

# Italian Renaissance Diplomacy and Commerce with Western Mediterranean Islam: Venice, Florence, and the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada in the Fifteenth Century

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**THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POSITION** of Italian mercantile republics in the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada (1232–1492) during the early Renaissance is widely known. Genoa, Venice, and Florence played a decisive role in facilitating the external commerce of the last Muslim state in the Iberian Peninsula, helping Granada to survive in a complex and rapidly changing geopolitical context, with an increasingly strong Crown of Castile pressing the Sultanate on the Iberian Peninsula and a divided and turbulent Islamic world in the Western Mediterranean, as a long-established historiographical tradition has shown.<sup>1</sup>

Scholars have mainly devoted their attention to the relationship of Granada with Genoa, which is understandable if we remember that the *Superba* had a privileged position in the Nasrid Sultanate thanks to the presence of its numer-

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1. Raúl González Arévalo, “Presencia diferencial italiana en el sur de la Península Ibérica en la Baja Edad Media: Estado de la cuestión y propuestas de investigación,” *Medievalismo* 23 (2013): 175–208.

ous merchants and the multiple treaties signed from 1279 to 1479, during the Muslim state's independent political life.<sup>2</sup> The Genoese activity in Granada was considered colonialist for a long time, a controversial concept that has been strongly challenged in recent studies.<sup>3</sup> In any case, the Genoese were not the only ones who took the opportunity to trade in Nasrid lands. Without minimizing the significance of Genoese involvement in developing the region's commercial potential, other issues to be addressed include the activity of perhaps less visible but far from insignificant merchant communities, including the Catalan-Aragonese one and, more to the point here, the Venetians and Florentines.<sup>4</sup> Their activities in the Nasrid kingdom were important in their own right, and it certainly complicates a vision defined perhaps too much by Genoese domination until quite recently.

To consider the relations between Venice and Florence, on the one hand, and the Sultanate of Granada, on the other, enhances our understanding of the role Renaissance Italian states played within the heterogeneous structures of Western Mediterranean Islam. This enhanced narrative may be constructed on the complementary pillars of diplomacy and commerce.<sup>5</sup> It is more difficult to do so in the case of Granada, for neither Venice nor Florence played a dominant role in its foreign politics and commercial relations. Yet Granada had a considerable interest in other Italian states apart from Genoa in the fifteenth century, during which time Venice and Florence made a decisive effort to increase their presence and influence in the Maghreb (mainly Tunisia) and the southern Iberian Peninsula. Despite their obvious differences, as two city-states ruled by strong political

2. Some very useful bibliographical indications can be found in the following essays: Antonio Malpica Cuello and Adela Fábregas, "Los genoveses en el reino de Granada y su papel en la estructura económica nazari," in *Genova: Una "porta" del Mediterráneo*, ed. Luciano Gallinari, 2 vols. (Genoa, 2005), 1:227–58; José Enrique López de Coca Castañer, "Génova y el Reino de Granada (siglos XIII–XV)," in *Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico: Secc. XIII–XVIII*, ed. Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Florence, 2007), 267–94; Alberto García Porras and Adela Fábregas García, "Genoese Trade Networks in the Southern Iberian Peninsula: Trade, Transmission of Knowledge and Economic Interactions," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 25 (2010): 35–51.

3. See the studies cited in the previous note.

4. On the Catalan-Aragonese community, see Roser Salicrú, "La Corona de Aragón y Génova en la Granada del siglo XV," in *L'expansió catalana a la Mediterrània a la Baixa Edat Mitjana*, ed. María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol and Damien Coulon (Barcelona, 1999), 121–44, and "The Catalano-Aragonese Commercial Presence in the Sultanate of Granada during the Reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous," *Journal of Medieval History* 27 (2001): 289–312.

5. Giovanna Petti Balbi, "Las ciudades marítimas italianas y el norte de Africa en época medieval: Relaciones políticas y económicas," in *Relaciones entre el Mediterráneo cristiano y el norte de África en época medieval y moderna*, ed. Carmen Trillo (Granada, 2004), 19–51, 19; Antonio Malpica Cuello, "Dal Mediterraneo islamico al Mediterraneo cristiano: Il dominio del bacino occidentale nel Mediterraneo centrale," in *Una città nel Mediterraneo: l'Opulenta Salernum*, ed. Valdo D'Arienzo (Salerno, 2001), 31–66.

and commercial oligarchies, Florence and Venice were both republics whose chosen mechanisms for interacting with Mediterranean Islam allow and encourage the comparative approach that is the focus of this article.

Ironically, the study of the Venetian and Florentine ties with Granada is of decisive importance precisely because it is almost impossible to talk about a Muslim Grenadian presence in Renaissance Italy, with the exception of a few isolated documents concerning Genoa. Besides, there is no evidence for direct relations between Granada and the southern cities of the Italian Peninsula, a secondary market with which the Nasrid kingdom maintained ties clearly mediated by Genoese intervention.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, this essay will study the diplomatic and commercial strategies followed by Renaissance Venice and Florence in Granada, comparing them with their approach to other Western Mediterranean Muslim states. As will become evident, Venice proved to be a very useful model for Florence, and their galley systems offer perhaps the best example. But, at the same time, it will be clear that if Florence followed the Venetian example in Egypt and the Maghreb, it did not do the same regarding Granada, where it chose a different way of interacting for the reasons that we will analyze in due time. The differences did not result, though, in a more successful position for either of these Italian republics in Granada, which remained always a secondary market in their economies.

#### DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND MERCHANT GALLEYS: VENICE AND GRANADA

Since the fourteenth century Venice was involved in a decisive political-economical turn that had roots in the past, paying increasing attention to the waters (both Mediterranean and Atlantic) of western Europe, as indicated by the establishment of the *muda di Ponente* in 1315, the convoy of merchant galleys that sailed from Venice to England and Flanders.<sup>7</sup> It was this route that first brought the *Serenissima* into regular contact with the Nasrid emirate, its ports and markets,

6. Adela Fábregas García, "Other Markets: Complementary Commercial Zones in the Nasrid World of the Western Mediterranean (Seventh/Thirteenth to Ninth/Fifteenth Centuries)," *Al-Masāq* 25, no. 1 (2013): 135–53.

7. Excellent general surveys of the galley system and its routes can be found in Jean-Claude Hocquet, "Les routes maritimes du commerce vénitien aux XVe et XVIe siècles," in *Atti del V Convegno Internazionale di Studi Colombiani: "Navi e navigazione nei secoli XV e XVI,"* ed. Graziella Galliano and Ausilia Roccatagliata, 2 vols. (Genoa, 1990), 2:581–605; Bernard Doumerc, "Le galere da mercato," in *Storia di Venezia: Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima; Temi, Il mare*, ed. Alberto Tenenti and Ugo Tucci (Rome, 1991), 357–95. Especially for the "muda di Ponente," see Doris Stöckly, *Le système de l'Incanto des galées du marché à Venise (fin XIII<sup>e</sup>-milieu XV<sup>e</sup> siècle)* (Leiden, 1995), 152–65.

in what proved to be a profitable relationship.<sup>8</sup> From the Grenadian point of view it is absolutely clear that the sultanate opened itself to Venice as a market, as the trade manuals—the famous “*pratiche di mercatura*”—undeniably record in the mid-fifteenth century.<sup>9</sup>

The high interest in Grenadian sugar meant that from 1395 onward the Venetian republic tried to ensure the support of the Nasrid authorities, as we can see in the *incanti*, the auction of the galleys’ voyages.<sup>10</sup> The decisive turning point finally arrived, though, in 1400. It all began, as was typical of the republic, with Venice sending an ambassador to Granada. It was then that the first official contacts took place, with negotiations leading to the opening of a Venetian consulate in Malaga.<sup>11</sup> That year the Senate also moved to request Nasrids to open a *fondaco* to address the needs of Venetian merchants in the port of call on their way to the North Sea. The ambassador, Bernardo Contarino, received an extensive commission with fourteen points that outlined the directives of Venetian authorities. In addition to the mandate to open a *fondaco* was an exemption from taxes when loading or downloading goods (only goods that were actually sold incurred taxes) and protection for Venetian subjects in the Nasrid realm. Contarino himself left a precious testimony of the embassy:

Upon my arrival at Granada, I was received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who informed me that his Majesty was extremely anxious to see me. I excused myself at first, on the plea that the distance to the royal residence was fatiguing after my long journey, and that my vestments were soiled and dusty from travelling. But the minister was importunate, representing that it was an extraordinary honour which his master conferred upon me, since other envoys were usually detained for some time before an audience was granted to them. Hereupon I yielded, retired to my apartments, opened my valise, attired myself in a bright court-suit and prepared to wait upon the monarch. My reception was peculiarly gracious and amiable, and I procured from the King whom I found seated on a thronal dais

8. José Enrique López de Coca Castañer has discussed this argument on numerous occasions. For a complex overview from the Iberian perspective, see his paper “Las galeras venecianas de Poniente y Berbería desde la perspectiva española,” *Medievalismo* 16 (2006): 113–72.

9. Raúl González Arévalo, “El Reino nazarí de Granada entre los manuales de mercaderías y los tratados de aritmética italianos bajomedievales,” *Revista del Centro de Estudios Históricos de Granada y su Reino* 19 (2007): 141–68.

10. Adela Fábregas García, “Acercamientos y acuerdos comerciales entre Granada y Venecia al filo de 1400,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 40, no. 2 (2010): 643–64, 654 n. 35.

11. *Ibid.*

and surrounded by his councillors, a charter written in Arabic characters upon red papyrus by virtue of which the subjects of the Republic are placed in the enjoyment of personal security and many special and valuable privileges throughout Granada.<sup>12</sup>

The answer reveals that the Grenadian authorities were well disposed to entertaining Venice's requests, as is clear from the letter King Muhammad VII wrote to the Doge of Venice describing the encounter: "I'm happy with you and for this I thank you and the noble Republic of Venice that a messenger of yours has come, the old, noble, loyal and courteous master Bernardo Contarini, may God protect him. . . . I am happy with your friendship and I have agreed to everything your ambassador has requested."<sup>13</sup> It would all be confirmed by the signing of the definitive treaty between Venice and Granada on May 23, 1400, agreeing as announced to all of the Venetians' requests.<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately, the consulate did not last long. Financial problems arose from the very beginning, and already in 1402 the Venetian Senate had arrived at the conclusion that "it is not as profitable as we had believed for our affairs to have a

12. The original Italian text is yet to be located. This English translation comes from the *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and Other Libraries of Northern Italy*, 38 vols. (London, 1864), 1:53; also cited by William Carew Hazlitt, *The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth and Its Fall, A.D. 409–1797*, 2 vols. (London, 1915), 2:664.

13. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Secreta, Serie Diverse, Commemoriali, reg. 9, fol. 111r (114), n. 205, *Copia Litere Serenissimi Regie Granate scripte in arabico in papiro rubeo translate de arabico in latinum*: "Al doxe de Veniexia grando e ebon Antonio Venier e al comun de Veniexia e ai grande e a i boni zentilomeni che Dio sia sanita e alegreza a tuti e Dio del cielo sia cum elli. In nome de Dio sia de lo Re de i mori seruo de Dio e quello che crede in Dio Machomet fio del Signor di mori fio de Joseph fio de lo Re de i mori fio del Re Abdelo fio del Re de i mori Joseph fio del Re de i mori Ysmayl fio de Naser Dio lo defenda, scriue a lo Doxe de Veniesia che e forte caualier e rico e de gran sangue grando como cristiano che sia al mondo homo de veritade in dicti e fati. El nobele Antonio Venier, el comun de Veniesia e i çitilomeni che xe in Venecia Dio i guarda e defenda tuti. Al doxe e a la comunita saludi assai. Iu ue scriuemo de lanbra alta de Granata Dio la defenda e guarda da tuti pericoli gratia sis dada a Dio e dia gratia a un altri. Io me tegno contento de vu altri e per questo gratia al ducha gran signor e al nobele comun de Veniexia che le vegnudo a un el uostro misaçier el uechio e nobele e lial de tute cortexie miser Bernardo Contarini dio lo defenda, de la carta de la uerita che el doxe el comu de Veniexia a dado che se diebia presentar mandassemo che vignisse in le nostre man el de a dito tute cosse che vu mandasse a dir e tute cosse che vu aue ordenado e no a manchado niente. El ne a dito de la amistade che vu aue con un e io el credo de la uostra cognosança e amistade un semo contenti de zo che vu dixte e nu Re me tegno contento de la uostra amistade e si o fato tuto quello che vu ave domandado per el uostro ambador de tute cosse che la dito dauanti da un. Io ue digo a vu altri che me mande a dir de tute cosse che vu aue bisogno in tuto el mio regno e tute cosse che vu ave de mestier per uostro amor io el fare che Dio ue lassa ayer ben. El re Saluda al doxe el comun cum tuti i zintilomeni. Fata di XXVIII de la nostra quarexema in Granata."

14. Published and analyzed in Fábregas García, "Acercamientos," 653 and 663–64.

consul in Malaga.” The last thing we know about this matter is that in 1406 there was no longer a consul in Malaga, and there were serious difficulties in finding a new one.<sup>15</sup>

The end of the Venetian consulate in the Kingdom of Granada by no means put an end to the diplomatic contacts between the *Serenissima* and the Nasrid authorities. In October 1421 the Venetian consul in Tunis informed the Senate that sultan Abu Faris had decided to withhold some Venetian merchants’ money to guarantee the charge of a pending debt, provoking their protests. The Hafsid sovereign had received the money from a Nasrid ambassador who had brought it from Granada, so it seems clear that it must have been related to some kind of commercial deal in the Iberian sultanate. The fact that it was a Nasrid ambassador who brought the money from Granada to Tunis unmistakably reveals that diplomatic relations still existed at the highest level between the Grenadian Muslim authorities and the Venetian republic.<sup>16</sup>

Nor was this episode to be the last in the official contacts between the Venetians and Granada. More than half a century later, Giovanni Manzini, *prete-notaio e cancelliere* on board the 1475–76 *muda di Barberia*, recalled in his *Quaderno di bordo* that “on 11th November, at noon, in Malaga, messer Piero Soranzo, in the presence of the magnificent master captain, presented a letter decreed by His Majesty the King of Granada of a certain amount of credit because of the damages suffered during the time he spent in Malaga. The captain himself had that letter translated from Arabic into Latin in a letter whose content is as follows: 1475, in Malaga.”<sup>17</sup>

That Venetian-Grenadian relations were close appears clear also in the fact that Malaga and Almeria continued to be ports of call for both the *muda di Ponente*, the convoys of merchant galleys sailing to the North Sea, and the *muda*

15. “Habere consulem in Malicha non redundant ad illud proficuum quo credebatur pro factis nostris.” *Ibid.*, 659–60.

16. Alberto Sacerdoti, “Venezia e il regno hafsida di Tunisi: Trattati e relazioni diplomatiche (1231–1534),” *Studi Veneziani* 8 (1966): 303–46, 332–33.

17. *Quaderno di bordo di Giovanni Manzini, prete-notaio e cancelliere (1471–1484)*, ed. Lucia Greco (Venice, 1997), 60: “Die undecimo mensis novembris, Maliche in meridie. Dominus Petrus Superancius coram magnifico dominio capitano presentavit quendam literam latam ex maiestate regi Granate de quodam credito chauxa dani sibi facto in tempore elasp[er]o [sic] Maliche. Que litera ipse dominus capitaneus fecit translatare ex arabo in latinum ad litera chuius tenor tallis est: ‘1475, in Malicha.’” Unfortunately the notary did not include a copy of the translated letter issued by the Nasrid king Abu al-Hasan Ali in his record, but we can understand that messer Piero Soranzo (a relative of captain Benetto Soranzo?) made a claim for some kind of justice or restitution, which the king of Granada must have granted in the form of credit to recompense damages suffered during his stay in Malaga.

di Barberia, which called at the Maghreb ports.<sup>18</sup> It is not insignificant that at the beginning of the sixteenth century Bartolomeo de Pasi recalled in his *Tarifa de Pexi e mesure*, in the chapter devoted to “El regno de Granata zoè, Malicha & Armaria,” that Venice exported to the Nasrid ports cloths (damasks, satins, fustians), all sorts of spices (odoriferous and dyes) and jewels (pearls, rubies, turquoises), along with loaded wax, kermes, almonds, and silks.<sup>19</sup>

Last, but not least, the Venetian galley system played a very important role in the trips of hundreds of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa, mainly merchants who chose it to travel for personal or professional reasons from Valencia to Granada and the Maghreb and vice versa. Therefore, the *mude* had a primary function in connecting the various parts of the Islamic world in the Western Mediterranean basin in the fifteenth century.<sup>20</sup>

#### A VEILED RELATIONSHIP: FLORENCE AND GRANADA

Unlike Genoa, with its traditionally dominant role, and Venice, with a highly visible galley system, the position of the Republic of Florence in Granada has been largely unnoticed, basically limited to the documents found in the Archivio Datini of Prato written between 1380 and 1410.<sup>21</sup> Only very recently has new evidence surfaced regarding Florentine commercial interests in the Nasrid emirate, as the trade books and the galley traffic at Malaga and Almeria show.<sup>22</sup>

18. Stöckly, *Le système*, 169–73.

19. Bartolomeo de Pasi, *Tarifa de Pexi e mesure* (Venice, 1503). I have used the first edition held in the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, NENC.1.3.3.9: “Da Uenesia se traze per Malicha & Armaria damaschini de ogni color, rasi ma pochi, zambeloti, ormesini, fustagni bianchi & negri & tutte sorte de specie, così grosse come menude, ma garofali & fusti de garofoli assai & alcune sorte de specie odorifere come sono benzui muschio, ambracan, l’oldano, zibeto & legno aloe, camfora, tigname assai. Trazesse ancora zoie ligade & disligade come sono perle, rubini & turchese & alcune altre zoie & tute sorte de meze. Nota che questi luogi di sopra hano solo uno canter al quale se compra cere, grane, mandorle & sede & se comprano al roto del ditto canter.”

20. The data from the Valencian official records have been gathered in David Igual Luis, “Italianos en la frontera marítima nazarí: La ruta de Valencia a Granada en el siglo XV,” in *Actas del congreso La frontera oriental nazarí como sujeto histórico (S. XIII–XVI)*, ed. Pedro Segura Artero (Almería, 1994), 467–75, 475.

21. Federigo Melis, “Malaga nel sistema economico del XIV e XV secolo,” in *I mercanti italiani nell’Europa medievale e rinascimentale* (Florence, 1990), 135–213; Adela Fábregas García, “Estrategias de actuación de los mercaderes toscanos y genoveses en el Reino de Granada a través de la correspondencia Datini,” *Serta Antiqua et Mediaevalia* 5 (2001): 259–302.

22. Raúl González Arévalo, “El Reino nazarí,” “Las galeras mercantiles de Florencia en el Reino de Granada en el siglo XV,” *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 41, no. 1 (2011): 125–49, and “Rapporti commerciali tra Firenze e il Regno di Granada nel XV secolo,” in “*Mercatura è arte*”: *Uomini d’affari toscani in Europa e nel Mediterraneo tardomedievale*, ed. Lorenzo Tanzini and Sergio Tognetti (Rome, 2012), 179–203; further developed in Raúl González Arévalo, “Apuntes para una relación velada: La

Yet it is the case that compared with the fourteenth century, the quattrocento context would drastically change after the Florentine conquest of Pisa in 1406 and the city's acquisition of Porto Pisano in 1421. Those events led to a complex process of reorganization of commercial institutions in an effort to consolidate the city's international impact.<sup>23</sup> The last stage would be the decision of Florence to build its own mercantile galley system in order to avoid its long-standing dependence on other naval powers (Genoa and Venice mainly), a reliance that was always contingent on changing political relations.<sup>24</sup> In this new context, Florence presented itself as the direct and legitimate heir of Pisa, which from the twelfth century had developed a commercial politics that had led to the sealing of treaties in North Africa, and particularly with Tunisia, with which no fewer than seven agreements were signed between 1157 and 1397.<sup>25</sup>

The turn in Florentine commercial politics appears clear. Florence began to rival Genoa in the Western Mediterranean, especially along the shores of Islamic North Africa (Tunisia), at the same time it was aspiring to compete with Venice in the trade of spices from the Near East, offering an alternative to the *muda* system with its own mercantile galleys. Thus, after acquiring Porto Pisano in 1421, Florence promoted official contacts with the Mamluk sultan of Egypt and the Byzantine emperor and sent an ambassador to Tunisia to request the renovation of the ancient Pisan privileges, as granted in the last 1397 treaty.

Throughout this process, Venice proved to be a very useful model for Florence, and the galley system is perhaps the best example of this. It merits noting that Antonia Borlandi, when comparing Saminiato de' Ricci's late fourteenth-century trade manual with Lorenzo Chiarini's text of 1458, concluded that the latter reflected a moment in which Florence had completely assimilated the Venetian experience. In fact, Florence had become a naval and maritime power by herself with the conquest of Pisa and the acquisition of Porto Pisano, as well as the building of a fleet of state merchant galleys. At the same time, following in

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23. Gene Brucker, *Dal Comune alla Signoria: La vita pubblica a Firenze nel primo Rinascimento*, trans. Davide Panzieri (Bologna, 1981), 482–88; Giovanni Ciccaglioni, "Il mare a Firenze: Interazioni tra mutamenti geografici, cambiamenti istituzionali e trasformazioni economiche nella Toscana fiorentina del '400," *Archivio Storico Italiano* 619 (2009): 91–125.

24. For the beginnings of the galley system and its insertion in the new commercial politics of Florence, see Michael E. Mallett, *The Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1967), 21–61.

25. For the treaties, see Michele Amari, *I diplomati arabi del R. Archivio fiorentino* (Florence, 1863). The complex evolution of the relationship between Pisa and Florence and the maritime dimension of both republics from the mid-fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century have been recently reevaluated in Sergio Tognetti, "Firenze, Pisa e il mare (metà XIV–fine XV sec.)," in *Firenze e Pisa dopo il 1406: La creazione di un nuovo spazio regionale*, ed. Sergio Tognetti (Florence, 2010), 151–75.



the steps of Venice, it had begun to develop its own policy in the Levant.<sup>26</sup> But Florence did not follow the Venetian model in Granada.

The Nasrid emirate offered two important ports of call to the Italian maritime trade networks, Malaga and Almeria. In the fifteenth century the first one was the main port in the emirate's maritime facade, the head of a complex system that involved the whole coastline, the main commercial door to opening Granada up to foreign mercantile interests.<sup>27</sup> A comparative and thorough study of the presence of the Venetian and Florentine lines of navigation in Granada has revealed that both fleets gave preference to Malaga on their way to the North Sea and to Almeria in their contacts with the Maghreb.<sup>28</sup> But only Venetian *mude* regularly visited Almuñécar, the third important port in the emirate. In fact, the Florentines included it only in the last and final voyage of the galleys to Catalonia and Barbary in 1478.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, the Kingdom of Granada not only remained a central geographical point in the navigation of the Tuscan convoys, but it was eventually decided that the contacts would be further developed by including Almuñécar together with Almeria and Malaga.

As a rule, in the Nasrid ports the Tuscan galleys acquired leather and hides, sugar, wax, silk, and almonds and introduced different kinds of Florentine cloths, while Venetians exported jewels and spices and loaded the same goods, as we have seen.<sup>30</sup> In both cases the data collected so far seem to reflect a model of affairs based on a short stay, reduced to the time it took to unload and load the convoys. This meant that there was no time to learn Arabic, which undoubtedly would have made commercial exchanges with the native population and merchants easier, as is clear from Genoese business practice.<sup>31</sup>

26. *Il manuale di mercatura di Saminiato de' Ricci*, ed. Antonia Borlandi (Genoa, 1963), 59.

27. Antonio Malpica Cuello and Adela Fábregas García, "La vida marítima y el poblamiento medieval de la costa del Mediterráneo andaluz," in *Navegación marítima del Mediterráneo al Atlántico*, ed. Antonio Malpica Cuello (Granada, 2001), 97–148, and "Embarcaderos y puertos en la costa del Reino de Granada," in *Navegación y puertos en época medieval y moderna*, ed. Adela Fábregas García (Granada, 2012), 68–102; Adela Fábregas García, "Redes de comercio y articulación portuaria del Reino de Granada: Puertos y escalas en el tráfico marítimo bajomedieval," *Chronica Nova* 30 (2003–4): 69–102; Raúl González Arévalo, "La costa del Reino de Granada en la documentación náutica italiana (siglos XIV–XVI)," *En la España Medieval* 31 (2008): 7–36.

28. Raúl González Arévalo, "Acordes y desacuerdos: Navegación y comercio de las galeras mercantiles de Venecia y Florencia en el Mediterráneo ibérico desde una perspectiva comparada," paper presented at the V Coloquio Internacional sobre Historia de la Navegación, "Navegación pública y navegación privada en el Mediterráneo medieval," Granada, September 5–6, 2013.

29. Archivio di Stato di Firenze (hereafter ASF), Provvisioni, Registro 168, fol. 169v, 21-I-1478.

30. González Arévalo, "El Reino nazarí," 163–64, and "Acordes y desacuerdos."

31. Roser Salicrú i Lluch, "¿Ecos de aculturación? Genoveses en el mundo islámico occidental," in Gallinari, *Genova*, 1:175–96; Antonio Peláez Rovira, "Sobre el uso de la lengua árabe en el comercio genovés con el Islam occidental bajomedieval," *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria* 47 (2007): 143–76.

Even with these initiatives, however, Florence never attempted to open a consulate or to sign a commercial treaty with Granada.<sup>32</sup> In fact, in the fifteenth-century records of the Florentine Chancellery only one official letter, hitherto unknown, is preserved, and it is not even addressed to the Nasrid sovereign but to the local and less important authorities of Almeria.<sup>33</sup> Leaving aside the peculiar feature that this letter is written in Tuscan dialect and not in Latin, as was normally the custom in official dispatches even with Islamic authorities, it is obvious that the Florentine Chancellery did not make an appeal to any kind of treaty, as it did with other conflicts in Tunisia or Egypt. It only makes reference to a friendship (“the friendship that we have always had with you”) with no formal frame, renewed almost every year with the arrival of the galleys.

Yet it is true that the election of Bongianni Gianfigliuzzi—a prominent member of a very powerful, wealthy, and ancient Florentine family—as captain for the 1461 trip to Flanders and England can by no means have been accidental. He had previous experience sailing with the Florentine galleys as patron; in 1460 he was in the Barbary galleys—which must have stopped at the Nasrid ports—as he himself recalls in his *ricordanze*.<sup>34</sup> Not only had he probably been calling at Almeria the year before, but also in his youth, after living in Barcelona and Valencia, he had moved to the Nasrid emirate for two years.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, he possessed valuable experience that made him ideally suited to the task of delivering a young Muslim boy who had been kidnapped in the city the previous year by some members of the crew, and restoring the good relationship with the local authorities, a mission that is the main issue of the letter.<sup>36</sup>

32. There is no evidence for this in Amari, *I diplomi arabi*.

33. ASF, Signori. Missive I Cancelleria, 43, fols. 162r–v, 5-IX-1461.

34. “[1460. Padrone Barberia e Spagna] Richordo che a dì primo di marzo 1460 partì da Porto Pixano padrone d’una ghalea del chomune di Firenze in chonpagnia d’una altra ghalea padrone Feuosino d’Andrea da Panzano e fu nostro chapitano Giuliano di Nicholò Ridolfi per uiagio di Barberia e Spagna e tornamo in Porto Pisano a salvamento a dì 16 d’ottobre in detto anno. Participavo in dette 2 ghalee per la ¼ parte e di salario ebbi fiorini 200, avanzai in detta mia parte fiorini 700” ([1460. Patron Barbary and Spain] I remember that the 1st of March 1460 I left Porto Pisano as patron of one galley of the Commune of Florence in the company of another galley for which Frevosino d’Andrea da Panzano was the patron, and Giuliano di Nicolò Ridolfi was our captain for the trip to Barbary and Spain, and we came back to Porto Pisano safe and sound on October 16 of that year): *Libro di ricordanze di Bongianni Gianfigliuzzi*, Archivio della Congregazione dei Buonuomini di San Martino, Gianfigl. 2.1.01, fol. 4. I have used the microfilm held in ASF, Archivi esterni, I.

35. “En el 1437 andai a stare in Almeria e Malicha e stettivi fino en el 1439, e trovami aver ghuadagnato ducati 400” (In 1437 I went to stay in Almeria and Malaga, and stayed there until 1439, and I earned 400 ducats; *ibid.*, fol. 0). See biographical notes in Vanna Arrighi and Francesca Klein, “Da *Mercante avventuriero* a *Confidente dello stato*: Profilo di Bongianni Gianfigliuzzi attraverso le sue *Ricordanze*,” *Archivio Storico Italiano* 161 (2003): 53–79.

36. “Alchaito Almerie, non potremo sufficientemente per nostre lettere esprimere quanto ci sia stato molesto e dispiacere auendo di nuouo inteso come alcuni tristi e’ quali si trouaro in sule galee

The fact that Gianfigliuzzi had been living in the sultanate is quite surprising, for there were no notices of Florentines staying in the Nasrid realm after the famous Tuccio di Gennaio stayed in Malaga as agent for the Alberti company in 1402–6.<sup>37</sup> But it seems that Gianfigliuzzi was not the only one, for the news that the young boy had been kidnapped in Almeria reached Florence “mainly through the letters sent here by our citizens that are there.” Who were those Florentines living in Almeria? No doubt they were merchants, probably agents for Florentine companies like the Alberti, Albizzi, Cambini, and Salviati who had commercial interests in Granada. Unfortunately we still have very little evidence of the activity of these companies in the Nasrid kingdom.

#### SIMILAR BUT NOT IDENTICAL: VENICE AND FLORENCE IN THE KINGDOM OF GRANADA

The study of the relations between Italian mercantile republics and the Muslim Mediterranean has thus far revealed a pattern, based solely on political contacts and diplomatic treaties, which regulated commercial exchanges between the parties. In certain instances this was overseen by a consular presence, as in the case of Genoa and Venice—if with certain variations—from the Near East to West Barbary and the Kingdom of Granada.

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nostre per compagni, cioè della ciurma di quelle, passando di costi le prefate galee, ne menarono con seco un fanciulletto di quelli della città vostra e' quali non arebbono ardito simile cosa tentare o mandare ad effecto se questo fusse uenuto a notitia del capitano o padroni delle galee sodette, e' quali come huomini saui e discreti non arebbono soferto simile mancamento, ma essendo loro di molte cose occupati secondo la consuetudine di quelli che tali officii exercitano e credendo secondo il detto di quelli che l'aucano tolto che'l fanciullo fusse d'altri paesi e non di quelli della excellentia vostra, non contradissono che detto fanciullo fusse insieme colloro al porto nostro condotto, ma da poi che per noi fu chiaramente compreso maximamente per lettere qui mandate da' nostri cittadini che costi stanno collui essere della leggie vostra e del territorio vostro et che la excellentia vostra si teneua grauemente di questo offesa deliberamo, subitamente che'l prefato giouinetto ui fusse rimandato, del quale perché alquanto è suto infermo, abbiamo fatto prendere diligentissima cura acciò che come e douere ui fusse sano e libero ristituto. El quale condurrà nella parte vostra el capitano nuouo delle nostre galee, huomo prestante e uirtuoso a noi carissimo, chiamato Bongianni Gianfigliaci, dal quale ancora più pienamente ogni cosa intenderete ne' dubiti più l'excellentia uostra noi auere a memoria benefici uostri uerso questa re publica e nostri cittadini e l'amicitia che con voi sempre tenuta abbiamo, la quale intendiamo per l'auenire non solamente conseruare ma etiamdio acrescere et sempre saremo parati a fare tutte quelle cose che siano alla magnificenza uostra grate e accepte, quella strettissimamente pregando che uogli rilasciare gli huomini nostri e le robe di quelli per questa cagione ritenuti auisando quella che quelli che furono cagione di tanto maleficio, noi abbiamo ritenuti et puniti puniti [*sic*] grauissimamente secondo che loro eccesso meritaua per modo che nessuno altro mai per alcun tempo ardirà simile cosa tentare et tucto quello bene che riceueremo da la excellentia uostra in luogo di singulare gratia riputeremo. 5 septembre 1461.” ASF, Signori. Missive I Cancelleria, 43, fols. 162r–v, 5-IX-1461.

37. Fábregas García, “Estrategias de los mercaderes.”

As is true for Venice, the data regarding the relationship between Florence and the Nasrid emirate are dispersed and limited, but the evidence is sufficient to reveal a consolidated and long-lasting contact that is confirmed by the Tuscan galleys' presence in Nasrid ports from 1425 to 1478. Yet it seems evident that the Florentine republic did not seek to formalize that relationship through treaties and, unlike with Venice, there is no evidence that the Nasrid authorities sought to officially get in touch with the Tuscans.

Therefore, if Florence followed Genoese and Venetian commercial politics in its contacts with Tunisia and Egypt during the fifteenth century, in the case of Granada the Tuscan republic seems to have chosen an unprecedented strategy to interact with Western Mediterranean Islam. In fact, Florence sanctioned its commercial relations with the Nasrid emirate exclusively through commercial practice, while seeking agreements with other North African states. The consequence of not having institutionalized oversight of its trading interests on the ground was that Tuscan traders in the sultanate were in a more precarious position than the Genoese and Venetians, although the records (such as they are) suggest that they nonetheless found a way forward without too many complications. It is possible that the constant contact with the Genoese community allowed them to benefit from their privileges, as Tuccio di Gennaio had done at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Yet, in the context of emerging geopolitics in the Mediterranean, this seems an overly simplistic explanation.

In fact, there cannot be any doubt that, in reorganizing its own commercial politics after becoming a territorial power with direct access to the sea, Florence was to a large extent emulating the models of Pisa and Venice. As already said, it stood in for the former as a Tuscan representative in Tunisia and sought to compete with the latter by sealing treaties with Egypt while building a state fleet and developing a mercantile network reaching the Maghreb and Alexandria.<sup>38</sup> Having said that, to better understand the Florentine position in Granada we should ask why if Venice, the model for the galley system and commercial relationships with the Muslim states of North Africa and the Near East, had signed a treaty with the Nasrid sultanate in 1401, Florence did not follow the example after 1420.

Two factors may provide answers. On the one hand, as Hidetoshi Hoshino has pointed out, although traditionally it has been said that the true economic

38. Although Pisa is the direct model for Florence in the relationship with Tunisia, we have to remember that Venice also had a long tradition of treaties with the Hafsi sovereigns (1231, 1251, 1305, 1317, 1391/2, 1427, 1438, and 1456). Sacerdoti, "Venezia e il regno hafside"; Bernard Doumerc, *Venise et l'émirat hafside de Tunis (1231–1535)* (Paris, 1999).

relationship between Florence and Egypt did not begin until the 1420s, when an embassy was sent to the Mamluk sultan and the galleys opened official trade routes with Alexandria, this Florentine initiative was then only formalizing on a political and diplomatic level commercial practices that had already existed in the second half of the fourteenth century.<sup>39</sup> In contrast, Granada was not a consolidated market for the Tuscans at the beginning of the fifteenth century, as it was for the Venetians. Hence, unlike the Venetians, the Florentines did not rush to seek commercial agreements with the Nasrids when establishing such accords with the Hafsids and Mamluks.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that the Venetian consular adventure was an unsuccessful endeavor, for it suffered from financial problems from the very beginning, as we have seen, and it seems clear that it did not fulfill both parties' expectations. Yet this setback did not affect Venetian commercial interests on Nasrid soil, which kept developing through the ongoing activity of the *mude di Ponente* and *Barbaria*. Nor did it alter the good relationship with local authorities, as later events showed.

It is entirely possible that Florence did not feel the need to develop diplomatic relations with Granada, it being sufficient to address its own commercial interests with the arrival of the state fleet. Furthermore, Tunisia provided similar goods, and the Florentines were better positioned in the Hafsid sultanate. In addition, the fall of Constantinople in 1453 altered the Italian mercantile powers' status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, while Genoa and Venice began a slow but inevitable decline, Florence acquired a predominant position in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, Mehmet II sought ways to reduce Venetian power in the ancient Byzantine territories on behalf of Florence, in what was a clear convergence of economic interests between Ottomans and Tuscans.<sup>40</sup>

As we have seen, a comparative analysis of Italian mercantile republics on the one hand and Granada and the other Islamic Mediterranean states on the other leads to a better understanding of both similarities and divergences in the strategies adopted by Italian Renaissance states in Western Mediterranean Islamic lands, while providing insight into the efforts of Muslim authorities to advance their own economic interests by taking advantage of the presence of major agents of

39. Hidetoshi Hoshino, "I mercanti fiorentini ad Alessandria d'Egitto nella seconda metà del Trecento," in *Industria tessile e commercio internazionale nella Firenze del tardo Medioevo*, ed. Franco Franceschi and Sergio Tognetti (Florence, 2001), 101–12, 105.

40. Bruno Dini, "L'economia fiorentina dal 1450 al 1530," in *Saggi su una economia-mondo: Firenze e l'Italia fra Mediterraneo ed Europa (secc. XIII–XVI)* (Pisa, 1995), 187–214, 191–93; Hidetoshi Hoshino, "Il commercio fiorentino nell'Impero ottomano: Costi e profitti negli anni 1487–1488," in Franceschi and Tognetti, *Industria tessile*, 113–23, 113–14.

international commerce in their territories.<sup>41</sup> And what is becoming clear is that in this particular pan-Mediterranean context, despite the evidence of the diplomatic contacts and commercial exchanges between Venice, Florence, and Granada, it is complicated to talk about a real commercial penetration of those Italian republics in the Nasrid emirate. The data gathered to date are far from having the voluminous compactness of other Mediterranean Islamic spaces like Egypt and Tunisia, of first importance in their respective economies. In this sense, it must be said that the area from the Cape of Gata to the Bay of Algeciras was an intermediate zone favored by that privileged means of communication that was the Strait of Gibraltar but not an economic space of first importance either to Venice or to Florence. Yet, at the same time, it is indisputable that their state lines of navigation contributed in a very important measure to the Iberian sultanate's integration into the commercial space of Christian Europe.<sup>42</sup> We have to acknowledge, then, that neither the Venetians nor Florentines abandoned the Nasrid commercial scene in the fifteenth century, when their commercial contacts reached their peak. The coast of the southeastern Iberian Peninsula was a subsidiary market on the routes to the West and the Maghreb.

#### AN EPILOGUE: RENAISSANCE ITALY AND THE WAR OF GRANADA (1482–1492)

The last chapter in the life of the Nasrid emirate arrived with the final war of conquest by Castile, from 1482 to 1492. At that point it is evident that Florence was much more interested in the Castilian commercial possibilities, with strong commercial communities established in Seville and Cadiz.<sup>43</sup> In addition, the Florentine galley system, the main means for commerce with Granada, had collapsed, unable to meet the demands of the city's economy, and ceased its navigation in 1478.<sup>44</sup>

41. Some recent studies have provided new data along these lines regarding Nasrid Granada and Mamluk Egypt, challenging the classic colonial vision. See Adela Fábregas García, "Actividad comercial de los reyes nazaríes y su implicación con los representantes del gran comercio occidental a finales de la Edad Media," *Studia historica: Historia medieval* 25 (2007): 171–90; Francisco J. Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, *Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne: Le deuxième état mamelouk et le commerce des épices (1382–1517)* (Barcelona, 2009).

42. Adela Fábregas García, "La integración del reino nazarí de Granada en el espacio comercial europeo," *Investigaciones de Historia Económica* 6 (2006): 11–40.

43. Raúl González Arévalo, "Florentinos entre Cádiz y Sevilla en los siglos XIV y XV," paper presented at the seminar "Castilla y el Mar en la Edad Media: La organización portuaria," Universidad de La Laguna, October 23–25, 2014.

44. Mallett, *Florentine Galleys*, 145–62.

But news about the war arrived regularly in the city on the Arno through the dispatches its ambassadors sent from Naples.<sup>45</sup> The Tuscans were not the only ones to forward intelligence on the progress of the conflict. At a time when Italian Renaissance diplomacy was extremely sophisticated, news was quick to arrive also in the courts of the Este of Ferrara and the Sforza of Milan—related by dynastic alliances to the Aragonese king Ferrante of Naples, uncle and brother-in-law to Ferdinand the Catholic—and the republics of Venice and Lucca.<sup>46</sup>

One of the most shocking episodes in the war concerns the help the Venetians rendered to the Nasrids. The Spanish sovereign personally informed his Italian relative in a letter from Seville on December 30, 1484, of the presence of a Venetian *muda* in the port of Almeria.<sup>47</sup> Both the Florentine and the Estense ambassadors in Naples repeated the contents of the letter, while also narrating the persecution of the Venetian *muda* at the beginning of February 1485 for violating the Catholic Kings' prohibition to help the Moors of Granada. Thus, in Giovanni Lanfredini's report, we read:

E stamani fece leggere a tutti noi oratori una lettera del re di Spagna. . . . E dice la chagione perché à provisto l'armata viniziana, che fu per aver portato vettuaglie in Granata, luogho a' Cristiani proibito, et tanto più abiando lui prese l'arme contro a lloro; e remdesi certo che a' buoni Viniziani dispiacerà che lor ghalie facino simil susidi a' infedeli, e che vuole seguire quella impresa, e aviserà di per di del successo, abiando maraviglia che questo re non l'avixi di queste cose di Turchi. Il che l'à ffatto, ma le lettere non eron comparite.

[This morning [king Ferrante] had a letter from the king of Spain read to all of us ambassadors. . . . And he says that the reason why he has given orders against the Venetian navy is that it has carried provisions to Granada, a place forbidden to Christians, even more so having himself taken up arms against them; and he is certain that the good Venetians will be dis-

45. Raúl González Arévalo, "La guerra di Granada nelle fonti fiorentine," *Archivio Storico Italiano* 609 (2006): 387–418.

46. Raúl González Arévalo, "Ecos de la toma de Granada en Italia: De nuevo sobre las cartas a Milán y Luca," in *Homenaje al profesor Eloy Benito Ruano* (Madrid, 2010), 343–53, "La rendición de Muhammad XII al-Zagal y la entrega de Almería en un documento de la cancillería de los Sforza de Milán (1489)," *Chronica Nova* 39 (2013): 335–46, and "La Guerra de Granada en la correspondencia diplomática de los embajadores de Ferrara en Nápoles (1482–1491)," paper presented at the international colloquium "La Guerra de Granada en su contexto europeo," Granada, May 9–10, 2013.

47. Antonio de la Torre, *Documentos sobre las relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, 6 vols. (Barcelona, 1950), 2:171–72 (1484, doc. 188), 29–XII–1484.

pleased that their galleys may assist infidels in such a way; and he [Ferdinand] wants to go on with that business [the war], and he will inform [king Ferrante] day by day of the success, and he wonders why this king [Ferrante] has not warned him about the Turks. He [Ferrante] had done so, but the letters have not materialized.]<sup>48</sup>

And so in Battista Bendedei:

Successive li significa come ne li zorni passati quattro o cinque galeaze de venetiani havendo dato subsidio presertim a li inimici soi de Granata, cum li quali tuttavia era in guerra: l'armata sua che havea sentito questo: et che havea comissione generale de pigliar qualunque li prestasse adiuto & presidio: havendo sentito questo se li pose adosso: et quella nocte fu una grande tempesta nel mare per modo che solum se ne prese una: et le altre se ne fugitero. Quello che crede despiacerà anchora a li boni venetiani: che per li soi navilli sii dato adiuto a li infidieli & contra sua Maestà.

[He [Ferdinand] also informs [Ferrante] that in the last days four or five Venetian galleys had assisted his enemies of Granada, despite the fact that he was at war with them. His navy, once they had heard of this, received the general commission to catch anyone who would give [the Muslims] help and protection. Having heard this, the Spanish navy put itself close to the Venetian fleet. And that night there was a big storm at sea, so that they could only catch one of the galleys, and the rest got away. He [the Spanish king] believes this will displease the good Venetians, that their ships have helped infidels against His Majesty.]<sup>49</sup>

In autumn 1484 Almeria was under the rule of Muhammad XI Boabdil, who had declared himself vassal of the Catholic Kings in order to recover the throne of Granada, for which he competed against his own father, Abu al-Hasan Ali, in a civil war that devastated the emirate during the extended fight against the Crown of Castile. Therefore, at least theoretically and since Muhammad was a subject of the Spanish monarchs, commerce was allowed in the territories he ruled. But, as the letters reveal, on this particular occasion the Venetians did not trade in Almeria with their traditional goods—jewels and spices in return for silk—but

48. González Arévalo, "La Guerra di Granada," 395.

49. Archivio di Stato di Modena, Ambasciatori, Napoli, 4, fol. 49, 2-II-1485; copies in *ibid.*, fols. 50 and 52.



supplied the Moors with provisions. The suspicion that these provisions would be used in the war against the Christians unleashed the rage of the Spanish sovereigns.

Naturally, the news of the chase of the galleys had first arrived in Venice. Francesco Guidiccioni, ambassador to the *Serenissima*, wrote to the *Consiglio degli Anziani* of the Republic of Lucca the same day that Ferdinand the Catholic informed Ferrante of Naples:

Haranno inteso Vostre Signorie come a Valensa, per la venuta del re di Spagna, è stata presa una delle nostre galee di Barberia, che tucte furono assaltate. Delle altre non se ne intende lo successo, ricche di ducati 35 in 40 mila. Dicesi perché haveano, contro lo precepto regio, portato vettovaglie alla Granata, luogo di infedeli, dove il re è acampato.

[Your Lords may have heard how at Valencia, because of the arrival of the king of Spain, they have caught one of our Barbary galleys, for they were all assaulted. We know nothing of what has happened to the others laden with goods worth up to 35 to 40 thousand ducats. It is said this transpired because in violation of royal law they were carrying victuals to Granada, place of infidels, where the king [Ferdinand] is camped.]<sup>50</sup>

Guidiccioni's letter is the only source that confirms that the Venetian galleys were part of the *muda di Barberia*. What is less clear is whether the galleys might have also stopped at Malaga, which was not under the protection of the Catholic Kings. There is at least one document that suggests this possibility. It is another dispatch, from Giovanni Pietro Arrivabene to his lord Francesco Gonzaga, marquis of Mantova, informing him from the Sforza court in Milan that "it is said that the king of Spain had captured a Venetian galley, resentful that their ships had carried grain to Malaga, city of Granada, which the king had under siege" (et se afferma che lo re de Spagna habia fatto pigliare una galeaza venetiana, sdegnato che lor navilii habiano portato grani a Malica, città de Granata, quello re teneva assediata).<sup>51</sup>

There is no evidence that Granada had asked for any kind of help from Venice. But recent research has shown that this quite surprising action was part

50. R. Archivio di Stato in Lucca, *Regesti*, vol. 5, *Carteggio degli Anziani (1473-1492)* (Pescia, 1943), 103, reg. 35, 30-XII-1484.

51. Maria De Luca, *Carteggio degli oratori mantovani alla corte sforzesca (1450-1500)*, vol. 14 (Rome, forthcoming), doc. 6, 4-I-1485. I thank the editor for giving me access to the information before it was published.

of the *Serenissima*'s strategy against the Trastamara supremacy in the Western Mediterranean. The superiority was assured with the alliance between Ferdinand of Castile and Aragon and Ferrante of Naples, a coalition that did not favor Venetian interests, neither in Italy nor in the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>52</sup> Be this as it may, the republic's protests and Ferdinand's interest in settling the question would end in a quick resolution. In February 1485 ambassador Pietro Sobraton asked for a safe conduct for the galleys returning from England and Flanders, which was granted under the condition that they did not stop at the Nasrid ports. The Venetian Senate pretended to accept this agreement of safe conduct, but the truth is that the following April a commission awarded to Bartolomeo Minio allowed him to stop in the usual ports of call, including Almeria and Malaga, with his galleys.<sup>53</sup> That said, there is no evidence that Nasrid Granada received any help from Venice again.

News about the War of Granada would arrive regularly in Italy until the end of the conflict. By then the major concern in Renaissance Italy—still afraid of Ottoman progress in the Balkans after the temporary conquest of Otranto in 1481—was the rise of a new power in Western Europe, the Spanish Monarchy. The Nasrid Kingdom of Granada was doomed, and the rules of the diplomatic and commercial relationships with Western Mediterranean Islam would quickly change in the first half of the sixteenth century. But that is a topic for another (hi)story.

52. Giovanni Ricci, "Mediterraneo 1484–85: Venezia aiuta Granada a resistere," *Mediterranea—Ricerche storiche* 28 (2013): 357–66.

53. López de Coca Castañer, "Las galeras venecianas," 135–36.