The Last Stand of Al Andalus

Lessons on the Changing Nature of War from an Early Modern Islamic Insurgency

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Abstract: The present article pursues a two-fold purpose. The first is to identify elements of continuity throughout history in internal armed conflicts where state structures are still in the process of being formed or, if already consolidated, where they have suffered serious deterioration. The second is to present and analyse a case study that has received scant attention in scientific literature on insurgencies, namely, the War of the Alpujarras, which was fought at the beginning of the early modern period and was the last Islamic rebellion in Spain.

Keywords: Insurgency, Counter-insurgency, Islam, New Wars, Early Modern Spain

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Introduction

The past three decades have witnessed various attempts to understand and categorise the changes undergone by armed conflicts.[1] Attention has focused particularly on internal armed conflicts, which were among the priorities of the post-Cold War security agenda and, since the mid-2000s, have continued to attract scholarly interest, increasingly from the counterinsurgency perspective. Martin Van Creveld was among the first to initiate this quest with his 'non-trinitarian wars' proposal, which was followed by other proposals such as 'Fourth

Generation Warfare', 'Compound Warfare', 'Hybrid Wars', 'War amongst the people', to name but a few.[2]

In terms of impact, one of the most influential contributions was Mary Kaldor's book *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, which analysed the essential characteristics of the civil wars of the last decade of the 20th century and highlighted their fundamental differences with respect to 'old wars', that is, inter-state wars fought between the end of the 17th century and the 20th century.[3] The 'new wars' framework sparked heated academic debate concerning the appropriateness and content of the term.[4] In a later publication in which she responded to the criticism received, Kaldor clarified that the adjective 'new' aimed to highlight the need to devise research methodologies to study post-Cold War conflicts and to change how political decision-makers perceived such conflicts and articulated solutions to address and/or resolve them.[5] According to Kaldor, 'new wars' were not necessarily 'new' from the historical standpoint given that some of their characteristic features (banditry, mass rapes, enforced displacements of the population, and massacres of civilians) have been present throughout history. The new aspect is the paradigm used to study them.[6]

As the case study offered in this article shows, 'new wars' are not in fact so 'new'. However, this is not the central focus of the work given that this aspect of the 'new wars' debate is no longer contentious. Rather, the primary purpose of the study is to identify elements of continuity in armed conflicts throughout history, particularly intra-state conflicts in which the erosion of state structures is often and simultaneously a cause and consequence of the armed conflict. Paradoxically, the 'new wars' approach affords interesting elements of analysis for a retrospective examination of the history of conflict.

Secondly, the article presents and analyses a historical case study unexplored thus far by scientific literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency. The case in question is the Islamic insurgency in the former kingdom of Granada (south-east Spain) between 1569-1571: the

Rebellion (or War) of the Alpujarras. As the last Islamic rebellion in the Iberian Peninsula, it had a major impact on early modern Spain and on the power struggles involving the major powers of the day in the Mediterranean. The case throws up interesting parallels with the present day, including identity politics, foreign combatants and support provided to insurgents by rival regional powers.

Key elements of the 'new wars' approach

In defending her proposal against the criticism received, Kaldor emphasised the four fundamental differences between new and old wars: actors, goals, methods and forms of finance:[7]

- Actors. Old wars (17-20th century) were fought by the conventional armies of the warring states. However, 'new wars' are fought by a combination of networks of state and non-state actors: regular armed forces, private security contractors, mercenaries, jihadists, warlords, paramilitaries, etc.
- Goals: Old wars were fought for geopolitical or ideological reasons, whereas new wars are fought in the name of identity (ethnic, religious or tribal). The aim is no longer to seize control of state power to implement a political programme for the whole of society but rather for a particular identity to take control of the state and its resources. The rise in the politicisation of identity is associated with new communications technologies, migration and the erosion of more inclusive political ideologies. At the same time, war itself becomes part of the construction of said identity. According to Kaldor, the point of making a distinction between ideology and identity is to illuminate different political logics, the way in which identity politics is associated with different practices, different methods of warfare and different ways of relating to authority. Identity politics is about

the right to power in the name of a specific group; ideological politics is about winning power in order to carry out a particular ideological programme.[8]

- Methods. Battles were one of the most salient features of old wars, as well as the primary means of capturing territory. In 'new wars', however, territory is captured through control of the population and displacement of those with an opposite identity. Consequently, violence is largely directed against civilians as a way of controlling territory.
- Forms of finance. Old wars were largely financed by states, whereas 'new wars' are funded by predatory systems: loot and pillage, kidnapping, Diaspora support, or smuggling in various commodities (diamonds, drugs, people, etc.). Revenue thus depends on continued violence. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between those who use the cover of political violence for economic reasons and those who engage in predatory economic activities to finance their political cause.

Based on these essential features, Kaldor argued that 'new wars' could be described as "mixtures of war (organised violence for political ends), crime (organised violence for private ends) and human rights violations (violence against civilians)."[9] This same combination of phenomena has been underlined also by Herfried Münkler. In his book *The New Wars*, Münkler stated that the weakening of state structures, the rise of non-state actors, the blurring of the borders between soldiers and civilians as the subjects and objects of violence, and the asymmetric strategies and capabilities of the combatants all have precedents in history.[10] However, the fact that all these factors coincide in post-Cold War conflicts allows us to speak of 'new wars' as a phenomenon. In a similar vein, Mark Duffield argued that a defining feature of 'new wars' is the privatisation of conflicts through networks of both state and non-state actors that ultimately erase the conventional differentiation between populations, armies and governments.[11]

Accordingly, Kaldor notes that a further key differentiating aspect of new wars is that "the warring parties are interested in the enterprise of war rather than winning or losing, for both political and economic reasons".[12] Thus, the inner tendency of such conflicts is war without end. Defined in this way, new wars create a shared interest among various actors to perpetuate the conflict as an instrument for reproducing political identity and furthering economic benefit.

In the 1999 edition of *New and Old Wars*, Kaldor illustrated her theoretical proposal empirically using a case study of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the revised edition of 2012, she broadened the empirical section to include an analysis of the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. A short time later she applied it to Syria also.[13] Other authors have offered specific case studies from Africa and, later, from Syria.[14] Consequently, the question underlying the case study offered in the present article is whether the 'new wars' approach is valid to identify elements of continuity in internal armed conflicts from Europe's early modern period, when state structures were still in the process of formation.

Strategic context of the case study

In order to understand the importance of the war of the Alpujarras and its internal dynamics, it must first be placed in a broader strategic context. The war took place under the reign of Philip II, king of Spain between 1556 and 1598. At the time of its outbreak, the Spanish Monarchy comprised not just the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula (except Portugal, which was not incorporated until 1580) but also the Duchy of Milan, the kingdoms of Naples (then covering much of southern Italy) and Sicily, the Franche-Comté (in eastern France), the Netherlands, Spanish possessions in the Americas, and various settlements in Asia, including the Philippines. The Spanish Empire faced two serious strategic threats in 1568.

The first was the revolt in the Spanish Netherlands which commenced in 1566 and involved a combination of traditional power struggles between nobles, and between nobles and the monarchy, as well as religious disputes between the Calvinists in the north and Catholics in the south. The Netherlands occupied an important place in the economic system of the Spanish Monarchy and were key also to the strategic encircling of France –Spain's traditional enemy– from the north. In 1567 the bulk of Spain's professional army was dispatched under the command of the Duke of Alba to put down the revolt in the Netherlands. The forces defeated rebel troops led by Louis of Nassau in the Battle of Jemmingen in July 1658.[15] Although the Monarchy regained control, the situation was far from stable, as was to become apparent in the following years.

The second major strategic threat was the expansion of the Ottoman Empire towards the Western Mediterranean. From 1516 onwards, the Empire had subdued various kingdoms in North Africa in what is now Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, capitalising on the political break-up of the Muslim kingdoms in these territories. In the Regency of Algiers, Ottoman and Barbary pirate attacks posed a threat to shipping and coastal populations in Spanish Monarchy territories in the Western Mediterranean. By way of response, the Monarchy took three courses of action: 1) various ports along the coast of present-day Morocco and Algeria were occupied as of the early 16th century; 2) a powerful squadron of galleys was maintained in the Mediterranean; and 3) the protection of the Spanish coast was enhanced by fortifying major cities, moving smaller ones inland or to high locations to facilitate their defence, the building of a network of watchtowers along the coast, and the creation of local urban militias, etc.[16]

Despite these measures, the threat persisted due to the proximity of the North African coast and the rise of the Ottoman Empire. In 1565, three years before the outbreak of the war of the Alpujarras, the Ottomans launched an ambitious operation against the island of Malta, then a Spanish Monarchy possession which had been ceded to the Knights of St John. The siege lasted

four months and the Ottomans were eventually defeated thanks to the resistance shown by the defenders and the arrival of Spanish-led help from Sicily.[17] Despite this setback in Malta, the Ottomans continued to pose a latent threat during the war of the Alpujarras. Their power was not curbed until a Christian coalition headed by Spain defeated a large Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Lepanto in October 1571. The Christian fleet was commanded by John of Austria, stepbrother of Philip II and until the previous year head of the military campaign in the Alpujarras.

Pre-uprising situation of the Moriscos

On 2 January 1492, the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada (the last Muslim territory in the Iberian Peninsula) was given up to the Spanish Monarchy, held at that time by the Catholic Monarchs Isabella and Ferdinand. As part of the surrender agreements, the latter promised to respect the Islamic faith of their new subjects. In parallel, the monarchs asked Hernando de Talavera, the first Archbishop of Granada, to initiate a campaign to evangelise the population peacefully and convert them to Christianity. Hernando de Talavera made strenuous inculturation efforts, learning Arabic and translating the catechism. His willingness to engage in dialogue and his friendly approach towards the leaders of the Muslim community earned him the name holy alfaqui ('wise man' in Arabic).[18]

However, the evangelising work of Hernando de Talavera produced few converts. When the Catholic Monarchs visited Granada in 1499, they were alarmed to find that a large part of the population were still Muslim. Beyond the religious issue, the political power of the monarchy had still not been consolidated fully at a time when the influence of the Ottoman Empire was increasingly being felt in the Western Mediterranean. Consequently, the monarchs sent

Francisco de Cisneros, Archbishop of Toledo and trusted adviser to the queen, to speed up the conversions.[19]

Hernando de Talavera and Cisneros clashed diametrically in their methods. Cisneros attempted to convert the Muslim leaders in Granada using a combination of incentives and punishment.[20] Discontent among the Muslim community sparked an armed uprising in Albayzín, Granada's most important Muslim quarter, in December 1499. The uprising was put down with very few casualties thanks to the good offices of Hernando de Talavera, although shortly afterwards Muslim populations in the Alpujarras also rose up and were followed by others in the Ronda mountains and the Sierra Bermeja hills (currently part of the province of Malaga) which had been part of the old kingdom of Granada.[21] Extensive military operations led by King Ferdinand himself were required to put down the rebellions. In 1502, following the end of the uprisings, Muslims in Granada were offered the choice between a royal pardon in exchange for their conversion to Christianity or enforced exile in North Africa, a route taken previously by many Muslims after the fall of the Nasrid Kingdom in 1492.[22]

Those who decided to remain changed from being Mudejars (Muslims who lived as a religious minority) to Moriscos (the name for Muslim converts to Christianity or their descendants). In socioeconomic terms, the Moriscos were treated little differently to the rest of the population. There was no widespread confiscation of private property, they continued to exercise their trades and professions, and the nobles and economic elite largely retained their privileged status. The main difference lay in their sociocultural integration. The Moriscos retained Arabic and their own dress and customs. Many secretly practised Islam while at the same time participating in Christian rites, availing themselves of the dissimulation (*taqiyya*) permitted to Muslims who suffered persecution or danger.[23] Meanwhile, some Moriscos remained in contact with the Granada Muslims who had emigrated to North Africa, including privateers who

frequently attacked the Spanish coast. Some Moriscos even assisted the Barbary incursions by supplying information or acting as guides for raids further inland.

An added problem were the Muslim brigands (known as *monfís*) who lived in mountain regions and whose numbers were swollen by members of the Morisco community who owed debts or had committed a crime. The monfis had operated since the fall of the Islamic kingdom of Granada and were a form of Islamic resistance to the Christian conquest.[24] They were to play an important part in the early part and latter stages of the war analysed in the present case study.[25]

Expectations that Morisco assimilation would be achieved through time alone proved in vain. The rise in Ottoman and Barbary attacks against the Spanish coast and fears of a Morisco uprising aimed at restoring Islam to the former kingdom of Granada led Emperor Charles V (King of Spain) to order a series of measures in 1526 to speed up their cultural assimilation. These included a ban on traditional clothing –and in particular on women covering their faces–, the obligation to keep doors of homes open on Fridays so they could not be used as mosques, the schooling of children to ensure a Christian education, etc. Such measures had been approved earlier by Queen Juana (daughter of Isabella and Ferdinand and mother of Charles V) but were deferred at the request of the Moriscos. Under Charles V enforcement was again deferred due to fears of a rebellion similar to that of 1499 and the measures were later suspended indefinitely.[26] The last thing the Emperor needed was a new front at a time when his energies were focused on fighting France, the German Lutherans and the Ottoman expansion in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the sizeable financial compensation offered by the Morisco community helped alleviate the beleaguered imperial coffers.[27] The sociocultural integration of the Moriscos remained unresolved, therefore.

The problem reared its head again in 1566. On the one hand, implementation had commenced of the Catholic reform measures arising out of the Council of Trent, which had ended in 1563.

The provincial synod in Granada reiterated the need for the Moriscos to assimilate culturally and abandon their Arab-Muslim heritage. The Morisco community constituted a religious anomaly in that, despite being officially Christian, the faith and rites of many continued to be Islamic.[28] They were generally viewed as people who did not want to integrate or, worse still, as informers and collaborators of the enemies of the Crown.

Changes in the political leadership of the city of Granada also played a part in the onset of the crisis. The new governor, Pedro de Deza, and the archbishop, Pedro Guerrero, were keen to resurrect the measures which had been deferred by Charles V, although fierce opposition was voiced by leading Morisco figures such as Francisco Núñez Muley, a noble with influential connections in the court of Philip II. In a written rejection of the measures, he presented Morisco cultural differences as characteristic features of their identity that did not pose a threat to loyalty to the crown.[29]

The Moriscos were also supported by Íñigo López de Mendoza, Marquis of Mondéjar, whose family had been the military authority in Granada since the days of Isabella and Ferdinand. The marquis had close ties to the Morisco community and advocated peaceful coexistence, aware that the imposition of assimilation measures could trigger large-scale conflict. In fact, the fragile balance in Granada had been preserved for decades thanks largely to mediation and dialogue on the part of representatives of both communities who had managed to minimise clashes and the abuses committed against Moriscos.

Advocates of a hard line persuaded Philip II implement the measures which his father, Charles V, had not imposed. In 1567, a Crown decree was passed ordering the assimilation of the Moriscos and giving a period of one year for compliance.[30] However, such a potentially destabilising measure was not accompanied by a strengthening of coercive measures. Instead, the forces of law and order in the city were merely placed on higher alert.[31] Conscious of the situation, the Marquis of Mondéjar, military commander of the kingdom of Granada, requested

an increased military presence to discourage, and if necessary put down, a possible rebellion. His request went unheeded as it was felt that the Moriscos lacked firearms or military training and would be unable to take control of strongholds.[32] For its defence, the territory of Granada could rely only on local militia, the small armies operated by nobles, and small coastal detachments which were reinforced in 1567 with a mere three hundred soldiers. The bulk of the army of the Spanish Monarchy was based in Italy –from where they countered the Ottoman and Barbary expansion in the Mediterranean– and much of it was deployed at the time in the Netherlands. Although the forces present in Granada and in the neighbouring territory of Murcia could deal with limited incursions from North Africa, they were in no way equipped to neutralise a large-scale Morisco insurrection.[33] There was no contingency plan for such a scenario.

In the months that followed, Morisco leaders in Granada sought to negotiate a further moratorium but were thwarted by the determination of the city's civil and religious authorities.[34] Meanwhile, a rebellion within the Morisco community began to take shape and violent actions by the monfis were also stepped up, leading to a deterioration in security in the region of Granada throughout 1568.[35] In December of that year, the ringleaders of the rebellion chose as their leader Fernando de Válor y Córdoba, a Morisco noble who was member of the Chancillery (local government) of the city of Granada. The Catholic Monarchs Isabella and Ferdinand had earlier formally recognised the privileges of his ancestors following the conquest.[36] Fernando de Válor changed his name to Muhammad Aben Umeya. His family was said to have descended from the Umayyad caliphs and his designation thus alluded also to the restoration of the caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula.

1 January 1569 was fixed as the date for the start of the general uprising.[37] The plan was for the Albayzín quarter to revolt first and, at the same time, to take control of the Alhambra military fort and use this to occupy the remainder of the city and extend the uprising to Morisco-

majority towns in neighbouring territories. However, the murder of several Christians in the Alpujarra on 23 December set events in motion earlier than anticipated.[38]

Strategic analysis of the insurgency

We will now move on to a description of the main features of the armed conflict and outline the aims, means and modes of the insurgents. This will be followed by a discussion of the political and military response by the Spanish Monarchy. The main sources used are the three chronicles of the war by Luis de Mármol Carvajal, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza and Ginés Pérez De Hita. Particular attention will be paid to the first of the three given that Luis de Mármol witnessed the events first-hand and his work offers a highly detailed account of the origins and evolution of the rebellion. Despite playing an active part in the war, he offers a balanced account and makes no attempt to play down the errors of the Christian forces that aggravated and prolonged the conflict. The chronicle by Luis de Mármol is considered to be the best source on the war by contemporary historiography.[39]

Aims of the insurgents

The insurgents lacked unity at the outbreak of the revolt, including with respect to the aims pursued. The moderate sector sought to use the uprising to secure the suspension of the Royal Decree but did not want a total break with the Crown. This sector included members of the former Muslim nobility who retained a privileged position in Spanish society.

For its part, the radical wing, which seized swift control of the insurgency, aspired to political independence and the reinstatement of a Muslim kingdom in Granada. The geographical proximity to North Africa facilitated connections with the Muslim kingdoms on the opposite

side of the Mediterranean. For practical reasons, in return for protection the insurgents accepted that any new kingdom would be a vassal of the Ottoman Empire and the regency of Algiers.

Means of the insurgents

The insurgents mobilised a substantial proportion of the Morisco population in rural parts, particularly in towns in mountainous areas (Sierra Nevada, Sierra de Baza, Sierra María) and the surrounding valleys. The approximately 10,000 Moriscos from Granada's Albayzín quarter did not join the rebellion as it had been triggered earlier than anticipated and the city garrison had reacted swiftly.[40] This circumstance had a serious impact on subsequent events given that, in view of the small size of the garrison in Granada, an uprising in Albayzín would likely have allowed the city to be taken.[41] Meanwhile, plans by insurgents in Almería to take control of the city resulted in failure.[42]

At the outbreak of the revolt, the insurgents had barely 3000-4000 fighters, including members of Morisco militias from relatively large towns (who were known as 'gandules') and several hundred monfis who had some military training. The remainder were largely drawn from the rural population and had no military training or experience. The figure rose to approximately 16,000 as the war progressed due to two main reasons. Firstly, the gradual spread of the revolt broadened the demographic base of the insurgency and an incipient administration was created under a council of government which had its capital in Ugíjar, in the heart of the Alpujarras. The new Muslim king, Aben Umeya, appointed a network of religious, civilian and military officials to govern the rebel territories. However, his reign was short-lived and his effective power was at best tenuous. He was murdered in October 1569 in what was –judging by the confused account offered by chroniclers–an obscure episode featuring a combination of rivalry with one of his followers over a woman and distrust on the part of some insurgency leaders due

to poor leadership and fears that he would strike a deal to surrender to the Christians.[43] He was succeeded by his cousin, Diego López 'Aben Aboo', who was supported by the radical wing of the insurgents.[44]

The second reason for the increase in numbers was the arrival of combatants from various outside parts. Luis De Mármol speaks literally of 'muxehedines' (mujahideens) from North Africa who fought with "floral garlands on their heads and swore to win or die […] they do not fear death and, with vain hope of eternal glory, place their lives in great danger".[45] These combatants can be considered foreign volunteers who waged jihad wherever it arose. It is therefore not far-fetched to view them as forerunners of the foreign mujahideen who fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s and have subsequently taken part in other conflicts such as Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s, Iraq following the 2003 invasion and, more recently, the war in Syria.

Other participants in the revolt included Barbary pirates who in some cases joined the insurgents but also, according to the sources, capitalised on the conflict to plunder from the Moriscos themselves.[46] The regency of Algiers (dependent on the Ottoman Empire) freed Muslim prisoners who were willing to fight alongside the Moriscos.[47] Following one diplomatic delegation sent to Algiers, the Morisco representative –Hernando El Habaquí– returned with four hundred fighters chosen from among volunteers.[48] Regular Ottoman forces also took part, led by their own officers. Closely aligned to King Aben Aboo, these small forces were incorporated into the insurgency hierarchy and influenced the decision to reject Christian offers of surrender, thus contributing to prolonging the conflict.[49] Despite their small size, they acted as a force multiplier.

In terms of weaponry, the insurgents initially possessed a very limited arsenal which was gradually added to through the capture of Christian weapons and even the purchase of arms from members of Christian militias.[50] An important role was played also by the arms sent from

North Africa and which were sold or supplied by the regency of Algiers, by the Muslim Diasporas of the former Muslim kingdom of Granada or were acquired from merchants in Tangiers and Tetuan. In this latter city, it was not uncommon for a Christian captive to be traded for an arquebus.[51]

At the height of the insurgency, the Morisco army boasted around eight thousand arquebusiers. Firearms –particularly arquebuses– played a crucial role given the nature of the mountainous terrain.[52] However, the insurgents lacked artillery. Although they managed exceptionally to acquire some pieces, the lack of cannons prevented them from seizing Christian fortifications and hindered their attempts to occupy key locations on the coast and walled towns inland.[53] The war effort was sustained thanks to the resources obtained from controlled territories. The mountain areas included fertile valleys which allowed populations to be fed; in addition, the insurgents looted gold and silver from churches, Christian properties and also from various wealthy Moriscos who chose not to join the revolt. A further source of revenue were the proceeds from the sale of captive Christian women and children in North African slave markets.[54]

Lastly, the insurgents capitalised also on the geographical factor. The centre of the revolt was deep inside the Alpujarras, a region of approximately 90 km east to west and consisting of sequences of valleys and ravines. It was surrounded by mountain ranges to the north (Sierra Nevada, with peaks above 3000 meters) and south, and stretched down to the Mediterranean coast (see Figure 1).

This theatre of operations, in which there was no significant permanent Christian garrison at the outbreak of the uprising (forces were deployed in Granada, with only small detachments based on the coast to deal with pirate incursions), afforded refuge to the rebels and seriously hampered counterinsurgency operations. Progress by a large army proved difficult and supply lines were exposed and vulnerable in a region that lent itself to ambushes and was very familiar

to the insurgents. Moreover, the rebellion commenced at the height of winter and the rain and snowfalls further hampered the advances of, and supplies to, the Christian troops.

Figure 1. Location of Las Alpujarras in south-east Spain, across from North Africa.

Methods of the insurgents

The insurgents adopted three major lines of strategic action: actions to mobilise the whole Morisco population, armed actions to extend and maintain control of rebel territory, and efforts to secure external support, particularly from the Ottoman Empire.

The efforts to mobilise the Morisco population emphasised the markedly identity nature of the conflict and garnered support among the different social classes of the community. Although the Moriscos in the city of Granada did not join the revolt en masse, individuals from non-rebel towns joined the insurgents, provided material support or passed on information concerning military preparations. The presence of the garrison in Granada and the suicidal nature of a rebellion in the Albayzín quarter –which would only have succeeded if based on the element of surprise, as initially planned– discouraged many Moriscos who supported the rebellion.[55]

The chronicles also reveal that many Moriscos from different social classes and from both rural parts and the city chose not to join the revolt for various reasons, either because they considered it a lost cause or merely wanted to live in peace.[56] This explains why, in some cases, the insurgents mistreated or forcibly enlisted Moriscos from the towns they attacked. Occasionally also, the rebels would kill unwilling Moriscos or confiscate their properties: indeed, this was one of the first orders issued by Aben Umeya when he seized control of the Alpujarra.[57]

This tension was present throughout the conflict. News of early killings of Christians in the rebel Alpujarra towns and the evidence of the extremely radical nature of the insurrection prompted members of the Morisco aristocracy to call for a surrender in exchange for a royal pardon. Foremost among them was Hernando El Zaguer, father in law of Aben Umeya, who was later assassinated by those opposed to negotiations.[58] During the course of the rebellion, various purges were ordered against those who favoured negotiation. However, by the first half of 1570, with all hope lost, the majority of the insurgents eventually accepted the offers of

surrender. For its part, the radical wing, which had taken control of the insurgency from its outset, held out until it was annihilated in the second half of 1570 and early part of 1571.

As was to be expected, the critical stage of the mobilisation occurred in the early days when success was shrouded in danger and uncertainty. In order to overcome resistance, the insurgents made their cause attractive by emphasising the injustice of the imposed assimilation measures, disseminating religious prophecies announcing the liberation of Granada Muslims,[59] and by stressing the logical possibilities of victory, not least because the Spanish Monarchy was overstretched due to the revolt in the Netherlands and the military rise of the Ottoman Empire.[60] All the above was framed in a common political-identity-religious project: the restoration of an independent Islamic political entity. It is worth recalling that, in 1569, few witnesses remained of the conquest of the Muslim kingdom of Granada (1492) or the subsequent Mudejar rebellion (1499-1501), and the vast majority of Moriscos had been baptised with Christian names at birth. Even so, the insurgency took firm root and in less than a week one hundred and eighty towns and villages had joined.

A contributing factor also were the tactics used by the rebel leaders. A first tactic was 'fake news': throughout the towns of the Alpujarras the ringleaders announced that the Albayzín quarter had risen up and had seized control of the Alhambra fortress.[61] Secondly, they instigated the killing and systematic torture of Christians in the towns and villages of Alpujarras. These actions were incited by a group of two hundred monfis which roamed the Alpujarra during the initial days of the uprising and were led by Aben Farax, a warlord tenuously subordinated to Aben Umeya and who had also made a bid for the crown.[62] Among other motives, it is not inconceivable that the barbaric acts committed against Christians involved a strategic element, namely, to cross the line of no return. Once this occurred, the response of the authorities would be collective and unwavering. The only options remaining to the rebels were victory or exemplary punishment.

Armed actions to expand and control the rebel territory included a combination of conventional and asymmetric combat. On the conventional side, the rebels managed to deploy thousands of fighters and occasionally launched full-scale sieges of fortified Christian towns.[63] They also used compact battle formations both in the heart of the Alpujarras and in open-terrain scenarios outside the mountains. However, all these major operations were defeated by the Christian forces, who were better organised and better armed for conventional combat.[64] For example, in June 1569 Aben Umeya attempted to destroy the army of the Marquis of Vélez with a force of 4500 Moriscos, reinforced by approximately 400 Barbary privateers and Ottomans, but the attempt ended in a bloody defeat.[65]

The major advantage of the rebels were their skills in asymmetric combat, particularly ambushes and surprise attacks on supply lines, on the small detachments that guarded routes, and against non-walled settlements with no or very small garrisons.[66] Throughout 1569-1570, the main period of the insurgency, hundreds of actions of this kind were carried out.

The third strategic action was aimed at securing external support for the rebellion. The armed struggle sought to gain time and to control as much territory as possible until the arrival of substantial support from Algiers or Istanbul. The rebel leaders engaged in considerable diplomatic activity. In their letters, both Aben Umeya and later Aben Aboo appealed to the Islamic solidarity and specifically the conscience of Sultan Selim II to persuade him to heed the call to jihad to liberate the land of the former Al Andalus.[67] At the same time, the insurgents tried unsuccessfully to seize control of a safe port through which to channel large-scale external aid, failing in particular in their bid to take Vera (Almería) in September 1569.[68] Instead, they had to make do with the aid that arrived through Castell de Ferro on the Granada coast and the numerous clandestine landings on beaches.[69] The lack of permanent access to the sea was a major strategic weakness of the insurgents.

An added factor was the lukewarm interest shown by the Ottoman Empire and the regency of Algiers. Sultan Selim II was focused on seizing Cyprus from the Venetians.[70] A sizeable Ottoman fleet and army (some 350 ships and 60,000 soldiers) landed on the island in July 1570 and completed the conquest in just two months.[71] As a result, aid provided by the Ottomans to the Morisco rebellion was limited and, beyond the propaganda aim of bolstering the image of the leader of Islam in the Mediterranean, was designed mainly to prolong the conflict. The primary goal was to wear down the Spanish Monarchy and distract it from the Cyprus operation; it was not designed to establish a beach head to conquer Spain.

The Sultan exercised influence over the Granada insurgents through four Ottomans (two military advisers and two ambassadors) who served on Aben Aboo's council of government and supported the radical wing opposed to surrender. Meanwhile, the interest of the Barbary pirates who were vassals of the Sultan was more immediate and selfish, namely, the capture of assets and people, not costly enterprises inland.[72] Lastly, the Beylerbey of Algiers, Uluj Ali, who was also a vassal of the Sultan, capitalised on the distraction caused to the Spanish Monarchy to expand his domains by attacking the Muslim kingdom of the Spanish protectorate of Tunis, which he conquered in early 1570.[73] This lack of strategic alignment between the insurgents and their external supporters was a further factor in the defeat of the revolt.

How the war of the Alpujarras unfolded (1569-1570)

A detailed analysis of the conflict is beyond the scope of the present article, which will offer instead a broad outline of how it unfolded from the insurgency and counterinsurgency perspectives. To a large extent, the war was a pendular affair, with the initiative swinging back and forward between the two sides. By way of summary, three main phases can be identified:

Rapid counterinsurgent reaction and partial failure of the rebellion (January–March 1569)

The counterinsurgent reaction was initiated as soon as the rebellion began to spread in the Alpujarra mountains in the final days of 1568 and consisted of three main courses of action:

1) *Securing control of the two main cities in the threatened zone: Granada and Almería*. The first of the two was of great symbolic value as it had been the capital of the last Muslim kingdom in the Iberian Peninsula, which explains the insurgent desire to seize control of it as the first step in the rebellion.[74] The second, Almería, was another chief city in the last Muslim kingdom and its port was essential in order to receive outside aid.[75] The insurgents devised a trap to take Almería but it too failed.[76] Nonetheless, monarchy control of both cities was initially precarious due to the lack of professional soldiers and the high number of Morisco residents, and also because many surrounding towns had joined the revolt and the insurgents were less than a day's distance from both. During the early weeks the two cities strengthened their defence by mobilising their own local militias and enlisting the support of militias from neighbouring towns and cities in the old kingdom of Granada.[77]
2) *Containing the spread of the rebellion in zones near the Alpujarras*, particularly coastal towns and accesses to the sea. In the area around Almería, this task fell to the armies of noblemen and local militias from Murcia led by the Marquis of Vélez which joined the fray on 1 January.[78] The aim was also to prevent the revolt from spreading to Moriscos in Murcia and Valencia (eastern Spain).[79] In the month that followed, these forces defeated the insurgents and dismantled the rebel army in the Almería area. The naval base in Cartagena (in Murcia) –home to part of the squadron of galleys– was used to send supplies and reinforcements to coastal towns in Almería and Granada.[80] In addition, galleys were deployed to patrol the area and impede the arrival of help to the

insurgents. Galleys brought from Italy not only carried companies from the Spanish regiments (*Tercios*) based there but then stayed on to patrol the adjacent waters.

3) *Quelling the hard core of the insurgency in the heart of the Alpujarras* by marching on the area from Granada. On 3 January, barely a week into the rebellion, the Marquis of Mondéjar set out with an improvised force of two thousand men to take control of the towns between Granada and the coast.[81] Once these were secured, the force advanced on the Alpujarras on 9 January, beginning with the town of Lanjarón, the western gateway to the Alpujarras.[82] From there it made its way through the Alpujarras to its easternmost point.[83] The insurgents were unable to detain the advance of the column led by Mondéjar. They avoided direct battle and failed in their attempts to ambush the Christian forces because the latter advanced in an orderly manner and with protection on their flanks, which meant that skirmishes were confined to the outer perimeters and proved largely ineffective.[84] The biggest vulnerability of the Christians were the long supply lines which necessarily followed predictable routes that lent themselves to ambushes both of the actual lines and the isolated garrisons protecting them. Thus, the umbilical cord linking the Christian force inside the Alpujarras and the Granada Plains suffered numerous attacks by insurgents who were familiar with the rural landscapes and knew how to operate in them.[85] However, even if they did slow its advance and operability, these actions failed to break the Mondéjar force logistically.

The swift reaction of the counterinsurgents contained the spread of the rebellion and in a matter of weeks managed to place a force in the interior of the Alpujarras, the initial sanctuary of the insurgency. As a result, many Moriscos, including senior moderate wing figures such as Hernando El Zaguer, the father in law of Aben Umeya (who had been designated by the latter as his captain general), accepted the offer of the Marquis of Mondéjar and negotiated their surrender.[86] The days of the Islamic insurgency appeared to be numbered.

However, two factors ruined the initial success enjoyed by the counterinsurgents:

1) *Political divisions over the ultimate status of the counterinsurgency strategy*, namely, the fate of the Moriscos in general and, specifically, of the insurgents who surrendered. Mondéjar preferred a negotiated solution.[87] However, this was not an attempt at appeasement given that Mondéjar was aware that the insurgents could use the negotiations to gain time until aid arrived from outside. For this reason, he continued his military advance in the Alpujarras while keeping the door open to negotiation.[88] His view was not shared by the other authorities in Granada, by the Marquis of Vélez –who adopted a much tougher policy in Almeria–, or ultimately by the Court of Philip II.[89] In addition to strategy differences, there were also personal clashes between the two commanders, a situation complicated further by the arrival of new authorities drawn from the ranks of noblemen who harboured their own personal and family grievances.[90] In April 1569, Mondéjar was relieved of command of the force in the Alpujarras and was recalled to Granada to serve as advisor to Juan of Austria, who assumed full control of operations and adopted a policy of military suppression of the insurgency.[91]
2) *Abuses by local militia against non-insurgent Moriscos and surrenderers*. As noted above, the bulk of the permanent Monarchy army was based in Italy and much of it had been deployed in the Netherlands. The counterinsurgent response fell largely to local militia who had limited experience and training and above all were poorly sustained logistically, poorly paid and unaccustomed to military discipline. This situation, combined with previously-mentioned factors –the lack of unity regarding strategy and the widespread feeling that all Moriscos, whether part of the revolt or not, deserved to be punished for the atrocities committed– created an explosive mix. Militias began to enslave Moriscos, loot their properties and desert, returning to their places of origin with their spoils.[92] The phenomenon affected not just the soldiers deployed in the

interior of the Alpujarras following the enforced departure of the Marquis of Mondéjar to Granada but also the garrisons put in place to protect non-rebel Morisco towns from raids by the insurgents and, above all, the troops commanded by the Marquis of Vélez in Almería.

Revival of the insurgency (April – November 1569)

The lack of a unified policy, the abuses committed against non-rebel Moriscos and surrenderers, and the weakening of the counterinsurgency forces due to mass desertions and the various successful ambushes carried out against raiding parties, which resulted in deaths of hundreds of soldiers and the capture of their weapons, created a window of opportunity for the insurgents and led to a worsening of the conflict as of April 1569.[93]

The insurgents regained control of a large part of the Alpujarras and extended the revolt to neighbouring regions: to the west in the Sierra de Bentomiz mountains (Málaga) and to the east along the Almanzora Valley (inland Almería), where most Morisco towns joined the rebellion.[94] The insurgents achieved their largest numbers of fighters during this period thanks to the recruitment of thousands of native Moriscos, foreign combatants and allied forces from the Barbary Coast and Ottoman Empire. Feeling strong, they attempted (unsuccessfully) to take the city of Almeria, laid siege to Oria on the border with Murcia, and engaged in a full-scale battle with the army of the Marquis of Vélez in Berja (Almería) in June 1569.[95] However, despite deploying in complex military formations, the Morisco army was once again defeated in conventional clashes.

During this second phase, the counterinsurgent response consisted of two main elements:

1) *A containment campaign* under the Marquis of Vélez, which proved inconclusive. His army was bolstered by ten companies brought from Spain's *Tercio* regiments in Italy,

and these were joined by troops recruited from the Iberian Peninsula.[96] In all, a total of twelve thousand infantrymen and seven hundred horsemen. Vélez managed to stem the advances of the insurgents in the Almanzora Valley but failed to regain control of all the towns. He then entered the Alpujarras from the east and dispersed the insurgents, albeit without defeating them as they only engaged in battle near Válor, in the very heart of the hills, in August 1569. Faced with logistics problems and further desertions, he was forced to withdraw to La Calahorra –at the foot of Sierra Nevada– and the Alpujarras were left in rebel hands.[97]

2) *The preparation of a professional force for a systematic and decisive campaign against the insurgents.* In tandem with the containment campaign led by Vélez, the spring and autumn of 1569 saw preparations in the city of Granada for a new force under Juan of Austria. The measures adopted included 1) the creation of three new Tercio regiments commanded by experienced officers and in which members of local militias were incorporated into a professional military structure, with similar pay to the solders brought from the Italy-based regiments; 2) logistics improvements to guarantee the sustainment of the new operations; and 3) the professionalisation of the command structure of the different garrisons through the appointment of veteran officials.[98]

In turn, the conflict was designated a 'war' rather than 'punishment of a rebellion' and this change carried legal consequences. The term 'war' had been deliberately avoided in order not to confer legitimacy on the insurgents. However, due to the scale of the conflict and the need to motivate the troops, a 'fire and blood' war edict was issued which included tax exemptions on any spoils earned.[99] Lastly, in order to secure the city of Granada, the entire Morisco population of the capital was dispersed and relocated to central regions of the Iberian Peninsula.[100] This measure had already been contemplated at the beginning of the rebellion as the authorities knew that the

population of the Albayzín quarter was in close contact with insurgents. However, the measure was delayed due to insufficient forces in the city to guarantee the security of the relocation process.[101]

The insurgents held the upper hand during the months of the Granada preparations. Capitalising on the paralysis of the Vélez army at the start of autumn 1569, the Moriscos launched fresh incursions into the north of the territory of Granada and again attempted to seize a port, but their siege of Vera (in Almería) proved unsuccessful.[102] The murder of Aben Umeya around that time and his replacement by Aben Aboo boosted the determination of insurgents.[103] In November 1569 they launched an offensive against the Christian outpost in the western Alpujarra –deployed there since the initial reaction by the Marquis of Mondéjar– and forced Órgiva and Lanjarón to be evacuated, while also subsequently defeating the Christian aid commanded by the Duke of Sessa.[104]

Systematic reaction against the insurgents and end of the rebellion (December 1569 – November 1570)

At the commencement of this final stage of the conflict, the insurgents had achieved their highest level of forces, approximately 16,000 combatants in control of difficult terrain. However, without significant external support and faced with the military machinery of a Spanish Monarchy fully prepared for a systematic campaign, the fate of the insurgents was sealed. Three major courses of action can be identified in this third phase:

1) Between December 1569 and April 1570, the army led by Juan of Austria regained control of the towns in the north of Granada and Almería one by one and took up position on the eastern face of the Alpujarras. The campaign included large-scale sieges such as the siege of Galera, which included heavy preliminary artillery pounding, the

detonation of underground mines and fierce urban fighting.[105] The loss of Galera, an extremely difficult location to conquer due to the abrupt terrain, was a serious blow to insurgent morale.[106] The military victories facilitated political action led largely by Christian nobles who had previously been friends with senior Morisco figures.[107] In March, Hernando Al Habaquí, leader of the Moriscos in the Almanzora Valley, opened negotiations with John of Austria through a Christian captain who had been a friend prior to the rebellion.[108] Rebel towns in the region gradually surrendered without a fight and other towns that did offer resistance were defeated. The Christian forces systematically targeted Morisco crops and livestock, seizing them where possible to supply the small garrisons established and in other cases destroying them to force the insurgents to surrender due to starvation.[109] In April, the Crown offered a pardon to Moriscos who laid down their arms on the condition that they would abandon Granada and be resettled elsewhere in Spain.[110] Many Moriscos surrendered and even king Aben Aboo himself gave serious consideration to the possibility. However, along with others who refused to yield he eventually rejected the offer. Nonetheless, he drew out the negotiations to gain time to allow help from abroad arrive and even had Al Habaquí killed due to fears that he might surrender.[111] Until the definitive collapse of the insurgency, Aben Aboo placed all his hopes in the arrival of aid from Algiers and the Ottomans to turn the situation around.[112] In the meantime, the military pressure exerted by John of Austria continued against parts which still held out in Almería and Granada, and a series of other operations were carried out in the Ronda mountains (Malaga).[113]

2) In parallel, between February and April 1570, a second army under the Duke of Sessa attempted to regain control of the Alpujarras and deprive the hard core of the insurgency of its main bastion. Although the initial operations met with fierce resistance, control of the towns of the western Alpujarras was eventually secured.[114] However, the

insurgents once again attacked the umbilical cord of the Christian army. An ambush against a convoy in the mountain pass of La Ragua caused eight hundred deaths and cut off supplies to the Christians, forcing them to retreat to the coast.[115] From there, they boarded galleys and successfully attacked the rebel town of Castell de Ferro. The remainder of the army merged with the forces of John of Austria, to whom many Moriscos had surrendered.[116] Other political actions by the Christians included the secret distribution throughout the Alpujarras of a document allegedly penned by an Arab wise man which painted a bleak picture of the future of the revolt and concluded that an agreement with the king was necessary.[117] A modern-day parallel for this measure can be found in contemporary psychological operations (PSYOPS). John of Austria departed the theatre of operations in August after he was tasked with preparing the allied force that was to defeat the Ottomans at the Battle of Lepanto a year later.

3) Lastly, once it became clear that Aben Aboo and his closest allies had no intention of surrendering, the Christian army under Luis de Requesens launched a campaign from September until November 1570 to cleanse all remaining insurgent bastions in the Alpujarras.[118] The military operation advanced from one side of the mountains to the other, successfully adapting to the terrain and implementing a scorched earth policy to deprive the rebels of supplies and refuge. Bulky equipment was reduced to a minimum to allow the forces to operate with flexibility.[119] Small detachments were organised to seek and destroy insurgents; strongholds were established to ensure control over high parts, mountain roads and towns; crops and storage facilities were razed; and caves used as rebel hideouts were attacked with smoke and fire.[120] Simultaneously, a fleet of galleys patrolled the coast and unloaded assault parties to attack pockets of resistance in towns and caves in the mountains near the sea.[121]

Having secured the Alpujarras with a network of permanent garrisons, Luis de Requesens demobilised the bulk of his army in Granada in November 1570.[122] Meanwhile, the sequenced dispersal of the vast majority of Granada Moriscos throughout the Peninsula continued as a means of preventing further outbreaks of insurgency.[123] Extraordinary logistical steps were taken to attend to the needs of those forced into exile to ensure the displacement and relocation occurred peacefully and thus prevent further grievances.[124]

However, isolated bands of monfís continued to act and Moriscos who had joined up with North African privateers carried out raids on coastal areas. Aben Aboo remained in hiding with some of his followers in the heart of the Alpujaras until March 1571 when an intelligence operation aided by traitors and double agents led to his death, which marked the definitive end of the last Islamic insurgency in the Iberian Peninsula.[125]

Conclusions

As illustrated in this case study, the four differentiating elements of 'new wars' are applicable to the last Islamic insurgency in Spain at the beginning of the early modern period: actors, goals, methods and forms of finance.

1) Actors**.** According to Kaldor, 'new wars' are different to old ones in that they are fought by a variable network of state and non-state actors, unlike the 'old wars' fought by regular state armies. Throughout the war of the Alpujarras, one can see evidence of the presence of a complex network of regular armies (Spanish Tercio regiments on the one hand; Ottoman advisers on the other), local militias (Christian urban militias and Morisco 'gandules'), warlords (Christian nobles leading the armies of their feudal dominions; next of kin of Morisco leaders), bandits and guerrillas (monfis), pirates (Ottomans and Barbary) and even jihadists (the 'muxehedines' or mujahideen).

2) Objectives. 'New wars' are fought over identity, the war itself becoming part of the construction of identity. If one objective stands out in the complex web of motivations underpinning the war of the Alpujarras, it is the Muslim identity of the insurgents. Indeed, the war became part of the construction of said identity. In theory, all the Moriscos who fought on the insurgent side had been baptised as Christians at birth. However, the war brought a severance of this Morisco identity, which was replaced by a wholly Muslim identity linked to that of their predecessors. One aspect highlighted by the sources is of particular interest in this regard: in several cases, the insurgents carried Muslim banners from the former kingdom of Granada which they had kept hidden since the days of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers.[126] The choice of Aben Umeya due to his lineage, his links to the Arab nobility and his alleged descent from the Umayadd caliphs was also part of this process of construction of identity based on the past.[127] Kaldor states that identity politics is about the right to power in the name of a specific group. In effect, in the war of the Alpujarras Morisco identity was underlined by the insurgents as the main cause of the conflict and used as a cohesive element, thus enabling them to mobilise resources and establish a clear dividing line with their opponents.

3) Methods. According to the 'new wars' proposal, battles lose their importance in favour of 'asymmetric' tactics, and territory is won and controlled by displacing the population. Although some full-scale battles were fought in the war of the Alpujarras, the insurgents were defeated in all of these and opted largely for guerrilla warfare. In the final phase of the war, the counterinsurgents also successfully employed counter-guerrilla tactics, including small 'seek and destroy' units and combat against insurgents hiding out in caves. Kaldor also emphasises that a typical technique is population displacement – the forcible removal of those with a different identity or different opinions. In the present case study, during the early stages of the war the insurgents tortured, killed or enslaved the Christian

population of the Alpujarras and Moriscos were displaced voluntarily or forcibly from neighbouring towns to areas under their control. For their part, the Christians forcibly displaced the Morisco population, firstly from the city of Granada and later from the entire region of Granada, dispersing them throughout the Iberian Peninsula to prevent their geographical concentration and neutralise a new revolt (until the definitive expulsion of all Moriscos from Spain between 1609 and 1613 during the reign of Philip III).

4) Form of finance. According to the 'new wars' proposal, such wars are financed by predatory systems rather than the war effort of the warring states. In this case, the insurgents resorted to pillaging Christian properties and selling captives to Barbary pirates to generate revenue to sustain the war effort. They also received support from neighbouring Muslim kingdoms and from the diaspora of former Granada Muslims in North Africa. On the counterinsurgent side, the coffers of the cities and the Monarchy financed the war effort in part but predatory systems played an important role also. During the first phase of the war, these practices proved counterproductive to reconciliation and to the sustainment of the Christian armies –due to the large number of desertions of soldiers who returned home with their spoils. The tactics were used again in the final phase, although this time as an official incentive to finish off any insurgents who refused to accept the offer of surrender. According to Kaldor, it is difficult to distinguish between those who use the cover of political violence for economic reasons and those who engage in predatory economic activities to finance their political cause. This ambivalence is indeed present both among the Morisco insurgents and the Christian forces. However, according to Kaldor, due to the differences in actors, objectives, methods and forms of funding, parties tend to perpetuate war for reasons of political identity and economic benefit. This is an interesting aspect of the case study and is seen clearly among the monfis and other recalcitrant sectors of the insurgency, particularly during the latter stages when they continued the fight even though

all hope of victory had been lost. The same was not true of the Christian forces, who were subject to the political and military control of a Spanish Monarchy keen to end the war and re-establish its authority as quickly as possible. With the gradual strengthening of state structures throughout the territory, the context no longer favoured 'new war' dynamics.

Clearly, one single case is insufficient to build a theoretical framework. However, the analysis of Islamic insurgency in early modern Spain offered here indicates that the core elements of the literature on 'new wars' are, in fact, elements of continuity in domestic armed conflicts in cases where state structures are still in the process of formation or, having been consolidated, where they have deteriorated seriously, irrespective of when the conflicts occurred: whether in the post-Cold War period or – as here– the 16th century. Based on this finding, further studies may help confirm the presence of the aforementioned elements in other historic cases.

At any rate, the contents of the present article further challenge the appropriateness of the term 'new wars'. In response to criticism received, Kaldor acknowledged that the characteristic features of new wars are found also in armed conflicts dating back centuries and the 'new' aspect is the redefinition of war, which constitutes "a different interpretation of war, a theory of war".[128] It might, perhaps, have been preferable to apply the term new to the theoretical framework rather than the actual subject matter.

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[91] Del Mármol, *Historia de la Rebelión*, 393-395.
[92] Ibid., 333; 363.
[93] Ibid., 389-390; Hita, *Guerras Civiles*, 146-147.
[94] Del Mármol, 467-472.
[95] Ibid., 455-457, 455-457.
[96] Ibid., 495-497.
[97] Ibid., 504.
[98] Ibid., 420-422, 430-432.
[99] Ibid., 520-521.
[100] Ibid., 474-478.
[101] Ibid., 265; Mendoza, *Historia de la Guerra*, 78-79.
[102] Del Mármol, *Historia de la Rebelión*, 512-515.
[103] Ibid., 522-527.
[104] Ibid., 528-541.
[105] Ibid., 575-587.
[106] Hita, *Guerras Civiles*, 196-197.
[107] Del Mármol, *Historia de la Rebelión*, 606-607.
[108] Ibid., 624-625.
[109] Ibid., 639, 681.
[110] Ibid., 41-642.
[111] Ibid., 688-689.
[112] Ibid., 699.
[113] Hita, *Guerras Civiles*, 229-234; Del Mármol, *Historia de la Rebelión*, 703-706.
[114] Del Mármol, *Historia de la Rebelión*, 597.
[115] Ibid., 647-650.
[116] Ibid., 660-663.
[117] Ibid., 608-613.
[118] Ibid., 701; 707.
[119] Ibid., 706-707.
[120] Ibid., 708-709, 714-715.
[121] Ibid., 715-716.
[122] Ibid., 722-724.
[123] Ibid., 717-721.
[124] Ibid., 619-621.
[125] Ibid., 725-728.
[126] Ibid., 297.
[127] Ibid., 199-201.
[128] Kaldor, “In Defence of New Wars”, 13.