

The Communication between Substances and the Unity of the Human Being in Petrus Hispanus' Commentary on *De anima*

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Abstract

This paper aims to describe the development of the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms in the *Sententia cum questionibus in libros I, II de anima Aristotelis*, attributed to Petrus Hispanus, and to emphasize the importance of the concept of 'communication', which is used by this and other authors of the 13th century.

Keywords: Petrus Hispanus; *De anima* commentaries; plurality of substantial forms; communication

Resumen. *La comunicación entre sustancias en la unidad del ser humano en el comentario al De anima de Pedro Hispano*

Este artículo pretende mostrar el desarrollo de la doctrina de la pluralidad de formas sustanciales en la *Sententia cum questionibus in libros I, II de anima Aristotelis*, atribuida a Pedro Hispano, y enfatizar la importancia del concepto de 'comunicación', que fue utilizado por éste y otros autores del siglo XIII.

Palabras clave: Petrus Hispanus; comentarios al *De anima*; pluralidad de formas sustanciales; comunicación

In the lectures of *Sententia cum questionibus in libros I, II de anima Aristotelis*¹, attributed to Petrus Hispanus, we find some of the positions that prevailed in

1. Published by Manuel Alonso Alonso (1944) in *Obras Filosóficas II: Comentario al "De anima" de Aristóteles*, Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 1944. This edition is based on the manuscript of Cracow, Biblijoteka Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 726, ff. 41r-134r. The discovery of another manuscript (Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Cod. Lat. Z 253 (= 1826), ff. 54r-99r) with many variants justifies the new edition on which we are working; see Pontes (1976). For some selected bibliography about the work, see Meirinhos (2005, 2011), Pontes (1964), Bazán (2002), Gauthier (1984: 239*-242*). This paper is part of my current research project that includes a preparation of the critical edition of the *Sententia cum questionibus in libros I, II de anima Aristotelis*. The texts from this work quoted in this article come from our edition in progress.

the psychology of the first half of the 13th century. Among them the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms in the soul has a key position².

The soul is defined as a substance composed of spiritual matter and form, following the *Fons vitae* by Ibn Gabirol³. This substance is also the form of the body to which the soul is united. This double reality, as a substance and as a form, is the origin of the diversity of its operations: some of them are performed with the body or in the body; others are performed with no relation to the body, only departing from the soul's essence, which is simple, diaphanous and luminous⁴. The Neoplatonic view of the soul, transmitted via the Latin tradition itself, as well as the Arabic, emphasizes the understanding of the body in its duality of limits and an instrument of a superior entity, which is an entelechy or substance. This substantialization of the soul, accepted by all Latin pre-Thomist authors, provides major theoretical difficulties concerning the unity of the human being only in the dimension of the metaphysical speculation: the discontinuity between the corporeal and the spiritual poses a question about the relation between the two ontologically diverse things.

One of the proposals for overcoming this difficulty is the articulation of the plurality of substantial forms, a doctrine whose paternity should be attributed to Ibn Gabirol (Bazán, 1967: 71-3) and that was followed by many

2. Some studies of reference are Zavalloni (1951), Bazán (1969; 1997), Gilson (1980), Wéber (1991), and Dales (1995). Some more recent works include Bieniak (2010), Lenzi (2011), and Silva (2012). On this subject, related to the origin of the soul in Petrus Hispanus' attributed works (especially in the *De animalibus*), see Pontes (1964).
3. "Sexta positio scribitur in libro *Fontis uite* quia in omnibus natura forme et natura materie siue sint corporalia siue spiritualia. Set triplex est materia, scilicet materia spiritualis et materia corporalis et materia media. In substantiis autem spiritualibus est materia spiritualis, in corporalibus est materia corporalis. In corporibus autem superioribus est materia media. Corporalis autem dicitur materia que habet naturam partitionis et dimationis et que est subiecta transmutationi et quia hec est in elementis propter hoc in eis est materia corporalis. In corporibus autem superioribus est materia habens naturam partitionis et dimationis, non tamen est subiecta transmutationi, et propter hoc dicitur media, quia a parte illa qua habet naturam dimationis dicitur coporalis, a parte illa qua non est subiecta transmutationi dicitur spiritualis, quia materia spiritualis nec habet dimensionem nec est subiecta transmutationi. Huic autem opinioni uel positioni adherentes dicimus et ponimus quod in omnibus substantiis spiritualibus est materia spiritualis et forma, et sic omnes composite sunt, et ideo dicendum est quod in anima intellectiua est compositio ex materia et forma uel ex quo est" *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 3, q. 4 (ed. Alonso, 251-2). Cf. Meirinhos (2011: 54-60).
4. "Anima intellectiua habet duplicem aspectum: unum, scilicet ad creatorem a quo exit in esse quem cognoscit, quoniam illius est causa. Iterum habet aspectum ad substantias superiores sibi similes separatas a materia et ad corpus quod dirigit et ad ea que ad corpus ordinantur que sub ipsa sunt. Et secundum duplicem aspectum duplicem habet potentiam: unam per quam comparatur ad superiora et per quam nata est separari et que est lumen ipsius anime illuminata, et hec potentia est intellectus agens, et hec est ei propria" *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 6, q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 294-5); "Anima enim illuminata est a primo et data est ei uirtus a principio ut cognoscat se ipsam et diuinum bonum" *Sententia cum questionibus*, QP1, q. 2 (ed. Alonso, 66; rep. in 167); etc.

Latin authors from the 13th century, such as Philip the Chancellor, Adam of Bockfeld, Robert Kilwardby and others⁵. The adoption of this model does not indicate the non-existence of disagreements among them about how this plurality is articulated⁶. Nevertheless, they all agreed on conceiving the existence of a plurality of forms in the animated being, which would be in charge of the different actions that occur within it or with it. This plurality includes not only the organic dynamism of the body itself but also the operations of a cognitive character.

According to Petrus Hispanus in the *Sententia*, this multiplicity of operations is unified around two main perfections of the body. One is the form of the mixture, *forma mixtionis*, the principles of which are related to the elements and their properties. This form is what causes corporeal operations without the agency of the soul, the *forma corporeitatis*.

The other is a form added to this mixture, *forma addita mixtioni*, which is the only substantial form *stricto sensu*, being the supreme perfection of the body as an animated body⁷:

Ad primam rationem in contrarium dicendum est quod forma corporis mixti est duplex: quedam est forma corporis mixti que est forma mixtionis. Alia autem est addita mixtioni. Loquendo ergo de forma mixti que est forma mixtionis uerum est quod ipsa est principium alicuius operationis per naturam alicuius elementi in ea determinati, quia resultat ex formis elementaribus et maxime est illa forma principium operationis per naturam caloris, quia forme elementares, que sunt maxime principia operationum, maxime sunt habentes naturam caloris.

Loquendo autem de forma mixti que non est forma mixtionis set addita mixtioni, talis non est principium operationis per naturam alicuius elementi, quia non resultat ex elementis, set est principium operationis per sui substantiam. Est enim substantia simplex et ideo multarum operationum est principium per naturam sue spiritualitatis et sue substantie et non per naturam alicuius elementi. Talis autem forma mixti est anima⁸.

This *forma addita mixtioni* is the soul, which unifies the diverse spiritual forms, that is, the vegetative, sensitive and intellective forms, as is proposed in

5. It is not completely resolved that the debate on the pluralism or unitarism was defended by Philip the Chancellor, whose *Summa* was very influential, cf. Bazán (1969: 55), Bieniak (2010: 123) and Silva (2012: 13).
6. The adoption of this model does not indicate the non-existence of disagreements among them regarding the substantialization of these forms or the manner in which these forms are related one to another, cf. Bazán (1969: 32-3).
7. Cf. "Habet enim corpus duplicem perfectionem: unam scilicet a forma mixtionis et hec est eius perfectio in genere mixtionum. Alia habet que est addita mixtioni qua corpus est id quod est in genere animatorum et hec est anima et sic quodam modo aduenit completo, quodam modo incompleto ipsa anima adueniendo corpori nec habet corpus secundum hoc duas formas substantiales nisi secundum diuersas naturas" *Sententia cum questionibus* II, lec. 1, q. 4.2 (ed. Alonso, 516-7).
8. *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 9, q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 348-9).

Aristotle's *De anima*⁹. Despite the fact that all of them are spiritual, these forms present divergences because of their relationships with the flesh. The intellective is above them, and its performance is independent of the corporeal instrument, being incorruptible and completely spiritual.

To save the spiritual nature of this intellective part of the soul, the author finally stated that the soul is not a unique substance with three potencies, but it is composed by several substantial forms¹⁰:

Circa primam questionem sic proceditur et queritur utrum anima uegetabilis et sensibilis et intellectiua in homine sint una substantia uel differant secundum substantias. [...] Solutio. [...] Et nos in principio sustinemus primam opinionem gratia disputationis¹¹, uia uero Aristotelis et aliorum philosophorum uidetur ostendere illas differentias anime differre secundum substantiam et non solum secundum potencias, et ideo illam uiam sustinemus et ponimus quod ille tres differentie anime in substantiis et potenciis differunt in eisdem et in diuersis. Questio autem ista querit de diuersitate intellectiue ad alias duas et dicimus quod differt ab illis secundum substantiam et secundum potencias in eodem et in diuersis¹².

In fact, not only the intellective form is different from the non-intellective form, but also the sensible is different from the vegetative. In sum, there are three substantial forms, *id est*, three substances:

Circa secundum sic proceditur et queritur habito quod anima intellectiua differat secundum substantiam ab anima uegetabili et sensibili prout sunt in eodem, queritur de opinione quorundam qui ponunt quod anima uegetabilis et sensibilis prout sunt in eodem non differunt secundum substantiam et

9. It must be stressed that for Petrus the books on the animals and vegetables deal with body itself: "Dicendum est quod in diuersis scienciis determinatur de anima et corpore animato, quia in corpore animato sunt multa. Primum est corpus et dispositiones eius ets uarum partium et diuersitas earum, et diuerse nature animalium et plantarum et diuerse complexionones eorum et diuersa loca in quibus habitant et sunt, et a parte ista determinatur de corpore animato in libro *Animalium* et in libro *Vegetabilium*. Secundum est natura anime, qua informatur, et operationes anime, que egrediuntur ab anima supra corpus, et sic de ipso determinantur in sciencia *De anima* et propter hoc intitulantur ab anima, quia determinatur in illa sciencia de corpore animato a parte operationum egredientium ab anima determinarum supra ipsum. Tercium est natura operationum quas habet corpus a parte corporis et que contra hunt naturam abeo; et sic de eo in minoribus libris, sicut in libro *De sensu et sensato*, *De morte et uita*, *De sompno et uigilia*. Diuersitas autem istarum scienciarum est a diuersitate diuersorum principiorum, quia alia sunt principia et rationes corporis a parte operationum anime quam a parte suarum operationum. Et iterum operationes que egrediuntur a corpore addunt rationes et principia supra complexionones corporum, et sic patet diuersitas huius sciencie ab aliis" *Sententia cum questionibus*, QP2 q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 88).
10. See the different meaning that *forma substantialis* has in Robert Kilwardby; according to Silva (2012:77), "substantial form is a constitutive part of a naturally subsistent thing".
11. Petrus Hispanus addresses this issue in another part of the commentary (I, lec. 4, q. 3 (ed. Alonso, 262)), where he defends, in terms of dialectical reasons, "*gratia disputationis*", the existence of a unique substance. Nevertheless, pluralism is his real position; cf. Pontes (1964:199-2), Meirinhos (2011:49-51).
12. *Sententia cum questionibus* II, lec. 6, q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 650-6).

queritur utrum anima uegetabilis et sensibilis prout sunt in eodem differant secundum substantiam. [...] Solutio. Ad hoc dicendum est quod quidam ponunt quod anima uegetabilis et sensibilis sunt eodem secundum substantiam et differunt solum secundum potencias differentes secundum maiorem subtilitatem et minorem. Intellectiua uero differt ab illis per essentiam et potencias et operationes, unde ponunt quod in homine sunt due anime differentes secundum substantiam quia uegetabilis et sensibilis non differunt secundum substantiam set solum secundum potencias. Dicendum est autem quod anima uegetabilis et sensibilis in eodem et in diuersis differunt secundum substantias et uirtutes et operationes tamen maior diuersitas est inter animam intellectiuam et ipsas quam inter ipsas ad inuicem¹³.

These substantial forms relate to one another, causing a hierarchy in which the most elevated and spiritual form rules the inferior as the motor of the group. In the case of the human being, it is the intellective that rules the ensemble:

Alterius enim speciei est uita in homine et in aliis, quia in homine regulatur ab anima rationali et completur. In bruto autem completur a sensibili, in planta autem a uegetabili et sic habet diuersas completiones secundum speciem, et ideo differt secundum speciem in istis. Similiter hec operatio sentire regulatur et completur in brutis a sensibili, in homine ab anima rationali¹⁴.

In contrast, if in unification the role of the intellective is decisive, the non-intellective virtues will be essential to the union of the soul with the body, which occurs as the result of the joint action of the soul and the body in communication:

Dicendum est quod operationes anime sensibilis omnes communes sunt. Set communitas operationum forme est duplex, quia quedam est communitas forme operationum secundum quam forma non habet propriam operationem sine materia [...]. Alia est communitas operationis forme in qua forma comparatur per materiam, sicut per instrumentum, et materia simul participat operationes influentes a forma, et hec iterum est duplex, quia quedam operatio dicitur communis materie et forme, quia forma recipit inicium suarum operationum a uirtutibus corporalibus, non tamen operatur mediante corpore nec organo, et sic operationes possibilis intellectus communes sunt. Secundo modo dicitur operatio communis materie et forme, quia forma operatur mediante materia, sicut mediante instrumento et recipit dispositiones mediantibus partibus materie, et sic operationes anime sensibilis communes sunt. Set hoc est adhuc duobus modis, quia quedam operationes anime sensibilis dicuntur communes que habent ortum a parte materie, sicut sompnus et uigilia, que incipiunt a corpore et terminantur in animam, quedam habent ortum a parte anime et terminantur ad corpus, ut sensus et ymaginatio. Et omnes istas operationes exercet anima sensibilis mediante corpore et partibus eius. Et propter hoc dicuntur communes¹⁵.

13. *Ibidem* q. 2 (ed. Alonso, 659-61).

14. *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 4 q. 4 (ed. Alonso, 268).

15. *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 6, q. 14 (ed. Alonso, 98-9).

The operations of the sensitive soul are common with the body. Indeed, the etymology of the adjective '*communis*' indicates the meaning of active co-authorship (*munus*: "function", "duty"), and this active communication with the body is clear in the operations of sensibility because the operations could never exist without the intervention of the body. Indeed, sensibility is a substantial form that uses the body as an instrument. In turn, the body is a diverse and complete substance, a positive entity with its own determinations¹⁶, and not a simple metaphysical co-principle, which also contributes to determining the operations of the sensibility. This joint action with two agents, the soul and the body, produces two types of *communes* operations: those that depart from the body and end in the soul, such as sleep and sleeplessness; and those that depart from the soul and end in the soul, such as the sensible actions, which are closely related to their ascribed organs and, in the last stage, with the dynamics of the elements.

Owing to this communication between substances in the sensible operation, the body and the soul could be in intimate contact. The same communication reaches the intellective virtue as well, because the possible intellect communicates with these sensible virtues, which are related to the body¹⁷. Due to the community of this starting point, the agent intellect develops its proper intellectual activity without relation to the body because, by its own action, the intellect thinks, free of corporeal matter and of the body:

Similiter intellectus agens in quantum illuminat phantasmata in possibili intellectu dependet a phantasia, sicut ab eo supra quod operatur. In quantum autem intelligit non dependet ab ea. Et notandum est quod cognitio intellectiva non dependet a phantasia nisi eo modo quo dependet a sensitiva. Sensitiva enim sit per accidentia, intellectiva autem per uera rei principia¹⁸.

In summary, the disparity of active principles, which this doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms involves, is associated with a dynamic understanding of the different realities, which compose, through active communication, the unity between the soul and the body without denying the multiplicity of substances. In the background of this complex view, the *communicatio* between different souls allows for conceiving a mediate relation, which saves their substantial independence. This mediation indicates that there is neither contamination nor ontological mixture between them. Nevertheless,

16. See Bazán (1969: 34): "Si la forme de corporéité est une forme substantielle — et l'étude du P. Zavalloni prouve qu'il en est ainsi — alors le corps est une réalité à laquelle rien ne manque dans l'ordre de la substance". Cf. as well Zavalloni (1951: 419).

17. "Et sic intellectus possibilis dicitur esse communis et eius operatio, quia dependet a phantasmatis et uirtutibus sensibilibus quantum ad specierum receptionem, non quantum ad operationem supra species receptas. Sic ergo patet quod anima intellectiva habet propriam operationem que est ipsius intellectus agentis, operatio ipsius possibilis communis est et in quantum per potentiam potentialem habet anima respectum ad corpus et ad ea que regit ad inferiora, et in quantum per illam disponitur ad cognoscendum primum per suos effectus et per posteriora", *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 6 q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 296).

18. *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 6, q. 3 (ed. Alonso, 302-3).

it is possible to conceive that, by virtue of these relational dynamics, the vegetative form communicates its vital properties to the sensitive, and in turn, the sensitive communicates the sensed and imagined to the intellective virtue. In contrast, it is clear that the intellective communicates with the inferior forms, ruling them and imposing order. Then, unity from multiplicity is produced, which is not, in any case, unity in the category of substance.

Dicendum est quod non propter hoc sequitur quod tres differentie anime sint una substantia, set quod solum una sit superior ad alias que illas regulat et secundum cuius regulationem et exigentiam alie operantur. Et hec est intellectiua, et hec in eodem corpore sicut in homine quia in alio non habent ordinem¹⁹.

The soul's simplicity, defended by Petrus Hispanus at several moments in the commentary²⁰, should be understood as spirituality, a property shared by these substances. *Stricto sensu*, to speak about a unique soul only has sense in referring to the aforementioned order. In addition, the soul appears as a unity in the context of science by virtue of its generic definition, in which the soul is defined as the principle of the actions that exist in the animated body²¹:

Dicendum est quod unitas in differentis anime est triplex: quedam est unitas earum in subiecto et hanc habent a corpore et hec est unitas materialis uel etiam hanc habent a composito in quo sunt. Est alia unitas ipsarum que est in substantia anime et hanc unitatem non habent differentie anime in homine set solum uirtutes que sunt eiusdem diffinitione habent hanc unitatem sicut uirtutes sensibiles inter se habent hanc unitatem in sensibili. Non autem differentie anime. Est tertia unitas que est in corpore et hanc habent inuicem differentie anime prout sunt in eodem sicut in homine et ordo tenet eas et unit eas secundum quem ordinem in corpore nate sunt se habere, unde sicut in maiori mundo ordo tenet et conseruat res et formas rerum similiter ordo tenet et conseruat istas differentias anime in corpore²².

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19. *Sententia cum questionibus* II, lec. 8 q. 3 (ed. Alonso, 709). Cf.: "Alterius enim specie est uita in homine et in aliis, quia in homine regulatur ab anima rationali et completur. In bruto autem completur a sensibili, in planta autem a uegetabili et sic habet diuersas completiones secundum speciem, et ideo differ secundum speciem in istis. Similiter hec operatio sentire regulatur et completur in brutis a sensibili, in homine ab anima rationali, et sic habet diuersas completiones secundum speciem" LI, lec. 4 q. 4 (ed. Alonso, 267-8). Cf. Pontes (1964: 203-4).
20. Cf. *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 2, q. 7 (ed. Alonso, 230): "Hoc autem est difficile et propter hoc est difficile in scientia cognoscere quidditatem anime. Alia autem causa est a parte anime propter simplicitatem eius. Est enim remota a cognitione nostra, quia simplex est non cadit in eam nisi per operationes suas. Est ergo duplex causa: prima est [...]. Secunda autem causa est propter simplicitatem anime". Cf. also *Sententia cum questionibus* I, lec. 4, q. 2 (ed. Alonso, 260); etc.
21. Cf. *Sententia cum questionibus*, QP3, q. 6.1.5.1, the *solutio* (ed. Alonso, 148).
22. *Sententia cum questionibus* II, lec. 6, q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 657).

The role of this communication is absent or minimal in the views in which either the body or the soul does not exhibit the character of full substantiability. Thus, William of Auvergne, in his work on the soul (c. 1240)²³, emphasized the unity of the rational soul, minimizing to the limit the active aspect of the body and its incidence in the non-intellective forms of the soul. According to him, the instrument is necessary, but the operation does not depend on the instrument but on who uses the instrument, the human soul²⁴.

Another position was assumed by Albert the Great, who, despite rejecting the plurality of spiritual substances, explained the unity of the potencies by means of communication, which preserves their differentiation²⁵. The intellect, in his action, communicates with the sensitive faculties, but it does not communicate in any case with the body in a direct manner. It can only be conceived as an indirect communication, insists the Doctor Universalis. For both Albert the Great and Petrus Hispanus, the “contact” between the body and the soul is to be found in the vegetative and sensitive forms:

Et ideo aliud esse diximus communicare corpori et aliud communicare ei quod communicat corpori in operatione. Possibile enim est, quod substantia incorporea existens in corpore ut actus corporis communicet corpori. Et possibile est, ut non communicet corpori, sed communicet communicanti corpori. Et possibile est, ut neque isto neque illo modo communicet, sed habeat operationes, quae nullam ad corpus habeant dependentiam²⁶.

Despite the differences among the aforementioned authors, all of them conceived of the soul or souls as complete substances. Therefore, the problem of the body-soul relation and the unity of the human being remained in the background.

Fully aware of the root of this difficulty, Thomas Aquinas rejected the doctrine of the plurality of forms, restoring, via Aristotle, not only the unity of the soul but also the unity of the human being. According to Aquinas, the soul with its potencies is the unique subsistent form of the body. The substantial unity of the human being is preserved²⁷. Thomas Aquinas’ psychological

23. In: Guilelmi Alverni Episcopi Parisiensis *Opera Omnia*, eds. F. Hotot, B. Le Feron. Orléans-Paris 1674.

24. Cf. Moody (1975: 28-34).

25. “Una igitur est substantia, in qua uniuntur omnia haec sicut proprietates naturales, quae potentiae naturales uocantur” (Albertus Magnus, *De anima* I, 2, 15, ed. Stroick, 59b).

26. Albertus Magnus, *De anima* I, 1, 6, ed. Stroick, 12a. Cf. *ibidem*, below: “Taliter autem distinguendo communicans corpori et communicans ei quod communicat corpori, euitabimus errorem Alexandri, qui dicebat in omnibus animam communicare corpori et ideo non esse separabilem a corpore. Nos enim ostendemus in sequentibus quod id quod communicat non corpori, sed ei quod est communicans corpori, secundum se est separatum neque corrumpitur nisi secundum quid et non simpliciter”.

27. Cf. Bazán (1997: 96): “In his *Questiones disputatae de anima* (*Questions on the Soul*), Thomas Aquinas reached a definitive position concerning the nature of the human soul through a process that included both an overcoming of Aristotelian hylomorphism and a rigorous

doctrine manages to simplify the explanation of the body-soul's relationships with the help of the Aristotelian doctrine itself, and he has no need to turn to some type of development of a communication of substances.

In fact, it is not in the field of psychology but of theology that Aquinas has been considered one of the thinkers of the communication of properties, applied to describing the mystery of the Incarnation and the two natures of Christ, both divine and human (cf. *ST III* q16 a8). Later, but in the same vein, Luther would develop theoretically the *communicatio idiomatum*, defending the two natures of Christ and real communication between them (Cf. Ngien, 2004: 54-68, and Strzelczyk, 2004: 12-223)²⁸.

Concluding Remarks

The implementation of the idea of communication in psychology can be explained by the same reasons by which this concept is provided in Christian theology. The presence of the *communicatio* or *communicantia* in one or another field of speculation points to the same difficulty, namely the multiplicity of natures within unity. In one case, the unity of the soul and the human being, and, in the other, the unity of the three persons in the Trinity.

For some medieval thinkers who accepted the plurality of substantial forms, such as Petrus Hispanus, the problem of the unity of the human being, composed by two realities that are ontologically diverse, is restricted to those parts where the flesh and the spiritual are in contact. According to Petrus Hispanus, this contact occurs in the vegetative and sensitive forms, in which communication with the body is performed — a communication between substances or realities that today remains difficult to explain.

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critique of the eclectic interpretations of this doctrine advanced by his predecessors". According to Bazán, the real problem in pre-Thomist thought is the duality of substances, hidden by all this complex system of forms, cf. Bazán (1969).

28. The book by Strzelczyk (2004) reconstructs the history of this concept from the Gospels and the epistles of Saint Paul to Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure and, finally, Luther.

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