

MIGUEL JEREZ-MIR | JOSÉ REAL-DATO | RAFAEL VÁZQUEZ-GARCÍA  
*Coordinators*

IBERIAN ELITES AND THE EU:  
PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
PROCESS IN POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC ELITES  
IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

Granada  
2015

Foreword .....	9
Preface .....	11
<hr/>	
CHAPTER 1	
Introduction: Iberian elites, the European Union and the Intune Project .....	15
Miguel Jerez-Mir   RAFAEL VÁZQUEZ-GARCÍA   JOSÉ REAL-DATO	
<hr/>	
CHAPTER 2	
Portugal and Spain in the process of European integration .....	25
SANTIAGO DELGADO FERNÁNDEZ   FILIPA RAIMUNDO   MIGUEL JEREZ-MIR ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO	
<hr/>	
CHAPTER 3	
Still Euro-optimists? European identity among Spanish and Portuguese elites and public opinion .....	57
ALEXSANDRA SOJKA   RAFAEL VÁZQUEZ-GARCÍA   MIGUEL JEREZ-MIR	
<hr/>	
CHAPTER 4	
National Elites and the European Political System: Portugal and Spain in a Comparative Perspective .....	85
João Pedro Ruivo   PEDRO TAVARES DE ALMEIDA	
<hr/>	
CHAPTER 5	
Iberian Elites and their Attitudes Towards the Europeanization of Policy Making .....	115
José Real-Dato   FRANCISCO JAVIER ALARCÓN-GONZÁLEZ	

© LOS AUTORES  
© UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA

IBERIAN ELITES AND THE EU: PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS  
THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS IN POLITICAL  
AND SOCIOECONOMIC ELITES IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

ISBN: 978-84-338-5838-2

Depósito legal: GR./1649-2015

Edita: Editorial Universidad de Granada

Diseño de la edición: Francisco Vega Álvarez

Cualquier forma de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública o transformación de esta obra sólo puede ser realizada con la autorización de sus titulares, salvo excepción prevista por la ley.

CHAPTER 6

Citizens' and elites' support for the EU, before and after the financial crisis: The Southern European Peripheries (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) in Comparative Perspective ..... 155

ANDRÉ FREIRE | CATHERINE MOURY

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: Iberian elites, the European Union, and its future ..... 183

MIGUEL JEREZ-MIR | JOSÉ REAL-DATO | RAFAEL VÁZQUEZ-GARCÍA

General Annex ..... 203

References ..... 227

List of contributors ..... 243

FOREWORD

The serious financial and economic crisis of the last years has severely affected not only the national spheres but also and increasingly the relationship between member states and the European Union and the support of public opinions for the process of supranational integration. As the impact of the crisis has been particularly hard for the countries of Southern Europe it is very important to explore with sufficient details the attitudes of public opinion and strategic elites toward Europe during this period.

The book by Miguel Jerez-Mir and associates, devoted to a systematic analysis of this theme in Portugal and Spain and to a comparison of the two countries with the rest of Europe, is thus a welcome addition to the scholarly efforts to understand what is happening to the European Union in this difficult period.

What is the nature of support for the process of European integration? To what extent a European identity has developed side by side with the persisting national identities? How compatible are the two levels of identification? Is support for a delegation of competencies to supranational authorities the same in all policy areas or the opinions differ significantly if welfare policies are involved instead of immigration or environment? How high is the level of trust in the European institutions? These are some of the crucial questions that need to be answered if we want to understand the complexities of pro- or anti-European positions. And these questions must be repeated diachronically in order to fathom the transformations under the impact of the crisis.

The book offers a broad and articulate exploration of all these themes and provides for the first time a systematic view of the attitudes of public opinion at large but also of different sectors of the social and political elites towards the European Union in the two Iberian countries. The authors of the book exploit fully the rich set of data produced by the research project IntUne (Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in "an Ever Closer Union") financed under the European 6th Framework Program, but also other important empirical sources (such as the Eurobarometers) and

## CHAPTER 5

# IBERIAN ELITES AND THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEANIZATION OF POLICY MAKING

José REAL-DATO | FRANCISCO JAVIER ALARCÓN-GONZÁLEZ

### Introduction

European integration can be described as a process where policy-making competencies are reallocated from national governments to EU institutions. As this process has advanced along the different treaties and reforms, decision making and policy formulation processes in an increasing number of policy areas have escaped from exclusive domestic control. This Europeanization<sup>1</sup> process has not been homogeneous, being subject to the complexities of the multilevel governance system of the EU. This architecture is clearly represented by the current Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) which distinguishes (article 2) between areas where the EU has exclusive competences and legally binding decisions are only adopted by EU institutions; areas where competences are shared between the EU and member States (both may adopt legally binding acts); and areas where the EU complements or supports the policies decided at the domestic level. In the cases of foreign and defence policy, decisions are still basically within the realm of intergovernmental relations, excluding any legislative act by the EU institutions.

1 Here we define 'Europeanization' with the precise meaning of a greater involvement of supranational institutions of the EU in policy formulation. In this respect, we distance ourselves from other definitions of the concept, which associate it to the impact these processes have on domestic institutions and processes (see Ladrech, 2010).

In this chapter, we deal with this specific manifestation of the process of European integration, focusing on the preferences of Iberian elites on the Europeanization of policy making. Our main goal is to offer a more fine-tuned image of how Portuguese and Spanish elites perceive the European integration process, aimed to complement the view offered by the usual approach focusing only in general attitudes of support (Hooghe, 2003: 283; Real-Dato *et al.*, 2012). In this respect, not only we offer a description of the short and long term preferences of Iberian elites over the Europeanization of a number of policy areas, but we also look for explanatory patterns accounting for the observed preferences in both countries. In our task, we take advantage of the design of the IntUne project, examining the opinions not only of political elites—where the scarce literature on this topic has concentrated in the past (Wessels and Kielhorn, 1999; Hooghe, 2003; Slomczynski and Wesolowski, 2010)—but also those of other elite groups included in the survey sample (economic, media, and union elites). Besides, in an effort to be exhaustive, our analysis also covers the two waves of the IntUne project surveys, carried out respectively in 2007 and 2009.

The chapter is structured as follows. After this introductory section, we describe the general attitudes of Iberian elites towards the EU in order to set a reference against which to compare both short and long term policy-making preferences. These are described in the subsequent sections, focusing on several different policy areas. Here we perform several comparisons. On the one hand, at each country, we compare between policy areas, types of elites, and between these and national citizens. Then we look at the differences/similarities between Portuguese and Spanish elites, as well as between those and the rest of countries included in the samples of the IntUne surveys. Finally, we compare results between the two waves. Following the descriptive sections, in the rest of the chapter we look for factors at the individual level accounting for the observed elite preferences, testing the main arguments found in the literature on EU integration—functional/instrumental, ideology, identity, and cognitive mobilization. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main findings in our analysis and some final remarks.

## General support towards the EU in Portugal and Spain

One initial question that arises when dealing with preferences regarding the Europeanization of specific policy areas is whether they reflect some underlying pattern of general support or, in contrast, both types of preferences (general and policy-specific) are somewhat independent. In this sense, we start by examining elites' general attitudes towards the EU in Portugal and Spain, in order to have a reference point to evaluate more specific policy-making preferences. Other chapters in this volume deal with this topic using different measures of general support.<sup>2</sup> In order to increase the diversity, we use here a question of the IntUne surveys where interviewees were asked about the extent they believed European unification should be strengthened. Table 5.1 shows the results in both waves for this question.

In the first wave, we observe how both elites and citizens in Portugal and Spain show levels of general support above the average in the countries included in the sample. Enthusiasm towards strengthening EU integration is particularly outstanding among Spanish elites, who show the highest level of support compared with their counterparts in the rest of countries—with the exception of Austrian economic elites. Spanish elites are also clearly more pro-EU than their fellow citizens, while in Portugal the average levels of support of citizens and political elites are practically identical, and just a few decimal points below that of economic elites.

In the second wave, we see the same general patterns in Spain—where there is even an increase in the average support among citizens. In Portugal, positions regarding the strengthening of the EU integration process are still above the average for all the countries in the sample in the cases of those of economic elites in the first sample, though without reaching the levels of enthusiasm in Spain. In contrast, Portuguese political elites show in the second wave a level of support below that of their fellow citizens, and also lower than the corresponding average for all the countries in the sample.

2 For instance, Freire and Moury use different variables to measure support for the EU such as the perception of the benefits the membership brings to the interviewees' country, the level of trust in the EU and its institutions, support for the Economic and Monetary Union, and the feeling of attachment to Europe.

Table 5.1. General support for the EU (IntUnE, first and second waves)

FIRST WAVE						
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	
Portugal	Political elite	77	6.74	2.42	0	10
	Economic elite	40	6.88	2.03	1	10
	Citizens	844	6.75	2.95	0	10
Spain	Political elite	94	8.13	1.60	3	10
	Economic elite	55	7.82	1.36	5	10
	Citizens	980	6.46	2.64	0	10
EU average	Political elite	1338	6.53	2.37	0.61	10
	Economic elite	708	6.70	1.92	1.94	9.72
	Citizens	14492	5.74	2.73	0	10
SECOND WAVE						
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	
Portugal	Political elite	67	6.43	2.30	0	10
	Media elite	36	7.06	2.18	2	10
	Trade union elite	16	7.06	2.54	2	10
Spain	Citizens	953	6.87	2.78	0	10
	Political elite	81	8.11	1.90	3	10
	Media elite	45	7.73	1.89	3	10
EU average (*)	Trade union elite	21	7.86	2.43	0	10
	Citizens	971	6.70	2.70	0	10
	Political elite	1092	6.54	2.32	0.65	10
EU average (*)	Media elite	545	6.86	2.19	1.76	10
	Trade union elite	274	6.93	2.19	2.41	9.82
	Citizens	15259	5.69	2.71	0	10

\*Notes: The question wording was: "Some say European unification should be strengthened. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, '0' means unification "has already gone too far" and '10' means it "should be strengthened". What number on this scale best describes your position?" The 'EU average' cells refer (except those in the 'N' column) to the averages for each statistic obtained from the corresponding figures in every country included in the sample of the first and second waves of the IntUnE elites and citizens surveys.

In sum, Iberian elites show in general terms (with the above mentioned exception of the Portuguese political elite in the second wave) a clear pro-EU stance. This is in line with the results shown in other chapters of this volume. The remaining question is, however, if this general stance is maintained when looking at specific policy preferences. This question/issue is explored in the following sections.

### Short term policy-making preferences

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the preferences of Portuguese and Spanish elites regarding the level of government on which a number of policy areas should be dealt with. As there is no reference to the scope of time—in contrast with the questions analysed in the following section—it is understood that those questions refer to the interviewees' positioning at the moment they were asked. Therefore, in the following pages, we will refer to them as 'short term' policy-making preferences.

Before examining the descriptive results in both waves, it is worth adding a brief note on the policy areas considered in the analysis. These policy areas are varied in terms of the subjects covered and the degree of involvement of EU institutions in the decision-making process. Most of the areas where competences are shared between the EU and member States, though the degree of involvement of supranational institutions varies. Thus, the role of EU in social policies (health care, fighting unemployment, social security) is mostly devoted to support and complement domestic policies. In other areas, there is a greater degree of involvement of the EU with respect to domestic authorities, given the transnational nature of many problems they dealt with (environment, immigration, energy) or the existence of an explicit common policy at the EU level linked to the creation of the internal market (agriculture). Along these policy areas, the IntUnE questionnaires also asked about the preferences on two policy areas (foreign policy and taxation) which have remained almost entirely under domestic jurisdiction (with some exceptions for the case of taxation, where negative rules protect member states' taxation policies become a hindrance for the working of the internal market).

Table 5.2. Preferred level of government (IntUne, first wave, relative frequencies)

	Fighting unemployment			Immigration policy		
	Portugal	Spain	EU (*)	Portugal	Spain	EU
National/ subnacional level	41,3	57	55,5	12,5	28	28,1
Shared	21,3	32,3	30,6	20	30,1	27,2
EU level	37,5	10,8	13,9	67,5	41,9	44,7
N	80	93	1312	80	93	1315
Political elite						
National/ subnacional level	55	54,5	54,8	15	18,1	27,5
Shared	10	34,5	29,1	10	16,4	27,6
EU level	35	10,9	16,1	75	65,5	44,9
N	40	55	675	40	55	677
Economic elite						
National/ subnacional level	65	73,7	73,8	46,9	41,4	54,1
Shared	29,5	24,1	21,1	49,6	56,1	41,4
EU level	912	997	14762	885	994	14502
N						
Citizens						
	✿					
	Environment policy			Fight against crime		
	Portugal	Spain	EU	Portugal	Spain	EU
National/ subnacional level	5,1	19,4	21,2	31,3	33,7	38,3
Shared	23,8	41,9	34	30	38	37,7
EU level	71,3	38,7	44,9	38,8	28,3	24
N	80	93	1313	80	92	1318

National/ subnacional level	17,5	23,6	16,3	32,5	32	33,6
Economic elite						
Shared	10	27,3	32,5	22,5	47,2	38,1
EU level	72,5	49,1	51,2	45	20,8	28,3
N	40	55	675	40	53	672
Citizens						
National/ subnacional level	55,9	46	50,5	53,2	46,8	56,1
EU level	39,1	51,2	43,3	39,9	49	36,6
N	902	994	14670	910	990	14752
	✿					
	Health care policy			Taxation policy		
	Portugal	Spain	EU	Portugal	Spain	EU
National/ subnacional level	72,6	68,8	68,3	40	48,4	56,1
Shared	17,5	29	26,6	21,3	34,4	28,5
EU level	10	2,2	5	38,8	17,2	15,4
N	80	93	1315	80	93	1312
Political elite						
National/ subnacional level	67,5	68,5	64,1	45	36,4	45,2
Shared	7,5	22,2	23,4	10	30,9	29,3
EU level	25	9,3	12,5	45	32,7	25,5
N	40	54	674	40	55	676
Economic elite						
National/ subnacional level	74,1	78,2	77,1			
EU level	21,7	19,6	18,5			
N	919	992	14779			
Citizens						

Notes: The question wording was: "In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas?" Answers in the elite survey: "regional level", "national level", "European level", "not an area to be dealt with at any level of government" (spontaneous), "regional and national (spontaneous)", "regional and EU level (spontaneous)", "national and EU level (spontaneous)", "all three" (spontaneous); answers in the mass survey: "regional level", "national level", "European level", "not an area to be dealt with at any level of government" (spontaneous), "more than one level of government" (spontaneous). Given the different alternatives of response, and for reasons of comparability, the cells do not include the 'more than one level' response.

(\*) The 'EU' columns represent the average percentage for each category calculated from the corresponding percentages in every country included at each wave of the IntUne elites and citizens surveys. This applies to the rest of descriptive tables.

*First wave*

A first fact we observe is that preferences on the Europeanization of specific policy areas do not always follow the general pro-EU support pattern observed in both countries. Table 2 shows clear differences between policy areas. Therefore, Portuguese and Spanish elites have a more pro-EU position in those areas dealing with transnational problems (environment, immigration, and fighting crime). In all these areas, the percentages of interviewees in both elite groups and countries who favour a total or partial (sharing authority) Europeanization is clearly a majority (above 65%). In contrast, these percentages are comparatively lower in the other policy areas, which refer to issues which have traditionally been central in domestic policies (fighting unemployment, health care, and taxation). This pattern brings additional evidence confirming Wessels and Kielhorn's (1999) hypothesis on the influence of this type of issues on policy-making preferences—support for Europeanization is stronger in those policy areas dealing with transnational problems. Besides, this result is in line with some evidence found in a previous work which studied elites' policy-making preferences in the whole sample of countries included in the first wave of the IntUne project (Real-Dato *et al.*, 2012).

Considering differences between types of elites, opinions are quite homogeneous in Portugal. The only significant differences between elites are

found in health care and environmental policy—where political elites are more prone than economic ones to consider that decisions in these areas should respectively remain under domestic jurisdiction or being shared. In Spain, positions differ to a greater extent. The percentage of members of the political elite who believe that immigration, environment, taxation, and health care issues should be dealt exclusively at the EU level is significantly lower (from a statistical point of view)<sup>3</sup> than that in the economic elite. The relationship reverses in the case of economic elites for those thinking that the authority in immigration policy should be shared.

Comparing elites and citizens,—although the wording of the respective questions does not allow us to perform systematic comparisons—, results shown in table 2 are clarifying enough. In Portugal, citizens are more prone than elites to favour that policy areas remain under national jurisdiction. This difference is particularly outstanding in the cases of immigration and environment policy, while for health care the opinions of Portuguese political elites and citizens are almost identical. In Spain, the percentages of those who prefer domestic authorities to be exclusively in charge of these specific policy areas are also higher among citizens, being the differences also remarkable in the case of environment.

Comparing the results in Portugal and Spain with the averages obtained for the set of EU countries included in the elite survey (in the tables denoted as 'EU'), results slightly differ from the general pattern observed for overall support towards the EU in the first wave. We observe that Portuguese elites have a significantly more pro-EU stance (in the sense of preferring a full Europeanization) in the three areas dealing with transnational issues – particularly in immigration and environment. This trend also appears for both elite groups in the cases of fighting unemployment and taxation policies, and for economic elites in health care issues. The positions of Spanish elites are, in general terms, closer to the EU average than in Portugal. There are, however, some interesting differences. For instance, the percentage of the economic elites who consider that immigration should be fully Europeanized is considerably higher than the average, while this perception reverses (though to a less extent) in the case of fighting against crime.

3 All significant differences mentioned in the descriptive sections of the chapter refer to an analysis based on standardized typified residuals (not shown in tables).



Table 5.3. Preferred level of government (IntUne second wave, relative frequencies)

	Fighting unemployment			Immigration policy				
	Portugal	Spain	EU	Portugal	Spain	EU		
Political elite	National/subnacional level	41.2	61.7	64.6	19.1	13.6	27.4	
	Shared	23.5	14.8	20.5	17.6	18.5	22.6	
	EU level	35.3	23.5	14.9	63.2	67.9	50.1	
Media elite	N	68	81	1056	68	81	1053	
	National/subnacional level	45.7	61.4	57.3	11.1	10.9	16.7	
	Shared	8.6	6.8	22	8.3	6.5	22.5	
Trade union elite	EU level	45.7	31.8	20.7	80.6	82.6	60.9	
	N	35	44	502	36	46	514	
	National/subnacional level	56.3	47.6	53.4	43.8	14.3	26.7	
Citizens	Shared	25	4.8	26.7	18.8	9.5	25	
	EU level	18.8	47.6	19.8	37.5	76.2	48.3	
	N	16	21	258	16	21	258	
Political elite	National/subnacional level	53.7	64	68.8	41.9	38.2	50.8	
	EU level	42	32.4	25.7	55.3	59.1	45	
	N	980	994	15238	967	982	15003	
✻								
			Fight against crime			Health care policy		
			Portugal	Spain	EU	Portugal	Spain	EU
Political elite	National/subnacional level	13.2	25.9	38	22.1	74.1	74.1	74.1
	Shared	26.5	23.5	31.8	35.3	8.6	16.1	16.1
	EU level	60.3	50.6	30.3	42.6	17.3	9.8	9.8
Media elite	N	68	81	1055	68	81	1056	1056
	National/subnacional level	8.6	26.1	41.4	33.3	67.4	71.6	71.6
	Shared	11.4	15.2	29.8	13.9	10.9	15.2	15.2

Trade union elite	EU level	80	58.7	28.8	52.8	21.7	13.2	
	N	35	46	507	36	46	508	
Citizens	National/subnacional level	18.8	14.3	33.4	25	81	67.2	
	Shared	43.8	9.5	31.7	25	0	17.2	
	EU level	37.5	76.2	34.9	50	19	15.6	
Political elite	N	16	21	256	16	21	256	
	National/subnacional level	51.7	40.6	54.3	70	79.4	76.5	
	EU level	42.8	54.3	38.9	26.4	18.7	19.6	
Media elite	N	980	990	15264	983	989	15245	
	✻							
				Agriculture policy			Energy policy	
			Portugal	Spain	EU	Portugal	Spain	EU
Political elite	National/subnacional level	64.7	16	32.3	35.3	22.5	24.9	
	Shared	22.1	12.3	26.7	27.9	13.8	30.5	
	EU level	13.2	71.6	41	36.8	63.8	44.5	
Media elite	N	68	81	1052	68	80	1049	
	National/subnacional level	63.9	10.9	27.7	38.9	6.7	14.5	
	Shared	11.1	10.9	25.2	22.2	6.7	26.8	
Trade union elite	EU level	25	78.3	47.1	38.9	86.7	58.7	
	N	36	46	510	36	45	508	
	National/subnacional level	68.8	14.3	30.9	50	19	16.6	
Citizens	Shared	12.5	4.8	25	25	4.8	29.8	
	EU level	18.8	81	44.1	25	76.2	53.7	
	N	16	21	254	16	21	256	
Political elite	National/subnacional level	67.4	70.5	66.9				
	EU level	29.3	27.1	28.6				
	N	947	988	15109				

Note: see Table 5.2.

Despite these overall patterns, there are also remarkable differences between countries. The percentages of Portuguese political elites who prefer decisions to be exclusively taken at the EU level are significantly higher than those in Spain in all policy areas but fighting against crime. The same pattern applies to economic elites in the case of fighting unemployment, environment, health care, and fighting crime. In its turn, Spanish economic elites prefer taxation to be shared between domestic and EU authorities in a significantly higher proportion than their Portuguese counterparts.

#### *Second wave*

Table 5.3 shows the results for the second wave of the InUline elite survey, where economic elites were substituted by members of the national media and union ones. Besides, the question on taxation policy was eliminated from the questionnaire, which now incorporated two new policy areas—agriculture and energy.

Again, an examination of preferences by policy area reveals that environment, immigration and fighting against crime are still policies where, in general, elites tend to favour Europeanization in a greater extent. Therefore, the sum of those that think authority in these areas should be shared or exercised exclusively by EU institutions is always above 70% for all subsamples—with the exception of environment and immigration in the case of Portuguese trade union elite. Besides, a majority (more than 60%) of all elite members in both countries—with the exception of Portuguese trade unionists too—also favour the Europeanization of energy issues. Here we can consider energy also as a policy area with a clear transnational component, confirming again Wessel and Kielhorn's hypothesis. In contrast, support for Europeanization is much lower—particularly in Spain—for health care and fighting unemployment.

Regarding the other policy area not included in the first wave—agriculture—no clear and common pattern appears in any of the two countries. This area has been also identified as having both a high cross-country and cross-border problem load (Wessels and Kielhorn, 1999: 178). This assertion is in line with the figures in the cells corresponding to the EU average, which demonstrate a high degree of support for the Europeanization of this

policy area. However, the percentages for Portugal show that elites' preferences in this country are quite different from this general view.

As in the first wave, we also find differences between elites within each country. In Portugal we observe the significant contrast existing in the preferences for a full Europeanization of immigration between the media and trade union elites—being the former much more in favour. The pattern repeats in the case of fighting against crime. In its turn, the percentages of Portuguese media elites who prefer authority to be shared in environmental and health care are also significantly lower than those among political elites. In Spain, there is a significant contrast between elite groups in environment and energy issues, being political elites significantly less in favour than media elites since the fact that these areas are exclusively dealt at the EU level.

In the second wave we also observe how Portuguese citizens are generally more prone to believe policy making should remain under national authority—the contrast is particularly outstanding in the cases of health care, agriculture, fight against crime and environmental policies. In the cases of immigration and fighting unemployment, however, the opinions are very similar to those of trade union elites—in fact, though the difference is not substantial, the latter are relatively more in favour of these policies remain under national jurisdiction than citizens. In Spain, we observe the same general pattern as in Portugal. In this case, differences between citizens and elites are remarkable in the cases of agriculture, environment, immigration, and fighting against crime. For unemployment, the percentage of citizens who think this policy should remain under domestic jurisdiction is very similar to those for political and media elites. The same applies for health care policy, but this time in the case of the trade union elite.

Looking at table 5.3, we also observe clear divergences between countries. Portuguese political elite has a significant more pro-EU stance/position/point of view (preferring either shared or exclusive EU competences over exclusive domestic authority) in environment, and health care. In contrast, the Spanish political elite shows a significantly more favourable stance towards the Europeanization (total or partial) of agriculture and energy, while for fighting unemployment the percentage of Spanish political elite who think this area should be kept under exclusive domestic jurisdiction is clearly above the one in Portugal. In turn, Iberian media elites have significantly different opinions regarding health care (as in the case

of political elites, Portuguese media leaders tend to think this area should be fully Europeanized), agriculture, energy (here Spanish media elites are significantly more in favour they are exclusively dealt at the EU level) and fighting against crime (the proportion of those who think this policy should remain under domestic jurisdiction is much lower in Portugal). In the case of trade union elites, again the Portuguese are significantly more in favour health care is completely Europeanized, as well as crime fighting. In contrast, Spanish trade unionists are more pro EU regarding agriculture, energy, and immigration policies.

Concerning the differences of the averages for the whole set of countries included in the sample, it clearly appears that these ones are much more abundant here than in the first wave. In Portugal, specific policy preferences also clearly differ from the general support pattern described in table 5.1. This country's political elites are significantly more pro-EU (in the sense they are more supportive of a full Europeanization) in all policy areas but energy and, above all, agriculture. Media elites present the same pattern—though in environment and immigration, the percentages of those who prefer shared authority is also significantly lower than the average. Portuguese trade union elites also adjust to these patterns in all policy areas, but in the cases of environment and immigration, where they are significantly favour in a greater extent than the average these policies remain under national jurisdiction. In Spain, specific policy-making preferences follow a similar pattern to the general support attitudes. All elites are significantly more favourable than the average to a full Europeanization in agriculture, energy, fighting crime, and immigration. Along with these policy areas, Spanish media and trade union elites also prefer in a greater extent than the average fighting unemployment to be fully decided by EU institutions. In addition, in the case of the trade union elite, they are significantly less prone than the average to consider health care should remain under exclusive domestic jurisdiction.

We must also refer to the changes in each country between both waves. As mentioned above, the changes in design introduced in the 2009 survey limit the possibility of comparison to the political elite, and just for five policy areas—fighting unemployment, health care, fighting against crime, immigration, and environment. In Portugal, the most remarkable change is found in health care policy, where we observe an outstanding increase of the

percentage of members of the political elite who think that decision making in this area should be fully Europeanized or, at least, shared between domestic and supranational institutions. There is also an interesting increase of pro-EU opinions regarding fighting crime. In Spain, there was an increase in all the six policy areas in the proportion of those thinking they should be dealt exclusively at the EU level—in the cases of fighting unemployment, health care, and environment such increase would correspond to a redistribution of pro-EU positions—an increase in the proportion of interviewees who think the respective they should be dealt exclusively at the EU level accompanied by an almost equivalent reduction of the percentage of those believing authority should be shared.

Table 5.4. Preferences for full Europeanization in 10 years (IntUne survey, first wave, relative frequencies)

	Unified tax system		Common social security		Single foreign policy				
	Portugal	Spain	Portugal	Spain	EU	Portugal	Spain	EU	
Political elite	Against 28,2	25,8	43,7	15,2	14	35	11,3	8,6	14,5
	In favour 71,8	73,1	54,8	84,8	86	64	88,8	91,4	84,7
N	78	93	1309	79	93	1312	80	93	1318
Economic elite	Against 37,5	21,8	40,2	20	13,4	37	7,5	3,6	10,2
	In favour 62,5	78,2	58,9	80	83,6	62	92,5	94,6	88,8
N	40	55	683	40	55	683	40	55	683
Citizens	Against 36,2	31,1	38,5	12,4	12,5	23	23,1	19,4	22,3
	In favour 57,8	68,8	57,9	84,2	87,4	75	68,5	80,4	74,6
N	856	958	13964	879	976	14236	784	967	13978

Note: The question wording was: "Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years or so, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following: 1) A unified tax system for the EU; 2) A common system of social security in the EU; 3) A single EU foreign policy toward outside countries." Answers: "strongly in favour", "somewhat in favour", "somewhat against", "strongly against", "neither in favour nor against". The percentage remaining to reach one hundred corresponds to the response option "neither in favour nor against".

## Long term policy-making preferences

The IntUne surveys also included a number of questions aiming to ascertain the preferences of elites and citizens on the complete Europeanization of three policy areas which remain under domestic authority almost completely (taxation, social security, and foreign policy) within ten years. Given this time span, we consider these long term policy-making preferences.

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the results for each respective survey wave. Here, patterns are closer to those observed for general support, since a majority of respondents in Portugal and Spain (both elites and citizens) are (somewhat or strongly) in favour of the Europeanization of the three policy areas. This is in line too with the average of the countries included in the sample—although opinions are usually more enthusiastic in the Iberian countries. However, we can also observe variation between policy areas, with taxation having a lower proportion of interviewees who support its full Europeanization in comparison with the other two. This difference is systematic along countries, survey waves, and types of samples, with the exception of the Portuguese trade union elite, where the percentage of those favourable to the Europeanization of taxation is slightly higher than the corresponding to those who think that there should be a common social security policy in ten years.

Comparing elites within countries, in the first wave, differences between elites in Portugal are not significant but in the case of taxation. Besides, political elites are more favourable than their economic counterparts to a complete Europeanization in two of the areas (taxation and social security). As in Portugal, Spanish economic elites are also more favourable than political elites to a single foreign policy within ten years. The same occurs in the case of taxation. However, the differences observed between elites are not statistically significant either.

In the second wave, the Portuguese media elite shows a more pro-EU stance than the other elite groups in all policy areas—being the difference particularly remarkable in foreign policy, where media leaders almost unanimously agree with this area being fully Europeanized in ten years. Besides, comparing Portuguese political and trade union elites, the percentage of those among the former supporting a full Europeanization are higher in

social security and foreign policy. In Spain, trade union elites are the elite group with the most favourable stance to both a unified tax and a common social security system, while this difference reverses regarding foreign policy. Besides, in the case of Spanish political elites, though strongly pro-European (always above three quarters), the percentage of those in favour of the full Europeanization in 10 years of taxation and social security are clearly behind the corresponding in the other elite groups.

With respect to the differences between citizens (whose opinion, remember, was mainly favourable to a full Europeanization of the three policy areas in the long term) and elites, in Portugal, they are significant in the cases of taxation and foreign policy in the first wave—citizens were less supportive for a full Europeanization of these policy areas in the long term (in the first case, only compared with the political elite). In the second wave the difference persists in foreign policy, while in the case of social security, Portuguese citizens become significantly more in favour of its Europeanization than their fellow national elites. In the first wave, Spanish citizens were significantly less prone to support a single foreign policy than economic and political elites. This pattern is also present in the second wave where, in addition, the difference between the media and trade union elites and the general public regarding the Europeanization of taxation is remarkable.

Comparing both countries, in the first wave it is worth highlighting (albeit not statistically significant) the difference in the case of economic elites when asked on the unification of taxation—being the Spanish members of this subsample more in favour than the Portuguese. In the second wave, significant differences between countries appear in the preferences regarding the long term Europeanization of taxation and social security policies. In the first case, Spanish political elites are more pro-European than those in Portugal. With respect to social security, significant differences affect the three elite groups, being the Portuguese respondents—despite their majority support for the Europeanization of social security—comparatively less enthusiastic than their Spanish counterparts.

We have mentioned that, in general, the support of Iberian elites to policy-making Europeanization in the long term is clearly above the average in the other member States included in the samples of both waves of the IntUne survey. Nevertheless, table 5.5 shows an exception to this general pattern. Here we observe that the Portuguese trade union elite is less sup-

portive than the European average with respect to the full Europeanization of the three considered policy areas—particularly in the case social security.

Finally, regarding the changes occurred in the second wave compared with the first one—which, remember, can be evaluated only for political elites—a remarkable change implies the decrease in Portugal of the percentage of those supporting the long term Europeanization of the three policy areas, particularly significant in the cases of taxation and social security (9.2 and 11 percentage points below, respectively). This is clearly in contrast with the situation in Spain and the average of the countries included in the sample, where pro-EU positions slightly increase in the second wave.

Table 5.5. Preferences for Europeanization in 10 years. (IntUne survey, second wave, relative frequencies)

	Unified tax system			Common social security			Single foreign policy		
	Portugal	Spain	EU	Portugal	Spain	EU	Portugal	Spain	EU
Political elite									
Against	37,3	21,5	43,4	26,5	12,5	34	13,2	4,9	13,2
In favour	62,6	77,2	55,8	73,5	86,2	65	86,8	93,8	85,8
N	67	79	1053	68	80	1058	68	81	1063
Media elite									
Against	27,7	15,2	35,8	22,3	6,5	35	2,8	0	10,3
In favour	72,2	84,7	63,5	77,7	93,5	64	97,2	97,8	89
N	36	46	510	36	46	516	36	46	517
Trade union elite									
Against	33,3	14,2	28,8	25	4,8	17	18,8	4,8	11,7
In favour	66,6	85,7	70,8	62,5	95,2	82	81,2	95,2	86,8
N	15	21	257	16	21	261	16	21	260
Citizens									
Against	37,9	28	38,2	12,6	12,1	22	24,8	17,6	22,5
In favour	60,5	71,2	58,7	85,6	87,2	75	71,4	81,1	74,7
N	930	956	13964	945	976	14236	894	965	13978

Note: see Table 5.4

## Explaining policy-making preferences

A question following the previous descriptive section is what explains the observed patterns. In this respect, the literature on the support for EU integration provides four basic types of explanatory arguments accounting for individual preferences (see other chapters in this volume for variations on this theme): 1) the functional/instrumental argument (support depends on the benefits individuals or their countries receive from EU membership) (Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993); 2) explanations focusing on the role of political ideology (in its common expression along the left-right axis) (Hix and Lord, 1997; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Marks and Steenbergen, 2002; Gabel and Anderson, 2002); 3) arguments emphasizing the influence of identity (identification with the national community is related to a lower level of support) (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; 2008; Risse, 2006; Herrmann, et al., 2004; Carey, 2002; Díez-Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001); and 4) explanations linking support with individual cognitive mobilization (individuals with higher levels of education, knowledge on politics or experience abroad show also higher levels of support for the EU) (Gabel, 1998; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991; Janssen, 1991; Inglehart, 1970).<sup>4</sup> Our interest in this section lies in determining which of these arguments provides a better account of Portuguese and Spanish elites' policy-making preferences in both waves of the IntUne survey.

In this respect, it is necessary to mention that, given the small size of the samples in the two countries, statistical multivariate estimation becomes problematic—particularly when using maximum likelihood estimation. In order to reduce these problems, we have opted to include just one variable for each of the explanatory arguments identified in the literature. This is clearly a limitation, since for all the arguments mentioned there is the possibility of including more than one explanatory variable, reflecting different specifications—i.e., testing extremism along ideology, the role of education vs. experience abroad, or comparing the influence of material benefits with the functioning of national or supranational institutions. Therefore, our analysis includes a number of choices within these different possibilities.

4 An extensive review of these arguments can be found in Real-Dato et al. (2012).

Thus, for the functional/instrumental argument we include a variable which extends that functional/instrumental explanation to the global perception of the working of EU institutions, the *average trust in EU institutions* (Council, Parliament, and European Commission, measured in a 0-10 scale) (Rohrschneider, 2002; Sánchez-Cuena, 2000).<sup>5</sup> In the case of ideology, we have included a dummy variable representing this factor (*left*), measuring those interviewees who self-position between the 0 and 4 in a 0-10 points ideology scale). For the identity argument, authors such as Hooghe and Marks (2005) have underlined that the important element in this factor is the degree of exclusiveness in identification. In this respect, we use an independent binary variable measuring if the interviewees feel *exclusively as national* (Portuguese or Spanish)—that is, those individuals who feel somewhat or very attached to its country and, at the same time, not very attached or not attached at all to the EU. And concerning the cognitive mobilization argument, given that elites present highly homogeneous values in the variables usually measuring this factor for citizens (education, interest in politics), we have opted to include another binary variable trying to uncover the relationship between having any working or studying *experience abroad* and a predisposition to support the Europeanization of policy-making. Finally, the models also contain two control variables—sex (*female*) and the respondents' *age*. Table 5.6 offers the summary statistics for all the independent variables in the analysis.

As in the descriptive section, we use general support as a reference for comparison. Table 5.7 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression on the variable measuring on a 0-10 scale the degree interviewees consider European integration should be strengthened. The only factor that has a significant coefficient in both countries and waves is the level of *trust in EU institutions*—running in the expected direction. In the case of Spain, *ideology* (self-positioning in the 'left') is also significant in both waves. In Portugal, along with the level of trust in EU institutions, general support

is also explained in the first wave by the variable representing the *identity* argument (exclusive national identity, the effect running in the expected direction); and in the second wave, by the *type of elite*, being political elites less pro-EU than the rest, in accordance with what has been remarked in the previous descriptive analysis.

Table 5.6. Independent variables (main descriptive statistics, IntUNE survey, first and second waves)

	FIRST WAVE				Spain					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Political elite	120	0.67	0.47	0	1	149	0.63	0.48	0	1
Left	119	0.27	0.45	0	1	148	0.28	0.45	0	1
Average trust EU	119	5.84	1.73	1.5	10	148	6.12	1.50	2	10
Exclusive national	120	0.04	0.20	0	1	147	0.07	0.25	0	1
Experience abroad	120	0.45	0.50	0	1	149	0.33	0.47	0	1
Female	120	0.19	0.40	0	1	149	0.27	0.44	0	1
Age	120	51.17	10.86	30	73	148	53.36	9.31	26	73
	SECOND WAVE				Spain					
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Political elite	120	0.57	0.50	0	1	148	0.55	0.50	0	1
Left	118	0.42	0.50	0	1	147	0.46	0.50	0	1
Average trust EU	120	5.73	1.91	0	10	148	6.03	1.87	1	10
Exclusive national	120	0.05	0.22	0	1	148	0.06	0.24	0	1
Experience abroad	120	0.32	0.47	0	1	148	0.38	0.49	0	1
Female	120	0.31	0.46	0	1	148	0.24	0.43	0	1
Age	120	49.73	11.00	30	76	148	51.08	8.56	28	72

5 For this instrumental/evaluative explanatory argument, we also tried with another dummy variable measuring the individuals' perception of the benefits their country had obtained by being a member of the EU (*my country has benefited from EU membership*). This variable reflected a 'sociotropic' version (Hooghe and Marks, 2005 of the classical egoistic instrumental argument employed in public opinion studies on EU support. However, given the high degree homogeneity (or, in other terms, low variability) of opinions on this subject in both countries, we had to eliminate it from the analysis.

Table 5.7. Models for general support (OLS regression, IntUnc first and second waves)

	FIRST WAVE		SECOND WAVE	
	Portugal	Spain	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	115	144	117	146
F statistic	2.75	3.9	2.88	4.15
Prob > F	0.012	0.001	0.009	0.000
R-squared	0.210	0.156	0.171	0.173
Root MSE	2.107	1.444	2.134	1.847
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>
Political elite	-0.060	0.032	-0.987	0.104
Left	-0.201	0.763	0.492	0.676
Average trust EU	0.476	0.271	0.422	0.312
Exclusive national	-2.421	-0.265	0.214	-1.525
Experience abroad	-0.118	0.186	0.601	-0.277
Female	-0.438	0.082	0.335	-0.186
Age	-0.001	0.001	0.017	0.029
Constant	4.351	6.034	3.808	4.996

Note: Robust standard errors. Range of the dependent variable: 0-10.

Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the results of the models for short term policy-making preferences. We only include the models with significant results in both countries—in some cases, this entails to eliminate some independent variables. The models referred to the first wave (table 5.8) include one transnational policy area (immigration) and the three domestic ones (taxation, fighting unemployment, and health care). Here we observe different patterns between countries. In the case of Portugal, something to remark is the negative, significant coefficient of *exclusive national identity* in all models. In other words, it is less likely that Portuguese respondents who feel exclusively attached to their country prefer authority to be shared between national and EU levels than decision to remain under exclusive domestic jurisdiction. In contrast, in the models for Spanish elites, this variable is significant only in the case of fighting unemployment. In turn, the socio-

tropic functional/instrumental argument only works in the models for taxation, fighting unemployment, and health care policy in the case of Spanish elites—respondents with higher levels of *trust in EU institutions* are more likely to support decisions in these policy areas being shared between domestic and EU authorities. Concerning ideology, again, it is only significant variable for Spanish elites in the fighting unemployment and immigration models—interviewees who see themselves in the *left* are significantly more likely to prefer decisions to be taken exclusively at EU level (immigration) or jointly with domestic authorities (fighting unemployment). In its turn, the variable representing the cognitive mobilization argument (*experience abroad*) does not show significant coefficients in any model.

Table 5.8. Models explaining short term policy-making preferences in several policy areas (multinomial logistic regression, IntUnc first wave)

	Immigration	
	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	118	145
Wald chi2	4310.08	19.55
Log pseudolikelihood	-85.953	-140.857
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.034
Pseudo R2	0.101	0.064
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>
Shared (*)		
Political elite	0.739	-0.308
Left	-0.010	0.971
Average trust EU	0.410	0.270
Exclusive national	-34.570	*** -1.097
Experience abroad	0.327	0.463
Female	-0.237	
Age	0.000	
Constant	-2.400	-1.750

EU exclusively (*)			
Political elite	0.101	-1.304	**
Left	-0.155	1.063	*
Average trust EU	0.291	0.146	
Exclusive national	-1.644	-0.335	
Experience abroad	0.524	0.495	
Female	-0.975		
Age	-0.036		
Constant	1.482	0.306	
Taxation			
Portugal			
Number of observations	118	146	
Wald chi2	3758.46	14.43	
Log pseudolikelihood	-109.19	-140.45	
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.025	
Pseudo R2	0.095	0.061	
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	
Shared (*)			
Political elite	0.727	-0.601	
Left	0.953	0.455	
Average trust EU	0.461	0.442	**
Exclusive national	-34.306	***	
Experience abroad	0.037		
Female	-0.267		
Age	-0.003		
Constant	-4.447	-3.274	***

EU exclusively (*)			
Political elite	-0.154	-1.270	**
Left	0.590	0.715	
Average trust EU	0.077	0.043	
Exclusive national	-1.118		
Experience abroad	-0.039		
Female	-1.386	*	
Age	-0.042		
Constant	1.152	-0.500	
Unemployment			
Portugal			
Number of observations	118	144	
Wald chi2	4670.88	6997.49	
Log pseudolikelihood	-106.99	-110.11	
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	
Pseudo R2	0.109	0.114	
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>	
Shared (*)			
Political elite	0.622	-0.413	
Left	0.758	1.267	**
Average trust EU	0.366	0.430	*
Exclusive national	-36.591	***	
Experience abroad	-0.707	-0.727	
Female	1.095	0.308	
Age	0.045	-0.029	
Constant	-5.467	-2.761	*



Experience abroad	-0.223	2.435
Female	0.300	1.840
Age	-0.040	-0.206 ***
Constant	1.699	2.255

Note: Robust standard errors; \*  $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.005$ ; (\*) 'National/subnational level' is the basic outcome.

With respect to the type of elite, for health care policy, Portuguese political elites are significantly less likely to prefer decision making to be ceded completely to EU institutions to it remains under exclusive domestic authority. In the case of Spanish elites, this occurs in the models for immigration, taxation, and health care. Finally, concerning the control variables, they are also significant in the taxation model for Portugal—*female* interviewees are less likely to think this policy area should be exclusively dealt at the EU level—and in the health care model in Spain—older interviewees are less likely to prefer this policy to be fully Europeanized.

Table 5.9 shows the significant models for short term preferences in the second wave—those run on environment, energy, fighting unemployment, health care, and agriculture policy. As in the first wave, patterns in significant variables differ between the two countries. In the case of Portugal, we observe *again* how *exclusive national identification* has a significant coefficient—with the expected effect—in all the models. For Spanish elites, that variable is significant in the energy, health care, and agriculture models. In the same vein as in the first wave, the variable representing the ideology explanatory argument is only significant in the fighting unemployment model for Spanish elites—*leftist* respondents are more likely to consider this policy area should be exclusively dealt at the EU level than it remains under sole domestic jurisdiction. In its turn, the coefficients for *trust in EU institutions* are only significant for the Spanish elite in the case of those preferring decision making in energy policy to be shared between the domestic and EU levels. Concerning the cognitive mobilization argument, having any working or studying *experience abroad* has a significant coefficient only in the environment model for Spanish elites – it is more likely that, in this policy area, respondents prefer sharing decision making between EU and

EU exclusively (*)			
Political elite	-0.136	-0.381	
Left	0.454	1.120	
Average trust EU	0.169	-0.059	
Exclusive national	-0.882	-37.230 ***	
Experience abroad	-0.617	-1.029	
Female	-0.748	-0.313	
Age	-0.036	-0.025	
Constant	0.392	-0.162	
	Health Care		
	Portugal		Spain
Number of observations	118	143	
Wald chi2	4171.15	45.64	
Log pseudolikelihood	-81.83	-78.80	
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	
Pseudo R2	0.081	0.177	
	Coef.	Coef.	
Shared (*)			
Political elite	0.766	0.030	
Left	-0.373	-0.069	
Average trust EU	0.117	0.361 *	
Exclusive national	-32.940 ***	0.746	
Experience abroad	0.278	0.029	
Female	0.405	0.983	
Age	-0.015	-0.001	
Constant	-2.827	-4.059 **	
EU exclusively (*)			
Political elite	-1.390 *	-3.650 ***	
Left	-0.314	-1.726	
Average trust EU	-0.173	0.214	
Exclusive national	-33.378 ***	1.938	

domestic institutions to the fact that it remains exclusively under the exclusive control of national or regional authorities.

Table 5.9. Models explaining short term policy-making preferences in several policy areas (multinomial logistic regression, InULme second wave)

	Environment	
	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	118	147
Wald chi2	3422.04	15.8
Log pseudolikelihood	-69.19	-117.98
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.045
Pseudo R2	0.226	0.074
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>
Shared (*)		
Political elite	3.524 ***	-0.660
Left	-0.388	0.614
Average trust EU	0.018	0.304
Exclusive national	-34.336 ***	
Experience abroad	0.578	1.495 *
Female	0.567	
Age	0.017	
Constant	-2.444	-2.379
EU exclusively (*)		
Political elite	1.400	-1.342 **
Left	-0.667	0.491
Average trust EU	0.238	0.268
Exclusive national	-2.598 **	
Experience abroad	0.724	0.457
Female	-0.978	
Age	-0.024	
Constant	1.522	0.241

	Energy	
	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	118	145
Wald chi2	5065.87	4828.53
Log pseudolikelihood	-120.41	-101.13
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.058	0.096
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>
Shared (*)		
Political elite	0.436	-0.188
Left	-0.253	-0.218
Average trust EU	-0.043	0.406 *
Exclusive national	-37.052 ***	-37.704 ***
Experience abroad	0.749	1.004
Female	0.614	-0.606
Age	-0.014	-0.052
Constant	-0.256	-1.168
EU exclusively (*)		
Political elite	-0.040	-1.222 *
Left	-0.106	0.448
Average trust EU	0.173	0.260
Exclusive national	-1.359	-0.548
Experience abroad	0.116	0.517
Female	-0.272	0.093
Age	-0.002	-0.032
Constant	-0.830	1.409

Unemployment		
	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	118	145
Wald chi2	4149.44	22.16
Log pseudolikelihood	-118.74	-122.32
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.036
Pseudo R2	0.038	0.077
	<i>Coef.</i>	
Shared (*)		
Political elite	0.800	0.797
Left	0.419	0.672
Average trust EU	-0.032	0.077
Exclusive national	-34.463	***
Experience abroad	0.260	0.907
Female	0.332	-0.385
Age	0.021	0.016
Constant	-2.147	-3.805 ***
EU exclusively (*)		
Political elite	0.001	*** -0.635
Left	-0.259	1.084 **
Average trust EU	0.068	0.200
Exclusive national	-0.205	
Experience abroad	0.120	-0.058
Female	0.196	-0.411
Age	0.003	0.029
Constant	-0.704	-2.964 *

Health Care		
	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	118	147
Wald chi2	3916.01	3548.74
Log pseudolikelihood	-105.60	-100.34
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.156	0.092
	<i>Coef.</i>	
Shared (*)		
Political elite	1.011	-0.135
Left	-0.650	-1.513
Average trust EU	-0.161	0.312
Exclusive national	-36.935	*** -34.243 ***
Experience abroad	1.091	1.428
Female	2.322	** 0.028
Age	0.006	-0.002
Constant	-0.114	-4.246 *
EU exclusively (*)		
Political elite	-0.040	-0.495
Left	-0.986	0.356
Average trust EU	-0.140	0.136
Exclusive national	-37.074	*** 0.658
Experience abroad	0.996	-0.066
Female	1.933	* 0.261
Age	0.006	0.050 *
Constant	1.255	-3.887 ***

Agriculture	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	118	147
Wald chi2	5513.18	4316.76
Log pseudolikelihood	-97.60	-98.58
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.067	0.089
	<i>Coef.</i>	<i>Coef.</i>
Shared (*)		
Political elite	0.722	-0.030
Left	0.748	-0.265
Average trust EU	0.070	0.357
Exclusive national	-37.068	-34.294
Experience abroad	0.109	1.221
Female	0.793	-1.402
Age	0.010	0.011
Constant	-3.095	-2.474
EU exclusively (*)		
Political elite	-0.743	-0.345
Left	0.358	-0.241
Average trust EU	0.132	0.247
Exclusive national	0.704	-1.714
Experience abroad	0.368	0.327
Female	-0.353	-1.315
Age	0.016	-0.001
Constant	-2.477	1.043

Note: Robust standard errors: \*  $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.005$ . (\*) National/subnational level is the base outcome.

Table 5.9 also shows the presence of significant coefficients for the type of elite in both countries. Compared with their counterparts in mass media and trade unions, members of the Portuguese *political elite* are more likely

to prefer environment and fighting unemployment policies to be dealt, respectively, jointly by national and EU authorities or at the EU level exclusively. In turn, respondents belonging to the Spanish political elite are significantly less likely to think that decisions concerning environment and energy policy should be made at the EU level exclusively. Regarding the two control variables, sex is significant in health care and agriculture policies for Portuguese and Spanish elites respectively—in the first case, *female* interviewees are more likely to prefer decisions to be shared or taken solely by EU authorities, while in the second, the sign of the coefficient reverses in the 'EU exclusively' part of the model. Finally, respondents' *age* has a positive, significant coefficient in the health care model for Spanish elites — it is more likely that the older the interviewees are, the more they prefer this policy area to be decided just at the EU level.

Comparing results in both waves, there are some interesting findings. In Portugal, the only theoretical argument which significantly explains elites' individual short term preferences in all the policy areas we have examined is the one linked to the respondents' *exclusive identification* with their country. In contrast, none of the other explanatory arguments is confirmed by the multivariate models. Another stable pattern found in the Portuguese elite in both waves is the absence of any significant effect of the variable *age* in all considered policy areas. In Spain, we do not find such continuities along time. The only exceptions are the significant effect of *ideology* on the fighting unemployment models, and that of *age* in the preferences on the Europeanization of health care. In contrast with Portugal, all theoretical arguments find support at both waves—excepting the cognitive mobilization argument in the first one. However, leaving aside the case of unemployment and the mentioned impact of ideology, there is not a stable, clearly defined pattern, either by policy areas or by type of policy (domestic or transnational).

Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the results of the multivariate models for long term Europeanization preferences. Again, in the first wave (table 5.10) we observe that models for taxation and social security did not differ statistically significant results in Portugal and Spain, respectively. For the significant models,<sup>6</sup> only two explanatory arguments present significant

6 In the case of the taxation model for Spanish elites, we had to eliminate some variables of the full model to get a significant Wald chi square statistic.

Regarding the control variables, only the coefficient for *female* is significant in the models of taxation and foreign policy for Portuguese and Spanish elites, respectively—women are less likely than men to support these areas being fully Europeanized in 10 years.

In the second wave (table 5.11) all models are significant. In contrast with the first wave, the coefficient for *exclusive national identity* is significant only in the social security model for Spanish elites. In its turn, the *functional/instrumental argument* finds confirmation in both taxation models, as well as in that for social security in the case of Portugal. This model and the one for foreign policy also confirm the significant influence of *ideology* in Portuguese elites' preferences observed in the first wave—being those respondents who position themselves on the *left* side of the ideological axis more likely not to favour Europeanization in the respective policy areas. Concerning the cognitive mobilization argument, the corresponding variable (*experience abroad*) has a statistically significant coefficient only in the foreign policy model for Portuguese elite.

With respect to the rest of variables, as in the first wave, the *elite group* the interviewees belong to does not have any significant influence in their preferences on the full Europeanization of the three policy areas in the long term. And, of the two control variables, only *age* presents significant, positive coefficients in the two taxation models, as well as in that on social security for Spanish elites.

Table 5.11. Models explaining preferences on the full Europeanization in 10 years of several policy areas (logistic regression, IntUne second wave)

	Taxation	
	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	118	145
Wald chi2	11.81	16.25
Log pseudolikelihood	-67.76	-61.99
Prob > chi2	0.038	0.023
Pseudo R2	0.103	0.129
	Coef.	
Political elite	-0.567	-0.926

coefficients. On the one hand, members of the Portuguese political and economic elite who feel *exclusively attached to their country* are less likely to favour a common social security system and a single foreign policy than those without such an attachment, and the same applies for Spanish elites in the case of foreign policy. On the other hand, Portuguese and Spanish elites' long term preferences on foreign policy and taxation, respectively, are significantly influenced by the degree of *trust in EU institutions*—a higher level of trust increases the likelihood of being in favour of the Europeanization of those policy areas.

Table 5.10. Models explaining preferences on the full Europeanization in 10 years of several policy areas (logistic regression, IntUne first wave)

	Social Security		Taxation		Foreign Policy	
	Portugal	Spain	Portugal	Spain	Portugal	Spain
Number of observations	117	147	118	143		
Wald chi2	9.58	7.63	18.89	23.26		
Log pseudo-likelihood	-47.59	-78.87	-24.89	-32.90		
Prob > chi2	0.213	0.022	0.009	0.002		
Pseudo R2	0.083	0.049	0.359	0.152		
	Coef.		Coef.		Coef.	
Political elite	0.300		-0.144	-0.432		
Left	-0.078		-0.620	0.855		
Average trust EU	0.127	0.310	0.815	***	-0.109	
Exclusive national	-2.372	*	-2.547	*	-2.339	**
Experience abroad	-0.317		-1.151	-0.151		
Female	0.313	-0.850	-0.827	-1.717	*	
Age	0.040		0.032	-0.065		
Constant	-0.291	-0.498	-1.531	6.613	*	

Note: robust standard errors; \*, p ≤ 0.05; \*\*, p ≤ 0.01; \*\*\*, p ≤ 0.005

Left		0.783	
Average trust EU	0.245	•	0.363 ***
Exclusive national	1.686		-0.802
Experience abroad	0.784		0.600
Female			0.076
Age	0.059	•	0.067 •
Constant	-2.506	•	-2.784 *
✱			
Social Security			
Portugal			
Number of observations	118		146
Wald chi2	14.81		15.61
Log pseudolikelihood	-61.25		-40.43
Prob > chi2	0.039		0.029
Pseudo R2	0.099		0.164
Coef			
Political elite	-0.256		-1.145
Left	-0.951	•	-0.832
Average trust EU	0.233	•	0.285
Exclusive national	0.610		-1.681 *
Experience abroad	0.645		0.046
Female	0.295		-0.002
Age	0.042		0.076 •
Constant	-1.278		-0.876
✱			
Foreign Policy			
Portugal			
Number of observations	118		147
Wald chi2	18.85		19.24
Log pseudolikelihood	-29.63		-23.62
Prob > chi2	0.004		0.008
Pseudo R2	0.276		0.161

	Coef	Coef
Political elite	-1.453	-0.580
Left	-1.500	•
Average trust EU	0.386	0.078
Exclusive national	-1.229	-1.487
Experience abroad	1.983	**
Female		-0.159
Age	-0.048	-0.065
Constant	3.168	6.050

Note: robust standard errors; •:  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*:  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*:  $p \leq 0.005$ .

Finally, when comparing models for long term competences in both waves, there are only a few continuities, most of them based on negative results. For Spanish elites, these are the positive, significant, influence of the level of *trust in EU institutions* over the preferences on taxation, and the absence of any explanatory role in the *ideology* and *cognitive mobilization* arguments, as well as in the case of the *type of elite*. For Portuguese elites, there is a great variation between the two waves in the explanatory models for long term policy preferences. The only continuities we can observe refer to the non-significant explanatory role of the *cognitive mobilization argument*, the *type of elite*, and *sex* in any model.

### Conclusions

In the introductory section, we stated that the rationale for this chapter was to offer a more nuanced view of the perception Iberian elites have about the European integration process. In this chapter and in other ones of this volume, we have shown how Portuguese and Spanish elites have had a long time a mainly favourable position towards the EU (above the average of the countries included in the sample, particularly among Spanish elites). However, this general stance is partially confirmed when looking at specific policy-making preferences, where we have observed how positions vary along policy areas, the time span considered, and the type of elite. Firstly, the degree of support for the Europeanization of policy making

remarkable ones are, in the case of Portugal, the more pro EU stance of all elite groups concerning health care (consistent in the two waves), fighting unemployment and environment (these only in the first wave). In turn, all Spanish elites are systematically more in favour than their Portuguese counterparts of the complete Europeanization of agriculture and energy policies. In the long term, however, there are few significant differences between countries—only in the second wave, in social security for all elite groups, and taxation for political elite.

When comparing Portuguese and Spanish elites' opinions with the average in the countries included in the IntUne sample, preferences toward the Europeanization of specific policy areas confirm the general support pattern that had been already observed. That is, Iberian elites show a more pro EU stance in almost all policy fields and for almost all elite groups. All the exceptions to this pattern affect Portuguese elites in their short term preferences—in the agriculture and energy policies, all elite groups are significantly less favourable to their Europeanization. Besides, Portuguese trade union elite are also less pro EU than the average in environment and immigration policies.

Finally, in the comparison between the two waves—limited to political elites—it is remarkable that, in the short term, there is an increase in the percentages of those preferring policies are exclusively dealt at the EU level for all policy areas. In Portugal, significant increases in pro EU positions during the second wave are limited to two policy areas—health care and fighting crime. In the long term, in contrast, between 2007 and 2009 there is a decrease among Portuguese political elites in the percentages supporting the full Europeanization of social security and taxation policy. In contrast, in Spain, there are not significant changes between the two waves.

In addition to these descriptive patterns, and despite the problems posed by the small sample sizes, the multivariate analysis has also shown some relevant results. The main one is the evident differences between the explanatory patterns accounting for specific policy-making preferences compared to those for general support. In Portugal, general preferences are mostly explained by instrumental reasons (represented by the variable measuring the level of trust in EU institutions), and by the interviewees' ideology and the type of elite in the first and second waves, respectively. In Spain, the variations on the levels of general support for the Europeaniza-

depends on the domestic or transnational nature of the problems that the policy area considered deals with, confirming the hypothesis which was set out more than a decade ago by Wessels and Kielhorn (1999). We have found that Iberian elites are, in general terms, more favourable to cede policy-making authority in the short term to the EU level in policies such as immigration, environment, energy, fighting against crime, and (this only for Spanish elites) agriculture. In contrast, Iberian elites are less enthusiastic about the Europeanization of health care, taxation and policies against unemployment. In the long term, preferences are also highly favourable to the full Europeanization of taxation, social security, and foreign policy, though Iberian elites find the perspective of a unified taxation system somewhat less attractive than the equivalent alternative in the other policy fields.

We have also observed divergences among elites within each country, some of them quite outstanding. For instance, in the short term, Spanish economic elites show a more pro-EU stance than their political counterparts in four out of the six policy areas we analyse. This pattern reverses when considering long term preferences—political elites are more in favour than economic elites of a full Europeanization of taxation, social security, and foreign policy—though differences are not significant. In the case of Portugal, there are significant differences between the short term preferences of media and the other two elite groups also in four policy areas.

In the previous pages we have also compared the opinions of elites and citizens, showing that, when considering short term preferences, citizens are more prone to think specific policy areas should remain under domestic jurisdiction. This is in line with the differences we observe in general support—with the exception of Portuguese political elites.<sup>7</sup> In the long term, this general pattern remains in most policy areas, with significant differences in foreign policy (in the two waves and countries), and taxation (just for Spain, also in the two waves). The only case where the pattern breaks is in Portugal in the second wave, where citizens appear significantly more in favour of the full Europeanization of social security than elites.

Our analysis has also revealed significant differences in the short term between the two countries in all policy areas in the two waves. The most

7 In the first wave, on a scale from 0-10, where 0 means 'EU has gone too far' and 10 'EU should be strengthened,' Portuguese political elites have an average score of 6.74, while citizens reach a 6.75. In the second wave, the respective scores are 6.43 and 6.87.

tion process are accounted by the same sociotropic instrumental argument and by the respondents' ideology as well in both waves. In contrast, patterns regarding Iberian elites' specific policy-making preferences are much more complex, due to the great difficulty to discern regular explanatory patterns. The most noteworthy remark refers to the systematic and significant relationship found in Portuguese elites for all policy areas between the exclusive national identification (the variable representing in our analysis the identity argument) and short Europeanization policy-making preferences. Besides, among the four explanatory arguments considered, this is the only one which finds support in Portugal for this type of preferences. In Spain, explanatory patterns are more complex. The only explanatory regularities are the significant coefficients found in both waves for ideology and age in the models for fighting unemployment and health care, respectively. Regarding long term preferences, it is even more difficult to find stable explanatory patterns applying to both waves. The only one is found for Spanish elites, where the degree of *trust in EU institutions* has a significant coefficient in the taxation model in both waves. The rest of models confirm the above mentioned complexity in the underlying explanatory patterns for policy-making preferences, both along policy areas, countries, the considered time span and waves.

In sum, our analysis demonstrates—both in descriptive and explanatory terms—that support for the process of EU integration among Portuguese and Spanish elites show different faces depending on the level of generality we focus on. In general terms, elites in Portugal and Spain—as well as their country citizen fellows—show a general, pro-EU stance, in a greater extent than the opinions we find in other member States, and preferences are mostly explained by instrumental (trusting EU institutions increases the level of support for Europeanization—and (only for Spain) ideological reasons. However, this picture changes when we zoom into specific policy areas. The degree of support greatly varies along policies dealing with transnational and non-transnational issues, with differences among elites and countries. And explanations—leaving aside the exceptional systematic pattern found in Portugal (where short term policy preferences depend clearly on the degree members of this country's elite exclusively identify with their national community)—have to be found on a policy-by-policy basis.

## CITIZENS' AND ELITES' SUPPORT FOR THE EU, BEFORE AND AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PERIPHERIES (GREECE, PORTUGAL, AND SPAIN) IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

ANDRÉ FREIRE | CATHERINE MOURY

### Introduction

The international financial crisis, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, plumbd economic growth and reminded financial institutions of the need to inspect more carefully the characteristics of the borrowers. Later on, around 2009–2011, many countries were pointed out as high-risk investments, demands for bonds issues by government decreased and the interest rate shot up. As a result, Ireland, Greece and Portugal were obliged to request loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU), which was granted with very demanding conditions (namely in interest rates and policy reforms in the role of the state and markets' deregulation, especially in the labour market); and Italy and Spain are spotted as risking contagion. All countries, moreover, have passed unpopular and far-reaching austerity measures, but especially those that received the above mentioned loans from the IMF/EU. These events have challenged the legitimacy of the European Union, at least in four different ways.

First, citizens see their national, and for many, individual economic conditions deteriorate—thus threatening the 'output legitimacy' of the Euro-