ricardo; Sánchez Soriano, Joaquín
In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. Each mechanism satisfies a distinct set of reasonable properties related to fairness and stability, which serve to axiomatically characterize them.
</description>
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<item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112194">
<title>On the optimality of direct democracy</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112194</link>
<description>On the optimality of direct democracy
Berga, Dolors; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, Bernardo
We study the optimality of direct democracy under incomplete information, in a setting where society must choose between two policies under one of two possible scenarios. Voters are of four types: leftist, rightist, selfish, and altruistic. While leftist and rightist voters are predetermined in their choice, selfish and altruistic voters form the undecided group. In our setting, incomplete information arises from two sources: the realized scenario and the composition of society. While existing literature typically considers only the first three types of voters, we show that introducing altruistic voters alters the effect of available information on the optimality of direct democracy, both under complete and incomplete information. Under complete information, this disruption breaks the alignment between optimal policies and scenarios that exists in the absence of altruistic voters. Under incomplete information, this misalignment becomes more pronounced. When only selfish voters are present, the policy chosen under direct democracy depends solely on the realized scenario and aligns with the optimal policy whenever voters are well-informed. However, with altruistic voters, a second source of informational distortion emerges—the composition of voter types—and altruistic voters can either facilitate or hinder optimal decisions, even when voters are well-informed. Crucially, even well-informed undecided voters may fail to select the optimal policy, as outcomes depend on the internal composition of this group.
D. Berga acknowledges the support from project PID2022-138003NB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and also from grant 2021SGR00570 funded by Generalitat de Catalunya. G. Correa-Lopera acknowledges support from the grant PID2021-127119NB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”, and the grant PID2022-138774NB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. G. Correa-Lopera and B. Moreno acknowledge support from the grant PID2023-147391NB-I00 funded by MCIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/FEDER UE. B. Moreno acknowledges support from the grant PPRO-SEJ426-G-2023 funded by the PAIDI Research Groups Program (Call 2023 – Plan Propio – FEDER, University of Málaga). Universidad de Granada/CBUA.
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<item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111987">
<title>Collusion when players take turns</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111987</link>
<description>Collusion when players take turns
Corchón, Luis Carlos; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, Bernardo
We present a model of two players who take turns to facilitate collusion. One of the players wins (contract, office), while the other loses by presenting a ludicrous proposal or no proposal at all. Assuming that players use grim trigger strategies, we show that it is possible to sustain agreements as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (a) for a range of discount factors below one but above zero and (b) for two disjoint intervals of the discount factor.
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<item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111904">
<title>El comercio exterior como salvavidas del régimen de  Franco (1943-1946)</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111904</link>
<description>El comercio exterior como salvavidas del régimen de  Franco (1943-1946)
Caruana De Las Cagigas, Leonardo Roberto; Tascón Fernández, Julio
En 1943, la victoria del Eje en la guerra parecía cada vez más improbable, lo que llevó &#13;
al Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores español a desarrollar una nueva política comercial con el fin &#13;
de preservar el régimen. Los lazos comerciales entre España y el Reino Unido eran importantes &#13;
para ambos países, pero, tras el conflicto, lo fueron aún más para los británicos debido al profundo &#13;
debilitamiento económico que la guerra les había causado. Por ello, los vínculos comerciales se &#13;
intensificaron, y, a pesar del rechazo político de Clement Attlee hacia Franco, cuando fue primer &#13;
ministro británico, mantuvo una actitud tibia e incluso defendió el régimen franquista frente a &#13;
Stalin. Esto con el objetivo de preservar las buenas relaciones comerciales, implicando en esta &#13;
política a su gran aliado, los Estados Unidos. Al mismo tiempo, hubo esfuerzos diplomáticos para &#13;
provocar un cambio de régimen, pero estos no prosperaron, ya que Franco consolidó su poder &#13;
por la fuerza y los lazos comerciales con los aliados no se rompieron. De este modo, el régimen &#13;
logró sobrevivir, pues ni el Reino Unido ni los Estados Unidos aplicaron una guerra económica &#13;
como la que habían llevado a cabo durante el conflicto.; In 1943, the Axis victory in the war seemed increasingly unlikely, which led the Spanish &#13;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop a new trade policy in order to preserve the regime. Trade ties &#13;
between Spain and the United Kingdom were important for both countries, but after the conflict, &#13;
they became even more so for the British due to the deep economic weakening caused by the &#13;
war. As a result, trade relations intensified, and despite Clement Attlee’s political rejection of &#13;
Franco, when he was the British Prime Minister, he maintained a lukewarm attitude and even &#13;
defended the Franco regime against Stalin. This was aimed at preserving good trade relations, &#13;
involving their great ally, the United States, in this policy. At the same time, there were diplomatic &#13;
efforts to provoke a regime change, but these did not succeed, as Franco consolidated his power &#13;
through force, and trade ties. In this way, the regime survives, since both the United Kingdom and &#13;
the United States did not wage economic warfare as they had done during the war.
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<item rdf:about="https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111579">
<title>La actividad laboral y productiva de las mujeres bilbaínas en 1900 Una propuesta metodológica para su recuperación</title>
<link>https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111579</link>
<description>La actividad laboral y productiva de las mujeres bilbaínas en 1900 Una propuesta metodológica para su recuperación
Pareja Alonso, Aránzazu
En este artículo se ha utilizado una fuente de origen fiscal de finales del s. XIX para analizar el trabajo no asalariado que aportaron las mujeres a sus familias en esta etapa de gran crecimiento económico de Bilbao. Asimismo, a estas titulares de pequeños y grandes negocios de venta y manufactura, se les ha buscado en el padrón de habitantes bilbaíno para cuantificar no solo la ausencia de contabilidad de su actividad laboral, sino también la productiva.; This article uses tax records from the late 19th century to analyse the unpaid work that women contributed to their families during a period of significant economic growth in Bilbao. Similarly, owners of small and large retail and manufacturing businesses were identified in the Bilbao census in order to quantify the absence of accounting for their productive activity.
Descargable en: https://www.eusko-ikaskuntza.eus/es/publicaciones/la-actividad-laboral-y-productiva-de-las-mujeres-bilbainas-en-1900-una-propuesta-metodologica-para-su-recuperacion/art-15182/; Esta comunicación pretende rendir unos primeros resultados de un proyecto de investigación financiado por una Ayuda de Investigación 2004, concedida por el Instituto de Historia Social&#13;
Valentín de Foronda de la UPV / EHU.
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