Electoral scenarios of success for anti-establishment political parties in Western Europe: a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

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The aim of this research is to identify the different electoral scenarios of success for anti-establishment political parties in Western Europe. To this end, a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis has been carried out in 26 national elections of European countries held between 2010 and 2015. Hypotheses from the demand side and supply side have been tested. Results suggest that high levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy and the state of the economy, distrust towards parties and politicians, as well as the presence of 'coaligence' (coalitions and convergence) in proportional electoral contexts, are favourable scenarios to these political parties. These results are coherent with some arguments found in the literature that state how anti-establishment actors present themselves as the only truly democratic actors and the only real political alternative.

Keywords: Anti-establishment, populism, Western Europe, QCA, fuzzy-set

Introduction

The latest elections in Europe and the United States of America have shown how the anti-establishment political actors are setting the electoral agenda in contemporary democracies. In Western Europe, the challenge to the political establishment had come from the radical right (e.g. National Front, Freedom Party of Austria, Party for Freedom, Swiss People's Party, etc.), but after the economic crisis of 2008, new anti-establishment forces on the left and other ideologically ambiguous spaces have emerged as well. In Spain and Italy, two anti-establishment parties –*Podemos* and Five Star Movement- have altered the party systems by obtaining 20.7% and 25.6% of the votes respectively in their first general elections. In Greece, the anti-establishment left party, *Syriza*, reached the government in 2015 after becoming the first political force with 36.6% of the votes. In Portugal, two radical left parties are the parliamentary support of the left government formed in 2015. In Ireland, the economic crisis has also boosted two radical left parties: the nationalist *Sinn Féin* (14 seats in 2011 and 23 in 2015); and the People Before Profit Alliance, which entered the Parliament in the 2011 elections with 4 seats, and 6 in 2015. Regarding the anti-establishment parties on the right, it is remarkable the electoral irruption of the Swedish Democrats, which obtained parliamentary representation in 2010 with 20 seats, and reached 29 more in 2014; and the True Finns, which improved its results from 5 seats in 2007 to 39 in 2011, and 38 in 2015.

This study aims to identify the different electoral scenarios of success for anti-establishment parties in Western Europe in the 'post-crisis' years. Previous studies have addressed similar purposes but focused either on the demand side (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015) or on the supply side (Abedi, 2002; Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007). Others have integrated both approaches but focused on radical right-wing populism (Veugelers and

Magnan, 2005; Mudde, 2007) and used statistical techniques that do not allow the analysis of multiple pathways for the same outcome (Norris, 2005). Finally, two recent studies (Van Kessel, 2015; Hanley and Sikk, 2016) have applied a research approach based on the principle of multiple conjunctural causation, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). However, the first is focused on the demand side and the internal supply side and does not include the patterns of party competition. Additionally, it was carried out before 2014-2015 elections, which for some countries resulted in major party system changes (e.g. Spain). The second is focused on the success of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

The findings of all this research suggest that different political and institutional scenarios can benefit anti-establishment parties, so integrating the supply and demand sides becomes necessary to study this phenomenon in comparative terms. Therefore, this research seeks to contribute to the study of the favourable electoral scenarios for anti-establishment parties in the post-crisis years integrating the demand and supply sides. In addition, we will adopt a methodological approach that allows us to analyse multiple pathways for the same outcome (Qualitative Comparative Analysis). The test will be applied in 26 national elections of 16 Western European countries.

Theoretical framework

The literature provides a great variety of terms to refer to the discourse that suggests a division between the political elite and the common citizen. Andreas Schedler (1996) points out anti-political-establishment actors 'describe one specific conflict as society's fundamental cleavage: the conflict between the ruled and the rulers' (1996, 294). These actors construct the 'political class' category following three basic assumptions: i) politicians are equal: they use a de-differentiation strategy by which government and

opposition are the same thing; ii) politicians are irrational: they are incompetent, immoral and insincere; iii) and politicians are too powerful: they describe contemporary political systems as pre-democratic systems where the political class concentrates all the power. In a similar vein, Robert Barr (2009, 32) describes anti-establishment politics as an appeal that 'constructs a view of society where 'the people' (commoners) are pitted against the power elite', whereas the term 'outsiders' refers to the position of the party within the party system. Thus, populism is defined by Barr (2009, 38) as a 'mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages'. Therefore, we prefer to consider 'anti-establishment' politics not synonymous with populism but as one of the main features of populism, where social conflict is presented in terms of 'us versus them'. In this regard, from Mudde's famous definition of populism as a 'thin ideology' (2004, 543), anti-elitism can also be considered as a core and necessary element of populism (Mudde and Rovira, 2017). Finally, this kind of discourse is found in both right and left-wing parties: whereas right-wing anti-establishment parties combine this populism with a nativist and an authoritarian profile (Mudde, 2007), left-wing anti-establishment parties do so with a socialist and anti-capitalist profile (March, 2017). In this sense, the anti-establishment rhetoric should not be confused with the specific ideological features of the parties displaying it. For example, the anti-establishment discourse refers specifically to the conflict between the people and the elite, not to the conflict between the native and the non-native people or ideas.

Regarding the context in which these parties compete, our theoretical framework comes from the literature about new parties, 'niche' parties, radical parties and populist parties. The main theoretical assumption of this study is that party competition is regulated by an electoral market that limits and influences the strategies and results of

political parties (Norris, 2005). In this sense, the electoral market has been analysed from the demand side, the supply side and the electoral rules that regulate political competition.

From the demand side, we first find explanations of the rise of populist parties to be linked to structural changes in contemporary societies (e.g. globalisation and post-industrialisation) as well as occasional changes (e.g. political and economic crises) that would contribute to the rise of populist attitudes among the population (Mudde, 2007). However, structural changes cannot satisfactorily explain cross-national differences in the performance of populist parties since they have affected Western European countries in similar ways (Mudde and Rovira, 2017; Van Kessel, 2015). Therefore, we will consider those aspects of the demand side that present variations across Western European countries.

First, some authors have pointed out how populism is intrinsically linked to major policy failures (Mudde and Rovira, 2017) and periods of crisis (Taggart, 2002). As Taggart states, populism 'is not the politics of the stable, ordered polity but emerges as an accompaniment to change, crisis and challenge' (2002, 69). Following this reasoning and given the major crisis of the period under study was the financial crisis of 2008, we will consider the dissatisfaction with the state of the economy as one of the possible favourable scenarios. The anti-establishment parties, both left and right, could take advantage of the social anxieties created by economic crises as well as show the incompetence of the ruling class in those particular contexts. In addition, the economic discontent usually has a punishing effect over the parties in office (economic voting theories). However, the mere economic discontent can benefit any opposition party, also mainstream parties. Therefore, we expect that dissatisfaction with the economy will only privilege anti-establishment parties when combined with political discontent. In

this sense, Kriesi and Pappas (2015) argue that the great recession impacted Western European countries not only in economic but also in political terms. For example, Mudde and Rovira (2017) suggest that the difficult balance between responsiveness and responsibility that mainstream parties face (Mair, 2009) have moved in favour of the 'responsible role' during the great recession years, increasing the gap between the people and the elite. Indeed, this increasing tension, along with the perception of widespread corruption[1] in some countries and the general trend of party cartelisation (Katz and Mair, 2009), are contributing to the increase of distrust in parties and politicians. In this study, and considering they are the main targets of anti-establishment actors' attacks (Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018), we will explore the high levels of distrust in parties and politicians as a favourable scenario for anti-establishment parties.

Second, populism has also been linked to the bad functioning of representative democracy (Taggart, 2002; Canovan, 2002). In the context of the great recession, the economic measures imposed by supranational institutions, considered anti-democratic and unrepresentative actors by anti-establishment parties, as well as the lack of alternative to the austerity economic policies, would have aggravated the tensions that the representative European democracies face. In this regard, both left and right anti-establishment actors also address the malfunctioning of representative democracies and promise to restore the popular sovereignty. Therefore, we will also take into consideration high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy as a favourable scenario.

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[1] High levels of perceived corruption were also explored in the pre-test as a favourable scenario and the QCA solutions were the same as those presented in this latest version. It suggests that distrust in parties and politicians is a more generalised scenario, since in these attitudes can contribute not only corruption but also other factors (e.g. cartelisation of parties).

Regarding the supply side approaches, the patterns of party competition would be the key element to explain the success or failure of political parties (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). The supply side can be studied analysing the inherent factors to the political parties (internal supply factors) and those that are not inherent to them (external supply factors). A recent study (Van Kessel, 2015) already addressed the internal supply side and concluded that the credibility of populist parties is a key element for their success. Bearing in mind these results, our study pursues to identify the external supply factors that can be favourable for the success of anti-establishment parties in Western Europe. Specifically, we will focus on the interactions among mainstream parties that create political opportunities for non-mainstream parties. One of the best-known theses from this approach is the ideological convergence one (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) that states that the ideological convergence of mainstream parties opens an electoral space to radical parties. In that sense, we will consider a new scenario: the presence of grand coalitions between right and left parties is a favourable electoral scenario to anti-establishment parties. This factor allows us to analyse a wider situation by which two or more mainstream parties converge de facto in government even when they do not present an ideological convergence. The selection of this condition is inspired by previous studies that have linked the presence of grand coalitions with the support for radical right parties (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) as well as by several studies that have identified a relationship between consensus politics and the support for populist parties (Papadopoulos, 2005; Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007). In short, these studies argue that the inclusiveness of consensual arrangements is at the expense of responsiveness, accountability and party competition, providing a fertile ground for populist parties. In this regard, the creation of grand coalitions could give more credibility to the anti-establishment actors when they state mainstream parties do

not compete, but collude, identifying themselves as the only real political alternative (Schedler, 1996).

Finally, we will also consider the proportionality of the electoral system as an institutional aspect of the electoral competition that could be favourable for non-mainstream parties. Following classic theories (based on Duverger's Law), we expect that proportional electoral systems may favour the support for anti-establishment parties even in countries with a low demand for them, whereas we reckon the opposite in non-proportional electoral systems. Other institutional factors have been linked to the success of populist parties as well. For example, the study of Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) addresses the relationship between the federal-unitary dimension of the states and populism, concluding that federal states are more conductive to populism than unitary states. However, the distribution of power between different territorial levels (or multi-level governments) can be considered a characteristic shared by all the countries of the sample: all of them (with the exception of Switzerland -a federal country- and Norway) are part of the European Union. Therefore, we are not including this causal condition in the analysis but those aspects that present more variation.

To sum up, the results of the aforementioned investigations suggest that there are different favourable scenarios for anti-establishment parties in Western Europe. Thus, the review of the literature leads us to establish the following hypothesis:

H1. There are different scenarios that lead to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in Western Europe after the economic crisis.

H1.1 The increasing levels of economic and political dissatisfaction have generated a favourable demand for these formations in Southern Europe.

H1.2 The demand for these formations in the Northern countries has remained low. This demand has been mobilized successfully by the anti-

establishment parties due to the existence of certain favourable patterns of party competition (external supply side factors).

Methodology

The research approach of this study is the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin, 1987, 2008), a 'research approach' based on the principles of the 'set theory, formal logic, and Boolean and fuzzy algebra' (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010, 2). It is a research approach well suited to cross-national studies that allows analysing relationships of sufficiency and necessity between the outcome and causal conditions. That is, unlike traditional statistical techniques, which have a linear and summative view of causality, QCA is a methodological approach based on the analysis of set relations, not correlations, which allows analysing multiple pathways to the same outcome. The QCA approach is also well suited for research designs involving medium and small N (5-50 cases) that are normally too few for most conventional statistical techniques. Considering that our main hypothesis is that different political and institutional scenarios can be favourable for anti-establishment parties and we have a sample of 26 cases, the QCA approach is perfectly suited to this study.

Among the possible versions of QCA, we use the fuzzy set in which membership of the cases in outcome and causal conditions is gradual, permitting membership scores in the interval 0-1 (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008). We have opted for this version instead of the crisp set (csQCA) because the causal conditions and outcome of this research vary in kind but also in degree.

Outcome: success of anti-establishment parties (ANT)

The units of analysis of the study were the elections held between 2010 and 2015 in 16 Western European countries. First, the selection of the elections as units of analysis instead of the countries increases the diversity of the sample in terms of negative and positive cases as well as the ability to capture possible temporal variations in countries. Second, we choose elections instead of political parties as units of analysis because the aim of this study is to identify those external factors that could be positive for the electoral performance of anti-establishment parties. The selection of political parties as unit of analysis includes internal factors such as the stability of internal organisation or leadership that are out of the scope of this article.

Regarding the outcome, it was measured following a double criterion. Firstly, the political parties were selected (Appendix1) following the 'anti-establishment/anti-elitism' scale from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, a data set commonly used in this field of research (Polk, *et al*., 2017). This variable measures the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric of each party on a scale where 0 means a complete absence of anti-establishment rhetoric and 10 means a complete presence. We set the threshold to consider political parties as anti-establishment actors at seven and half. This threshold is high enough to distinguish political parties that maintain an intense anti-establishment discourse from other parties that only use this kind of rhetoric occasionally (e.g. new challenging parties such as *Ciudadanos* in Spain)[2]. Secondly,

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[2] We also check the profile of the electorate of the selected anti-establishment parties and all of them showed less external political efficacy than the national average, expressed by the disagreement with the statements: 'Politicians care what people think', 'Political systems allow people to have influence on politics' and 'Political systems allow people to have a say in what government does' (ESS7).

electoral results in national parliaments[3] were used to measure the success of these political parties (Appendix2). The analysis was carried out for elections held between 2010 and 2015. The 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey was the first to include the anti-establishment variable, so we cannot consider elections before 2010 (these surveys are conducted every four years). Regarding the calibration of the data, we fixed the threshold for full membership in the set 'success of anti-establishment parties' (ANT) at 30% of the vote, which denotes a massive electoral support; the crossover point at seven percent of the vote; and full non-membership at 0%[4]. In Western European democracies, the five percent is normally sufficient to obtain representation in parliamentary elections and it would be a good threshold if we had taken political parties as a unit of analysis. However, the units of analysis of this study are elections that include, in most cases, more than one anti-establishment party. For instance, if we use the five percent as threshold, cases like Germany-2013, would be into the group of 'elections with successful anti-establishment parties' because the sum of the electoral results of the AfD and NPD -two marginal parties without parliamentary representation in 2013- would exceed that percentage. For this reason, the seven percent is low enough to include into the group of 'elections with successful anti-establishment parties' cases like Belgium2010-2014, that have minor anti-establishment parties but with a long trajectory of parliamentary representation; meanwhile it is high enough not to oversize the weight of some marginal parties that do not even have parliamentary representation.

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[3] In case of more than one anti-establishment party, the outcome was measured by the sum of the electoral results of all of them.

[4] Our criterion coincides with Hanley and Sikk's (2014) who also took the election as unit of analysis.

Causal conditions

One of the most difficult research steps of the QCA is the selection of the casual conditions. The ideal situation would be to run an analysis with all possible conditions that could affect the outcome in order to make the analysis as exhaustive as possible. However, just like in statistical models, 'high numbers of conditions are also dysfunctional for QCA' (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010, 6) because they increase the number of logical remainders and, consequently, the problem of limited diversity; and generate very complex solutions, making it very difficult to get theoretically meaningful interpretations. In short, the QCA is also subject to the 'many variables – few cases' problem (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). Our research strategy is based on the selection of those causal conditions that can be favourable for anti-establishment parties, excluding those causal conditions that only can be beneficial for specific ideological positions (e.g. nativism[5]). We also select those institutional and political conditions that could be positive for the success of non-mainstream parties (e.g. the proportionality of the electoral system). The results of this analysis could be complemented with other studies that focus on the specific ideological positions of these anti-establishment parties.

As discussed in the theoretical framework, we will examine the following five causal conditions as favourable scenarios for anti-establishment parties:

Dissatisfaction with present state of the country's economy. The data for this causal condition was collected from the European Social Survey[6] (Rounds 4-7). The variable is presented in the surveys as a scale of satisfaction where 0 means 'Extremely

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[5] Comparative studies also have shown that these attitudes do not explain the success of Western Europe anti-establishment parties in comparative terms (Van Kessel, 2015; Norris, 2005).

[6] We used the standard Eurobarometer for Greece.

dissatisfied' and 10, 'Extremely satisfied'. The cumulative percentage from 0 to 4 was taken as measure of dissatisfaction with the economic situation. As Table 1 shows, Northern countries and Switzerland have the lowest levels of dissatisfaction of the sample whereas Southern countries, Ireland and France have the highest levels. Finally, we found UK2015 and BEL2010 as intermediate cases. Since it is difficult to theoretically determine meaningful anchors for these kinds of causal conditions (the same applies to the second and third causal conditions), the data were calibrated based on the distribution of cases within the sets and taking into consideration previous studies to decide the crossover points. We also considered the outlier cases within the sets of dissatisfaction and distrust to avoid an excessive influence of them in the fuzzy set scores. Therefore, we have followed the calibration criterion of Van Kessel (2015) by which the country with the second largest percentage in an item was taken as the upper threshold and the same for the lower threshold. The threshold for full non-membership in this set was fixed at eight percent (SWI2015) whereas the threshold for full membership was set at 84% (IRE2011). Finally, there are two intermediate cases with close values in dissatisfaction: BEL2010 (43.5%) and UK2015 (54.3%). For the case of Belgium, Pauwels and Rooduijn (2015) argue that despite some financial problems, the impact of the economic crisis was relatively limited in the country (e.g. the unemployment rate hardly changed during the crisis), having a minor effect on populist appeals. In contrast, Goodwin (2015) notes that the impact of the economic crisis in the UK, in terms of unemployment and gross government debt, was one of the most severe in Europe (only Southern countries and Ireland showed a harder impact). Thus, the crossover point was set at 50% (UK2015).

Distrust in political parties and politicians. The data for this causal condition was collected from two variables of the European Social Survey[7] (Rounds 4-7): trust in political parties and trust in politicians[8]. The original variables are presented as a scale where 0 means 'No trust at all' and 10, 'Complete trust'. The resulting variable was recoded and the values from 0 to 4 were taken as a measure of distrust. As Table 1 shows, Nordic countries (except Finland), Netherlands and Switzerland have the lowest levels of distrust of the sample whereas Southern countries have the highest. Finally, we found as intermediate cases FIN2011-15 and SWI2011. The threshold for full non-membership in this set was fixed at 28% (NET2010) whereas the threshold for full membership was set at 90% (POR2015). Finally, the crossover point was set at 43% to differentiate the intermediate cases that showed higher levels of distrust than trust. This is the case of FIN2011-15, which experienced a remarkable increase of distrust in parties and politicians from 2010 to the present. As Ylä-Antila and Ylä-Antila (2015) note, an election funding scandal that implicated all major parties just before the 2011 elections boosted the anti-establishment claims against the corruption of the political elite. Regarding SWI2011, the other intermediate case, showed more trust than distrust in parties and politicians and we did not find references to any political crisis that could negatively affect the political elite (e.g. Bernhard, Kriesi and Weber, 2015).

Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in country. The data for this causal condition was collected from the European Social Survey[9] (Rounds 4-7). The original variable is presented in the survey as a scale of satisfaction where 0 means

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[7] We used the standard Eurobarometer for Greece.

[8] Cronbach's Alpha >0.8.

[9] We used the standard Eurobarometer for Greece.

'Extremely dissatisfied' and 10, 'Extremely satisfied'. The cumulative percentage from 0 to 4 was taken as a measure of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy. As Table 1 shows, Nordic countries and Switzerland show the lowest levels of dissatisfaction of the sample whereas Southern countries have the highest levels (in the case of Spain, since 2012). Finally, we found France, Ireland and United Kingdom as intermediate cases. The threshold for full non-membership in this set was fixed at nine percent (NOR2013) whereas the threshold for full membership was set at 60% (POR2011). Finally, the crossover point was set at 42% to differentiate the intermediate cases that showed higher levels of dissatisfaction than satisfaction (FRA2012 and IRE2011). The closest case is UK2010. However, the former countries have shown higher levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy than the UK in European Social Surveys since 2006. Kriesi and Pappas (2015) also pointed out that the economic impact of the crisis was severe in the UK whereas the levels of satisfaction with democracy remained at acceptable levels. On the contrary, they noted a democratic malaise in France as consequence of the great recession, besides economic dissatisfaction.

Coalition and convergence ('Coaligence'[10]). The fourth causal condition refers to the coalitions between right-wing and left-wing political parties in the previous term to each election. The first argument behind this causal condition comes from the classic convergence thesis (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) by which the ideological convergence of mainstream parties opens an electoral space for radical parties. The second assertion comes from authors that connect coalitions and consensual politics with populism. The basic idea is the formation of coalitions entails inter-party and elite

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[10] We will refer to the combination of coalition and convergence (either de facto or ideological convergence between elections) as 'coaligence'.

cooperation (secret negotiations, commitments and political concessions between political elites) which provides a fertile ground for anti-establishment appeals (Papadopoulos, 2003; Mair and Katz, 1995; Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007). Taking into consideration both arguments, we will analyse the formation of government coalitions between left and right-wing parties as favourable electoral scenario for anti-establishment parties. The full membership (1) in the set 'Coaligence' is the presence of grand coalitions between the two major parties on the left and right. We consider this scenario as the major expression of both arguments: first, when mainstream parties share the executive power they must set aside their major ideological differences in order to make the government feasible ('factual convergence'); second, it opens a favourable scenario for one of the main arguments of anti-establishment parties, that is, major parties are anti-democratic actors that do not compete but collude, preventing other parties from reaching power. This scenario would allow anti-establishment parties to present themselves as the only political alternative. In addition, there is another kind of government coalition that does not include the two major parties simultaneously, but it consists of parties from different ideological blocs. Following the four-value fuzzy set calibration of Rihoux and Ragin (2008), this type of coalition will be considered to be 'more in than out' in the set 'Coaligence' (0.67) since it meets the two criteria (coalition and 'factual convergence'), but by not including the two major parties, the discourse about the lack of a political alternative would have less acceptance than in the first scenario. Finally, there would be two scenarios out of the set 'Coaligence'. One is the 'more out than in' (0.33), characterised by government coalitions between political parties of the same ideological bloc (the factual convergence criteria would not be met); the other is the 'fully out' (0), characterised by one-party governments. In the last scenario, the discourse about the collusion and the lack of alternative between political

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parties would be more difficult to accept than in previous scenarios. However, it can be

argued that mainstream parties could have suffered an intense ideological convergence

between elections in the last two scenarios, which would also favour electorally anti-

establishment parties. Therefore, we have calculated the ideological convergence

between elections to ensure that all possible convergence scenarios are covered

(Appendix3). Only AUS2013 and ITA2013 suffered a high ideological convergence

between mainstream parties (the difference between them was reduced by more than

one unit). The first case is already characterised by the first scenario (grand coalition)

whereas the second had a right-wing coalition in 2008-2011 and a technocrat

government in 2011-2013. Considering that the country experienced a coalition

government and the two mainstream parties suffered an intense ideological convergence

we will consider the case of Italy-2013 as 'more in than out' in the set (0.67). Finally,

another combination would be possible for those cases that present a high ideological

convergence in one-party government contexts. In this scenario, only one of the two

criteria would be met (ideological convergence) and it would be included in the cases

'more out than in' (0.33). In our sample, none of the cases reaches the high degree of

convergence experienced by AUS2013 and ITA2012[11].

   Proportionality of the electoral system. The Least Squares Index of Gallagher

was used as indicator of the proportionality of electoral systems. Results (Table1) show

a group of countries with proportional electoral systems with minimal disproportional

effects: Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Austria and

Belgium; a group of countries with proportional and mixed electoral systems that

produce some degree of disproportionality (from less to more): Portugal (proportional

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[11] The closest cases are FRA2012 and SPA2011. We explored in the pre-test their inclusion as
   'more out than in' (0.33) cases and the results were the same.

electoral system without legal threshold), Spain ('rectified' proportional electoral system with a legal threshold of three percent), Germany (mixed member system with a legal threshold of five percent), Ireland (single transferable vote system) and Greece ('reinforced' proportional electoral system with a majority bonus of 50 seats and a legal threshold of three percent); and finally, a group of countries with electoral systems suffering high levels of disproportionality between votes and seats: France, United Kingdom (majority electoral systems) and Italy (proportional electoral system[12] with a large majority bonus of 340 seats and different legal thresholds for individual parties and coalitions). Since this causal condition ranks the degree of proportionality of electoral systems, and high scores in the original index mean high disproportionality, the scores have been reversed in the calibrated data: high scores in the set 'Proportionality of the electoral system' mean high levels of proportionality and vice versa. The threshold for full membership in this set was fixed at 0, close to the lowest value of the sample (Denmark); the crossover point was set at ten, close to the intermediate value of Greece; and the threshold for full non-membership was set at 18, close to the highest value of the sample (France).

The raw data were calibrated (Table1) according to the criteria described above and using the Software fsQCA 2.0.[13]

Table 1. HERE

Results

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[12] 2005-2015.

[13] www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml

The first step in the analysis is the assessment of necessary conditions for the presence of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). 'A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for the outcome to occur, but its presence does not guarantee that occurrence' (Ragin, 2008, 108). Results (Appendix4) show that there are no necessary conditions for the presence of the outcome (consistency values are lower than one). Only the proportionality of the electoral systems and the distrust in parties and politicians obtain high values (0.76), although not enough to be considered as necessary conditions.

The next step is the evaluation of sufficiency conditions for the presence of the outcome. In a sufficiency relationship, the causal conditions (or their combinations) are a subset of the outcome $(X \leq Y)$, i.e., are sufficient to produce the outcome, but they are not necessary because other sufficient conditions may produce it as well. The procedure to evaluate the subset relationship between the outcome and causal conditions is by means of a truth table (Appendix5). The consistency[14] cut off was 0.85, at the recommended levels by the literature on QCA (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008). The truth table shows the ten logically possible combinations with empirical evidence (rows 1-10). There are no inconsistent cases in the rows that include the positive cases (1-6) whereas there are three positive cases (UK2015, NET2012 and SWE2014) in rows 7 and 10 which group the negative cases. This will introduce inconsistency values to the analysis of the absence of the outcome. Nonetheless, both coverage[15] (0.86-0.9) and

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14 The consistency establishes whether the combination of conditions is a subset of the outcome $(X \leq Y)$, or not.

[15] 'Coverage' measures how much of the outcome is explained by each solution term and by the solution as a whole (Ragin 2008, 85).

consistency values (0.85-0.88) are higher than standard values for that kind of comparative analysis (0.8-0.85).

FsQCA software provides three solutions that differ in the treatment given to counterfactual logical remainders. First, the complex solution (Appendix6), which only includes empirically observed cases, is the most conservative and descriptive solution; second, the parsimonious solution, which includes all the logical remainders, is the simplest one; and third, the intermediate solution which only incorporates the good counterfactuals (i.e. the logical remainders that the researcher decides under the knowledge of the conditions and cases). Following the paths of the complex solution and the literature review, we set that the presence of the five causal conditions should contribute to the outcome.

The intermediate solution is shown in Table 2, indicating two different paths to the success of anti-establishment parties:

Table 2. HERE

Path1. COA*PRO: cases characterised by 'coaligence' in proportional electoral systems contexts. This path gathers elections with a majority number of radical right-wing parties (Freedom Party of Austria, Team Frank Stronach, Party for Freedom, Flemish Interest, Swiss People's Party, True Finns, LAOS, ANEL and Golden Down) although some radical left-wing anti-establishment also are included (Workers' Party of Belgium, *Syriza*, Communist Party of Greece and Irish parties). The case of NET2012 does not appear in this path and does as an inconsistent case in the fuzzy table due to the short government right-wing coalition (VVD and CDA) of the previous term of 2012 elections. However, the Netherlands is characterised for government coalitions that mix left and right-wing parties (VVD, CDA, PVDA and D66). In this sense, after the grand

coalitions of VVD and PVDA in 2007-2010 and 2012-2017, the PVV increased its electoral results, whereas they decreased in 2012 elections after the right-wing coalition of CDA and VVD in the previous term. Thereby, the solution would be theoretically consistent also in the case of the 2012 elections in Netherlands since the electoral evolution of the PVV is coherent with the solution indicated.

Path2. DEM*ECO*PAR: cases characterised by high levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, with the economic situation and high levels of distrust in political parties and politicians. Unlike path1, this solution groups elections with a majoritarian number of left wing anti-establishment parties (Left Front, Civil Revolution, *Podemos*, People Before Profit Alliance, *Sinn Féin*, -Irish- Socialist Party, Unitary Democratic Coalition, Left Bloc, *Syriza* and Communist Party of Greece) although it also includes some right-wing anti-establishment parties (National Front, League North, ANEL, LAOS and Golden Down) and the ideologically ambiguous, Five Star Movement. The elections of Greece-2012-2015 are the most consistent cases within this solution since it is the country that registered the highest levels of distrust and dissatisfaction, as well as the highest vote share for anti-establishment parties (47.4 and 51.8% respectively). In addition to having the most favourable demand for anti-establishment parties of the sample, both Greek elections were also characterised by a beneficial political context (path1): as a consequence of the dramatic economic and political situation of the country, both mainstream parties (PASOK and ND) were forced to form a grand coalition to implement austerity measures. Thus, the combination of a favourable demand and external supply sides provided the perfect ground for anti-establishment parties in 2012 and 2015.

The parsimonious solution[16] shows two simpler paths: i) the presence of 'coaligence': FIN2011-15, NET2010, BEL2010-14, SWI2011-15, AUS2013, IRE2011, GRE2012-15, ITA2013; or ii) high levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the country: GRE2012-15, POR2011-15, SPA2015, ITA2013, FRA2012 and IRE2011. That is, the parsimonious solution lead to the same paths that the intermediate solution but simplifying the terms of the configurations of causal conditions. On the one hand, the 'coaligence' are only present in proportional electoral systems contexts (except for Italy) but are not a characteristic of all proportional electoral contexts (e.g. Denmark and Norway). So, the path1 can be simplified to the presence of 'coaligence'. On the other hand, the levels of distrust in parties and politicians were already very high before the great recession, not only in the countries characterised by the path2 (between 64-85%) but also in other cases with unsuccessful anti-establishment parties (e.g. GER2013 and UK2010). This suggests that this condition may work better as a necessary condition for the success of anti-establishment parties rather than as a sufficient one. Regarding the economic and democratic dissatisfaction, we can point out that both strongly increased during the years of the great recession. However, the rise of the dissatisfaction with the economy started before (since 2008) the rise of the dissatisfaction with democracy (since 2010) in the countries defined by this path. This suggests that the dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy may be related with the representation gap that was opened as a consequence of the austerity measures, especially on the centre-left as they were in clear confrontation with the ideological profiles of these parties (e.g. the labour market reform approved in 2010 by the Spanish socialist government). A similar conclusion is reached by Della Porta *et al*. (2017) who suggest this representation gap clearly benefited the anti-establishment parties that

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[16] Consistency: 0.851830; coverage: 0.892814

emerged not only with an anti-austerity programme but also with an anti-corruption and democratic regeneration discourse.

Figure 1. HERE

Regarding the negative cases (elections without successful anti-establishment parties), the analysis of necessary conditions (Appendix7) shows that only the absence of high levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy are close to one (0.91), suggesting that it is a necessary condition for the absence of the outcome. Finally, we explored two different analyses of sufficient conditions for the absence of the outcome. On the one hand, we analysed the negative cases assuming the inconsistency of the row containing United Kingdom elections (it was out of the solution). The parsimonious and intermediate solutions (the latter assuming that the absence of the five causal conditions leads to the absence of the outcome) were the same: the absence of 'coaligence' combined with the absence of high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy in proportional electoral contexts would lead to the failure of anti-establishment parties[17]. On the other hand, we explored the sufficient causal conditions considering the row containing UK elections as negative. Analysing the electoral evolution of anti-establishment parties in UK, we can conclude that it is a country where anti-establishment parties have difficulties to overcome (e.g. the UKIP has a 3.5% of votes on average since its foundation). The analysis including UK2015 as negative case only eliminates the proportionality electoral context in the QCA solutions, which makes more sense in theoretical terms. That is, both parsimonious and intermediate solutions point out that the combination of the absence of 'coaligence'

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[17] Consistency: 0.868207; coverage: 0.667015.

with the absence of high levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy would lead to the failure of anti-establishment parties[18].

The other countries characterised by this path are DEN2011-15, NOR2013, SWE2010-14, GER2013, NET2012 and SPA2011. First, Denmark and Norway have two successful and institutionalised anti-immigrant parties, the Danish People's Party and the Norwegian Progress Party, but they are not currently characterised by a strong anti-establishment discourse[19] (CHES2014; Andersen, 2008; Meret, 2010). Secondly, Germany used to have marginal anti-establishment parties such as the National Democratic Party of Germany. However, the Alternative for Deutschland obtained parliamentary representation in the 2017 elections. In this sense, the elections of Germany in 2017 reinforce the hypothesis of the grand coalitions since the AfD has increased its electoral results after the coalition between the CDU and SPD. Thirdly, Spain used to have low levels of economic and democratic discontent before the crisis. However, the great recession had a severe impact on the country. At the beginning, its effects were economic, especially in terms of unemployment, which favoured the major party on the right in 2011. However, the lack of institutional response to the demands of the population against the austerity measures, along with the corruption scandals of mainstream parties, unleashed a political crisis in the country. At that moment *Podemos*

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[18] Consistency: 0.799772; coverage: 0.73382.

[19] The CHES2014 shows medium-low scores in anti-elitism (6.9 and 6.6 respectively), at similar levels to other parties not considered as anti-establishment (e.g. *Ciudadanos*). The anti-elitism does not form part of the main issues of these parties either: those are immigration, taxes and EU in the case of the DF (CHES2014) and taxation, immigration, and welfare in the FrP (e.g. Jupskås, 2015).

emerged, trying to cover the representation gap that we could witnessed during 2011 and 2015 (Della Porta *et al*., 2017).

Finally, there are two inconsistent cases in this path: NET2012 (this case was commented above) and SWE2014. Sweden is characterised by the same combination of causal conditions that Norway and Denmark but in the 2014 Sweden elections, an anti-establishment party obtained a 12.9% of votes. Unlike its Nordic neighbours, Sweden Democrats has been excluded from any participation in government by mainstream parties. This could have an effect on the anti-establishment appeals of the SD because it would reinforce the idea that mainstream parties do not compete but they collude, hindering any opposition force (Schedler, 1996). However, the three main issues of this party were 'Immigration', 'Nationalism' and 'Multiculturalism' (CHES2014) which could indicate that this party was supported by its xenophobic positions rather than by its anti-establishment rhetoric.

Discussion

Results showed anti-establishment parties were successful in contexts of high levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works combined with dissatisfaction of the economic situation and high levels of distrust in parties and politicians (Southern countries and Ireland) as well as in political contexts of 'coaligence' and proportional electoral systems (West and Northern countries of the sample and Greece). Thereby, the QCA solutions pointed out two general favourable scenarios for the success of anti-establishment parties, highlighting the necessary integration of both the demand and supply sides when analysing this phenomenon in comparative terms. On the one hand, favourable political and institutional contexts may explain the success of these parties even in countries with a low demand in comparative terms (e.g. Northern and West European countries –except France-); on the other hand, a very favourable demand may

be sufficient for the success of anti-establishment parties even in countries with a more unfavourable political and institutional context (e.g. Southern European countries, including France and Ireland).

These results are coherent with some arguments found in the literature. First, some authors have connected consociativism and political consensus between mainstream parties with the support of populist parties in Western Europe (Papadopoulos, 2005; Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007). These authors suggest consensual arrangements are at the expense of responsiveness and accountability of the political elite, providing a fertile ground for populist appeals. Similarly, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found that the presence of grand coalitions helps to explain the vote for the radical right in Western Europe. They interpreted that grand coalitions may increase citizens' dissatisfaction. However, we consider that the link between grand coalitions and the success of anti-establishment parties is not explained only by this mentioned rise (it would be reflected in the levels of dissatisfaction and distrust), but also by the growth of the alienation towards mainstream parties specifically and, above all, by the expanding credibility of the anti-establishment discourse (internal supply side). As other studies have noted (Van Kessel, 2015), the credibility of populist parties is a necessary element for their success. In this sense, one of the core dimensions of their discourse is the de-differentiation strategy (Schedler, 1996) by which mainstream parties form an undifferentiated political class, collude and do not offer a political alternative to relevant issues. This dynamic would allow the anti-establishment parties to present themselves as the only real political alternative. In addition, anti-establishment parties are normally characterised by radical ideological positions (Polk, J. *et al*, 2017). In this sense, and taking into consideration the classic convergence thesis (Kitschelt and Mcgann, 1995), this factual convergence may also favour anti-establishment parties since it leaves the

ideological extremes without strong competitors. Thus, besides rises in the discontent with mainstream parties, we suggest grand coalitions may benefit anti-establishment parties in two complementary ways: first, by increasing the credibility of their discourse about the existence of an undifferentiated political class; and second, by opening the extreme ideological spaces in which they compete.

Second, our results are in line with recent research that links the economic and political effects of the great recession to the success of populism, especially in Southern Europe (including France). For instance, Kriesi and Pappas (2015) found that its effects were different by sub-regions: although they were very severe in peripheral countries and Eastern countries, they were very limited or non-existent in Nordic and Western countries (except France). Also, in line with our results, they found the success of populism was more prominent in countries that experimented both economic and political crises. Della Porta *et al*., (2017) also states that anti-establishment parties were benefited from the representation gap that emerged as a consequence of the lack of institutional response to the economic demands of the population in Southern Europe. Hence, what began as discontent with the state of the economy and the austerity measures evolved into dissatisfaction with the functioning of representative democracy (in a previous context of distrust in political parties). This makes sense to the extent that the mere discontent with the economy could lead to the support of any political party in the opposition, including mainstream parties (e.g. the 2011 Spanish elections) whereas it would be reasonable that the increase of the discontent with democracy will lead to the support for those parties that focus precisely on that: the corruption and collusion of the political elite, the deterioration of the functioning of democracies and the promise of restoring the popular sovereignty. In the context of the great recession, the rise of democratic malaise may be linked to the decision-making process in past years,

especially with the economic decisions taken from the so-called *Troika,* which have been interpreted by anti-establishment actors as an anti-democratic attack on the sovereignty of the peripheral EU countries. In addition, the tense relationship between the representative functions of political actors and their role as government agencies has been aggravated during the great recession (Mudde and Rovira, 2017), especially when government parties (e.g. PSOE and PASOK) had to take economic decisions that were in clear confrontation with their electoral programmes (neo-liberal labour market reforms, cuts in social budgets, etc.). Finally, if we state that anti-establishment parties have benefited from mobilising the discontent and resentment of citizens in peripheral countries, it also means that they face the great challenge to maintain their electoral success when the discontent declines. In this sense, they probably need to become competent and credible actors to keep their electoral support (internal supply side).

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Table 1. Raw and calibrated data.

	OUTCOME		ECO		PAR		DEM		COA		PRO	
Cases	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated	Raw	Calibrated
AUS2013	26.2	*0.92*	34.6	*0.25*	66.4	*0.82*	28.85	*0.23*	1	*1*	3.31	*0.88*
BEL2010	9.7	*0.59*	43.4	*0.38*	59.4	*0.74*	32.4	*0.29*	2	*0.67*	3.77	*0.87*
BEL2014	7.4	*0.51*	38.35	*0.3*	51.9	*0.64*	25.2	*0.18*	2	*0.67*	4.6	*0.83*
DEN2011	0	*0.05*	27.3	*0.17*	28.25	*0.05*	10.75	*0.06*	3	*0.33*	0.73	*0.94*
DEN2015	0	*0.05*	23	*0.13*	36.25	*0.21*	10.3	*0.05*	3	*0.33*	0.81	*0.94*
FIN2011	19	*0.83*	18.75	*0.1*	44.1	*0.52*	16.1	*0.09*	2	*0.67*	2.95	*0.89*
FIN2015	17.6	*0.8*	31.5	*0.21*	44.15	*0.52*	16.75	*0.09*	1	*1*	3.03	*0.89*
FRA2012	20.5	*0.85*	74.6	*0.9*	73.76	*0.88*	44.53	*0.6*	4	*0*	17.66	*0.05*
GER2013	6	*0.39*	29.9	*0.19*	71	*0.86*	30.55	*0.26*	3	*0.33*	7.83	*0.66*
GRE2012	47.4	*0.99*	99	*0.99*	92	*0.96*	79	*1*	1	*1*	9.93	*0.51*
GRE2015	51.8	*1*	97	*0.98*	92	*0.96*	77.66	*1*	1	*1*	9.75	*0.52*
IRE2011	12.1	*0.66*	83.85	*0.95*	75	*0.89*	44.85	*0.62*	2	*0.67*	8.69	*0.6*
ITA2013	31.9	*0.96*	79.3	*0.93*	86.9	*0.94*	52.2	*0.85*	2	*0.67*	17.34	*0.06*
NET2010	15.5	*0.75*	23.5	*0.13*	28.8	*0.06*	14.9	*0.08*	1	*1*	0.81	*0.94*
NET2012	10.1	*0.6*	33.8	*0.24*	33	*0.12*	12.8	*0.07*	3	*0.33*	0.99	*0.94*
NOR2013	0	*0.05*	4.9	*0.04*	36.6	*0.22*	9.15	*0.05*	3	*0.33*	2.56	*0.9*
POR2011	13.1	*0.69*	82.55	*0.95*	85.9	*0.94*	58.1	*0.94*	4	*0*	5.68	*0.79*
POR2015	18.5	*0.82*	82.35	*0.95*	89.2	*0.95*	57.1	*0.93*	3	*0.33*	6.54	*0.74*
SPA2011	0	*0.05*	73.45	*0.89*	73.05	*0.87*	28.65	*0.23*	4	*0*	6.93	*0.72*
SPA2015	20.7	*0.86*	80.7	*0.94*	86.4	*0.94*	52.9	*0.86*	4	*0*	6.02	*0.77*
SWE2010	6.4	*0.44*	27.2	*0.16*	39.35	*0.33*	14.95	*0.08*	3	*0.33*	1.25	*0.93*
SWE2014	13.3	*0.69*	18.25	*0.09*	38.85	*0.3*	11.8	*0.06*	3	*0.33*	2.64	*0.9*
SWI2011	26.6	*0.93*	18.5	*0.1*	40.6	*0.38*	10.2	*0.05*	1	*1*	3.76	*0.87*
SWI2015	29.4	*0.95*	8.45	*0.05*	33.55	*0.13*	6.85	*0.04*	1	*1*	3.8	*0.87*
UK2010	4.1	*0.22*	60.06	*0.71*	69	*0.84*	41	*0.48*	4	*0*	15.1	*0.13*
UK2015	16.4	*0.77*	54.25	*0.59*	67.55	*0.83*	33.1	*0.31*	3	*0.33*	15.04	*0.13*

Outcome - electoral performance of anti-establishment parties; ECO – Dissatisfaction with the present situation of the country's economy; PAR – Distrust in political parties and politicians; DEM – Dissatisfaction with the functioning of country's democracy; COA – Coaligence; PRO – Proportionality of electoral system.

Table 2. Intermediate solution for the presence of the outcome.

Paths	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Cases
1. COA*PRO	0.582217	0.355664	0.875458	NET2010, FIN2015, AUS2013, SWI2011-2015, BEL2010-2014, FIN2011, IRE2011, GRE2015-2012
2. DEM*ECO*PAR	0.518271	0.291717	0.914071	GRE2012-2015, POR2011-2015, SPA2015, ITA2013, IRE2011, FRA2012

Coverage: 0.873934, consistency: 0.869170. Twenty-six cases. COA – Coaligence; PRO – Proportional electoral systems; DEM – High levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of country's democracy; ECO – High levels of dissatisfaction with the present situation of the country's economy; PAR – High levels of distrust in political parties and politicians.

Figure 1. Membership in electoral success of anti-establishment parties` plotted against membership of intermediate solution.

Table A1. Political parties included in the analysis: mean values obtained in anti-establishment/anti-elitism scale of Chapel Hill Expert Survey of 2014.

Political parties by country/anti-establishment score							
Austria		Belgium		Denmark		Finland	
Freedom Party of Austria (FPO)	8	Flemish Interest (VB)	9	No party obtained a value above 7.5		True Finns (PS)	9.12
Team Frank Stronach (TS)	7.9	Workers' Party of Belgium (PVDA)	8.39				
France		Germany		Greece		Ireland	
National Front (FN)	9.54	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	7.77	*Syriza*	8.55	We Ourselves (SF)	8.19
Left Front (FG)	7.7	National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)	9.11	Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	9.77	Anti-Austerity Alliance - People Before Profit (PBPA)	9.25
				Golden Down (XA)	10	Socialist Party (SP)	8.8
				LAOS	9		
				ANEL	9.22		
Italy		Norway		Portugal		Spain	
League North (LN)	8.8	No party obtained a value above 7.5		Left Bloc (BE)	7.5	*Podemos*	10
Five Star Movement (M5S)	10			Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU)	7.5		
Civil Revolution (RC)	9.33						
Sweden		Switzerland		The Netherlands		United Kingdom	
Sweden Democrats (SD)	8.89	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	8.37	Party for freedom (PVV)	9.4	Green Party (GP)	7.66
Pirat	8.06					United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	9.28

Table A2. Electoral results (% valid votes) of anti-establishment parties (2010-2015).

Country/political party	Election year		Country/political party	Election year	
Austria	2013		Italy	2013	
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	20.5		League North (LN)	4.1	
Team Stronach for Austria (TS)	5.7		Five Star Movement (M5S)	25.6	
			Civil Revolution (RC)	2.2	
Belgium	2014	2010	Norway	2013	
Flemish Interest (VB)	3.7	7.8	-	-	
Worker's Party of Belgium (PVDA)	3.7	1.9			
Denmark	2015	2011	Portugal	2015	2011
-	-	-	Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU)	8.3	7.9
			Left Bloc	10.2	5.2
Finland	2015	2011	Spain	2015	2011
True Finns (PS)	17.6	19	*Podemos*	20.7	-
France	2012		Sweden	2014	2010
National Front (FN)	13.6		Sweden Democrats (SD)	12.9	5.7
Left Front (FG)	6.9		Pirat	0.4	0.7
Germany	2013		Switzerland	2015	2011
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	4.7		Swiss People's Party (SVP)	29.4	26.6
National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)	1.3				
Greece	2015	2012	United Kingdom	2015	2010
Syriza	35.5	26.9	Green Party (GP)	3.8	1
Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	5.6	4.5	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	12.6	3.1
LAOS	-	1.6			
ANEL	3.7	7.5			
Golden Down (XA)	7	6.9			
Ireland	2011		The Netherlands	2012	2010
We Ourselves (SF)	9.9		Party for Freedom (PVV)	10.1	15.5
Socialist Party (SP)	1.2				
Anti-Austerity Alliance-People Before Profit (PBPA)	1				

Source: parties-and-elections.eu

Tabla A3. Coalitions and convergence.

Elections	Government coalitions (previous term)	Major party* on the left (previous term)	Major party* on the right (previous term)	Ideological convergence between elections
AUS2013	SPO, OVP	SPO	OVP	-1,53
BEL2010	PS, CDH, CD&V, VLD, MR	SP.A/PS	CD&V/MR	0,02/1,33
BEL2014	PS, CDH, SP.A, MR, CD&V, VLD	SP.A/PS	N-VA/MR	0,65/-0,09
DEN2011	V, C	SD	V	-0,29
DEN2015	SD, RV, SF- SD, RV	SD	V	-0,22
FIN2011	VIHR, KESK, KOK, RKP	SDP	KESK	-0,12
FIN2015	SDP, V, VIHR, KOK, KD	SDP	KOK	0,16
FRA2012**	(UMP) – Gov: UMP, IND, PRV, NC, FRS	PS	UMP	-0,62
GER2013	CDU, CSU, FDP	SPD	CDU	-0,34
GRE2012	PASOK - ND, LAOS, PASOK	PASOK	ND	0
GRE2015	PASOK,ND	PASOK	ND	0
IRE2011	GP, FF, PD	LAB	FF	1,28
ITA2013	PdL, LN, MPA - technocrats	PD	PdL	-1,19
NET2010	PvdA, CDA, CU	PvdA	CDA	0,07
NET2012	VVD, CDA	PvdA	VVD	0,22
NOR2013	AP, SV, SP	AP	FRP / H	-0,03
POR2011	PS	PS	PSD	0,1
POR2015	PSD, CDS/PP	PS	PSD	-0,34
SPA2011	PSOE	PSOE	PP	-0,75
SPA2015	PP	PSOE	PP	-0,16
SWE2010	ALLIANCE	S	M	0
SWE2014	ALLIANCE	S	M	-0,34
SWI2011	SPS, SVP, FDP, CVP – SPS, FDP, CVP, BDP	SPS	FDP	0
SWI2015	SPS, FDP, SVP, BDP, CVP	SPS	FDP	-0,25
UK2010	LAB	LAB	CON	1,45
UK2015	CON-LIB.DEM	LAB	CON	0,3

Data: www.parties-and-elections.eu, CHES, official websites of governments, www.whogoverns.eu

*Major non-populist party

**Semi-presidential system

Table A4. Analysis of necessary conditions for the presence of the outcome.

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
Dissatisfaction economy	0.607795	0.810065
Distrust in political parties and politicians	0.767357	0.792453
Dissatisfaction democracy	0.528624	0.913684
Coalitions and convergence	0.704629	0.868619
Proportionality	0.768575	0.690750

Outcome: Anti-establishment. Twenty-six cases

Table A5. Fuzzy set table (anti-establishment).

Raw						Outcome			
	ECO	PAR	DEM	COA	PRO	N	ANT	Cases	Consistency
1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	ITA2013	1.000000
2	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	GRE2012, GRE2015, IRE2011	1.000000
3	1	1	1	0	1	3	1	SPA2015, POR2011, POR2015	0.934272
4	0	1	0	1	1	5	1	AUS2013, BEL2014, BEL2010, FIN2011, FIN2015	0.910420
5	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	FRA2012	0.886889
6	0	0	0	1	1	3	1	NET2010, SWI2011, SWI2015	0.852986
7	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	UK2010, UK2015	0.845714
8	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	GER2013	0.815126
9	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	SPA2011	0.765625
10	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	DEN2011, DEN2015, NOR2013, SWE2010, SWE2014, NET2012	0.615251

Note: COA – Coalitions and convergence; DEM – High levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in country; ECO – High levels of dissatisfaction with the present situation of the economy in the country; PAR - High levels of distrust in political parties and politicians; PRO – Proportional electoral systems. AUS – Austria; BEL – Belgium; DEN – Denmark; FIN – Finland; FRA – France; GER – Germany; GRE – Greece; IRE – Ireland; ITA – Italy; NET – Netherlands; NOR – Norway; POR – Portugal; SPA – Spain; SWE – Sweden; SWI – Switzerland; UK – United Kingdom.

Table A6. Complex solution for the presence of the outcome.

Paths	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency	Cases
COA*PRO*~ECO*~DEM	0.460414	0.347138	0.867968	NET2010, SWI2011, SWI2015, FIN2015, AUS2013, BEL2014, FIN2011, BEL2010
ECO*PAR*DEM	0.518271	0.404994	0.914071	GRE2012, GRE2015, POR2011, POR2015, SPA2015, ITA2013, IRE2011, FRA2012

Note: coverage: 0.865408, consistency: 0.879332. Outcome: ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT. 26 cases. COA – Coalitions and convergence; DEM – High levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in country; ECO – High levels of dissatisfaction with the present situation of the economy in the country; PAR – High levels of distrust in political parties and politicians; PRO – Proportional electoral systems; ~ - absence of the causal condition. AUS – Austria; BEL – Belgium; FIN – Finland; FRA – France; GRE – Greece; IRE – Ireland; ITA – Italy; NET – Netherlands; POR – Portugal; SPA – Spain; SWI – Switzerland.

Table A7. Analysis of necessary conditions for the absence of the outcome.

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
High levels of dissatisfaction economy	0.556367	0.432630
Absence of high levels of dissatisfaction economy	0.755741	0.529240
High levels of distrust in political parties and politicians	0.670146	0.403774
Absence of high levels of distrust in political parties and politicians	0.655532	0.621782
High levels of dissatisfaction with democracy	0.379958	0.383158
Absence of high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy	0.914405	0.530909
Coalition and convergence	0.502088	0.361111
Absence of coalition and convergence	0.817328	0.617508
High levels of proportionality	0.879958	0.461412
Absence of high levels of proportionality	0.410230	0.508409

Outcome: absence of anti-establishment. Twenty-six cases.