

Philosophy of Language and Metaphor

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1 Introduction

To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him—like praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting. Addiction to metaphor is held to be illicit, on the principle that whereof one can speak only metaphorically, thereof one ought not to speak at all. Yet the nature of the offence is unclear. (Black, 1954-5: 273)

These are the words with which the philosopher Max Black starts his seminal article 'Metaphor'. With it, he points out that, traditionally, the study of the metaphorical use of language has been neglected by philosophers because they think that metaphor is incompatible with serious thought. In contrast, he attempts to clarify the notion of metaphor and to argue for its cognitive value. Black's defence of the cognitive value of metaphor depends on his explanation of how to produce some metaphorical senses (or meanings) related to the metaphorical uses of a word or words in some metaphorical sentences.

According to Black, in the metaphorical sentence (1),

(1) Man is a wolf

'wolf' is the metaphorically used part of the sentence that, taken literally, shows a contrast with the remaining words by which it is accompanied. This word is the focus of the metaphor while the remaining words are its frame. With the metaphorical use of the focus its meaning changes from its literal meaning to a meaning that can be called 'metaphorical'.

Most authors who had had something to say about the metaphorical use of language espoused some form of what Black (1954-5) calls 'the substitution view'. Any proposal claiming that a focus is used in place of an equivalent literal expression falls under this substitution view, according to Black. To account for the interpretation of (2),

(2) Richard is a lion

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one just has to substitute 'a lion' for 'brave' since the metaphorical meaning of the former coincides with the literal meaning of the latter due to the similarity between their meanings (Whately, 1846/1963). This mechanism of substitution reduces the metaphorical contribution to an ornamental value. In cases like this, Black denies that there is a genuine cognitive value.

According to Black, not all metaphors are instances of substitution. There are 'interaction-metaphors' such as (1) whose characterisation depends on explaining that the properties of a category concept can be projected onto a different category. Some characteristic(s) associated with the meaning encoded by the focus (term(s) from source domain) change(s) to be able to describe what is talked about, the target domain.¹ In the metaphorical use of 'wolf' in (1), 'wolf' gets a sense that does not coincide with any literal substitute, rather, it depends on seeing the concept MAN through the concept WOLF. Some of the characteristics of wolf ('fierce', 'carnivorous' and 'treacherous') change to be able to describe the man (Black, 1954-5: 288).² They are mapped to the target domain to select, highlight, organise and/or introduce some aspects in the concept of man as intended by the speaker with that utterance. This metaphorical concept (MAN AS WOLF) informs our understanding of the fierce and treacherous behaviour of man that the speaker has in mind and intends to communicate with her utterance. This type of mechanism characterises the interaction theory of metaphor, a proposal intended to account for the production of metaphorical meaning in a way that does justice to the cognitive value of some metaphorical utterances, 'interaction-metaphors'; the kind that 'are of importance in philosophy' (Black, 1954-5: 292). On such a view, the metaphorical meaning of the focus does not coincide with any other ready-made concept (lexicalised meaning established in the long term memory of members of the linguistic community). In such interaction-metaphors, the substitution mechanism is not acceptable. Since metaphorical meaning has its own cognitive value, it is not possible to find an exact paraphrase. It has just an explanatory value but it is not meant to exhaust its cognitive metaphorical insight (Black, 1954-5: 293). The interaction view can account for the new meaning, which provides new knowledge about the target from the perspective taken and communicated by the speaker. This new perspective of a concept justifies the cognitive value of the metaphor.

A development of this idea has been called 'perspectival theory', characterized by Kittay in the following way: 'To call our theory perspectival is to name it for the function metaphor serves: to provide a perspective from which to gain an understanding of that which is metaphorically portrayed. This is a distinctively cognitive role.' (Kittay, 1987: 13-14). This distinctively cognitive role is the feature that most theorists of metaphor agree on. This agreement, however, is not complete as we will see in this chapter. The relevance-theoretic deflationary account is an exception and, even among those who agree, there are important

¹ 'Source domain' and 'target domain' are terms introduced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) corresponding to what Black (1954-5) called 'subsidiary subject' and 'principal subject'. We are using the former because they are currently the terms of art.

² If a theory of metaphor tries to show how we are led by the context to select those characteristics of wolf that will literally fix Richard the man, this theory is defending a form of the substitution view (Black, 1954-5: 281n10).

differences about the way it is explained or named ('mapping', 'perspective taking', 'seeing as', for example).

The other important contribution by Black, his defence of metaphorical meaning, has received critical responses by philosophers who reject any non-literal propositional (or truth-conditional) effects in metaphor interpretation (Davidson, 1978; Lepore & Stone, 2015). Even when metaphorical meaning is supported, current explanations are informed by the updated general theories of meaning in which they are framed and thus they differ in important respects. For Black (1954-5: 277), although the recognition and interpretation of the metaphorical focus may require attention to the circumstances of their utterances, metaphorical bearers are expressions such as the sentence (1) that include a focus, 'wolf'. More recent accounts of metaphorical meaning argue that metaphorical bearers are not expressions but utterances (Grice, 1975/89; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; Recanati, 2004; Carston, 2002; Romero & Soria, 2007) and that, with them, the speaker communicates a metaphorical propositional content that involves a metaphorical meaning associated with the term(s) from the source domain used in the metaphorical utterance. Besides their agreement about metaphorical propositional effects, important discussions are raised. Metaphorical meaning has been, and still is, the focus of intense debate in the philosophy of language.

In this chapter, we expound theories of metaphor, focusing on their recent developments and controversies. In the section 2, we discuss the sceptical strategy on metaphorical propositional contents. Although sceptics (Davidson, 1978; Lepore & Stone, 2015) reject metaphorical meaning, they support Black's defence of a distinctive role for metaphor: seeing one thing as another. Disagreements with sceptics are abundant. The notion of metaphorical meaning (as part of speaker's meaning rather than of the linguistic meaning) is often considered as a useful notion to account for some of the characteristics of the metaphorical use of language. In sections 3 and 4, we consider the non-sceptical arguments for metaphorical meaning. These sections take account of two main issues. The first, discussed in section 3, concerns whether the production of metaphorical effects (propositional or non-propositional) have particular characteristics or not. As we will see in section 3.1, some scholars take a deflationary position according to which the meanings of many other kinds of utterances are explained in the same way as the metaphorical ones (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, 2008; Carston, 2002; Wilson & Carston, 2006). In section 3.2, we consider non-deflationary accounts of metaphor according to which the peculiar characteristics of metaphorical meaning reveal the cognitive value of novel metaphor (Black, 1954-5, 1977; Indurkha, 1986; Kittay, 1987; Forceville, 1991; Romero & Soria, 1997-8; Gentner & Wolf, 2000). The second issue, discussed in section 4, concerns the debate on metaphorical meaning as part of two types of propositional contents involved in speaker's meaning; implicature (Grice, 1975/89; Kittay, 1987; Borg, 2012) or what is said (Romero & Soria, 1997-8; Stern, 2000). Finally, we present a summary in the conclusion.

2 Sceptical accounts of metaphorical meaning

Metaphor is the dreamwork of language (...). (Davidson, 1978: 31)

With these words, Davidson begins his influential article against Black's defence of metaphorical meaning, a meaning compatible with serious thought. In it, Davidson (1978: 46) denies 'that metaphor does its work by having a special meaning, a specific cognitive content.' According to Davidson, this use of language is related, like any other, merely to the literal meaning. In the case of metaphor, the speaker believes that the literal meaning of the sentence is obviously false or trivially true. Thus, (1) and (2) express obviously false literal propositions while (3)

(3) Man is not a wolf

expresses a trivially true one. These literal statements inspire or prompt us to see one thing as another. They invite us to attend to some likeness (Davidson, 1978: 40) but this invitation does not constitute a meaning. Davidson accepts that metaphor produces some characteristic effects but they constitute some kind of non-propositional import 'caused', rather than 'meant'. In his words: 'much of what we are caused to notice is not propositional in character.' (1978: 46). There is no metaphorical meaning related to the source domain terms because using and understanding a metaphor is, for Davidson, a creative effort that is not guided by rules and 'the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination.' (1978: 31).

The explanations of metaphor that appeal to metaphorical meanings are, according to Davidson, vacuous: it is not a metaphorical meaning that allows us to understand a metaphorical utterance, rather, when we understand it, we call what we understand 'metaphorical meaning'. Literal meaning and truth conditions have, in contrast, genuine explanatory power because they can be assigned to words and sentences without taking into account their use.

In Davidson's theory, metaphor fulfils its function via nothing other than what is conveyed by the literal meaning of the words used. A metaphor only has one meaning, the ordinary meaning (Davidson, 1978: 39). The presumption here is that words and sentences can be assigned truth conditions without taking into account their use. However, this is challenged by non-propositionalist authors such as Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 180), Bach (1987: 176-9), Carston (2002: 19-21) or Recanati (2004: 56-8) who defend semantic underdeterminacy, that is, the recognition that for sentences to be able to establish the literal truth conditions of an utterance, we need, in most cases, contextual information that is not obtained automatically with independence of the speaker's intentions. Once the need for contextual information to determine literal truth conditions is admitted, one could admit its role in metaphorical interpretation. Davidson, nevertheless, would undoubtedly reject this possibility because he argues that the interpretation of metaphor is not guided by rules or interpretative principles that deliver a metaphorical meaning or any new meaning.

This disagreement depends on their different ideas on the constitution of meaning and is an essential part of the debates between minimalists and contextualists. Crucial to this debate is the position about propositionalism. One

common contextualist claim against minimalism is that the minimal proposition has no role in the interpretation of non-literal utterances. For example, in relation to the metonymical utterances of sentences such as ‘the ham sandwich left without paying’, Recanati says:

The interpreter does not go from the concept of ham sandwich to that of ham-sandwich-orderer after having entertained the absurd literal proposition; rather, it is *because* the interpreter goes from the concept of ham sandwich to that of ham-sandwich-orderer (as a result of an accessibility shift resulting from the interpretation of the predicate) that he or she does *not* entertain the absurd literal proposition. (2004: 33)

A strong version of non-propositionalism is Romero and Soria’s (2019) claim that many (but not all) metaphorical utterances cannot be literally grasped even if we consider contextual information. The literal content of sentences such as (1) or ‘the ham sandwich left without paying’ cannot be obtained since semantic composition is not available without pragmatics. Although they are syntactically well-formed, composition is precluded by normal type constraints (Asher, 2011) and thus, no intelligible literal content is entertained by the speaker and available to the hearer. In cases of semantic mismatch such as these, Recanati (2013: 177) agrees with Romero and Soria (2013a) that ‘compositional modulation’ is mandatory from the truth-conditional point of view (although not linguistically mandatory as it could be claimed following Asher).³ From the non-propositionalist standpoint, the truth-conditions of sentences such as (1) cannot be, as Davidson proposed, ‘what the words, in their more literal interpretation mean, and nothing more.’ (1978: 32). Truth-conditions are obtained only from the interpretation of utterances not of sentences and sentences of this type do not get the literal proposition without pragmatic processes in utterance interpretation. Davidson proposal conflicts with non-propositionalist views.

Following Davidson, Lepore and Stone (2015) also argue for (i) the defence of a likeness or similarity as the type of effect characteristic of metaphor; (ii) the rejection of metaphorical meanings; and (iii) the rejection of metaphors as conveying metaphorical propositional contents. Their objective is to attack the new criticisms of the sceptical account, especially those which adopt the notion of speaker meaning as explained by pragmatic theories. In their view, the non-sceptic strategy on metaphorical meanings, characterised in general by the rejection of (ii) and (iii), fails to come to grips with both the power of metaphor and with the explanatory resources of traditional pragmatic theories on speaker meaning (Lepore & Stone, 2015: 169). Lepore and Stone argue that, if the notion of speaker meaning were developed coherently, there would be no room for any communicated propositional meaning in the metaphorical interpretation of utterances. In their opinion, the view of the metaphorical mechanism as analogical thinking, as part of imagination, is compatible only with the rejection of metaphorical meaning (Lepore & Stone, 2015: 170).

³ Stern (2000, 2011) also argues for a strong version of non-propositionalism related to metaphorical utterances. However, he uses saturation rather than modulation to obtain the metaphorically expressed proposition.

Grice (1957/89)'s definition of speaker meaning, for example, permits Lepore and Stone to show why they reject the alleged metaphorical meaning. The nature of speaker meaning is determined by an intention aimed to produce certain effects by means of the recognition of speaker's intention to produce them. The recognition of speaker's intention to produce certain effects is a necessary condition for the audience and a reason to reach them. This notion of speaker meaning, however, is of no use to explain metaphorical meaning. According to Lepore and Stone (2010: 170), when the speaker uses language metaphorically his intention is that the audience appreciate certain similarities, but the hearer's appreciation of the similarities, the type of metaphorical non-propositional effects, is not achieved by means of the hearer's recognition of that intention and thus the metaphorical effects cannot be metaphorical meanings in the speaker meaning. For Lepore and Stone, nothing propositional is communicated through metaphor, nothing is added to the common ground. For sceptics, speakers cannot agree or disagree when they use metaphorical utterances.

To dispute this, Black (1979) analyses Davidson's metaphorical statement '[m]etaphor is the dreamwork of language' to show, in a practical way, that Davidson's serious philosophical (and in part metaphorical) work was wrong. According to Black (1979: 134), a reader could disagree with Davidson's metaphorical remark and reasons could be offered for and against it. Thus, communication through metaphor is possible, metaphorical effects are propositional. Indeed, their philosophical and metaphorical dispute shows that they both communicate metaphorical thoughts in their arguments and they disagree on what is metaphorically said by Davidson. In this vein, Romero and Soria (2016) argue against Lepore and Stone (2015) that speakers can agree or disagree when they use metaphorical utterances and that the notion of speaker's meaning, rightly understood, can give an adequate explanation for non-conventional uses of language with propositional effects. In the following section, we provide an overview of the arguments for metaphorical meaning that take into account the explanatory resources of pragmatic theories.

3 Deflationary vs non-deflationary accounts of metaphorical effects

A common argument of non-sceptical theories about metaphorical meaning is that there is some process of interpretation that changes the meaning of some part of the metaphorical bearer, resulting in a metaphorical meaning different from the literal meaning of that part. Metaphor exploits the change of meaning of words, a contextual adjustment. There are different defences of metaphorical meaning taking into account whether the production of metaphorical meaning has particular characteristics or not. A deflationary account of metaphorical meaning, as we will see in section 3.1, is defended by relevance theorists (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, 2008; Carston, 2002) as they do not accept a specific pragmatic mechanism to explain how the conceptual adjustment required by the metaphorical use is obtained. By contrast, in philosophy of language, linguistics and other related disciplines most scholars, as we will see in section 3.2, defend the particular characteristics of metaphorical effects which are sometimes taken to be non-

propositional (the sceptical views explained in section 2) or propositional in nature. For those defending propositional non-deflationary views, the cognitive value of metaphor allows an explanatory account of metaphorical communication (Black, 1954-5; Indurkha, 1986; Forceville, 1991; Kittay, 1987; Romero & Soria, 1997-8; Gentner & Wolf, 2000).

3.1 Deflationary accounts

There is no mechanism specific to metaphor, no interesting generalisation that applies only to them. (...) “metaphor” is not a theoretically important notion in the study of verbal communication. (Sperber & Wilson, 2008: 84-5).

Relevance theorists (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, 2008) are the most prominent advocates of the deflationary approach to metaphor. Although they defend the claim that metaphor interpretation involves a type of meaning adjustment, they deny any peculiarity of the metaphorical mechanism for the production of its effects.

The meaning adjustment that takes place in the interpretation of metaphor is only derived by the same general pragmatic principle, the Communicative Principle of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95: 237). In Relevance Theory (RT), interpretation involves maximizing positive cognitive effects at the least possible effort and this is achieved by testing interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility, and stopping when the hearer has enough implications to satisfy his expectations of relevance.

In the process of arriving at the intended interpretation of a metaphorical utterance, this pragmatic derivation involves the loosening of a concept where one or more features of this concept are dropped. The remaining features characterise the communicated content. This is a type of what is known as ‘the categorization view of metaphor’ (Glucksberg, 2001) which is defended by other contextualists such as Recanati (2004).

In RT, metaphor is not derived in a peculiar way. Together with approximation and hyperbole, it occupies a point in a continuum of cases of loosening. In this sense, there is not a theory of metaphor proper but a more general theory of meaning adjustment. This is known as the continuity view.

Although in early RT the communicated contents resulting from loosening were characterized as (weak) implicatures, in current RT, under the influence of Carston (2002) who raises a debate about the questionable asymmetry between enrichment and loosening in the original account, both the result of loosening and the result of enrichment have effects on explicatures.

In the continuity view, ‘there is no clear cut-off point between “literal” utterances, approximations, hyperboles and metaphors, and they are all interpreted in the same way’ (Wilson & Carston, 2006: 406). The only difference is a matter of degree. Wilson and Carston (2006: 413-14) illustrate this continuity view with different uses of ‘boiling’ in different utterances of (4)

(4) The water is boiling

According to the context of use, the concept BOILING undergoes a pragmatic adjustment producing different ad hoc concepts, BOILING*, BOILING**, and so forth.

Depending on whether it is an approximation, a hyperbole or a metaphor, different encyclopaedic assumptions (listed in 4a-c) are activated and communicated:

(4)	a. SEETHES AND BUBBLES, HIDDEN UNDERCURRENTS, EMITS VAPOUR, etc	Metaphor
	b. TOO HOT TO WASH ONE'S HANDS IN, TOO HOT TO BATHE IN, etc	Hyperbole
	c. SUITABLE FOR MAKING TEA, DANGEROUS TO TOUCH, etc	Approximation
	d. SAFE TO USE IN STERILISING INSTRUMENTS, etc	Literal

Only in (4d), both the denotation and the encyclopaedic assumptions associated to the encoded concept are kept and therefore the use of 'boiling' can be considered literal. However, in (4a)-(4c) BOILING does not preserve the logical entry associated with the concept BOILING (TO REACH, OR CAUSE SOMETHING TO REACH, THE TEMPERATURE AT WHICH A LIQUID STARTS TO TURN TO GAS) and so different ad hoc concepts such as BOILING* can be derived. The encyclopaedic assumptions detailed in (4c) would be activated, for example, if someone utters (4) when he tells the interlocutor that the water has reached the adequate temperature to make tea; those that appear in (4b) would be activated if you want to warn someone that you have to mix hot and cold water to avoid burning when you want to have a shower; and those indicated in (4a) if it is uttered when talking about the rough sea on a cold winter day. In all cases, its denotation is an extension of the denotation of the concept BOILING, and the content conveyed would be (4e).

(4) e. THE WATER IS BOILING* (or BOILING**, etc)

The ad hoc concept BOILING* is characterised in line with the encyclopaedic assumptions simultaneously activated by 'water' and 'boiling' in each of those uses and in the case of metaphor they would be those listed in (4a). Interpreting a metaphor, according to this approach, involves deriving assumptions related to BOILING in order of accessibility. The accessibility of these assumptions is constrained by the topic THE SEA WATER so that only the encyclopaedic assumptions in (4a) get activation for the interpretation of (4) in the metaphorically biasing context in which the speaker is talking about the sea water on a cold day. Ad hoc concepts have local effects on explicatures and warrant a range of weak implicatures in cases of metaphor. In the appropriate metaphorical context, the speaker may be conveying a set of assumptions such as: that the sea water is bubbling, that the sea water has undercurrents, etc.

This view of metaphor has been questioned by different camps. One of the problems (Romero & Soria, 2007, 2014; Wearing, 2014), acknowledged by relevance theorists themselves, is 'the emergent property issue' (Wilson & Carston, 2006) or how the ad hoc concept can activate encyclopaedic assumptions that are not associated with the encoded concept (Carston, 2010a: 256). Furthermore, Romero and Soria (2014: 503) argue '[t]here are no properties related to the concept expressed by its metaphorical vehicle that are also literally applied to the topic in the same sense. In the agitated cold sea water, there are no hollow globules that result from rapid heat.' The production of the bubbles of the waves is not related to the temperature of the water, as are the other encyclopaedic features activated by the other cases of loosening. Water is agitated in both cases but the

kind of agitation is different in each (only as a metaphorical property, the water agitation implicates that it is inadvisable to go sailing, for example). Relevance theorists claim that the emergent property issue is a challenge for all theories of metaphor, but Romero and Soria (2007) argue that the emergent property issue can be dissolved if analogical transfer is included in the derivation of metaphorical ad hoc concepts. In a similar vein, Wearing says:

the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor (Carston, 2002; Sperber and Wilson, 2008) as well as other central categorization accounts (Glucksberg, 2001; Recanati, 2004) lack the resources to explain such cases [category-crossing metaphors]. An adequate categorization account, I argue, cannot avoid incorporating the central element of rival, comparison-based, views: analogy. I show how this might be done within a categorization framework. (2014: 78)

If this proposal of a combination of RT and a distinctively cognitive role (Romero & Soria, 2014; Wearing, 2014) were accepted, it would seriously affect the continuity view. However, this is not so serious for Recanati, since he does not hold the continuity view. For him, not all figures of speech are derived in the same way.⁴ In fact, in his answer to Romero and Soria (2007), Recanati (2007: 163) says: ‘the imaginary mixing of features from both the source and the target is the most characteristic feature of metaphor. That property is, indeed, irreducible to loosening.’ For Recanati the apparition of emergent features is a form of enrichment that depends on this characteristic feature of metaphor that combines with loosening in the derivation of the ad hoc concept.

In collaboration with Rubio-Fernández and Wearing, Carston now defends a weaker continuity thesis. In their words, ‘there are *at least* descriptive and psycholinguistic differences between metaphor and hyperbole to which it is worth paying attention.’ (Rubio-Fernández, Wearing & Carston, 2015: 25). In this sense, she departs from standard RT. In addition, Carston (2010a, 2010b) worries about the adequacy of the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor for some types of metaphor. As she puts it:

A second question, one that has interested me for some time, concerns just how far we should or can take the *ad hoc* concept approach, what range of cases it applies. While it provides a neat and convincing account of how we understand spontaneous conversational (often somewhat conventionalised) cases of metaphor, such as ‘John is a *mouse*’, (...), and so on, it is not obvious that it carries over to more innovative cases or to those that are extended and developed over a stretch of discourse/text (perhaps a whole poem). (Carston, 2010a: 256)

The relevance-theoretic explanation of ad hoc concepts resulting from loosening seems not to convincingly capture what happens in the interpretation of highly creative metaphors such as the utterance of (5).

⁴ Recanati (2004) does not use the Relevance Principle to explain loosening and he recognises other mechanisms to account for other figurative uses of language (e.g., metonymy as a case of transfer).

(5) Love is the lighthouse and the rescued mariners⁵

In these cases, Carston defends a second interpretation route. According to Carston (2010b: 318), in the interpretation of highly creative metaphors the only explicit meaning delivered is, in a Davidsonian vein, the literal meaning. A range of weak implicatures are conveyed and non-propositional or imagistic effects⁶ play a dominant role. On this second route, the literal meaning in (5) is metarepresented and retained for further inspection. However, this view conflicts with the contextualist view that the literal interpretation is not accessed by default in utterance interpretation. Indeed, Wilson seems to disagree when she affirms in relation to Carston's second route that '[t]he assumption that constructing an ad hoc concept is more effortful than accepting the encoded "literal" meaning conflicts with a view often expressed in relevance theory, that the pragmatic processes "apply spontaneously, automatically and unconsciously to fine-tune the interpretation of virtually every word" [Wilson, 2003: 273].' (Wilson, 2018: 194). The second route does not seem to be accepted in standard RT. In this and other contextualist approaches, non-literal interpretation is easier to construct than a more literal one. As the current debate shows, the issues raised around metaphorical effects are controversial even within relevance-theory.

3.2 Non-deflationary accounts

The rejection of a deflationary account comes from both sceptical and non-sceptical positions. From the sceptical point of view, Lepore and Stone explicitly challenge the deflationary account of metaphor:

We'll try to convince you that you can't put together the inferences required for metaphor with the inferences required for irony or those required for hinting, and so on for other figures of speech. Since all of these practices are dramatically distinctive, as we will argue, it follows that overarching frameworks like the Cooperative Principle [CP] or the Principle of Relevance can't be the whole story. (Lepore & Stone, 2015: 83)

From the non-sceptical point of view, authors such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Kittay (1987), Forceville (1991, 2008), Romero and Soria (1997-8, 2007, 2014) or Wearing (2014), among many others, have argued for an interpretation process of mapping (or some sort of analogical projection) for the explanation of imaginative or creative metaphors, which must be interpreted metaphorically and have non-literal effects on speaker's meaning. Metaphorical meanings which contribute to propositional contents (what is said and/or implicatures) can be adequately characterized in this way. These interaction views defend the claim that the change of meaning that the metaphor entails depends on a partial mapping of one

⁵ The utterance of this sentence, an example taken from Carston (2010b: 295), is part of the poem about love ('Hana') by the Serbian author Oscar Davičo. The full poem can be found translated into English in Carston (2010b: 311).

⁶ Carston (2018: 198) claims that mental imagery has an important role in creative metaphor. However, mental images are also activated by non-metaphorical (creative) utterances. Mental imagery is not a peculiar feature of metaphor and yet it is also of interest for a non-deflationary theorist when it is claimed that these effects may be achieved by analogical thinking as Lepore and Stone suggest.

conceptual domain to another. This mechanism allows us to explain how properties not associated with the concept used metaphorically emerge and offers a homogeneous explanation for cases of metaphor, whether highly creative or not.

As Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 154) say, ‘the primary function of metaphor is to provide a partial understanding of one kind of experience in terms of another kind of experience’. Lakoff and Johnson focus on metaphorical conceptual structures such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY which are part of categories stored in the conceptual system.⁷ Many of their verbal expressions are considered ‘literal metaphors’ and not ‘imaginative metaphors’, the kind that are of importance in philosophy of language. There are two types of imaginative metaphors. Imaginative live metaphors express the non-conventional part of a stored metaphorical conceptual structure. Imaginative novel metaphors express new metaphorical conceptual structures that are not stored in the conceptual system. Examples such as ‘Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children, most of whom fight incessantly’ generate a new way of thinking about something (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 53).⁸ Conventional and new metaphorical structures ‘have entailments, which may include other metaphors and literal statements as well.’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 139). The result is a coherent network of entailments. Creative metaphor highlights certain features while suppressing others and provides an organization of specific aspects about the target that our conventional conceptual system does not make available.

Let's focus on how the interpretation of a novel metaphorical utterance such as (5) can be explained according to the mapping approach. The metaphorical mechanism links two separate cognitive domains to conceptualise one as another. A cognitive domain is a coherent structure of related senses which is part of the speaker's conceptual system stored in long-term memory and which determines the way in which semantic information is stored in the mental lexicon. In these structures, the knowledge associated with each word depends on the knowledge of the other senses and if the relationships between the senses are altered, the senses themselves are altered.⁹ Following Indurkha (1986) and Romero and Soria (2016), who work in a Blackian tradition, we explain the mapping approach to novel metaphor. In (5) not only is there a semantic mismatch that requires some contextual adjustment, there is also a contrast between the concepts involved, identifying the concept LOVE as the target domain (D_t) and the complex concept LIGHTHOUSE AND RESCUED MARINERS¹⁰ as the source domain (D_s) from which to describe the target domain. This contrast activates metaphorical interpretation, making us project properties from D_s to D_t and conceptualise LOVE AS LIGHTHOUSE AND RESCUED MARINERS. This projection is specified with a mapping, M , from the source domain, LIGHTHOUSE AND RESCUED MARINERS, to the target domain, LOVE. A domain can be represented by a set of terms forming its vocabulary, V , and by a set of sentences, S_s

⁷ For Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 77-86), concepts are structured in ‘experiential gestalts’, which are multidimensional structured wholes.

⁸ For an explanation of these distinctions, see Romero & Soria (2005).

⁹ For more details on this approach, see Kittay's theory of semantic fields (1987: 214-57).

¹⁰ This is a complex concept constructed for the occasion of the utterance to become the source domain (for an explanation of this, see Romero & Soria, 2016: 160; Keating & Soria, 2019: 213-24).

from the source domain and S_t from the target domain, which specifies how these terms give access to the information associated with the category concept.

Source domain (D_s): LIGHTHOUSE AND RESCUED MARINERS	Target domain (D_t): LOVE
<p>$D_s = \langle V_s, S_s \rangle$</p> <p>$V_s = \{ \text{'Lighthouse', 'tower', 'light', 'firm ground', 'illuminate', 'mariners', 'risk', 'orientate themselves', 'night', 'rescue', 'mainland', etc} \}$</p> <p>$S_s =$</p> <p>[1_s] Lighthouses are tall towers on firm ground near the coast with a light at the top,</p> <p>[2_s] The light of the lighthouse illuminates and guides the mariners at night,</p> <p>[3_s] Mariners look for the lighthouse to orientate themselves,</p> <p>[4_s] When mariners get rescued from the dangers of sailing, they feel great relief,</p> <p>[5_s] When the mariners see the lighthouse, they reach the mainland and feel safe,</p> <p>[6_s] For a lighthouse to function properly, someone has to take care of it, etc.</p>	<p>$D_t = \langle V_t, S_t \rangle$</p> <p>$V_t = \{ \text{'love', 'feeling', 'power', 'help', 'people', 'distress', 'carry out a life project', 'loved person', 'emotional balance', etc} \}$</p> <p>$S_t =$</p> <p>[1_t] Love is a feeling of human beings who seek to share it,</p> <p>[2_t] The power of love helps people in distress,</p> <p>[3_t] People seek love to carry out a life project,</p> <p>[4_t] The person who loves tries to satisfy the needs and tastes of the loved one, etc.</p>

Figure 1 Representation of source and target domains

The interpretation of (5) consists in elaborating a partial admissible function F from the terms that belong to the source domain, the arguments of the function, to the terms that belong or that will belong to the target domain. This, applied to the example, would entail a partial function, F , between terms formed by the pairs: (lighthouse \rightarrow love), (light \rightarrow power), (illuminate \rightarrow help), (mariners \rightarrow people), (night \rightarrow distress), (orientate themselves \rightarrow carry out a life project), (mainland \rightarrow emotional balance), (rescue \rightarrow save), (dangers of sailing \rightarrow distress). The application also consists of a subset of sentences from the source domain, S , which can be transformed coherently using F to information associated only with the target domain. In the example, S could be formed by sentences like [2_s], [3_s], [4_s] and [5_s] of Figure 1, sentences that include properties that are not literally applied to love. These sentences are transformable by F because each of its terms belongs to the arguments of this function or it belongs directly to the vocabulary of the target domain. Source domain terms get the meaning of the target domain terms to which they are applied in F , meaning that is established in the metaphorically restructured

target domain.¹¹ When transforming the sentences of *S*, we find others only in terms of the target domain, [2_{t'}], [3_{t'}], [5_{t'}] and [6_{t'}] as we can see in Figure 2.

Restructured target domain (D_{t'} or LOVE^M): LOVE AS LIGHTHOUSE AND RESCUED MARINERS

[2_{t'}] The power of love helps people in distress,
 [3_{t'}] People seek love to carry out a life project,
[4_{t'}] When love saves people from distress, they feel great relief,
[5_{t'}] When people find love, they reach emotional balance and feel safe.

Figure 2 Representation of the metaphorically restructured target domain or *D_{t'}*

If the union of these sentences with part of the information of the target domain is coherent, that is, if this union is true in at least one model, then the sentences of *S* have been coherently transformed by means of *F* into sentences of the target domain. Coherence is an inferential requirement for mappings: we can only transfer the transformed information from the source domain that does not make our conception of the target domain incoherent. The mapping *M* for (5) generates a metaphorically restructured conception of LOVE, LOVE^M or LOVE AS LIGHTHOUSE AND RESCUED MARINERS, characterised by the structural constraints of Figure 2. With [2_{t'}] and [3_{t'}] nothing new is added to the target domain from the source domain, some information is reinforced and highlighted by the relational similarities that are revealed by their alignment with the characteristics activated in the source domain. Since the information in [1_t] and [4_t] (see the right column of Figure 1) is not selected, it is attenuated. In addition, when the description of the target domain from the source domain adds information which is not present in the first one, but is consistent with it and relevant to understand the metaphorical utterance, novel properties emerge in the target domain as in the case of [4_{t'}] and [5_{t'}]. Metaphorical reconceptualization creates similarity, something which has been repeatedly defended by authors in the Blackian tradition.

The metaphorically restructured target concept causes a shift in the context of interpretation of the metaphorical utterance of (5): LOVE AS LIGHTHOUSE AND RESCUED MARINERS is the concept from which (5) can be interpreted. From this new context, a new meaning is produced, at least for the terms from the source domain used in (5). Thus, the term from the source domain 'lighthouse' does not mean in that context, TALL BUILDING NEAR THE COAST WITH A LIGHT AT THE TOP TO WARN MARINERS OF ROCKS OR OTHER DANGERS, rather it acquires the meaning that love has in LOVE^M. LOVE^M, the metaphorically restructured target domain, allows us to determine the ad hoc concept or, as Romero and Soria (1997-98, 2016) call it, the provisional metaphorical meaning associated with the words 'lighthouse', 'rescued' and 'mariners'. This meaning is conceivable only from the metaphorically restructured

¹¹ In this way, the interaction approach dissolves the emergent properties problem of how properties not associated with the concept represented by the source domain can be activated. The properties of the source domain do not have to be applied literally to the topic (a restriction defended by categorization views).

category concept LOVE^M. Hence, this pragmatic theory of metaphorical provisional meaning does not fail to come to grips with the power of metaphor, as Lepore and Stone have claimed in their criticisms of non-sceptical theories of metaphorical meaning (see Section 2 above).

The mapping and categorization views differ because the latter (e.g. RT) emphasize the creation of an ad hoc concept for the focus while, for the former, the important thing is the recategorization of the target. What gives us new insight is not the indication of what aspects are selected in D_s (S_s in bold letters in Figure 1), this selection is just an aspect of the explanation of the mapping. The important thing is that by the analogical application or mapping, these properties selected in the D_s , are used to create an emergent ad hoc category in the target domain. This ad hoc category concept (e.g. LOVE^M in Figure 2) gives access to information that was not accessible from the conventional category LOVE. The new information that is accessible from the restructured target domain or metaphorical concept can be exploited in the derivation of any kind of effect (propositional and non-propositional) just as with the information associated with any category concept. For relevance-theorists metaphor is only a matter of language while in the mapping approach metaphor is primarily a matter of concepts. A new category concept is created ad hoc and this can be represented linguistically or in other modes or combination of modes (Forceville, 1991, 2008). The mode(s) (linguistic or multimodal) of both metaphorical and non-metaphorical utterances may have an impact on the non-propositional interpretive effects but this is not peculiar of metaphor. In metaphor, however, the different modal aspects associated with a particular linguistic and multimodal representation of a concept may affect the mapping and thus the metaphorical ad hoc category. In this sense, multimodality is a crucial aspect in metaphor analysis.

4 Metaphorical content: implicature or what is said

In this section, we explain the debate about metaphorical meaning with effects on implicatures or on what is said, focusing on the non-deflationary account of metaphor from which a view of metaphor as restricted to implicature is still defended.

From the proposals that argue for a particular type of meaning in metaphor interpretation, metaphorical meaning is sometimes considered as an ingredient of what is implicated and sometimes as an ingredient of what is said. According to the first position, the speaker makes as if to say literally one thing in order to mean another (Grice, 1975/89; Kittay, 1987). According to the second, the speaker means what she metaphorically says (Romero & Soria, 1997-8; Stern, 2000).

In the Gricean approach, the behaviour of metaphor should be explained as a case of particularised conversational implicature. According to Grice (1975/89), in metaphor the speaker flouts (ostentatiously fails to fulfill) the first maxim of quality of the CP, 'Do not say what you believe to be false'. With (1), the speaker cannot plausibly mean *that man is a wolf*, a proposition that involves a categorial falsity (Grice, 1975/89: 34). Gricean 'what is said' is part of speaker meaning and something that is blatantly false cannot be a content that he intends to

communicate; *that man is a wolf* cannot be the content 'said'. With (1), the speaker has just 'made as if to say' literally *that man is a wolf* and implicated *that he is fierce and treacherous*. Consequently, what the speaker means is only what the speaker implicates. The implicature re-establishes the situation and the speaker's behaviour becomes cooperative.

Implicature derivation in metaphor interpretation is triggered by a special type of flouting the first maxim of quality: categorial falsity. Many psycholinguists use the results of reaction time experiments to reject this identification criterion. Their argument is the following. They assume that categorial falsity entails two (or more) propositional stages (Gibbs, 1992: 580), metaphorical comprehension takes place after literal comprehension. They also claim that two propositional stages entails additional time in metaphor processing (Way, 1991: 51-2). Furthermore, since certain psychological reaction time experiments show equivalent processing times for metaphorical and literal interpretations (Gerrig, 1989), they conclude that interpretation in two propositional stages and categorial falsity should be rejected. Thus, the Gricean implicature theory of metaphor, which appeals to an additional propositional stage, should be abandoned because any additional stage is inconsistent with empirical data. Nevertheless, the results of reaction time experiments are not homogeneous. The results of experiments run by Gerrig (1989) show equivalence in processing times but these results were not replicated in Giora (1999) whose empirical tests give results showing non-equivalence.

Thus it is relevant to wonder what the role of empirical available data is. As Romero and Soria (2013b) argue, if the categorial falsity which involves a first propositional stage were a necessary condition of novel metaphor, experiments should show non-equivalence in all cases, something that does not happen. Experimental results do not support falsity as an identification condition for all metaphors and the interpretation of metaphor in two stages must be discarded. Nevertheless, the implicature view of metaphor could be defended since equivalence in processing times is compatible with an additional process for the derivation of implicatures which operates concurrently. If the identification criterion is described as some subpropositional categorial oddity (pragmatic or semantic) that does not depend on processing a literal proposition first, it does not trigger an additional propositional stage and it is not incompatible with those empirical results. A defence of metaphor as implicature is possible if it affects subpropositional constituents. Any sub-propositional version of the identification criterion is equally open to those results that show equivalence in processing times and to those that show non-equivalence.

Kittay changes the criterion of categorial falsity in that direction, although it is fair to point out that her motivation is not to avoid the previous criticism, but to solve different problems of Gricean metaphorical identification. Not all metaphorical utterances need categorial falsity to be identified as such and those that present it do not seem to fix a literal propositional content.

In a metaphorical utterance (6),

- (6) [Mary says about an aging professor emeritus:] The rock is getting brittle with age¹²

¹² An example taken from Reddy (1969: 242) and thoroughly discussed by Kittay (1987: 71-2).

the sentence shows no categorial falsity. Thus, with the Gricean criterion, (6) cannot be identified as metaphorical. Furthermore, cases like (1), in which there is a categorial falsity, are not literally accessed. The speaker of (1) does not make as if to say a literal proposition because (1) cannot fix an evaluable literal propositional content. To have an evaluable content it must be graspable and no graspable literal proposition is delivered by (1) without a contextual modification (fictional, metaphorical, etc) of at least one of the concepts encoded by the words used. Categorial falsity opposes 'well-formedness' rather than truthfulness; it indicates a semantic mismatch according to type constraints (Asher 2011). 'Wolf' encodes some type constraints that 'man' does not satisfy unless some modulation of meaning occurs.

To avoid these problems without abandoning the implicature view of metaphor, Kittay rejects the assumption that falsity is an identification condition of a metaphor that depends on processing a literal proposition and it must be admitted that rather than a falsity, there is a categorial mismatch (or incongruity). Neither (1) nor (6) express a false literal proposition. (1) presents an incongruity between some terms in the sentence (an unfulfilled type constraint) and (6) presents a pragmatic categorial incongruity that results from using 'the rock' in a context in which the speaker does not refer to a rock.

Kittay's theory of metaphor as implicature satisfies these two demands by replacing the requirement of categorial falsity with the requirement of incongruity, defined by the Principle of Incongruity (1987: 70). Incongruity does not depend on processing a literal proposition but on processing literally the subpropositional constituents. In this way, the critique that psycholinguists (Gibbs, 1992; Way, 1991) made to the theory of implicature was already avoided in Kittay (1987). The subpropositional conception of Kittay's identification criterion is, like any subpropositional conception of metaphorical identification, compatible with the rejection of the thesis of two propositional stages.

The problem of incongruity as an identification criterion is that (7),

- (7) [In a restaurant, a waitress, looking at the ham sandwich customer, says to another:] The ham sandwich is waiting for his check

an example of metonymy, is not distinguished from metaphor. Two of the subpropositional elements of (7) show an incongruity although it is not a metaphorical utterance. Thus, Kittay's criterion is not enough. By contrast, for Romero and Soria (1997-8: 377-80), utterances are identified as metaphorical by a complex criterion which involves both a contextual abnormality (or incongruity) and a conceptual contrast (or the recognition that the speaker is using terms from the source domain to describe the target). Metonymies, like (7), are very different. The speaker of (7) is not using the expression 'ham sandwich' which normally describes food to describe a customer in a restaurant. The orderer of the sandwich is specified rather than described by the use of 'the ham sandwich'. 'Sandwich' encodes SANDWICH and is used to talk about a sandwich in order to specify a particular orderer in the same way as 'ham' encodes HAM and is used to talk about the ham in the sandwich to identify the sandwich in question. There is no demand

of meaning shift. In (1), by contrast, 'wolf' encodes WOLF but is not used to talk about a wolf.

If the implicature theorist accepted the complex identification criterion, she might accept that the speaker conveys no literal proposition. Thus it could be argued that the speaker flouts the first maxim of quantity (and not the first maxim of quality) because there is nothing less informative than having no proposition. In this way, it is possible to have a theory of metaphor as implicature that includes adequate identification criteria, which are describable with some type of subpropositional flouting of the maxims of the CP.

However, the complex identification criterion does not directly give support to the implicature view. Since it depends on processing the subpropositional components, it is also viable to argue that, in the interpretation of metaphor, what is said is metaphorically said.

Indeed, the notion of what is said has recently become, not without debate, an object of study of pragmatics. From this point of view, for what is said to be considered as a propositional content included in the speaker meaning, it must include the results of the contextual adjustments of the meanings of the lexical units when they are used metaphorically. The meanings (or ad hoc concepts) that result from these adjustments affect the truth-conditional content expressed by the utterance and thus what is said is not always what is literally said (Recanati, 2004: 4).

On this view, metaphorical meaning is involved in propositional contents explicitly expressed (what is said). If the Gricean tests to characterise implicatures are considered, this claim can be supported since metaphorical propositional contents do not possess them (e.g. implicatures are cancellable but metaphorical content is not, implicatures have independent truth conditions from the utterance truth-conditions and metaphorical contents do not).

5 Conclusion

Philosophers of language generally recognise that metaphor involves the production of metaphorical effects. However, they often debate about their propositional or non-propositional nature, the mechanisms for their production (conceptual mapping, loosening, saturation), their distinctive or non-distinctive character and their contribution to what is said or what is implicated.

Different views on metaphorical propositional effects	Sceptical	Non-sceptical	
		Effects on the proposition expressed	Effects only on implicated propositions
Davidson Lepore and Stone	+	-	-
Grice Kittay Early Relevance Theorists	-	-	+
Current Relevance Theorists Recanati Romero and Soria Stern	-	+	-

Figure 3 Different positions on metaphorical propositional contents.

Regardless of whether metaphorical effects are argued to be propositional or non-propositional, many philosophers of language defend a distinctive character for metaphorical effects. Although for sceptical theorists, these distinctive effects of metaphorical thinking cannot be captured in literal utterances since they are non-propositional, they do not deny that metaphor accomplishes many of the same things that non-sceptical philosophers on metaphorical meaning (Black or Kittay, for example) have claimed for metaphor. They all argue for the claim that some type of distinctive mechanism (mapping/analogical projection or saturation) is involved in the production of metaphorical effects. By contrast, for those who, like Sperber and Wilson, argue that there is no mechanism peculiar of metaphor, there is no special cognitive value that metaphor helps to reach. The metaphorical use of language is argued to be on a continuum with other loose uses of language, albeit at the extreme end of the continuum.

Different views on the mechanism to derive metaphorical effects	Deflationary	Non-deflationary	
	Loosening	Analogical projection	Saturation (M-that)
Standard RT	+	-	-
Sceptics	-	+	-
Authors in the Blackian tradition	-	+	-
Stern	-	-	+

Figure 4 Deflationary/non-deflationary positions on metaphorical effects.

The strategy of both the sceptical and deflationary accounts is a negative one. They both attempt to provide counterarguments to the non-sceptical and non-deflationary view of metaphor in the Blackian tradition whose main tenet is that metaphorical communication is possible and that metaphorical utterances convey a special type of propositional contents. The view of metaphor as mapping or analogical projection is, as we have seen, the most generally accepted theory (also defended by sceptics). Even Recanati or Wearing, who defend the loosening view of metaphor, recognise that some sort of conceptual blending or analogy is needed to explain metaphor in contrast to other cases of loosening. Thus, the only purely deflationary account is that provided by relevance theorists.

Many of the views that are grouped together in these tables have very different ways of defending their positions. In a chapter, however, it is not possible to give credit to all the merits of each and to all their differences. Our purpose was simply the presentation of the different views, their general commitments and the general controversies they generate.

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