

Tesis Doctoral-PhD Thesis

Programa de Doctorado en Psicología

**Los efectos de las amenazas al control percibido y la agencia grupal en
preferencias políticas y alianzas.**

Effects of threat to perceived control and group agency on political
preferences and alliances

Álvaro Rodríguez López

Directores

Soledad de Lemus Martín

Marcin Bukowski



**UNIVERSIDAD
DE GRANADA**

ESCUELA INTERNACIONAL DE POSGRADO

Programa de Doctorado en Psicología (B13.56.1)

Editor: Universidad de Granada. Tesis Doctorales
Autor: Álvaro Rodríguez López
ISBN: 978-84-1195-252-1
URI: <https://hdl.handle.net/10481/90822>

El presente trabajo ha sido financiado a través por los proyectos “Procesos de alianza en el afrontamiento a las amenazas a la identidad y al control percibido” (Ref. PID2019-111549GB-I00) y “Impact of lack of control experiences on intergroup relations: The role of coalition formation and recategorization processes” (2018/30/M/HS6/00298) concedidos por el Ministerio de ciencia e Innovación Español y por el Polish National Science Centre

This work has been funded through the projects “Alliance processes in coping with threats to identity and perceived control” (Ref. PID2019-111549GB-I00) and “Impact of lack of control experiences on intergroup relations: The role of coalition formation and recategorization processes” (2018/30/M/HS6/00298) granted by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and by the Polish National Science Centre.

Universidad de Granada

Programa de Doctorado en Psicología

Centro de Investigación, Mente, Cerebro y Comportamiento (CIMCYC)

Departamento de Psicología Social

Facultad de Psicología

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Granada, 26 de Enero de 2024

Directoras de Tesis

Doctorando

Fdo: Soledad de Lemus Martín

Fdo: Álvaro Rodríguez López

Fdo: Marcin Bukowski

En tres tiempos se divide la vida: en presente, pasado y futuro. De éstos, el presente es brevísimo; el futuro, dudoso; el pasado, cierto.

SÉNECA

La política es el arte de lo incierto, lo que nos lleva a un principio de incertidumbre-política generalizada.

EDGAR MORIN

Es una época de cambios. Tal vez sea también una época para aprender otras verdades, otras costumbres.

BRANDON SANDERSON

Cuando creíamos que teníamos todas las respuestas, de pronto, cambiaron todas las preguntas.

MARIO BENEDETTI

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RESUMEN

La percepción de control es una necesidad básica inherente al ser humano, puede ser definida como la medida en que una persona puede producir resultados deseados y prevenir resultados indeseados (Antonovsky, 1979, Bukowski et al., 2017, Skinner, 1996). Así mismo, la percepción de control está relacionada con la eficacia del individuo (Bandura, 1997). La autoeficacia implica poder cambiar la situación en beneficio de uno mismo o de un grupo mediante acciones directas o bien, acciones indirectas que satisfagan las necesidades de uno mismo o del grupo (Landau et al., 2015; Rothbaum et al., 1982). La carencia de control va a conllevar consecuencias negativas en el individuo, sentimientos aversivos que lo van a predisponer a revertir las condiciones que causan ese malestar para así poder conseguir estabilidad y volver a un estado emocional positivo. El control puede percibirse amenazado a diferentes niveles, cuando éste se percibe amenazado a nivel personal el individuo puede tratar de restaurarlo a nivel colectivo (Fritsche et al., 2011). Es por ello que debemos unir el termino de percepción de control al término de agencia, ya que ésta va a actuar como una herramienta restauradora a nivel grupal de la percepción de control cuando esta sea baja (Fritsche, 2022; Pratto, 2016).

La presente tesis doctoral analiza como la amenaza hacia el control personal puede ser restaurada mediante la identificación con el grupo y la actuación de acuerdo a sus objetivos y valores (Fritsche et al., 2011). De hecho, tal y como refleja el modelo del control basado en el grupo, la amenaza al control va a producir un aumento en el pensamiento etnocéntrico, esto es, el favoritismo endogrupal (Fritsche et al., 2013). Además, se va a producir también una conformidad con las normas sociales y una complicidad con las acciones llevadas a cabo por el endogrupo (Fritsche y Jugert, 2017) En el Capítulo 1, desarrollamos este marco conceptual en profundidad.

Uno de los contextos clave para que se produzca una pérdida de control en el individuo puede ser una crisis económica, ya que la mayoría de acciones que se llevan a

cabo para evitarla se mantienen fuera del alcance del control personal del individuo (Merolla et al., 2012). En el contexto de la crisis económica de 2008, se ha demostrado que culpar al exogrupo puede servir como medida para restaurar el control personal en una situación de amenaza (Bukowski, et al., 2017). Teniendo en cuenta el contexto de la crisis económica en España, hemos desarrollado nuestros estudios para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis sobre la influencia de la falta de control en el grupo, específicamente sobre la intención de voto y el apoyo a diferentes partidos políticos en el contexto político español. Si las decisiones para solucionar una crisis económica son tomadas por la clase gobernante de un país, la gente intentará influir en esas decisiones a través de la participación política. Concretamente, nos centraremos en analizar si el control personal puede influir sobre las preferencias políticas en la intención de voto y si la ausencia de control sociopolítico puede llevar a un mayor apoyo a alianzas políticas. Los objetivos generales y específicos de la tesis se desarrollan en el Capítulo 2.

En la primera serie de estudios (Capítulo 3), mostramos que las personas que poseen un control personal bajo (frente a alto) tendrán una mayor tendencia a rechazar los partidos políticos tradicionales que defienden el mantenimiento de un sistema político conservador. En cinco estudios experimentales (cuatro en España y uno en Francia) manipulamos experimentalmente la sensación de control personal bajo (vs. alto) y medimos las intenciones de los/as participantes de apoyar a los partidos políticos tradicionales y nuevos. En cuatro de los cinco estudios, los resultados obtenidos van en línea con las predicciones, de tal manera que el bajo control personal redujo el apoyo al principal partido conservador. Nuestros resultados apoyan la idea de que las personas bajo condiciones de amenaza pueden preferir esfuerzos colectivos (grupos agénticos) como medio para la restauración de control (Fritsche et al., 2013), en lugar de la búsqueda de estructura como sugieren algunas teorías sobre el control compensatorio (Kay et al.,

2008). No obstante, esta forma de restaurar el control se producirá cuando el propio contexto enfantece que el cambio social es posible, en línea con la Teoría de la Identidad Social (Tajfel y Turner, 1979). Por tanto, las personas solo parecen buscar el cambio en respuesta a una falta de control personal cuando la agencia colectiva es también baja, si la situación actual permite la restauración del control colectivo, y además si las acciones grupales son apropiadas para restaurar la agencia colectiva (acciones agénticas).

En la segunda serie de estudios (Capítulo 4) realizamos dos estudios correlacionales y uno experimental en los que analizamos como afecta la falta de control personal y sociopolítico al apoyo a diferentes alianzas políticas para formar gobierno, considerando el papel de la eficacia percibida de las alianzas como variable moderadora. Encontramos que el bajo control sociopolítico (pero no el personal) se relaciona con un mayor apoyo a las alianzas en forma de coalición o recategorización de partidos con una ideología de centro-derecha, especialmente si estas se perciben como eficaces. Además, comprobamos experimentalmente que la alta eficacia de la coalición de centro-derecha es suficiente para incrementar el apoyo a esta alianza, independientemente del control percibido.

En resumen, la amenaza al control percibido es identificada como una variable fundamental para las preferencias políticas. Un contexto de amenaza como el que puede generar una crisis económica, provocará que se pongan en marcha una serie de mecanismos restauradores para poder recuperar el control percibido. En esta tesis podremos ver como la participación política puede ser una herramienta restaurativa del control personal a través del *yo-colectivo*. Además, la amenaza al control sociopolítico puede poner en marcha procesos de alianzas políticas, con el objetivo de producir cambios en el entorno que reduzcan el contexto de amenaza (e.g., garantizando un gobierno

estable). En el Capítulo 5, se reflejan las conclusiones de este trabajo así como sus limitaciones y futuras implicaciones prácticas.

OVERVIEW

The perception of control is a basic need inherent to human beings; it can be defined as the extent to which a person can produce desired results and prevent unwanted results (Antonovsky, 1979, Bukowski et al., 2017; Skinner, 1996). Likewise, the perception of control is related to the individual's effectiveness (Bandura, 1997). Self-efficacy implies being able to change the situation for the benefit of oneself or a group through direct actions or indirect actions that satisfy the needs of oneself or the group (Landau et al., 2015; Rothbaum et al., 1982). The lack of control will lead to negative consequences in the individual, aversive feelings that will predispose them to reverse the conditions that cause this discomfort in order to achieve stability and return to a positive emotional state. Control can be perceived as threatened at different levels; at a personal level, but also the individual may try to restore it at a collective level (Fritzsche et al., 2011). This is why perception of control should be linked to collective agency, since this will act as a restorative tool at the group level of the perception of control when it is low (Fritzsche, 2022; Pratto, 2016).

This doctoral thesis analyzes how the threat to personal control can be restored through identification with the group and acting according to its goals and values (Fritzsche et al., 2011). In fact, as reflected in the group-based control model, the threat to control can produce an increase in ethnocentric thinking, or more generally, ingroup favoritism (Fritzsche et al., 2013). In addition, we can also observe conformity with social norms and compliance with the actions carried out by the ingroup (Fritzsche and Jugert, 2017). In Chapter 1, we develop this conceptual framework in depth.

One of the important contexts that can evoke feelings of control loss is the one of an economic crisis, since the majority of actions carried out to avoid it remain outside the scope of the individual's personal control (Merolla et al., 2012). In the context of the 2008 economic crisis, it was shown that blaming the outgroup can serve as a means to restore

personal control (Bukowski, et al., 2017). Taking into account the context of the economic crisis in Spain, we have developed our studies to test the hypothesis on the influence of lack of control on voting intentions and support for different political parties in the Spanish political context. If decisions to solve an economic crisis are made by the government of a certain country, people will try to influence those decisions through political participation. Specifically, we will focus on analyzing how personal control can influence voting preferences, and how the absence of sociopolitical control is related to support for political alliances. The general and specific objectives of the thesis are developed in Chapter 2.

In the first series of studies (Chapter 3), we show that people who possess low (vs. high) personal control will be more likely to reject traditional political parties that advocate maintaining a conservative political system. In five experimental studies (four performed in Spain and one in France) we experimentally manipulated the feeling of low (vs. high) personal control and measured participants' intentions to support traditional and new political parties. In four of the five studies, the results obtained are in line with our predictions, such that low personal control reduced support for the main traditional conservative party. Furthermore, we were able to observe that people in conditions of threat support collective efforts (agentic groups) as a means of restoring control (Fritzsche et al., 2013), instead of searching for any type of structure as some theories on compensatory control suggest (Kay et al., 2008). Further, we test a hypothesis in our studies that this support for agentic groups will occur when the context emphasizes that social change is possible as indicated by the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore, people seem to seek change in response to a lack of personal control when collective agency is also low and if the current situation allows for the restoration

of collective control, and furthermore if group actions are appropriate to restore collective agency.

In the second series of studies (Chapter 4) we carried out two correlational studies and one experimental in which we analyzed how the lack of personal and sociopolitical control affects the support for different political alliances to form a government, proposing the perceived effectiveness of the alliances as a moderating variable. We find that low sociopolitical (but not personal) control is related to greater support for coalition alliances or recategorization of parties with a center-right ideology, especially if these are perceived as effective. Further, we experimentally show that high perceived efficacy of the center-right coalition is sufficient to promote support for this political alliance, independently of perceived control.

In summary, threat to perceived control is identified as a fundamental variable that is related to political preferences. A threatening context such as the economic crisis, can activate a series of restorative mechanisms aimed to restore a threatened sense of perceived control. In this thesis, we show that political participation can be a restorative tool of personal control by acting through the collective self. Furthermore, the threat to sociopolitical control can launch processes of political alliances, with the objective of producing changes in the environment that reduce the threat context (e.g., guaranteeing a stable government). Chapter 5 reflects the conclusions of this work as well as its limitations and future practical implications.

CAPÍTULOS TEÓRICOS

THEORETICAL CHAPTERS

CAPÍTULO I

INTRODUCCIÓN

1. Contexto Socio-Político

Las crisis económicas, políticas y sociales que en España se han estado viviendo durante los últimos 15 años han afectado a la población general, provocando un cambio de actitudes y comportamiento social (Fritsche y Jugert, 2017). Las fluctuaciones en la economía pueden afectar a las personas profundamente, afectando a su punto de vista del mundo como algo estable y predecible. Estos cambios abruptos en el contexto sociocultural pueden causar angustia, ansiedad y miedo por el futuro porque el sentido de control se pierde (Jetten et al., 2017). Esta situación puede generar, también, sentimientos de indefensión y dar lugar a que se desarrollen una serie de mecanismos para tratar de recuperar el control perdido (por ejemplo, a través del comportamiento político votando en unas elecciones). Por ello, las personas están motivadas para llevar a cabo acciones determinadas para restaurar ese control perdido y sentir que está influyendo en su contexto político social. Esta tesis pretende analizar como en respuesta a un contexto de crisis, las personas pueden llevar a cabo estas acciones políticas, concretamente acciones de apoyo a un partido político determinado o a una alianza entre varios partidos, para restaurar el control perdido. Estas acciones pueden llegar a tener una gran repercusión en la sociedad provocando cambios paulatinos y favoreciendo la movilización por parte de la ciudadanía.

Por ejemplo, en situaciones que ponen en riesgo el bienestar de la población, podríamos considerar el apoyo a políticas radicales o a líderes políticos más autoritarios (Torres-Vega et al., 2021), como consecuencia de un tipo de motivación que predispone a la persona para actuar y recuperar ese estado de bienestar perdido o amenazado (Abramson, 1983). De esta forma, la población tratará de eludir la amenaza que supone el ataque al bienestar individual, llevando a cabo acciones tanto a nivel personal como

grupales que pueden servir para mejorar las condiciones económicas y personales, mientras que otras pueden estar simplemente dirigidas a ejercer una función paliativa protegiendo la autoestima (Fritzsche y Jugert, 2017).

Una situación que claramente generó una amenaza al bienestar y al control percibido en nuestra sociedad, fue la crisis económica de 2008. Diversos estudios han sido publicados con el objetivo de averiguar las causas de esta crisis que a partir de 2008 se globalizó, afectando fuertemente a países del sur de Europa, como por ejemplo, España. La entrada en la Unión Europea y la adopción del euro como moneda nos ha proporcionado muchos beneficios como el apoyo monetario ante posibles crisis, el fomento de la inversión y el aumento del comercio internacional. Aunque también, como señalan diversos expertos, esta medida ha podido contribuir, junto con la combinación de otros factores complejos, como son la acumulación de un desequilibrio económico de los hogares y los gobiernos, los tipos de interés bajo y la revalorización continua de la vivienda, a un boom inmobiliario que terminó en 2007 con el comienzo de la desaceleración económica (Mañas & Rabajo, 2008).

En 2008, tras la explosión de la burbuja inmobiliaria en Estados Unidos, debido a una serie de políticas bancarias que otorgaron indiscriminadamente créditos hipotecarios sin respaldo suficiente, unido a la desregularización financiera global y una política monetaria implementada por la reserva federal (Reyes y Cardoso, 2014), provocaron que uno de los bancos de inversión, Lehman Brothers, pidiera protección crediticia declarándose en bancarrota. Mientras, otros bancos como Merrill Lynch eran adquiridos a la mitad de su valor. La carencia de crédito se extendió rápidamente por todo el mundo ya que diversas instituciones financieras tanto de Europa como de Asia tenían títulos financieros asociados al mercado inmobiliario estadounidense y comenzaron a verse afectadas por un impago crediticio masivo. Para intentar paliar estos efectos algunos

gobiernos llevaron a cabo acciones como la nacionalización de sus bancos para reducir los efectos de esta prominente crisis económica. Debido a estos acontecimientos surge una etapa de inestabilidad donde predominaron una serie de políticas de austeridad y una sucesión de reformas estructurales que en nuestro país tuvieron una gran repercusión social. Estas medidas dieron lugar al agravamiento de la situación de crisis en las economías familiares, así como un incremento de la sensación de vulnerabilidad por parte del ciudadano de a pie. Si consultamos el tercer trimestre de la EPA (Encuesta de Población Activa) del año 2012 podemos ver que hubo un aumento de 85 mil personas que se sumaban a las filas del desempleo aumentando la tasa de paro hasta un 25%, dando lugar a una sociedad empobrecida.

La oficina europea de estadística (Eurostat) publicaba que desde el año 2008 hasta el año 2012 se destruyeron unos 7,2 millones de empleos en España. Esta tasa de empleabilidad a día de hoy ha ido fluctuando viéndose perjudicada de nuevo con las crisis derivadas de la pandemia del coronavirus en 2020 o el conflicto bélico Rusia-Ucrania desde 2022. Según la BBC, se estima que la crisis económica generada por la pandemia de la COVID-19 será la cuarta peor de los últimos 150 años, reduciéndose la economía mundial en más de un 5%. Esta situación de inestabilidad económica, iniciada en 2008, vino además acompañada por numerosos casos de corrupción producidos en el panorama político español. El portal de noticias “El Economista” señalaba que el coste de la corrupción en España supuso más de 7.500 millones de euros robados con más de 175 tramas de corrupción desde que la democracia en España comenzó. Encabezando esta lista están los dos principales partidos políticos de nuestro país, el Partido Socialista (caso ERE) y el Partido Popular (Trama Gürtel), algo que incrementó la sensación de desprotección y el distanciamiento de la población de a pie con las instituciones.

Todos los acontecimientos anteriormente mencionados han contribuido a un escenario político y social convulso en España. Según el Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) elaborado en los años 2011 y 2012, uno de cada dos españoles pensaba que nuestros representantes políticos desempeñaban mal o muy mal su acción política, aumentando estos datos con el paso de los años y sumándole otras preocupaciones como el aumento de la crispación política, la mala gestión de la crisis sanitaria (COVID-19), o la relación con el conflicto Rusia-Ucrania (CIS 2020 a 2022). Estos datos suponen un cuestionamiento a la calidad de nuestros representantes políticos y, por ende, una desconfianza hacia las políticas desarrolladas por éstos. La ciudadanía hace manifiesta una preocupación, la baja identificación con los poderes políticos que los representan al tiempo que se refleja la percepción sobre la escasa capacidad de nuestros gobernantes para subsanar las diversas crisis (sociales, políticas y económicas) que se han vivido (Fraile & Hernández, 2020; Jiménez Díaz, 2016).

Fruto de este descontento y la desconfianza existente hacia los partidos políticos, han surgido numerosos movimientos sociales que inundaron las plazas de diferentes lugares. Podemos poner ejemplos como “Occupy Wall Street” en Estados Unidos, “Nuit Debout” en Francia, el movimiento “YoSoy132” en México o el movimiento 15-M o movimiento de los indignados en España, todos con un punto en común: la defensa de diversos derechos ciudadanos y causas sociales, y el rechazo de las políticas de austeridad.

Esta situación ha dado lugar al surgimiento de un nuevo ciclo político donde el dominio del bipartidismo de los partidos clásicos se ha visto cuestionado con el nacimiento o resurgir de fuerzas políticas minoritarias como una forma de protesta contra las políticas de austeridad o políticas antisociales. Entre estas nuevas fuerzas políticas, fruto del descontento (Mudde, 2004), en España destacan tres sobre las demás. Por un lado el partido Podemos (2014), que asume posiciones más drásticas que los partidos


tradicionales de ideología de izquierda. Por otro lado, Ciudadanos (2006), asumiendo un papel de centro derecha en España y aglutinando los votos de la gente descontenta con la derecha tradicional. Y, por último, el partido VOX (2013), que aglutina las ideas radicales de extrema derecha y que iría ganando más popularidad con el paso de los años. Otros partidos alternativos con más trayectoria histórica como Izquierda Unida (que posteriormente junto a Podemos formaría la coalición de partidos Unidas Podemos) también han tenido un papel más protagonista a causa del envejecimiento mostrado por los partidos tradicionales. Para esta tesis es importante que aclaremos la diferencia entre partidos tradicionales, que son aquellos que avalan los valores más conservadores, políticas económicas más liberales y la defensa del tradicionalismo cultural y nacional, y los partidos del cambio, que irían en contra de estos valores centrándose más en las necesidades básicas de la población y luchando contra el descontento hacia la clase política (Iglesias-Pascual et al., 2021).

Una de las primeras pruebas de este descontento, se puso de manifiesto en las elecciones de Mayo de 2014 al Parlamento Europeo. Podemos alcanzó 1.239.133 votos correspondiente a 5 escaños de representación en el parlamento europeo. Sin embargo, este proceso de cambio se ha ido normalizando, produciéndose un desgaste en los denominados "partidos del cambio". Siguiendo el estilo de la mayoría de países europeos, la derecha ha ido consagrando su poder como una manera alternativa de combatir las simultaneas crisis vividas (económicas, sanitarias, territoriales y bélicas). Para entender los acontecimientos políticos de la última década en España se puede consultar el siguiente esquema:

El Partido Popular (partido tradicional de ideología de derechas) obtiene mayoría simple con la cual no podía gobernar por sí solo, fracasando la legislatura sin que ningún candidato de las listas más votadas pudiera formar gobierno dando lugar a una nueva ronda de Elecciones Generales.



Moción de censura a Mariano Rajoy (Partido Popular) por los múltiples casos de corrupción en los que se ve implicado su partido.



El Partido Socialista de nuevo obtiene mayoría simple y, gracias a un acuerdo con otros partidos con representación parlamentaria de ideología de izquierdas (Unidas Podemos, En comú Podem y En Común), se permitió formar un Gobierno estable en España por primera vez desde el año 2015.

2015

2016

5 de Marzo de 2019

28 de Abril 2019

2019

Resultados de las Elecciones generales de 2015



El Partido Popular (partido tradicional de ideología de derechas) obtiene mayoría simple de nuevo consiguiendo gobernar tras meses de negociaciones para obtener los apoyos necesarios.



El Partido Socialista (partido tradicional de ideología de izquierdas) obtiene una mayoría simple, sin conseguir apoyos suficientes para formar gobierno.



El análisis de esta evolución política puede desarrollarse desde diversas disciplinas. Desde la psicología social, proponemos que un proceso psicológico que puede contribuir a explicar los cambios en las tendencias de voto en nuestro país es la amenaza al control percibido. En concreto, en esta tesis doctoral nos centraremos en los mecanismos restauradores de control personal y sociopolítico a través del grupo, mediante la utilización del voto como herramienta restauradora, y el apoyo a las diferentes alianzas políticas.

2. Control como variable psicosocial

El ser humano está motivado para llevar a cabo determinadas conductas sociales. Según Kleinginna (1981), la motivación es el motor para actuar, *aquellas fuerzas que inician, activan y dirigen una determinada conducta para la consecución de un objetivo*, es decir, la activación de una conducta dirigida hacia una determinada meta. Una de las necesidades sociales básicas hace referencia a la necesidad de sentirse eficaces con el entorno social y con nosotros mismos, por lo tanto tener *control* sobre la situación (Fiske, 2004). Toda persona parece motivada a mantener su capacidad para influir en los acontecimientos venideros y poder evitar sucesos o consecuencias negativas, ya que el ser humano pretende buscar la seguridad y, por tanto, evitar o minimizar todo lo que pueda entrañar peligro para nuestro sistema de vida (Janicki y Krebs, 1998).

Según Skinner (1996) el *control personal* se ha definido como la medida en que una persona (o grupo) puede producir resultados deseados en su vida y evitar los no deseados. Esta autora manifiesta la ambigüedad existente en la literatura sobre la terminología del término *control personal*, ella misma, incluso, plantea una serie de distinciones para abordar el estudio de la *percepción de control*. La primera de ellas hace referencia a 3 aspectos, denominados *control objetivo*, *control subjetivo* y *experiencia de control*. Esta clasificación hace alusión a la importancia que tiene el propio procesamiento

de la información en el bienestar de la persona por encima de poseer una determinada cualidad o no. Por ejemplo, si el poseer control se manifiesta de manera objetiva en la persona esto repercutirá de manera positiva en su bienestar psicológico (e.g., una persona que está recibiendo un tratamiento de quimioterapia recibe análisis positivos de mejoría de la enfermedad). Sin embargo, si esta información no se recibe de forma manifiesta, aunque los efectos estén siendo beneficiosos para la persona, puede repercutir de manera negativa sobre el estado de ánimo de la persona, generando una sensación de impotencia e incertidumbre (ej., una persona que recibe un tratamiento de quimioterapia sin informarle de si está mejorando o empeorando) (Abramson et al., 1978).

Así mismo, la experiencia del control hace referencia a los sentimientos de una persona cuando ésta interactúa en un determinado contexto pretendiendo producir unos resultados deseados o prevenir unos no deseados. Por ejemplo, alguien que se propone apuntarse al gimnasio para mejorar su forma física o para evitar problemas de salud. Por lo tanto, mientras que la interpretación objetiva (condición real) o subjetiva (creencias) podrían reducirse a un plano psicológico, la experiencia real de la *percepción de control* podría interpretarse como la interacción de esta variable con el contexto social, influyendo psicológicamente sobre la persona (Langer y Imber, 1980; Skinner, 1985).

Si realizamos un esfuerzo integrador de toda la terminología empleada en esta temática podemos concluir tres aspectos fundamentales que son intrínsecos a la percepción de *control personal*. El primero de ellos hace referencia a las metas intrínsecas que son necesarias para tener una sensación de control (e.j., votar para formar parte del proceso electoral), el segundo aspecto fundamental es la sensación de percibir que las acciones de la persona van dirigidas hacia una meta concreta (e.j., votar con la intención de cambien leyes desfavorables a la persona), y por último, el individuo debe sentir que está influyendo en su entorno de alguna manera (p.e., votar a un determinado partido

pensando que esta acción será determinante a la hora de cambiar el Gobierno) (Fritsche et al., 2008; Fritsche 2022; Stollberg., 2015).


Atendiendo a los efectos, que la teoría indica que genera esta variable, podemos decir que la falta de control personal puede considerarse como una señal de peligro y, por tanto, no es de extrañar, que la persona busque de forma activa poseer control (Pittman y D'Agostino, 1989). Esto va a producir consecuencias positivas de diverso grado, como por ejemplo, aumento de la autoestima, la confianza en sí mismo o incluso la salud física (Deci y Ryan, 1987). Hay que destacar que lo que parece generar este bienestar no es poseer control real (objetivo), si no la propia percepción de poseer control incluso sin llegar a tenerlo realmente (subjetivo), contribuyendo a efectos positivos en nuestro organismo (Manstead y Hewstone, 1996). Así podemos decir que estamos intrínsecamente motivados a mantener o restaurar el control personal, algo que veremos en mayor profundidad en el siguiente apartado.

2.1 Tipos de control: Personal, interpersonal y sociopolítico

Existe una multidimensionalidad en lo referente a la variable de *control*, no solo en cuanto a las teorías que rodean a este término, si no también en cuanto a su naturaleza y el número de factores que componen dicha variable, habiéndose propuesto desde 2 únicos factores (Reid y Ware, 1974) hasta 18 factores (Coan, 1974). En este trabajo nos centraremos en el enfoque de Paulhus y Christie (1981), que divide el espacio vital del individuo, en términos de esferas del comportamiento, de esta manera podemos distinguir tres actos diferentes que rodean a la persona en su espacio de vida y es el individuo el que va a lidiar con diferentes fuerzas externas dentro de cada esfera (*Figura 1*).

Figura 1.

Tres esferas principales de comportamiento según Paulhus y Christie (1981)



Según el esquema de las esferas de control de Paulhus y Christie (1981), el individuo compite primero con situaciones de logro personal, como por ejemplo, ganar una carrera, sacarse un título de idiomas o aprender una nueva habilidad. Esto también podría denominarse *eficacia personal* o autoeficacia coincidiendo con la terminología propuesta por Bandura (1977). Posteriormente, el individuo, en una escala más social, interactúa con el otro en situaciones grupales, ya sea mediante relaciones sociales de diversa índole, como defender tus intereses en una reunión de trabajo o mantener la concordia en el núcleo familiar, esto sería lo que denominamos: *control interpersonal*. Por último, en cuanto al sistema socio-político, son muchas veces las que la persona entra en conflicto con las normas sociales o políticas establecidas pudiendo actuar de diversas formas, ya sea participando en manifestaciones, votando en contra de alguna política

concreta o recogiendo firmas por una determinada causa, experimentando de esta forma un *control sociopolítico*.

Como hemos visto la persona construye su *control personal* desde diferentes dominios, el enfoque que se propone desde la teoría de las esferas de control permite tener en cuenta diferentes contextos, dotando al *control* de unas características que se moldean según el entorno en el que se desarrolle la persona. En línea con esta propuesta y con recientes investigaciones (Potoczek et al., 2022), en esta tesis se analiza el control como una variable dependiente del contexto sociopolítico. Así, en la primera serie empírica analizaremos el control personal en términos generales en un contexto de crisis económica y cómo este influye sobre las preferencias políticas y la intención de voto (Capítulo 3). Mientras que en la segunda serie empírica, distinguiremos los efectos del control personal y del control sociopolítico sobre el apoyo a diferentes alianzas políticas entre partidos (Capítulo 4).

2.2 Consecuencias ante la falta de control y respuestas de restauración

El control personal ha demostrado ser un constructo válido como predictor del bienestar tanto físico como psicológico (Bandura, 1989). Se ha evidenciado que mantener una percepción de control positiva ayuda a combatir fuentes de estrés (Glass y Singer, 1972), mientras que la falta de *control percibido* o *control personal* genera estados nocivos para la salud tanto física como mental, por ejemplo procesos de depresión (Burger, 1989). La experiencia de control no solo es importante porque lleve cambios a nivel subjetivo o influya a nivel objetivo en el contexto desarrollado, si no, porque este factor es el que parece influir realmente en el estado de ánimo de la persona. Por muy negativo que sea el contexto o la concepción subjetiva del individuo acerca de su control personal, el tomar una acción determinada para intentar paliar la situación (ser optimista

o incluso desviar la atención de efectos negativos) demuestra que es una potente herramienta que provoca en la persona numerosos beneficios psicológicos (Skinner, 1996; Miller et al., 1989). La literatura muestra que ante la falta de control, el proceso normal es que la persona desarrolle una serie de acciones restauradoras para recuperar el equilibrio (y en consecuencia intentar paliar los efectos negativos generados por la ausencia de dicha variable), intentando influir en aquellos acontecimientos que le han provocado esa pérdida de control y generado incertidumbre (Landau et al., 2015).

Cabe destacar que el beneficio de un entorno carente de incertidumbre es propiciar a la persona una información más precisa de la relación entre sus acciones y los resultados de éstas. Por tanto, un contexto donde es fácil predecir las consecuencias de las acciones llevadas a cabo generará una cierta acomodación de la persona a ese contexto percibido como menos hostil, provocando a su vez cierta pasividad y siendo menos probable que las personas se involucren en acciones para el cambio. Por ello proponemos que la amenaza al control percibido puede ser fundamental para que se produzca cambios en el sistema (Meijers y Rutjens, 2014).

Por lo tanto la persona que vive un contexto de incertidumbre buscará restaurar el control mediante diferentes estrategias como por ejemplo acciones de carácter personal, social o religioso, para de esta manera aliviar la ansiedad que experimentan cuando perciben aleatoriedad (Kay et al. 2008). Entre diversas acciones podemos destacar algunas estrategias compensatorias como apoyar de maneras más férrea el propio sistema en el que vives (Jost et al., 2004), o incluso delegar responsabilidades sobre Dios u otros poderes divinos (Rutjens y Loseman, 2010). Otras alternativas para acabar con la incertidumbre generada por la ausencia de *percepción de control* son la negación (p.ej., los movimientos negacionistas ante la pandemia COVID-19), o el desarrollo de teorías conspiratorias ante determinadas situaciones políticas (Eshel et al., 2022; Whitson y

Galinsky, 2008). Si tomamos como ejemplo una crisis política, un mecanismo compensatorio que permita reducir los efectos negativos de ésta, podría pasar por responsabilizar a determinados grupos, ya sean minorías étnicas, o partidos políticos o gobernantes de ideología opuesta a la propia (Landau et al., 2015). Como consecuencia de estas atribuciones, es probable que aumente el apoyo a líderes autoritarios que prometen corregir la situación (Torres-Vega et al., 2021).

Por lo tanto, una forma de reforzar este *yo individual* sería adoptando un rol pasivo, no llevando a cabo ninguna acción sobre el entorno y produciéndose una acomodación en las condiciones existentes reafirmando el sistema y apoyando a partidos políticos o líderes que ostenten un mayor poder dentro de la sociedad y por tanto las estructuras sociopolíticas que el sistema brinda (en la literatura se ha denominado a este tipo de control, *control secundario o control compensatorio*) (Kay et al., 2008, 2009). Por otro lado, cuando la persona interactúa directamente con el entorno para cambiarlo y hacer que este se ajuste a las necesidades del *yo*, y las acciones que realiza le permiten reforzar el propio concepto del *individuo*, es ella misma la que ejerce control (lo que la literatura ha denominado *control primario*). En definitiva, en la literatura cuando se ha hablado de falta de *control* se ha hecho poniendo un mayor énfasis al control primario o secundario, es decir las acciones concretas que una persona de manera individual puede llevar a cabo para sobreponerse a las condiciones existentes (control primario) o la acomodación de estas a las condiciones existentes y por tanto la conformidad y complacencia con el contexto tal como es (Weisz et al., 1984; Cialdini and Mirels., 1976).

Por otro lado existe una fuente complementaria de restauración de control primario, este principio reside en la restauración del control a través del grupo (en contraposición de ser el *yo individual* el *agente* controlador). La amenaza al control puede impulsar a las personas a actuar de manera grupal ante situaciones de crisis personal o

social, cuando creen no tener la capacidad suficiente para afrontar la arbitrariedad del contexto que les rodea (Stollberg y Fritsche, 2017). Específicamente, cuando el endogrupo de las personas promueve normas positivas que fomenten el compromiso alentando a la persona a actuar por una causa que haga frente a la incontrolabilidad del contexto (Potoczek et al., 2022). En nuestro trabajo prestamos especial atención a esta forma complementaria de *control primario*, en el que el *yo* deja de ser agente de control para ser el *grupo* el nuevo agente de control (control primario extendido) (Stollberg y Fritsche, 2017).

3. Agencia Grupal y Control basado en el grupo.

Hasta ahora hemos hablado del *control personal* como una variable de carácter individual a través de la cual la persona intenta influir de manera personal en el entorno para intentar ganar control de nuevo, pero ¿qué ocurre si ese mecanismo personal falla? Sería lógico pensar que la persona quedara atrapada en un círculo vicioso de malestar del que no podría salir (i.e., indefensión aprendida; Seligman, 1975). En el apartado anterior hemos mencionado algunas formas de restaurar el control que escapan a las herramientas que posee la persona. Cuando el *control primario* no es suficiente y falla, procedemos a realizar una serie de cambios internos para poder restaurar nuestra percepción de *control personal*, estos cambios van desde confiar en otras personas que pueda ejercer el control de una manera más óptima que nosotros mismos (ej., líderes políticos) o bien una mayor identificación con determinados grupos sociales con los que compartimos características o metas (Weisz et al., 1984).

Más allá de los mecanismos compensatorios previamente mencionados, existe una fuente complementaria de restauración de control primario, este principio reside en la restauración del control a través del grupo (en contraposición de ser el *yo individual* el

agente controlador). Todas las personas que vivimos en sociedad pertenecemos a grupos concretos, grupos con determinadas características con los cuales compartimos metas y objetivos. No solo esto, sino que también tendemos a definirnó en función del grupo que compartimos (deportista, español, estudiante) adoptando de esta manera el estereotipo del endogrupo (Reicher et al. 2010; Tajfel y Turner, 1979). Los seres humanos somos seres sociales que vivimos en comunidad con otras personas, dependiendo en gran medida de los demás y siendo controlados por ellos, a través ya sea de la nacionalidad, de una organización laboral o de relaciones interpersonales (Fritsche, 2022). La Teoría del Control Basada en el Grupo (Fritsche et al., 2013) indica como la percepción de pertenencia grupal puede dotar a la persona de una sensación de apoyo por parte de otras personas, lo que favorecerá el mantenimiento del control sobre las decisiones y contingencias de la vida diaria.

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a un grupo mayoritario en la sociedad anticipaban un mayor control en la tarea siguiente consistente en un debate con otro grupo, en cambio aquellos que pensaban que pertenecían a un grupo minoritario anticipaban un menor control en el debate.

Las personas tienen la capacidad de ganar *control* no solo a través del propio *control personal* que posee el individuo, sino también a través de la experiencia de su endogrupo de manera efectiva y autónoma persiguiendo sus objetivos colectivos (Fritzsche, 2022). Por lo tanto, la existencia de una relación de interdependencia social no debe ser vista por el individuo como un obstáculo, si no como una forma de ganar *control* a través de su yo social o yo agéntico. Así, el control personal se puede ver reforzado a través del grupo cuando este es agéntico, es decir cuando el grupo tiene unas metas comunes y realiza acciones coordinadas para alcanzar dichas metas e influir en su entorno (Jugert et al., 2016). Por ejemplo, si estamos en desacuerdo con el precio de la gasolina y somos transportistas lo más probable es que de manera individual no consigamos nada puesto que no tenemos la suficiente capacidad para influir en nuestro ambiente y conseguir reducir el precio del combustible. Sin embargo, si nos establecemos en una plataforma a la cual todos los transportistas se puedan unir, de manera coordinada, se podrá ejercer una mayor presión sobre los sectores que influyen en el precio del combustible, consiguiendo que yo aumente mi control personal a través de un grupo que comparte mis mismas metas y objetivos (*agencia grupal*). En este ejemplo podemos ver claramente como ese colectivo tiene una serie de *metas comunes* que sería conseguir un abaratamiento de los costes del petróleo, una percepción de que sus *acciones* van *dirigidas a unas metas concretas* utilizando la interrupción en la cadena de suministros como medida de presión y, por último, el sentimiento de *influencia sobre el entorno* al ver que determinados sectores del gobierno proceden a reunirse con ellos para solucionar el problema.

La Teoría del Control Basada en el Grupo (Fritsche et al., 2013) indica como la percepción de pertenencia grupal puede dotar a la persona de una sensación de apoyo por parte de otras personas, lo que favorecerá el mantenimiento del control sobre las decisiones y contingencias de la vida diaria. Esta sensación de pertenencia grupal dependerá de la situación tal y como indica la teoría de la identidad social (Tajfel y Turner, 1979). El individuo se sentirá altamente identificado con el grupo, cuando el grupo en cuestión se convierte en referente para la persona, percibiendo a todos los integrantes del grupo como similares entre sí y diferentes a otros, pudiendo de esta forma adoptar las características que definen a ese grupo en concreto.

La teoría del control basada en el grupo (Fritsche et al., 2008; Fritsche, 2022) propone que la pertenencia a un grupo es una forma importante de restablecer el *control personal* a través de su yo social (agencia grupal). Así, la persona se sentirá motivada a sentirse más identificada con su identidad social o personal en función de la que le haga sentir un mayor *control*, esta identificación con cualquiera de estos yo (personal o social) incrementará el bienestar de la persona.

La teoría del control basada en el grupo parte de 3 premisas importantes. La primera hace referencia a que si a una persona se le hace visible su indefensión ante una determinada situación, ésta incrementará su identificación con grupos sociales que sean importantes para la persona y de esta forma poderse defender de la amenaza (por ejemplo, adoptando una actitud etnocéntrica) (Fritsche, 2022; Jonas et al., 2014). La segunda premisa muestra que el control personal no solamente se puede ver fortalecido en una persona mediante la mera identificación con el grupo, ya que también se puede ver beneficiado al experimentar control como miembros de un grupo. Por ejemplo, alguien puede sentirse identificado con un determinado partido político y hacer campaña para lograr votos en un proceso electoral (Fritsche et al., 2017). Por último, la tercera premisa

se refiere a aquellas personas que pueden utilizar esta estrategia de control basada en el grupo frente a aquellos que, por determinadas circunstancias, no disponen de ningún grupo con el que sentirse identificados. Quienes si pueden apoyarse en el grupo experimentarán beneficios a nivel psicológico e incluso a nivel físico, frente a quienes no se sientan identificados con ningún grupo (Fritsche, 2022; Greenaway et. al., 2015). Estos últimos tomarán acciones, buscando nuevos niveles de identificación con otros grupos o grupos supraordenados que representen sus valores o sus ideologías y que, en definitiva, resulten más atractivos (Stollberg et al., 2015).


4. Participación Política y Control Personal

Cuando una persona se siente amenazada por su entorno y es incapaz de predecir los resultados de sus actos, ésta muestra un mayor interés por los elementos que están causando esa amenaza concreta. Por ejemplo, en lo que nos repercute en este trabajo, si hablamos de una crisis política las personas se interesarán más por los actores políticos involucrados, partidos políticos y programas electorales (Fiske et al., 1983) siendo la interacción con estas esferas políticas lo que podríamos denominar *comportamiento político*. En este apartado nos vamos a ceñir a los mecanismos de *control* político que una persona puede emplear para recuperar su *control personal*.

Para entender correctamente qué implica el *comportamiento político* tenemos que entender éste a un nivel más general y ver en la participación política un aspecto más concreto, que puede conllevar la participación electoral a través del voto (Grasso y Giugni., 2022) (Fig. 2).

Figura 2.

Representación Comportamiento político y sus componentes



Podemos encontrar personas con ideología liberal, con ideología conservadora, personas bien documentadas u otras que no lo están. Todo lo cual puede influir en las acciones políticas que se lleven a cabo, desde ejercer el voto hasta participar en manifestaciones o movimientos sociales de diversa índole (Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Teniendo en cuenta que existen múltiples maneras de participar en los procesos de decisiones políticas, tenemos que mencionar dos grandes tipos de participación política: la participación *convencional* y la *no convencional*. La participación convencional hace referencia a acciones como votar, acudir a mítines de campaña electoral o simplemente debatir sobre política (participación electoral). La participación no convencional haría mención a conductas como participar en manifestaciones o *escraches* políticos (Sabucedo y Sobral, 1986).

Para esta tesis nos centramos en el estudio del voto como una herramienta convencional para influir en la clase gobernante. El voto, según su definición, es un método democrático mediante el cual un grupo toma una decisión de manera colectiva. En política, el voto es una herramienta mediante la cual la ciudadanía expresa una opinión o preferencia, es propia de las democracias y se establece como un derecho fundamental de la ciudadanía mediante el cual pueden elegir a sus representantes en las instituciones públicas. Participar en un proceso electoral es una forma directa de influir en el sistema social y político que tiene muy bajo coste para la persona que emite el voto, pero un alto beneficio o coste para su vida cotidiana. Incluso la no emisión del voto es una forma de participación (Schram y Sonnemans, 1996).

Cabe preguntarse qué puede hacer que una persona ejerza su derecho a votar frente a alguien que decida abstenerse. Según Campbell et al. (1961) es fundamental sentir cierto grado de identificación con un determinado partido político, además esta identificación, será el resultado de un proceso de socialización en general y de la influencia familiar en particular, donde también contribuirá la eficacia percibida de los partidos políticos (Sears, 1969; Sabucedo y Sobral, 1986). La participación electoral puede ir unida también al locus de control (Rotter et al., 1966), siendo los sujetos con locus de control interno personas más activas electoralmente al sentir una mayor responsabilidad sobre los acontecimientos que ocurren a su alrededor, al contrario que las personas con un locus de control externo, que consideran que su intervención en un proceso electoral no tendrá ninguna repercusión, teniendo éstos últimos una mayor probabilidad de abstenerse. Por su parte, la teoría de la justificación del sistema presenta la participación electoral como un motivador social que defiende el sistema evitando de esta manera el cambio e intentando volver al punto de equilibrio inicial (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012).

4.1 El voto como herramienta restauradora del control personal

En España el voto, a lo largo de su historia política, se ha visto centralizado entre la denominada izquierda (de ideas liberales) y la derecha (de ideología conservadora). Según el CIS (Centro de Investigaciones sociológicas) y otros estudios del ámbito socio-político existe una clara división bipartidista entre estas dos ideologías anteriormente citadas, representadas en el Partido Socialista Obrero Español y el Partido Popular, respectivamente, los cuales se han disputado el poder durante más de 30 años en España desde la Transición. Sin embargo, a raíz de la crisis económica de 2008 el panorama político español empezó a fragmentarse con el surgimiento o resurgir de otros partidos políticos, los ya mencionados partidos del cambio que contaron con gran apoyo popular. Aunque los partidos tradicionales sigan, a día de hoy, contando con numerosos seguidores, esta fue la primera vez en la historia democrática española que el debate político no estaba monopolizado por los dos partidos clásicos.

Este marco de cambio político en España ha dado pie a que la ciudadanía crea que una remodelación de las instituciones políticas es posible, acompañado este proceso de un sentimiento de *eficacia política* que podría ser entendido como la creencia que una persona tiene el suficiente control sobre el proceso electoral para satisfacer su necesidad de *control personal* (Rehnson, 1975). Según Rehnson (1975), para que se perciba como posible un cambio político, y de esta forma utilizar las urnas como herramienta restaurativa de control, es necesario tener en cuenta varios aspectos: el primero de ellos sería la necesidad de *control personal*, el segundo aspecto sería que la situación política sea la apropiada y, por último, haber tenido una serie de intentos exitosos de restaurar el control a través de las urnas. En esta tesis nos centramos en el voto como una herramienta que puede ser interpretada como un mecanismo de *control primario* tanto a nivel individual como colectivo (control primario extendido).

El voto es una acción individualizada, porque es la persona de manera individual la que emite el voto, pero también puede ser entendido como acción grupal porque es el conjunto de la sociedad la que decide el resultado con la suma de los votos individuales. Así, investigaciones recientes han demostrado que aquellas personas que sientan un bajo control sociopolítico se encontrarán mas predispuestas a participar en un proceso electoral si advierten que la norma del endogrupo es favorable a emitir el voto (Potoczek et al., 2022). A su vez, el sentimiento de pertenencia que los partidos políticos generan sobre el grueso de la población generará identidades compartidas, que podrían servir en futuras alianzas políticas en caso de ser éstas necesarias (Dávila y Silva, 2016; Fritsche & Jugert, 2017; Stollberg et al., 2017).

4.2 Alianzas políticas

Hemos hablado anteriormente de una herramienta para restaurar el *control* en crisis socio-políticas, a través del voto, pero cuando esta estrategia no es suficiente porque ningún partido tiene la capacidad de formar Gobierno, cabe preguntarnos qué otras estrategias para recuperar el control sociopolítico existen. Hay estrategias válidas que implican la cooperación entre diversos grupos o actores políticos para conseguir objetivos comunes (Fritsche et al., 2008). Cuando la identidad grupal no es suficiente para restaurar el control de los miembros del grupo, es necesario ampliar los límites percibidos por el grupo, pudiendo recurrir a otras identidades existentes o emergentes compartidas por otros en una situación similar (Ellemers et al., 2002).

Como indica la Teoría de Control Basada en el Grupo, cuando se produce una pérdida de control personal se puede recurrir al grupo para restaurarlo (Fritsche 2013), pudiendo dar lugar, esta amenaza al control, a actitudes beneficiosas a nivel intergrupalo. Por ejemplo, en recientes estudios sobre las consecuencias de la crisis para el desempleo, se demuestra que las personas son capaces de buscar similitudes intergrupales y revelar

positividad hacia miembros de otros grupos que experimentan una situación similar (Bukowski et al., 2019). La existencia de identidades sociales amenazadas puede desembocar en el surgimiento de estrategias de cooperación entre grupos para conseguir metas comunes, porque el propio grupo ya no es suficiente para restaurar el control, debiendo cambiar el nivel de categorización. Estas colaboraciones pueden surgir entre grupos desaventajados con el objetivo de aumentar la agencia colectiva (p.ej., alianzas entre partidos políticos minoritarios como pueden ser Izquierda Unida y Podemos) o entre un grupo aventajado y un grupo desaventajado (p.ej., la coalición de Gobierno entre el Partido Socialista, mayoritario, y Unidas Podemos, minoritario, en la última legislatura).

Aunque si bien es cierto que el control basado en el grupo puede polarizar a los grupos que opten por esta estrategia de afrontamiento, provocando un aumento del etnocentrismo, prejuicios o culpabilización hacia grupos minoritarios (Bukowski et al., 2017; Butz & Yogeewaran, 2011), también podemos encontrar otros estudios que reflejan como ante una situación de crisis global como la pandemia por COVID-19, se incrementó la tendencia a involucrarse en movimientos sociales centrados en solventar problemas sociales, valores comunales y cooperación intergrupar (Del Fresno-Díaz et al. 2022; Lemay Jr. et al. 2021).

Teniendo en cuenta que los límites intergrupales son maleables dependiendo del contexto, el endogrupo puede modificar su estructura en función de los objetivos que quiera alcanzar y la posibilidad que tengan de alcanzarlo (Turner et al., 2019). Para un grupo, el cual no tiene posibilidades de alcanzar sus metas, sería positivo el establecimiento de alianzas y categorizarse en un nivel de identidad supraordenado que incluye al grupo interno y externo (recategorización en un grupo) (Giannakakis y Fritsche 2011).

Esta cooperación intergrupal puede verse como una forma efectiva para promover el cambio social. Si tomamos como ejemplo la situación nacional, España, se tuvo que enfrentar a dos elecciones generales infructuosas tras la destitución del presidente del Gobierno, Mariano Rajoy, para que se formase finalmente un Gobierno de coalición que permitiese sacar a España del bloqueo político y alcanzar los objetivos establecidos. En esta tesis analizamos situaciones en las cuales la identificación con el propio grupo no será suficiente para resolver la amenaza al control percibido, y por tanto el grupo tendrá que alterar los límites del mismo e incluir a nuevos grupos en él (*recategorización en otro grupo*) o cooperar con otros grupos que compartan valores para conseguir objetivos determinados (*coalición*) (Ver Fig.3).


En concreto, cuando se produce un proceso de *recategorización* en otro grupo, las categorías percibidas se alteran y los miembros de diferentes grupos se conciben como un grupo superior único, más inclusivo en lugar de ser dos grupos completamente separados compartiendo incluso identidad (Dovidio et al., 2009). Por su parte, un proceso de *coalición* puede ser interpretado como un medio instrumental para aumentar la agencia del endogrupo conduciendo a la cooperación con exogrupos para conseguir metas comunes, sin cambiar la identificación o las barreras de ninguno de los grupos (Flade et al., 2019).

Estos procesos de alianzas pueden ser percibidos de diferente forma dependiendo del punto de vista. Desde una perspectiva minoritaria, una alianza que implique recategorizarse en otro grupo puede sentirse amenazante (p.ej. Izquierda Unida recategorizándose en unas nuevas siglas como las de Podemos, generó desacuerdos en una minoría del electorado y entre sus militantes por tener que depender de otro grupo). Por otro lado, una *coalición* puede ayudar a proteger la identidad del grupo e impulsarse en esta colaboración para alcanzar metas comunes (p.ej. Unidas Podemos y su coalición

con el Partido Socialista para formar Gobierno, ambos grupos salieron beneficiados y dependen el uno del otro para alcanzar sus metas). (Ver Fig. 3).

Figura 3.

Representación de modelo de alianzas Coaliciones y Recategorizaciones



A modo de síntesis, en este capítulo hemos podido ver los fundamentos teóricos que sustentan nuestros objetivos, los cuales pretenden examinar los mecanismos de afrontamiento de la amenaza al control percibido, desde la perspectiva de la Teoría del Control Basada en el Grupo (Fritzsche et al., 2013), en un contexto sociopolítico.

CAPITULO II

OBJETIVOS Y PREGUNTAS DE INVESTIGACIÓN

Objetivos y preguntas de Investigación.

Los efectos generados por la amenaza al control personal es algo que ampliamente ha sido investigado a lo largo de la literatura (Skinner, 1996; Bukowski et al., 2016), así como los mecanismos de respuesta de la persona ante la amenaza al control, que le permita sobreponerse a las circunstancias amenazantes. Teorías como las de control compensatorio (Kay et al., 2008), o la teoría de Justificación del sistema (Jost et al., 2004) proporcionan respuestas a como una persona puede adaptarse a las condiciones existentes sin tener intención de modificarlas de ninguna forma. La teoría del control basada en el grupo propone que una forma adicional para la persona de restaurar el control cuando ésta no puede restaurarlo a través de sus propios medios *yo personal* (control primario), es mediante su *yo social* (un grupo relevante para la persona) como extensión de ese *yo personal* (control primario extendido) (Fritzsche et al., 2013; 2022).


Ante una situación de pérdida de control podemos ver diferentes formas de restauración del control a través del grupo, algunas de corte hostil como por ejemplo el incremento de comportamientos prejuiciosos (Butz, 2011; Becker et al. 2011) u otras de carácter más constructivo como la participación política a través de movimientos sociales, la emisión del voto electoral, o la identificación con exogrupos que se encuentren en situaciones de desigualdad parecidas a las del entorno del endogrupo (Bukowski et al., 2019).

El objetivo general de esta tesis es contribuir a este extenso campo de respuestas producidas ante la amenaza al control, a través de nuestros estudios y de acuerdo con los objetivos planteados podemos ver como cuando el control personal se ve amenazado en un contexto sociopolítico se pueden plantear al menos dos estrategias para volver a restaurarlo: 1) cambiar el voto y el apoyo hacia los partidos tradicionales especialmente cuando se ve también amenazada la agencia grupal; 2) o bien, buscar apoyos en grupos

externos a través de alianzas que permitan restaurar tanto el control personal como la agencia grupal (Ver Figura 4).

Figura 4.

Esquema General Tesis



Con la intención de abordar el objetivo general de esta Tesis Doctoral, es decir, examinar cómo afecta la amenaza al control percibido sobre las preferencias y la participación política, se propusieron diferentes preguntas de investigación que responden a una serie de objetivos específicos, éstas serán abordadas en los siguientes capítulos empíricos.

En el Capítulo 3, planteamos las siguientes preguntas (1) ¿Existe relación entre la percepción de control personal y el apoyo a partidos tradicionales? (2) ¿Se puede restaurar el control personal intentando provocar un cambio en el sistema político cuando el grupo se percibe como (poco) agéntico? (3) ¿Cómo influye la amenaza al control personal en el

apoyo a los partidos tradicionales cuando se enfatiza el cambio o la estabilidad? (4) ¿Existe una relación entre la estabilidad y el aumento del apoyo a los partidos tradicionales? Para dar respuesta a estas preguntas se llevaron a cabo cinco estudios experimentales con participantes de la población general ($N = 724$). Los estudios intentaron evocar (*mindset priming*) un contexto de amenaza (ya fuese amenaza económica o una situación general vivida), para comprobar si efectivamente la amenaza al control personal afecta al apoyo o la desaprobación de los partidos tradicionales. En el segundo estudio se manipuló también la eficacia política (Pinkleton et al., 1998) para comprobar si esta variable interfería sobre los efectos de la amenaza al control sobre el apoyo a los partidos políticos. En el tercer estudio, se manipuló el control personal y la agencia grupal en un contexto de punto muerto político donde no se conseguía formar gobierno. Nuestra primera hipótesis, de este tercer estudio, planteaba que ante una amenaza al control (imposibilidad de formar gobierno) apoyar a partidos tradicionales puede convertirse en la respuesta más agéntica. Alternativamente, un menor control podría llevar a un *menor* apoyo a los partidos tradicionales siempre y cuando el grupo sea percibido como agéntico. En el cuarto estudio, se volvió a analizar si la amenaza al control personal genera un menor apoyo a los partidos tradicionales en otro contexto cultural (Francia) en el cual el cambio social real era posible (se había producido ya un cambio en la tendencia de voto en las elecciones previas). Finalmente, el quinto estudio intentó replicar experimentalmente las condiciones bajo las que se llevaron a cabo los estudios 3 y 4, manipulando el control personal, manteniendo la agencia del grupo constantemente baja y manipulando el contexto (situación de cambio vs. estabilidad). Las hipótesis planteadas para este estudio fueron que la amenaza al control personal producirá un menor apoyo a los partidos tradicionales cuando la situación de cambio se enfatiza, mientras que

para nuestra segunda hipótesis planteamos que el apoyo a los partidos tradicionales será mayor cuando se destaca un contexto de estabilidad.

En el Capítulo 4 mostramos una serie de tres estudios que exploran el apoyo hacia diferentes alianzas políticas en función de la amenaza al control personal y sociopolítico y de la eficacia de las alianzas. Estos estudios están compuestos por participantes de población general ($N = 1217$), encontrándose toda la metodología e hipótesis preregistradas. El objetivo de este trabajo es aumentar el conocimiento sobre la teoría del control basada en el grupo, explorando nuevos mecanismos de restauración de control cuando la agencia grupal no es suficiente. Planteamos la colaboración con exogrupos, en forma de recategorización o coalición con el objetivo de conseguir metas comunes. También pretendemos diferenciar entre control personal y sociopolítico (Paulhus, 1983), mostrando que dependiendo de la esfera en la que se produzca esta amenaza, se pueden derivar respuestas diferentes. Con estos estudios pretendemos responder a la siguiente pregunta de investigación (5) ¿Cuál es el impacto de la falta de control sociopolítico y personal en la disposición a colaborar con exogrupos que comparten metas y objetivos comunes, y en la aceptación de colaboraciones entre partidos políticos en forma de coaliciones o fusiones (recategorización) entre partidos? Para dar respuesta a esto se plantearon 2 estudios correlacionales y 1 experimental. El primer estudio plantea cuatro hipótesis. La primera de ellas pronostica que el bajo control (personal y sociopolítico) llevará a la formación de coaliciones (cooperación entre dos formaciones políticas manteniendo sus propias identidades) (Hipótesis 1). Así mismo pensamos que esto también dará lugar a la unión de diferentes formaciones políticas bajo unas mismas siglas (recategorización) (Hipótesis 2). También se propuso una moderación de la orientación política en estos procesos, siendo aquellas personas que no tengan una ideología política definida (aquellas personas en el centro del espectro político) las que muestren un mayor

apoyo hacia una alianza de coalición (Hipótesis 3) y de recategorización (Hipótesis 4). En nuestro segundo estudio se plantearon cinco hipótesis. La primera de ellas predice que el bajo control sociopolítico aumentará el apoyo para una coalición política (Hipótesis 1) y esto se encontrará moderado por la eficacia percibida del grupo político (Hipótesis 2). Nuestra tercera hipótesis pronostica que un menor control sociopolítico aumentará el apoyo a una recategorización entre partidos (Hipótesis 3) encontrándose este efecto moderado por la eficacia percibida de la recategorización política (Hipótesis 4), por último se planteó la posibilidad de que la orientación política modere la relación entre el bajo control sociopolítico y las coaliciones de derechas (Hipótesis 5). El tercer estudio, de carácter experimental, plantea tres hipótesis. La primera hipótesis investiga si hay un efecto de la eficacia percibida de la alianza (manipulada experimentalmente) sobre el apoyo a las coaliciones, pronosticamos que una mayor eficacia percibida hará más probable el apoyo hacia coaliciones. Nuestra segunda hipótesis predice que el bajo control sociopolítico generará un mayor apoyo a las coaliciones de centro derecha. Finalmente, nuestra tercera hipótesis predice que el bajo control sociopolítico predecirá el apoyo a coaliciones de centro derecha siempre y cuando la eficacia percibida de la coalición sea alta.

Por lo tanto, la presente tesis doctoral está compuesta por un total de 5 capítulos, un capítulo teórico, un capítulo dedicado a los objetivos y el planteamiento general, dos capítulos empíricos y un capítulo final dedicado a la discusión general y las conclusiones de este trabajo. Los capítulos empíricos aquí incluidos son artículos científicos que poseen su propia introducción teórica y una discusión general; así que puede haber momentos que algunos argumentos expuestos en esta tesis se repitan. En el Capítulo 5 se abordará la discusión general, donde se hablará de los principales resultados obtenidos, sus implicaciones teóricas y prácticas, así como líneas futuras de investigación. Tras esto

se muestra un apartado con la bibliografía empleada en nuestro trabajo, además se incluirá un apartado de *anexos* donde se incluirá el material empleado en los capítulos empíricos. Finalmente, y tal y como dictan los canones para obtener la mención de doctorado internacional, se presentarán los capítulos teóricos y la discusión general en español, mientras que los capítulos empíricos y la conclusión final se presentará en inglés.

CAPÍTULOS EMPÍRICOS

EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS

CAPITULO III

Political Change as Group-Based Control: Threat to Personal Control Reduces the Support for Traditional Political Parties

Political Change as Group-Based Control: Threat to Personal Control Reduces the Support for Traditional Political Parties

Álvaro Rodríguez López^{1*}, Soledad de Lemus¹, Marcin Bukowski², Anna Potoczek^{2,3},
Immo Fritsche⁴

¹ University of Granada, Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC)

² Jagiellonian University, Department of Philosophy, Institute of Psychology

³ University of Warsaw, Interdisciplinary Centre for Mathematical and Computational
Modelling

⁴ Leipzig University, Wilhelm Wundt Institute for Psychology

Publicado en:

Rodríguez-López Á, de Lemus S, Bukowski M, Potoczek A, Fritsche I (2022) Political change as group-based control: Threat to personal control reduces the support for traditional political parties. PLoS ONE 17(12): e0278743.
<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0278743>

Abstract

People desire agentic representations of their personal and collective selves, such as their own nation. When national agency is put into question, this should increase their inclination to restore it, particularly when they simultaneously lack perceptions of *personal* control. In this article, we test this hypothesis of group-based control in the context of political elections occurring during socio-economic crises. We propose that people who are reminded of low (vs. high) personal control will have an increased tendency to reject traditional political parties that stand for the maintenance of a non-agentic political system. We experimentally manipulated the salience of low vs. high personal control in five studies and measured participants' intentions to support traditional and new political parties. Across four of five studies, in line with the predictions, low personal control reduced support for the main traditional conservative party (e.g., Partido Popular (PP) in Spain, the Republicans in France). These results appeared in contexts of national economic and/or political crisis, and were most pronounced when low (vs. high) national agency was made salient in Studies 4 and 5. The findings support the notion that rejecting the stability of the national political system can serve as a means to maintain a sense of control through the collective self.

Keywords: Personal control; Group Agency; Socio-Economic Crisis; Voting intentions.

Introduction

In the last decade, large sociopolitical changes have taken place worldwide. In political terms, the rise of right-wing and populist movements has been discussed as an effect of the 2008 economic crisis (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). This socio-economic crisis affected not only people's life conditions (e.g., unemployment, increased social and economic inequality, reduced income) but also evoked psychological threats to basic motives of control and predictability (Bukowski et al., 2017; Fritzsche & Jugert, 2017). Economic threat was shown to motivate psychological responses in order to maintain or restore a sense of control and to activate personal or collective attitudes and responses that are palliative (e.g., blaming, prejudice) or socially constructive (e.g., collective action toward social change) (Fritzsche et al., 2017). In this research, we focus on the psychological underpinnings of changes in support for traditional system-affirming parties as a function of people's low personal control. We argue that in the context of strong economic and social threats in the last decade in Europe, traditional parties that may have contributed to a lack of perceived agency at the national level could promote political distancing of voters, as a form of coping with threatened control.

Personal control has been defined as the extent to which a person can produce desired outcomes and prevent undesired ones (Skinner, 1996) and it is considered to be a basic human need (Fiske, 2018; White, 1959). When personal control is threatened, people are motivated to reestablish the belief that the world is controlled through their autonomous self (Fritzsche, 2022; Fritzsche et al., 2013). According to group-based control theory (Fritzsche, 2022), this applies to both representations of the self as an individual person (e.g., as "I") and definitions of the self as a collective agent (e.g., as "We"; *social identity*) (Reicher et al., 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Accordingly, people desire control, or agency, for their own self ("I") as well as for their self-defining ingroups ("We"). Also,

when people's sense of personal control is threatened they take efforts to restore their sense of control on the level of their social self by identifying with agentic ingroups (Stollberg et al., 2015) or engaging in group-based action in order to re-establish a sense of control through their (social) self (Stollberg et al., 2017).

Some situations can threaten this perception of personal and group-based control on a large scale. The 2008 economic crisis (Fritsche & Jugert, 2017), or recently the crisis generated as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (Mann et al., 2020) are good examples of threats to personal and collective control. Several studies have shown that the 2008 economic crisis had a great impact on well-being (Stuckler et al., 2009) and threatened people's sense of control (Fritsche et al., 2017). Such threats to control elicited control-restoring responses which might operate at the ingroup level (e.g., increased ingroup trust) or intergroup level (e.g., promoting collective actions for social change when economic threat is salient) (Fritsche et al., 2017). The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of low personal control on voting intentions in the context of an economic and social crisis. We assume that voting can function as a direct coping mechanism with lack of control experiences (Fritsche & Jugert, 2017; Stollberg et al., 2017). Recent research has shown that following general voting norms of the ingroup is an effective way to cope with lack of sociopolitical control (Potoczek et al., 2022). Extending this work, we focus on whether personal control threat can influence people's voting intention by reducing support for traditional parties. Specifically, we argue that rejecting the stability of the national political system, and thus indirectly supporting collective change, is a means to restore a sense of control through the collective self.

Coping with threats to control in a sociopolitical context

A socio-economic crisis can guide people to take different steps to restore personal control, from individual and self-contained measures to social strategies at the group

level, producing changes in people's social behaviors, values and attitudes (Fritzsche & Jugert, 2017; Stollberg et al., 2017). The 2008 economic crisis strongly hit Southern European countries such as Spain, Greece or Italy, provoking a massive increase in unemployment rates amongst the youth, and generally enlarging social and economic inequalities. Such economic threats fostered hostile interethnic attitudes but also increased ingroup trust, group efficacy and citizens' support for collective actions when national economic identity was salient in the context of the economic recession in Spain (Fritzsche et al., 2017). Moreover, lack of control triggered by the economic crisis also led to attributing blame to specific groups (e.g., bankers or political parties) in order to restore perceived control over the situation in the Spanish context (Bukowski et al., 2017). If established political parties are blamed for threatening people's control at the national level (e.g., through austerity policies), this should reduce people's support for them, particularly when they are highly motivated to engage in group-based control (Fritzsche et al., 2017).

Following a group-based account, we argue that threats to personal control in a national, political and economic context may encourage people to respond in a way that, in their opinion, re-establishes national agency (Fritzsche et al., 2017). For instance, Spanish people respond to subliminal cues that threaten their national identity, legitimizing the economic disadvantage by increasing their ingroup bias (van Breen et al., 2021). Group-based control research proposes, and has shown, two different collective responses to threatened personal control. First, people identify more strongly with salient social ingroups, especially when these are agentic (Stollberg et al., 2015). Second, they more strongly pursue salient ingroup norms (Stollberg et al., 2017; Potoczek et al., 2022) and ingroup goals (e.g., helping in the campaigns of a political ingroup) (Fritzsche et al., 2008). Importantly, such responses of ingroup support are assumed to be most

pronounced when the agency of a potentially agentic ingroup simultaneously seems to be at stake (Fritzsche et al., 2017; Fritzsche et al., 2013). Threat to personal control should motivate people to re-establish control of a potentially agentic ingroup. We propose that threats to control experienced in the context of a socio-political crisis might cause traditional, system-affirming parties to be rejected. These parties can be perceived as threatening collective agency, thus people with low personal control can be motivated to stop supporting them as a way to restore their control and group agency.

This prediction presumably contradicts the conservative shift hypothesis according to which different threats may promote support for conservative ideologies as an attempt to decrease fear and anxiety (Jost et al., 2003). Additionally, it opposes notions of the compensatory control model, which argues that when personal control is threatened, people try to preserve a sense of order by defending the legitimacy of different sociopolitical institutions (Kay et al., 2009). To integrate the theories of group-based control and compensatory control (Fritzsche, 2022; Stollberg et al., 2016), it has been proposed that group-based control represents people's primary response to threatened personal control. Only when collective routes to control seem futile do people resort to reducing uncertainty and, thus, rejecting change. According to group-based control theory, threats to personal control will provoke a motivated group-based shift (Stollberg et al., 2017; Barth et al., 2018) e.g., by acting as group members and supporting collective actions performed by a relevant ingroup (Fritzsche et al., 2011). The model implies that when social change represents ingroup norms or serves the establishment of collective agency, people will more strongly pursue change under conditions of threatened personal control (Stollberg et al., 2017).

In sum, in times of threat, people might not support any system or party per se, but choose those that stand for (restoring) national agency. This may go along with people

supporting parties that pursue change when this change promises to re-establish national agency, but rejecting parties that stand for preserving the status quo. When people perceive the current political system as non-agentic, striving for change might indicate an effort of group-based control. This might well be the case in countries that strongly suffered the consequences of the 2008 economic crisis and struggled to overcome them. In such socio-political contexts, several social movements emerged that demanded social change (e.g., los Indignados in Spain or Occupy Wall Street in the U.S.).

Beyond helping to restore national agency, identifying with, and supporting those movements might have intrinsic value for people who feel their control is threatened. This is because collectives who demand change might be perceived as being more agentic than collectives that just want to maintain the status quo. Demanding system change may mainly elicit internal causal attributions, suggesting goal-directed collective action can be an effective expression of collective agency. Instead, when groups demand system maintenance, this can also be attributed to many non-agentic causes, such as tradition, norm conformism, habits or even external pressures from international institutions (e.g., World Bank, EU). In line with this reasoning, Stollberg et al. (2017) found that threat to personal control increased people's conformity to salient ingroup norms when these were framed as a collectively shared demand for change but not when framed as a demand for stability. Applied to political decisions, this means that control threats experienced during global economic crises may foster people's striving for collective social change. We argue that such change can be achieved, for instance, by not supporting system-affirming parties. We test this prediction, that low personal control can promote social change, in the form of reduced support for traditional, system-affirming parties in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis in two European countries: Spain and France.

Overview of the Present Research

In the present article, we hypothesize that in the context of a general political crisis, people may reduce their support for system-affirming traditional parties when they are motivated to bolster their sense of control because personal control is threatened. We examine two factors that might moderate this effect, namely the perception of national agency and whether political and social change seem possible (e.g., reality constraints). We used the natural context of elections and political changes occurring in Spain (2015, 2016 and 2017) and France (2017), and also experimentally manipulated agency and stability in a hypothetical election scenario in the last study. Thus, we expect backlash against traditional parties to be a function of threat to personal control, mainly when national agency is threatened and when there are realistic chances for change to happen. By traditional parties, we refer to system-affirming parties that endorse more traditional values and also those whose speech is based on the defense of national and cultural traditionalism (Iglesias & Benitez; 2021) (e.g., Partido Popular in Spain and Les Republicains in France).

We hypothesized that reminding participants of low personal control, especially in the context of economic and political crises that reveal a low level of group agency in current political solutions, will decrease their support for traditional parties. To test this hypothesis, we carried out 5 studies. Studies 1-3 and 5 were conducted in Spain, whereas Study 4 was conducted in France.

The 2008 economic crisis had a strong impact on Spanish citizens, increasing unemployment, poverty and social inequalities (Hierro & Rico; 2019; Vázquez; 2019). Its effects led to high dissatisfaction with the government amongst Spaniards (Barometer of 2010). Discontent about the existing political system created space for new movements – e.g., in 2014 a new political party (Podemos) emerged and received 8% of the votes in

the European elections. One year later, it became the third political force in Spain. Study 1 was carried out in Spain in 2015 when, for the first time, new parties that appeared as a reaction to the political crisis ran in the regional elections, breaking down the bipartidism system. In Study 2, we tested our predictions before the general national Spanish elections of 2016. In order to check whether the effects depended on the perceived agency of the group, we manipulated collective agency and control orthogonally in Study 3. Although group-based control theory would predict that the effects of low control on supporting traditional parties should appear more clearly when agency is low, this should not be the case when change does not seem possible. The sociopolitical context in Spain at that time impeded actual change. The third study was conducted after the second round of Spanish general elections in October 2016 when the country was under a period of political impasse with no party being able to form a government. That was a reality constraining situation that may have led people to search for stability rather than change. For this reason, in Study 4, we tested our predictions in a context in which the possibility for political change was less constrained, in France after the 2017 presidential elections in which a new leader had arisen (e.g., Emmanuel Macron) to the detriment of the two established parties (Les Republicaines and Parti Socialiste). Finally, we experimentally tested whether the perceived efficacy of stability versus change strategies determined the impact of threats to control under low agency conditions in Study 5, in a hypothetical election scenario in Spain in 2017. This article is framed in a chronological way with the aim to examine how personal control and group agency influenced political changes as a function of the specific sociopolitical context that followed the 2008 crisis in two different European countries.

Study 1

We conducted Study 1 to examine whether threat to personal control affects attitudes towards and support for the different political parties in Andalusia, Spain, in 2015. We expected that in low control conditions, the main opposition traditional party and the main party in the government would receive relatively less support than in the high control conditions. At the time when the study was conducted, the socialist party in the government (PSOE) had been ruling for 37 years at the regional level. Thus, although this party does not represent traditionalism in terms of social values, it was representative of a well-established political system in the region. The main opposition party (PP, more traditional in values and economy) had never ruled in the region since democracy was established in Spain, but at that time it was the ruling party at the national level. Two new parties were running for the first time in these elections: Podemos (left wing) and Ciudadanos (liberal). As a consequence of reduced support for the system-affirming parties, we could expect to find increased relative support for the new parties under low control conditions.

Materials and methods

All the studies received approval from the institutional research ethics committee of the University of Granada and the Public Health Code of France. All participants gave informed written consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.

Participants and design

Spanish nationals (50 male, 106 female), aged $M = 27.14$ ($SD = 10.47$), completed the experiment online via Qualtrics. The sample was completed using a snowball procedure through different social networks. The study followed an experimental unifactorial design with 3 conditions: high control, low control, and a null condition

(where control was not manipulated). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions.

We excluded 10 participants who refused to fill in the manipulation task and those with missing values in the focal variables, which left us with a final sample of 146 participants. We conducted a sensitivity analysis using G*power (Faul et al., 2007). Results showed that with this sample size ($N = 146$), the minimum effect size that we can detect for $\alpha = .05$ and $1 - \beta = .80$ is $f = .26$ (minimum detectable effect).

Procedure

The study was introduced as a “questionnaire to learn about the personal experiences and opinions of different aspects of social life of Spanish citizens” and was administrated one week before the local elections that were held in March 2015 in Andalusia. First, participants completed the Need for Closure Scale (Webster y Kruglanski; 1994), which was not included in the analyses (see Appendix 2 in the supplementary materials), and then they completed the manipulation and answered the variables as described below.

Control Manipulation. Participants read a short report indicating experts’ opinion about the economic crisis, showing that it had a controllable (vs. not controllable) course and that its effects could be reduced (or not). Then, participants had to think about and write down 2 controllable (vs. non-controllable) effects of the economic crisis. This manipulation was previously used in other research that was performed in the context of the economic crisis in Spain (Bukowski et al., 2017) In the null condition, participants read a piece about sports (see Appendix 1 in the supplementary materials for all the condition details). Then, participants had to write down two examples of sports they practice in their daily life.

Measures

Perceived control. We asked participants to indicate on a 7-point scale (from 1 = Not at all, to 7 = Absolutely): *To what extent does the crisis cause you to lose control over your life? To what extent do you think you have control over the impact that the crisis has on your life? To what extent do you feel that you have control over your life at this moment?* Since the reliability of the 3 items of the scale was unacceptable ($\alpha = .33$), and the correlations between items were low (Items 1-3: ($r = -.360, p < 0.01$; Items 1-2: $r = .054, p = .507$; Items 2-3: $r = .201, p = .012$), we consider the items independently because they address different aspects of control.

System Justification. Participants rated their willingness to support the system using eight items on a 7-point-scale (from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Totally Agree; $\alpha = .68$), e.g., *In general, the Spanish political system works as it should.* (Kay & Jost, 2003)

Support for political parties. We measured support for parties with three items referring to the affective response towards the different political parties in Spain (*How close do you feel to the proposals of the following parties?*), their intention to vote for each party in the next elections (*What is the chance you would vote for each of the following parties in the next election?*), and their beliefs about the efficacy of each party to solve the economic situation if they were elected (*To what extent do you think that the management of each of the following parties, if it won the elections, would improve the socio-economic conditions in Spain?*). Participants gave their answers on a slider ranging from 0 to 100. We averaged across three items to create an index for each party ($\alpha = .93$ to .95).

Results

Perceived control

We did not find a significant effect of the control manipulation on items measuring perceived general control over life, all $F_s \leq 1.08$, ns.

System Justification

We obtained a significant effect of threat to personal control manipulation on system justification in the ANOVA, $F(2,146) = 3.40$, $p = .036$, $\eta^2 = .05$. Pairwise comparisons showed that in the high control ($M = 3.31$) condition participants support the system more than in the low control condition ($M = 2.93$) ($p = .030$; $d = .52$), while neither the low control ($p = .47$; $d = .26$) or the high control ($p = .44$; $d = .27$) were statistically different from the baseline condition ($M = 3.11$)

Support for the parties


We expected that low control conditions would decrease support for system-affirming parties. We found an effect of threat to personal control manipulation on support for the traditional opposition party, $F(2, 146) = 3.17$, $p = .045$, $\eta^2 = .04$. In line with our reasoning, pairwise comparisons show that participants supported the traditional party less in the low control condition ($M = 10.01$) compared to the high control condition ($M = 22.83$), $F(2, 146) = 3.17$, $p = .038$, $\eta^2 = .04$. Although means were in the expected direction, the comparison between the low control and the baseline condition ($M = 15.68$) was non-significant, ($p = .07$ $d = .26$). There were no significant univariate effects of control for any other party, all $F < 1.5$, ns. (See Figure 1).

Regarding the correlational analyses, both participants' perception that the crisis reduced their control ($r = -.26$, $p = .005$) and their perceived personal control ($r = .26$, p

$= .001$) were significantly related to support for the traditional party but there was no relation between the impact of the economic crisis on the lives of the participants ($r = .02$, $p = .78$). That is, the less personal control they felt, and the more they perceived that the crisis affected their feelings of control, the less they supported the traditional opposition party.

Figure 1.

Support for the different political parties by experimental conditions (Traditional Party: PP)



Discussion

The results of Study 1 partly confirm our hypothesis that participants in a low control condition will show less support for traditional parties. The main traditional opposition party was supported less by participants in the low control than in the high control condition. However, there was no significant difference between the low control and the null condition, so we cannot conclude that the effect is uniquely due to lack of control (and not to salient *high* control). Although the direction of the means was the same for the Socialist party that held the regional government at the time, this effect was not

significant. The fact that the framework of the economic crisis referred to the country might have shifted participants' attention toward the traditional party that was ruling at the national level. Low personal control reduced participants' intention to vote for and support the traditional party compared to high control. Although we could not show a reliable control threat effect when comparing it to the neutral control group (null condition), the direction of the former effect suggests that one way to restore control at the group level implies supporting change by *not* supporting the traditional party. The manipulation of personal control threat did not influence general feelings of control over one's life, but possibly activates the idea that the economic effects of the crisis were (un)controllable and triggers the search for causal attributions which could imply blaming the ruling parties, in line with previous studies using the same type of experimental manipulation². Interestingly, we also found that participants under low control decreased their support for system justification claims, showing that their general motivation to maintain the status quo was affected by the threat to their personal control. This is in line with group-based control theory, indicating that participants do not support the system as a tool to reduce uncertainty (as compensatory control theory would predict), rather they search for a way to strengthen their group agency (Fritsche & Jugert, 2017; Stollberg et al., 2016).

Study 2

The results of Study 1 suggest that in situations of threat to personal control, there is a decrease in support for the traditional party. We carried out a second study in order to corroborate our results. We expected that low control will predict less support for the traditional party that ruled in Spain at that time (Hypothesis 1). We also manipulated political efficacy to test whether the effects of control on support for the parties depended on perceived general political efficacy (Pinkleton et al., 1988).

Study 2 was carried out in the framework of the second Spanish general elections that were run in 2016. After a first round of elections, when no political party received sufficient support to form a government, and the elected parties were unwilling to reach a coalitional agreement, the elections had to be repeated after six months.

The Spanish electoral system implies that the representation of parliamentary seats does not correspond to the actual number of votes that each party receives, which favored the traditional parties against the new political parties in the previous round of elections (El Diario, 2016). We measured participants' support for a legislative change towards a proportional representation of the parties in the parliament based on actual votes. In line with our general hypothesis, we predicted that low control will increase support for such a legislative change (Hypothesis 2).

Materials and methods

Participants and design

Spanish nationals (28 male, 60 female), aged $M = 22.41$ ($SD = 3.88$), were randomly assigned to one of 4 experimental conditions, following a 2 control salience (high/low) x 2 political efficacy (high/low) design. However, the small sample size prevented us from conducting interaction analyses, therefore we focus on a unifactorial

design with control as a main predictor and controlling for the political efficacy manipulation as a covariate (the analyses with political efficacy as an orthogonal predictor can be found in the Appendix 2 in the supplementary materials). A sensitivity analysis for a one-way ANCOVA showed that with this sample size ($N = 88$), the minimum effect size that could be detected for $\alpha = .05$ and $1 - \beta = .80$ is $f = .30$ (minimum detectable effect). No exclusions were needed based on the same criteria as in Study 1.

Procedure

The study was carried out on the 15th of June 2016, 11 days before the elections. Participants were recruited from the campus libraries of one Spanish university. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. They received a similar questionnaire as in Study 1, with the differences outlined below.

Control Manipulation. This manipulation differed slightly from that used in Study 1. Participants read a statement about the impact of the economic crisis on people's lives (people are able to cope with and control the effects of the crisis in their lives / people are not able to cope with and control the effects of the crisis in their lives) (Bukowski et al., 2017), and were asked to write down two controllable or uncontrollable effects (high control vs. low control) that the economic crisis had on their life (see Appendix 1 in supplementary materials).

Measures

Perceived control. The same 3 items were used as in Study 1. Still, the reliability of the scale remained low ($\alpha = .54$) and the items were considered separately.

General Voting intentions. This scale evaluated the intentions of voting on a scale from 0 ("I would not vote again in the next elections") to 100 ("I am completely sure that I will vote in the following elections").

Support for the parties. The same 3 items as in Study 1 were used. The reliability was good for all the parties ($\alpha = .92$ to $.96$) except for the socialist party (main party in the opposition, $\alpha = .42$).

Support for a change in the voting system. Support for a change in the voting system was measured with two items: *To what extent do you agree with a reform of the Electoral System so that there is a greater possible proportionality between the number of votes and the number of parliamentary seats?/Would you agree with a single constituency model in which the actual percentage of votes was proportionally reflected in the number of seats?* Participants rated their willingness to change the electoral system on a 7-point-scale (ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = totally, $\alpha = .76$).

Results

We conducted a Univariate ANCOVA with Control (high vs. low) as a factor and Political Efficacy as a covariate on each of the dependent variables and a MANCOVA on the support for the different parties. Results did not differ if the covariate was excluded.

Perceived control.

As in Study 1, there was no effect of the control manipulation on the perceived general control items. All, $F_s < 1$, ns.


Support for the parties, general voting intention and support for a change of the voting system.

Before analyzing the different scales of support for the different political parties, we analyzed the general intention to vote in the next elections, and we did not find any effects of the manipulated variables, $F < 1$, ns. Regarding support for the specific parties, we expected to replicate the result of Study 1 such that low control would predict reduced

support for the traditional party (Hypothesis 1). We found a significant effect of threat to personal control on support for the traditional party, $F(1,87) = 4.65$, $p = .034$, $\eta^2 = .053$, and a similar, albeit non-significant trend for the main opposition party, $F(1,87) = 2.89$, $p = .093$, $\eta^2 = .034$. The governing traditional party was supported less in the low control conditions than in the high control one (Fig. 2). Lastly, we did not get significant results in the measure *change of the voting system*, $F < 1$, ns.

Figure 2.

Support for the different political parties by experimental control condition (Traditional Party PP)



Discussion

The results confirmed our first hypothesis, such that threats to personal control led to reduced support for the traditional party in comparison with a condition in which high control was primed, in line with the findings of Study 1. In sum, the results of this and the previous study tend to confirm our main hypothesis that threatened personal control can lead to changes in voting norms, reflected in decreased intentions to support for at

least one traditional party. Still, the effects are weak, could be partly explained to both high and low control conditions, and it is unclear whether the manipulation of control refers to perceived control at the personal or the collective level, because it referred to the global economic crisis. This might explain why we do not find significant effects on the manipulation checks of the first two studies, because we are manipulating control at the collective level (related to collective agency) but measure the effects at the personal level (related to the self which can trigger defensive mechanisms) (Jonas et al., 2014). In order to disentangle these two factors, in the next studies we manipulated them orthogonally. According to the group-based control model, ingroup support and defense should be most prominent when both personal and collective control seem at stake (Fritzsche et al., 2017; Fritzsche et al, 2013).

One limitation of the first two studies is that we did not assess the political orientation of the participants. Political orientation can strongly influence their support for the different parties and could partly account for the effects of control on our dependent variables. For this reason, we included this measure in the subsequent studies.

Finally, as in study 1 the manipulation of personal control threat did not influence general feelings of control over one's life, but it possibly activates the idea that the effects of the economic crisis were (un)controllable and urges persons to search for alternatives as explained in Study 1. We include a measure of feelings of control evoked by the specific situation in the next studies.

Study 3

Only an agentic group can help to restore control, therefore, threats to personal control could lead to reduced support for traditional parties but only when the ingroup is presented as non-agentic (Stollberg et al., 2015). However, when change is not probable, the opposite pattern might be expected. Thus, in the context of a political impasse, following the group traditional norm (e.g., supporting the system-affirming party) might be the most agentic response to threat to personal control (Hypothesis 1). Alternatively, when control is threatened, but the group is perceived as agentic, arguably there is more hope and scope for change and thus, participants might distance themselves from normative voting tendencies by supporting the traditional parties less (Hypothesis 2). Study 3 was conducted in October 2016. At that point in time, Spanish citizens had gone through two rounds of general elections in less than 6 months with no clear outcome that could lead to the formation of a legitimate government. Before the third round of elections, public opinion was clearly in favor of overcoming the blockage (Elimparcial.es, 2021) and the traditional party in the government was the only one that could reach the sufficient majority to overcome the impasse. Therefore, there was a reality constraint that impeded perceptions that actual change was possible. According to social identity theory, when there is little scope and hope for social change, people are more likely to accept the system as legitimate (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). We conceptualize the ingroup at the national level (Spanish people) as we are measuring the effects of personal control threats on voting intentions in the Spanish general elections.

Materials and methods

Participants and design

The study was carried out on a total sample of 143 Spanish nationals from the general population, 67 of whom were women and 76 men, with an average age of 32.28 ($SD = 15.02$). Following the same criteria of exclusions as in the previous studies, 4 participants who did not fill in the manipulation task or had missing values on the focal variables were excluded. This study followed a 2x2 between-group design (Control salience [high vs. low] x Group agency [high vs. low]). We conducted a sensitivity analysis using G*power (Faul et al., 2007). Results showed that with this sample size ($N = 141$), the minimum effect size that we can detect for an ANOVA 2 x 2 is $\alpha = .05$ and $1 - \beta = .80$ is $f = .22$ (minimum detectable effect). Data collection was carried out by means of an anonymous questionnaire distributed at a bus station and on campus, which helped us to obtain a more representative community sample (65 participants were students and the rest of the sample was formed by community members).

The collection period ran from 14 to 17 October 2016, when the main political parties in Spain were still negotiating in order to form a government and there was no certainty about whether the elections would have to be repeated a third time.

Procedure and measures

After signing the consent form, participants received the materials described below. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.

Political Orientation. We measured political orientation on a scale from 0 (extremely left-wing) to 100 (extremely right-wing).

Control manipulation. To make sure that the effects described in studies 1-2 are not just specific to the threat to personal control assessed in the context of the economic crisis, we used a manipulation task that relates to general aspects of personal control. Instead of mentioning economic recession, we asked participants to think of and describe one situation of their lives that they can (or cannot) control (Fritsche et al., 2013). We assigned participants to one of two conditions - high vs. low personal control.

Perceived control. We modified this measure to avoid referring to general feelings of control over one's life, and focused instead on the experience of control evoked by the specific situation. After completing the manipulation participants were asked to show on a 10-point scale (0 = none control, 10 = total control) how much they felt in control in that moment (*To what extent did the situation you described make you feel you had control over what was happening?*).

Group agency manipulation. We created two texts recreating a historical fact about the independence war between France and Spain at the beginning of the 19th century, in which we activated either low or high agency of the ingroup (Spanish). We used the definition of group agency in terms of group free consensus about common goals, the coordinated actions of the group towards those goals and the ability of the group to attain goals (Fritsche et al., 2011). In the low agency condition the inability of the Spanish people to prevent the coronation of a French king was emphasized, whereas in the high agency condition the effectiveness of the Spanish people to depose the illegitimate king was activated (see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Materials).

Perceived group agency. To check if the group agency manipulation worked properly, we asked "What degree of group agency of the Spanish people did the example you have been presented with describe?" Participants answered on a scale from 0 (Low group agency) to 10 (High group agency).

General voting intentions. As in Study 2, participants were asked to indicate how likely it was that they would take part in the next elections on a scale from 0 to 100.

Support for political parties. Participants were asked about their support for the four main parties included in the polls (two traditional parties and two new parties) with the same 3 items as in the previous studies on a scale from 0 to 100. The reliability for this index was between $\alpha = .85$ and $\alpha = .94$.

National identity. We used 3 items taken from Leach et al.'s (2008) identification centrality scale and one general item (Doosje et al., 1998). Participants answered on a seven-point scale (ranging from 1 – Totally disagree to 7 – Totally agree): *I identify with the Spanish as a group/I have strong ties with the Spaniards/In general, being Spanish is an important part of how I see myself/Being Spanish is important to me.* ($\alpha = .89$).

Group efficacy. In order to measure the efficacy of the Spaniards as a group, we used 3 items adapted from van Zomeren et al. (2008) on a 7-point scale (from 1 – Totally disagree to 7 – Totally agree). The items were as follows: *I think the united Spaniards can successfully defend their rights/I think the united Spaniards can successfully overcome their difficulties/I think the united Spaniards can improve their status in society* ($\alpha = .94$).

Results

Perceived control and group agency.

There was a significant main effect of the control manipulation on perceived control, $F(1,138) = 498.08$, $p < 0.01$, $\eta^2 = 0.79$. Participants in low control conditions perceived less control ($M = 1.47$) than participants in high control conditions ($M = 8.47$).

Finally, there was a significant effect of the agency manipulation on the agency manipulation check, $F(1,138) = 132.82, p < 0.01, \eta^2 = 0.49$. In the low agency condition, participants perceived less group agency ($M = 2.58$) than in the high agency condition ($M = 7.16$).

General voting intentions

There was no effect of threat to personal control manipulation on general voting intentions, $F(1,139) = 3.16, p = .074, \eta^2 = .02$. The pattern suggests that in low control conditions, the probability of participating again in the next elections tended to be higher ($M = 77.63$) than in high control conditions ($M = 66.80$). This effect was not moderated by agency, $F(1,139) = .78, p = .378, \eta^2 < .01$.


Support for political parties

In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2 x 2 MANCOVA including control and agency as independent variables and support for the different parties as dependent variables. We also included political orientation as a covariate. We expected to find that participants in low control conditions would show more support for traditional parties when group agency was low (H1) and reduce it when group agency was high (H2). The results of the analysis showed no multivariate significant effects, all $F_s \leq 1.93, ns$, all $p_s \geq .38$. Univariate analyses showed a significant interaction of control and agency on support for the traditional party in the government, $F(1,140) = 4.61, p = .034, \eta^2 = .03$. Planned comparisons indicated that when group agency was low, participants supported the system-affirming party more in the low control ($M = 28.87$) than in the high control condition ($M = 20.41, F(1,140) = 4.61, p = .034, \eta^2 = .033$). However, under conditions of high agency, support for the government tended to be lower in low control ($M = 19.38$) compared to high control conditions ($M = 24.57; F(1,140) = 3.58, p = .060, \eta^2 = .03$;

Figure 3). Results did not vary significantly when political orientation was not included as a covariate. Descriptive and correlations appear in Table 1. Further information about mean scores and standard deviations for support for the different political parties by experimental condition can be found in Table S1 in Appendix 2 in supplementary materials.

Figure 3.

Support for the different political parties by experimental conditions



Group efficacy and National identity

For the group efficacy variable, we obtained a significant effect of collective agency in a MANCOVA using political orientation as a covariate, $F = 7.75$, $p = .006$, $\eta^2 = .05$: Those who were made aware of low collective agency reported less group efficacy ($M = 5.36$) compared to those in the high collective agency condition ($M = 5.98$). Finally, the control variable and the interaction between personal control and agency did not report significant results, all $F_s \leq .99$, $ns.$, all $p_s \geq .05$, $ns.$

For the national identity variable, we did not obtain any significant results over agency, $F \leq .46, p \geq .21, ns.$, and for the control variable the results are also not significant, $F \leq .21, p \geq .46, ns$ which was also the case for the interaction between both variables. See Table 1 for descriptive and correlations.

Table 1.

Means, Standard deviations and correlations for Support for the Parties and National Identity.

<i>DV'S</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
1.Support for traditional party	23.28	29.37	-	-.06	-.46**	.60**	.41**
2. Support for main opposition party	30.40	24.72		-	.09	.12	.26**
3. Support for new liberal party	32.57	32.47			-	-.31**	-.34**
4. Support for new left-wing party	30.33	28.44				-	.36**
5. National Identity	4.54	1.62					-

Note. *indicates $p < .05$. ** indicates $p < .01$.

Discussion

The results showed that participants in the low control condition (vs. high control) supported the traditional party *more* when group agency was low. Thus, threats to personal control can lead to support for normative parties when group agency is low. This result is partly contradictory to our previous findings, although we had not manipulated collective agency previously. This pattern of results might be because, at the time the study was conducted, Spain faced a political impasse, which seemed to be leading to a deadlock when no government had been formed for over 7 months. To determine whether our hypotheses regarding the effect of threat to personal control on changes in normative voting patterns would be supported in a context in which change could actually take place, we conducted the next study in a different national context (France) in which political change could happen.

Study 4

We generally hypothesize that lack of control should influence support for traditional parties when group agency is low depending on whether change or stability are perceived as the most strategically agentic responses. Study 3 provided support for this prediction in the context of a political impasse, where following the ingroup norm through supporting the traditional party in the government was seen as the only way out. But do people with low personal control *reduce* their support for traditional parties in a context in which change is possible? In Study 4, we tested this hypothesis in France, just before the legislative elections and shortly after presidential elections in 2017. Until that date, the French Parliament was mainly composed of deputies from two parties: the ruling *Parti Socialiste* (left-wing), and the main opposition party – *Les Republicains* (right-

wing). However, the situation had utterly changed in 2017, when new parties (such as *En Marche* or *La France Insoumise*) and an old system-affirming party, previously rather unpopular (*Front National*), gained stronger support. Therefore, at the time the study was conducted, France was in the middle of a political change. The data were collected right after the presidential elections in which, for the first time, the candidates from the two traditional parties had failed to go to the second round of election. Therefore, the context of change was highly salient in the country at that moment. Because our main hypothesis referred to the effect of low control on support for traditional parties when group agency was perceived as *low*, we manipulated only control salience and kept agency constantly low between participants. We predicted that participants in the low control condition will be less likely to support the traditional parties compared to those in the high control condition.

Materials and methods

Participants and design

Participants were 82 French nationals with voting rights in French legislative elections, who took part in 2017. After excluding 7 participants who refused to fill out the manipulation task, the final sample consisted of 75 participants (53 Woman, $M = 30.21$, $SD = 11.45$). A sensitivity analysis showed that with this sample size, the minimum effect size that we can detect for $\alpha = .05$ and $1 - \beta = .80$ is $f = .33$ (minimum detectable effect). The study was conducted online and the data collection started two weeks before the elections (in May 2017). The study followed a one factorial design (high personal control vs. low personal control). It was conducted using SurveyMonkey and, as in Study 1, distributed via different social media platforms.

Procedure and measures

We administrated to participants the following materials:

Control manipulation. We used a similar manipulation as in Study 3 with the difference that participants had to think about and describe two aspects of their lives that they could (or could not) currently control instead of one situation⁹. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions – high vs. low personal control.

Perceived control. After completing the manipulation task, participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) how much they felt in control of their lives at that moment.

Low collective agency prime. In Study 4, we aimed to keep group agency on the same level among participants (low agency salient). All participants were presented with the description of a current political situation in France that triggered low collective agency. Specifically, they were reminded of the protests organized in France between March and September 2016 that mobilized hundreds of thousands of people to demonstrate against the new labor law reform presented by the government. However, despite the scale of the protest, the government had not given up on their project, which resulted in failure of one of the most important movements of this type in France in the 21st century. The original text used in the study is available in Appendix 1 in the supplementary materials.

Collective agency. To check whether we managed to keep the level of perceived ingroup agency constant between participants in two conditions (high vs. low personal control) we added 2 items from the collective agency scale developed by Stollberg et al. (2015). These items were “In general, the French have common goals they are able to

achieve” and “I think the French are able to achieve common goals”, $r = .29$, $p = .011$. Due to a relatively weak correlation, we analyzed items separately.

General voting intentions. Similar to the previous studies, participants were asked to indicate how likely it was that they would take part in the next legislative elections in France on a scale from 0 to 100.

Support for political parties. It was measured with the same 3 items as in previous studies. The alpha level for support for each of the parties was between $\alpha = 0.89$ and $\alpha = 0.93$.

Political orientation – votes in the previous elections. Participants’ political orientation was measured with a question asking who they voted for in a presidential election that took part in April 2017. We recoded participants’ answers to a scale from 1 to 8 where 1 stood for the most left-wing candidate and 8 stood for the most right-wing candidate (Each candidate chosen by participants was coded as follows: 1 – Philippe Poutou, 2 – Jean-Luc Mélenchon, 3 – Benoît Hamon, 4 – Emmanuel Macron, 5 – François Fillon, 6 – Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, 7 – Jacques Cheminade, 8 – Marine Le Pen. Answers of those participants who did not take part in the elections or who cast a blank vote were treated as missing values). We also asked participants to indicate who they voted for in the second round of the elections.

Other measures have also been used and can be consulted in appendix 2 in the supplementary materials.

Results

All dependent variables were analyzed using analysis of variance, including control factor as the main IV and controlling for political orientation as a covariate.

Perceived control

We found that participants in the low control condition felt less in control than participants in the high control condition ($M_1 = 3.82$, $M_2 = 4.61$, $F(1,73) = 6.00$, $p = .017$, $\eta^2 = .08$).

Perceived agency

We checked whether control manipulation influenced both items measuring perception of ingroup agency (agency of French people). As expected, there were no significant differences between low and high control participants for the first item ($M_1 = 3.86$, $M_2 = 3.74$, $F(1, 63) = 0.10$, $p = .758$, $\eta^2 < .01$), or for the second item ($M_1 = 4.29$, $M_2 = 4.26$, $F(1, 63) = 0.03$, $p = .865$, $\eta^2 < .01$). Therefore, we kept it constant among participants. The mean of these two items ($M = 4.10$) was not statistically different from the midpoint of the scale (4), $t(74) = 0.73$, $p = 0.470$.


Support for political parties

To test our hypothesis that threat to personal control decreases support for the system-affirming parties, we used a MANCOVA with control as the independent variable and support for the parties as dependent variables. We found that threat to personal control decreased support for the traditional party (Les Republicains) that served as the opposition party ($M_1 = 18.48$, $M_2 = 27.53$, $F(1, 63) = 4.19$, $p = .045$, $\eta^2 = 0.06$; Fig 4) in comparison with high control. Control manipulation did not affect support for any other party, all $p > .12$. Results without political orientation as a covariate show the same

pattern, although the interaction became non-significant, $F(1,75) = 2.06$, $p = .156$ $\eta^2 = .294$.

Figure 4.

Impact of control manipulation on support towards different parties (Traditional party: Les Republicains)



Measures such as General Voting Intentions, Control Restoration Scale and other results like interaction of control manipulation and perceived efficacy of French people on voting intentions in legislative elections and mean scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the main dependent variables by experimental condition can be consulted in Appendix 2 in the supplementary materials.

Discussion

We conducted Study 4 at a time when France was in the middle of a major political change; namely it was carried out in the same month as, for the first time in years, a candidate from a new party different from two traditional ones (Emmanuel Macron,

leader of *En Marche!*) became the President of the country. Our aim was to test whether, in this change context, the threat to personal control may decrease support for traditional parties. Indeed, we found that in the low control condition, participants were less likely to support the traditional party than those in the high control condition. These results support our hypothesis, although we cannot exclude the possibility that they might be partly driven by high control condition. Contrary to Study 3, which was conducted in Spain when change was seen as improbable, setting a reality constraint for our hypothesized effect of threat to personal control on support for traditional parties, in this study change was perceived as a real possibility, hence even when low group agency was activated across conditions, a change in voting intentions and support towards one of the traditional parties was observed as a function of threat to personal control.

Study 5

Studies 3 and 4 provided opposing evidence about the impact of threat to personal control on support for traditional parties when group agency is low in two different contexts in which stability or change could be seen as the most agentic responses to deal with threat to personal control at the time the studies were conducted. As previously explained, this incongruence might be due to the situational factors that created a reality constraint in Spain, where change was improbable (a stability strategy was preferred), versus a highly changing political situation in France (political change was a real possibility). In order to provide empirical support for this situational explanation, in Study 5 we experimentally manipulated stability versus change under low agency conditions. We tested the effect of threat to personal control on support for the parties when group agency was constantly low and stability versus change were primed as the best (e.g., most efficient) political strategies in times of crises. Based on the findings of Study 4 we

hypothesized that threat to personal control would produce reduced support for traditional parties when change is emphasized (Hypothesis 1), and also based on the findings of Study 3 we hypothesized that support for traditional parties would be increased when stability is primed (Hypothesis 2).

Materials and methods

Participants and design

The study was carried out with a total sample of 255 Spanish nationals, 164 of which were women and 91 men with an average age of 24.49 years ($SD = 9.04$). 47 participants had to be excluded according to the same exclusion criteria as in the previous studies, because they did not answer the manipulation task or had missing values on the focal variables. We conducted a sensitivity analysis using G*power (Faul et al., 2007).

Results showed that with this sample size ($N = 255$), the minimum effect size that we can detect for $\alpha = .05$ and $1 - \beta = .80$ is $f = .40$ (minimum detectable effect).

The data collection was conducted using an anonymous paper-based questionnaire at a bus station (community sample). The collection period occurred between 13 and 30 June 2017. The political situation in Spain at that time was that a government was formed by the traditional party after two failed elections.

Procedure

At the beginning we measured the political orientation of participants, and then asked them to imagine and write down two situations in which they had experienced full control or lack of it (depending on the experimental condition). Afterwards, they read a brief text emphasizing the need for stability vs. change to overcome the crisis. Thus, we randomly assigned participants to one of the four experimental conditions.

Control Manipulation. We used the same manipulation task as in Study 3, in which participants had to think of and describe one situation in their lives that they could (or could not) control.

Measures

The materials were presented in the following order.

Political Orientation. We measured political orientation on a scale from 0 (extremely left-wing) to 100 (extremely right-wing).

Perceived control. We measured perceived control with the same item as in Study 3.

Low agency priming. We used the same text as in Study 3 to activate low group agency. Note that in this study agency was not manipulated, but it was held constantly low across conditions.

Perceived group agency. We measured perceived group agency with the same item as in Study 3.

Political strategy manipulation (Change vs. Stability). We created two scenarios presenting experts' perspective regarding what is best for a country to maintain (vs. change) government in the case of a crisis (see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Materials).

Political strategy manipulation check. Here we asked participants: *To what extent do experts consider that a change of government would be positive for Spain?* This scale ranged from 0 to 10, where 0 stood for "Not positive" and 10 for "Very positive". This question was created to test if our manipulation worked as expected.

General voting intentions. As in the previous studies, we asked participants how likely it was that they would take part in the next legislative elections if there was another round of legislative elections in Spain on a scale from 0 to 100.

Support for the parties. The same three items as in the previous studies measuring closeness, voting intentions, and perceived efficacy of each party were used. The reliability for this index was between $\alpha = .90$ and $\alpha = .95$.

National identity. We used the same scale as in Study 3 ($\alpha = .91$).

Group efficacy. As in study 3 & 4 we used the same items ($\alpha = .91$).

Results

Perceived control and perceived political strategy

A 2 x 2 MANOVA was carried out for perceived control, agency, and political strategy as dependent variables. There was a significant effect of the control manipulation on perceived control, $F(1,205) = 676.9$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .77$, such that in the situation of low control, the participants perceived themselves as having felt less control in that situation ($M = 1.59$) than in the situation of high control ($M = 8.04$). There was also a significant main effect of the political strategy manipulation on the corresponding manipulation check, $F(1,206) = 50.76$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .20$. We can observe that when stability is emphasized there is less support for accepting political change ($M = 5.70$). However, when change is primed there is higher support for accepting political change ($M = 7.94$).

Voting intention and support for the parties

First, we carried out a 2 x 2 ANOVA on voting intention. The main effect of stability versus change manipulation was not significant, $F_s < 1$, ns. There were no

significant effects of control or interaction on this variable, $F_s < 1$, ns. Descriptive statistics and correlations appear on Table 2.

Table 2.

Mean, Standard deviations and correlations for support to the Parties and National identity.

<i>DV'S</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
1.Support for traditional party	26,37	30.80	-	-.089	.54**	-.44**	.42**
2. Support for main opposition party	28,99	24.63		-	.16*	.14*	.03
3. Support for new liberal party	32,97	27.96			-	-.41**	.41**
4. Support for new left wing party	29,41	32.96				-	-.39**
5. National Identity	4,56	1.78					-


Note. * $p < .05$., ** $p < .01$.

We conducted a 2 x 2 MANCOVA to test the main hypotheses of this study, using the manipulation of control (high vs. low) and the best strategy of acting (change vs. stability) as fixed factors, political orientation as a covariate and support for the different parties as dependent variables. There were no significant multivariate effects, all $p_s > .05$.

The analysis of univariate effects showed a main effect of threat to personal control on support for the traditional party in the government, $F(1, 204) = 5.66, p = .018, \eta^2 = .028$, indicating that participants in the low control conditions supported the system-affirming party less ($M = 23.38$) than in high control ones ($M = 30.18$). This effect was not significantly moderated by political strategy (stability vs. change), $F(1, 204) = .615, p = .434, \eta^2 < .01$. However, the planned comparisons showed that the effect was only significant for the condition in which change was promoted as the best political strategy (Fig5), $F(1, 204) = 5.06, p = .026, \eta^2 = .025$, whereas no significant effect of threat to personal control appeared in the stability condition, $F(1, 204) = 1.26, p = .263, \eta^2 < .01$ (see table S5 in Appendix 2 in supplementary materials). Results did not vary significantly if political orientation was not included as a covariate.

Figure 5.

Support for the different political parties by experimental conditions (traditional party: PP)




National identity and group efficacy

We also found a significant interaction of political strategy (change vs. stability) and participants' level of national identification using political orientation as a covariate, $F(1, 204) = 4.93, p = .027, \eta^2 = .02$. Pairwise comparisons showed that in the low control conditions there was a significant effect of political strategy on national identification (Fig 6), $F(1,204) = 4.81, p = .029, \eta^2 = .02$; those who perceived low control and when stability was primed as the best political strategy felt more strongly identified with their national ingroup ($M = 4.97$) than when change was primed as the best political strategy ($M = 4.33$). There was no effect of strategy priming in the high control conditions, $F(1,204) < 1, p = .330, \eta^2 < .01$. The interaction effect became non-significant if political orientation was not included as a covariate, $F(1,206) = 3.81, p = .052, \eta^2 = .01$, but the pattern of results was the same, and paired comparisons remained significant, $F(1, 206) = 4.83, p = .029, \eta^2 = .023$.

Considering the group efficacy variable, we did not find any significant results, $F \leq 3.12, ns, p > .05, ns$ (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and correlations).

Figure 6.

Effects of control and change vs. stability conditions on national identification



Discussion

Overall, in Study 5, threat to personal control led to reduced support for the traditional party in comparison to a high control condition. This replicates the findings of Studies 1, 2, and 4. As in previous studies, we need to be cautious when interpreting this finding exclusively according to our predictions, as priming high control could have partly contributed to the effects. Regarding the role of stability versus change, the results are not conclusive, although the *a priori* planned comparisons are in line with our predictions that the effect should occur primarily when change is emphasized. Still, the condition in which the traditional party received the least support was the one in which personal control was threatened and change was seen as the most effective coping strategy, which is in line with the findings of Study 4 in France, where political change had already taken place.

Of interest, low control led to higher ingroup identification when stability was primed as the best political option. This result is consistent with the group-based control restoration literature that has found increased ingroup identification under conditions of threat to personal control, particularly when the group was perceived as agentic (Stollberg et al., 2015), or stable (Proudfoot & Kay; 2018). Specifically, in the stability condition of the present study, participants were likely to infer that the current shape of the national ingroup promises collective agency.

Correlational analyses showed that national identification is positively correlated with voting intentions and support for the traditional party and negatively correlated with the new left-wing party that challenges the system. It is possible that, in the stability condition, threat to personal control leads to increased national identification and higher support for traditional parties. These effects could explain the findings of Study 3 in which

threat to personal control and group agency led to the highest support for the traditional party when change was not seen as possible.

General Discussion

Across four out of five experimental studies, we showed preliminary evidence that loss of personal control can evoke a willingness to change non-agentic political systems of the ingroup. When the context of an economic or political crisis was salient, people whose sense of personal control was threatened were less likely to support traditional parties that represented the old system (Bukowski et al., 2017). Such results, supporting our hypotheses, occurred in Studies 1, 2, 4 and 5. Although we did not find an effect of the threat to control manipulation on general feelings of control over life in our first two studies, one might still argue that such a manipulation triggers feelings of low controllability of the economic effects of the crisis in line with previous research (Bukowski et al., 2017). In Study 3 we found the *strongest* support for the traditional party when both personal control and group agency were low. This result is the only one that aligns with compensatory control theory (Kay et al., 2009), and system justification theory suggesting that people might accept the system as legitimate, or promoting a conservative shift when they perceive the group as unable to carry out social change (Stollberg et al., 2016). This was the case in Spain in the context of a political impasse, in which Study 3 was conducted (after two rounds of political elections in 6 months and the failure of political parties to form a functional government). On the contrary, when change was highly salient and possible (Study 4), after a presidential change in France; Study 5, experimentally manipulated in Spain), and collective agency was low, threats to personal control decreased support for the traditional party. Thus, our hypothesis about reduced support for traditional parties when control is threatened was conditionally confirmed in our studies, but only when political change was possible or pictured as the

most efficient solution. This supports an integrated model of group-based and compensatory control (Fritzsche, 2022; Stollberg et al., 2016). People respond to threatened personal control with group-based control restoration (“extended primary control”; (Fritzsche, 2022)) as long as a relevant in-group is cognitively available that people consider potentially agentic or for which establishing group agency seems possible. If such a group is not available in a given situation, people are expected to turn to establishing order and structure in their environment (“secondary control”) through affirming existing social systems, as predicted by compensatory control theory (Kay et al., 2008). For people, this reduction of uncertainty may lay the ground for restoring personal control at a later point in time.

Threat to personal control and perceived group agency lead to a change in support for the parties

There are different “routes” to restore threatened personal control: personal strategies and collective coping strategies (Stollberg et al., 2016). One way to restore control is to change the environment in which people live and voting entails the most efficient way to achieve such a change in democratic societies (Landau et al., 2015; Shockley & Fardosi; 2015). In this research, we focused on voting behavior as a restorative tool that allows a person to maintain their own sense of control via her or his collective self (Fritzsche et al., 2017; Stollberg et al., 2017). The specific socio-political context determines whether support for maintaining a stable system or changing it is perceived as a more agentic form of coping with personal control threats. It also sets up the limits of controllability, that is, imposed reality constraints often make change impossible (Spears et al., 2001). This is consistent with social identity theory, which predicts that social change is unlikely to occur when stability is emphasized (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and with system justification theory, which claims that individual or group

threats will lead to validating the establishment (Jost et al., 2004; Osborne et al., 2019). However, when the situation is perceived as unstable or illegitimate, actions towards social change will emerge (Tajfel & Turner; 1979). In such unstable conditions, when normative behaviour no longer serves its function to protect the ingroup, individuals might react by distancing themselves from the norm or by searching for alternatives (Jimenez-Moya et al., 2017). Our research findings suggest under what type of conditions threatened personal and collective control can lead to support for political change. Two factors seem to be crucial to determine such boundary conditions – agency of the political party and the functionality of the coping strategies of focusing either on change or stability (including a possible scope for change). Further research should focus more on those contextual factors that might play an important role in understanding when threats to personal control lead to support for traditional vs. new political parties.

The present results can contribute to better understanding how and why personal and collective control threats interact. Previous research on group-based control has repeatedly found that people engage in group-based action most vigorously when lacking personal control and threat to collective agency are salient at the same time (Fritsche et al., 2017; Fritsche et al., 2013). We found evidence of this pattern in two of our studies (Studies 4 and 5). However, we also identified a crucial boundary condition of this effect in Study 3, suggesting that this pattern does not occur when there is a situation of political impasse. That is, people only seem to search for change in response to a lack of personal control when collective agency is low if the current situation allows for the restoration of collective control (Studies 4 and 5) and their specific group-based actions are appropriate means to restore collective agency (Study 5). Future studies should test this in different and more controlled settings.

The results suggest that pursuing collective change might be a viable means of group-based control. In fact, groups (e.g., nations) that pursue change might signal that they are acting due to intrinsic and distinct collective goals, which should stress their agency. Also, this indicates that following threat to personal control, at least some people under certain circumstances do not necessarily become more conservative as proposed in the literature on conservative shift and compensatory control (Jost et al., 2003; Landau et al., 2015). Instead, our research opens the possibility that some people may prefer collective efforts of control restoration over reducing uncertainty seeking for structure (Stollberg et al., 2017). This is consistent with prior research which shows higher social connectedness (Bukowski et al., 2019) and prosocial intentions (Alonso-Ferres et al., 2020) under situations of economic threat due to the 2008 economic recession.

Limitations and Future Research

We are aware of some limitations of this research. First, our studies were not preregistered, which renders our predictions exploratory. Further, most of the sample sizes are small and therefore the statistical power was often insufficient to detect significant effects. The conditions under which the studies were run and the limited time to recruit the samples before the elections constrained the sample sizes. Finally, we only included a baseline condition in the first study, thus we cannot exclude the possibility that our effects may be partly driven by the increase in control in the high control condition. Nevertheless, the pattern of results replicates across 4 out of 5 studies and is consistent with our main hypothesis, supporting our conclusions.

Also, in the first two studies, the manipulation of control did not have a significant effect on items that measured personal control. This is probably due to the manipulation being context specific (related to the consequences of the economic crisis), whereas the items we applied measured a more general sense of personal control. Thus, it was not an

adequate manipulation check measure. Previous literature suggests that when people's sense of personal control is threatened, they attempt to compensate for this threat by expressing higher feelings of control as a defense mechanism (Jonas et al., 2014). Thus, proximal defense reactions to personal control threat often lead to a denial of threat. This also seemed to be the case in the first two studies reported here, in which personal control threat related to the economic crisis did not impact broader perceptions of control. In the following studies (3 to 5), however, control was not manipulated in the specific context of the crisis and the items measuring momentary feelings of personal control were properly adjusted to the type of manipulation used, resulting in a more viable manipulation check.

We also acknowledge that our samples are primarily female and young people, who have been identified as common actors of social change in the literature. Thus, our findings cannot be generalized to other samples without further evidence (Ho & Dougherty, 2015).

Conclusions

Our research shows that threat to personal control affects support for political parties. In four out of five studies, we observed that low control led to lower support for system-affirming parties when national agency was at stake because of economical and societal crises. This occurred in different political contexts (regional and national elections and in two different countries), and especially when change was perceived as both possible and effective. However, when low control was accompanied by a sense of low group agency and stability in the sociopolitical context was perceived as the best political strategy, system-affirming parties were *supported*. These findings bolster the notion that rejecting the stability of the national political system, and thus indirectly supporting collective change, can be considered as a means to maintain a sense of control

through the collective self. This might be an adaptive response to overcome societal crises.

CAPITULO IV

**United we stand... Coping with lack of control through
political alliances: The role of group efficacy**

**United we stand.... Coping with lack of control through political alliances: The
role of group efficacy**

Álvaro Rodríguez López^{1*}, Soledad de Lemus¹, Marcin Bukowski²

¹ University of Granada, Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Center (CIMCYC)

² Jagiellonian University, Department of Philosophy, Institute of Psychology

Abstract

Personal control is a basic psychological need which can be affected when the society faces high degrees of unpredictability, evoked for example by socio-economic or political crises. In three studies, two correlational and one experimental, we analyze whether low control (personal or sociopolitical) increases support for political alliances and whether it depends on the perceived effectiveness of the specific type of alliance. Our results show that low sociopolitical control enhances the support of certain political alliances (right-wing coalitions). We also found that low sociopolitical control predict support for alliances based on right and center parties when this parties are perceived as effective. However, when center-right coalition's efficacy is experimentally manipulated, its effect overwrites the impact of sociopolitical control. These results highlight the importance of considering both more stable dispositional tendencies to perceive one's control over the political reality, in parallel with situational experiences of group efficacy to understand people's support for different political alliances.

Keywords: Political Alliances, Sphere of Control, Vote, Coalitions.

United we stand.... Coping with lack of control through political alliances: The role of group efficacy

Different crises - political, social and economic - affect people's sense of control over the environment. In such moments of social crises, people who experience low personal control often aim to restore it (Greenaway et al., 2017; Fritzsche et al., 2011; Bukowski et al., 2017). In order to decrease these feelings of uncontrollability, one can carry out a series of compensatory actions such as making attributions to powerful external agents (God or the government) (Landau et al., 2015), relying on conspiracy theories (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015), or blaming certain ethnic minorities or disadvantaged groups for the instability experienced by the population (Becker et al., 2011; Bukowski et al., 2016). However, people can also directly engage in more constructive forms of coping, such as increasing the sense of identity with political parties (Greenaway, 2022), or modifying their support for certain political parties, for example, by reducing support for traditional parties (Rodríguez et al., 2022). These forms of control restoration take place when a person acts as a member of a group or supports a given group (Fritzsche et al., 2011; 2013). The group-based control model assumes that when people feel that their personal control is threatened, they can turn to an ingroup that is powerful and act on behalf of the group. By doing so, they experience collective efficacy that can help them to regain lost personal control (Fritzsche, 2022). For example, a person whose personal control is threatened may choose to support (or disapprove of) political groups in search of greater collective agency (Rodríguez-López et al., 2022), or support the establishment of political alliances with other groups to increase group effectiveness or collective efficacy (Thomas et al., 2019). But what happens if the ingroup is not

perceived as effective or agentic? People might start supporting new political alliances that show a potential for efficacious action and change.

Socio-political consequences of lacking control

Perceived control has been conceptualized as a heterogeneous construct (Skinner, 1996). Paulhus and Christie (1981) proposed in their Spheres of Control model, three different ways to conceptualize control: interpersonal, personal, and sociopolitical. We will focus on the distinction between these last two spheres of control – personal and sociopolitical – since they are relevant from the perspective of the group-based control model. Firstly, personal control is defined as the experience of control that a person can feel over their achievements and own actions. On the other hand, sociopolitical control is defined as the experience of control over the political and social system, which can predict, for example, participation in voting or demonstrations against local politics (Paulhus and Christie, 1981). This distinction between personal control and sociopolitical control is necessary when the objectives established to restore control irremediably clash with the social and political system (Paulhus, 1983). A person may perceive that they have relatively high degree of control over their personal goals, but relatively little control over what happens in their sociopolitical context (Paulhus and Christie, 1981). Previous research has shown that when crisis management policies are not effective in solving social problems, this causes high levels of uncertainty, which can directly affect personal control, sociopolitical control or both. This lack of control can influence the political decisions of the population. For example, a context of high socio-political instability, such as the economic crisis of 2008, can negatively affect personal control leading to less support for traditional parties, thus benefiting new political parties and new forms of political participation. This tendency increases when the group to which one belongs does not show the ability to achieve proposed goals (Rodríguez-López et al., 2022). In addition,

the specific environment in which a lack of control is experienced can determine what types of responses will be used to face a threat. For example, people who think that they do not have control over social or political problems may carry out actions that try to recover sociopolitical control through voting, relying on the ingroup and the norms that it manifests (Potoczek et al., 2021). Also, engaging in political groups can help people to feel more in control in the course of their own lives (Greenaway, 2022).

The effects of threat to personal and sociopolitical control can have both negative and positive social consequences, depending on how people cope with these threats. Some actions derived from the lack or absence of personal control can lead to xenophobic attitudes (Fritsche et al., 2013). Also, a lack of sociopolitical control is related to support for authoritarian leaders who promise solutions to problems, and provide a false sense of security for those most threatened (Torres-Vega et al., 2021). But threat to perceived control can also result in the promotion of constructive attitudes and behaviors that serve the interests of the ingroup. For example, threatened control can trigger higher identification with a social group that makes it possible to achieve common goals and therefore restore lost personal control (Fritsche, 2022). Also, if there is evidence that high levels of collective efficacy exist, threatened control can increase personal intentions to engage in pro-environmental behaviors and restore a sense of personal efficacy (Jugert et al., 2016).

Support for political alliances as a response to lack of control

Identification with agentic groups can generate feelings of empowerment and control (Fritsche et al., 2011). People strive for a positive identity, with this need being expressed through favorable comparisons between relevant ingroups versus relevant outgroups (Giannakakis & Fritsche et al., 2011), but on certain occasions this identification with the group is not enough to restore a loss of control. When the ingroup

is not efficient, it might be necessary to expand the perceived limits of the ingroup, either by merging with other existing groups (recategorization as one group), or by forming an alliance between different group members that share similar goals and support the same cause (coalition between different groups) (Potoczek et al., 2023).

In a political context, alliances are produced with the objective of achieving consensus between different political parties, in order to promote specific policies or even to form a government. In the case of Europe, the formation of political alliances is common since it generates greater efficiency when it comes to obtaining a parliamentary majority if no party has reached 50% of the votes. When one's own resources and those of the in-group are not effective in achieving personal or group goals, collaboration with other groups can provide an opportunity to achieve common goals in an effective manner that could not be achieved in an individual manner or by the in-group alone.

Alliance processes can be classified differently depending on the purpose of the alliance itself. On the one hand, a political coalition involves the collaboration of two political forces in similar situations that join forces to achieve political goals (getting to parliament, for example, or even governing a country). This type of union would not mean loss of political values or the loss of identity of the party itself (e.g., traditional left party and a coalition with newer radical-left parties in order to form a government). In this process, the outgroup is perceived as merely an instrumental resource that will serve to increase ingroup agency, leading to a specific cooperation to achieve common goals without implying a change of identity on the part of the group (Flade et al., 2019). On the other hand, a different form of political alliance is recategorization as one group, with both groups merging under a single acronym, potentially losing the distinctiveness of their initial identities along the way, but gaining a sense of unity and cohesion.

Efficacy of political alliances

In the context of social or political crises, perceived group efficacy can generate proactive social behaviors to restore control. Group or collective efficacy can refer to people's shared beliefs in the ability of the members of their own group to produce desired effects through collective action (Bandura, 1995, 1997). Translated to the political sphere, it is the ability of a person to influence the government and its policies (Craig and Maggiotto, 1982). Also, the importance that this variable (collective efficacy) in political groups and political change has also been pointed out by other authors (Johnston and Baer, 1993). Participating in politics can generate a feeling of self-competence and control over one's environment, also making the person more participatory in future electoral processes and political events (Finkel, 1985). As Lee (2006) revealed in his article, there are reasons to believe that collective efficacy is an important variable that needs to be taken into account in times of political change. Additionally, this author suggests that collective efficacy can constitute an independent dimension of political efficacy that has been defined as the ability to influence the political process (Abramson, 1983). This is precisely in line with what we suggest in this article, actions in political processes will be dependent on the perceived effectiveness of the group.

Group efficacy plays an important role in group performance (Bandura, 1993). The shared belief of the group's ability to generate the expected results can be a turning point in producing results through collective actions, supporting coalition governments, tolerating pacts between different political formations and even supporting these changes at the polls (Thomas et al., 2019). We propose that perceived collective efficacy of such different forms of political actions is an important variable that needs to be taken into account when considering the relation between perceived lack of control and involvement

in agentic actions (Fritsche et al., 2018). In our research, we ask whether group efficacy can play a moderating role in the relationship between a threat to control and support for different political alliances.

Overview of the present investigation

In our present work we intended to examine how low personal and sociopolitical control influence support for collaboration between different political groups to form a government. Also, we assessed the moderating role of the perceived efficacy of these groups in the relationship between control and support of the different political coalitions. To do this, we tested our hypotheses in the political context of Spain, which served as a good example of a coalitional government. In three studies (two correlational and one experimental) we intended to verify the role of personal and sociopolitical control and group efficacy in supporting the establishment of political alliances. The three studies were developed in different contexts. The first was carried out in a real-world context, just before the 2019 general elections in Spain, from which no party emerged with an absolute majority, leaving the door open to a possible coalitional government. The political party that obtained the most votes was the traditional party of the left (PSOE) obtaining 28% of the votes, followed by the traditional party of the right (PP) that obtained 20.81% of them. Therefore, the alternative parties were key in forming a government. The other two studies aimed to replicate the results obtained in the first study, and at the same time solve some limitations imposed by the Spanish political reality. Thus, we created and applied an imaginary context, in which the elections had already taken place and the government had already been established with the alliance between two parties, which made fictitious reference to the parties that in our country represent the traditional right and the center (PP and Ciudadanos). The choice of these two political parties is due to the fact that, as we have seen in previous studies, the

perceived efficacy of the center-right coalition affects their support depending on the sociopolitical control perceived at the correlational level. In the 3rd study, we intend to replicate this effect by experimentally manipulating group efficacy of the alliance between the two potential allies among the two main right-wing parties (PP and Ciudadanos).

Study 1

This study was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework (<https://osf.io/zb4cj>) and has the approval of the committee of the University of Granada. Our first hypothesis was that low control (at both the personal and sociopolitical level) will lead to support for coalition formation (Hypothesis 1), and will also promote the formation of different political alliances (i.e., recategorization; Hypothesis 2) we do not have any predictions for specific alliances, because we assumed that low control will enhance all forms of political cooperation (recategorization or coalition). In an exploratory way we also proposed that these effects could be moderated by the political orientation of the participants. That is, we predicted that those who feel close to moderate parties that do not have a clear political position, for example, centrist parties, will show greater support for coalitions (Hypothesis 3) or recategorization of political formations (Hypothesis 4). Also, in an exploratory form the moderating role of group efficacy was examined.

Method

Participants & Design

This study was carried out with a general population of Spanish nationality (146 men, 368 women and 3 participants who did not want to specify their gender), with a

mean age of 22.68 years. ($SD = 4.37$), who completed the study online through Qualtrics. Based on previous studies we performed the power analysis based on the *pwr* package for R (developed by Stéphane Champely based on Cohen, 1988) where we found that for a power of .80, we needed a sample of $n = 400$ based on post hoc analysis from previous studies (Rodríguez-López, et al., 2022). We recruited 517 participants but after excluding those who did not respond to the focal variables, we kept 456 participants. The distribution of the sample was predominantly left-wing ($M = 26.54$; $SD = 23.27$ on a scale of 0 to 100). This is a sample that exercises their right to vote since 84.7% reported having participated in the previous elections. (PP: 2.2%; PSOE: 24.9%; Unidas Podemos: 37.1%; Ciudadanos: 11.6%; VOX: 1.3%; Blank Vote: 2.6%; Did not vote: 14.8%; Not specified: 5.5%) (See Fig. 1 in Supplementary Materials, Appendix 2).

The study followed a correlational design between two predictor variables, personal and sociopolitical control, and as criterion variables we analyzed support for different coalitions or possible recategorizations between parties. The sample was completed through different social networks and a mailing list from the University of Granada.

Procedure and Materials

The study was presented to the participants as a "questionnaire to find out more about the experiences and options on different aspects of social life" and was passed before the general elections in Spain on November 10, 2019, the second held this year. Participants completed the following scales in the order presented.

Spheres of control (Paulhus & Christie, 1981). The participants rated on a 7-point scale their degree of agreement with a series of items that referred to personal and sociopolitical control (From 1= Totally disagree to 7= Totally agree). It was divided

into two subscales of 10 items each, with the first referring to personal control (e.g., *When I get what I want it is because I have worked hard for it*; $\alpha = .61$) and the second referring to political control (e.g., *In the long run, voters are responsible for bad government at both the national and local levels*; $\alpha = .70$).

Perceived importance of the coalition. Four items were created on a 10-point scale (from 1 = *Not at all important/Effective* to 10 = *Very important/Effective*) about the importance of forming a government coalition and its effectiveness (*To what extent do you consider it important to form a government coalition? coalition government? To what extent do you consider it important that the parties abstain so as not to block the formation of a government? To what extent do you think that a coalition government would increase the chances that Spain will achieve its goals? do you think that a coalition government would be effective to govern*) ($\alpha = .79$).

Support of different government coalitions. The participants answered 5 items where they were asked about different possible coalitions of parliamentary political parties (Unidas Podemos with PSOE, PSOE with Ciudadanos, PP with Ciudadanos, PSOE with PP and finally PP with Ciudadanos and with VOX) that could take place in Spain (*To what extent would you agree with the formation of a coalition government between the following parties. Being 0 - I do not agree and 100 - I totally agree*).

Coalition effectiveness. For each possible coalition, 4 items were included, which refer to the similarity of the parties proposed in each coalition (*How similar do you think these political parties are?*), identification with each proposed coalition (*To what extent would you identify with the coalition?*), if the parties share common goals (*To what extent do you think these parties have common goals?*), and finally the possibility of achieving their goals through the coalition (to what extent do you think

these parties together could achieve their goals effectively) ($\alpha = .83$; $\alpha = .81$; $\alpha = .50$; $\alpha = .81$; $\alpha = .71$) on a 10-point scale (from 1 = *Not at all similar/Not at all/Do not have common goals/ Could achieve nothing* at 10 = *Very similar/A lot/They have many common goals/Totally*).

Political recategorization as one group. One item was created, on a 10-point scale, which made reference to support for the creation of left or right political recategorizations for future elections (*To what extent would you agree that for future elections a new political category of left/right ideology that encompasses all parties of this orientation under a single candidacy*)

Electoral participation and importance of the vote. 2-item scale from 0 to 100 intended to assess the probability and importance of voting in upcoming elections $r = .61$

Political identification. The identification of participants with the 5 main political parties (Unidas Podemos, PSOE, Ciudadanos, PP and VOX) in Spain was measured (*To what extent do you feel identified with the proposals of the following parties?* 100 being the maximum identification and 0 no identification).

Political orientation. On a spectrum from 0 to 100, the study participants classified their political orientation, with 0 being a left-wing ideology and 100 a right-wing ideology.

Past electoral participation. Using 2 independent items, participation in past elections was measured using a dichotomous question (*Did you vote in the previous elections?*) and the electoral selection that was made of certain political parties (*Please, below, we would appreciate it if you indicated the party you voted for in the last elections*).

National identity. Four items of 7 points from the Leach et al (2008) centrality scale were used (e.g., *I have strong ties with the Spanish/ In general, being Spanish is an important part of my personal image*) ($\alpha = .90$).

Group effectiveness. 3 items of 7 points from an adaptation of the van Zomeren et al. (2008) scale were used. (*I think that united Spaniards can improve their status in society/ I think that united Spaniards can successfully defend their rights/ I think that united Spaniards can successfully overcome their difficulties*) ($\alpha = .92$).

Results

First, a series of correlational analyses were carried out between our principal variables (See Table 1).

A weak positive correlation was observed between personal and sociopolitical control ($r = .111, p = .018$). However, these two factors were related differently to the other variables. Personal control was positively related to overall coalition importance ($r = .112, p = .016$), while sociopolitical control was negatively related to this variable ($r = -.176, p < .001$). In addition, sociopolitical control was positively related to the coalition between Unidas Podemos and PSOE ($r = .187, p < .001$), while it negatively related to the rest of the coalitions that included the PP: the coalition between PP and Ciudadanos ($r = -.180, p < .001$), the coalition between PSOE and PP ($r = -.123, p = .008$), the coalition between PP, Ciudadanos and VOX ($r = -.192, p < .001$), and with the recategorization of right-wing parties ($r = -.176, p < .001$).

Table 1.*Correlations of the main study variables.*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Personal Control	--	.111**	-.040	.091	.050	.045	.018	-.032	-.002	.112*
2. Sociopolitical Control		--	.178***	-.091	-.180***	-.123***	-.192***	-.176***	.025	.093*
3. Coalition Unidas Podemos-PSOE			--	-.105*	-.449***	-.183***	-.464***	-.162***	.254***	.287***
4. Coalition PSOE-Ciudadanos				--	.475***	.535***	.114*	.157***	-.055	.191***
5. Coalition PP-Ciudadanos					--	.485***	.624***	.275***	-.153***	-.015
6. Coalition PSOE-PP						--	.234***	.212***	-.028	.042
7. Coalition PP-Ciudadanos-VOX							--	.269***	-.104*	-.113**
8. Recategorization Right-Wing parties								--	.274***	.026
9. Recategorization Left-Wing parties									--	.063
10. Perceived importance of the coalition										--
<i>M</i>	4.89	4.18	65.7	32.8	23.5	18.8	10.41	2.72	4.86	7.06
<i>SD</i>	.065	.081	34	28.7	28.7	24.28	23.30	2.9	3.38	1.66

Note. * $p < .04$ ** $p < .02$ *** $p < .001$

Effects of control and group efficacy on the different types of alliances

To test our first and second hypotheses, a series of linear regressions on the outcome variable of support for the different coalitions and recategorizations was carried out, introducing personal control, sociopolitical control, and group efficacy as predictor variables. As we can see in Table 1 sociopolitical control is related to greater support for the left-wing coalition and less support for coalitions that include right-wing parties, while the effect of efficacy produces the opposite effect: the greater the group efficacy, the less support for the left-wing coalition and the more support for the right-wing coalitions.

We can also observe that our predictor variables do not produce significant effects on recategorization of parties with a left-wing ideology. On the other hand, sociopolitical control negatively predicted support for a recategorization of all the right-wing parties. Additionally, perceived group efficacy positively predicted the support for this type of recategorization.

Table 2.

Multiple Linear Regressions Using Personal Control, Sociopolitical Control, and Group Efficacy to Predict Support for Different Coalitions and Recategorizations.

COALITIONS						
Model 1						
DV	M (SD)	IV	M (SD)	β	SE B	t
Unidas Podemos+PSOE	65.77 (34)	Personal Control	4.89 (0.65)	-1.83	-0.35	-0.74
		Sociopolitical Control	4.18 (0.81)	8.58	0.20	4.44**
		Group Efficacy	5.36 (1.49)	-2.81	-0.12	-2.62**
PSOE+Ciudadanos	32.88 (29)	Personal Control	4.89 (0.65)	2.90	0.66	1.38
		Sociopolitical Control	4.18 (0.81)	-4.16	-0.12	-2.54*
		Group Efficacy	5.36 (1.49)	3.30	0.17	3.63**
PP+Ciudadanos	23.55 (28.74)	Personal Control	4.89 (0.65)	0.89	0.02	0.44
		Sociopolitical Control	4.18 (0.81)	-7.41	-0.21	-4.63**
		Group Efficacy	5.36 (1.49)	4.48	0.23	5.05**
PP+PSOE	18.88 (24.28)	Personal Control	4.89 (0.65)	0.77	0.21	0.44
		Sociopolitical Control	4.18 (0.81)	-4.35	-0.15	-3.15**
		Group Efficacy	5.36 (1.49)	2.90	0.18	3.78**
PP+Ciudadanos+VOX	10.41 (23.31)	Personal Control	4.89 (0.65)	0.49	0.01	0.29
		Sociopolitical Control	4.18 (0.81)	-5.96	-0.21	-4.51**
		Group Efficacy	5.36 (1.49)	1.91	0.12	2.60*
RECATEGORIZATIONS						
Model 1						
Left-Winger ideologies	4.86 (3.38)	Personal Control	4.89 (0.65)	0	-0.02	-0.01
		Sociopolitical Control	4.18 (0.81)	0.03	0.11	0.57
		Group Efficacy	5.36 (1.49)	0.02	-0.45	-0.40
Right-Winger ideologies	2.72 (2.97)	Personal Control	4.89 (0.65)	-0.03	-0.16	-0.72
		Sociopolitical Control	4.18 (0.81)	-0.18	-0.67	-3.95
		Group Efficacy	5.36 (1.49)	0.10	0.20	2.13

Note. ** significant at $p \leq 0.01$; * significant at $p \leq 0.05$


Non-significant effects of moderation by political orientation were found for the rest of the political coalitions (including left-wing coalitions).

Political orientation as a moderator of the relationship between sociopolitical control and support for various coalitions and recategorizations

In order to test Hypothesis 3, different moderation analyses were carried out with the PROCESS macro package for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; Model 1, bootstrapping, 10,000 repetitions and 95% *CI*). In the first analysis, political orientation appears as a moderator between the effects of sociopolitical control on support for the right-wing ideology coalition (PP, Ciudadanos and Vox), $b = -0.26$, $SE = .05$, 95% *CI* [-0.36, -0.17]. In this model we can observe that when the political orientation is of the centrist ideology, an effect of sociopolitical control is observed on the probability of support for a coalition of parties of right-wing ideology ($b = -10.1$ $t(455) = -5.5$, $p \leq .001$). In such a way that when their control feels low, they are more supportive of the formation of the right-wing coalition (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1.


Moderation of political orientation on the effect of sociopolitical control towards support for a coalition of parties of right-wing ideology



As we can see in Figure 2, significant effects are also found for the coalition between the classic leftist party (PSOE) and the new center political party (Ciudadanos), $b = 0.26$, $SE = .07$, 95% $CI [0.13, 0.40]$. When the political orientation is a centrist ideology, an effect of sociopolitical control is observed on support for this coalition (PSOE and Ciudadanos), in such a way that when they perceive greater sociopolitical control they will be more supportive of this possible coalition between a centrist party and a left-wing party ($b = 8.3$, $t(454) = 3.11$, $p = .002$).

Figure 2.

Moderation of political orientation on the effect of sociopolitical control towards support for a coalition of left-wing ideology parties PSOE-Ciudadanos.




In order to test Hypothesis 4, two moderation analyses were performed with the PROCESS macro package for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; Model 1, bootstrapping, 10,000 repetitions and 95% *CI*). In both our first analysis and the second, political orientation was used as a moderator. In a first step, political orientation was used as a moderator between sociopolitical control and support for recategorization in another group of left-wing parties, finding no significant effect for this interaction ($p = .880$), nor for the interaction with the recategorization in another group of parties with right-wing ideology ($p = .909$).

Perceived efficacy as a moderator of the relation between sociopolitical control and support for coalitions

As an exploratory analysis using the PROCESS macro moderation model for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; Model 1, bootstrapping, 10,000 replicates and 95% *CI*), we tested whether the perceived efficacy of each political coalition serves as a moderator between perceived sociopolitical control and support for the coalitions. In this case, we obtained a significant result on the coalition between the center-right parties (PP and Ciudadanos), $b = -1.88$, $SE = .06$, 95% *CI* [-3.07, -0.7]. As we can see in Figure 3, a greater perceived efficacy of the coalition will elicit greater support for the coalition when sociopolitical control is perceived to be low ($b = -1.88$, $t(454) = -3.13$, $p = .002$).

Figure.3.

Moderation Perceived effectiveness of the coalition on the effect of Sociopolitical Control towards the support of the same coalition (PP and Ciudadanos)



Discussion

We found support for our first two hypotheses, that is, low sociopolitical control was related to support for coalitions. Additionally, this effect occurred specifically in those coalitions that include right-wing parties, but not those that include left-wing parties. We also observed significant effects of low sociopolitical control on the support for merged political parties (recategorization as one group), but only for parties with a right-wing ideology. Therefore, we can partially confirm our first two hypotheses, meaning that the alliances that contain a party with a right-wing ideology are those favored by low sociopolitical control. However, no effects of low personal control were

found on these variables. Additionally, we must highlight that we found that high sociopolitical control produces greater support for coalitions of leftist parties. This could be explained by the fact that the sample was generally more left-leaning, thus those who felt they had control over sociopolitical factors were more inclined to trust that a left-wing coalition could effectively form a government.

In relation to our third hypothesis, we only obtained a significant effect for the moderation of political orientation on the direct effect between sociopolitical control and support for the coalition that encompasses the 3 right-wing parties (PP-Ciudadanos and VOX). For those who have a centrist ideology, this may be due to the circumstances that produce low sociopolitical control and a threat of the economic crisis, which may activate a need to support authoritarian ideologies that make decisions for the individual, especially for those who do not have a strongly defined political ideology (Torres-Vega et al., 2022). However, this effect does not translate into greater support for recategorization of the right-wing into a single party. Therefore, the results seem to suggest that it is an instrumental support for this type of coalition to achieve certain political objectives (i.e., to form a functional government at that point in time), rather than considering these parties could eventually merge into one.

In line with this argument based on the instrumentality of the coalition, we found that the efficacy attributed to the center-right coalition moderated the effect of sociopolitical control on support for this coalition. The results showed that participants who feel that they do not have the capacity to influence the sociopolitical sphere will support a center-right coalition more as long as they perceive it to be an effective means to achieve group objectives. However, this effect occurs for the center-right coalition that does not include the extreme right. It is very likely that the natural context in which the study was carried out influenced the responses of the participants. Therefore, in

subsequent studies and with the intention of moving away from the Spanish political context, which could influence the results, we will try to replicate these results in an imaginary context.

In addition, the results obtained regarding the perceived effectiveness of the coalitions indicate the importance of investigating the role of this variable. We believe that the perceived effectiveness of political alliances can lead to support for new forms of politics that in turn allow the perceived control of the individual and the group to be restored in a different way, not through an individual self but rather via a collective self (Fritsche, 2022).

Study 2

This study was carried out in an imaginary context to avoid the effects of real expectations related to the different political options in Spain on support for political alliances in general. Our hypotheses for this study were the following: low sociopolitical control (Paulhus and Christie, 1981) will increase support for coalition formation between political parties (Hypothesis 1); perceived effectiveness of each coalition will moderate this effect (Hypothesis 2); low sociopolitical control will increase support for cross-party recategorization (Hypothesis 3); the perceived efficacy of recategorization will moderate this effect (Hypothesis 4); and, finally, political orientation will moderate the effects of low sociopolitical control in right-wing coalitions (Hypothesis 5).

Both our hypotheses and the method are pre-registered in the Open Science Framework and can be consulted at the following link: <https://osf.io/qe9hy>

Method

Participants & Design

The participants completed the study online through the Qualtrics survey platform. The sample was completed using social networks and the institutional dissemination channel of the University of Granada. Those participants who did not correctly complete the main predictor variable and the dependent variables were excluded. We also took into account those who failed our attention control items, although this last variable was not pre-registered, excluding a total of 94 participants.

Following previous studies, we performed the power analysis based on the pwr package for R (developed by Stéphane Champely based on Cohen, 1988), where we found that for a power of .80 we need a sample of $n=240$ based on post-hoc analyses from previous studies (Rodríguez-López, et al., 2022). Thus, we recruited 312 participants but after exclusions we kept only 218 participants (53 men, 164 women, and 1 gender non-binary) with an age of $M = 21.37$ ($SD = 4.47$). The sample was predominantly left-wing (political orientation: $M = 34.80$; $SD = 25.64$).

Procedure & Materials

The study was presented as a “questionnaire to find out personal experiences and opinions on different aspects of daily life and various socioeconomic issues of Spanish citizens” and was administered from January to May 2021. First, the participants completed the Spheres of Control scale (Paulhus, 1981), after which the participants had to read a fictitious situation where an imaginary society (Satellité) was presented that was very similar to the Spanish context, both in terms of its political parties and its socioeconomic situation. Finally, the participants were told that elections would be called soon in this society and they were given the opportunity to read the electoral proposals

(based on real proposals from the main political parties in Spain), then answering the rest of the variables in the questionnaire. It should be noted that the political parties were renamed with a new figurative name to avoid comparisons with reality, the equivalences appear on Table 3.

Table 3.

Equivalence of fictitious political parties with reality

Fictional Political Party	Original Political Party	Ideology
Oval	Unidas Podemos	Extreme left
Rectangle	PSOE	Left
Diamond	Ciudadanos	Center
Triangle	PP	Right
Cross	VOX	Extreme Right

The measures used in this study appeared in the following order:

Spheres of Control. Same measure as in the previous study, using the personal control scale ($\alpha = .66$) and the sociopolitical control scale ($\alpha = .68$).

Political Spectrum. Participants had to rank politically from left to right (including the center) the imaginary political parties created for this study. This served as a check that they had understood the study, although it was not pre-registered as a reason for exclusion.

Political Identification. Identification with imaginary parties was measured on a scale from 0 to 100.

Support of different government coalitions. The same measure was used as in Study 1.

Political Agency. 3 items were used on an 11-point scale referring to the similarity of the imaginary parties included in specific coalitions “How similar do you think these political parties are?” (from 0 = could not achieve anything to 10 = Totally), common goals “To what extent do you think these parties have common goals?” (from 0 = have no common goals to 10 = they have many goals in common) and finally the effectiveness in achieving their goals “To what extent do you think these parties together could achieve their goals effectively?” (from 0 = they did not achieve anything to 10 = Totally). This scale was based on the definition of agency by Brewer et al. 2004.

Perceived Efficacy of Coalitions. 1 item on an 11-point scale “To what extent do you think these parties together could achieve their goals effectively?” (from 0 = they did not achieve anything to 10 = Totally).

Political recategorization as one group. Four independent items were created, on a 10-point scale, which referred to the predilection for the creation of a new political category of different ideologies (*To what extent would you agree that for future elections a new political category be created so that these parties are included as one?*), including four recategorizations: the left-wing parties, the right-wing parties, and two categories including the center party united with the left-wing parties or the right-wing ones.

Effectiveness of Recategorization. An item was created, measured on a 10-point scale, where participants were asked: *To what extent do you think this new grouping could effectively achieve its goals?*

Importance and probability of voting. Two items were created, measured from 0 to 100, with 100 being “very important” and 0 “not at all important” (From 0 to 100, as

a citizen of Satellite, how important would it be for you to vote in the elections? 100 being "Very important" and 0 "Not at all important") and being 100 "I am sure I will vote" and 0 "I will not vote in the elections" (From 0 to 100, as a citizen of Satellite, what is the probability that you will vote in these elections? Being 100 "Very Likely" and 0 "Not Likely").

Political Orientation. The participants scored from 0 (Left) to 100 (Right) their political orientation.

Results

To begin with, as in the previous study we carried out correlational analyses (Table 4).

Table 4.*Correlations of the main study variables.*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Personal Control	--	.244***	.053	.081	-.110	-.127	.030	-.123	-.005	.005
2. Sociopolitical Control		--	.195**	-.096	-.159*	-.107	.155*	.006	-.060	-.121
3. Coalition Extreme Left + Left Party			--	.165*	-.125	-.183**	.464***	-.200**	.090	-.334***
4. Coalition Left Party + Center Party				--	.490***	.238***	.110	.075	.391***	.072
5. Coalition Right Party + Center Party					--	.676***	-.030	.349***	.204**	.368***
6. Coalition Right party + Center party + Extreme Right party						--	-.083	.505***	.090	.603***
7. Recategorization Extreme Left party + Left Party							--	.026	.422***	-.076
8. Recategorization Right party + Extreme Right party								--	.056	.703***
9. Recategorization, Extreme Left party + Left party+ Center party									--	.094
10. Recategorization Right Party + Center party + Center party										--
<i>M</i>	4,98	3,95	59	46,26	41,03	29,01	6,27	3,76	5,03	3,66
<i>SD</i>	0,68	0,85	30,25	26,78	27,37	28,93	3,16	2,80	2,78	2,65

Note. * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Specifically, the direct correlation between our two predictor variables (Personal Control and Sociopolitical Control) was positive ($r = .244, p \leq 0.01$). However, the only predictor variable that correlated with our outcome variables was sociopolitical control. We observed statistically significant positive correlations between sociopolitical control and the left-wing coalition between the traditional party (Rectangle Party) and the more progressive left-wing party (Oval Party) ($r = .195; p < .001$). We also found a significant correlation between the more moderate right-wing coalition where the classic right-wing party (Triangle Party) appears and the center party (Rombo Party), with this being negative ($r = -.159; p < .001$).

Support for Coalitions

In order to test our first hypothesis, four multiple linear regressions were performed using personal control and sociopolitical control as predictor variables, to test if these variables have an effect on support for coalitions.

As we can see in Table 5, sociopolitical control is positively related to greater support for the left-wing coalition and negatively related to the support for coalitions that include the classical right wing party and the center party, which means that the higher the level of sociopolitical control, the more people are willing to support these forms of coalitions based on left-wing alliances. Additionally, we found that sociopolitical control is negatively related to support for right-wing coalitions (Table 5), indicating that low sociopolitical control predicted higher support for these coalitions based on right and center party alliances. These results replicate those obtained in Study 1.

Table 5.

Multiple Linear Regressions using Personal Control and Sociopolitical Control to Predict Support for Different Coalitions.

			Model 1		
DV	M (SD)	IV	β	SE B	t
Extreme Left + Left** R ² = .038	59.03 (30.25)	Personal Control	.246	.006	.081
		Sociopolitical Control	6.85	.193	2.81**
Left+ Center R ² = .038	46.26 (26.78)	Personal Control	4.31	2.70	.111
		Sociopolitical Control	-3.87	-.123	-1.78
Right + Center R ² = .031	41.03 (27.37)	Personal Control	-2.99	-0.75	1.09
		Sociopolitical Control	-4.53	-.141	-2.04**
Right + Center + Extreme Right R ² = .022	29.02 (28.94)	Personal Control	-4,51	-.107	-1.55
		Sociopolitical Control	-2.76	-.081	-1,17


Note. ** significant at $p \leq 0,0$; * significant at $p \leq 0,05$

Perceived efficacy of coalitions as a moderator of sociopolitical control and support for coalitions

For our second hypothesis, a moderation analysis was carried out using the SPSS Process macro package (Hayes, 2013; Model 1, bootstrapping, 10,000 repetitions and 95% CI). As we can see in Figure 5, there is a significant effect of the moderating variable on the effects of sociopolitical control on support for the right-wing coalition that refers to the Right and Center Party, $b = -1.81$, $SE = .77$, 95% $CI [-3.32, -0.29]$. Thus, we can say that a greater perceived effectiveness of the coalition will cause greater support for this coalition, when sociopolitical control is threatened ($t(215) = -3.69$, $p < .001$ $b = -9.94$).

Figure 4.

Moderation of the effectiveness of the coalition on the support for the coalition of Diamond Party and Triangle Party



Recategorizations with other political groups

To test our third hypothesis, four multiple linear regressions were performed using personal and sociopolitical control as independent variables. First, high sociopolitical control predicted the support to recategorization of the leftist parties. The rest of the results for the other recategorizations were non-significant (see Table 6).

Table 6.

Multiple Linear Regressions using Personal Control and Sociopolitical Control to Predict Support for Different Recategorizations

RECATEGORIZATIONS			Model 1		
DV	M (SD)	IV	β	SE B	t
Extreme Left Party + Left Party** R ² = .024	6.27 (3.16)	Personal Control	-.008	-.037	-.116
		Sociopolitical Control	.157	.584	2.27**
Right Party+Extreme Right Party R ² = .038	3.76 (2.80)	Personal Control	-.132	-.539	-1.90
		Sociopolitical Control	.039	.128	.558
Extreme Left Party + Left Party+Center Party R ² = .031	5.03 (2.78)	Personal Control	.010	.041	.143
		Sociopolitical Control	-.062	-.204	-.892
Right Party + Center Party + Extreme Right Party R ² = .022	3.66 (2.66)	Personal Control	.037	.141	.526
		Sociopolitical Control	-.130	-.406	-1.87

Note. ** significant at $p \leq 0,01$;

* significant at $p \leq 0,05$

To test our fourth hypothesis that predicted a moderation of perceived efficacy of each recategorization on the effects of sociopolitical control on support for recategorizations, four moderation analyses were carried out with the PROCESS macro package for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; Model 1, bootstrapping, 10,000 replicates and 95% *CI*). Non-significant results were obtained, which corroborate this hypothesis for extreme left party and left party, $b = -.028$, $SE = .04$, 95% *CI* [-0.11, 0.62], for right party and extreme right party, $b = -.073$, $SE = .07$, 95% *CI* [-0.62, 0.20], for the trio formed by extreme left party, the left party and center party, $b = -.067$, $SE = .04$, 95% *CI* [-0.14, 0.15] and the trio formed by the right party, extreme right party and the center party, $b = -.077$, $SE = .07$, 95% *CI* [-0.21, 0.05].

Political Orientation as a moderator of perceived sociopolitical control and support for right-wing coalitions

To test our fifth hypothesis that predicted a moderation of political orientation on the effect of perceived sociopolitical control support for right-wing coalitions, another moderation analysis with PROCESS was carried out. The interaction effect was not significant, $b = .064$, $SE = .08$, 95% *CI* [-0.09, 0.22]. Therefore, the effect found in Study 1 was not replicated.

Discussion

In this study, we found a tendency to support center-right coalitions when sociopolitical control is low. This result is in line with our Hypothesis 1, and replicates the results of Study 1. Additionally, our results show that high sociopolitical control positively predicts support for the coalition of left-wing ideological parties (as it was the case in Study 1), and higher sociopolitical control was also positively related to support for left-wing recategorization. Thus, the unexpected finding of Study 1 was replicated

again in Study 2. These results could be driven by the ideology of the participants (most of them left-wing). Thus, those with more sociopolitical control would trust more that a left-wing coalition could effectively form a government, in line with their values, or even unite as a one-group recategorization for future elections.

Our second hypothesis was partially confirmed, finding a moderating effect of the perceived effectiveness of coalitions on the relation between sociopolitical control and support for a coalition between the classic right-wing party and the center party. These results are in line with the theory of collective efficacy (Bandura, 1986), that is, relying on the joint capacities of both parties to organize and execute the contextual actions required to achieve a determined goal. In this way, we can conclude that a sense of low sociopolitical control can motivate the person to carry out control-restoring actions through a new, efficacious group (Fritzsche, 2011).

Low sociopolitical control was not a predictor in the case of recategorizations between political parties. In addition, the perceived efficacy of the recategorization as well as the political orientation do not seem to play a moderating role in this study on sociopolitical control and support for new forms of collaborative politics, thus hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 were not confirmed. It is possible that some of the exploratory findings of Study 1 are not strong enough to hold in a non-realistic imaginary scenario, or simply they appeared as a result of the specific sociopolitical context in which Study 1 was conducted.

In short, the results of the second study replicate in an imaginary context the effect of low sociopolitical control on support for center-right coalitions and that this effect is moderated by perceived efficacy of the coalition. In order to experimentally test the effect of perceived efficacy of such a center-right coalition we conducted Study 3.

Study 3

The previous two studies showed that participants who feel that they do not have the capacity to influence the sociopolitical sphere will support a center-right coalition more as long as they perceive it to be an effective means to achieve group objectives. In this study we developed an experimental procedure to test the impact of such center-right coalition perceived efficacy on support for different political alliances on both sides of the political spectrum: coalitions between different groups and recategorizations as one group. We hypothesize that the effectiveness of the alliance between the classic right-wing party and the center party would increase support for coalitions in general (Hypothesis 1). Further, we predicted that participants with low sociopolitical control will support center/right coalitions (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we also predicted that perceived coalition effectiveness will moderate the effects of sociopolitical control on support for specific coalitions, such that low sociopolitical control will predict support for center/right coalitions when perceived group efficacy is high (Hypothesis 3).

This study was preregistered on the Open Science Framework page:

<https://osf.io/v5s6e>

Method

Participants and Design

This study was carried out with a general population (128 men, 253 women and 7 non-binary gender) with an age of $M = 25.16$ ($SD = 8.01$), who completed the study online through the Qualtrics platform. The sample was completed using social networks and the University of Granada mail list. Those who did not correctly complete the attention checks as well as the main variables were excluded from the study; a total of 12 participants were excluded. As in previous studies we performed a power analysis based on the pwr package for R (developed by Stéphane Champely based on Cohen, 1988) where we found that for a power of .90 we needed a sample of $n=240$ based on a post-hoc analysis of previous studies (Rodríguez et al., 2022), with the final sample being 376 participants. This was a sample that exercised their right to vote since 69.9% of the participants declared having voted, with their vote being predominantly left-wing (PP: 7.2%; PSOE: 15.7%; Unidas Podemos: 25.3%; Ciudadanos: 5.7%; VOX: 3.4%; Blank Vote: 6.4%; did not vote: 30.2%; unspecified: 6.2%).

Procedure & Materials

The study had a two-group design – participants were randomly assigned to a high vs. low center-right wing coalition efficacy condition. Prior to the efficacy manipulation, each participant was made to read (as in study 2) the proposals of each political party in the imaginary society.

Experimental manipulation of coalition efficacy. We manipulated the perceived efficacy of the coalitions that formed a past government in a fictitious society using two scenarios that we invented for the purpose of this study. After reading the text, which mentioned two political parties (center party and traditional right-wing party) that

had (or had not) achieved the proposed objectives, demonstrating (or not) great effectiveness (see Appendix 1 in the supplementary materials), they responded to the following scales.

Spheres of Control. The participants indicated on a 10-item, 7-point scale (from 1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree) their perceived sociopolitical control, which was based on the scale of Paulhus and Christie (1981), $\alpha = .73$.

Efficacy Manipulation Check. After the manipulation (High Efficacy vs. Low Efficacy) the participants' understanding of the manipulation was evaluated with the following question: *After reading the text, how effective would you say the collaboration between political parties of Satellite has been?*

Support of different government coalitions. The same measures were used as in Study 1 & 2.

Political Agency. 2 items as in Study 2.

Perceived Efficacy of Coalitions. 1 Item as in Study 2.

Political recategorization as one group. The same measures were used as in Study 1.

Political Spectrum. Participants were required to rank (0-100) politically from left to right (including center) the imaginary political parties created for this study.


Past vote. The participants had to think about the last elections held in Spain and were asked, firstly, if they voted and, secondly, which party they had voted for. This measure was used to determine their political orientation.

Results

To test Hypothesis 1, a multivariate MANOVA was performed, $F(1,388) = 1.99$, $p = 0.09$; Wilks $\Lambda = 0.98$ $\eta^2 = 0.02$. In relation to the experimentally manipulated variable, perceived efficacy of center party and right party (center-right parties), we obtained significant results on the support for coalitions based on center-right parties ($F(1,388) = 5.94$, $p = 0.15$ $\eta^2 = 0.15$) and also on the support for coalitions between right-wing parties that included also the extreme right-wing party - VOX ($F(1,388) = 5.51$, $p = 0.19$ $\eta^2 = 0.14$), as can be seen in Figure 5.

Figure 5.

Support for coalitions according to the experimental condition.



In order to test our second hypothesis, two linear regressions were carried out where sociopolitical control was used as a predictor variable. For the first regression, we used the coalition of the center party with the classic right-wing party as a dependent variable, obtaining no significant results ($F(1,387) = .947$, $p = .331$, $R^2 = .002$). In the second regression we used the coalition that included the center party, the far-right party


and the classic right-wing party as the dependent variables, also obtaining non-significant results ($F(1,387) = .319, p = .572, R^2 = .001$).

With regard to Hypothesis 3, we conducted a moderation analysis (Model 1) with Process, and found that the interaction of sociopolitical control on the effect of efficacy on support for center-right coalitions did not reach statistical significance, $b = 5.95, SE = 3.12$ 95% $CI [-.18, 12.07]$ ($p = .057$), although the results go in the opposite direction than predicted. Specifically, sociopolitical control is positively related to support for the right-wing coalition when this is presented as being efficacious.

Because in the previous two studies we found a positive effect of sociopolitical control on support for left-wing coalitions or recategorization, we decided to explore the joint impact of sociopolitical control and efficacy of the center-right coalition on these left-wing political alliances. We found a significant interaction effect on the recategorization of left-wing parties ($b = -.74, SE = .33$, 95% $CI [-1.38, -.10]$; $p = .023$). We can observe in Figure 6 that participants stop supporting recategorizations on the left-wing when they feel in control and perceive the efficacy of the center-right coalition as high.

Figure 6.

Moderation of the effectiveness of the United Podemos and PSOE coalition according to the experimental condition.



Discussion

Overall, our first hypothesis that greater efficacy predicted stronger support for coalitions (specifically right-wing coalitions) was confirmed. Further, when the efficacy of the coalition between the right-wing and center parties was manipulated, no direct effect of sociopolitical control on the support for different political alliances was observed contrary to our second hypothesis. However, contrary to our predictions and the findings in the two previous studies, it seems like the relation between sociopolitical control and support for right-wing coalitions was positive when the efficacy of such a coalition was described as high. Although this result was not statistically significant, it seems that when past evidence is presented suggesting that a center-right wing coalition is efficacious, this effect overrides the effect of dispositional low sociopolitical control.

The results obtained in this study highlight the importance of perceived effectiveness of a political alliance for its support. These results are consistent with

previous findings, showing that collective efficacy can motivate people to support a specific cause (e.g., proenvironmental behavior; see Jugert et al., 2016). In our research we go one step further and show that efficacy perceptions can also enhance individual intentions to support political coalitions.

Results regarding the role of socio-political control did not confirm our predictions. That is, low sociopolitical control did not enhance support for coalitions and did not interact with manipulated efficacy of coalitions. It is plausible that the high efficacy manipulation had itself a control restorative function (Jugert et al., 2016), so individual differences in perceived sociopolitical control did not reveal its impact on support for different types of coalitions. In future research, it might be beneficial to also experimentally manipulate perceptions of control related to the socio-political sphere, as this has been successfully done in the past (Torres-Vega et al., 2021).

General Discussion

In this work we wanted to examine whether and how personal and sociopolitical control are associated with support for collaboration between different political groups to form a government (Paulhus & Christie, 1981). Additionally, we assessed the moderating role of perceived group efficacy in the relationship between control and support for different types of political cooperation (Fritzsche, 2013). To meet this end, three studies were developed and carried out in different contexts. The first study was carried out in the real political context of Spain, and the other two studies in an imaginary context in order to replicate the results obtained in Study 1, and at the same time to move beyond the specific Spanish political reality.

The results obtained across studies revealed interesting patterns of support for both types of alliances (coalitions and recategorizations) based on right-wing parties. The

first two studies showed that alliances that contain a party with a more traditional ideology (right-wing ideology) were favored by those who experienced low sociopolitical control (Hypothesis 1). However, we did not observe significant effects of low personal control on support for such political alliances. These results show how lowered sociopolitical control affecting the support for different coalitions might be explained by changes in political systems in times of sociopolitical crises. Possibly, the loss of confidence in a political elite that has not managed to take a firm position on critical issues, such as economic insecurity, has given rise to the emergence of new parties that position themselves drastically in the extremes of the political spectrum, changing the political landscape (Caiani & Graziano, 2019). When the loss of trust in traditional parties reduced support for them, these minority parties became necessary to build coalition governments in several regions in Spain. Our results suggest that people with chronically lower perceived sociopolitical control tend to support these political alliances including more polarized right-wing groups. Conversely, in both studies, high sociopolitical control was related to more support for left-wing alliances. This might be due to the fact that our samples were mostly center to left-wing in terms of political ideology. Thus, amongst those who lean towards more leftist ideologies, the more sociopolitical control they have the more they believe that a left-wing alliance might be efficacious in forming a government. Overall, these results can help us to understand how perceiving threats to control in the sociopolitical sphere can increase the support for different forms of intergroup cooperation depending on their location on the political spectrum.

Our results also show that participants preferred a recategorization of right-wing parties (including the extreme-right) when sociopolitical control was low (Hypothesis 2). This is in line with previous findings showing that authoritarian leaders or governments with a marked far-right profile with aggressive policies against immigration or defense

of national values can come to power in economically threatening contexts (Torres-Vega et al., 2021). Although this effect on recategorization was not affected by participants' political ideology, those with a more center ideology showed stronger support for coalitions that included the three right-wing parties (PP, Ciudadanos and VOX) (Study 1). This is consistent with previous findings suggesting that centrist participants show higher authoritarianism when they feel they have low sociopolitical control (Torres-Vega et al., 2021). However, the fact that this political ideology moderation only applies to support for coalitions (and not recategorization in one future united party) suggests that this support for options including more extreme right parties is instrumental in achieving certain political objectives, such as gaining power within national politics.

We also found in two studies a moderating effect of perceived efficacy of the alliances on the effect of low sociopolitical control on support for coalitions between the classic right-wing party and the center party (Hypothesis 2). However, this effect did not replicate when the efficacy of the right-wing coalition was experimentally manipulated in Study 3. In this case, the effect of efficacy overwrites the impact of sociopolitical control, showing that greater efficacy predicted higher support for different right-wing coalitions (including moderate and extreme-right wing parties). It is possible that the situational perceived efficacy of a political alliance in the past provides sufficient feelings of control regardless of individuals' dispositional tendencies to experience low sociopolitical control.

There are three main contributions of this research: Firstly, it reveals the relation between different types of control (personal and sociopolitical) and support for political alliances; secondly, it specifies how two types of political alliances – coalitions between different groups or recategorizations into one group – are related to perceptions of control;

and thirdly, it highlights the importance of group efficacy as a predictor of support for political alliances over and above individual differences in perceived control.

Context-dependent effects of personal and sociopolitical control

When there is a threat in our environment, the individual draws on his or her capacity for control to cope with this particular threat (Skinner, 1996). Previous research showed that a threatened personal control can lead to support for collective actions in the context of the economic crisis in Spain but not in Germany (Fritsche et al., 2017). Other studies have emphasized that the context in which lack of control is experienced matters and, more importantly, the fact that the context matches the domain in which the individual or collective action will take place (Potoczek et al., 2022). For example, lowered sociopolitical control was positively related to voting intentions, so a form of social behavior, when a social norm was salient (Potoczek et al., 2023). This is why, in our studies we introduced the distinction between personal and sociopolitical control (Paulhus, 1983) and assessed the role of both types of control in support for political alliances. According to goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2015), people choose the most instrumental means to a goal. In our studies, sociopolitical control seems to be more closely related to support for different forms of political alliances. The results that we obtained, indeed show that sociopolitical (not personal) control is a valid predictor of support for different forms of political cooperation, such as coalitions between different parties or recategorization into a single party. This finding contributes to the literature that shows that low sociopolitical control can affect political perceptions and choices (Potoczek et al., 2023; Torres-Vega et al., 2021). In future studies it will be important to make a distinction between the threats to control depending on the context, allowing us to focus on specific control restoration mechanisms depending on the domain in which control is threatened.

Group-based control and on support for political alliances

Supporting political alliances can be a means to restore control on the group level, which could also lead to a restoration of personal or sociopolitical control. This idea is consistent with the group-based control model that highlights the role of collective agents as a means to restore personal control (Fritsche, 2022). Our results provide additional support for this theoretical approach but also supplement it and go beyond it in two aspects. Firstly, we show that in political contexts, it is not personal control that leads to a tendency to support group-based action in the form of political alliances but a sense of lack of control over the sociopolitical domain. Secondly, and more importantly from the perspective of the group-based control model, we show that low control, specifically sociopolitical control, can lead to support for forms of political cooperation between different parties (intergroup), especially if they are perceived as effective. In other words, people do not only support their narrowly defined ingroup (i.e., the political party that they identify with) but also a broader ingroup (i.e., an alliance between different parties). From the perspective of the group-based model this means that the collective self is based on a superordinate level of categorization (“We, the alliance”). Recategorization has already been considered in previous research as a process that can restore control in threatening situations (Giannakakis & Fritsche, 2011). However, our research shows that people support coalitions that are not based on one coherent superordinate category, but rather constitute a loose association between diverse groups that decide to act in a coordinated fashion to obtain common goals. The support for coalitional forms of cooperation is a new aspect that extends the group-based control model and even though its relevance has already been shown in previous research (Bukowski et al., 2023), its application to the sociopolitical context is novel and highly relevant in terms of possible practical applications. For example, in situations of high levels of uncontrollability and

unpredictability we can often find an increase in support for other types of policies such as political alliances between different parties, or even the formation of a coalition government. This trend can be seen in current examples of governments in Spain, Germany, Italy or Poland in the last years.

In sum, the group-based control theory (Fritzsche et al., 2013) shows how threats to control can lead people to try to regain control through the *we* or the ingroup via agentic actions. Our studies show that if the ingroup fails to restore control, then alliances between the ingroup and other groups that share a similar political orientation can also help to restore control. However, one important factor that needs to be taken into account is the potential efficacy of this new political alliance.

The role of perceived efficacy of the alliance

The processes through which collective efficacy exerts its influence on political preferences and behaviors, such as participation in political processes has been the subject of previous research in the domain of political psychology (Lee, 2006). We propose that in socio-political contexts that can be characterized by a high degree of unpredictability, people might support cooperation between different political parties in the form of a new alliance, but the extent to which they will do so depends on the perceived efficacy of such political alliances. Specifically, *expected group efficacy of newly formed political alliances* can play a moderating role between the perception of control threat and the actions carried out to combat that threat. Studies 1 and 2 showed support for this moderating role of expected alliance efficacy when support for alliances is considered. Importantly, Study 3 revealed that *past efficacy* of a political alliance might be the key factor when a person is deciding whether to support it or not. After experimentally manipulating efficacy, the participants supported the more effective one, independently

of their experienced level of control. This finding seems to suggest that efficacy matters for both those who lack control and those who feel in control but probably for different reasons – the former can restore their lowered perceptions of control by supporting an efficacious coalition, and the latter, who feel in control, support it to maintain their high levels of control. An examination of this possibility should be the aim of future research on the role of perceived alliance efficacy.

Furthermore, the cultural context can define the role of group efficacy. For example, collective efficacy becomes more important in collectivist cultures, as Spain is classified (Hofstede, 2019). Bandura (1997) proposed that the origin of collective efficacy is in internal efficacy. However, Abramson (1983) suggested that this relationship between individual efficacy and collective efficacy will occur in democratic societies, but in societies that are in transition this process might be different, that is, people's efficacy can be influenced by events that may occur due to political change (Semetko & Vakenburg, 1998). As we know, Spain is a country that has undergone a long transitional period in its recent history, changing from a dictatorship to a democracy. In general, this makes collective efficacy an important variable for transitional societies that may be influenced by environmental factors and historical contingencies. Our studies consistently showed that collective efficacy is indeed an important variable in the context of Spain, but also in fictitious contexts that resemble the Spanish one. It is also possible that we obtained similar results in both contexts due to participants projecting their knowledge and expectancies of how their own political scene is formed on the imaginary context.

Practical Implications

The latest socio-economic crises have generated a subjective feeling of ineffectiveness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the electoral process, politicians and

democratic institutions (Megias & Moreno, 2022). This work indicates that even in threatening situations people can be motivated to influence their sociopolitical environment, allowing them to use their vote to support political coalitions as a tool to combat threats, and thus reducing disaffection towards national politics and negative attitudes that are associated with it.

These results also suggest that it is important to provide people with effective means of exerting sociopolitical control. Other suggested strategies that might work in the long-term involve the construction of an educational system that would allow the importance of electoral processes and the functioning of democratic institutions to be taught (White et al., 2000). Additionally, a well-developed educational system would provide the population with an effective organization that truly allows them to introduce change at the local level, such as the improvement of facilities or access to opportunities.

Limitations and Future Directions

The first limitation of this set of studies that we can highlight is the sample size of our correlational studies that may have too low a statistical power to detect significant effects. A second limitation that must be pointed out about the first study is the influence that a real context can have on results. Current political events or the participants' own ideology can generate false results, which is why the subsequent two studies tried to recreate an imaginary context based on our current national politics. Still, it is not clear to what extent we managed to go beyond the current socio-political context and the associations that people might have between the fictitious parties and their own political landscape. Finally, we are aware that most of our samples are populations with a clearly marked left-wing ideology and mainly women, who are normally the main actors in social

change, this may compromise the generalizability of the results and must be taken into account for future studies.

A final guideline for future studies would be the need to explore in greater depth why specific alliances can be perceived as an effective means to restore control. Therefore, we believe that it would be important to carry out a longitudinal study where the impact of the contextual changes could be examined. Future studies will also have to explore why coalitions can be seen as effective means to restore control. Experimental evidence to prove the effect of different forms of alliances on control would be necessary.

Conclusions

Our studies show that threat to sociopolitical control may lead to greater support for political formations that bring together right-wing parties and center (as it could be in the national case, Partido Popular, Ciudadanos and VOX). This seems to happen especially when such alliances are perceived to be efficacious and thus able to restore control on the collective as well as individual levels. As Duckitt (2001) manifested, right-wing ideologies contain motivational objectives of order, social control and security. Thus, a lack of sociopolitical control seems to be a possible cause of support for right-wing coalitions in our studies.

This work as well as future research can provide relevant insights into understanding why lack of control can generate more confidence in authoritarian parties (right-wing ideological parties) as proposed by conservative shift theory (Jost et al., 2003). It has also been shown that there is an indirect relationship between economic crises, authoritarianism and trust in political leaders, where sociopolitical control plays a mediating role (Torres-Vega et al., 2021). Other research suggests that when sociopolitical control is low, political participation could be based on a national or

acquaintance social norm (Potoczek et al., 2022). In the light of our results, support for coalitions (including those between more conservative parties) might be a psychologically adaptive response to overcome different societal crises that evoke strong feelings of lack of control.

DISCUSIÓN Y CONCLUSIÓN

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

CAPÍTULO V

Discusión general

This doctoral thesis addressed the question of how people cope with threats to personal control and group agency in specific socio-political contexts. Our purpose with this work was to examine how voting intentions and group collaboration can be used to regain personal control. This general discussion section has been conceptualized around four research questions:

1. Whether and how does the perception of control affect political preferences and voting intentions?
2. How does the perception of control and voting intention depend on group agency?
3. Does the real possibility of change or stability of the political system modulate the influence of low control on attitudes and voting intention?
4. Does the lack of sociopolitical and personal control promote greater support for political alliances?

These questions have attempted to be resolved in the studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4. These aim to observe how personal control influences voting tendency; as well as checking if similar groups can provide a support network to achieve collective goals. Finally, we have attempted to verify how, in the face of difficulties in achieving our goals, the union of different groups (i.e., political parties), can be tolerated to a greater degree. All this has been developed through six experimental and two correlational studies divided into two scientific articles.

Next, we will analyze these objectives, the implications that our results have, the limitations and some questions that may constitute future lines of research.

Whether and how does the perception of control affect political preferences and voting intentions?

The first objective was to analyze how the perception of control affects when carrying out actions aimed at restoring personal control and if this would affect the intentions to vote for a certain political party in an electoral framework.

Taking into account the results obtained in our Chapter 3, the majority of studies shown in it (Studies 1, 2, 4 and 5) we can see how control is going to be decisive for system change or for its maintenance. Specifically, when lack of personal control is experienced, support for conservative parties will be lower.

To test the role of control in a context that generated a feeling of uncertainty in the participants of our studies, we tried to recreate contexts of instability where some participants felt they had control of the situation and others felt more vulnerable. The results corresponding to the first objective of our studies demonstrated how low personal control reduces the participants' intention to vote and support the traditional parties (Socialist Party and Popular Party).

These studies show how perceived control plays a fairly important role in politics. For example, we can see how a person with low control in a threatening context can use their political participation in an instrumental way by voting for new political parties, by abstaining or by getting involved in political protest movements (Horton & Thompson, 1962). Therefore, we can see how the perception of personal control can be decisive for the maintenance of the political system or its change. Our studies conclude that if there is a lack of personal control, support for the system will be much lower, not maintaining the status quo as proposed by system justification theory (Jost et al., 2004). In fact, the climate of perceived injustice generated by an economic crisis such as the one that began in 2008

generated greater identification with new protest movements, in turn facilitating the emergence of new political parties (Ignazi, 1996).

But not only personal control plays a fundamental role in the development of the events that we try to reflect here, group agency is another fundamental element to take into account since it plays an important role in providing the necessary tools for the individuals to achieve their goals.

How does the perception of control and voting intention depend on group agency?

Another objective of this work was to study the role that group agency plays in relation to the restoration of the perception of control when it is at stake.

According to the Group-Based Control Theory, the agentic group can be a restorative source of control when the individual's own tools are not sufficient and as long as the group itself is accessible (Fritzsche, 2022). Those people who see their personal control threatened will be able to act jointly to defend their interests and achieve common goals, being able to regain control (Fritzsche et al., 2013). This theory is tested in our first empirical article shown in Chapter 3, proposing that the threat to control would enhance group agency and in turn would more clearly promote social change that supports new, emerging parties. However, the results we obtain throughout these studies are not fully consistent. This may be due to a third factor: whether there is a real possibility of change or not (maintenance of the system). If we look at the results obtained in one of our studies (Study 3, Article 1), it helps us to understand that not only control and agency must be the factors that are going to play an essential role when it occurs a change, but probably the current political context and whether there is an opportunity for that change to occur will be important (Study 5, Article 1).

Overall, in our studies we have been able to observe less support for the system and the classic parties when personal control is threatened, particularly in the group is perceived as not agentic but not always. It will also depend on whether the context presents a possibility for political change.

Does a real possibility of change or stability of the political system modulate the influence of lack of control on attitudes and voting intention?

Some previous findings indicate that in a situation where personal control is threatened, traditional parties will be supported, legitimizing this way the existing political system (Jost & Banaji, 1994). However, if we take into account the political context, in our case a context in which change is perceived as possible, we find that low personal control and low group agency does not imply more support for traditional parties (as discussed in study 3 of article 1). In this case, it seems more likely that the parties that opt for a change in the system are supported.

This argumentation is consistent with the Social Identity Theory, which predicts that social change is not likely to occur when stability is emphasized, however when the situation is perceived as unstable or illegitimate, actions will be taken to promote social change (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This way both, the individual and the group, try to distance themselves from the norm (contrary to what the System Justification Theory proposes) and will try to look for alternatives (new emerging parties). This type of action implies changes in the environment in which people live and voting can be the most efficient way to achieve such a change in democratic societies (Landau et al., 2015; Rodríguez-López et al., 2022; Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015).

It is important to highlight that in our studies, in contexts where stability prevails, low control led to greater identification with the ingroup. This is consistent with what is

proposed by the Group-Based Control Theory (Fritzsche, 2022), since in this context, stability in politics can be perceived as indicative of collective agency, which can be perceived as a form of proximal defense. People establish their worldview in a way that seems controlled by themselves or their ingroup, a context that does not favor change could provide a safe environment and reduce uncertainty. This result is also in line with previous evidence on the usefulness of stability (over change) in organizational contexts to maintain employees' perceived control (Proudfoot & Kay, 2018).

**Does a lack of sociopolitical and personal control promote greater support
for alliances between political parties?**

In Study 3 (Chapter 3) we find that when the Spanish participants felt that their control was threatened and that their group was lacking collective agency, then they supported traditional parties *more*. However, the opposite occurs in Study 4 developed in a different context (France). This inconsistency between the results highlights the importance of the socio-political context. In the case of Spain, we could see how there was greater support for traditional parties due to the context of political blockade when no party managed to take over the government. Faced with this situation, participants chose to give greater support to those parties that were most likely at that time to form a stable government, which at that time were the traditional right-wing parties. Although we explained this outcome as a strategic decision based on the stability of the situation, consistent with group-based control model, this could be also seen as supporting evidence for a compensatory response (Kay et al., 2008). In line with this, the results obtained in our second article presented in Chapter 4, show how the perception of low socio-political control (that is, when people perceive that they have a low influence on what happens in the socio-political sphere) can lead to greater support for alliances between right-wing parties, especially if these are perceived as effective.

Considering the results of our studies that we have carried out in various socio-political contexts, we can conclude that threat to control experienced in a sociopolitical context can lead to seeking other ways of doing politics. These new policies are reflected in our studies in the support for new political formations, such as support for a political formation of the right, center and extreme right that brings together all its parties (Partido Popular, Vox and Ciudadanos). However, if the existing political formations and a stable political climate are perceived as potentially effective, people might also support traditional ways of doing politics, which seems in line with the claims of the compensatory control model (Kay et al., 2008).

Also, in this thesis the perceived effectiveness of a given coalition has been highlighted, as it can play a fundamental role in a political decision making process, when people show support for a specific type of political alliance. What we propose is that if people consider political alliances as an effective way of achieving their goals, they could use their votes in an instrumental way, perhaps favoring minority political groups that can establish alliances with other larger political parties and influence them to achieve common goals.

In Table 1, I would provide an overview of the hypotheses and main outcomes of this research.

Table 1.

Summary of hypotheses and designs of the studies presented in this thesis

Chapter	General Hypothesis	Study	Design	Evidence Found
Chapter 3 (Article 1)	Hypothesis 1: Those people who perceive low personal control over the economic crisis will support traditional parties less	Study 1	Experimental 3 (High Control vs. Low Control vs. Neutral Condition)	Confirmed: Low Personal Control predicts less support for traditional parties.
		Study 2	Experimental 2 (Control: High vs. Low) x 2 (Group Agency: High vs. Low)	
		Study 4	2 Conditions (Control: High vs. Low)	
	Hypothesis 2: Low personal control and low group agency will produce less favorable attitudes towards the party in the Government.	Study 5	Experimental 2 (Control: High vs. Low) x 2 (Context: Change vs. Stability)	Not Confirmed: People in the low control (vs. high control) condition were more supportive of the traditional party when group agency was low.
		Study 3	Experimental 2 (Control: High vs. Low) x 2 (Group Agency: High vs. Low)	
	Hypothesis 3: Low personal control and low group agency will produce less favorable attitudes towards the party in the Government.	Study 4	2 Conditions (Control: High vs. Low)	Confirmed: Low Control and low agency led to a change in the voting preferences
	Hypothesis 4: Perception of low personal control and low group agency will increase the intention to change the party in the Government when change (vs. stability) is perceived as the best political strategy available.	Study 5	Experimental 2 (Control: High vs. Low) x 2 (Context: Change vs. Stability)	Partly confirmed: The role of stability versus change in this study is inconclusive. However, the a priori planned comparisons are in line with the prediction that the effect should occur.

Table 1.

Summary of hypotheses and designs of the studies presented in this thesis (Continued)

Chapter	General Hypothesis	Study	Design	Evidence Found
Chapter 4 (Article 2)	Hypothesis 5.1: Low Control (Personal and Sociopolitical) will lead to the formation of coalitions	Study 1	Correlational	Partly Confirmed: Sociopolitical control (not personal) predicts the formation of right-wing coalitions.
	Hypothesis 5.2 Sociopolitical Control and support for a given coalition will be moderated by the perceived effectiveness of the group (political effectiveness)	Study 2	Correlational	Partially Confirmed: Significant results are obtained for center-right parties
	Hypothesis 5.3 Less sociopolitical control will increase support for recategorization	Study 1	Correlational	Confirmed: Significant effects of low sociopolitical control on the support of merged political parties of right-wing ideology
	Hypothesis 5.4 Less sociopolitical control will increase support for recategorization	Study 2	Correlational	Not Confirmed: Low sociopolitical control was not a predictor in the case of a recategorization of political parties
	Hypothesis 5.5 The perceived effectiveness of the coalition will play a moderating role between sociopolitical control and support for center/right coalitions	Study 3	Experimental	Confirmed: Effect of perceived alliance effectiveness on support for center-right coalitions

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The results obtained in this doctoral thesis demonstrate how the perception of control and group agency are related to voting intentions and support for political alliances. Below we will discuss the main theoretical contributions and some practices that can be derived from this work.

On a theoretical level, this research offers additional empirical support for recent theories that show that personal control can be a relevant variable that determines involvement in electoral processes that can bring political change, but also, it can affect the establishment of alliances between different groups (Becker & Wright, 2022; Bukowski et al., 2023; Potoczek et al., 2023), more specifically – political alliances.

The results obtained offer evidence consistent with the existing literature where control is shown as a relevant variable for voting intentions (Darmofal 2010). The perceived effectiveness of political actors is important in this process as we can see in Chapter 4 of this thesis, and could mean greater participation in electoral processes by the population and even determine voting intentions (Campbell et al., 1961, Abramson & Aldrich, 1982).

Likewise, the studies mentioned in this thesis reflect the importance of examining the control variable, not as a homogeneous construct as classical theories propose (Skinner, 1996), but in independent spheres that provide a more significant set of attributes, to characterize individuals' behaviors (Paulhus & Christie, 1981). The studies carried out in Chapter 4 suggest that sociopolitical control is a construct that is useful to assess in situations in which politicized actions are measured (Paulhus, 1983). Previous research showed that it is important to consider the match between the domain in which lack of control is experienced and the one in which people intend to take actions to restore

a lost sense of control. For example, pro-environmental collective action was more supported when control was deprived in an environmental context (Potoczek et al., 2022). Similarly, lack of control in the socio-political domain can fuel constructive individual and collective action related to voting and supporting political alliances.

From our studies we can also derive a series of practical implications, which we point out below. Firstly, we can highlight that a situation of economic crisis can lead to a detriment in the person's perception of control, generating a series of negative conditions that promote actions to recover lost control, some of which can lead to greater political polarization and to legitimization of far-right political groups through their collaboration with other traditional parties. Therefore, to avoid adverse effects in situations of societal crises, measures should be adopted that facilitate the population's access to all types of resources that favor coping with a crisis, promoting a more positive vision of the environment, as opposed to a hostile vision that favors the emergence of radicalism that promotes climates of hate.

In relation to the latter, the media and social networks have a fundamental role in the physical and mental health of people facing a crisis. Not having reliable sources of information (Jones, 2017) can aggravate the effects of a crisis and undermine the emotional health of those affected. Without a doubt, variables such as control and agency will be more easily affected in a context such as the one described. Therefore, it seems important to develop ways of combating fake news, as well as preventing it from being used in political campaigns, as this could help to avoid harmful effects for the population such as the rise to power through hate and populist speeches, such as we could see it in Donald Trump's political campaign (Make American Great Again) or the subsequent assault on the Capitol (The Conversation, 2020).

Another way to combat the negative effects of a crisis is to try to empower the population by promoting political participation as a control restorative tool. A population with accurate information about its social context and the development of politics in its country might adhere less to populist discourses. This empowerment could be carried out through community participation, reinforcing participation in local politics, organizing small assemblies at the meso level such as neighborhood groups, organizations that can scale to a macro level and have a real impact on society, thus increasing the sociopolitical control of people. Specifically, our work can show us a path for collaboration between diverse groups that can provide an opportunity to restore control in a constructive way (aimed at problem solving). Our work also shows that when people form new alliances they could change their own social categorization to a more inclusive one, promoting more cooperative environments with common objectives but maintaining their own identity and idiosyncrasy.

Limitations

It is important to mention some of the limitations that this research has in order to promote improvements in future research. First, the sample size is one of the main limitations that we must allege for some of our studies, since in many of them they may have low statistical power to detect significant effects. On the other hand, the conditions under which many studies have been carried out were limited by the time set by national politics (for example, short periods before elections so that current political news would not harm the results) when a piece of news could jeopardize the manipulations used in our experimental studies.

Another limitation to acknowledge is that the samples were unbalanced in terms of the participants' political ideology. The majority of participants were women and young people with a more progressive left-wing ideology, which complicates the

generalization of the results to other samples without further evidence (Ho et al., 2015). This, together with distrust when answering questions about political ideology to a stranger or even involving a factor of social desirability, means that the results must be interpreted with caution.

Likewise, it should be noted that the use of real political parties when measuring voting intention can affect the results obtained because the people participating in the study have preconceived ideas about such political parties. To try to reduce this problem, in studies 2 and 3 of Chapter 4, we developed a fictitious society with imaginary parties that represent all ideological spectrums. However, fictitious stories and scenarios also have their limitations as people interpret the abstract symbols of political formations with reference to their knowledge about the current political context, which might also affect the generalizability of the obtained results.

Conclusion

In short, the eight studies that make up this doctoral thesis and which constitute two scientific articles, form a contribution to the area of research on control, agency and political attitudes and alliances. The results allow us to understand how control threats affect political decisions, group cooperation and its influence on the political landscape and the establishment of alliances (coalitions and political recategorizations).

If we make an integrative effort between the two lines of research presented in this document, we can conclude that collaboration, whether with members of the same group or with other groups with similar objectives, is a fundamental element to attain common goals and this way to restore threatened control. Taking all the results of this thesis together, they increase our knowledge about the theory of Group-Based Control by providing a contextualization of the assumptions of this model and testing it in real

political and dynamically changing socio-political settings. Our findings provide some support for the main assumption of Group-Based Control showing that (in)group agency is crucial especially when personal control is missing, as it can serve as a means to restore it. Additionally, it provides evidence that new political formations might be perceived as more agentic when they have the potential to introduce change (since, as the theory indicates, changing an existing system could imply more group agency). Finally, alliances between different groups (political formations) can be perceived as a means to regain group agency too, and also, as a vehicle for introducing social and political change.

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ANEXOS

ANNEXES

Anexo 1.

Medidas

1. Escala Justificación del Sistema (Kay y Jost, 2003)

-
1. En general considera que la sociedad es justa.
 2. En general, el sistema político español funciona como debería.
 3. La sociedad española necesita ser radicalmente reestructurada.*
 4. España es el mejor país donde vivir.
 5. La mayor parte de las políticas sirven para obtener el mejor resultado posible.
 6. Todo el mundo tiene la oportunidad de perseguir la riqueza y la felicidad.
 7. Nuestra sociedad esta empeorando cada año.*
 8. La sociedad esta estructurada de tal forma que cada persona obtiene lo que merece.
-

Escala de respuesta desde 1 (Totalmente en desacuerdo) a 7 (Totalmente de acuerdo).

(*) Ítem inverso.

2. Escala de apoyo a los partidos políticos.

-
1. ¿Cómo de cercano te sientes a las propuestas de los siguientes partidos?
 2. ¿Cuál es la probabilidad que votes a uno de los siguientes partidos en las próximas elecciones?
 3. ¿Hasta que punto crees que la gestión de cada uno de los siguientes partidos mejoraría las condiciones socio-económicas en España?
-

Escala de respuesta desde 0 a 100. Los partidos políticos que se mostraba a los/las participantes eran los siguientes: Partido Popular (PP), Partido Socialista (PSOE), Podemos, Izquierda Unida, Unión Progreso y democracia (UPYD), Ciudadanos.

3. Apoyo para un cambio en el sistema de voto

1. ¿En que medida estas de acuerdo con una reforma en el sistema electoral para que haya una mayor proporcionalidad posible entre el número de votos y su representación parlamentaria?
2. ¿Estaría de acuerdo con un modelo de circunscripción única en el que el porcentaje real de votos se reflejara proporcionalmente en el número de escaños?

Escala de respuesta desde 1 (Nada de acuerdo) a 7 (Totalmente de acuerdo)

4. Identificación con otros países en crisis

1. Me siento cercano a ellos.
2. Me siento identificado con ellos.
3. Me siento unido a ellos.

Escala de respuesta desde 1 (Nada) a 7 (Totalmente). Los países empleados fueron Irlanda, Italia, Grecia y España.

5. Opinión sobre la nueva reforma francesa (2017).

1. ¿Crees que los cambios introducidos por el Gobierno, en la legislación laboral, son desfavorables para la población francesa?
2. ¿El fracaso de las protestas ha afectado la capacidad del pueblo francés para alcanzar con éxito sus objetivos?

Escala de respuesta dicotómica (Si/No)

6. Esperanza por el cambio.

Espero que haya un cambio político en Francia. Puntuado de 1 (Estoy totalmente en desacuerdo) a 7 (Estoy totalmente de acuerdo).

7. Esperanza por un futuro positivo del país.

Mis esperanzas por el futuro de Francia son positivas. Puntuado de 1 (Estoy totalmente en desacuerdo) a 7 (Estoy totalmente de acuerdo).

8. Identidad Nacional (Leach et al., 2008)

-
1. Soy feliz por ser francés
 2. Ser francés es una parte importante sobre como me percivo a mi mismo/a.

La escala de respuesta iba desde 1 (Totalmente en desacuerdo) a 7 (Totalmente de acuerdo).

9. Necesidad de cambio.

Los/as participantes fueron preguntados/as: “¿El sistema francés requiere un cambio profundo?” Escala de respuesta dicotómica (Si/No)

Anexo 2

Manipulaciones Experimentales.

1. Manipulación Experimental Control Personal Estudio 1, Artículo 1.

(A) Condición Alto Control.

“Como afirma un prestigioso periódico económico internacional, las medidas desarrolladas para paliar los efectos negativos de la crisis en la que nos encontramos inmersos están resultando útiles, y su impacto para frenar la crisis es notable. Los expertos destacan que la evolución de la crisis es controlable y se reducirá en los próximos meses. Es posible predecir cuánto durará y cómo evolucionará. Se reducirá así el impacto negativo sobre los ciudadanos, que están encontrando formas de afrontar y controlar los efectos de la crisis en su vida presente o a medio plazo. Escribe una lista de 2 efectos controlables que la crisis tiene para tu vida y para tu futuro.”

(B) Condición Bajo Control

“Como afirma un prestigioso periódico económico internacional, todas las medidas desarrolladas para paliar los efectos negativos de la crisis en la que estamos sumidos actualmente son inútiles, y su impacto para frenar la crisis es mínimo. Los expertos destacan que la evolución de la crisis es incontrolable y seguirá desarrollándose en los próximos meses. Es difícil predecir cuánto durará y cómo evolucionará. Por lo tanto, seguirá teniendo un impacto negativo en los ciudadanos, que no tienen forma de afrontar y controlar los efectos de la crisis en su vida presente o a medio plazo.

Escribe una lista de 2 efectos incontrolables que la crisis tiene en tu vida y tu futuro.”

(C) Condición Control

Los profesionales de la salud afirman la importancia de la actividad física y el deporte para mantener una buena calidad de vida, diversos estudios demuestran que a pesar de ello en España no hay suficientes actividades deportivas, 4 de cada 10 ciudadanos practican deporte y apenas 7 de cada 10 caminan diariamente, viendo Con estos datos se podría decir que nos estamos convirtiendo en una sociedad sedentaria.

Escribe 2 situaciones en las que practicas deporte en tu vida diaria.

2. Manipulación Experimental Control Personal Estudio 2 Artículo 1.

(A) Condición Alto Control

La experiencia de la crisis económica en los últimos años ha puesto de manifiesto como las personas **son capaces de hacer frente y controlar** los efectos de la crisis en sus vidas.

Describe 2 efectos de la crisis económica que **SI hayas podido controlar** en tu vida tanto presentes como futuros (p.ej., gastar menos dinero)

(B) Condición Bajo Control

La experiencia de la crisis económica en los últimos años ha puesto de manifiesto como las personas **no son capaces de hacer frente ni controlar** los efectos de la crisis en sus vidas.

Describe 2 efectos de la crisis económica que **NO hayas podido controlar** en tu vida tanto presentes como futuros (p.ej., menor empleabilidad)

3. Manipulación Experimental Eficacia política Estudio 2 Artículo 1.

(A) Condición Alto Eficacia Política

Aparte de a nivel personal, también existen medidas que se pueden tomar para afrontar los efectos de la crisis a nivel político. Las decisiones políticas son tomadas por nuestros representantes escogidos democráticamente.

En la actualidad, la situación política en España es bastante ambigua, y es un momento clave en el que nuestros representantes pueden alcanzar acuerdos acerca de objetivos comunes que permitan tomar decisiones y llevar a cabo propuestas que promuevan cambios relevantes en la sociedad española.

Piensa y escribe 1 ejemplo de propuesta política que SI pueda llevarse a cabo en este momento para mejorar la situación de la sociedad española tras la crisis.

(B) Condición Baja Eficacia Política

Aparte de a nivel personal, también existen medidas que se pueden tomar para afrontar los efectos de la crisis a nivel político. Las decisiones políticas son tomadas por nuestros representantes escogidos democráticamente.

En la actualidad, la situación política en España es bastante ambigua, y ahora mismo nuestros representantes no pueden alcanzar acuerdos acerca de objetivos comunes que permitan tomar decisiones ni llevar a cabo propuestas que promuevan cambios relevantes en la sociedad española.

Piensa y escribe 1 ejemplo de propuesta política que NO pueda llevarse a cabo en este momento para mejorar la situación de la sociedad española tras la crisis.

4. Manipulación Experimental Control Personal Estudio 3, Artículo 1.

(A) Condición Alto Control.

En esta parte necesitamos contar con tu capacidad para imaginar cosas. Te pedimos que hagas un ejercicio de imaginación, tómate el tiempo que necesites para poder describirlo de forma detallada, incluso aunque pueda ser una tarea un poco difícil.

Por favor, recuerda alguna ocasión en la que algo sucedió que te hizo sentir que tenías total control sobre la situación. Por favor, describe una situación en la que sentiste que tenías total control. ¿Qué sucedió? ¿Cómo te sentiste? Etc.

(B) Condición Bajo Control

En esta parte necesitamos contar con tu capacidad para imaginar cosas. Te pedimos que hagas un ejercicio de imaginación, tómate el tiempo que necesites para poder describirlo de forma detallada, incluso aunque pueda ser una tarea un poco difícil.

Por favor, recuerda alguna ocasión en la que algo sucedió que te hizo sentir que no tenías ningún control sobre la situación. Por favor, describe una situación en la que sentiste que no tenías ningún control en absoluto. ¿Qué sucedió? ¿Cómo te sentiste? Etc.

5. Manipulación Experimental Agencia Estudio 3, Artículo 1.

(A) Alta Agencia

Entre 1808 y 1814 España vivió un periodo de violencia y de inestabilidad política a causa de las guerras napoleónicas donde el pueblo español se vio invadido por el Imperio Francés.

En Mayo de 1813 el pueblo español consiguió deponer del trono a Jose I (Rey impuesto por Francia) iniciando así la recta final hacia la independencia.

Este es un ejemplo histórico. Piensa y escribe otro suceso más reciente en el que los españoles **SI HAYAN CONSEGUIDO** alcanzar un objetivo común como

(B) Baja Agencia

Entre 1808 y 1814 España vivió un periodo de violencia y de inestabilidad política a causa de las guerras napoleónicas donde el pueblo español se vio invadido por el Imperio Francés.

En 1808 José I (Rey impuesto por los franceses) se consolida en el trono de España, sucumbiendo el pueblo español ante los intereses franceses a pesar de los esfuerzos por evitarlo.

Este es un ejemplo histórico. Piensa y escribe otro suceso más reciente en los que los españoles **NO HAYAN CONSEGUIDO** alcanzar un objetivo común como pueblo y el destino de los españoles haya estado determinado por factores externos o la suerte.

6. Manipulación Agencia Estudio 4 Artículo 1. (En este estudio la Agencia se mantuvo baja en todas las condiciones experimentales)

En febrero de 2016, el gobierno de Manuel Valls presentó el proyecto de reforma laboral, conocida como ley El-Khomeri. Según el Gobierno, este proyecto tenía como objetivo flexibilizar y simplificar la legislación laboral. Sin embargo, provocó la protesta sin precedentes de los franceses, que lo consideraron una vulneración de los derechos de los empleados y de los sindicatos, en beneficio de las empresas. Entre marzo y septiembre de 2016 se organizaron numerosas manifestaciones nacionales que movilizaron a cientos de miles de personas de diferentes orientaciones políticas para protestar contra la reforma en todo el país. A pesar de la magnitud del movimiento de protesta, el gobierno no ha renunciado a su proyecto, introduciendo sólo algunos cambios menores. Por último, a falta de una mayoría parlamentaria suficiente, el Primer Ministro decidió recurrir al artículo 49, apartado 3 de la Constitución, que permite adoptar nuevas leyes sin votación. Este remedio, considerado antidemocrático, marcó el fracaso de uno de los movimientos de este tipo más importantes en Francia en el siglo XXI. Estos acontecimientos pueden considerarse una derrota del sistema democrático: las encuestas muestran que más del 80% no está de acuerdo con los cambios introducidos por el gobierno.

7. Manipulación Contexto participación Política Estudio 5 Artículo 1.

(A) Contexto de Cambio.



Expertos de diferentes campos, politólogos y economistas en concreto, subrayan la importancia de que se produzca un cambio en el gobierno para el desarrollo del país y especialmente para la recuperación económica de éste sobre todo si ha sido afectado por una crisis económica como es el caso de España, además este cambio también ayuda para aumentar la soberanía nacional y además para establecer las libertades de los ciudadanos para decidir sobre su futuro, éstas teorías también se encuentran apoyadas por diversos estudios en campos como el de los Recursos Humanos por ejemplo, donde se demuestra que la mejor opción para una empresa y la manera más factible de aumentar su capital es cambiar la plantilla evitando que se repitan errores del pasado en la producción y así llegar a obtener mayores beneficios.

(B) Contexto de Estabilidad.



Expertos de diferentes campos, politólogos y economistas, subrayan la importancia de un gobierno estable para el desarrollo del país y especialmente para la recuperación económica de éste sobre todo si ha sido afectado por una crisis económica como es el caso de España, además esta estabilidad también ayuda para aumentar la soberanía nacional y para establecer las libertades de los ciudadanos para decidir en su futuro, éstas teoría también se encuentran apoyadas por diversos estudios en campos como el de los Recursos Humanos por ejemplo, donde se demuestra que la mejor opción para una empresa y la manera más factible de aumentar su capital es mantener a la misma plantilla utilizando la experiencia adquirida por sus trabajadores en ese periodo de crisis para obtener beneficios.

8. Manipulación Eficacia Política Estudio 3 Artículo 2.

(A) Alta Eficacia Política

En este estudio tu formas parte de “Satellit ” en esta sociedad tras el resultado de las elecciones que anteriormente te hemos comentado, el gobierno se form  por la cooperaci n de diferentes partidos, los Partido Tri ngulo  y Partido Rombo  Y a lo largo de los casi dos a os que esta cooperaci n de partidos pol ticos ha estado gobernando **han conseguido** alcanzar los principales objetivos que se hab an propuesto. Por tanto la cooperaci n entre los partidos en el gobierno ha reflejado una **gran eficacia**. Imagina que pronto van a haber unas nuevas elecciones y te vamos a preguntar una serie de cuestiones sobre este tema.

(B) Baja Eficacia Pol tica

En este estudio tu formas parte de “Satellit ” en esta sociedad tras el resultado de las elecciones que anteriormente te hemos comentado, el gobierno se form  por la cooperaci n de diferentes partidos, los Partido Tri ngulo  y Partido Rombo  Y a lo largo de los casi dos a os que esta cooperaci n de partidos pol ticos ha estado gobernando **no han conseguido** alcanzar los principales objetivos que se hab an propuesto. Por tanto la cooperaci n entre los partidos en el gobierno ha reflejado una **baja eficacia**. Imagina que pronto van a haber unas nuevas elecciones y te vamos a preguntar una serie de cuestiones sobre este tema.

