UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA

Universidad de Granada in cotutelle with Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna.

Programa de Doctorado en Estudios de las Mujeres, Discursos y Prácticas de Género

Dottorato di Ricerca in Lingue, Letterature e Culture Moderne
(Curriculum EDGES – Studi delle donne e di genere)

Title:

Power in Public Art Spaces. Frictions, Performativity and the Generation of Counter-Hegemonic Narratives.

Presented by: Ángela Harris Sánchez.

PhD Coordinator
Amalia Morales Villena.

(University of Granada)

Supervisors
Margarita Sánchez Romero.
Pilar Villar Argáiz.
(University of Granada)

Coordinatrice di Dottorato
Serena Baiesi.
(University of Bologna)

Supervisor
Rita Monticelli.
(University of Bologna)

Granada, 2023.

To my grandparents, Pepe and Daphne, who gave me a home that protects me beyond their lives.

Acknowledgments.

There are many people, groups and projects this thesis is built upon. I want to try and thank all of them for supporting me in this long process, for providing the economic, affective, ideological, political, critical and methodological help for my work and for my own way of thinking.

First, I would like to acknowledge the support received from the Ministry of Education by granting me the FPU fellowship which has allowed my research to become my main occupation. Being recognized and paid to do this is a privilege which resonates with me when many other friends have had to abandon their research because of economic reasons. The FPU, as Formación de Profesorado Universitario, i.e. as also training to become a university professor, has also given me the unique opportunity to discover myself as a teacher, an experience I would never have had without it.

I want to thank my home University, Universidad de Granada, because of many years of public and quality education, and because of its support with the Plan Propio Grant that allowed me to visit Columbia University in New York, which would have been impossible for me to pay for. Thanks, Frances, for inviting me to learn from her classes at the Centro de Estudios de la Etnicidad, where I joined her inspiring "Video as Enquiry" seminars and had the chance to meet the students in her group. Academically, the experience bore results which materialized in two publications and in the opening case study collected in this thesis. Personally, Frances and Maggie were a second family to me in the most needed times of March 2020. You both looked after me when I felt most vulnerable, amidst the fear and loss of incipient Covid in New York. I can never thank you enough for this.

I celebrate and thank the other public and available institutions I have worked with: University of Utrecht and University of Bologna, being affective institutions to me where I started thinking about these projects. UniBo has also hosted me during the cotutelle secondment and there are many people there who have become not only my colleagues but also my friends. Also the many other institutions which have been home for the congresses, talks, summer schools and think tanks I have participated in during these four years. Two people stand out when I think about these places: Vita and Jasmina. Without your wise advice I wouldn't be doing research.

I want to thank my Department, Departamento de Prehistoria y Arqueología, for making a space for me. I thank all my colleagues and, specially, I want to thank its director, Paco, and prior director, Andrés, for finding spots inside their curriculum where my theories could flourish and I

important at the time, and which are now structural parts of my identity. You have always trusted me, even at those times I did not trust myself. Thanks for insisting upon the importance of genealogies.

In these genealogies, thanks to my family, that has broken my haunting knowledges of what kinship should be through their own embodiments and experiences.
I thank my dad, who has taught me importance of intelligent humor and of funny conversations. It is thanks to you that I care about asking people how they are. And it is thanks to you that I can write this thesis in English, which is another genealogical privilege.

Thanks to my uncles, Cris and Jose, for being my other parents. Thanks for giving me a space from where to recognize myself as a lesbian when it seemed impossible to come out. Thanks for finding the connection to Edu and Xyrus, my cousins, but also my nephews, which have been a jump of life for our whole family. I struggle to think about the family prior to their arrival.

Thanks to my grandmother, Lini, who has looked after me in the most loving ways for the past 31 years. You were the first inspiration for me wanting to become a teacher, as you know.

Thanks to all my friends, which make family with me. My best friends Alba, Membri, Pedro, Celia, Blanca, Nat, Marce, Lucía, Dolores, Javi, and to my many amantes-amigas who are the reason I write from autoethnography. Thanks ….

Thanks to my past lovers and to the present ones, for extending the notions I have from love but still loving hard.

Thanks to my Italian family, who I try to see every time I have the chance to (Matteo, Valen, Ana, Giulia, Pau).

Thanks again to Marce, or Mari Paz, depending on who you ask, for being able to calm me in absurd situations the past years. Thanks to Duna, even if our way of acknowledging each other works beyond words.

Thanks to the many people that have been part of my activist life, and which for many reasons are remembered through other names in this thesis.

Eternal thanks to my grandparents Pepe and Daphne, who left the world while I was writing this thesis. As Ocean Vuong writes, "I miss you more than I remember you". Sometimes affect comes before knowledge and that is why this work is for you. Without the homes you provided for me, I would have been unable to enjoy life as much as I have.

Table of Contents.

Abstracts/Riasunto.

Abstract

This thesis applies queer theories to the examination of experiences which go beyond queerness. Decolonial, antiracist and feminist new materialist theories are applied to four case studies dealing with the issue of power and public art spaces. By applying concepts as methodologies, autoethnographic reflections and f(r)ictions as research alternatives, the thesis brings up new diffractive readings from where to perform those scenarios differently. In doing so, the thesis disentangles historical, material, philosophical, political and disruptive meanings which haunt the four case studies and bring out their *artivist* potential.

Riassunto

Questa tesi applica la teoria queer per examinare sperienze che vanno altro il queerness. Teorie decoloniali, antirraciste, feministe e nuevo materialiste si applicano a cuatro casi studi che essaminano il problema del potere e gli spazi artistici publici. Traverso la applicazione di concetti come metodologie, riflesioni autoethnografiche e alternative fictionalizi per la ricerca, porta nuove letture da dove attivare quelli scenario di altre forme. Di questa maniera, si sbogriano significati historici, materiali, filosofici, mistici, politiche e disrutivi che sono spettri dei casi studio presentati in questa disseminazione.

How to read this Thesis.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first two chapters are the frame to the four Case Studies. The introductory chapter is the initial epistemological setting, in which I explore the traditional and historical theoretical genealogies from where I depart, concerning three main issues: power, space and temporalities.

The second chapter corresponds to the methodology, which is in itself another theoretical chapter, since one of the Thesis' explorations is its research praxis, autoethnographic investigation and an approach to theoretical concepts as methodologies.

Chapter three is simply a momentum, a triggering, a temporality of failure and an emergence. It is an unexpected chapter that responds to the voids, loses, and changes the Thesis assumed due to the Covid-19 pandemics. This circumstantial inclusion became essential for my positioning to the subsequent research.

The following Case Studies are structured through a presentation of the artistic experience narrated in each Case Study and its context in relation to my own experience; a "triggering", where a set of concepts arise for the examination of the Case Study; and, finally, a resolution, which diffracts (following Karen Barad feminist New Materialist approaches) with the initial story narrated.

Chapter four examines the first Case Study, the *Valor Y Cambio* project by Frances Negrón-Muntaner, and thinks about the limits of the Archive, while reflecting through the *¿Archivo queer?* Of Reina Sofía Museum, in Madrid.

Chapter five corresponds to the second Case Study in which I explore the liminal space of 7.1km of separation between the archaeological site of Thermi and the refugee camp of Moria, both on the Island of Lesvos, which is set in diffractive analysis with the *Datamatics 2.0* performance by Ryoji Ikeda.

Chapter six deals with the Bologna Case Study, the eviction of a queer liberated space, exploring the contradictions of anti-hegemonic thinking inside activism and proposes new readings of power which can also make radical thinking accountable. This chapter is diffractively read through *Adrift*, created by Gabriella Carrizo and Franck Chartier.

Chapter seven works as a conclusion through the examination of the last case study, which corresponds to the project *Young People's Assembly*, directed by artists Anthony Haughey. It reads diffractively the previous chapters, giving a specific closing to the work.

The Side B conclusions are analogous to the Side B Bibliography, which try to recognize all those lost, silenced, forgotten and excessive conversations which have positioned official theories in the shape that are used in the chapters. It corresponds to a personal art-project which is called "Building a house: pt.1 sleeping with concepts" and which is the first part of a series which I use as a bridge from where to think about my future research. These conclusions, following the drive of "concepts as methodology", work in action and in transition to no closures, which is one of my main tenets in this thesis.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION. SETTING OFF FROM THEORIES AND THE DISSECTION OF THIS BODY.

1.   On power. Foucault's biopolitics in our lives after Zuckerberg

Our starting point to the theoretical locations for this thesis is power. Thinking about how to introduce this part, I have reflected on what all the case studies selected in this research have in common: identity, violence, ethical resistance and agency. As I started writing, I came to the understanding that a discussion of power demands a parallel debate on what we understand as violence, resistance and ethics. Above all -and highlighting this very particular and sometimes invisibilised element- power is not only something received, transmitted or enacted from one body to another, but it also contains in itself the forces of auto-regulation and self-control. Thus, my mention of Zuckerberg in the title responds to the dominant contemporary frames and final destination of the discussions springing from Foucault's surveillance and body controls. In this very particular current scenario violence, resistance and ethics are dependent on the self-surveillance of subjectivities.

In this sense, my critical positioning here is to analyse power in all its forms, contradictions, ambivalences, frictions and fictions. My purpose is to understand what it means to me, to my surroundings and to locate and situate power in relation to my experiences. In particular I am concerned with my experiences of art, since my academic life has always had to do with it. Hence, as I reflect upon in the methodology section, I use autoethnography- among other methodologies- as an ethical stance to situate my research and the concepts dealt with in it and to avoid universalisations of the ideas and critiques that appear in the following sections. In the subsections which follow within this theoretical chapter I review the theories which have given birth to the salient concepts researched upon. In the methodological chapter which follows this one, I will revisit them from my "Concepts as methods" proposal.

The way I envisage the structure of this chapter is through the archaeological method of stratigraphy, i.e., I will use the strata methodology to address the theoretical genealogy I use in my research, a palimpsest which can bring forward the layers of signifiers and theorists which serve as a base from which to build up the subsequent case studies. This palimpsest is constructed in a conscious way, as explained in the methodology, from the awareness of the particular theories, methods, concepts and parts that I relate in my work. In these superpositions, there are assembled strata of situated knowledges (Haraway, 1988) performing a continuum between genealogies which are already connected (such as the dialoguing of Michel Foucault and Paul B. Preciado) and my extrinsic combinations which are the result of my own personal choices (as is the case of the dialogue between Jean Baudrillard and Judith Butler).

1.1. Stratum 0: Power and hegemonies: a genealogical account

Stratum 0 should start, in my opinion, with Michel Foucault's *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969). Being one of the author's most discussed terms, genealogy is here used to go beyond etymological understandings of changes throughout time, and into the social contexts that are embedded in those transformations. Following this trend, Archaeology is used, both in Foucault's work and here, as a lens through which the discursive conditions of the past can be observed, rather than an explanation of it. I would like to start by conducting an in-depth analysis of Michel Foucault's work on power. This will help me to, later on, elicit the particular parts of his work that I will use for my analysis of the case studies.

One recurrent idea in Foucault's theories is the treatment of power as neither an agency nor a structure. This offers a much more permeable idea of power, at least on power in modernity, which relates to a regime that permeates the social values and subjectivities shaping life. *Contamination*, a main concept in my research as will be evidenced in the following sections, comes to mind in my

interpretation of Foucault. We could call his regime a "regime of contamination" since the power invoked in bodies contaminates every aspect of the *times being[1]*.

Having set the start of his critique to systems of knowledge and truth in his *The Order of Things* (1966), Foucault focuses on how power functions in networks and not by singular enterprises of control. As he states, power resides in every entity,

> The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. (Foucault, 1978: 93)

"Power is everywhere" because it is a functioning system existing in the shaping of things, in the reality we relate to, including our own bodies. It is positive not because of its ethical values, but because it generates, it creates, it shapes the reality we relate to. Power, as Rosi Braidotti would later on express, is affirmative, potential (Braidotti, 2013a). It functions immanently, intrinsically and inherently to any type of relationality. The decentralisation of power is exercised from certain time-space positions, which allow a non dichotomous view of how power is reproduced and exercised, being at the same time "intentional and nonsubjective" (Foucault, 1978: 94). This is important to note because this thesis analyses power structures and mechanisms not as attributed to single subjectivities or groups, but as intrinsic to and imbued in relationalities. This is also fundamental because of the consequences derived from this proposition. One of the strongest effects of this perspective is the principle of resistance,

---

[1] By this expression I mean the times that are happening at the moment, the perceived temporalities of presentness.

> Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power [....] These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances (Foucault, 1978: 95-96)

In this sense, resistance stands as a dialectical response to power. This is also to say that resistance does not necessarily escape the effects of power, but is rather formed depending on the perspectives from which it is conceptualised as such resistance. A shared emergence, power "comes from everywhere" (1978: 93). In this dispersion, power and resistance share the same ontological configuration[2], that of social-relational effects and affects. These perspectives, which will be analysed from queer theory standpoints in the next sections of this thesis, are important to this work because of my intention to question the common assumption that counter-hegemonic discourses are always the *loci* from where to escape from power hegemonies.

I have always felt uncomfortable with the empowering movement that was a trend some years ago. It made me doubt our ability of resistance without having to reproduce supremacist and patriarchal ways of response to oppressions. It made me think of a lack of political imagination to find alternative ways of inhabiting sociality and relationality that could be rooted outside colonial and capital logics. From this point of view, I also find problematic the ways we, sometimes, from social and activist movements imagine ourselves outside the power relations that we so feverly criticise. Maybe it is the enfleshed work we put on these actions that makes us so unwilling to accept that we are part of the structures themselves and that, at the end of the day, we reproduce some of their dynamics. Being able to respond to violence, taking response-ability for structures that are embedded in our

---

[2] Ontology is the set of practices, studies and ideas engaging in the metaphysics of the nature of being.

daily lives, also means taking the space to acknowledge what parts of our identities are sometimes more of a partner in crime for the oppressor than a comrade for the liberation movements.

1.1.1 The loc(k)ations of power and resistance

As I further explore in the methodology section, I don't use Foucault- or any other author- here as an idolised theorist from where to depart. However, I do want to recognise the genealogical aspect of his theories of power and hegemonies which has helped me understand my own positioning inside both activism and research, and the connection between both of them. This is also one of the theoretical reasons why this thesis uses autoethnography as a main methodology of analysis from where to study power, resistance and their *loc(k)ations[3]*. What I mean by this wordplay is that if we continue examining power only from the recognised historical locations, some exercises of power and violence existing in non-hegemonic places are locked out of our discussions. This said, the location of power does not reside just in the binary between in and out, but is rather a complex set of contaminated positions. In this direction, my use of theories of power destructs this exterior-interior opposition by centring my analysis of power and its oppressions inside and outside institutions and established contexts. My analysis engages into examining powers existing in traditionally non-powerful spaces such as activisms or radical theories.

Foucault considers the control over the social body through two main poles: the control of the body as a machine (a direct relation to a westernised capitalised conceptualization of the body as a space of production and docility inside a system)

---

[3] This wordplay intends to express how the required practice of location of power has a double bind. This difficulty exists in that when the location of power is enunciated, it also becomes locked into that particular location. From other perspectives on power as contamination, these practices of locations are important at the same time as they expose how power travels from one place to another in a constant flux.

and the control of the body in its biological extension. The construction of health systems, nature discourses and the fantasy of the body as organic serve as mechanisms of life regulation. As he states in the last part of *The History of Sexualit*y (1978),

> The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organisation of power over life was deployed. The setting up, in the course of the classical age, of this great bipolar technology-anatomic and biological, individualising and specifying, directed toward the performances of the body, with attention to the processes of life characterised a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through. (139)

Power is relational. Power comes in many shapes and forms, from many locations and identities. In *Technologies of the Self* (1988) Foucault distinguishes between four types of technologies which function as the specific apparatuses through which reality is constructed in a westernised normality and unity[4]. During one of his seminars at the University of Vermont in the fall of 1982, he explains them as follows:

> [T]here are four major types of these "technologies", each a matrix of practical reason: (1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the self, which 1 permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and

---

[4] The main purpose here is "to analyze these so-called sciences as very specific "truth games" related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves" (1988: 18).

semis, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (1988: 18)

The technical project of identity, ie., the way in which technology inside westernised modernity systems is conceived as a manner of control and taming of the *selves*, involves radical ways of conceiving identity beyond traditional essentialist conceptualisations. The individual is, hence, always tied to technologies of control that involve signs, discourses, institutions, material powers, knowledges and other techniques[5].

Foucault's concept of technology is saliently important to this thesis since it allows it to take direction and give shape to the chosen case studies. Indeed, the four types of technologies match the four case studies: the technologies of production can serve as the arena for the study of the *Valor y Cambio* case in NYC; the technologies of sign production could be the path for the analysis of the case study of political activation through art in Dublin; the technologies of power, as a central piece of my own research, is developed and explodes in the case study of Moria and, finally, the technologies of the self travels throughout the case study of Bologna, that is also the fully self-ethnographic case study in my research. To these categories, I also add a new subdivision of control which appears as the chapter of The Void, which I analyse as technologies of refusal, that try to bring together all those in-betweens loc(k)ations, absences and impossibilities to the forth and face them as desirable failures (Halberstam, 2011).

---

[5] I here use the understanding of discourse that Michael Herzfeld would reframe as *disemia*, as an understanding of signs, exceeding the linguistic centrality that is normally associated with Foucauldian takes on discourse. Herzfeld understands *disemia* as a concept that "expands the narrowly linguistic frame of *diglossia*. It does not ignore language, but contextualises it as part of a semiotic continuum that includes silence, gesture, music, and the built environment, and economic, civic, and social values" (2016: 20).

Furthermore, and as Foucault explains in the case of the subdivision of the technological domains of self-knowledge and control, these four case studies domains do not function independently but rather contaminate each other, although each one has helped me explain a particular and specific form of power. As Patrick H. Hutton reviews from Foucault's work at the last part of *Technologies of the Self*, "[t]he continuities for Foucault are to be found not in the ideals themselves but in the underlying strategies designed to implement them" (Hutton in Foucault, 1988: 128). This statement is important, not just because it brings to mind the idea that reality is designed, that also means sketched, performed, arranged and mapped.

Technologies are defined in Foucault's texts as a set of practices and actions that enable certain systems of control. As such, technologies being more than a preexistent set of structured forms, and focusing rather on their practice and action characteristics, also speak about how we enact and exercise power over ourselves. In this sense, my analysis focuses on both identity and sociality as a conjunction from which we cannot escape.

While shaping the above-mentioned technologies, Foucault's interest in the self in his last years of research was mostly concerned with the reproduction of power and discipline even in what was understood as freedom. As he states in an interview collected as part of his posthumous works, "[w]hat I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom" (1988: 15). Foucault deals with this rampant understanding of freedom, as essentialized and universalized inside a particular system of values in his last lectures, while also introducing a last inquiry: self-surveillance. As Hutton interprets "it is not knowledge of our sexuality that gives us power over ourselves (...) but our will to establish power over our sexuality that incites a search for self-knowledge" (1988: 131). As such, the singularity of identitarian construction is decentralised in these works and is given a twist so as to focus on its ability to adapt, enact and take many forms. This last stage in Foucault's work means a subversion towards his own previous work because of its combination of

8

fragmentology[6] and rhizomatic wanderings, two aspects which I find most appealing for my quest. Indeed, Foucault's posthumous philosophy connects with the impossibilities and potentialities of this thesis: the impossibility of closure, of singularity, of reality.

Technologies of the self is also an apex in the theoretical escalation towards a queer and decolonial critique in this thesis.[7] In this sense, self-surveillance, a central mode of discipline in Foucault's analysis, will be expanded upon in this thesis in tandem with gender and queer theorists, such as Judith Butler or Paul B. Preciado. However, at this stage I want to introduce another important aspect of this text that is discursively in dialogue with a trans-temporal Foucauldian text, that of *The Order of Things* (1966). In a sort of derridean haunting (1993), Foucault leaves us with a constant question, which is always present but never evidenced in his work: the disruption of the idea of the origin. In *The Order of Thing*s, Foucault expresses that in modernity the expectations of finding the origin, that intrinsic and essential matter that gives base to a particular circumstance lived in the present, has no meaning. In this way, he states that

> [i]n modern thought, such an origin is no-longer conceivable: we have seen how labor, life and language acquired their own historicity, in which they were embedded; they could never, therefore, truly express their origin [....] It is no longer origin that gives rise to historicity; it is historicity that, in its very

---

[6] In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault uses fragmentology to speak about discontinuities in History. Against a traditional understanding of History as a *continuum*, Foucault proposes breaking its narrative into fragments to speak about the multiple stories which are unfinished, unclear and open that are also part of histories.

[7] Following my ideas about "concepts and methodologies", the theoretical connections through which theory is analysed and exposed in this work depart from the acknowledgment of these connections as performed, enacted and situated, rather than pre-existent, inherent or historically accumulative: they do not sum up in a palimpsest but are rather performed depending on the way they are put together. I will return to this in the methodological chapter.

fabric, makes possible the necessity of an origin which must be both internal and foreign to it. (1994, 1966: 329)

As we can see in this quote, ontology is signified by power: the ontological claim to "what there is" relates to the narrative of reality rather than to reality itself. Ontology is just as mediated by power as are epistemologies. Ontological and epistemological framings reduce the categories of existence, reality and materialities to monistic understandings. From the above quote we can also conclude that history is not necessarily an answer to an event, to the origin of a circumstance, but rather the medium to arrange a material narrative of such an event. In this sense, power becomes identitarian. It sticks to subjectivity in its naturalisation. It is integrated through moves of self-surveillance. Power, laws and institutions are also helped by this self-control. Identity is not always the result of coercive forces, but it is more commonly a product of how human subjectivity naturalises the actions of the invisible regulation of bodies. This invisibilization of powers is precisely what I try to dismantle throughout my thesis, in connection to the ways in which queer, sexual and gendered embodiments are disciplined. Self-surveillance is essential in order to understand the theoretical omnipresence of power.

As Derrida frames it, power is neither dead nor alive (1994: 84). It is not a matter of visualising it, making it public or killing it. We, as mediums, need to haunt it from the spectral order instead,

And if this important frontier is being displaced, it is because the medium in which it is instituted, namely, the medium of the media themselves (news, the press, telecommunications, techno-tele-discursivity, techno-tele-iconicity, that which in general assures and determines the spacing of public space, the very possibility of the res public and the phenomenality of the political), this element itself is neither living nor dead, present nor absent: it spectralizes. It does not belong to ontology, to the discourse on the Being of beings, or to the essence of life or death. It requires, then, what we call, to save time and space

10

rather than just to make up a word, hauntology. We will take this category to be irreducible, and first of all to everything it makes possible: ontology, theology, positive or negative onto-theology. (Ibid)

This connects with my tenets in the following sections that the ghosts haunting identity are rarely articulated as historical. They are neither present nor absent. They are spectral. Capitalism, which can also translate as an alias to the western ethos for this thesis purpose, is the site of creation of spirits, of simulacra, of reality viewed in singular ontological formulations.

Maybe one of the main elements for this construction of control and surveillance is the concept of *truth,* that Foucault analyses throughout his whole career. For the author, knowledge, and the concept of *episteme* itself, are constructions of sites of power that depart from monistic views of what truth means in a particular time-space. These centralities erected through discourse- which I explore more closely in the section of history and fiction- allow the systematisation of forms of hegemonies and control that are not individualised in particular bodies or actions, but rather follow what has been previously explained: the omnipresence of power. As Foucault explains, discourse

[I]s not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined. It is a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed (Foucault, 1972: 55)

Discourse is a contingent system that produces knowledge and meaning. Discourse, as power, is productive, relational and is both intentional and non-subjective. Discourse, in its entanglement with power, is what this thesis shapes and is shaped from. It is the recognition of the locality of my own research and the "always-already" limited epistemologies. Discourse cannot be escaped. In other words and terms, there is no objectivity outside the text: everything is discourse, "there is no

outside-text" (Derrida, 1997: 158). However, certain rules, structures and categories precede discourse, and this is the particular way in which discourse camouflages its potentiality and ability as a production of those meanings and knowledges. This is, the invisibility of the norms that are foundational in discourse constructions is the reason for discourses being sometimes hard to disentangle and to be recognized as sites of power.

This invisible structure of discourse is also related to another factor that I find essential to consider here. Traditionally, disciplines such as Sociology, Anthropology, History or Archaeology approach space and time as independent units of analysis, thus ignoring the interdependence between both. Furthermore, they overlook other elements which are tangled to the event under study, such as relationality. When these disciplines are directed to study the presence of power, this delusive autonomy between space and time limits the consideration of how these elements are connected, interact and relate between each other. It seems as if maps and clocks were enough to determine the conditions under which certain aspects of life and society take place in time and space. However, further considerations of relations of closeness, difference, friction, divergence, modification or adjustment in these contextualisations highlight the importance of relationality as an essential feature determining them. The context becomes an encounter, not existing in itself, but rather activated through the lens of each one of the interactions existing in the conjunction of space and time. The formation of objects depends upon discursive relations that are at the limit of discourse. And here we return to the idea that discursive relations do not stand in exteriority or interiority, but are rather liminally entangled: "[t]hese relations characterise not the language (*langue*) used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a practice" (Foucault, 1972: 46).

1.1.2. Chronotopes

At this stage, Mikhaíl Bakhtín's *chronotope* concept serves my purpose of contextualising my case studies along the lines explained above. For Bakhtín, the chronotope represents the impossibility of analysing time without a spatial dimension, and vice versa[8]. Still, there is a third element lacking in this formula, that of relationality[9]. Bakhtín explores the idea of *Heteroglossia* and its refraction in his *Dialogic Imagination: 4 essays* (1934), where we read that

> A common unitary language is a system of linguistic norms. But these norms do not constitute an abstract imperative,- they are rather the generative forces of linguistic life, forces that struggle to overcome the heteroglossia of language, forces that unite and centralize verbal-ideological thought, creating within a heteroglot national language the firm, stable linguistic nucleus of an officially recognized literary language, or else defending an already formed language from the pressure of growing heteroglossia (pp. 270-271)

This vision of language as already "ideologically saturated" [10](p. 271) also gives us a hint of the direction of Bakhtín's theories. It seems as if Bakhtín's theories were the jumping off for a consideration of discourse as a *chronotopical* account of time-space that explores their connections and relationalities. Bridging Bakhtín to Foucault's approach to discourse, *heteroglossia* connects to a more open account of experience, considering more rhizomatic understandings of language

---

[8] As I will expose in the following chapters, this analysis of chronotopes is developed by Teresa del Valle (2000) from a feminist autoethnographic perspective.

[9] This will also be explored through new materialisms, since relationality adds to time-space a particular idea that engages in other-than anthropocentric views.

[10] Saturation refers to a state of modernity, global capitalism and renovating colonialism in which exception is non-factual. Rather than events, time is saturated by phenomena that, because of their constant presence, are not considered an exception. In the soackness sense of saturation, the term can offer a possibility to read the "situations in which the elements involved may be difficult or impossible to separate" (Jue and Ruiz 2021: 1)

generations. Meaning and discourse, in this dialogic trend set by Bakhtín, already speak about a necessary relationality, which can expose the capacity of different experiences to being contaminated, becoming polluted, affecting and being affected (Spinoza, 1667, 1993).

In all these respects, I use space as a contingent element that gives shape to my thinking. Space is the circumstantial element of the assemblages of theory that are performed here. In this sense, language, as illustrated by the past fragments, is also space as territorialisation, concreteness of meaning, signification, imagination and connection. It is not that language, and linguistic analysis, become the abstraction of geographical space, but rather that the abstraction of what space means also contains the taken-for-granted linguistic strategies that occur in the social realm. Take, for instance, William Labov where we can read that the way in which language is used is as territorialised and has so much to do with the construction of state policies as our ways of thinking about land property and separation in our contemporary west contexts (1973).

Homogenisation and centralisation are pivotal terms when referring to linguistic evolutions and settings and it must be noted that a great quantity of the terminology surrounding language theories are paired to spatial concepts and this is far from accidental. Language is contextual. It is inscribed in places. Language, words, ways of saying and expressing different ideas, are located. Language forces are mutable locations. How language is propagated has been well studied by poststructuralists, but the most material ways of how it is contaminated by space, time and relationalities has not always been the focus of attention. Manuel DeLanda retakes Labov's ideas on the importance that social setting has to language and updates it with a debate on what organisations and institutions mean for the sociality of discourse. In his words,

> The Tuscan Academy of Language, founded in 1582, and its French and Spanish counterparts (founded in 1637 and 1713, respectively) were complex organizations staffed with linguists officially dedicated to homogenizing and formalizing the dominant dialect of a particular city (Florence, Paris, Madrid).

14

The authoritative dictionaries, grammars, and rules of correct pronunciation that they published operated as true order-words as they propagated through the rising middle classes, anxious to speak like their aristocratic counterparts. The further spread of standard languages involved, in addition, larger assemblages comprising many organizations: extensive networks of elementary schools and *compulsory* primary education in the standard. (2016: 65)

Returning to Foucault's account on discourse and power, after the clarification of this ambivalence between presence-absence in regard to discursive positions, the aspect of how objects are materialised is interesting in order to think about the infinite juxtapositions that are related to discourse. Because of our anthropocentric and ontological philosophical and scientific tradition, sometimes these juxtapositions or simultaneities are difficult to understand as the core generation of circumstances. In this sense, the friction between the inside and the outside, as regards discursive positions and generations, confirms this interiority of discourse as a practice which is still pending on exteriority (since it depends on other elements for its operation). Thus, the emergence of objects is the response of relations that

are established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization; and these relations are not present in the object; it is not they that are deployed when the object is being analyzed; they do not indicate the web, the immanent rationality, that ideal nervure that reappears totally or in part when one conceives of the object in the truth of its concept. They do not define its internal constitution, but what enables it to appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to them, to define its difference, its irreducibility, and even perhaps its heterogeneity, in short, to be placed in a field of exteriority. (Foucault, 1972:45)

These sets of relations are, therefore, linked to the emergence of objects in very complex ways, even if these levels of relations are not always connected or, what is more important here to understand the complex positionality of their generation, not superposed on each other.

1.1.3. Possibility

One of the strongest concepts in regards to the topic of how objects are formed, is the concept of *possibility*. *Possibility* is fundamental to understanding how objects emerge. As I will further analyse in the section on History as fiction, one of the strongest consequences of discourse analysis in Foucault's work is captured in my own research in his notion of *'Historical a priori'*, that I use to navigate my case studies. In this respect, the use of *a priori* employed by Foucault is fundamental, not only in order to understand how discourses and epistemes shift and interlock in a time-be-coming[11], but also to recognise that these traces are sometimes difficult to discern.

As problematic as the genesis of the concept may be[12], the *Overton Window* is an interesting theory to understand Foucault's point when speaking about the historical *a priori*. The Overton Window, which was a theoretical explanation on the importance of think tanks and policy makers and industries, helped explain how

---

[11] In this mix, the idea of ontological existence, which corresponds to 'being' is already only sustained by a changing quality which alters this reality in a continuum. Being can only settle by an unsettling becoming.

[12] Created as a political strategy by a conservative think tank in Michigan, the Mackinac Center for Public Policy. Introduced by Joseph P. Overton in the 90s, the term became popular as a way to think about the possibilities of policies in governmental programmes.

new ideas and topics happen to become important in social systems. The Overton Window has, since its outset, helped to understand how the changes we perceive as a whole society respond to the possibilities which exist at the moment without focusing on how politicians or institutions introduce new issues, but rather analysing how these topics are first introduced in the social realm. This is important because it relates to the theories examined in Foucault's work, where discursive practices and power analysis have more to do with the viability of reproducing them at the moment in question than with particular and singular actions of power. This, at the same time, gets us to the point at which power, violence and the oppressions linked to them have a lot more to do with a set of practices and relations that intertwine and sustain each other, than with exceptional accounts of them. This shift of how power is exposed, consequently, speaks about the necessity of finding new ways of confronting power through strategies which can take into account this intricate location of power, which is not just one. This is not to say that there are no alternatives of "being" in life outside the discourses already-existing in the so-called *window*, i.e. beyond the social framing possibility, but these contentions are a fundamental analysis to do in examining the potential political changes which critical studies research deal with.

1.2. Disturbed deposits: the assembled stratum

In order to analyse the tensions where this thesis stands, in a way that "no longer relate[s] discourse to the primary ground of experience, nor to the a priori authority of knowledge" (Foucault, 1972: 79) the methodological parameters must engage with the theoretical corpus. This way I engage with a twofold move between non-essentialist epistemologies and self-experiences.

Because of the genealogical connections, the historical links and their theoretical relations, I want to turn my attention at this stage to how the notion of *rhizome*, explored by Gilles Deleuze and Feliz Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), is pertinent to an analysis of the multiplicity of power practices and their

possible disarticulations. Rhizomatic thinking appears in Deleuze and Guattari's work as a disruption of monistic, visible and hegemonic ways of facing reality. Reality is, in fact, a messy mix with no beginnings or ends, but multiple middles. Rhizomatic thinking entails a break from monism since it challenges the idea of a unity which is primary and, thus, hegemonic to the successive parts and is also visible and recognisable. As I noted before, in Foucault's work, relationality- not only between human living forces but also in connections to entities, spaces, ideas, languages and positions- is fundamental in order to analyse how reality is lived and experienced. In regard to this idea, the work by Guattari and Deleuze also considers connection and relation important to examine how the object, the work or the subject is generated:

> Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order. (1980: 7)

Here relationality takes the form of a complex set of assemblages. A rhizomatic analysis of assemblage implies nothing but connects to all. It distances from speaking of a subject in particular and recognises the openness and infinite points of connection surrounding it. As Jamie Heckert reads from the consequences of decentralising the centre itself, as it is displayed in Deleuze and Guattari's work, there is a rejection of "the notion of the independent subject, but [they] see the 'individual' as a multiplicity interconnected with other multiplicities" (Heckert in Nash, 2010: 48) and continues "a rhizome is also nomadic, and 'never allows itself to be overcoded'" (Deleuze and Guattari in Heckert). Here, I read overcoded as normative and nomadic as queer.

When thinking about the reification and reproduction of power, rhizomatic analysis is crucial. In doing so, it engages in the barren use of political thought when thinking about change in singular directions. It exposes how the life of power is a complex set of connections which make it impossible to resolve through independent changes. This means that there is no hegemonic point that would work as a monistic generation of that power and, thus, the disarticulation is more related

to a constant rethinking and reworking through the assemblage than a battle towards a specific target. In this sense, the moral dichotomy between bad or good becomes a simplification which is incapable of attending to the consequences of reducing ethical values to the binary. This set of contaminations, which speaks in the in between spaces and beyond the limits of the signification of power, is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the ambivalence of rhizomes,

> Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees. There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another. That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of the good and the bad. (1980: 9)

This ambivalence of rhizomes, both territorialising and deterritorialising, stratifying and, at once, dislocating or signifying and, altogether, suppressing, breaks the binary look that is traditionally implied when interpreting reality. To interpret reality should, then, be taken into more performative awareness. Following these ideas, intensified by the rhizomatic disruption of permanent readings of reality, any interpretation of it seems, then, a transitional stabilisation. This is, at the same time there is an intake of information about a specific situational experience, there is also a displacement of the multiplicity of readings which are discharged. The interpretation of reality unfolds performative and mimetical at once, repeating at certain rhythms while imitating in specific mannerisms. Mimicry is an important aspect for my particular connection to Deleuze and Guattari's work since it links in an organic way to the critique on dichotomies which takes place in their analysis. In this account of mimicry, Deleuze and Guattari decompose the binary position which it entails, being an account of reality and its imitation, insisting in the performative aspect of this semiotic use. The way reality is interpreted and the mimetic aspects of reproducing certain ontological readings is reconsidered through the lens of this phenomenology. Mimicry is rooted in my work since my analysis works with queer and gender studies as a method of confronting certain topics. It

deals with their stabilisation while, at the same time, it deconstructs them as ontologies. Gender and sex being performative, serve from this secondary concept in Deleuze and Guattari's work. For the authors, mimicry stands as an impossibility, and is therefore connected to- binary logics. It is at this point quite easy to see what the connection to Deleuze and Guattari's mimicry is to a butlerian performativity, both terms serving as main figures to the constitution of gender and queer studies. In particular, and as I have just referred to through performativity, the canonical work by Judith Butler in *Gender Trouble* (1990) serves as an epitome for the case.

Before getting into queer substance, and in order to contextualise the approach of this not-anymore-new field[13], I would like to briefly attend to two concepts which deal with reality, its copy and the perceptions about both. Through the work by Jean Baudrillard regarding the concept of *simulacrum*, the difference between simulation and hyperreality can be understood. On the one hand, simulation is centred on the capacity of distinction between the real and the fictional. On the other hand, hyperreality pleads for an idea of fiction as overcoming reality itself. Maybe performativity stands in the space in between, at least in Judith Butler's use of the concept. Performativity, understood as relational, challenges the ontological distinction between fiction and reality. After all, aren't maps, rather than land, laws rather than dialogues, what ultimately counts as reality? In terms of gender, performativity exploits the notion that the ontological sign is not lost in reality, as some may think when speaking of gender theories, but rather, that it was never there. The many attacks to queer and gender studies outside the biological and essentialist binary women-men, base in this fictional destruction which gender performers destroy through our positioning. In this sense, we shout that from the many things we try to destroy, gender and sex are not part of them, because they

---

[13] It was an automatic tandem queer studies and, somehow, a novelty when I started in Academia some 13 years ago. Even if this can be said of queer studies as a propagated and accepted frame of work, since there are not few threats this research field suffers, queer studies and queerness has been resisting for many decades now. Even if nominally appearing during the 90's, already in the previous decades many were already writing outside the heteronorm and also the homosocial paradigm.

never existed in the first place. Sex and gender, representing ontology and epistemology respectively[14], are as fictional as each other.

1.3. Gender accumulations (assemblage): queer assemblages to new (and ordinary) materialisms.

The rhizomatic approach to breaking binaries and touching on imitation and mimicry functions here as springboard to a contemporary analysis of gender and queerness. It also clarifies the way in which certain historic-philosophical concepts are used in this thesis in as much as they are in tension with other concepts. The sense of becoming in Deleuze's theories is central to these questions. In this sense, the analysis done by poststructuralists throughout the 70's and 80's centralises concepts, notions and readings which, in an anachronic sense, function in a dialogue with concepts appearing in the 90s. To put it through an example, the work by Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault works in conversation to Butler's use of poststructuralism even if these readings are only possible through their coming together. The potential aspects of the poststructural mimicry, performance and identity were unlocked through their reshaping through Butler's lenses. As a sort of *pastiche*, which will enter in conversation with this section in which simulacrum and performativity are introduced, my use of concepts recognises its limits in that they are another imitation of reality. As exposed in the methodological chapter, I use the different parts of the concepts to inscribe them in every part of the thesis. Following the Deleuzian move, I stand in that "it's not a matter of bringing all sorts of things under a single concept, but rather of relating each concept to the variables that explain its mutations." (Deleuze, 1995: 31)

---

[14] In contrast to ontology, epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge and how this is generated. It is a philosophy of what it is known.

Mimicry, understood as the various types of simulacra we come across in the poststructural era, connects with gender studies through the notion of *performativity*, introduced by Butler in *Gender Trouble* (1990). Departing from John L. Austin's acts of speech concept[15]. Butler states from the preface that,

> [P]erformativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration (preface xv Butler 1999)

Performativity partakes of the idea of simulacrum as an illusion and mimesis of a particular construction of reality. On the one hand, performativity, as discourse, is an act of repetition; on the other, the reality that performativity mimes responds to a set of constructions that are depicted as core to "what there is". While speaking about the constructed illusion of interiority[16] that reality, as performative and discursive, produces, Butler explains that

> reality is fabricated as an interior essence, [*and*] that very interiority is an effect and function of a decidedly public and social discourse, the public regulation of fantasy through the surface politics of the body, the gender border control that differentiates inner from outer, and so institutes the "integrity" of the subject. In other words, acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for the purposes of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive heterosexuality (Butler, 1999; 1990: 173)

---

[15] *How to Do Things with Words* (1962)

[16] In the sense of intrinsic and essential.

The regulation of bodies, subjectivities and accounts of relationality towards the world are sustained through an idea of interiority. To phrase this differently, it would seem like matters dealing with identity and subjectivity are dependent on an intrinsic account of matter that would work independently from other world-matterings. Butler breaks yet another binary by positioning "nature" as another site of human constructionism. Nature and culture pair with sex and gender by exposing how these four constructions are mediated by systems of anthropocentric relationality. Nature and sex are not intrinsic or essential in a different way as culture and gender, but are all part of the same constructive continuum. This inner force which is constructed as natural and essential is already a product of its very perception. Hence, Butler recedes from the anthropological opposition between culture and nature, or translocated to gender terms, the binary between gender and sex. Sex, as gender, is real "only to the extent that it is performed" (Butler, 1988: 527). The "nature-culture" divide that can often be found as a critique and justification for certain feminisms (such as trans-exclusive, radical, or essentialist feminisms) is unexcused. Butler places *gender* at the core of their research as yet another fragment of how control and power function in our contexts.

The body, and the identities that appear through it, is in itself an act and "an active process of embodying certain cultural and historical possibilities" (Butler, 1988: 521). Butler's *performativity* concept is also the tool through which gender appears to us as naturalised, as exemplified by drag. Drag related to gender is equivalent to Raymond Williams's notion of *lived hegemony*. Following Antonio Gramsci's ideas of hegemony, Williams writes that

> A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits. In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular. Its internal structures are highly complex, as can readily be seen in any concrete analysis. Moreover [...], it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed,

recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own. (1977: 112)

The foucauldian omnipresent power ("power is everywhere" 1978:93) is here relocated to the examination of identity. A hegemony is more a structuring practice than a set of ideological beliefs. A gendered hegemony, therefore, is beyond ideology, and thus, hard to trace, not only because of its abstraction, but, especially, because of its malleability. In Butler's theories, drag is discussed as an excess from the norms which have been constructed as intrinsic to bodies and bound to ideas of interiority. Thus, drag is a pivotal instance where discourses surrounding gender are exposed. In her words, "drag fully subverts the distinction between inner and outer psychic space and effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender identity" (Butler 1999,1990:174). Butler introduces then the "imitation game" that performativity stands for, an alignment to *simulacra* theories in which the copy and the original are not distinct because of the originality or ontological reality of the latter, but rather entangled. The so called "original" is already a mock of a certain pre-established model that

[I]mitate[s] the myth of originality itself (....) The loss of the sense of "the normal," however, can be its own occasion for laughter, especially when "the normal," "the original" is revealed to be a copy, and an inevitably failed one, an ideal that no one can embody. In this sense, laughter emerges in the realization that all along the original was derived (Butler, 1999, 1990: 176)

Butler's thinking concurs with theories regarding *simulacra* in that they destruct the opposition between the original and the copy -or between reality and illusion-, through a reconsideration of the place that binaries take in the representation of what is understood as reality. Following this trend, the mimetic act of being corporeal in the world, ie. having a body, becomes a strategic point from which truth and the norm are also constructed.

The relation between mimicry, masquerade, repetition and pretence results in performativity helping sustain certain gender pretexts, as Butler explains in her writings. Referring to *masquerade*, while re-reading Jacques Lacan, Butler states that

> The term is significant because it suggests contradictory meanings: On the one hand, if the "being," the ontological specification of the Phallus, is masquerade, then it would appear to reduce all being to a form of appearing, the appearance of being, with the consequence that all gender ontology is reducible to the play of appearances. On the other hand, masquerade suggests that there is a "being" or ontological specification of femininity prior to the masquerade, a feminine desire or demand that is masked and capable of disclosure, that, indeed, might promise an eventual disruption and displacement of the phallogocentric signifying economy. (1999: 60)

Masquerade uncovers the dynamics of corporeal regulatory norms. As we can read from other queer theorists, such as Annmarie Jagose in regard to the construction of gender identities, "queer operates not so much as an alternative nomenclature [...] than as a means of drawing attention to those fictions of identity that stabilise all identificatory categories. (1996: 125). Queerness is connected to masquerade in that it blows off the constrictions of this gender representation. In this sense drag, as used in queer theory and in Butler's work in particular, is the articulation of this masquerade for the queer specificity.

In the theoretical corpus of *simulacra*, Jean Baudrillard, in an act of intertextual mimesis, references the *Ecclesiastes* to introduce simulacrum as that which is "never what hides the truth" since "it is truth that hides the fact that there is none. The simulacrum is true." (Baudrillard, 1981: 9. *My translation*[17]). The activation of Butler's drag as a strategy of deterrence of certain paradigms of what

---

[17] "Le simulacre n'est jamais ce qui cache la vérité- c'est la vérité qui cache qu'il n'y en a pas. Le simulacre est vrai." (L'Ecclésiaste in Baudrillard, 1981: 9).

corporeality ought to be is allied to the distinction that Baudrillard finds in the tension between representation and simulacra. As he illustrates,

> Representation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real (even if this equivalence is Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Simulation, on the contrary, stems from the Utopia of the principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as the reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas representation attempts to absorb simulation by interpreting it as a false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation itself as a simulacrum. (1981: 16. *my translation*[18])

Representation deviates from simulation in that it does not construct an image of the real sustaining itself in the act of mimesis, while simulacrum does. This is translated into drag and a gender language in that through this representation drag denounces the very act of the norm inscribed in the primitive gendered reference. In this sense, it does work through representation, but it twists it in a way that exposes the excess that the "original" represents already. At this moment, a nostalgia for the real is activated:

> When the real is no longer what it was, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality - a plethora of truth, of secondary objectivity, and authenticity. Escalation of the true, of lived experience, resurrection of the figurative where the object and substance have disappeared. Panic stricken production of the real and of the referential, parallel to and greater than the panic of material production: this is how simulation appears in the phase that concerns us - a strategy of the real, of the

---

[18] "Telle est la simulation, en ce quelle s'oppose à la représentation. Celle-ci part du principe d'équivalence du signe et du réel (même si cette équivalence est utopique, c'est un axiome fondamental). La simulation part à l'inverse de l'utopie du principe d'équivalence, part de la négation radicale du signe comme valeur, part du signe comme réversion et mise à mort de toute référence. Alors que la représentation tente d'absorber la simulation en l'interprétant comme fausse représentation, la simulation enveloppe tout l'édifice de la représentation lui-même comme simulacre." (Baudrillard, 1981: 16)

neoreal and the hyperreal that everywhere is the double of a strategy of deterrence. (Baudrillard, 1981: 17. *my translation[19]*)

Reality is shaped by simulations. Simulations do not only generate meanings, but they also shape reality. Analogously to Foucault's reconsideration on discourses, simulations are here viewed as positive in that they generate and activate new forms of the "real". The so-called "original" doesn't precede the copy anymore, as "[t]he territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it" (Baudrillard, 1981: 10, *my translation[20]*). In a similar way, and as will be analysed in the case studies I explore, spaces don't resist institutions nor do justice and organisation escape surveillance.

Further deepening in this analysis of the copy and the original in oppositional standards, the gaze, the way someone's body is looked at, and the implication of relationality in the formation and reproduction of gender and corporeal adequacies, is also fundamental in Butler's work. We could even say that she, somehow, drags Foucault's opera to insert it in her particular research chronotope,

The unproblematic claim to "be" a woman and "be" heterosexual would be symptomatic of that metaphysics of gender substances (....) Thus, "I feel like a woman" is true to the extent that Aretha Franklin's invocation of the defining Other is assumed: "You make me feel like a natural woman" (Butler, 1999, 1990: 29-30)

---

[19] "Lorsque le réel n'est plus ce qu'il était, la nostalgie prend tout son sens. Surenchère des mythes d'origine et des signes de réalité. Surenchère de vérité, d'objectivité et d'authenticité secondes. Escalade du vrai, du vécu, résurrection du figuratif là où l'objet et la substance ont disparu. Production affolée de réel et de référentiel, parallèle et supérieure à l'affolement de la production matérielle : telle apparaît la simulation dans la phase qui nous concerne — une stratégie du réel, de néo-réel et d'hyperréel, que double partout une stratégie de dissuasion." (Baudrillard, 1981: 17)

[20] "Le territoire ne précède plus la carte, ni ne lui survit" (1981: 10)

The double claim in this fragment is not always differentiated. On the one hand, gender is formulated as opposite to the other's gender, but on the other hand, what Butler states here is that gender is viewed, recognised and mirrored from an external relation that reinforces the idea of relationality as primordial in the formulation of identities. Here, there is a comeback to Foucault's conception of domain as part of a system of relations rather than a pre-existent state of matterings. In this sense, the idea of theories being rhizomatically contaminated is integrated as a focal way of applying these. In this trend, Butler's ideas are granted by their activation through other theories which dialogue with her own, such as the use of Baudrillard's *simulacra* in the previous fragments.

Another activation of simulacrum theories in the present and concerning a specific field of study I use in my work, is their relation to New Materialisms. Deleuze and Baudrillard, among others, have implied an awakening of the concept of intra-actions, central to theories regarding New Materialisms, through the reconsideration of the ontology and metaphysics of difference. In this sense, difference is also queered in a way that it externalises and exorcises its own meaning from the binary positions which dialectic philosophy had maintained as central to its thought. What I mean by this is that, as I will explain in the following paragraphs, difference being redirected to a state which takes place rather than an intrinsic property of objects and entities breaks free from dichotomic considerations of difference as moving from one pole to another. It engages in a relational property of this phenomenon, explaining in the temporality of the contact and intra-active forces between two objects/entities rather than independently existent. The breaking of this dialectic construction of difference is fundamental for the reconsiderations of identity, as we can see through Karen Barad or Jane Bennet's works, where intra-actions become a scenario where the self, also including inanimate entities, turns into a specific force from where to consider these differences that occur beyond the idea of pre-established bodily states.

1.4. A material awakening of the layers that matter: New Materialisms and their ordinariness.

Manuel DeLanda maintains that only through the overcoming of the binary between immanence and transcendence, can we put forward the question of identity. As he explains, "[t]he traditional way of accounting for a stable identity is by postulating the existence of essences, transcendent entities that have been part of realism for more than two thousand years and are therefore not easy to eliminate" (2018: 2). This constraining understanding of identity has been linked to the essence of nature, a discourse which we can well see reflected in conflicts regarding gender policies and narratives nowadays. To engage into otherwise- identity politics does not mean to remain in an immanent realm, but rather to work through a metaphysical and ontological thinking that can allow new gender imaginaries. In this sense, *gender* may be a fiction, but at some points it may need a material anchorage. Or let me phrase it otherwise, we might defend the idea that the future will be NB (non-binary) and queer, while we simultaneously engage with and defend those present subjectivities that are suffering the consequences of anti-identitarian violences right now. As DeLanda clearly explains about the notion of *assemblage*,

> The minimal definition of the term *assemblage* is that of a whole with properties that are both irreducible and immanent. An assemblage's properties are irreducible because while they emerge from the actual interaction between its parts, they cannot be ascribed to any of its parts. And they are immanent because if the components of the assemblage ceased to interact its own properties would cease to exist: emergent properties may not depend on this or that particular interaction, on this or that connection with matter, but they do demand that there should be some connection with matter. (2018: 3)

In this sense, the importance of relationality is one of the adhesives in this agglutination. The assemblage of identity counts with these non materialistic elements, not tangible in their autonomy, which are relations and situations that, when activated in this identitarian assemblage, are the beginning for the identitarian formation. As indicated above, this activation does not mean that the identity is lost

or only exists and can be accounted for pending on these relational circumstances, but rather this circumstantial component can subsist and coexist with a more rooted understanding of identity. It is a fact that in a social and pseudo democratic way of being in the world, stability, for the sake of representation and political existence, is also still needed. As Rita Monticelli engages her students to think about, the problem with identity politics is how they overlook the importance of relationality and intersectionality in their formulations. In this sense, identities are not lived as formations and fixed categories, but rather as positions from which different situations can be read in very different perspectives. In her words,

> Gender, ethnicity and class, as an extent of differential power relationships, mark identities in different ways and suggest how cultural memory- that is also linked to the distribution and the transmission of power- is to be found in specific contexts rather than be considered as monolithic and essentialist (2011: 1387)

An important aspect of the use of New Materialisms is the view of realisms that this approach involves. Realism has traditionally been depicted from a humanist perspective and has portrayed this relation between perception and the world as ontology when, in fact, this relation is yet another epistemological formulation. Epistemology, on the other side, has a great value for an understanding of empirical facts, but has, nevertheless, failed on the account of the multiplicity of experiences. Many human experiences and other-than-human accounts of the world have been ignored. Experiences involved within non-western cosmologies, animal experience or the otherwise forms of life or worldling that are not even subject to (human) perception have suffered a constant overlook which has reduced knowledge to exclusive accounts. It has ontologized epistemology, not making it too different from ontology's principles. The realist ontology proposed by NM (New Materialisms) includes a wholeness that considers uncontrollable facts, accepting that, as humans we are limited to knowledge, perception and experience just as any other entity.

I here want to use the work by Karen Barad, not only one of the main researchers that permeate this thesis, but also a fundamental name when speaking about New Materialisms. In particular, I want to draw attention to their way of framing these ideas under the concept(s) of onto-epistemologies. Onto-epistemology is simultaneously a neologism and a conjunction formed by two historical concepts. On the one hand, it stands as neologism because it includes the idea of the impossible separation between what is considered reality- ontology- and what is counted as construction- epistemology. This is also analogous to the rupture of the genealogical distinction between sex and gender, a hiatus that, as discussed earlier on, we see in queer theory and, in particular, in Butler's work. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it also acknowledges that this impossibility coexists with the urgency of an accurate look into the histories of both concepts: the construction of reality and the construction of knowledge. Or, to translate into the queer agitation mentioned above, even if sex has also been dis-essentialized and brought into question as a cultural and historical construction, the way gender and sex are produced follows different dispositifs (Foucault, 1977). And this difference also requires analysis[21].

The importance of New materialisms for my investigation lies in the conjunction between a posthumanist mindset- that engages with non-anthropocentric perspectives and antispeciesism- and the remaining importance of relationalities. As Karen Barad explains- an onto-epistemology is a breakthrough to see the gaps that may be full, empty, saturated or remaining in the void (2007). A void can be already signifying and packed, even if not perceivable due to our

---

[21] I analyse this use of concepts as methods in the methodological section, where I explain the novel openings that this approach can lead to, such as the generation of new temporalities in concepts, which is one of my main propositions.

human limitations (2012). This is the point: we are not the limit but rather limited. We are not liminal but truly entangled in constant-vibrating assemblages.

Identity and new materialism also share a strong connection in that identity has also a potentiality in discovering its self-organising agency. Let me explain: even if identity is two folded between something that can be apprehended into politics and something else that changes over time, identity has a potential force of becoming, without a specific point of arrival. Theodor Adorno also worked from this perspective of identitarian impossibility. In his reading of how philosophy has shaped identities, identity is already a non-identity since it holds to negative dialectics. To put it simply, he draws a sketch of critique to epistemology as historically depicted as the philosophy of knowledge rather than as an element of knowledge that allows a certain parameter of human vision for ontological understanding. As Adorno states, "[t]he negative motive of identitarian philosophy has remained in force: nothing particular is true; no particular is itself, as its particularity requires" (1966, 2004: 152). The identity of concepts, and, conversely, the concepts involving identity, are dependable to the mobility and immanence of the matter that contends the concepts in real life. This is, concepts are already copies of the real, and cannot, therefore, be substituted for it. They are limited by this impossibility which makes them as unstable as the matter that they represent in real life. In Adorno's words,

> the idea of something immutable, something identical with itself, would collapse as well. This idea derives from the rule of the concept, from the concept's tendency to be constant as opposed to its contents, to "matter," and from its resulting blindness to matter (1966; 2004: 137)

Thus, identity, as we know it inside research environments, is both held to a question of epistemology and of ontology, that are, but, inseparable. On the one hand, identity is held to epistemology since the concepts that are driven from it, knowable and generated by what identities express, are necessarily an epistemic capacity to hold responsibility onto those identities that are socially located. On the

other hand, identity is both a set of concepts representing another set of images and happening evolving bodies that are changeable and movable and go beyond the human capacity of constant recognition and understanding, linking it to other accounts of existence that go beyond the containment of epistemic significations. This does not equal a justification for the exclusion of certain identities and subjects, but rather it involves recognition of the limitations of our human capacities to allow a self-organisation of the body as matter that evolves, adapts and folds as time passes and space happens.

This point should also be taken into consideration the particularity of the media era in which these conceptual orders and turns are imbricated. Following Franco "Bifo" Berardi's concept of *semiocapitalism*, the conjunction between the capital media and collective affects, is in tandem with the inseparability of epistemology and ontology that was explained before. As Berardi states, "a semiotic regime is repressive when one, and only one, signified is ascribed to each signifier" (2009: 111). The Foucauldian understanding of power, in knowledge and discourse, is tainted here through particular uses of concepts that are capitalised through normative arrangements, marking them as naturalised within a frame of feelings and values. This is, these naturalised arrangements of the use of concepts become repressive since they lock these notions inside certain uses and connections which difficult other relationalities that are potential for the application of these same concepts. Notions of gender, race and ability are closely tied to these onto-epistemological dispositions and, hence, ascribing new directions from where to use and apply them is a real challenge.

Let me return to Adorno, who would probably not identify as a new materialist since he walks sharply away from considering objects at the same level as categorical humans. In a wake of understanding theories outside the binary limits of epistemological uses, new values are given to the acceptance of the limits of these frames of knowledge. In this way, the negativity involved in this limitation is given a new value, engaging to it rather than trying to fix knowledge. Adorno sets a good terrain from which to see the anthropocentric imagination further and gives

us a locus from where to explore negation as a method that is beyond the dichotomy positive-negative and rather speaks about limitation and impossibility of a capacity (epistemological and ontological perception from the human mind).

As I am writing this very first part of my thesis, I realise how much the rhizomatic analysis has influenced me. This is simultaneously good and bad. On the one hand, it has allowed me to generate a non-dichotomous-hierarchical way of viewing theories and knowledge. On the other hand, it is very difficult to pigeonhole it all into the categorical classifications required for the presentation and comprehension of my ways of thinking theory.

2. The law of superposition[22]: Gramsci and the hegemonies beneath Foucault

To analyse systems of power, such as knowledge production or identitarian positions, is important for the present times. Not more than ever. But neither less. Things are not "better than ever". Yes, we have over the years trespassed certain paradigms of what has been considered deviant. Yes, there are certain overtures of differences between identitarian positionalities. I won't go right now into how inclusion is not our goal per se. But I will remark that what is meant when saying that things are not better than before is that what has shifted is not a particular way of acceptance and tolerance towards the other, but rather there is a time shifting. This means that the only thing that has changed is time. Time has passed and things that were out of mind some years ago are setting down into the general view. This is why hegemonies are still important because they speak about deviance in the face of the historical and current account of the norm. The foucauldian understanding of power means a shift in the "power" paradigm. It transfers its existence from an individual *persona* to a system of "strategic situations", a power that "is

---

[22] Following Archaeologist Edward C. Harris, I use the law of superposition as an account of an older layer of stratification that, still because of its positioning in the stratum, appears in a lower part of the stratum.

everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (Foucault, 1978: 93). As I have elsewhere analysed, "This understanding has potential applicability to critical realms of socio-political action in analogy to other approaches to power and hegemonies, such as the work by Antonio Gramsci" (Harris, 2018: 14). This conjunction works inside this thesis because it de-essentializes the traditional way of studying a theoretical approach, not because of its applicability but from its historical genealogy. Here, Foucault and Gramsci are valuable to this work in their dialogic status, which is embraced and enacted by several scholars, such as Joan Cocks. Cocks suggests,

> There are certain striking thematic repetitions [between Gramsci and Foucault], certain similar analytical obsessions – certain ways, too, in which their arguments and insights are reciprocally illuminating. What is flawed in each argument alone, moreover, is improved by the selective combination of the arguments together. (Cocks, 1989: 26)

The state of power that permeates the works by both authors "speaks more about positionalities than of positions and this, at the same time, brings us to consider how power is relational" (Harris, 2018: 16). This relational perspective is fundamental to gain a wide angle about identitarian theories and practices. It also facilitates "fresh considerations of how power works inside places that are constructed as 'counter-hegemonic'" (ibid), that is one of the goals of the present thesis. The agential engagement that is also activated through this perspective takes us to a particular characteristic that power has in the author's examination: power is not negative because it is productive. Power produces. Power is effective, as Foucault makes clear:

> The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an "ideological" representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called "discipline". We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals". In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals

of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production. Is it not somewhat excessive to derive such power from the petty machinations of discipline? How could *they* achieve effects of such scope? (Foucault, 1995: 194)

Power is generative in so subtle ways that it makes self-regulation and discipline look as natural to the human body. I will come back to this matter further on. But an important aspect that we sense in the shift from Foucault's power and Gramsci's is the lack of direct action that we find in some of the criticism on the "regimes of truth" (Foucault, 1995), which are tangled in systems of knowledge, is addressed by Gramsci's consideration about how action and practice has been disruptive throughout history. In an article written for the socialist paper *Il Grido Del Popolo* in 1916, Gramsci expresses how:

every revolution has been preceded by a long process of intense critical activity, of new cultural insight and the spread of ideas through groups of men initially resistant to them, wrapped up in the process of solving their own, immediate economic and political problems, and lacking any bonds of solidarity with others in the same position (Gramsci, 1994: 10)

Power is everywhere. In Gramsci's analysis, this is so because the constant division between oppression and power doesn't really apply to sociality, in which we mostly find how these intertwine. This is not an ontological account. It is not a general rule applied to any social situation since there are cases where certain identities are thrown out of any consideration of power. Nevertheless, the perspective in which oppression and hegemony exclusive to each other when considering identity, breaks the essentialism that exists when claiming identity from monistic and holistic points of view. Power is everywhere, and this also means power is not only present within hegemonic bodies or groups. This escape from essentialist considerations of oppressions, "that fail to recognize more ambiguous and hidden relations of power" (Harris, 2018: 16), we need to acknowledge the omnipresence of hegemonies in contemporary capitalist/westernised contexts. As I have explored in my research,

36

> This state of power, as both theorists determine, speaks more about positionalities than of positions and this, at the same time, brings us to consider how power is relational, a perspective that can allow fresh considerations of how power works inside places that are constructed as "counter-hegemonic". (2018: 16)

Power, as Foucault determines, is productive. Consequently, power doesn't depend upon someone or something in particular. It is rather locked inside a system of production that impregnates sociality. Following this link to a productive system, "[p]ower does not equal lack, even if it produces it. Power is not negative, even if it produces negativity. Power produces and is imbricated in every process of life and is informed in and informs every realm of society" (Harris, 2018: 16). As can be read in Bruno Latour's theories, power, rather than a process of diffusion- as a blurred quality in passing throughout history-, it is translated[23]. As he states,

> This model of diffusion may be contrasted with another, that of the model of translation. According to the latter, the spread in time and space of anything claims, orders, artifacts, goods- is in the hands of people; [...] there is no inertia to account for the spread of a token (Latour, 1986: 267)

To state that power is everywhere, is not the same as to say power has no active agents that we need to pin down. Hence, power is neither outlined in singular bodies nor inert to social life. These considerations take us to a certain account I want to shape in the following section, because of its connection to my own experience that can be found in the case-studies chapters. This is the aspect of self-regulation discipline and/or self surveillance.

---

[23] translation is here used in a double sense: as a movement of location and as a linguistic adaptation.

As I have written in the upper part of this section, power enacted to oneself is an integral shape of power in the liquid times and contexts we inhabit (Bauman, 2000). It is maybe the uncomfortability of this type of power, which makes it erased from many critiques, since it requires a self-criticism which is not always possible to face. To put it in Foucault's terms, there is a certain automatism of discipline and self-regulation in the functioning of a liquid body in postmodern times. Starting from the notion of biopower, as we see in Foucault's analysis on bodily control- and as has been analysed in the previous sections- takes part in many shapes: the body is gendered, is normalised, is assumed, is controlled, is exercised, sexed, nationalised, assembled. In this sense- and taking a special look into how the body is assembled- the body is both and at the same time forced and a force, it is both controlled and the exercise of control itself, not only for/towards others, but also to itself. The first part of this assemblage, the way in which a body is controlled, by many different forces- some nonhuman ones- will be discussed in the following sections regarding New Materialist Theories. For now, I want to concentrate on the important task of examining self-control, on how biopower is no such other thing than how power is swallowed, drunk, digested and, sometimes, vomited.

2.1. Self Surveillance and autoregulatory practices. Post practices of a post worlding.

Autoregulation, self-control and self-surveillance are entangled in every form of power, since power, in the age of *capitalocene* (Moore, 2016), in a globalised tendency, is much more than a *persona*. Power, as Foucault reminds us, is continuous even if not visible, is disindividualise and disidentified, but still effective. It goes without saying how this is boosted if we locate these terms in a post-pandemic scenario in which we are placed at the moment. Post as in postcolonial, not because the situation has ended, but rather because its effects are already settled in and functioning in a regulated and normalised way, without a state of exception that amplifies its rarity.

Paul B. Preciado or Byung Chul Han are only some of the many theorists of contemporary ages that have been also dedicating their work to the analysis of the way in which power is exercised through, lets say, identity itself. I mainly use these two authors in this introductory part because they have also thrown some light on the post-apocalyptic circumstances of this self-regulation in the aftermath of Covid-19. Their work is only a short sample of the multitude of writing that has been driven from the health crisis triggered by COVID-19. Auto-surveillance and self-exploitation are the two main concepts, respectively to both authors, that are used to analyse the systems that, somehow, biologize our own life. They have become natural. Or at least, in this *post-ozonic* frame of the world, more natural than nature itself, that at this point, remains extinct if considering its essential characteristic: that of "not being touched by human".

In Preciado's work, when speaking about the pharmacopornographic industry- which is the name he gives to the society of control- that commodifies bodies and modes of living, production and consumption, that generates, explains that the "'junkspace[s]' by means of mechanisms of immediate auto-surveillance and ultra rapid diffusion of information, *[is a]* a continuous mode of desiring and resisting, of consuming and destroying, of evolution and self-destruction" (Preciado, 2013: 41). This friction breaks the dichotomic appraisal of the processes of commodifying identity and sexuality, among others, through these new technologies of power, which also include the virtual realm. This invites new explorations of the intra-activity that takes place between the possibility/limit binary that appear in discourses regarding media-virtual spaces.

The ascendant location of these considerations, their background, can be found in the conceptualization of Foucault's panopticon. The panoptic machine is not only an architecture of gaze, but rather stands for a position from where to control. Discipline is tangled in the panopticon since the control is not exercised exclusively from certain powered personas, but rather involves the whole community, in a voyeuristic control. Power becomes a secret gazing desire. In this account, Foucault states that

There is no risk, therefore, that the increase of power created by the panoptic machine may degenerate into tyranny; the disciplinary mechanism will be democratically controlled, since it will be constantly accessible "to the great tribunal committee of the world". This Panopticon, subtly arranged so that an observer may observe, at a glance, so many different individuals, also enables everyone to come and observe any of the observers. The seeing machine was once a sort of dark room into which individuals spied; it has become a transparent building in which the exercise of power may be supervised by society as a whole. (1975: 207)

Preciado, in his study of how the body is commodified inside the systems we populate, does a clear critique to this fundamental way of control, of swallowed control. The body is already delusive since, as in a Truman syndrome, it knows it is being observed. From Foucault's considerations of the historical architecture of the panopticon while serving as a vigilant strategy inside prisons, he determines that

the major effect of the Panopticon [...][*is*] to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action (1975: 201)

Preciado recognizes these scenarios and updates them. In the specific scenario of the pharmacopornographic era, in which the voyeuristic aspect of discipline is expanded through the considerations of contemporary times as pornographic expressions of desire consumption, Preciado warns us that not only necropolitics are central pieces of the way of regulating live, but also the biopolitical forces have shifted their strategic locus. In this sense, Preciado reminds us that biopolitical apparatuses are swallowed in ways that subjects accomplices to power control. As he states in a beautifully and scary fragment,

the differences between the panopticon and the Pill are significant. Within the length of hardly a century, they underline the transition from a disciplinary

regime into a pharmacopornographic regime. In the first case, we're faced with an external political architecture that defines the position of the body in a space that is collectively regulated, creating specific positions of power (monitor/monitored, doctor/patient, professor/student…) and allowing the generation of a form of knowing (visual, statistical, demographic) concerning those individuals being controlled. In the second case, we're faced with a mechanism that—without any change in its effectiveness—has reduced its scale to that of a biomolecular technology that may be consumed individually and introduced by bodily orifices. In the pharmacopornographic era, the body swallows power. It is a form of control that is both democratic and private, edible, drinkable, inhalable, and easy to administer, whose spread throughout the social body has never been so rapid or so undetectable. In the pharmacopornographic age, biopower dwells at home, sleeps with us, inhabits within (Preciado, 2016: 207).

Power is edible. Power is the immaterial form of surveillance. Power is sometimes unrecognizable. Power that, believe it or not, is still everywhere. As an ambivalence, power exists in contrast to resistances, in friction to autodetermination, and in tandem to other ways of life that decenter de anthropocentric understandings of life, and thus, work outside power. Still, the weight that power has in a global move, remains in strength and linked to any process of life, in or outside a modernity system, even beyond the capitalocene rules, in honour of Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer (2000).

In a sense, we can see how auto-surveillance is a deviation of self-freedom. But what is the cause? Where is the conflict? I have thought many times about these questions. Even the questions I think come into error, since we cannot reduce them to prototypes of reasoning-why-we-self-control, but rather, also here, we find the activation of auto-surveillance through assemblages that happen and take part in our social understandings and beings. What I mean by this is that self-surveillance has more to do with how circumstances are entangled together than to a set of circumstances that pre-exist and give a fundamental reasoning to this specific way of control to happen. Here I want to introduce the perspective of Manuel DeLanda,

41

that has been analysed before, but I would like to activate a specific part of his thinking: territorialization and assemblages. In his book, DeLanda, rereading the work by Guattari and Deleuze gives a special strength to the idea of territorialization. As he explains, "[t]erritorialisation refers [...] to the degree to which an assemblage's component parts are drawn from a homogeneous repertoire, or the degree to which an assemblage homogenises its own components." (2016: 22). Territorializing an assemblage is the way in which it concretizes and allows for a certain and specific possibility but also through the potentiality out of the equation, since it has become ascribed to a certain set. But, as DeLanda continues some lines down,

> [I]n normal circumstances, this mild degree of territorialisation may be compatible with the acceptance of personal differences. However, when two or more communities engage in ethnic or religious conflict, not only will the geographical boundaries of their neighborhoods or small towns be policed more intensely, so will the behavior of their members. The distinction between "us" and "them" will sharpen and any small deviation from local norms will be noticed and punished (2016: 22).

3. History and its making. The frictions of fictions.

3.1 History in Capital H. Fiction as theory: a concept

Dismantling systems of thought[24] does not always mean to lose the whole reference. And still, there are moments at which a particular idea must change radically. In this radicality, I align with the use of non-colonial theoretical actors, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) and Naoki Sakai (2006) on their use of provincialism[25] and translation, respectively.

---

[24] Assuming knowledge and thought as one of the main elements of power structures.

[25] Provinzialising in this analysis is used as a site of contention for historical and philosophical accounts, insisting on how processes of translation are also involved in a particular location.

On the one hand, Chakrabarty's deconstruction of power has helped me recognize what particular History I hereby criticise. This said, the authorised ways in which normative and westernised History has constructed past times is not balanced by the alternative ways in which history has been lived through or has helped enact memory and heritage in other non-centralized communities or areas of epistemological eruption. This is not to say that traditional and authorised history should be dodged, but, rather, that the monolithic ways in which history is lived, perceived, used and abused in "late-capitalist" (Adorno 1987) first worldings is distanced from the otherwise ways of engaging in multiple narratives from the past. Along these lines, the translation problem that goes beyond languages is also at the centre of this thesis, since it also focuses on the methodologies, forms and geometries that history- and the disciplines linked to it- take in order to engage with a community's past. Provincializing is then translating in a way that is understood for a located reader, who is potentially engaged, linked and attached to the subject/circumstance under discussion, a *mestiza* strategy of perception which refuses to be adapted and displaced (Anzaldua, 1987).

As Sinthujan Varatharajah asks themselves: "How does a U.S. term live on outside its place of origin?" (Varatharajah, 2022[26]) since the capacity of adaptation of certain words comes without an introspective view of their actual transfusion, as Varatharajah names it. How, then, can transfusion actually be enacted in another context with completely different particularities?

I feel deeply related to this argument because I have been into fictional theory since I started being interested in Feminism. Even before, the whole existence of someone in a dissident identity appeared to me as somehow fictional since the

---

[26] Sinthujan Varatharajah 13 April 2022 the funambulist "The Weight Words Carry: On 'Brown', 'Bipoc' and 'Other Transfused Labels'.

strategies of acknowledging different parts of myself needed figurations and metaphors for their whole accountability. As Rosi Braidotti has notably exposed in her research on feminist figurations, the theories that save us are those searching beyond objective parameters of reality:

> I believe in the empowering force of the political fictions that are proposed by feminists as different from each other as Luce Irigaray and Donna Haraway. The former emphasizes images drawn from female morphology and sexuality, such as the two lips that suggest closeness while avoiding closure. The latter proposes instead the figuration of the cyborg (Braidotti, 1994: 3).

Braidotti brings forward the recognition of the centrality of political imagination when speaking about subjectivities that are brought forward, such as that of the female subject. In this manner, she accounts for a double move: on the one hand, the consideration of the possibilities existing at a particular moment, which I consider primordial in a political activation, and, on the other, the desire for a particular change. As she eloquently puts it "to reconcile historicity, and therefore agency, with the (unconscious) desire for change" is one of the most difficult goals (Braidotti, 1994: 30). Through the consideration of three levels of sexual difference, that of difference between men and women, that between women and other women, and the differences within each woman, she proposes a practical alternative for feminist analysis and transformative thinking. Through these three levels of sexual difference Braidotti states that,

> If you translate these three levels of sexual difference on a temporal sequence, following Kristeva's scheme that I have already quoted, you can argue that levels one and two belong to the longer, linear time of history. Level three pertains to the inner, discontinuous time of genealogy. The problem, however, is how to think through the interconnectedness between them, that is to say: how to account for a process of becoming, while empowering women's historical agency? (1994: 168)

The beautiful way of thinking about how to connect and combine conflicts regarding exteriority and those that are more related to the inner self, is drawn from the recognition of the breaking of the categorical distinction between both spaces (in-out), as argued in other sections of this thesis. In this sense, it is essential to investigate what strategies open up to balance desires and potentialities while accepting the conditions that are possible in a specific situation.

3.2. History and the archaeological record.

Coming from an archaeological environment, I have realised how uncritically we have formed and disseminated historical periods. The divisions follow a colonial understanding of how to live and under what conditions to live. What I mean by this is that "progress", civilization and production are at the core of any narrative concerning a positive and milestone event, such as that of the so-called "Neolithic revolution" (Childe, 1936). This positive event, that obviously took place in more than a specific time and place, relates to the way in which ways of life went from nomadic to sedentary, generating a production stability that was also generative of many other facts. The term, coined by Vere Gordon Childe in the mid 1930's, was explored from a Marxist point of view which, nonetheless, remained uncritical regarding power formations. Childe's theory is interesting since it does break free from disturbing understandings of society in a dichotomous fantasy where the main change is produced through the introduction of writing and literate life. In this sense, Childe's theories exceeded this limit by attesting to how ways of life had been in constant change from other kinds of developments, such as urbanity, technologies, etc. Still, the way in which society is only possibilised by power mechanisms, such as the administration of land, labour and institutions, is not in any way answered by Childe. In later critiques, this is one of the most prominent discussions of how History has perpetuated a particular image of what civilization means, how it was achieved and to what an extent this image has framed our colonial minds in the present. I would like to push this idea further on by the analysis that researcher Jen Rose Smith does in her upcoming book *Icy Matters: Race, Indigeneity, and Coloniality in Ice-Geographies*.

45

While discussing the issue of land in regard to decolonial theories, Smith argues that the settler's view on land always takes the form of earth and that this normative image is broken when we think of otherwise ecologies, such as those regarding ice. Smith discusses the problematics that sedentarism has meant for other ways of living life. Through the term "Temperate normativity", she analyses "how Western civilization is grounded in this idea of agriculture as a specific kind of cultivation, and this sort of sedentary lifestyle that is meant to emerge from an agricultural way of being in the world, of a kind of stasis in space" (Smith, 2022, funambulist). This way, Smith recalls Childe's works by analysing how the revolutionary forms of sedentarism and agriculture were rather imposed on our ways of thinking. This form of environmental determinism is also perpetuated by the still-ongoing understanding on how we divide historical periods. The way in which this determinism relocates or directly expels certain subjectivities is related to the theories explored in the following upcoming section concerning decoloniality and, as Professor Juliana Hu Pegues does on their analysis to Alaskan native experiences, certain bodies are racialized through a "being out of time" (2021), in a similar trend that Smith discusses about the image of the Asian immigrant people in Alaska constructed through a "being out of place".

4. On colonialism: the importance of space beyond cartography. PLACES

4.1. Ontology and the problem of the state: colonial conceptual spaces.

The problem with ontology, as introduced above, is that it is always seen as a singular substance. We cannot accept that there is a different ontological consideration that disarticulates the first ontological thought. The problem with religions, particularly with hegemonic views of these, is that we cannot understand different systems of beliefs subsisting and coexisting together. In this sense, ontology is constructed from an anthropocentric view in which the human person seems the one moulding reality, instead of taking ontology as already a specific vision of what there is that rises from specific subjective locations. Ontology then,

parallel to the notion of sex when addressing it as another site of human construction, should be recognized as yet another epistemology of human worldmaking, to help recognise the relationality and dialogue between different ontologies, where matter and their physics doesn't respond to ontological thought (which, as such thought, is already constructed) but is an independent force that we, as humans, might perceive and envision in very different ways.

As Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui explains in her signature work about life otherwise, t the notion of ch'ixi can serve as "an epistemology that is capable of nourishing through the aporias of History instead of gobbling and denying them, echoing the politics of oblivion" (2018: 25. *My translation[27]*). In this sense, and leaving this notion for further explanation and expansion in this pages, Rivera Cusicanqui draws towards a possibility of ontological enactment, of imagining otherwise, of different lifeways, outside of the "colonial ethos" as she recalls in these pages and working through contradictions.

The spatial connection exists in the very way in which Rivera explains and denounces the coloniality of knowledge, that she argues through the reconsideration of Franz Tamayo's work, a Ch'ixi thinker that has been underestimated because of his lack of "modernity". Modernity is also understood in connection to space, since it responds to the colonial places from where epistemologies were articulated in opposition to those cosmological visions of knowledge that weren't dichotomic to ontological considerations of reality. The Cartesian unexistence in many of these ch'ixi thinkers takes us also to see how the episteme is a site of resistance from where to exist otherwise. As Rivera acknowledges, the notion of Bovarism (from Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*) is used to describe how (in this case) indigenous thinking has to be legitimised "appealing to authors that have [*in fact*] made fashionable colonialist issues" (2018: 28. *My translation[28]*).

---

[27] "una epistemología capaz de nutrirse de las aporías de la historia en lugar de fagocitarlas o negarlas, haciendo eco de la política del olvido" (2018: 25)

[28] "recurriendo a autores que han puesto de moda los asuntos del colonialismo" (2018: 28)

4.2. Beyond Cartography: ontological close encounters. The extensive - intensive and the actual-virtual.

I want to take account of fundamental differences in which space is perceived, lived and affected. I depart for Gilles Deleuze as a virtual and intensive landscape from where to engage with more contemporary critical thinking (1968). These two properties, the virtual and the intensive, will be explained below.

However, before we complicate this theoretical background any further, I want to briefly explain my enthusiasm with space imaginaries. Because of the dominant colonial ways of engaging with the issue of space throughout history, we have neglected the possibility of accounting for different parameters of demarcation that go beyond the conceptual mindset of frontiers. I would like to delve into Gilles Deleuze's differentiation between the limitation of space through maps. As a rejection of the Hegelian understanding and dispersion of reality as totality, the assemblage theory that Deleuze proposes, explained in the previous sections, breaks free from pragmatic understandings of reality and, specifically, walks out of the limitation of reality as phenomenological. As he explains, there is a radical difference, at least from a phenomenological point of view, between extensive maps and intensive maps (1996). Deleuze's theorization of space also involves the human body, activating Kant's concept of *noumenon* through which phenomenological understandings of the world, and thus, anthropocentric ways of inhabiting knowledge, are called into question. This is interesting since the sense of identity is broadened and sharpened through its own dispersion. The idea of the human body, as already a space of extension affected and cast by intensities, throws us in a completely new understanding of identity. As DeLanda explains of Deleuze's thinking:

Deleuze's ontology is a realist ontology. But while most realist philosophers espouse one or another form of essentialism, the belief that what gives the contents of this mind-independent world their identity is the possession of an essence, for Deleuze the identity of any being can never be taken for granted and always needs explanation in terms of the historical process which produced it. If we characterize the identity of material beings as defined by extensities (not only by its spatial boundaries but also by the amounts of matter and energy contained within those boundaries) then the process that produces those beings would be defined by intensities. In this sense, human beings not only inhabit extensive spaces, they themselves are extensive spaces. (DeLanda in Buchmanan, 2005: 82)

The reworking of concepts as essentialism is fundamental since it is a current conflict activated once and again. Essentialism, as a way to reduce and transform conflicts and transforming them into motionless is characteristic of the social experience, in general, and the political life, in particular[29]. As DeLanda includes in his profound analysis of assemblages as, in this particular paragraph, a multiplicity that engages into realist philosophy, and as such, it abandons this transcendence of which essentialism is constituted. As he postulates, "[t]he most important transcendent entity that we must confront and eliminate is the one postulated to explain the existence and endurance of autonomous entities: *essences"* (2016: 139)

As will be retaken in the analysis of queer temporalities, the multiplicity activated through New Materialistic accounts is fundamental to delve into theories regarding the pivotal role of relations and relationalities in the way in which we construct and give signification to the world. This abandonment of anthropocentrism also responds to the endorsement of a worldview where we are

---

[29] And with political here I do not mean a mere institutionalised sense of political changes and habilitations, but a more corporeally involved way of politics, where a body, just because of its flesh, can already be passively political.

part of space, of that extensiveness where the actual is not the only reality, in an ontological sense,

> While extensive quantities (such as volume, area, length, amount of energy or entropy) are additive, intensive quantities are not. For example, if one adds two equal volumes of water one gets twice the amount of water. But if one adds two quantities of water at forty five degrees of temperature one does not get a body of water at ninety degrees but one at the original temperature. Deleuze defines intensive quantities as "indivisible", a definition which is simply another way of expressing the same point: a gallon of water at ninety degrees can be divided in extension, yielding, say, two half gallons, but the two parts will not each have half the temperature. (DeLanda in Buchanan, 2005: 81)

4.3. Beyond the metaphor: decolonization.

I refer to whiteness as the main system which has cut, and still does cut, my identity. As I will further explain in the methodology section, my use of self-experience in this thesis tries to remain critical of my complicities in the westernised white-washed encounters and experiences which have built my history. The references to whiteness and white supremacism, which are constantly addressed as part of my structural embodiment and part of the genealogy which I come from, are referenced beyond a racial demarcation. It is in the recognition of the social powers I am intrinsically informed by that I read Sonya Renee Taylor (2018) and Ibram X. Kendi (2019), among many others, to remain accountable of my own position in the world, acknowledging that my body has many layers of significations which are in need of an intersectional analysis. The oppressions I have lived through my queerness have allowed a disconnection from other privileges which have taken me to reproduce other violences, are also fragments of my identities which need to become a priority to my analysis. This is, self-surveillance cannot be deconstructed without a continuous self-revision and self-positionality.

6. New Materialisms

6.1. Ontoepistemologies and New Materialisms: Absent Presences.

Maybe Deleuze and Guattari wouldn't use the souvenir sentence of "all roads lead to deconstruction" in their use of the Rhizoma. Even so, it is important to emphasise this aspect of their theory applied to research in order to resignify the value of the ways in which theory and concepts are reached in our studies. In this thesis, these concepts are achieved through many paths.

As acknowledged in the above section about fiction, figurations and other ways of thinking through and of the body have been essential forms of subversive thinking inside feminist and queer studies and activism related to gender. These figurations, which are present in an extensive theoretical corpus, are fundamental to rethinking materiality and corporeality[30]. Figurations and living otherwise open doors that matter, in both their senses: in importance and in substance. This is the first focus in this thesis on using New Materialisms, or at least it is a specific link to these "innovative" theories.

In her account of materialisms, Jane Bennet posts an important account on vital materialisms, throwing out of the box the anthropocentric values that historical materialisms have had until some decades ago inside western philosophy, theory

---

[30] See Braidotti 1994 in the Fiction and History section.

and politics. In this otherwise materialism we see the potential of the recognition of the agentic contribution of nonhuman forces (Bennet, 2010: xvi). Bennet works through the concept of affect, but with a very particular break: affect as a concept may be human, but what happens through the movements and vitalisms of affectivity affects and is affected by other-than-human entities. In her words,

> For the vital materialist, however, the starting point of ethics is less the acceptance of the impossibility of "reconcilement" and more the recognition of human participation in a shared, vital materiality. We are vital materiality and we are surrounded by it, though we do not always see it that way. (2009: 14)

Bennet asserts a particular critique into dichotomies, in her own way, departing from Adorno's theories of materiality, where the life-matter philosophical mantra is rejected in favour of a less bounded amalgam of possibilities. As Bennet explains, her materialist vitalism helps "theorize a materiality that is as much force as entity, as much energy as matter, as much intensity as extension" (2009: 20). Bennet throws a small reference to the queering of materialistic epistemology and gives a rhizomatic account of what vitalism can be outside the human-centred enclosure we are used to. "A lot happens to the concept of agency once nonhuman things are figured less as social constructions and more as actors, and once humans themselves are assessed not as autonomous but as vital materialities." (2009: 21)

If there is a particular concept that I highlight from Bennet's work is that of *agency*. Agency is a key notion to take into consideration inside critical studies, involving new/other materialisms. Agency has a fundamental role in theory regarding subjectivity, politics and how bodies get intertwined in life. It is important to note that, from a non-human, decolonial and queer centred perspectives, agency becomes a reclaiming aspect to hold into accountability. It deals with the subjective capacity of making decisions and situating oneself inside the equation of worldmaking. It deals with the relation between non-human forces which escape the exceptional reading of human control *(humans are capable of everything and*

*anythin*g) while maintaining active human responsibility in this formula. It also defeats the ontological privileging of humanity, which carries the idea that agency is only present in human living bodies. Distributive agency pins down as a central idea, where this accountability remains active at the same time as power to affect and be affected (Spinoza, 1677, 1993; Clough, 2007) is operating. This means that, under the lens of this distributive operating activity, which travels between different bodies and entities, agency maintains present the understanding of intended motions. Bennet speaks about this idea when commenting that

> In the tradition that defines agency as moral capacity, such new effects are understood as having arisen in the wake of an advance plan or an intention, for agency "involves not mere motion, but willed or intended motion, where motion can only be willed or intended by a subject". A theory of distributive agency, in contrast, does not posit a subject as the root cause of an effect. (2009: 31)

Distributive agency activates action solely to certain bodies, but also engages other vibrant forces that "live" in different capacities otherwise human. Distributive matter unroots the human as the "cause of an effect" (ibid). It engages in the necessity of distributing the idea of agency beyond the human "exceptional" body. Bennet stresses this idea by speaking about the human building of intentionality, which is tied to moralism and limits the notions of agency. As they write,

> This understanding of agency does not deny the existence of that thrust called intentionality, but it does see it as less definitive of outcomes. It loosens the connections between efficacy and the moral subject, bringing efficacy closer to the idea of the power to make a difference that calls for response. And this power, I contend along with Spinoza and others, is a power possessed by nonhuman bodies too. (2009: 32)

The use of "definitive" breaks the dividuum between the human body and everything else. It focuses agency beyond the anthropocentric idea of intentionality and ethics. Reading through Derrida, Bennet throws in a very interesting idea highlighting that the perception of reality for the human consciousness is directly

tied to a linear temporality where things are perceived because of their pending onto an idea of future, a not here or now, that manifests their existence. As she recalls from Derrida,

> [A]n alternative to this consciousness-centred thinking by figuring trajectory as "messianisity." Messianicity is the open-ended promissory quality of a claim, image, or entity. This unspecified promise is for Derrida the very condition of possibility of phenomenality: things in the world appear to us at all only because they tantalise and hold us in suspense, alluding to a fullness that is elsewhere, to a future that, apparently, is on its way. For Derrida this promissory note is never and can never be redeemed (2009: 32)

This is, interestingly, a fundamental point when speaking about otherwise materialisms because sometimes is not noted into enough clarity how these alternative ways of viewing the human subject entangled in the world also generates other potential temporalities, that are neither linear nor singular, but rather align to the form of an assemblage. What there is and what can be are not necessarily at two different points, but fold into each other. And this is essential for the understanding of how the human mind, our epistemologies, cannot be universalized or taken as fundamentals for the ordering, organising and activation of the world. We are limited. We are fragmented. Each epistemology is true and valid and, simultaneously, holds an impossibility of general application. Bennet asks herself how to hold in responsibility certain human acts that, even if dependent on a set of other vibrant entities, have an intentionality and reproduce certain systems of power. In this sense, Bennet leaves the question open by speaking of the possibility of a strategic material agency linked essential to humans.

My use of queerness is already saturated. In this sense, and as will be fully understood through its application to animal studies from the next section, the accountability of queerness is applied working through the saturation of anthropocentric views. This means that, even if recognizing my human animality, which in turn works from a very particular notion of knowledge, I maintain

accountability of my embodied privilege as a standpoint. I work condensed in the notion of *saturation* [31]used by C. Riley Snorton (2017; 2020) in his reading of the messiness and multiplicity of the term applied to racial categories: racial representation, while being embodied, exceeds its saturation point. Also reading Melody Jue and Rafico Ruiz's use of the concept (2021), "[s]aturation (...) is adequate to situations where discrete objects/substances/phenomena may be difficult to delineate. It involves an attitude of ontological openness, wherein the researcher does not know all the substances, elements, agencies, or processes in advance, but rather explores what may co-saturate within a given situation" (p, 2). This saturation of already saturated categories takes the writer to ask for other directions for new mechanisms to deal with representational discourses. Applied to my own identity, *saturation* works through both problematics: the possibility of exceeding this human exceptionalism and the impossibility of dropping its privilege. Thus, new materialisms are envisioned in these sections of my thesis as informational saturation while engaging in other types of agencies. As Mel Chen explores,

> Animacy is built on the recognition that abstract concepts, inanimate objects, and things in between can be queered and racialized without human bodies present, quite beyond questions of personification. Theorizing this animacy offers an alternative, or a complement, to existing biopolitical and recent queer-theoretical debates about life and death, while the idea of toxicity proposes an extant queer bond, one more prevalent today than is perhaps given credit (2011: 265)

As we read from Chen's thinking, these accounts of other-than- human agents and intimacies involving identity formations, affective lives and other critical debates, should not be totalized as positive elements, but rather as alternative ways of confronting what we understand and construct as reality. In this sense, NM and other alternative theories are not gatekeepers to optimism and a universal value for

---

[31] A concept debated in the next chapter, the void.

alternative futures. They do not invite or refuse negativity or futurity. Instead, they register alternative ways of being in the world and examining "reality". We can see that Chen brings forth the toxicity[32] in which some practices may become involved as otherwise views of how to face critique beyond human-exceptionalism. Chen's project is directed to understand "the potential to resignify toxicity as a theoretical figure, in the interest of inviting contradictory play and crediting queer bonds already here: the living dead, the dead living, antisocial love, and inanimate affection." (p, 266). As such, toxicity is animated through its exceeding a historical materiality associated to toxic critiques that, nevertheless, refuses to abandon its materiality.

Indeed, as many decolonial and indigenous scholars remind westernised visions of New Materialisms, the novelty of materiality is, in fact, very old. If we think about materialities lived through other cosmologies, we can assume that the "new" part of materialisms is original only to some contexts. In this sense, NMs are used in this thesis as a wide understanding of theories involving a connection to other forms of agency which go beyond the figure of the human body, also including in this figuration an anti-racist and decolonial critique which can expose what the model body of this human representationalism means. As Tina Campt explains, in a conversation with Alexander Weheliye about flesh, refusal and rhythms, "the ways in which different forms of energy are transferred and affect one another [....] That's my point of departure that to me is productive and generative as opposed to requiring me to attribute agency somewhere" (2020; min: 39-40). In this sense, giving centrality to other forms beyond the human can also attend to isolated elements as flesh, embodiment and (lifeless) objects which are engaged through the energetic transfers rather than the already human exceptional attribution of agency

---

[32] The use of toxicity exceeds is traditional understanding of substances destroying a body and incisively stresses the recognition of human embodiment as embedded in the world. In this insistence of human relationality to other world entities toxicity is framed as another state of our contemporary identities, exploring our embodiments and subjectivities in a relational continuum which deconstructs the exceptionalist idea of the human.

to certain entities. Therefore, we see how both strategies, attributing agency to entities and focusing on the energy transmitted from one body to another and vice versa, can be points of reference to make room for other forms of experience which are less visible and need a story of their own. This is important for the restructuring of more ethical and inclusive visions of time, history, memory and knowledge, in ways which can open to the multiplicity of experiences while simultaneously remaining accountable for the exercises of violence which distribute through specific embodiments.

7.: Beyond time, Adagio. Queer temporalities, slow theories and combined ontologies.

> Reminder: "This is a story of art without markets, drama without a script, narrative without progress".
> -Jack Halberstam, *The Queer Art of Failure*.

7.1. Perfect timing and good intentions: Positivism and future.

> "At the center of *Cruising Utopia* there is the idea of hope, which is both, a critical affect and a methodology"
> -Jose Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia (2009: 4)

The anti-relational/antirrelational turn that we find in the works of queer theorists, such as Lee Edelman, Laurent Berlant or Leo Bersani, has been fully valued and criticised inside queer studies. In his breaking question for one of his chapters in

Homos (1996), "Should a homosexual be a good citizen?" Bersani escapes the trap of becoming a replica of the gender/sexual identity pattern. In doing so, he also flies from a productive ethical model of the imitation game that gay and lesbian's rights had represented and reinforced throughout the last decades of the century[33]. Not as a celebration of exclusion, but as an affirmation of aberration, Bersani goes on deconstructing what it means for certain bodies to be recognized. Recognition is vision. Inclusion is gaze. Those who look are many. Those who portray are few. This way, his critiques posit a narrative of rejection that has, historically, a great value to different causes engaging deviant gender and sexual ways of living.

The issue of recognition is also rescued by other authors who see this rejection to state and a reconsideration of an outlaw manner compatible with more relational ways of sociality, in an ambivalence between in and out, where the also dichotomous view of being included by law and its practices or submitting a death-drive live is broken. As I will analyse in the last part of this section, through the consideration of Queer Death Studies critiques, this breaking of the binary between reification or death, from my considerations, doesn't equal a normative positivism where life is seen as the only option of resistance or politicisation.

Lee Edelman's antisocial project of No Future (2004) epitomizes the queer subject as a site of potential rejection to heteronormative forms of reproduction. Through the figure of the child, Edelman urges queerness to abandon commodification systems of recognition and inclusion. While the foundations upon which Edelman sustains his argument are interestingly recognized by radical queer movements which reject this "gentle" idea of the future, he fails in recognizing the privilege embodiment from where he proposes this negativity. A fundamental parallelism to understand the anti-relational queerness and temporality that

---

[33] Here I am referring to the *homobsession* to fit into familiar, social and relational heterosexual categories which have taken LGBTQ+ movements to focus on reproductive and productive standards of life for their political reclaims, abandoning and dismissing the radical and non-normative potential some of our identities represent for sociality.

Edelman proposes is the following: "But there are no queers in that future as there can be no future for queers" (2004: 30). This easy and direct formulation of a futurity is what characterises the distinction between relational and anti-relational queer critique. One, the relational critique, addresses a normative future where queers cannot be located, because of this future's implicit expulsion of aberrant bodies. The other, the anti-relational, doesn't stop here, but adds the impossibility of any kind of future in queerness. As a consequence, the anti-relational refers to a space of normative rejection rather than a lost connection, since this temporality tied to the present generates strong kinships in many queer experiences. In *No Future* Edelman presents the image of a nostalgic past which functions also as a promise of the future, that is, at the same time, constructed upon the symbolic figure of the child, through an innocent and hopeful image of a promised future that entail re-productivity:

> [W]e do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter future tomorrow, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future. We choose, instead, *not* to choose the Child, as disciplinary image of the Imaginary past or as site of a projective identification with an always impossible future. (2004: 31)

To critique the figure of the child is to decline a reification of the body in the future through the discipline of the present. It is not a question of de-potentializing immature bodies, such as those of children or even animals (immature in so far as they represent a constant impossibility of the anthropocentric idea of progress), which are located in a place of resistance for theorists such as Jack Halberstam in his reconsidering of failure (2011) but rather to escape the trap of the promises of a figuration for the future, which comes through the regulation of the present body.

In reading Lee Edelman, José Esteban Muñoz makes a great contribution to rescuing those fundamental parts of *No Future*'s propositions. Muñoz works together apart with Edelman's project, framing temporalities within the notion of

hope. Edelman's pessimistic view, anything referred to future is sterile, but this, in Muñoz's language, is not necessarily a negative term:

> *No Future* is a brilliant and nothing short of inspiring polemic. Edelman clearly announces his mode of argumentation as being in the realm of the ethical, and this introduction is an anticipation of a reanimated political critique and should be read as an idiosyncratic allegiance to the polemical force of his argument and nothing like an easy dismissal his argument and the seductive sway of the antirelational thesis energizes my argument in key ways. (Muñoz, 2009: 11)

Remaining critical to the way in which, as Muñoz puts it, the queer anti relational turns "are romances of the negative, wishful thinking, and investments in deferring various dreams of difference" (p, 11), which, in his opinion, are present in Bersani and Edelman, among others, Muñoz addresses time remaining accountable to the way in which it is constructed. His "queer hope" goes beyond the idea of a future, or to put it materially, it overcomes the bare promises of normative optimism.

Muñoz goes deeper in the criticism through the normative aspects of time ordering. He does not limit his critique to the future temporality of reproductive visions, such as the case in many queer theorists, but also researchs into other fundamental aspects of linear temporalities. In his vision towards the past, Muñoz draws a parallel with these critiques to reproductive values when dealing with questions of historicity. Muñoz works through Heidegger's notion of *historicity* contesting it. To acknowledge Heidegger's famous contribution, *a subject is already historical*, only works if we also recognize that this critical perspective was praised by the same thinker that would join the Nazi regime some years after. To rework this temporality is to save concepts from their creators. As Muñoz explains, "Heidegger is then philosophical master and abject political failure (....) [and this is] Thinking beyond the moment and against static historicisms" (2009: 17).

Time is a ghost. Time haunts subjects. Linear time haunts queerness. It imposes an idea of the past, before present, and a mandatory future. Nevertheless, we, queers and not only, lack historicism, we are forced resistance and we are typically hopeless. Typically because even if, as queers, we sometimes celebrate our being in the world, our desires and our relationalities, our bodies are marked by a sense of void into the future. Our requirement to be *on/in time* is as tautological as our reclusion to reordering our own events. As David L. Eng asserts, modernity is the "persistent denial of such coevalness, its disciplining of time and space into the political logic of liberal humanism and the economic logic of liberal capitalism" (2008: 1487).

It is important to note the difference between what Muñoz calls "antirelationality" and concrete utopias that is his own reading of radical propositions for queer hope. This way, the reciprocity between relational refusal and critical alternatives is sustained in his work. Muñoz allows a wide range of critiques on the impossibility of certain typologies of future, in this particular case, straight futures (reproductive, productive, capital, consequential to a past). At the same time, Muñoz recovers the idea of hope to inscribe it into queer terms: hope is a horizon, hope is not here and will never be in the present, but it will constantly move us forward, a forward which I read as not so much a position in time as it is a position towards a possibility. It is more used as it is in "I'm looking forward to seeing you". I am looking forward to you.

Importantly, this also implies a critique on the present, which is often lost in the promises of futurity. As Muñoz reads in the utopic writings by artists such as John Giorno, the idea of possibility "lies not merely in the fact that imagining any utopia offers us something that is more than another time but also, [...] in that what is made available first is a critique of the present and of its Emits, its barriers." (Muñoz, 2009: 37). Thus, queer utopias, in a very broad sense, also need to engage with those limits, those of-trail constructions of race, class or ableism which

intersect in gender identities. Queer temporalities, then, add another important element: a negation of nostalgia[34].

The concept of "History", as introduced above, is also part of this debate because it is also inscribed into heteronormativity. History is normalised by gender and, vice versa, it contains normative ideas about gender. Throughout Muñoz's whole opera we see an idea of historicity as ephemeral. Queer temporalities deal with ephemeral pasts that materialise in infinite gestures that are the traces of a longing time. Ephemera, gestures, mimics, touches, those are our traces and we are our ghosts.

Ephemera, as Karen Barad's void, is not emptiness at all. It is an entering abjection, it is served to expel stable remains. The ontology of loss, of invisibility, and as a consequence

[t]o accept loss is to accept queerness—or more accurately, to accept the loss of heteronormativity, authorization, and entitlement. To be lost is not to hide in a closet or to perform a simple (ontological) disappearing act; it is to veer away from heterosexuality's path (Muñoz, 2009: 73).

POSE
STRIKE A POSE
PAUSE

Our queer bodies are not only deviant because of our practices, but also because of our rhythms, histories, and ways of ordering time. Future is not a bright reproductive scenario, and the past is sometimes blurry. Present is sometimes

---

[34] Nostalgia is concretely rejected in these parragprahs in its conneciton to ormative understanding of temporalities, where past and present contain positive and negative values, nostalgia being or a missing of the past as something better that has been lost, or a feeling of being backwards.

sustainable because of "ritualized performances", as Muñoz writes, that sometimes mask us in the social setting, and others help us imagine different possibilities. Sometimes both happen at the same time. But this imagination is mediated through moments that are described as past but renew themselves in everyday practices. As Muñoz reads from Crimp

> Although the moment that Crimp describes is a moment that is behind us, its memory, its ghosts, and the ritualized performances of transmitting its vision of utopia across generational divides still fuels and propels our political and erotic lives: it still nourishes the possibility of our current, actually existing gay lifeworld. (2009: 34)

In this fragment, Muñoz is clear about queer emotionality informed by specific temporalities: queer affects sometimes stand on top of moments of response, resistance and defiance to existing timings. Muñoz reading and assisting to Douglas Crimp's lectures about aids/HIV, dyke and fagot mourning and loss writes,

> Freud tells us that mourning is the reaction not only to the death of a loved person, but also "to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as a fatherland, liberty, and ideal. Can we be allowed to induce, in this "divinized" list, the ideal of perverse sexual pleasure itself rather than one stemming from its sublimation? Alongside the dismal toll of death, what many of us have lost is a culture of sexual possibility: back rooms, tea rooms, movie houses, and baths; the trucks, the piers, the ramble, the dunes. Sex was everywhere for us, and everything we wanted to venture: Golden showers and water sports, cocksucking and rimming, fucking and fist fucking. Now our untamed impulses are either proscribed once again or shielded from us by latex. Even Qisco, the lube we used because it was edible, is now forbidden because it breaks down rubber. Sex toys are no longer added enhancements; they're safer substitutes. (Crimp in Muñoz, 2009: 33)

<div align="right">Reminder: "We need other times".</div>

Audre Lorde, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House"

I want to move on here to a much more acid use of queerness, that of the breaking of the binary between humanity and anything/everyone else. Indeed, there is a working opposition to the idea that the human, as a full and rich category, exists in an impossible symbolic trade to anything else. Speciesism is constructed through these parameters, that are also an ideology: the human is superior to any other species. As an anti speciesist activist, I have been dealing with all sorts of critical readings regarding what it is, where is it the point, where to turn this around. But, as any other ideology, it is not based solely in a slaughter industry that kills more than 153.7 thousand pigs a day (rounding decimals that are actually lives), only in the Spanish territory, that is- but has less visible and tangible ways of violating and exploiting other bodies. My use of queerness, both intimately and theoretically, also works through these stances that are, at first sight, outside gender discourses. I say at first because, as I will explain afterwards, the meat industry and the superiority of humanity vs. animality (as we had already forgotten the infamous Darwinism evolution), is tied to gender structures and patriarchal thinking.

In connection with our discussion on queer temporalities I want to stop at this stage on how meat and dairy consumption (to make it radically clear), are also bound to an idea of futurity. The fantasy of survival, of nurturing a body, is an idea that matters in linearity towards a future promise. Needless to say that this is only an illusion, being that the world is ending because of, precisely, animal industry and, above all, the human exceptionalism idea that has taken us to the consumption of the planet as if we were the only piece in the puzzle. Still, it is not so much the material effects that we are now starting to actually face, because of their burst in our very bodily systems, but rather the very ideology of "some are more equal than others". The Orwellian allegory also serves Jack Halberstam to think about these intricate ways of constructing the world. In his words,

> Building new worlds by accessing new forms of sociality through animals turns around the usual equation in literature that makes the animal an

allegorical stand- in in a moral fable about human folly (Animal Farm by Orwell, for example). Most often we project human worlds onto the supposedly blank slate of animality, and then we create the animals we need in order to locate our own human behaviors in "nature" or "the wild" (p. 32)

Halberstam sees a huge potential in the way allegories and metaphors drive to new ways of engaging and dealing with reality. Still, he also questions what is there to animality in these animated films and historical fables. While speaking about the family ideology, Halberstam, proposes a very interesting category of "straight time", that of continuity. Writing on the mass media film culture of the 2000s, Halberstam sees potential in the way certain films distort the conceptualization of the ideal of the family "[a]s a kind of false narrative of continuity, as a construction that makes connection and succession seem organic and natural, (...) [which] also gets in the way of all sorts of other alliances and coalitions" (2009: 71). In his own view, kids' films, those that are not-yet sexualized, have a potentiality to deconstruct the idea of individualism which we do encounter in for-adult movies. By using examples from films produced by *Pixar*, he exposes the alternative patterns of cooperation and community building present in these films, engaging us in a reading which serves to demonstrate that sexuality is not only gendered but also capitalised and temporally ordered. And in this, Halberstam's proposal pairs with Edelman's thinking on "reproductive futurism" is here produced through the "domestication in the form of romance" (Edelman, 2004: 132). It is not only an idea of the future, that I will come back to when speaking about reproduction in queer cosmologies, but also the very connectivity between times through a sense of continuity, that normalising structures, like that of family, allow.

In so doing, the passing of queer lives to be good-citizens also entails adapting to these values, that Halberstam recalls in the critiques to *homonormativity* in Lisa Duggan's work (2002). In my own case studies, I very much engage in these theories because they pinpoint problematics of how self-regulation has been part of my own queer life. Not only the ideological values that these concepts impose in deviant bodies, but rather the way in which a queer structuration of marriage and

family sense is also a fundamental gear for private property and capitalism. I will be using this cross-connection in one of the chapters (Bologna), when speaking about squatting politics and the normalisation of the citizen body.

The biological failure of our own continuity in time that we represent- following natural rhythms of reproduction-, can be now overcome by a legal system of inclusion.

7.2. Inclusion. What a great word.

Retaking the point which I first touched upon when exploring Lee Edelman's unpopular *No future*, Halberstam does place a great deal of potentiality not upon the image but upon the bodies of children and animals. This inclusion of animality as an ideal of non-progress -as I have expressed above- goes hand in hand with the figure of childhood, not because of an intrinsic innocence, an ideal that works in tandem for some as antiabortion stands- but rather as a response to adult centred constructions of humanity and anthropocentrism. In this respect, Halberstam sees a potential in the way children's films work through the, sometimes, non-human bodies, to generate a community base response to the plot. Following the connection to Edelman's book, and departing from the critique to both, the child and the "dumbest animals" (2004: 137), as he, at a point, states, I want to analyse a particular turn I see from this critique to Halberstam's or Muñoz. In their texts, *The Queer Art of Failure* and *Cruising Utopia*, respectively, the authors decentralise the general public in order to centre upon a particular set of non-dominant groups, which consume these art productions, either through cartoons (as in the former) or as queer performances (in Muñoz's case). Here I would like to insist on how Edelman's negativity is contested through the fictional utopias which the other two authors generate in their writings, where only playful children and queers exist. While Edelman's negation of utopia is rooted on a conscious presence of antagonists who consume and eradicate these sites of resistance, Halberstam and Muñoz imagine a world where community base response and relational desires are the cultural forms of existence.

7.3. Beyond nurturing: a non-dichotomous account of tactics.

Another point I want to highlight is that of the different construction of the (C)child that the texts have. One, the Child in Edleman's text, is problematic in that it focuses on the idea of innocence, and corresponds to the child as an imaginary, an ideology. The other, following the point I made above- the authors start to write to the child as a public and not about the child as an ideology, and this is the potential. The first is highly risky because innocence is equalled not only to domesticated or/and compliant figures, but in a lower sense, it represents the generative State. Here, the invisible and indivisible bond between the state and a sense of innocence represented through the child also takes us to a new consideration: how non-violence is seen as the only way to resist and engage in a well seen citizenship. Peter Gelderloos explains this point brilliantly when writing *How Non-Violence Protects the State* (2007).

As Gelderloos explains, non-violent positions are also embedded to certain privileges, implying that "Nonviolence refuses to recognize that it can only work for privileged people, who have a status protected by violence, as the perpetrators and beneficiaries of a violent hierarchy" (2007: 24). In the text, there is a remarkable clarification that the problem with non-violence is not its strategy as such, but its imposition as the only path to end an already existing violent or oppressive system. Gelderloos clarifies that, even if many oppressed subjects have chosen non-violence as a tactic of resistance, the problem stands with the normalisation of non-violent standards as the only way to achieve freedom or response of some kind. As he defends as a specific approach,

> a *diversity of* tactics, meaning effective combinations drawn from a full range of tactics that might lead to liberation from all the components of this oppressive system: white supremacy, patriarchy, capitalism, and the state. We believe that tactics should be chosen to fit the particular situation, not drawn from a preconceived moral code.
> (p, 3)

This approach stands as a breaking of the historical boundary between violence and pacifism, as there was nothing in between or outside their limits. Anarchism is pictured here, as I sense it in my own practice, as a way of recognizing the necessary specificity of every situation and the rejection of any standardising way of governing people and their struggles and joys. Most people who defend pacifism as an ideology of resistance, also hold a certain status that allows them to configure the world only by sit-downs, hunger strikes or melodic chants. I, myself, use these tactics. But not only. I use these and many others in the recognition of my own oppression as a dyke womxn but also white abled and remunerated one. As I will explore in one of the chapters (Bologna), these nonviolent strategies have surrendered to armed forces in the majority of cases. In some others, as I will also analyse, they weren't even read as resistance, and as such, they were dismissed and blurred in space as if nothing had happened. I will come back to this in the chapter concerning Bologna.

Gelderloos touches upon structures of sexism that are entangled with the violence binary discourse. As it is well known, many of the first (*white bourgeois*) feminists, or at least, those we recognise by name, claimed themselves as pacifists. They did so because they saw a masculinisation of action in violence which, aftermath, led to an implicit sexism and violence against women. Here, apart from including other identities such as queer and trans people in the consequences of a patriarchal system of values, Gelderloos also disarticulates the myth of violence as only tied to the masculine/male's body. As he states,

> The entire idea that violence is masculine, or that revolutionary activism necessarily excludes women, queers, and trans people is, like other premises of nonviolence, based on historical whitewashing. Ignored are the Nigerian women occupying and sabotaging petroleum facilities; the women martyrs of the Palestinian intifada; the queer and transgender warriors of the Stonewall Rebellion. (p, 69)

As he maintains non-violence linked to particularly oppressed feminised bodies is a white and westernised reading of the matter. Yes, passive actions work. Sometimes. In some places. Under certain circumstances. But this should not contaminate and, quite literally, colonise resistance.

These critical views of how resistance has been constructed, also pose another problematic: the identitarian construction of the activist/militant/oppressed as a total subject, in itself and throughout time and space. In this respect, subjects that represent any kind of resistance, through passivity, direct action, mourning or peaceful dialectic, are many not only between one another, but also they themselves are not a singular totalizing enduring quality. As I analyse in my review of Patrizia Melzer's *Death in the shape of a young girl: Women's political violence in the Red Army Faction* (2015; 2018),

> In *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl*, Patrizia Melzer problematizes the binary constructions of these discourses in order to analyse the participation of women inside activist and terrorist groups. In doing so, Melzer does not only challenge the social order, but also any essentialist representation of the feminist subject. Instead, she privileges feminist practice by focusing on acts and behaviours rather than identity construction of feminist subjectivity. (2018: 3)

In Melzer's analysis, the violent actions of the women inside the terrorist group of RAF was viewed from the outside feminist groups as the consequence of influential violent male activists, thus imposing not only a peaceful essence to female bodies, but also romantic love, as if these women in the movement would be incapable of enacting violence if it wasn't for an heterosexual driven passion that forced them into action. From a different perception, this involvement in terrorist militancy was also viewed as "the result of an 'exceed of women's liberation'" (2015: 2). All in all, Melzer discusses how "[w]omen's participation in militant and political groups in the 1970s and 1980s was not in accord with prevalent perceptions of women as peaceful and nurturing" (2015: 2). This time framing can be extended non only

temporally, since the restriction to political action and violence is still a component restricted to women's political life, but also to different aspects of analysis. In my case, I do see a strong connection to one of the case studies, when, in the city of Bologna, we faggots and dykes, were infantilized in a particular protest and dismissed as incapable of non-obedient and non-passive resistance. As I will analyse in the chapter, their treatment towards us was also constructed from this feminization of queer movements, where state forces as police agents, with whom we wanted nothing to do, were nurturing our passive and fragile sissy bodies.

> Current scholarship usually posits that women in left-radical groups distanced themselves politically from the autonomous women's movement and thus from the question of feminist politics. To dismiss the connection between left-radical women and feminist activists/politics because their ties were not formally organised means to discount gender as an organising force beyond consciously politicising it. Instead, my analysis [...] that armed women at times engaged intensely with feminist issues and politics (p. 7)

Here, Melzer is very clear about the essentialism that we sometimes find in gender issues and movements. In this sense, someone's decisions can be gendered even if they are not politicised through gender political views. Or to put it quite simply, Melzer's interest is "in feminist political practices, not defining 'the' feminist political subject" (p. 10). Hence, the rejection of certain action expectations bound to different bodies does not equal an unwavering defence of terrorism or violence as such, but rather re-orientates the search of the subject of feminism to the object of practices of response. This also means that the search for practices may lead us to an image of women we don't identify with. An image we may even criticise. But this in itself is an act of feminist practice since the "basis of women's peacefulness and (moral) superiority" is broken (p. 17). Gender does not only affect and effect in informed bodies, but it also permeates a full range of aspects of one's identity. The singularity of political identity that we see here is memorable. If you choose feminism, the rest of your militancy is bullshit. If you choose anything else besides recognizing our struggle as womxn, you're out of play in feminist issues.

In a deviation from the particular issue of women terrorists, Melzer analyses how the use of active violence as a political strategy is viewed by the general public as uncomfortable to the state's promises. In the connection to the promises of futurity that I have discussed through queer temporalities, Melzer writes, "[B]ecause terrorists symbolise a violent departure from the social contract and challenge the promise of democratic political measures, they are often demonized in public debates" (p. 232). Again, we see not a defence of violence as such, but a twist on questions regarding resistance, struggle, feminisms and identity structuration.

7.4. There is nothing new to matter. Everyday materialism, renewed matters and queer deaths.

Following the previous sections, I want to explore the connections existing between different epistemologies which can stand as allies of each other. Even if the specificity of theories that are marked to fit a certain context, the openness to these plurality of visions and the way we sustain them is also important to allow them their own paths. From decolonialities to New Materialisms, I want to draw a line to see what there is to matter that is sustained in both, not so much as points of connections, but rather as particular responses to the sometimes shared points of emergence

New materialisms, as Jerry Lee Rosiek, Jimmy Snyder, and Scott L. Pratt, need to recognize and include indigenous literature on agent ontologies, and deal with their concurrent existence (2020). NM and EM (Everyday Materialisms) being essential in their own contexts of genesis. Everyday materialisms stand as a factual response of otherwise-considerations of matter which are not new, but stand themselves through a long set of genealogical cosmologies which didn't, in the first place, work from anthropocentrism. According to this visibilisation of the everyday practices of material accounts, new materialisms are a set of theories which are located inside a certain geopolitical organisation, that of the global north, where not

only the practices of epistemologies take the human body as central, but also other forms of extraction and acceleration have debounced our human lives from dead and inert vibrancies. The posthuman is also re-envisioned since it is criticised as the limited alternative of the westernised philosophy to think outside the human exceptional box.

Rosi Braidotti's strong contribution is that of combining "features that are usually perceived as opposing, namely the possession of a sense of identity that rests not on fixity but on contingency" (Braidotti, 1994: 31). Fixicity and contingency are important to dismantle stagnant identitarian propositions which seek transcendence. In connection to this radical idea, there is something which has been often overlooked in readings of that fragment, the idea of possession. Among other themes, this thesis takes a close look at the meaning of possession and the privatisation of elements that are not related to these concepts a priori. In this regard, relating identity to a sense of the private is not usual but still important to take into account the way in which identities are constructed following the strategies of real estate. What I mean by this is that speaking about fixity in relation to identity, as Braidotti criticises here, is another way of constructing an oppositional dynamic inside-outside, in which, once more, there are subjectivities that do not fit in. Even if Braidotti is here using the subjectivity of the category of woman in its broadest sense, I think her thinking is fundamental to the breaking free of political and activist considerations of diversity in identity, such as those queer or transfeminist movements are trying to reframe.

On exile, in Braidotti's work, it should be accounted that the nomad is not on an exile but a massive force abandonment:

> Critical thinking is not a diaspora of the elected few but a massive abandonment of the logocentric polis, the alleged "center" of the empire, on the part of critical and resisting thinking beings. Whereas for Benhabib the normativity of the phal logocentric regime is negotiable and repairable, for me it is beyond repair. Nomadism is therefore also a gesture of nonconfidence

in the capacity of the polis to undo the power foundations on which it rests (1994: 32)

I am aware that there is a certain consciousness of privilege in Braidotti's work, and it is for me important that there is a recognition of a necessary stable point of identity from which to operate, that can "allow one to function in a community" (Braidotti, 1994: 33). Still, and focusing not only on her work, this compulsory flexibility and fluidity is sometimes corseted in very tight ropes. And, as it continues -and although being aware of the political context in which this text was written- to state that "the nomad has no passport- or has too many of them" (1994: 33) is somehow out of debate as an impossible comparison of situations. However, keeping in mind that "Nomadic cartographies need to be redrafted constantly" (1994: 35) I will use Braidotti as an example on how these cartographies ought to apply this change for them not to become maps.

I would like to re conduct the notion of nomadism, used by a great amalgama of theorists referenced in these pages (Braidotti, Deleuze and Guattari) to reincorporate the particular use that Isabelle Stengers does by attaching it to the use of concepts that we use in academic research and critical practices. Stengers speaks of a notion of nomadism that, from my point of view and as will be exposed in the following pages, overcomes some of the limitations that the nomad metaphor presents as regards ethical standpoints of privilege recognition. My critique of Braidotti's work is, obviously, more an emphasis than an attack of her thought. I do not analyse the two texts I have used in this section in singular ways, but rather embed them together in a search of the reconstitution of very important insights but actualized in the contemporary lens from my own situatedness. Subjective nomadities speak about how space and movement are also subjective to the one who sees them, perceives them and enacts them. Braidotti retains an interesting point of self-analysis:

Before we let ourselves joyfully celebrate our international ism, therefore, let us ask ourselves: are we sufficiently present as citizens in our country to start

thinking seriously about being citizens of the world? Unless we reflect seriously upon our own belonging to, involvement in, and implication with our culture, we are in danger of postulating internationalization as yet another version of women's exile (1994: 253)

More than because of the sense of internationalisation which Braidotti takes from this moment onwards, this point is important to see how we generate a sense of allies without falling into a self-determinism politics of generalisation and universalization of ethical approaches.

The critique to these privileged and self-centred practices of the human beyond body are also inhabited by a self-awareness of the ways in which my abled embodied construction has overlooked for many years critical disability studies. In this sense, my critique to the posthuman and other alternatives which are based on particular embodied experiences, while not being completely aware of this specificity, is also involved in my position on the normativity of abled embodiments. As in the works by theorists Eli Clare (2009), Margrit Shildrick (2002) or Sami Schalk (2022) -to name only a few- we cannot speak about gender, sexuality and queerness without situating them in connection to other systems of experience, such as ableism or race.

As has been previously announced, this consideration of matter, which goes beyond the normative understanding of the cartesian division between thought and everything else, drawing a line of superiority between the human activity and everything else, is radically connected to the way in which death and otherwise-non-living agents are important to take into account. In this regard, another aspect of queer temporality I want to touch upon, and that I deeply value, is the theories and works involving the Queer Death Studies critiques. QDS (Queer death studies), as will be referred to from this point on, focus on the importance of necropolitical forces surrounding contemporary bodies, including non-human ones. It also attends the many ways in which death and mourning vary from one context to another.

It departs from Achille Mbembe's (2003) thesis on how, through the idea of sovereignty, states have the power to work through the logic of annihilation and to involve a citizen imaginary to partake in these actions, maybe not actively, but completely. Death only gains its own property within linear time, a temporality of a body that disappears at the end of a straight line. But the importance of this set of critiques goes beyond this linearity, or at least beyond its sense of ordering of time. It rather focuses on the aspects that involve each of the stages of life. It overcomes the limitations of anthropocentric views of memory and living experiences. The human body becomes another expression of material bodies that inhabit the world, and the temporality of memory is distorted into new perspectives of how to remember, how to write history and, most importantly, how to occupy the present moment.

The other space of critique in QDS, the one focusing on the many aspects of death and the infinite affectivities which derive from them, also tries to recognize the anthropocentric visions of life, in which aspects such as human exceptionalism, white representationalism and active companions[35] are at the centre of the most part of the western epistemological tradition. Of course, the resulting anthropocentrism, racism, colonialism and speciesism are the practical outcomes of this set of traditions.

These two aspects are important to attend when using presumed geopolitical concepts concerning the control of bodies by states, institutions, world alliances and other forces of power. In the specific case of biopolitics and necropolitics, QDS involves an awareness of the multiplicity of death, in its forms of enaction, strategic

---

[35] What I mean by this, and following but also deviating (from) Donna Haraway's understanding of transpecies communality (2003), is that the only relationality regarded by the human body are those entities which allow a specific activity which fits inside human exceptionalism and is understood by its own activity. The ambiguous use of the author responds to the exceptionalist selection she does while only engaging in certain "significant others", referring to dogs. It also dives into the problematics surrounding the argument of evolution which she attends to explain the bond between humans and dogs.

significance and ways of being understood around different spaces and times. In his analysis of Tasmanian indigenous realities, Gregory Lehman addresses this aspect of death and relationality while speaking about the intimacy of death and the centrality of its thinking for the formulation and formation of cosmological understanding. In Lehman's words, "The world we live in vibrates with the energy of political struggle and revitalisation. The clarity of our vision and the depth of our understanding of the world today is made possible through their intimacy with death." (1997: 54). In this claim of otherness in the conceptual use of death, Lehman also addresses the important influence of colonial presence in Tasmanian indigenous experiences and the becoming of death as a "quiet companion", which also tainted the notion of death, the past, ancestors and vibrant entities in a constant resistance to colonial presence. In this sense, the recognition of the many archives for death does not mean a desire to romanticise its use from abusive, violent, extractive, statal, colonial and official forces, but rather an opening it to find alternative ways of living which exceed the cultural forms we sometimes take for granted in the white-western tradition.

Important names for me in the study of these otherwise considerations of death, dying and mourning are Marietta Radomska, Tara Mehrabi and Nina Lykke who situate this critique as a supremacist problem from the perspectives touched upon previously: the human, whiteness, cis-male, heteronormative and, I would add, abled body. In their move towards queerness, they question these normative understanding of the body which, in turn, translate in specific ways of understanding contemporary discourses surrounding, in this case, death. As they write,

> [T]he engagements with death, dying and mourning constitutive of conventional Death Studies' research (e.g. Kearl 1989; Kasher 2007), need to be taken critically further, among others, where they have been constrained by normative notions of the human subject; the human/nonhuman divide; continuing bonds; family relations and communities; rituals; and experiences of mourning and bereavement. Individuals who do not fulfill the conditions of the normative idea of the human (usually imagined to be white, middle-class,

heterosexual, cisgendered, and able-bodied) tend to be ignored in dominant stories on death, loss, grief and mourning. Moreover, the current environmental crisis seems to produce new kinds of planetary consciousness about living in ecological and social proximities to extinction, which also gives rise to demands for new kinds of stories of death, dying and mourning. (2019: 5)

To open the conceptual uses of death dying and mourning, to recognize the specific strategies behind their issued necropolitical and biopolitical controls of the social bodies and working outside the dichotomous between dead or alive are some of the main concerns in this non-binary view of theory, which can more easily approach certain parts of the case studies which cannot be understood through these split examinations.

In the case of Judith Butler's understanding on the topic, and as many of the authors engaging in QDS have recognized as part of their epistemological tradition, to think what bodies are grievable is an important task in these critical considerations. This takes us beyond the action of killing and dying and relates to the more relational fact of the consequences involved, such as grief, loss and mourning. Who is allowed to mourn, how and whose body is grievable, such as Butler asks in their famous *Precarious Life* (2004) becomes fundamental in the disentangling of the understanding on the normative constructions of embodiment. In this sense, queer theory is taken to a new stage: gender and sexuality, albeit their importance in the genealogical path towards a queering of social understanding of oppositional discursive constructions, are not always present nor needed for a queer claiming of alternatives.

In her development of the notion of *necropatriarchy*, which tries to address the specific necropolitics which mean femicides[36], Sayak Valencia engages in questions surrounding death, mourning and justice for violences which have become anchored

---

[36] The term, coined by Jane Caputi and Diana Russssell is defined as "Femicide is the ultimate end of a continuum of terror that includes rape, torture, sexual slavery (particularly in prostitution), incestuous and extrafamilial child sexual abuse, physical and emotional battery, sexual harassment, genital mutilations (clitoridectomies,

In this sense, I propose necropolitics as the management and capitalization of the death processes that are highly tied to sexism and necropatriarchy in the Mexican state. Necropolitical power expands in a metastable way, among classes, races and generations, regularly leading against those who are nonbinary, queer, racialized, poor, renegade, and/or people living in conditions of precarity. I understand necropatriarchy as the privilege of exercising the techniques of necropolitical violence proffered by the patriarchy to the figure-body of the individual man (2019a: 185)

These postmortem/transmortem politics, as Valencia nominates the *necroadministrative* state of impunity in which trans, cis and gender non-conforming women go through in the Mexican state speak to us about the variable and multiple management of death and mourning which rhythmically changes in their tactics but move in the same tone when it comes to targeting vulnerable embodiments. The way in which these theoretical localities highlight the ambiguity which is sustained by generalised identity exclusions (in this case those towards women) is interesting since it also specifies their location, insisting upon the specificity of each place to target different embodiments (for example with the specific case of racialized women in Spain).

---

infibulations); unnecessary gynaecological operations (gratuitous hysterectomies), forced heterosexuality, forced sterilisation, forced motherhood (criminalising contraception and abortion), psychosurgery, […] denial of protein to women in some cultures, cosmetic surgery and other mutilations in the name of beautification. Whenever these forms of terrorism result in death, they become femicides" (1990; 1992: 15) I pair with most of the elements involving femicide/feminicide but particularly stand against any form of colonial, patriarchal, paternalistic way of dominating agency, by which I do recognize sex workS beyond the simplification of the limits of human trafficking and forced labor.

CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGIES IN ACTION: Concepts as Methods.

1. Introducing the method.

My thesis brings works together, connects them, in a recognition of words I would never be able to articulate myself. I hear them. And I hear their echoes in other words that I have spoken and heard somewhere, sometime, somehow. I speak and I scream, but the emphasis of my own sentences is upon the reverberation of these other works that have guided my body into spaces of epistemological desire, to face alternative radical ontologies.

Writing about and against hegemonic power and power hegemonies inside Academia can be an Oxymoron. The conjunction between academia and active critical positions seems contradictory. Nevertheless, I have wanted to explore its contradiction under the belief that systems of knowledge, such as Universities and research spaces, need to confront the power that is reenacted inside their landscapes of production. And this springs from the recognition that this thesis will also end up being a performative dogma. As Foucault states, it is time to admit that

> [P]ower produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does

not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. (Foucault, 1995: 27)

Hence, it is important to return to systems of power pertaining to epistemological production under the pragmatic light of methodology. At a practical level, this thesis draws from the analysis of four specific case studies in the quest for the reevaluation of the ways in which power articulates the different situations they represent.

Departing from my exploration of genealogies of theories of power in the preceding chapter (Gramsci, Foucault, Butler, Preciado…), I retake these ideas now to expose how genealogies are also functional as methodologies. This, in turn, involves the liberation of the main frames of this thesis, such as queer concepts, elements and experiences from their traditional meta-applications within the sphere of Queer Theory. My aim in this chapter is to explore queerness as methodology, overflowing constricted applications which have often excluded non queer examples. The exclusionary application of these concepts dilapidates their potentialities. Besides, we cannot disregard the genealogical ties between the primaeval uses of the concepts when they were created and their current usages, which often deviate from the original coinage. A famous example of this is the very discussed case of *Intersectionality*, which has detoured from its critical genealogy by its overuse and a lack of revision and recognition by white scholars and activists. Landscapes of historical friction, words enacted in impossible connections and the uses of languages are queered going beyond identity[37].

In this sense- and as I will explore below- the division into sections of this thesis is more performative than procedural. The specific case studies are analysed in constant awareness of the impossibility of separating the methodology from the

---

[37] As it is traditional in the application of queer and gender theories, these are usually applied to case studies and situations which have a central tie to gender or/and sexual identities. In the case of the thesis, even if gender and sexuality are present in every scenario, they are not the organising element of the experiences which are located in my analysis. In this case, even if gender and sexuality also appear as core elements to some of the situations here exposed, queer theory is applied to give new understandings and throw different questions to encounters which exceed a queer/gender understanding.

theoretical corpus, and of an impossible destination towards concrete results. This thesis engages in the theoretical-methodological orientation[38] of a queer utopian understanding of research, following José Esteban Muñoz (2009). It does not intend to lead to stable histories and historicities but rather aims towards disturbing narratives that continually move towards new horizons.

In this work, the *locus* of the body is focal, since it is from my body that theories are lived, experienced, analysed and deformed. Corporeality is fundamental since I defend there is an ambivalence in its simultaneous role as discursive and experiential and, thus, has the potential to both perform and transform. As Thomas J. Csordas examines in his *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self* (1994), "[t]he dominance of semiotics over phenomenology, and hence concern with the problem of representation over the problem of being-in-the-world, is evident in the relation between the parallel distinction between 'language' and 'experience'" (1994: 11). Embodiment has been taken for granted, as if the way a body materialises was somehow exterior to discursive practices[39]. Still, what I stress here is that this inclusion of the flesh as another site of construction should not equal an impossibility to inhabit configurations of knowledge that acknowledge the necessity of self-situatedness in critical research. To put it very simply, experience is not an excuse for eluding self-revision[40]. This acknowledgement includes revisiting the ways in which

---

[38] This combination of words is inspired by the way in which Karen Barad also puts concepts into conversation, reading them one through another and highlighting the importance of intersecting cultural and conceptual forms, which rather than existing in themselves, exits in their performative coming in contact (2014)

[39] Theories relating to the intersection between subjectivity and embodiment, such as Judith Butler (1990; 1993) or Elisabeth Grosz (1994) try to focus on the many layers which link discursive practices to materialising body experiences. In more recent research, this intersection has been focusing on embodiment beyond representation. This ongoing work has also been developed when speaking about the discursive embodiment of transness (Snorton, 2017; Lehner, 2021), disabilities (Wong, 2020, Shildrick, 2002), racialization (Snorton, 2017; Wong, 2020) or fatness (Pausé et al., 2014), to mention only a few for this matter.

[40] What I mean by self-revision is the way in which identity should be equality committed with autoexploration and autocriticism in ways in which it can serve not only as a body of resistance but also as a body for accountability.

colonial epistemologies, gender roles or sovereignty permeate our contexts, experiences and identities.

The referent "we" in this thesis has a particular location, economic basis and specific time relation. In this sense, and following critical theories on their insistence of the need to become response-able for one's place of enunciation, I follow Sylvia Wynter's insights on how the category of the human has been assumed to be holistic and monistic to all kinds of violences, to others (human and otherwise). In this reflection, she challenges how

> The *referent- we* of man and of its ends, he implies, is *not* the *referent- we* of the human species itself (...) [N]atural scientists and also bourgeois subjects, logically assume that the *referent- we*—whose normal behaviors are destroying the habitability of our planet—is that of the human population as a whole. (Wynter in McKittrick, 2015: 24)

This awareness of totalising semiotic formulas is revised in this dissertation, since many of the critiques and potentialities are extracted from specific contexts where the use of Wynter's homo-economicus that normalises the effects of a globalised economic system while invisibilising the different ways of inhabiting it. In this thesis materialities are rethought through 'new' materialisms, queerness is applied to non-queer experiences and art is used. All these acts are acknowledged to be as situated as my personal appellation to this "we". This means that I do not believe in the newness of materialism, nor do I dismiss forms of art or queerness that go beyond institutions and identity politics. These unsettling elements may exist outside theorisation, and as such I am not choosing these to commodify in this thesis. Thus, the active elements in here are mainly dealt with by academic theorisation, wanting to maintain the anonymity and anti institutionality of many ideas, experiences, movements and cracks which will be only referred to. The last thing I would like to do in this work is to give radical information for academics (including myself) to reproduce the subject/object binary   of   study.

2.   Methodology as a happening.

This is just a *happening⁴¹*. Academia, its roles, hierarchies and, above all, the theories "we" [42]create are just *happenings*. This is an important issue for me: fiction is already a methodology that draws attention to the way in which the epistemologies we create as humans,- that is, as assemblages of time-space-relations- are just *happenings*. It only happens once. But this can also imply a strong consequence: it only responds to the issue for which it has been created.

I want to avoid the situation where this research is equated to activism as an actual *happening*. Still, I do want to point out and use the idea of the *immanence* of research (Spinoza, 1677, Braidotti, 2013), because it is the only way to explain the my use of some theories, such as the above mentioned new materialisms, performance and queerness, three of theoretical frames that are pivotal to my work and to my living life, immanently related.

In a general sense- or rather, in an official account- this thesis is articulated by five main tools: queerness, decoloniality, autoethnography, fiction and anarchism. These tools are actually conceptual frames, notions from where I organise and activate the chapters in it. In the following sections, I will explain each one of these conceptual frames, giving value to their active specificities and not taking for granted how each person can perform each one of these categories differently. In doing so, I also wish to escape a generality of meanings, or a given critical way of applying and situating

---

[41] Allan Kaprow Uses the term in the mid 50's to design those performances of art that are spontaneous and temporally unique because of their immanent quality (Kaprow, 1956).

[42] As it has been exposed in the closing of the previous section, the locality of this thesis also insists on a commonality driven from the contexts I have lived in. The locations of academia, whiteness, legalness, Europe and activisms in these places conform to the vast 'We' which I use to speak about specific relationalities.

them[43]. In relation to this, another aspect worth clarifying is the phenomenology[44] of each case study that takes it to engage with particular methods in each case.

In the case of my first case study, *Valor y Cambio* (Case study 1) the circumstantial explosion of the protests after George Floyd's murder by police activity (aka. racism, supremacism, brutality and abuse), which took place on 25th May 2020, just after my research visit to New York, deeply affected my research so that the initial aim of that case study, the use of art as a tool for political activation, radically changed towards the need to reevaluate concepts. Concepts appeared to me as needing to be built into methodologies, that can relocate them into responses and be nurtured by activism. In the second case study, that of Bologna, the materiality that is lived through volatile spaces- such as those in o*k*upied and liberated social centres and squats- is directly related to the analysis of particular situations where the details of certain material remains become essential to the general picture of complex scenarios. Likewise, in the case of Thermi and Moria, because of the strong dichotomy between Archaeological History and Ephemeral injustice respectively, there is an implicit dialectic modality that works in the analysis of these two spaces, or, rather, on the space that is created by binding them together. This approach brings back and forth questions of visibility, history, space and bio-necro-politics (Foucault, 1975; Mbembe, 2003; Valencia, 2010). In the case of Dublin, which engages young people into political debates through an assembly, to a new level, the own ephemeral value of the intervention draws the political taint of the project, where political responses refuse stagnation and are used as situated responses to specific and contextual issues.

---

[43] In this sense, I want to engage in the way in which I use decolonial theories, still accepting that my identity is also informed genealogically by white supremacism and colonial thinking. Also, recognizing that, while I identify as an anarchist, currently my income comes from the State of Spain, there is also a contradiction and ambivalence I don't want to ignore.

[44] A philosophical path which insists that reality is, in fact, how events are perceived, experienced and signified by subjects.

In the genesis of feminist "Standpoint Theory" (or theories), Patricia Hill Collins (1991), insisted on the importance of a self-definitory practice, while speaking of the particular situations of black women inside the feminist globalised movement. This meant, quite simply, not only locating oneself in a situation, but, more directly, recognising that a social and political movement does not affect everyone equally, and, thus, fighting it demands the employment of a wide range of strategies. This also meant a self-revising questioning of feminism as a white articulation that responded to the needs of a very specific profile of women, dismissing the great amalgama of identities that are already implied in the "woman" tag. As she recalls through Barbara Smith's writings (1983), the intersections of categories working within one's identity should be taken into account when generating specific responses to situations regarding oppression and resistances. In this sense, a standpoint can locate a particular issue and generate a concrete response to it while, at the same time, recognising "that intersecting oppressions of sexuality, race, gender, and class produce neither absolute oppressors nor pure victims" (1991: 126).

Standpoint theory, refusing the self-implying objectivity of traditional science, also reworks through epistemologies that have been silenced throughout History. In Sandra Harding's work (1993) objectivity is given a new significance from a feminist point of view. This is, the way in which traditional science has worked through an oppositional making of the world, stating what was true or false, what needed to be modernised and what was already inside the logics of progress, is challenged through these fresh methodological approaches to science and research. The intake I apply to my work from these situated knowledges and other standpoints is the engaging into how our/my beliefs and values already permeate the whole of this work, from the case study selection, to the interpretation, from the choosing of cultural materials to the critiques. As Harding puts it from the "information of hypothesis" to the "interpretation and sorting of data" (1993: 69) we need a regeneration of our ways of inhabiting knowledge. And this is fundamental when introducing the methodology of autoethnography, since its point of departure stands in the acknowledgment of how epistemologies are socially constructed. This is also the first step to a legitimation of knowledge coming from one's own context, that both accepts and engages in its

limitations, while being directly informed by everyday practices and embodied approximations to knowledge and "reality". In this thesis, autoethnography is continuously active even if not always applied.

As David M. Hayano described in his account of the possibility of other forms of ethnography (1979), autoethnography is not a singular and sharp ended methodology, but an assortment of methods regarding research done in everyday scenarios. In this sense, autoethnography bears similarities with queer methodologies and theories, as a breaking free from singular ways of definition, sustained by a binary set of mind, regarding them as normative forms of control and codification. *Decodifying* is here a pertinent verb and action because it encapsulates the point of convergence between different practices and methodologies which do not only involve other ways of approaching research and reality but often also include subjectivities and identities that are also outside the code.

Taking Hortence Spillers as an inspiration for this point, following her advocatory distinction between flesh and body (1987), here the materialistic turn moves towards the flesh. Remembering the way in which the flesh precedes discourses around the body- as many other scholars of colour have been writing about for decades- is a marker in my work, to warn about the need of destructuring theories surrounding Marxism, critical theory, queerness, sociality and intimacy that depart from misconceptions about the body as a universal existence. As Spillers suggests, the living ways of the flesh in decodifying experiences can challenge the ideas of family, romantic love, identity and corporeality structured as monistic in social sciences research. She challenges these inferences writing that,

> It seems clear, however, that "family", as we practice and understand it "in the West"- the *vertical* transfer of bloodline, of a patronymic, of title and entitlements, of real estate and the prerogatives of "cold cash", from *fathers* to *sons* and in the supposedly free exchange of affectional ties between a male

and a female of *his* choice- becomes the mythically revered privilege of a free and freed community. (1987: 74)

Derived from this, it also seems clear that preconceptions of heterosexuality equaled to heteronormativity are here disentangled to give place to other ways of living inside intimacy and affection, even beyond the idea of romanticism implied in nuclear understandings of bonds. This is what I refer to when I am being critical of the universal application of certain concepts, such as Materialism, art and identity. Let me dissect this in the following sections.

3.   Queering the methods.

As will be noticed throughout this work, *queerness* is the connective element between parts, being central, as it is, to the analysis of many critiques that I formulate in this thesis. This is not only because of the epistemological value of queer studies or the queer ethnographic approach, both driven from theoretical and personal experience, but rather because of the way this *queerness* functions as an "ethico-onto-epistem-ology" (borrowing Karen Barad's term, 2007) which has several implications as regards my research. To begin with, this idea works upon a rhizomatic understanding of research so that this queering of the method also means the interlockness between the parts of this thesis which are not only in dialogue with each other, but rather haunted by each other, following no linear time, no ordered space, but rather a continuous contamination without a particular rhythm. This section, for instance, corresponds to the start of this thesis only because of a circumstantial formal necessity. However, this part could also be read as a product of the conclusions which are placed at the end of this thesis. Second, my focus is on how this *queering* applies to circumstances that are not sketched by gender or sexuality, at least *a priori,* as I explore below. In this rhizomatic relation towards theories, this *queerifying* of quotidian and ordinary encounters is in conversation with the meaning and reevaluation of negativity. Negativity, that is unfolded in the second chapter (the void), in the present chapter relates to the coeval conjunction between *saturation* and *insignification*. On the one hand, these chapters are saturated by concepts, theories,

genealogies, affects and identities while, on the other, all of these elements are, at many points, insignificant and only activated through their performing connection(s). Third, deriving from the above, the meaningless elements are not irrelevant but ephemeral. Following Jose Esteban Muñoz's idea of ephemeral performance in queer lives, queer evidence is already pictured through the ideas of transitions. Queer is applied outside its limits of identitarian commitment "and makes this space legible outside of its insular sphere." (1996: 5-6), even if this intelligibility, its reading, is also called into discussion and seeks other forms of material existences that go beyond discursive practices of signification and interpretation.

I depart from a very specific text: *Queer Methods and Methodologies: Intersecting Queer Theories and Social Science Research*, edited by Kath Browne and Catherine J. Nash (2010). It is one of the foundational texts that made me think there was so much to learn from *queerness* as a method. It brings together the voices of queer researchers and puts into dialogue their research practices and their experiences. To identify with is to experience in particular ways, and this, whether we like it or not, has a direct effect on how we approach our investigations.

It seems appropriate at this stage to explain the meanings of queerness used in this thesis in the context of the multiple complexities the term generates. In my work, queer is applied to how I live my queerness as a non-straight person. It does not necessarily equal my not-anymore cis identity, neither does it cancel the way in which my sexuality is changing everyday. Queerness is a non-normative way of engaging in/with my gender and sexuality. I pair with Browne and Nash in this sense, when explaining how, for them, queerness "is and should remain unclear, fluid and multiple." (2010: 7). Departing from a sexual and gender orientation focus, this work is a practice towards disorientations (Ahmed, 2006).

Though informed by experience, this approach goes beyond the (true) satisfaction of the merging of theory and practice during all these years of research. It has mostly to do with a possibility. As a queer person, I have understood that the resistance I have had to face much of my life has also made me defiant of normative ways of explaining

experience. As an example to illustrate this, the way my queer persona thinks about the future is deviant on what hetero-productive companions see as their time ahead. I do not state this as an accusation, but as a reminder that the way in which we gaze at things is directly informed by our own identities.

On queering the method, Judith Butler is one of the first authors who makes a clear reference to a changing of paradigm. Butler, who already represents such paradigm change through her own persona, engages in this understanding of queerness as a form of practice that exceeds reductive forms of discourse. In her words,

> If the term "queer" is to be a site of collective contestation, the point of departure for a set of historical reflections and futural imaginings, it will have to remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes. (1993: 173)

Here we see that the meaning of *queering* lies on the very uncertainty of its own application. It comes out as more a method than a settled theory to use. Following this direction, I align with Alison Rook's application of queerness as a situated method, particularly when she states that embracing queerness under this light also takes research to a new different level,

> [Q]ueer as a body of theory is not limited to thinking about gendered and sexual subjectivities. Rather it is a philosophical commitment to contesting the logics of normativity. Queering ethnography therefore necessarily involves exploring the normative logics of ethnographic research and writing. This includes interrogating the fictions of ethnographic time and space and the intersubjective nature of the field. (Rook in Browne and Nash, 2010: 29).

Queerness is much more than an identity. It is a way of facing experience and, thus, has the potentiality to dismantle normative situations which are not necessarily based on

gender and sexual politics. The interesting point here I want to highlight is how Rook recognizes the importance of temporality in the construction of ethnographic time, which also includes methodological research. As a queer issue, Time also represents the particular rhythm of queerness as a method. Engaging in temporalities releases queerness from the risk of becoming stagnant in its signification. In her reflection on Jack Halberstam's critique to "straight" time (2005), Rook recognizes the "temporal normativities" of research practices (*Ibid*) and draws attention to the specific potentiality of queerness, as a method (rather than queer theory or critique) to challenge these temporal constructions. In liquid times (Bauman, 2000) fluidity is not a choice but rather a strategy. As Jo Grzelinska writes, "Queering methodologies invites the messiness of research – its fluidity, resistance, unspecificity and lack of disclosure" (Grzelinska, 2012: 113).

4. Concepts as Methods: Reading through one another.

> Reminder: By what criteria is one to isolate the unities with which one is dealing; what is a science? What is a œuvre? What is a theory? What is a concept? What is a text? How is one to diversify the levels at which one may place oneself, each of which possesses its own divisions and form of analysis? (Foucault, 1972: 5)

In the last years, there has been an internal critique and discussion on the way in which historical authors, normally white cis men, are overused in our theoretical approaches to research. The debate is at a dead end since, while, on the one hand, it is true that this overuse reinforces a very particular epistemological body of production, on the other, its mitigation could risk losing fragments of those theories that could be used in contemporary frames. This is the case of the recurrent use of Michael Foucault whose theories and, even more importantly, whose persona, permeate the basis for this excess.

My use of practices of refusal takes place at many levels: from the uses of negativity to the rejection of applying coherent theoretical concepts. In this thesis my research is connected to various denials and decodifications which are, simultaneously, grounded in material possibilities of situated experiences and runaways from normative expectations. Indeed, each one of the subsections in this chapter on methodology speaks about refusals.

My first refusal practice is my choice to use concepts as methodologies. This stance involves a recognition of concepts as both genealogically situated and potentially neological. As I have mentioned above, the reason for this particular move is my refusal of the problematic ways in which concepts are often framed from the connections to the authors who formulated them. Sometimes it is hard to distance authors from concepts so that the latter either get lost in time or are merely used on a faithful rapport to their original meaning, depriving them of their potential to become relevant to other situations. What I propose here is a move towards a fragmentology of concepts, where they are used as malleable and adaptable to new critical settings. They become "loyal" to their new situatedness rather than to their historicity and genealogy. It is, quite simply, an application of the contemporary possibility of "The Death Of the Author" (Roland Barthes, 1968). The author loses the position of origin since the cultural contamination of the quotations and references takes the text to a different direction, towards the different readers and agencies encountering the text. Conceptual fragmentology, as clearly evinced in the chapter on the void, is an essential method of this work, refuting totality and the symbolic consequences driven from it, such as epistemological dominations, knowledge inheritance and genealogical

supremacism. As Zygmunt Bauman also warns the contemporary reader, "[w]hat has been cut apart cannot be glued back together. Abandon all hope of totality, future as well as past, you who enter the world of fluid modernity" (2000: 22)

The first entanglement is between time and space. Thinking these two concepts through one another makes a new category appear: relationality. Relationality is understood not only as a human quality but as an experience that incorporates in its own praxis all kinds of entities.

This way of interlocking concepts, acknowledging their barren use if taken independently, is also connected to these new uses of temporalities. Time, correspondingly, is also seen in conjecture to space, and furthermore, is not bound to a linear and a genealogical sense of its rhythm. In this sense, Historicity and genealogy are important but should not be taken for granted as essential elements for memory. The past should be revisited, nevertheless, regressing to the past is not the only way of keeping an event accountable, this is, active for its possible agitation.

In doing so, the singularity of the concepts used here does not disappear. On the contrary, its temporality changes since the concept is studied as a whole, both in its neologic futurity, and in its historical past, looking into the consequences of its past uses, generating what I use as onto-epistemologies (Barad, 2014). Particularly, I want to draw attention to their way of framing these ideas under the concept(s) of onto-epistemologies. As Barad explains in their conceptualization of this conjunction, onto-epistemology is simultaneously a neologism and a conjunction formed by two historical concepts. On the one hand, it stands as neologism because it includes the idea of the impossible separation between what counts as reality- ontology- and what counts as construction- epistemology. In the account of gender and queer studies, this reconsideration is analogous to the separation from the material distinction between sex and gender that we see in queer theory and in particular in Butler's work. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it also acknowledges that this impossibility coexists with the need of an accurate look into both histories: that of the construction of reality and the one deepening into the construction of knowledge. Or, to translate it to the

other comparison related to gender theories, even if sex has also been de-essentialized and brought into question as a cultural and historical construction, the way gender and sex are produced follow different dispositifs which should be disentangled. As Anne Fausto-Sterling examines (2000), denaturalising the physical body, even if it follows different paths as deconstructing gender as a social marker, shares its same root: dualism. Dualism, in Fausto-Sterling's analysis is connected to other systems of social construction, such as the mentioned critique to racial differentiation, by their commodification through science and their meaning inside biopolitics (p, 8)

As many authors have proposed in recent years, there is a responsibility for people working in knowledge institutions on how to conduct and promote research in our academic settings to produce real impact. This is the case with J.K. Gibson-Graham's[45] critique and their use of queerness as a method. In their famous "Queer(y)ing capitalism in and out of the classroom" (1999), they unfold two concepts, queer and query, in order to generate an understanding of queerness as a position to challenge reality. It is a way of addressing difference not as a state of separation between elements, but as a capacity of constant transformation.

theoretical escalation: Following my ideas about concepts and methodologies, the theoretical connections through which theory is analysed and exposed departs from the acknowledgment of these connections as performed, enacted and situated, rather than pre-existent, inherent or historically accumulative. They do not sum up in a palimpsest but are rather performed through the way they are put together.

In this sense, and as it is unpacked in the following fragments, history wouldn't work without a rapport to fiction. Fiction works for both, decolonial and queer theories, since it upholds the impossibility of finding a general truth for historicity and gender, respectively. Methodology is embraced here as a connective point between theory and

---

[45] Pseudonym used by economic geographers Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson who share their research and publish as a tandem.

experience, and this, in turn, implies a change in the way we use different way of using theoretical concepts.

In the engagement with black critiques to the devirtuation of the concept of intersectionality, this use of concepts as methods intends to keep in touch with the genealogical process of concepts at the time as it can reach other connections which, a priori, might not be related to the concept's notion. In this sense, through the case studies some concepts will be deactivated from their hegemonic roots, exploring how the authors behind their naming were, in many cases, far from the ethics built inside the concepts; in other cases, such as in the analysis of the commodifying of "el buen vivir", analysed by Macarena Gómez Barris (2017), concepts are in need of preserving their meaning, since in these cases, such as in the history behind intersectionality, they are built as active responses and strategies of resistance to forms of working power and oppression. In this sense, the impossibility of translation, both in linguistics and in geographical terms, is reconsidered to see the limits of conceptual uses.

5. Intimacy as praxis.

In this attempt of a rhizomatic reading of method as theory, and vice versa, I would like to introduce work by Elizabeth Povinelly related to intimacy since it serves me to enhance the importance of affect and intimacy in the writing of this thesis. Affect and intimacy are the main characteristics of a queere(d) methodology, that in her work is both a strategy (as a method) and a concrete depiction of what becomes research (as the theory).
Povinelly's understanding of intimacy goes beyond the traditional way of introducing queer studies. It moves from speaking about the interaction in particular relating

situations between specific subjects (those involved in sexuality and gendered) towards a queering of relationality between who researches and who is being researched upon, a relation which is often is somehow blurred (2006).

In this sense, and as it is explored in the justification of self-ethnographic research for this work in particular, to be part of the subject I look towards, does not only make me an object of research from where to remain critical of its limits (as in the limits of othering the subject of study), but also introduces the people I have encountered throughout these 4 years of inquiry as authors of this thesis. This is recognized through a Side B bibliography that cites works that were never published. The people who are not involved in academic research- or that have no names because they correspond to conversations inside a bar's bathroom-, are cited in the apocryphal bibliography, which is at the very end and which I have decided to call Side B bibliography.

Going beyond the idea of a queering method of analysis, queerness is also directly related to ethnography and other methodological approaches that look into how people relate in their own settings. Departing from the intermediacy of intimacy, I use Autoethnography in its convergence to queerness. In particular, these connections share many lights from methodological perspectives, more than from theoretical stances. They are more committed with a coherence in their unstabling positions than in their theoretical forms. As Stacy Holman Jones and Tony E. Adams explain, "[a]utoethnography and queer theory share conceptual and purposeful affinities: Both refuse received notions of orthodox methodologies and focus instead on fluidity, intersubjectivity and responsiveness to particularities" (Holman and Adams in Nash, 2010: 197). As we can see, queerness and autoethnography are convergent in *how* they face research more than *what* they actually look at.

Furthermore, autoethnography is also in connection to queerness in that they are ways of being and worlding that are way closer to intimacy and allyship than other systems of knowledge. Saidiya Hartman does a magnificent act of rebellion towards official history in her looking into the hidden past. In the book *Wayward Lives, Beautiful*

Experiments (2019), she examines black queer intimacy at the dawn of the twentieth century. As she explains by unblocking the hidden histories of black wayward lives, "[i]mmorality and disorder and promiscuity and inversion and pathology were the terms imposed to target and eradicate these practices of intimacy and affiliation" (Hartman, 2019: 200). There is a distance towards the use of queerness here, a distance driven from the specific black subjectivities Hartman examines in her book. Nevertheless, there is a strong statement in her way of implying how intimacy has been targeted as a marker to unrecognize certain deviant subjects. As such, intimacy and allyship are fundamental echoes for my analysis. Affect and intimacy, or affected methodologies and intimate theories, takes me to the very core of a methodological disruption, through the implementation of autoethnography as a key guide to my own way of entering and interacting with research.

A practical way in which intimacy is enacted in the thesis is the way I have tried to engage in the case studies and the people surrounding them. As in the interviews and visits to certain scenarios, I wanted to distance myself from the traditional interview and position my research inside a conversation method which could deal with oral epistemologies. From a growing decolonial consciousness, it has been in the past five years when I have compromised myself to a critical motion inside research and academia, without disengaging on the ways in which I also reproduce certain powers of being part of an institution. The methodologies of autoethnography, affect and intimacy have become radical, as in rooted but also resistant to specific commodifications which take place inside epistemological spaces. Being aware of my situatedness and privilege, I have tried to work from this perspective, while engaging in what Margaret Kovach nominates "Conversational method" (2010). Remaining compromised with self-revision, I have used these methodologies to claim for a different way of making, dealing, recognising and remembering knowledge. Without wanting to appropriate specific uses of oral history, I do see the connections with the many stories and theories which have arisen during these past five years of research from narrators which stand outside academia because of many reasons: refusal, academic ignorance, etarian distance or mere uninterest. As Kovach writes, "The conversational method aligns with an Indigenous worldview that honours orality as means of transmitting knowledge and

upholds the relational which is necessary to maintain a collectivist tradition." (p, 42). Here, orality engages in relationality, in a commonality of knowledge which disarticulates inheritance colonial patterns of epistemologies and recognizes other memories, wider archives and transtemporal genealogies.

6 Affects and effects.

As has been anticipated in the former section, from a traditional methodological angle this thesis engages with an autoethnographic approach. It does so since its point of departure is power, in its different forms, with its capacity of permeation. Power is everywhere (Foucault, 1975). Consequently, power is also present and constituent of my own identity, and thus, my research. Autoethnography is a qualitative methodology in which the researcher is taken as a main object of analysis, together with other participants/cases/situations that complement their research. In autoethnography I see the potential to stress sociality and critique including my own experience into these dynamics, recognizing what violences, hierarchies and actions I myself reproduce or entangle.

Beyond a methodological approach, autoethnography is here called upon as a theoretical inquiry that leads to new understandings concerning theory and epistemology. Autoethnography is one of the main matters of this thesis. And matter, in its round, is here drawn within the multiplicity that Judith Butler uses in her most famous piece, *Bodies that Matter* (1993). *Matter* as an act of physical encounter and accountability, twisting the incorporeality of high theory, and *matter* as a way of counting in the world, of being significant, as signifier and signification. As Butler puts it when explaining the aim of bringing back the materiality of a body, this is,

> the recasting of the matter of bodies as the effect of a dynamic of power, such that
> the matter of bodies will be indissociable from the regulatory norms that govern
> their materialization and the signification of those material effects; (2) the
> understanding of performativity not as the act by which a subject brings into being

what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains; (3) the construal of "sex" no longer as a bodily given on which the construct of gender is artificially imposed, but as a cultural norm which governs the materialization of bodies; (4) a rethinking of the process by which a bodily norm is assumed, appropriated, taken on as not, strictly speaking, undergone by a subject, but rather that the subject, the speaking "I," is formed by virtue of having gone through such a process of assuming a sex; and (5) a linking of this process of "assuming" a sex with the question of identification, and with the discursive means by which the heterosexual imperative enables certain sexed identifications and forecloses and/or disavows other identifications (1993. Introduction: xiii).

In this fragment we can perceive certain twists that can be used to change the way we dive into research. As it can be read, Butler does not only refer to a gender/sex system of ordering traditional discourse, but to *queering* as an act of turning upside down while addressing the particularities of bodies in their specific materiality.

7. Situatedness:

As Susan Stryker performs for her "Dungeon Intimacies" (2008), the situatedness of this thesis has followed a navigating process of the selected genealogies which have tainted my own way of thinking. As Stryker announces at the start of her article, "[t]he physical landscape is made of memories" (p, 36) and continues travelling through images that constitute her own understanding of memory through place. Situatedness is important beyond the politics of locations. It understands how physicality and the built environment are embedded in our own

fleshy identities. It addresses these locations by insisting on the importance of material encounters such as those sustained through spatial dispositions.

Following Stryker's account of the kink communities in San Francisco and scholar Michelle Liang's methodological identitarian accountability, I use situatedness to address the intimacies which permeate my own visions on words, theories and political readings. As Liang accurately explains, a follow "the interest of acknowledging my own positionality in this research, I identify with the words" (2020), adding queer, kink, BDSM, asexual, white, abled, middle class and neurotypical. The only stable category of these body inscriptions is white, which is a huge part of who I am and has constructed and informed my amalgama of privileges that have impregnated my life. Nevertheless, the rest are mobile. Some are not even specified, since, for example, it has been 4 years now that I have been thinking about my gender identity.

As Susan Stryker reflects upon her own idea of autoethnography in "Dungeon Intimacies", an essay used by Hayward in her account of the transpaciality of her "Spider City" (2010), the place of the deviant body is never where it is expected. Stryker writes "I was not where others looked for me, and I was where they saw me not" (p, 42) while Hayward offers a transpositionality to grant it a sense and "to name the spatial-sensual-temporal processes that mark such trans-sex transitions." (2010: 237). Stryker is read by Hayward while pending on a concrete signification, a space mattering that Hayward gives in a particular reading. They are diffracted one through another breaking a sense of linear time. At the same time, years ahead, I read them both in an attempt to speak about the coexistence of unseen visible bodies affecting the space of affection.

Stryker closes her piece asking "[o]ur bodies are spaces set in motion, motions set in space: what trace of their generative locations do these mobile architectures make as they extend into the world?" (2008: 45) after rethinking how spaces of resistance, including the human embodiment, can be captured into normative commodities of sociality. After all, the official space is still imbricated within other disording

locations. This specular frame, the body as motion and motion as embodiment, is the move I address while twisting Braidotti's figuration of the nomad. Nomadity being an embodiment but also embodiment being in motion and in subjection. The body exceeds human exceptionalism, overlapping an ability of response to human particularities when it comes to terms of injustice while aggregating other-than-human entities in these strategies and motives of response.

Following this formula of self-awareness, I am very interested in how some contemporary scholars that I use here- many of them not known in the majority of research spaces of research- have coupled the situatedness that Haraway grounded, with actual practical ways to acknowledge a position in time, space and relation to the world, in ways that can remain accountable and critical. Following Kirthana Selvaraj's account of their own imbrication in the system, to remain critical is also to remain "not complicit, interrogating the ways in which we non– First Nations people continue to benefit from the subjugation of these ancient peoples." (2021: 66).

At this point, I want to recall a text written by Aisha M. Beliso-De Jesús and Jemima Pierre, *Anthropology of White Supremacy* (2019), a fundamental theoretical base to call into question disciplines of whiteness as a system of self-centralization . What I mean by this is that the way in which, as white people, as leftists, feminists, ecologists, anti-racists, queers and other politicised conditions, we shall adjust to our characters, 'we' sometimes exclude ourselves from critiques and call-outs, thinking that positioning ourselves in discursive counter-ideologies exempts us from perpetuating and permeating systems of power. As they remind readers,

> [W]e encourage this research alongside analyses of global structures of power. But, rather than regarding white supremacy as representative of extremist racist groups (as exist throughout Europe and the Americas), we understand white supremacy to be infused in all structures of global power, including liberal notions of international law and sovereignty. (2019: 3)

The two authors reflect on how white supremacism is strategically misused as exceptional. In this sense, the construction of whiteness as a supremacist category is linked to otherness and exception: other whites, non-academics or liberals, and in particular situations, not entangled in everyday dynamics.

There is a benefit and implied privilege that comes with whiteness and it is only addressable acknowledging it, since "white supremacy as a long-standing global system of power that benefits all white people, certainly did not satisfy this view." (Beliso-De Jesús and Pierre, 2019: 5). One of the strategies of this implied reproduction of white supremacy happens in the perception of certain epistemological facts. In their words, "Normative considerations of 'empirical', 'ethnographic', and presumed 'real' research thus lends to the invisible workings of white supremacy" (p, 7), where knowledge is framed as an ontological capability drawn by racial identity rather than by the distanced research from where white academics seem to work and produce epistemological material. As they note, one does not have to be explicitly racist to reproduce white supremacy or its discursive formations.

Whiteness and colonial mindset has, thus, produced and reproduced a very particular idea of reality. Reality, that could be taken as the aim of research for science, is mediated by a very particular cosmovision. Deviations in these ways of knowing the world, that are more likely to be approximations than straight directions, have been taken as too subjective ways of engaging in research practices. As such, autoethnographies, being other ways of engaging with *realness*, have been fooled as narratives that weren't objective enough.

I use autoethnography as a constant reminder of the situatedness of my research and the works I produce. In too many situations we can recognize how white researchers, and particularly upsetting, feminist researchers, have (*we have*) denounced the way in which our studies are framed as experiential facts -rather than giving them the empirical importance they merit- while, simultaneously reproducing the same strategies, languages and nostalgic writing rhetorics that escape the potentiality of breaking the inescapable realness that academic consumerism requires. Maybe the problem is not a need to reclaim certain experiences or subjectivities to be considered empirical inside *our* academic

territories, but rather to deterritorialise knowledge. This way, we may acknowledge that, while research is real only in the context of a given time-space-relationality, we also need to engage in practices that dismantle the whiteness that exists in looking the other way when realising who makes up our syllabus, our classrooms, our conferences, and so on (Beliso-De Jesús and Pierre, 2019).

Beliso-De Jesús and Pierre propose an Anthropology of white supremacy to unravel the strategies and normalizations that white superiority has to resist, beyond an "identity (i.e., the 'white supremacist') (*but also*)[...] the structural embeddedness of white supremacy in the world" (2019: 8). This note into identitarian considerations is very interesting for my point here because it unsettles homogenising ways in which we are in the world, and in this case in particular, in academic research. As I have noted some lines above, the lamenting of white critical researchers of being taken for granted because of the personal link or an identity 'more suitable' for a certain topic, some of the feminists, an umbrella where I include myself, resists both from a personal identity that can be excluded while, at the same time, it reproduces the parameters of white supremacist research because of their nevertheless inclusion in certain publishing/teaching/research dynamics. This is, autoethnographic research can expose the ways in which situatedness is often used as a metaphor, not engaging in decolonial practices that would recognize empirical research that stands beyond epistemological logics.

8.   Returning to affects.

Returning to Povinelli, I would like to recall a very specific idea of how intimacy may be used as a methodological approach. In this sense, autoethnography represents the formal configuration for this intimate relationality that drives within research. As Povinelli frames, there is a "space between flesh and environment" (2006: 7) which she calls *carnality*. Flesh is important here not because of its natural characteristics of 'being' in the world, but rather because of its hygroscopic capacity. Flesh absorbs the context. Flesh is the result of an experiential pollution. This aspect is fundamental for the position one takes when conducting an autoethnographic research. When speaking

about the third element inserted in the different experiential locations of this work, that of relationality, insists on how autoethnography in this applied case is a mixture between self and others.

Patricia Clough's recollection of Baruch Spinoza's ideas on *affect* (2007; 1677), that are expanded in the theoretical chapter, are recalled here to insist upon the importance of decentering humans from anthropocentric exceptionalism. This does not only insist upon anti-humanist methodologies[46] - that is also included in these thinking actions-. It also works through the methodological turn of the affective use in theories that involves engaging in the implications that to "affect and to be affected" sink the body into. To grasp the use of this moto applied to the chapter, I am using Gregg and Seigworth's understanding of *affect*, when they write writing that

> At once intimate and impersonal, affect accumulates across both relatedness and interruptions in relatedness, becoming a palimpsest of force-encounters traversing the ebbs and swells of intensities that pass between "bodies" (bodies defined not by an outer skin-envelope or other surface boundary but by their potential to reciprocate or co-participate in the passages of affect). Bindings and unbindings, becomings and un-becomings, jarring disorientations and rhythmic attunements. Affect marks a body's belonging to a world of encounters or; a world's belonging to a body of encounters but also, in non-belonging, through all those far sadder (de)compositions of mutual in-compossibilities. Always there are ambiguous or "mixed" encounters that impinge and extrude for worse and for better, but (most usually) in-between. (2010: 2)

Affect is performative, not in its unreal generation but in its impossibility of being captured outside its particular chronotope. This sense of affect as already mutant is related to the next chapter, a circumstantial creation, dedicated to the voids, the impossibilities and the negative parts in this thesis. Here, the impossibility already gives a trace of what

---

[46] having already spoken about what notion of the human is here called into question.

kind of negativity is activated in these fragments, not as a traditional feeling of exclusion and inaction, but rather a disruption of senses of wholeness and universal values. In this case, affect is fragmented to embrace reciprocity in the entities it affects. An entity is both affected and affects, and in this inseparability also lies an impossibility of grasping affect in traditional terms. Affect is here mentioned as a method, it is performed as a strategy and informed as an impersonal intimacy.

The activation of affect in a candid manner is pertinent in terms of connecting affectivity to other conceptual relations, such as that of perception. Affect has been until this point an example of how to break problematic understandings of how to think about knowledge and experience inside certain narratives. In general, affectivity and affect theories take us to different places, non-domesticated ones, from where to explore. This does not mean that affect is exempt from other constructive parts, as if affect was somehow a virgin way of experiencing life. As in the break of the dichotomic essence between sex and gender that we see in butlerian use of theory, the cartesian dualism is here challenged through immanent horizontal spinozian logics, which have as an immediate consequence in this case of engaging into affect addressing is already-contaminated and contained in location.

In this sense, perception becomes a fundamental concept to hold here. Dylan Robinson speaks about perception as part of the colonial project, where "'settlers' attempts to civilize Indigenous perception into a temporality of productivity" (2020: 54). The way we listen, we attend to and we perceive are bound to our affective life, but are also tied to epistemological logics of affective formulation. Affectivity and its means towards it, is yet another strategy of surveillance, and in this sense, the use of affectivity and autoethnography as countersides of methodologies need to remain conscious of their own arrangements and programing. In Robinson's use of redressness, there is an extrinsic connection to Ahmed's Orientations. In Robinson's account of ontological reorientations that can reject hungry ways of consuming experiences such as listening, that is the main topic of the book, they write that

resisting forms of hungry listening also entails dislocating the fixity and goal-oriented teleology of listening with more flexible listening practices that [...] situate listening as a relational action that occurs not merely between listener and listened- to, but between the layers of our individual positionalities. (2020: 58)

What is interesting about this paragraph, apart from the general potentiality it brings forward and the positioned critique it holds, is that in this dislocation of a particular way of orienting practices of knowing can decentre the human exceptional view of its epistemological centrality by engaging in a need of modifying the very ontological paradigm. In this sense, to dislocate teleological meanings is connected to practices that don't surf around human's understanding of the practice but rather in its very ontological relation to it. The way in which this also gives account of the many fragments and positions an identity can take and the relation towards others more than humans that it entails to engage into knowledge and recognition practices. Time and space once again are accompanied by the importance of institing in the third relational element for their contextualization.

As I analyse in a drastic way throughout the thesis, power is taken as relational. The contemplation of contemporary forms of power through these diversified theories also exposes the way in which this relational power does not exist as a reality in itself but it is rather enacted and performed by the relationality of two or more elements, that don't necessarily have to be living bodies or material entities. Albeit this positioning, I use *Affect theory* as a way to engage in more specific tools of power, that sometimes get blended inside master theories, as when claiming that power is relational as if all critique would be already done after this statement. I want to engage with affect theory as a personal consciousness of how power, in a first stance has affected my own life through affects- as I will disseminate in the case studies chapters- and how I have step by step become conscious of how affect is used in contemporary productive locations to colar dispositifs (foucault) of power in bodies. As Ben Anderson writes in his book dedicated to affect,

> it is not enough simply to claim that affects are relational, and/or are emergent from relations and/or take place in relations [....] Whilst I do not disagree with the basic proposition, arguing that entities are "relationally constituted" has become automatic, [...] it tells us nothing specific about different affects and what they do. The initial task for an analysis of affective life is, then, to attend to differentiated "capacities to affect and be affected"; exhaustion, pain, greed, and so on. The second task is to trace how affects emerge from and express specific relational configurations. (Anderson, 2014: 10-11)

Affect theory engages in a use of theory which uses the relational understanding of power while addressing the certain stagnated dynamics which are satellite to fleshy experiences. In this move towards an intersectional account of social relationalities and stages of power, which works through both circumstantial power and stagnated power, identity is also moved beyond a space of undescreetness while engaging into its importance. Affect theory is used above a relational account of coming together. It follows what Muñoz writes when stating that "The 'we' speaks to a 'we' that is 'not yet conscious' (...) [and] is not content to describe who the collective is but more nearly describes what the collective and the larger social order could be, what it should be." (2009: 20). Affect theory engages in relationality as a possibility, as a new path to follow, without wanting to describe the "we" as an ontological conjunction.

The imperative call to certain affects and emotions, such as those of happiness in contexts that are informed by the basis of neo-liberalism and productivity can speak up the attachment to the normativity that then manifests in material consequences as those of oppression towards dissident bodies, deliberately, as the subject of killjoy that she exemplifies through the feminist individual, or coerced by the social order. As Ahmed explains,

> These conversion points between good and bad feeling do matter; some bodies are presumed to be the origin of bad feeling insofar as they disturb the promise of happiness, which we can re-describe as the social pressure to maintain the signs of 'getting along'. This is why I do not describe the sociality of affect in

terms of transmission or contagion, where feelings pass between proximate bodies, but in terms of the politics of attribution and conversion. There is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings (2007: 127)

Affects have an active role in marking bodies. The possibilities to escape the hegemonic paradigms that we inhabit in our daily lives through "duty" affects finding location in the questioning of these attachments that makes life "bearable". *Affect aliens*, the concept that Ahmed uses to speak about dissension of instruction manuals to be *in* life, are creative sights that can allow the excess, the stress of these tense bonds. As she points out,

> [p]ossibilities have to be recognized as possibilities to become possible. (....) This is why affect aliens can be creative: not only do we want the wrong things, not only do we embrace possibilities that we have been asked to give up, but we create life worlds around these wants (Ahmed, 2010: 218).

By doing this Ahmed positions herself challenging affirmative theories, such as those from Rosi Braidotti, that may lack the tracking of the privilege of their locations when they claim generalised solutions to issues that need to be narrowed to concrete situations. Ahmed states nevertheless that is not that

> feminist, anti-racist and queer politics do not have anything to say about happiness other than point to its unhappy effects. I think it is the very exposure of these unhappy effects that is affirmative, which gives us an alternative set of imaginings of what might count as a good or at least better life. (Ahmed, 2007: 135)

9. Diffraction.

I speak of myself. I do it trying to maintain the criticism in my body. But above all, I always bring theory into my stories to maintain them legit to this work. Maybe it is already so. I mean, it is not so long that our feminist motto was 'the personal is political' and yet there is a sense of impostor when making our lives the situated flesh from which to bring theory closer. In this sense, autoethnography here has a particular temporality. It

re-turns. I use re-turn in Barad's use of the dash. As they explain, this linguistic formula does not propose to "go back" but rather,

> by re-turning – not by returning as in reflecting on or going back to a past that was, but re-turning as in turning it over and over again – iteratively intra-acting, re-diffracting, diffracting anew, in the making of new temporalities (spacetimematterings), new diffraction patterns (....) [T]he temporality of re-turning is integral to the phenomenon of diffraction. (2014: 168)

Diffraction is stated as a counter-piece of this self-impression, since it accounts for the *contact with* rather than objectifying the "self" in isolation. What I mean by this, and taking Barad's work as central to this understanding, is that the autoethnography that you can find in this thesis does not speak about identity as pure, but as a contamination of circumstantial encounters with other entities beyond the self, and these entities, in turn, inscribed beyond the human. Autoethnography is the account of my entanglement with the situations that are encountered through theory. Following Barad, in this entanglement, there "are not unities. They do not erase differences; on the contrary, entanglings entail differentiatings, differentiatings entail entanglements. One move –cutting together-apart." (2014: 176). This cutting together apart, as it has been explained elsewhere- the elements that are activated here through the 4 case studies, the chapter of the void and this methodological ground- is the ontological justification for the chosen topics: there is a self-involvement with certain situations that caught my attention, and where I post some questions and activate some signifiers. The limits of the thesis are as infinite as the possible answers that can arise from the problematics here presented. I cut from exteriority to engage with the *intra-riority* sometimes accessible to my analysis, others left as a consideration that would need further reflection. And still, even if acknowledging these uncontested potentialities, "[t]he existence of indeterminacies does not mean that there are no facts, no histories, no bleeding – on the contrary, indeterminacies are constitutive of the very materiality of being" (2014: 177). Or, to change it into a practical example and as I explain in the case studies, the figuration of the Mestiza (Anzaldúa; 1987) is not the same as the figuration of the nomad, or even the posthuman (Braidotti,

1994; 2013). There are potentialities in all three of them, but only one is in charge of its own materiality of being.

Taking one of Eva Hayward's interesting takes on the leakages happening in divergent bodies and how these can radically change the ontology of traditional questions, I want to centre, or divert, from eccentricity. I feel attached to the trend in which Hayward announces the start of her research in *Spider City Sex* (2010): "I want to ask an eccentric question, an interrogative that borders on incoherence" (p, 225). While addressing embodiment from a trans transitioning experience, Hayward shifts the focus from how space affects the subject to how the subject can weave the environment. This is eccentric not because of the subject in question, as trans embodiment is always put into light as already divergent, but rather the way in which the analysis is posted in the first place: how a place affects is also feeded by how a place is affected. This breaks with the notion of space as a mere geographical and material location and imbues it as an organically inert, if focusing in the traditional materiality involved in spaces, but still as a vibrant locus where energies are central to the very notions of the space.

Eccentricity is, as it will be discussed throughout the case studies, both urgent and divergent. It is urgent because it derives from non-normative entities and identities, and it is divergent because the analysis does not centre on this non-normativity. It, quite simply, does not centre. In an alternative way, this eccentricity seeks to face how these elements involved in the case studies act and exist in their "materiality, emotionality and performativity" (Calderón-Sandoval and Sánchez Espinosa, 2021: 6), outside their gender paradigm.

Returning to Hayward, I want to rescue an idea she once analysed through a conversation with Kathrin Thiele about relation(al) archives, where she insists on the relational fact added to a certain paradigm of sociological concern. As the example of *relation* taken in its fundamental notions, the insistence on other notions of the words, such as relational(ity), is fundamental for abandoning the ontological seeking of the concept, and rather focusing on the relation in itself. In the conversation, Hayward goes on to analyse how her use of difference is not within the traditional genealogy of the

concept, to speak about ontological difference, but rather difference as in differentiation, that insists on how the materiality of difference comes to be significant in the first place. As she explains "not simply difference as an ontological orientation (...) to some degree I am critical of the ontological project but that is not a foreclosure of difference and processes of differentiation" (Utrecht University Graduate Gender Programme 2022: min 11:00)

10. Autoethnography ft. fictions.

Autoethnography is *too sentimental and not scientific enough*. Still, people criticising these personal and situated methods, generally do not enter a self-critique to see, not only in what ways their science is a totalizing activity that leads to new and renewed forms of colonial thinking and epistemic violence (Spivak, 1988), but also in what ways their claims, from their monistic understandings, are also works of fiction. After all, I ask myself, what's more accurate, a science fiction work that rewrites the story of slavery from lost ancestors voices, or an encyclopedia built upon a civilising narrative that erases any other way of knowledge other than white and European centred? As Ruth Pinder makes us consider while addressing both the potentialities and limitations of autoethnographic works, she writes that

> Autoethnography has often been charged with being too close to the seamier side of rhetoric. The criticisms are familiar enough: its advocates are seen as ethically unprincipled, theoretically primitive, emotionally self-indulgent, the authorial voice a biased irrelevance (Anderson, 2006; Delamont, 2007; Adler and Adler, 2008). Autoethnography seems to be more about the author's power to hoodwink his/her audience than the disinterested search for objective knowledge. I am interested in how the critique is presented either in terms of excess or insufficiency, "too much" of this element, "not enough" of that, its personal animus often barely concealed. In fact, such terms are infused with moral values, placing the rhetorical conventions of auto-ethnography squarely in the domain of culture (Strecker and Tyler, 2009) (Pinder, 2015: 11)

The limitations of critique to autoethnography fall, once again, in a binary circle, where researchers that hold a personal account, sometimes motivated because of a critical search to knowledge, are seen as *never enough* but *already excessive*. This also stands in connection to queerness because of the way in which deviant subjectivities are constructed, at the same time, as a *lack* and as an *excess*. This point is connected to the second case study (Bologna) of the thesis, where I explore in more detail how queer genealogies and bodies are marked through specific experiences.

The place of autoethnography is real in its location towards potentiality. It is a grounded fiction of the fact that is *not yet here*, and still, it is *fully present*. I engage with knowledge that is valuable as a situated enunciation at the same time as it is compostable and lost. I pair with Braidotti's thought in the *Posthuman Critical Theory* (chapter 4) in that this thesis uses the four case studies as figurations that are combined to the theory explained and analysed here. As Braidotti states,

> My golden rules are: cartography accuracy, with the corollary of ethical accountability; trans-disciplinarity; the importance of combining critique with creative figurations; the principle of non-linearity; the powers of memory and the imagination and the strategy of de-familiarization. These methodological guidelines are valuable not only as building blocks for posthuman critical theory (2014: 163).

Even if I do see some problematics in this work[47], I highly value a posthuman critique that engages in the limitations of anthropocentric values. Following her thought about what the posthuman means, these figurations are not materialised in a different or alternative *personae*, but rather in locations and cartographies that make them work in fragmentation. I am implying that I have found the unity to all these pieces, but I do claim that the novel way research always has is how each person in academia and elsewhere configures a new way of bonding fragments together, giving birth to always new figurative relation (relationality understood beyond the human).

---

[47] That I describe in the theoretical corpus.

A claim to other ways of engaging in the formulation of knowledge[48] engages into other ways of doing research, and, in particular, decenters a linearity of time, that depends upon Historical narratives of power[49], and brings a rhizomatic praxis of how to engage into temporal (historical) facts.

11. History ft. Hollywood and other archaeological artifacts.: Fiction as method.

Reminder: Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledge
(Haraway, 1988: 581)

As it has been anticipated before, the decomposition of History as a unit of knowledge to address the past is one of my aims in this work. Having worked at the Archaeology department now for over four years has made me quite conscious of the double bind that can be found in disciplines concerning the narrative of the past. Archaeology, and in specific, studies concerned with material culture, break the idea of History as an eventful condensation of time and space. Artefacts have a singular treatment and can take us to a better understanding of the conjunctions between humankind and objects, or to put it otherwise, it can ultimately be related to renewed materialistic perspectives. In Archaeology there is a specific potentiality on how the narrative that certain objects are given is performative in its way of standing in time: their steadiness is valuable as a way of fiction; their interpretation is valid at a certain time and space. Still, the

---

[48] I use this expression (*formulation of knowledge* instead of *formation of knowledge*) because I do acknowledge a range of ways of constructing knowledge that happen outside academic settings, inciting in how a formula of knowledge is more accurate to describe the coded epistemologies that enter these spaces of power.

[49] Note the distinction of use between my use of capital *H* when speaking about an established and official account of History.

necessary performativity of these reading is important to consider, since, as Mark Graham explains about recent studies concerning matter,

> What these studies all point to is the queerness of matter and things. By this I mean that matter and things are performative, provisional, indeterminate (despite their apparent material obduracy), and, in the case of artifacts, continually gesturing beyond themselves to their, often disavowed, constitutive outsides. (Graham in Nash, 2010: 184)

The queering of the method here refers to the instability of the reading of these objects. This disentangling of historical narratives can be broadly found in different author's work. In particular, I want to recall work by Saidiya Hartman. As she exposes at the beginning of her book[50], memory, as an archaeological product, is already a fiction created from the side of power. As she writes,

> the dispossessed, the subaltern, and the enslaved is forced to grapple with the power and authority of the archive and the limits it sets on what can be known, whose perspective matters, and who is endowed with the gravity and authority of historical actor (2019: 7)

I use fiction in connection to autoethnography because of the possibility it brings in the distinction between identity as a site of resistance and identity as a site of enunciation. Identity, as a way of engaging in the connection between one's body and the world, faces a complex matter in the recognition that, while identitarian politics are still fundamental, their *leitmotiv* are the acknowledgment of identity as another fiction. Fiction here is not charged with a negative meaning, but rather with ongoing possibilities that embrace mobility and malleability as a way of being in the world. It exceeds the paradigms of reality, science and objectivity, to welcome new forms of worlding, new limits to respect and ongoing diversities to imagine. In a completely different tone, Edgar Chías translates

---

[50] *Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments (*2019)

this fictional dialectical conversation between "domination and subordination" (Chías, 2013: 9) into an amalgam of possibilities in his play when twisting the characters enacting certain roles of violence. It forces a constant change of the interlocutor's position, that exceeds more than a simply fixed category inside the exchange and this remains crucial in the position that identity takes here.

Fiction has also been a pivotal element to destroy and negotiate with colonial understandings of the past. We can read this from Toni Morrison's afrofuturistic landscapes (2007) to the poetics of Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherrie Moraga (2015), passing by the metaphors of Frantz Fanon (1968), touching upon the critiques to colonial identitarian constructs by María Lugones (2008), and hearing bell hooks speak about anticapitalization of the author's name (2000).

As it will be specified further on, and following this idea of a rhizomatic account of elements surrounding these parts, fiction is in tandem with temporalities. In this sense, fiction and time are enmeshed in coloniality. The importance of stating these two elements individually responds to the necessity of understanding both as constitutive parts of Historical narratives. This is central to the argument, since when I criticise history as a fictional dispositif, what I am implying is that History does not actually exist. As the WAI architecture Think Tank group has analysed for an issue on time, "HISTORY DOESN'T EXIST. Historical narratives do really exist, like propaganda: though rendered with ideology, they are real productions that satisfy the positions of settler-colonisation, ruling classes, capitalism, white-supremacy, and heteropatriarchy." (The Funambulist, 2021). Narratives, that are remixed by time and fiction, are materially accountable. History has been locked into an ontological trap. There is a particular *dispositif* that challenges this idea of Historical narratives and their fictions: Archives. Archives, in a wide sense, are flourishing as counter-narratives of other documented absences.

The archives don't come without problematics and are still a site of revision, as I analyse through the first case study, since one of its sides lies side by side in commodifying practices that still and quill the potentiality of transient, passing, ephemeral actions. As we can see through the recuperation of all those narratives in

114

Ferrán Burguillos Martínez and Jose Antonio Frias's excellent records (2006), the sometimes paradigm of recollection is not enough and there are other intersections that are in need of questioning. For example, and as it also happens in the recollection of some archives in this thesis, we exceed the space of the word, in those oral traditions, to engage into more controverted documents, as occurs in the recuperation of memories during the Franco dictatorship where the specific law against homosexuality[51] took many dissident bodies into court and jail. In my own research inside the *¿Archivo Queer?* of the Reina Sofía Museum, launched in 2012, I could see the many ambiguities on following the traces of a radical archive, since the many questions arising can be resumed in a very specific interrogation, raised by Andrea Díaz, Nando Dorrego, Marta Sesé & Gerard Voltà in regards to this specific archive (2016): "Is archiving always radical?".[52]

12. decoloniality

In relation to the archive and how to track memory in alternative ways, the question of decoloniality comes into discussion as a main point of consideration as a piece of methodological approaches to research. Fiction as a resistance to rationality's systematisation towards the notion of "truth" is an interesting medium to write and think about *otherness*. *Otherness* as a social construct but also as not-real-enough to become history. In this section, I want to speak about the importance of a decolonial methodological approach in my research studies. The conjunction between decoloniality as *theory*, as *method* and as *approach* is based on the recognition of an implicit colonial imprint in Archaeology, Anthropology, Ethnography -naming a few of those in which my research focuses- and Research Studies in general. Knowledge fields, that are capital patterns of power, need to acknowledge the colonial understanding of conquest and modernization that they implicitly handle. These narratives, following the idea of knowledge for the present and the future, are held

---

[51] Ley de vagos y maleantes was a law approved under the republican state, in august 1933, but was used for the specific attack of homosexuality in the Franco era.

[52] "¿Archivar siempre radical? A propósito del ¿Archivo queer? del Museo Reina Sofía" (2016, título original)

stratigraphically in the same palimpsest as colonial historical discourses. This implies that, even if we try to distance ourselves from dominant discourses of cultural, epistemological and material subjugations, our position is already tainted with narratives of the past that have been erased by layers, rather than uprooted.

The unraveling of colonial thinking and positionality implies a recognition of an impossibility. To work through decolonization should not disregard the way in which colonial thinking is at the base of our knowledges, or that we still reproduce coloniality within our western/ized epistemological settings. As some decolonial authors remind us, decoloniality is not the opposite to coloniality, but nevertheless can recast cultural variations in ways which can recognize them rather than ostracise them. As Ojeya Cruz Banks explains while analysing popular forms of culture, such as dance in the diaspora, she states that, "[W]hile this approach is not in complete opposition with colonial knowledge, it does strive to recuperate the importance of cultural difference and an explicit acknowledgment of hybridity" (2012:161). Here, popular ways of generating and reproducing one's own cultural experiences can drive to a recognition that does not happen when using high theory practices. As an alternative, low theory is defended as a way of concreteness inside situated research. Following Stuart Hall's defense on this use of concrete theory in Gramsci's work, he examines how

> Some critics have assumed that Gramsci's concepts operate at this level of concreteness only because he did not have the time or inclination to raise them to a higher level of conceptual generality—the exalted level at which 'theoretical ideas' are supposed to function. Thus both Althusser and Poulantzas have proposed at different times "theorizing" Gramsci's insufficiently theorized texts. This view seems to me mistaken. Here, it is essential to understand, from the epistemological viewpoint, that concepts can operate at very different levels of abstraction and are often consciously intended to do so. The important point is not to 'misread' one level of abstraction for another. We expose ourselves to serious error when we attempt to 'read off' concepts which were designed to operate at a high level of

abstraction as if they automatically produced the same theoretical effects when translated to another, more concrete, 'lower' level of operation (Hall, 1990: 413)

In Gramsci's case this concreteness stands in assonance to a Marxist orientation. In further uses, this defense to lower forms of theory, that achieve situatedness, are connected to a great amalgama of perspectives, in Hall's case being oriented to antiracist and decolonial approaches to the examination of cultural articulations.

Low theory, sometimes depicted as not true enough, is in direct connection to fiction and autoethnography as ways of standing and identifying inside research. For my research, low theory is important because it brings particular expressions into light to uncover subtle ways of how reality is constructed and perceived. Furthermore, low theory has a radical importance in Archaeology and material culture research since it recognizes the importance of concrete actions that have cultural effects. In the archaeological record this means that bringing attention to disempowered and low forms of material culture, namely maintenance activities, have radical consequences in the community, even if their expressions do not always happen in the "public" realms and, thus, have been abandoned from the historical account.

Turning to a specific Archaeology text, archaeologist Whitney Battle Baptiste designs a *Black Feminist Archaeology* (2011), going into those concrete material remains that, even if insignificant *a priori*, can refurbish normative identity constructions, in this case reshaping African American History in the United States. As she discusses while engaging in her own critical praxis for her interpretation of excavation of *The Hermitage* plantation, in a return to the understanding of captive life, she states a necessity to include "socialization process in the private spaces that were often characterized as meaningless exchanges to outsiders, but were essential to Black cultural production" (2011: 87).

Decolonization and antiracist methods mean moving from a theoretical approach of discourse to an actual application of decolonization movements. The limits of research, of entry to certain spaces, both physical and of thought, has taught me that remaining critical about my own identity construction, as a genealogically settler, sometimes means accepting a boundary of entry into certain experiences. As Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang write as an interruption from political correctness, decolonization has sometimes been an emblem more than a practice. In their famous text "Decolonization is not a Metaphor", Tuck and Yang denounce the double bind of inclusion, as it sometimes tends to normalise and invisibilise the radicality of resistance. As they write,

> [T]his kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization (....) When metaphor invades decolonization, it kills the very possibility of decolonization; it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future. Decolonize (a verb) and decolonization (a noun) cannot easily be grafted onto pre-existing discourses/frameworks, even if they are critical, even if they are anti-racist, even if they are justice frameworks (2012: 3).

Methodology may be the most important task inside a research activity. It is not the *what* but rather the *how* that shapes everything else. In their reading of Patrick Wolfe, Tuck and Yang see the importance of this cognitive shifting of what settler thinking actually means and entails. This idea is explored and exposed in Wolfe's thought when he writes that "settler colonisers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event" (2007: 388). On this analysis of what settler colonialism is, Wolfe exploits the way in which History has been written, as an event founded discipline, based on particular temporalities as succession, rather than a continuum structure. In this light, Wolfe goes on to explain that when speaking about the structure of colonisation, "we are not talking about an isolated event here. Thus, we can shift from settler colonialism's structural complexity to its positivity as a structuring principle of settler-colonial society across time." (2007: 399)

I use Wolfe in the theoretical corpus to give structure to the unsettling of linear time as a way of ordering hegemonic history through the rhythm of events. Wolfe's account on time outside the paradigm of historical events opens a space of recognition for all those processes, structures, projects and experiences which are held in a continuum which exceeds the linear chronology. In this sense, linear temporalities pair with historical narratives as they focus on the presentness of the event, demarking from this pivotal and distinct experience a past and a future in relation to it. When examining other historical presences and existences, we can see how this ordering of time through milestones is yet another colonial vision of human rhythm and memory. Slow processes of settlement are held unexamined and, thus, no further discussion of reparations related to historical narratives seem possible under these "lights"[53].

13. Temporal dislocations:

As we have seen in the former sections, the way in which knowledge fields, such as Ethnography and Anthropology, are constructed also speaks about different temporal positionalities dividing the practice between the object of study and the subject of research. As anthropologist Johannes Fabian writes concerning this issue, "[A]nthropology has been constructing its object- the Other- by employing various devices of temporal distancing, negating the coeval existence of the object and subject of its discourse" (1983: 50). The idea of coevalness is important to remark here, because, even if time can also be read as a historical time, its application and reading corresponds to a fact of presentness. Or to put it more clearly, subjects constructed within the contemporary rhythm work in time, while people who are

---

[53] The skeptical use of certain concepts that relate brightness, light and whitened elements is due to their loose connection to positive scientific discoveries and states of knowledge which only perpetuate a particular image of the enlightened. In this sense, and as it is examined through the chapter of The Void, some negative, dark, black and misty states can also give us new information on how to stand critically through knowledge.

distanced from this present time, are framed as History, but don't enjoy the action of presentness.

As Karen Barad includes in their research in relation to the openness which is made possible when working through non-linear sense of time, these imaginaries understand materiality in a different way, they are

> Not imaginaries of some future or elsewhere to arrive at or be achieved as a political goal but, rather, imaginaries with material existences in the thick now of the present — imaginaries that are attuned to the condensations of past and future condensed into each moment; imaginaries that entail superpositions of many beings and times, multiple im/possibilities that coexist and are iteratively intra-actively reconfigured; imaginaries that are material explorations of the mutual indeterminacies of being and time (Barad, 2015: 388)

The material is here re-taken as a site of connecting subjectivities and identities to entities, times, spaces and other encounters. The situatedness that is discussed here is fundamental to a positionality inside decolonial critique as a method. Beyond theoretical landmarks, situatedness implies a conscious exercise of acknowledgment of our position in research, that does not only engage with spatiality and geographical terms, but also our symbolical locus of enunciation. In consonance to other ways of facing ontology and epistemology- or as I have framed it ahead, how we use fiction, queerness and autoethnography as new ways of engaging in how we see and live the world- there is a ambivalence in work when using decolonial methodologies in our research. On the one hand, a sense of unity is driven from the fact of working to a settling of new epistemologies that, on the other, are already recognized as partly fictional. As Donna Haraway explains in her famous *Situated Knowledges* (1988),

> "our" problem, is how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own "semiotic technologies" for making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a "real" world, one that can

be partially shared and that is friendly to earthwide projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness (1988: 579)

Through her proposition of a necessary dialogic understanding of the world, Haraway binds science, science fiction and fantasy as features of "feminist objectivity", throwing an indivisible bond between fiction and "science" that has been fundamental to gender and critical studies ever since. In her criticism to this totalizing technological vision, which she conceptualises as the "God Trick", who sees everything from nowhere, Haraway states a very particular idea of *truth* from a feminist point of view, in that "[*w*]*e* unmaske[d] the doctrines of objectivity because they threatened our budding sense of collective historical subjectivity and agency and our "embodied" accounts of the truth" (1988: 578, *my clarification*).

Queenbala Marak reviews in her article "Writing the 'Self': Writing Autoethnography" (2015), that the critiques to autoethnography stand because of their being too sentimental. The potentiality of this sentimentality, as Marak understands, is earmarked in the recognition of new epistemologies denied through time. As a feminist issue, autoethnography engages into new ways of understanding the world and knowledge while embracing narratives that have been objected to from historical genealogies. Autoethnography and the writings from the self, from these recognized positionalities, are a feminist and decolonial issue, since, as it has been examined throughout the past decades, emotions and feelings have been linked to an infantilization and feminization of the subject, derived from colonial and sexist thinking.

It is interesting to remark how this defense of fictional ways of understanding the past is also linked to the following question: Why are affects are tangled to emotionality but colonial and patriarchal thinking aren't? Let me explain: A defense to understand epistemic thinking as a fiction in itself, does not only recognize other forms of being in life, but destructs the dichotomy between objectivity and emotions, engaging in the understanding that, something being socially official and settled does

not mean it is scientifically contrary to emotions. This means that even the most rooted thinking in our research is, in the first place, connected to affect and emotions. The way we engage in subjectivity is directly linked to the way in which reality is experienced, understood and, ultimately, transformed.

14. Refusal.

I here want to make a double action: one to engage in a decolonial thinking for this research while the other, localising it into my own experiential contexts. My way of handling this synchronism is bridging these theories to an anarchist political thinking that I follow in my daily political life. For this purpose, I use the concept of *refusal* as a direct connection between decolonial thinking and western anarchist experiences.

In the personal use of anarchism to my own deconstruction as a white body, I use particular antistate critique to remain critical about the ways in which certain bodies are targeted at the same time they are invisibilised. Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang explore this idea in their claim towards refusal towards a decolonization of data, they explain the importance of "a recognition that some communities—particularly Indigenous, ghettoized, and Orientalized communities—are over-coded, that is, simultaneously hyper-surveilled and invisibilised/ made invisible by the state, by police, and by social science research" (2014: 811). This ambivalence is a particular rhythm that officiliaty and whiteness as systems of representation follow in order to maintain their status: they surveille to continue an invisibilised rhetoric of those controlled. They continue stating the particular use of refusal as a practice of unbecoming saying that,

> Analytic practices of refusal involve an active resistance to trading in pain and humiliation, and supply a rationale for blocking the settler colonial gaze that wants those stories. Refusal can comprise a resistance to making someone or something the subject of research; it is a form of objectless analysis, an analytic practice with nothing and no one to code. (2014: 812).

Refusal stands as a situated alternative to commodification and assimilationist practices, engaging in identity politics and practices with a different gaze towards their claim. It also helps "researchers and the people who prepare researchers to avoid building our/their careers upon the pain of others" (ibid). As Saidiya Hartman and Tina Campt focus upon in their 2015 founded Practising Refusal Collective, the radical modalities of refusing visual and representative systems of control which are given and taken for granted and narrow down our political imaginations. As Campt explains, to move towards refusal is to explore it "as a generative and capacious rubric for theorizing everyday practices of struggle often obscured by an emphasis on collective acts of resistance." (2019, online).

Refusal as a method of research implies many questions in relation to selection, reading, translation and positioning. In these senses, the selection of case studies follow this tension between officiliaty and radicality, break free from oppositional readings of reality, negate a possible translation in its linguistic and spatial ways and positions in the friction between reality and fiction, using art as the medium to apply theories.

Paul B. Preciado comes to mind when thinking about these refusal practices, directing this negation towards binarism. I had the privilege to meet him back in 2017, on the 2nd of November, while attending a special lecture held at the Het Nieuwe Instituut. He evinced how hard it is to sum up the problematics of every single fixed material that "we" encounter and the enclosure "we" must confront. There are two aspects of the talk that I want to relate to some issues concerning translation and binarism. The first one is the fragility of consciousness and of the material scenario of "real" life. The second is the important role that art plays in order to denaturalize the power strategy in it. For the former, Preciado uses a specific example: Leoni Rogozov's self operation. Considering Rogozov's half anaesthetised body, Preciado speaks about the simultaneous form in which the body is conscious and unconscious. This resetting of the understanding of bodies is essential to rethink them as spaces of possibilities outside the norm. The political fictions of the body and the human are also burst in *Side B: Adrift,* performance used to analyse the case study in Case Study 3.

This brings me to the second point, the power of art in creating new possibilities of opening the "black boxes" Preciado inspires to explore in this lecture. Art, and more specifically dance-theatre, can help us confront our posthuman era we are part of in an affirmative and explorative form, breaking boundaries between different possibilities and bodies and helping us to yearn for new ways of relations with others and with ourselves. It can help us to recognize "the modern fantasy of the body as a stable, unified, bounded entity, and gives a language to the multitude of connections that bodies form with other bodies (human and otherwise)" (Malins, 2004: 85)

15. Anarchism.

Strangely enough, my use of anarchism does not respond to my anarchist ideology, but a sincere belief on how anarchism as a method is the only political match -in terms of ideology referring to the status quo- this work can have. I use anarchism as a method in relation to the traces above: queerness, decoloniality, ethnography and fiction. In relation to them, anarchism also functions by breaking the isolation of positions and treating "individuality and community as mutually constitutive, rather than as in opposition to one another (....) [*and*] freedom as a social product, rather than as a value/goal that is necessarily in tension with community." (Daring, 2012: 2).

Anarchism has been a leading point in my research for years now, and has led me to uncontrollable thinking. Uncontrollable because it has never settled down, and has always been adding situated perspectives to this thought. As I wrote some years ago, for my master's dissertation thesis,

> Against any kind of social contract, relational anarchism draws from the conception of queer from where I position myself, one that is anti-assimilationist, celebrates failure, works through vulnerability and acknowledges precarity (Shildrick, 2001; Halberstam, 2011; Butler, 2004). (Harris, 2018: 40)

I was here concerned by the ways in which relations were experienced in my own contexts. Here, against more allosexual forms of relations, like polyamory or open relationships, relational anarchy also engaged in a deeper sense of the other, prioritising the people that surround our lives, without necessarily being intimate partners. Even if this seems a bit out of track in the present thesis, my way of understanding relations gave me the tools to address the ways in which the binary construction that normative culture has imposed in sociality, were present in every context I looked into, as it happens with a romantic sense of "pairing".

Furthermore, this analysis gave structure that added a new component to my own research. In the pairing of time and space to study particular contexts, after my first dissertation, relationality was a basic item that changed completely my point of view of different situations: not only contextualising a particular epoch or location was important, but the encounters and codes towards others- including non-human- others-, was also primordial for their better understanding. As anarchist authors remind us in these solutions and dissolution politics, the strategies that are found in anarchist methodologies are "coalitions that can negotiate a temporary common ground, and moving beyond divisive identity politics" (Daring, 2012: 79).

Anarchism as a method is also a partner to my use of queer temporalities in the following sections. As I will explain through the works by Halberstam or Muñoz, a promise of future, in normative politics, is also reworked through anarchism:

> The disruptive vision of the promise of ideological agreement inside political movements involves a transgression of straight temporalities. These normative temporalities maintain us attached to ideas of futurity which interrupt the dynamism of our movements. (Harris, 2018: 48)

This apprehension to promises for the future is something that, I am sure, many of us recognize as those easy optimistic ways of working through politics and resistance. The way linear temporality has been productive to our political imaginations is

something here is reworked through many aspects. As the one above, the ideological aspect of futuristic views of politics is disrupted when thinking of other aspects of communality and radicality which go beyond this promise in the future. In this sense, the way affect and kinship are used in the thesis work outside the temporality of expectation, which, as we know, takes us to a waiting rhythm of a future which will become present. As Caitlin Berrigan addresses through the disruption of care as a main expectation in the construction of relationality,

> Kinship is anarchy. Enigmatic and unruly, the social formations that go by this name evade the specifics of structure and definition. In its ideal form, kinship refracts into aspirational horizons: chosen families, loyalties, loves, queer futurities, ancestral conjurings, intuitive magnetisms (....) Toxic kinships haunt us through inheritances both material and immaterial (2022, online)

The subversive ways in which kinship and intimacy deal with authoritarian patterns, also puts forward an anarchist understanding of time, in its re-dealing with the concept of inheritance. Heritage is decentralised from the normative conception of the nuclear family, also extricating it from the linear temporality of production and reproduction. As Berrigan explains, these inheritances haunt us and modify our ways of experiences, sensing and imagining otherwise. As Heather Davis also deals while engaging in new forms of genealogies which can decentralise normative understanding of inheritance, the idea of kinship is rooted into this colonial, capital and patriarchal view of genealogical property. Ad they write,

> Inheritance as right, possession, and property indicates how Western modernity conceives of intergenerational time. Here, we become with the world through our objects. Inheritance as property, rather than as skills or ways of being, assumes a naturalized relation to capital and to colonial extraction and is about the ways in which filial relations, patriarchy, and race unfold across generations, consolidating, rather than redistributing, privilege. (2022: 15)

In their words, there is a commitment to refusal. A refusal to given privileges. A refusal to normalise genealogies of colonial reproduction. A refusal to become a commodity to the system. As in the potentiality of refusal, anarchism also stands as a resistance to any form of commodifying our work as to be swallowed by inorganic forms of production which surround our environments. As Tina Campt and Saidiya Hartman's use of refusal, anarchism is here taken as a disordering of power, and thus goes beyond its political strategic positioning.

The promise of happiness (2010), following Sara Ahmed's ideas, is denied here, in defense of a sense of being in the world that, even if uncomfortable, is engaged in the circumstances surrounding sociality. Also in the path followed by Ahmed's refusal to academia[54], other forms of theory open up, which disentangle thought from the spatial and contextual landscape of institutions. Low theory as the accessible epistemological movement ideated by Jack Halberstam can be thought as "a kind of theoretical model that flies below the radar, that is assembled from eccentric texts and examples and that refuses to confirm the hierarchies of knowing that maintain the *high* in high theory" (2011: 16).

---

[54] Resigning from Goldsmith in 2016 after the institutional hesitated responding to sexual abuse. Resignation letter can be read here: https://feministkilljoys.com/2016/05/30/resignation/

THE VOID AS SATURATION. A CIRCUMSTANTIAL CHAPTER ON THE VOID
AS SATURATION AND NEGATIVE POTENTIALITY

People say that my work is pessimistic,
but it's not – it's negative. (Mark Fisher, Crack magazine, 2014)

1. Introduction.

I want to start this chapter speaking about toxicity and contamination. In doing so, I want to appreciate the contamination of this thesis with circumstantial and uncontrolled intoxications. Here, toxicity and contamination are used in the abstract sense discussed in the methodological chapter, which helps me employ the concepts to refer to the philosophical turns my work has suffered given the circumstances that have taken place in the past five years. Nonetheless, to speak about toxicity in philosophical terms becomes a muddy issue if we engage in the concrete social and natural moments we are living through right now. It is concerning the stages of damage we have come to normalise. It is alarming how this era of contamination is still blamed upon the human genus and not particularly examining what the actual structures of the human are producing this destruction. As Kathryn Yusoff warns their readers in *A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None* (2018), nothing is neutral about this geologic era. They write,

> Origins draw borders that define inclusion and exclusion, and their focus is narrow, narrating a line of purpose (read Progress) and purposefulness (read Civilization), while overlooking accident, misdirection, or the shadow geology of disposable lives, waste, toxicity, contamination, extinction, and exhaustion. There is not geology on one hand and stories about geology on the other; rather, there is an axis of power and performance that meets within these geologic objects and the narratives they tell about the human story. Traveling back and forth through materiality and narrative, the origins of the Anthropocene are intensely political in how they draw the world of the present into being and give shape and race to its world-making subjects. (p, 34)

The axis Yusoff mentions activates uncomfortable connections between questions such as whiteness, property or progress and destruction, contamination, violence, extraction or extinction. Only a few lines after this quote we read that "nothing that can be found in the end is not already prefigured in the origin. Origins configure and prefigure the possibility of narratives of the present" (Ibid). Circumstances are political, and this is what I intend to reflect upon in this chapter. The COVID-19

pandemic and its several lockdowns paralysed my work, my life and my healing but, above all, it also exposed me to a series of questions which gave complexity to my research.

As previously discussed, in my reading of Foucault's research on the omnipresence of power (1978), the concept of contamination stands out as important to bring into conversation. It speaks of the idea that intimacies, affects and power are transmitted between bodies. Yet, there is also a potential contained in these intoxications. As Mel Y. Chen addresses, toxicity can also be sustained "as an animated, active, and peculiarly queer agent." (2012: 10). Besides, transmissions are also held to various subjective exposures. This is, the way a body gets contaminated, biologically or experientially, is associated with how a body is presented in sociality. In my case, the way my body is exposed has allowed me to transform the pandemic circumstances into a set of theories and ideas which have helped develop my own research frames.

This chapter is born of a necessity rather than out of a planned schedule of events. In this respect, it is very similar to the schema followed in neoliberal fast Academia which often forces us to publish or perish, to produce articles before we have had the slow tempo we need in order to simply meditate a bit on what we really want to write about. When Covid-19 exploded, the penny finally dropped. Everyone started writing about pandemics, about the ecosystems we were inhabiting and the post apocalyptic era we had become then, *and only then*, aware of. Some of the readings I did on the topic were highly pertinent and more than interesting. But others, while speaking with some companions, were 'suggested' by their editors to be written because it was a public demand and easy to sell. I had the privilege to be immersed in another topic for my own research, so I could distance myself from these pressures. Or, at least, this was my intention until I understood how the pandemic had affected, modified or mortified my own case studies. I understood then that speaking about the historical context of the pandemic was somehow personal for everyone. Being a pandemic, a vast number of the population had been involved, although we still had to remain conscious of the differences existing between material situations inside a health

crisis as such. I decided I would let myself be affected by these modifications and then, after everything had calmed down, I would choose what was central to my study out of the lived circumstances. After many reflections, the concept that can be seen as companion of this thesis, the element that had *contaminated* this thesis because of the pandemic, was, and still is, the *Void*.

Drawn from an impossibility, but not only, the void and other concepts are used to disentangle certain practices driven from the meaning of different notions. These concepts, such as the *void* itself, *negativity*, *passivity*, *ephemera* or *untranslatability*, come not only from an impossibility but also from an agential cut. In some parts of the case studies, a void responds to a decision rather than to an impossibility. In this sense- and as has already been questioned in the methodological part-, I interrogate "Is archiving always radical?" (Díaz et al., 2016) and I do so in order to engage in the voids as saturation: To be absent doesn't mean an ontological emptiness. Indeed, as discussed during a seminar with Macarena Gómez Barris in May 2019, absences can be shaped very differently, sometimes being positional voids which are filled up as presences somewhere else (such as the known expolio cases all around *our* Modern Museums[55]). The regulating figure of who archives is sometimes unavoidable, even more so when the process doesn't involve self-exploration. Some stories don't want to be told, at least following academic standards. Some parts have been cut agentially, responding to the question in a very pragmatic way: archiving is not always radical. Hence, using Barad's transitional moments of stabilising phenomena, I have decided to move away from totalising theories and to leave out some questions, problematics and interpretations because of various reasons. To insist on the commodification of memory is to dismiss the specific landscapes which fill memory in. To acknowledge the impossibility of a narrative and to respect the desire of oblivion is an important task for us in research. In this sense, the recognition of research limits, of anti institutionalisation demands, of the variety of epistemological existences, of desires to

---

[55] Snorton (2017, 2020)

be forgotten and of futile encounters determines some of the positionings of my analytical gaze.

As Mark Fisher recalls when discussing hauntology, "Derrida's neologism uncovers the space between Being and Nothingness" (Fisher, 2014: 112). This hauntological space is where the void and other notions stand as they push themselves into this thesis. The theoretical traditions which reach these pages are haunted. Hauntology is haunting. As Fisher writes,

> [h]auntology was the successor to previous concepts of Derrida's such as the trace and différance; like those earlier terms, it referred to the way in which nothing enjoys a purely positive existence. Everything that exists is possible only on the basis of a whole series of absences, which precede and surround it, allowing it to possess such consistency and intelligibility that it does. In the famous example, any particular linguistic term gains its meaning not from its own positive qualities but from its difference from other terms. (Fisher, 2014: 26).

I am calling on Mark Fisher, AKA K-punk, because the voids in my work are as present as his spectre K-Punk is a saturated void. His suicide was only the start of the present recognition of his devices to analyse popular culture. I am calling on him, not as an encrypted creator, but as the ghost who has haunted my work in so many different forms. First in Art History as a disruptor of 4 years of aesthetic classical study, then now, 12 years later, as a plethora of signification in the many absences of this thesis work.

As an extension of the parts of the thesis which follow this chapter, the particularity of the conversational tone used in the case studies is something that I decided to introduce in this part, even though it is an element that interpellates methodology in a decisive way. This trend is highly influential on the resulting conversations that have encouraged the after-words that are written on the analysis of these "interviews". Therefore, I have chosen to introduce the void in this section since

the conversationalist mode has erased the traditional form of the interview in order to open up a deeper connection with the other, not as a site of knowledge, but as a space of shared prosaic philosophic intimacy. *Las conversadoras* (2006) reached my hands in November 2022, when, after a breakup with one of my best friends, another good one gave it to me. It became an intimate substitution to converse with in the last months of writing. The book is the extraction of a whole summer shared between Marguerite Duras and Xaviere Gauthier. In the heat of the summer their intimacy makes them pose questions that become long reflections in some of the pages. They turn to one another unfolding an number of topics which they recognise as impossible to respond to, as a liberating pouring of words. The rhythm is decentralised to give space to suspended responses submerged in contemplation. This absence of immediate response is what connected my personal conflict to how my thesis kept changing. The impossibilities were not agential. They were not empty either. They were saturated in suspension.

It seems pertinent at this point to speak on how the measurement of any value is based upon human exceptionalism. It uses anthropocentric methodologies that guess and decide the way in which a certain reference and data is interpreted. It constrains the way in which we are asked to produce. A way such as in rhythm but also as in morphology. In this sense, the vacuum is not only already saturated, following a physics turn towards what the void means, but in essence what is said is that "The nature of nature depends on how you measure it" (Barad, 2016: 20:29 min. The binding I use in this thesis between methodologies and theories is materialised through the invisible inevitables which come to surface. Whether extracted, avoided, muted, evicted or mistranslated, the elements come to life through the vibrancy of the chapters. I have chosen to see and, conversely, I have chosen not to see. To see is to neglect other sites of seeing. That is why this thesis calls on art, following Macarena Gomez Barris's use of submerged epistemologies in *The Extractive Zone* (2017), being fully aware that my approach to the chosen case studies may cut the eternal possibilities of infinite readings. The case studies illustrate my ideas on research as bridging art, reality and theory and hence follow Gomez Barris's inspiring words when she states her intention to work "across spaces that might not otherwise be organised together in one study, delinking from the naturalisation of national histories and from

the heteronormativity of the nation-state." (ibid: 2). Denaturalising the blank space, testing its saturation and, above all, leaving it empty in some cases, is what this chapter challenges, in order to acknowledge the politics of location I depart from and which are limited and impossible for a full epistemological recognition. I have decided to see and such intention forces me to recognise that there are parts I can't reach to see.

2.   Recycling: Nothing is really new. Pastiche, nostalgia and neologism.

If we think of productivity in academic terms, the void takes a radical turn: what is absent is not actually a state of forms, matter as such, but a particular way of matter entering, this is, what is new and valued as such.

In a famous conversation with Andrew Broaks about *modernity* and *pastiche* in 2014, K-Punk, AKA Mark Fisher, states that,

> it's the formal nostalgia of the current moment rather than the psychological nostalgia per se. Well, it's both in some sense, but I think more problematic is the nostalgia of form, you know, where things are repeated but in an unacknowledged way, and the increasing naturalisation of pastiche. It's prescient that in his '80s texts Fredric Jameson talked about the increasing prevalence of pastiche, but in those early days of what we then called postmodernism pastiche was still noticeable as a style, the quotation marks were still around things. Whereas now, the quotation marks have disappeared. Appropriation is no longer signalled, it's just assumed I think (2014: Crack magazine)

This interview starts with an impossible title: the paradoxical question "Do you miss the future?" and goes on to explain the incoherences wrapped in the emotional tools that human exceptionalism has employed in order to resist and insist upon its particularity. One of these is nostalgia which works in diffractive ways and touches at once the past, the present and the future. These three-time locations are here merged through Fisher's critique on how the expectations of a capital system are in need of

raw cultural pieces, neological perspectives and shocking futurities as immersed in production as a whole. This also applies to the fundamentals of knowledge production. We are made to miss a future not only as a horizon to expect better ways of inhabiting experience, but, more importantly, as a landscape of original consumption: we miss the future because we are required constant reinvention. We miss the future because we are too imbued in a present of constant production. We are in dressage, as Henri Lefebvre coined in reference to this disciplining of the modern subject (2004). *Pastiche* or *Simulacrum*, it is not a question about how close we are from the real but rather that the real, as it finally bursts on our faces, was never there. The ontological difference between Jameson's (1992) and Baudrillard's (1981) independent readings of postmodernity in Fisher's analysis gets to a dead end because the ontological as a counterside of constructionism is finally dislodged from it, abandoning human exceptionalism.

3.   On negativity: the queer's archives. the archive's queers.

These are the parts that were not meant to be written, the accessible formulae that were kept out because of material selection. They are the feelings and affectivities which did not quite fit in the whole. But the whole has holes through which some shades are allowed in.

Some years ago, long before my professionalisation as a lecturer in History, I attended one of the seminars that would change my whole academic career. I will be honest here- since I think there is also a self-critique to the way in which academic aesthetics are consumed in "our" circles- I was not eager about this course because the researcher in question, someone called Teresa del Valle, was not young enough to, in my opinion, pour in "fresh" feminist ideas. I had not slept much because M., my partner back then, had been texting me all night because of problems in our relationship which had been going on for several months. My belly was inflated in gas because of my lack of rest, my neck was twisted to the left, the direction I had kept responding to her messages. When I got to the classroom, Teresa was standing in front of the table,

in a way that now appears to me as very appropriate to anthropologists: silent, smiley, beholding, cold but intimate. Two minutes were enough for her to capture my attention. It was not how she talked- I would leave that to other artsy experiences- but the simple way she would put things together or ask her questions to the group. Yes, she was speaking about things I had already read elsewhere[56], but the questions she posed were located and localised in that specific chronotope (Del Valle, 1999). At some point, Del Valle spoke about History and milestones. Against the idea of big scenarios, Teresa reframed the idea of everyday practices as a way of being in History. This idea, which is now valued from feminist and critical views of disciplines such as Archaeology, something that I explore in other parts of the thesis, works against landmarks as historical events. From a feminist perspective, Del Valle, spoke about the importance of disempowered ways of being (in) History. She went on exploring the importance of auto-ethnographic research from this perspective, since the particular ways in which we live and the specific things that occur in our lives are determinant to our research, not only because they affect them, but because the quotidian parts of our experiences are already, already historical facts. Writing in my notebook I realised my belly was still inflated with nerves, and afterwards I felt the need to cry out of self-compassion. My archives hadn't recorded these insignificant messages, but my body traced them in every step I took that day. I was able to take responsibility for myself and, when night fell, I wrote my last message to M.

In my entanglement between the parts of this thesis, I want to reactivate certain sections of the methodological chapter, such as those relating to counter-narratives and autoethnography, here. Even the empty archive is saturated with information. Empty, as in a void, or insignificant. As del Valle explains, the archive is already there. The small stories that are imprinted on our bodies are the same motions that move in time.

---

[56] It goes without saying that this kind of alliteration in research happens constantly, since our capacity of production is, as for human bodies, comes dosed, this being the idea of research.

Departing from Mikhaíl Bakhtín's account of the conjunctions of time and space in literary chronotopes (1937), Del Valle proposes gendered chronotopes, which adds to Bakhtín's neologism a relational account of the ways in which time and space are determined and determinant to literary and theoretical framings. In her analysis, del Valle presents alternative narratives of historical accounts, counter-narratives, in which social memory has been modified by specific encounters which, nevertheless, may be moulded inside quotidian practices. These specific chronotopes can take us to non-discursive memory (1999: 38) that I find extremely interesting as an idea, since it collects the need of looking into disempowered accounts of sociality and cultural and experiential formations. As she writes,

> By generic chronotopes I understand, on the one hand, all those points where time and space imbued with gender appear in a dynamic convergence. Like powerful links full of reflexivity and emotions, they can be recognised with the following characteristics: they act as a synthesis for wider meanings; they are cathartic, catalytic; they condensate creativity and they are dependent on modifications and continuous reinterpretations. They are temporal spots with complex activities and meanings where identities are negotiated, where new interpretations of actions, symbols generators of inequality can be in conflict [....] Chronotopes are, thus, a methodological strategy (1999: 12, *my translation*[57]).

Chronotopes are methodologies. The way in which the third element in experiential encounters, that of relationality, is added as significant for certain formations and formulations is primordial to the understanding of chronotopes. It is central to my own goals since it attributes importance to the time-space compression

---

[57] "Por cronotopos genéricos entiendo en primer lugar los puntos donde el tiempo y el espacio imbuidos de género aparecen en una convergencia dinámica. Como nexos poderosos cargados de reflexividad y emociones, pueden reconocerse con base en las características siguientes: actúan de síntesis de significados más amplios; son catárticos, catalizadores; condensan creatividad y están sujetos a modificaciones y reinterpretaciones continuas. Son enclaves temporales con actividades y significados complejos en los que se negocian identidades, donde pueden estar en conflicto nuevas interpretaciones de acciones, símbolos creadores de desigualdad [....] Los cronotopos son, por lo tanto, una estrategia metodológica[...]" (1999: 12) original.

only when activated through specific encounters. It encounters non-living agents, reshapes the archive in its content and signification and holds it in its dynamism. It finds a special place for those everyday practices as significant elements for historical sequence.

In this reading of time and space as historical accounts, Del Valle breaks with the human delirium of uniqueness and independence which Almudena Hernando names as the "Fantasy of individuality" (2012). In Hernando's work, this fantasy has served history to archive milestones such as wars, treaties or doctrines while relinquishing what she calls "maintenance activities". She writes,

> Besides their participation in productive tasks, complementing masculine tasks, women have fulfilled a role which men haven't, and that has been fundamental for the group: they have sustained the bonds of the group, making it possible for men, despite the growing individuality they were developing, not to lose their sense of belonging to a unity stronger and bigger than themselves. This also prevented the distress which their consciousness of smallness would have caused them (2005: 127, *my translation*[58]*)*

As she explains, this fantasy of individuality has served the big names in History, namely (but not only) those white masculine identities, to accomplish the historical deeds that are evidenced in historical records. At the same time, it has erased the role of feminised and otherwise bodies when serving for the cohesion of the group. This should not be taken as an essentialist value in Archaeology. The way of looking into the past with refreshed ideas should not take us to ontologise the understanding of femininity as one and only, adapting it to values of caring, affect and emotionality. The claim here is to look at disempowered identities, not only those feminised

---

[58] "[A]l margen de su participación en las tareas productivas, complementando las tareas masculinas, las mujeres han cumplido una función que los hombres no han ejercido, y que ha sido fundamental para el grupo: han sostenido los vínculos del grupo, posibilitando que, a pesar de la individualidad que los hombres iban construyendo, éstos no perdieran la sensación de pertenecer a una unidad más fuerte y más grande que ellos mismos, evitando así la angustia que la conciencia de su pequeñez les habría generado" (2005: 127) original.

understandings from the present, but also disabled bodies in the past and their multiple meanings exceeding reductionist views (Shildrick, 2002, 2012). These simplistic views breathe through our present, in time and space. What is chased in this thesis is a recovery of those identities that have been located in chronotopes of disempowerment or non-visibility (not invisibility), giving them other values beyond the individuality impressed in the archives of official historicities. Not only is the idea of femininity from our presentism narrow and poor (a fact that takes to a sort of *alocronism*, following Johannes Fabian concept (1983), of the ancient subject into a prestructure of subjectivity in itself), it is also disposed as a set of spatial arrangements whose purpose is to organise genders and sexualities in ways which can be controlled and arranged.

Ideas linked to gender and sexuality, as the scheme which femininity follows from the realm of sociality, are domesticated in ways which can serve to control identities while, at the same time, giving an idea of freedom and justice. The idea of femininity is also conceived following modernist values and desires of gender organisation which, reading Oyèrónké Oyèwùmi or Maria Lugones, can be found as the basis of the colonising set of mind (1997, 2008 respectively). These transcultural fantasies, following Oyèwùmi's thesis, give a sense of unity when speaking about subjectivities not only from the present, but also when seeking for them in the past. While speaking about the colonisation of the Oyo empire, Oyèwùmi writes that

> [I]mpulse to apply this assumption transculturally is rooted in the simplistic notion that gender is a natural and universal way of organizing society and that male privilege is its ultimate manifestation. But gender is socially constructed: it is historical and culture-bound. Consequently, the assumption that a gender system existed in 0yo society prior to Western colonization is yet another case of Western dominance in the documentation and interpretation of the world, one that is facilitated by the West's global material dominance. (1997: 32)

The exceptionalism of the West, as a social strategy for white supremacism, and the strategies of colonial thinking and identity values are in this thesis exposed in ways

that checkmate reductionist visions of universal criticisms, as in the case of feminist theory and gender studies. Oyèwùmi warns that "researchers always find gender when they look for it" (1997: 31), a critique that takes us to Joan Scott (1986) in her analysis of gender as an important category only if contextualised. Indeed, not every critique should be taken as critical, but should be applied when the context, taking into consideration the temporal-spatial-relational trinity, demands it. In this sense, when driven from a universal value and not a situated response, the westernised critique of the category of gender has become essentialistic in its denial of experiences which may not be active, performed or reproduced in the same ways as the context of critique production. As Oyèwùmi exposes, the white categorical assumptions in research and epistemologies have also contaminated the way in which gender is a plural, unsettled and unpredictable experience.

As Eva Hayward proposes as trans negativity in this turn towards dislocations of human exceptionalism "turns against liberal (white) transgender projects about visibility, accessibility, and progressivism, to expose how these political logics are predicated on racialized humanism" (2017: 193). Indeed, in this new stream of attention to other non-illuminated points, the critique also follows traditional, i.e. racist, ways of engaging in negativity. What was dark was not clear and its opacity was the element justifying its being kept out. In Ahmed's analysis further on, this opacity is brought back keeping it dark and sometimes untranslatable. As it follows, darkness and other negative points are in saturation of absences, being filled up but still unaccounted for. Taking Barad's diffractive method in connection to this break from oppositional rigidities,

> The two-slit diffraction experiment queers the binary light/darkness story. What the pattern reveals is that darkness is not a lack. Darkness can be produced by "adding new light" to existing light – "to that which it has already received". Darkness is not mere absence, but rather an abundance. (Barad, 2014: 171)

Abundance, a saturation of the space of absence that gives new meaning to the notions that exist inside the idea of void, such as darkness. These darknesses, lights and other bright ideas give the sense of a dislocated epistemology, an "eccentric" one. On the one hand, eccentricity is here taken as a divergence from the centre while, on the other, as contemporary resistance movements activate, it insists upon the particular urgency in space, on the removing critiques and epistemologies from central units. Many critiques follow these dislocations from Arjun Appadurai's analysis of identitarian imagination (1996), Anibal Quijano's undoing on progress, knowledge and modernity (2000) to María Lugones's dismantling of gender universalism (2008). All of them expel ontological understandings of identities, those understandings which still permeate our cultural interpretations and political imaginaries. As Lugones expresses in her famous chapter concerning the coloniality of gender,

> [T]he modern, colonial gender system cannot exist without the coloniality of power, since the classification of the population in terms of race is a necessary condition for its possibility [....] Problematizing biological dimorphism and considering the relationship between biological dimorphism and the dichotomous construction of gender is central to understanding the scope, depth, and characteristics of the colonial/modern gender system. The reduction of gender to the private, to the control over sex and its resources and products is an ideological issue ideologically presented as biological, part of the cognitive production of modernity that has conceptualized race as "gendered" and at the same time gender as racialized in ways particularly differentiated between Europeans-as/whites-as and colonized/non-whites. Race is neither more mythical nor more fictional than gender – both are powerful fictions. (2008: 93-94, *my translation*[59])

---

[59] "[E]l sistema de género moderno, colonial no puede existir sin la colonialidad del poder, ya que la clasificación de la población en términos de raza es una condición necesaria para su posibilidad [....] Problematizar el dimorfismo biológico y considerar la relación entre el dimorfismo biológico y la construcción dicotómica de género es central para entender el alcance, la profundidad, y las características del sistema de género colonial/moderno. La reducción del género a lo privado, al control sobre el sexo y sus recursos y productos es una cuestión ideológica presentada ideológicamente como biológica, parte de la producción cognitiva de la modernidad que ha conceptualizado la raza como «engenerizada» y al género como racializado de maneras particularmente diferenciadas entre los europeos-

The reductive forms in which difference and inequality are envisioned, those affecting sexual practices and rights, property or private specialities, are, as Lugones warns us, ideologically contained.

Oyèwùmi and Lugones bridge towards intersectional analysis of coloniality since their focus attends to the double subordination of colonised women both from a racial system and from a gendered categorisation (1997: 123). Critical voices, often coming from feminist and gender studies, reclaim a counter-archive which could contain different accounts of histories and favour a more inclusive narrative. Even if this alternative is fundamental for a different use of Historical epistemologies and disciplines, which can be sustained from more critical positionalities, the idea of a counter-archive also reproduces another essentialist idea of History. The fact that everything is material for memory and archives, the obsession from humanist exceptionalist thinking about the future in terms of heritage, also silences the many experiences which, from agential positions, reclaim oblivion and ephemeral existence.

As it is explained further on, untranslatability and opacity can be radical ways of engaging in experience. From these anticolonial, transgendered and refusal claims, the counter-archive is only another possibility of reclaim, not the only alternative for these traditional ways of sketching the past. Yes, the way of collecting through a certain discipline also follows colonial standards. This positive connection to negativity, this calling attention towards voids and blank spaces is what I want to activate in the following section. Departing from the theories cited above, I engage with queerness as positive negativity, queerness as dislocation, queerness as desinformation and queerness as death.

---

as/blancos-as y las gentes colonizadas/no-blancas. La raza no es ni más mítica ni más ficticia que el género –ambos son ficciones poderosas." (2008: 93-94)

4.   Queer deaths.

On speaking about absences and negativities, we must also approach the coevality between voids and saturation, between life and art, reality and imagination or, ultimately, life and death. This is the context from where I am applying Queer Death Studies to this chapter.

As we have seen before, Queer Death Studies is a relatively new field of research, unknown in many of the theoretical and academic environments where I normally operate. It is, nevertheless, well inscribed in activist and politicised spaces, where death and mourning have been, since many years ago, central to disruptive scenarios. Queer, racialised and non-human bodies implied inside these activisms (active or passive, depending on their human or non-human category) have centralised the importance of these negative and deviant affects, involving death, mourning or mental health effects. In the increase of some of these experiences after the pandemics, these alternative and non-optimistic emotions have permeated even more inside activisms and daily experiences. Queer Death Studies is, from my personal experience, important to account for here as a new theoretical base which can help explore from the "negational" movements that are detailed above, through the work of Sara Ahmed, Jack Halberstam or Franz Fanon, to name only a few. QDS, as will be referred henceforth, dedicate their thinking to alternative ways of looking at death, dying and mourning, different from the dominant views which centralise the colonial, gendered and abled status quo. These systems of domination have engaged sociality into very particular ways of conceptualising death and its affects by generating necropolitical, war-based, extractivist and control arrangements.

QDS is one of the proposals in my thesis. It is not so much about negative feelings and pessimistic effects, but as a claim of otherness through conceptual ecologies. This is, what is there to death, to mourning and to surrendering when welcoming other connotations of these very notions into critical studies? Yes, there is a great dose of privilege to remain in this negativity and to choose to give up. It can appear as if Lee Edelman's non futurity was here retaken for the theoretical turn. Instead, the turn towards this negativity is not related to sorrow but a reconsideration

143

of non-capital ways of being in affective life which could include otherness as an active part of this theoretical turn. I look critically on the queer negativities, represented by Edelman or Leo Bersani (1995) and then I listen carefully to Angela Jones's concern that the negativity surrounding queerness may also be already a privilege which not everyone can assume (2013). Jones puts it very clearly when writing that in the case of Bersani,

> [w]hile he astutely critiques the teleological forces at work within redemptive theoretical projects, his focus on negativity ignores at worst and neglects at best the necessity of emancipatory politics for many queers whose material conditions make embracing the negative a political privilege or luxury (p. 4).

New materialisms are agential in this section exceeding the figure of Karen Barad and their analysis of saturation and void, that breaks the normative understanding of what emptiness actually entails. I recall Claire Colebrook's work here in the connection between QDS and NM through the concept of passive vitalism which she reads from Deleuze and Guattari's writing. Also analysed by QDS researchers such as above mentioned Marietta Radomska (2020), Colebrook's work is an inspiration for embracing the tension between materiality and vitality, and also between life and art. Art, as this circumstantial chapter has finally taught me, works as a passive component in this thesis. The pieces selected for the case studies are works for a diffractive reading of the specific situations sketched in these cases. Under the application of Barad's use of *Contingent Ontology* (2007: 73), I understand the coeval existence that happens here between life and art, vitality and materiality and void and saturation. The way contingency is applied here to standardised ways of fusing life and research is in connection with an impossibility: that of grasping singular meanings from these cases while, at the same time, acknowledging the unattainable alternative.

In her structuration of passive vitalism, Colebrook has an interesting take to bridge the gap between NM and QDS. Her approach on vitalism brings forward a critique on posthuman exceptionalism which engages in the problems surrounding the solidity of identity politics. As she notes,

> What I want to suggest in this chapter is that the contemporary valorization of becoming over being repeats rather than destabilizes a highly traditional and

humanist sentiment of privileging act over inertia, life and creativity over death and stasis, and pure existence or coming-into-being over determination. (2014: 75)

Becoming over being, even if disturbing stability, is still fixed within humanist privileging. Passivity and negativity are here debonded from a human particularity that reduces time to hope and futurity ideas and space, involving action and vitalism as the counterpart to passivity. All of these terms coexist under this perspective, giving a centrality to passive vitalism which "is one in which 'life' is not some force that actualizes itself in single bodies, but a 'field of survey' that places any body's becoming in relation to the forces of its milieu, and never as active self-creation" (2014: 79). The phenomenology to which Colebrook gives space and this different direction of time that abandons futurity and becoming, is related to the conceptual turn to orientation that Sara Ahmed uses for her *Queer Phenomenology* (2006), with which I further engage later on. In Colebrook's approach this orientation is also meaningful in order to speak about the dislocation of the notion of becoming stating that "[t]here would no longer be man as subject, the being who is nothing more than his own self-becoming, for becoming-woman suggests that becoming is oriented, or tends toward, a term beyond the process of becoming" (2014: 80). In the case of art, this has an ontological restructuration, noting ontology from Barad's contingency, since the separation between the real and the aesthetic is no longer necessary. The distance from ontological reality, from everything else, outside the human exceptionalist mindset, loses force from this perspective. The diffractive reading of art practices, which this thesis applies to the situations dealt with in the case studies, follows this new ontological pattern. It allows the art experience to be the generator of the impossible realities, represented by the actual experiences taken into analysis. As Colebrook writes,

> any becoming is always localized; it is a force of a particular quantity, in relation to another quantity, producing a point of relative stability, or a field. In terms of "the aesthetic," it is not a question, then, of art practice returning the subject or creative potentiality to the sense of its own forming power.

Rather, the art object would be the result of a collision not intended or reducible to any single life. (p, 83)

The dislocation of the place that art holds in these analyses destructures how it is also disposed in relation to the case studies used in my research. It is a matrix of uses, meanings, becomings, generations and impossibilities. Art is used as an unfolding of "relative stability", applied in order to give a localised reading of particular experiences, but maintaining its potential to engage into the impossibilities that already exist in these interpretations, as contingent:

The universe is not some single object that is then perceived or synthesized; there are events of perception, each of which is an unfolding of an infinite series. There is no conflict in these series precisely because there is no outside as such, or life as such, beyond all the points of view that compose the harmonious whole. This doesn't mean that truth is relativized, that we don't get to the truth because of perspectives; rather, truth is composed of relative series, not located in "a" point, but effected from an open whole of converging and diverging points. Life just is this quantity of divergent worlds. (p, 83)

Critically, these new perspectives cannot fall into relativisms of any kind or into human exceptionalism but rather help us remain aware of the fact that we should not de-responsabilise acts and mindsets. The posthuman is returned to while, at the same time, it is reshaped as an infinite figuration. The nomad, in its impossible interpretation[60], is rethought in terms of movement and action, in space and time, from non-human new material possibilities while mainly addressing its particularity in our ontological contingency. In this contingency, the nomad becomes situated, its interpretation is enabled through its concreteness. In the potential movement of the nomad, life, as in

---

[60] Following the critiques to reduce nomadism to a mobility of subjectivity, displacing identitarian fluidity to other circumstances of movement which do not always attain agential desires, such as those of forced migrations, refugee and asylum seeking and escaping violence movements.

the exceptional difference between human vitality and anything else, draws attention to the connections between New Materialism and Queer Death Studies and the voids these frames engage in.

From this critical situatedness, and remaining open to the many possibilities which the motion of the nomad brings, what life means, what death entails and the territory of mourning are reviewed stating new hopes that exceed pure possibilities. Hope, action, vitalism and meaning are in "[s]pectral presences and present absences" (Radomska et al. 2020: 92). Other ways of thinking about life as also encompassing death and mourning in its logic, are part of a new look at negativity as affirmative. Affirmative politics which depart from these negative feelings, and which think about embodiment and human experience, lead towards new forms of hope. This approach helps escape the singular negations that we can find in traditionally negative queer studies such as the above cited works by Bersani or Edelman. We can find these new approaches to otherwise-temporalities in critiques such as "Cruel Optimism" (Berlant, 2011) in favour of the sort of hope which does not conceive the future uniquely as a human becoming.

Reviewing Franco "Bifo" Berardi's *Semiocapitalism* (2009), death, mourning and negativity are detached from compulsory ways of inhabiting affective sociality and public feelings. Obviously, as I have indicated above, this is also in need of a continuous recognition of the locations and situations where these disruptions take place. What I mean by this is that reclaiming "negative" feelings needs also a critique which can pay attention to the multiple locations where these feelings take place and attend to the reasons, consequences and motives which can be important to their claiming. Depending on the context, death, dying and mourning can be a matter of reclaim to make them enter the potentiality of affirmative "negative" feelings or they can be a symptom of violences which have to be criticised and reclaimed making them non-affirmative feelings. Acknowledging these positionalities from where to reject public feelings might also entail the impossibility of disruption, where normative ways of remaining and resisting in certain affects may also be cardinal points to take into account.

As Ahmed's affective dislocation, when exposing what *The Promise of Happiness* (2010) really entails[61], QDS decodifies new forms of facing what is particularly exceptional about humans and other living entities: death. With a necropolitical mindset that remains critical of the abuses of deciding on behalf of someone else's body whether or not such a body should stay alive, QDS engages in affirmative critiques which are tangential to otherwise utopic arrangements. As Angela Jones explains, these utopic enactions create[62]

> spaces in the present that do not necessarily allow for complete emancipation or even happiness, but are suggestive of the potentiality for the future; they give hope. Given that happiness is a normative and regulatory construct, it seems fitting here that the construction of queer utopian spaces does not hinge upon happiness, but rather are simply autonomous spaces in which to breathe (2019: 3)

This is what radical hopes look like: potentially spilled and spatio-temporally affected. In this sense, the promising compulsion towards a better future takes us to the notion of waiting, as intrinsic to human rhythm and temporal expectation. *Waiting* is related to impossibility, negativity and passivity. I take Ghassan Hage's conceptualisation of the term (2009) because I find it particularly interesting for application to the case studies I analyse and because of my specific critique on the notion of *motion*, when theorised as nomadic, capable or total. In subsequent chapters this sense of waiting will be explored from the perspectives of motion and mobility. Here I want to focus on the saturation that *waiting* holds within. Since utopia tinges all this dissertation, the notion of *waiting* becomes central because it calls into question the different forms of envisioning and looking forward to "futures". Hage formulates the question "what kind

---

[61] Ahmed's dislocation resides in the fact that they expose how positive public feelings, such as happiness, are really commodified to control subjectivities and relationalities and, as such, other feelings signified as negative can also have potentialities to reclaim owned feelings.

[62] *Enaction* is here used in the sense of *enactivism*, which refers to the position through which cognition is understood as the dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.

of waiting is exhibited in the phenomenon that one is examining?" (2009: 1). Surely, the waiting after entering a refugee camp cannot be equal to the experience of travelling nomads when waiting to move in a flight delay. Nor do agency, passivity or emotionality seem to be the same in these two cases. If applying this obvious distinction between experiences and conditions to the case of people in capitalised contexts facing a sense of stagnation, it seems like appropriating certain figurations can be a problematic analogy. As Eliana de Souza Ávila explains, the commodification of the figure of nomadism is problematic since it invisibles the particularities of movement, including its absence. They become tokenised figurations of identities which seek for the justifying of the "modern state". As they explain

> queer and the migrant, despite – or because of– their power as emblems of bodily mobility and fluidity across borders of gender and nation, have increasingly become tokenized as figures of transcendence, mobility, and freedom, while reinstalling material and symbolic stagnation on the racialized sites of immobility (2017: 41).

Departing from this notion of *waiting* as a new form of engaging in differences between experiences, I want to draw a line of connection between new ways of engaging in materiality and normative senses of experience. How we wait, what we wait for and the agency involved in these different modes of waiting involve already an activity that disentangles passivity from its reduction to enaction. Hence, the different types of waiting also imply a sense of suspended rhythm, a notion of temporality acquired through cultural and lived experience. This is interesting because rhythm is normally thought of as the pace of a particular moment which generates an action. It is harder to think about the rhythm of enaction, or about the action involved in temporalities with a suspended rhythm, two situations which can relate to Hage's notion of waiting. The presence of this perceived absence is essential to the claim of this chapter. The temporalities of suspensions such as waiting, queuing, expecting or, imagining are full of action, the sort of action that exceeds the temporality of presentness. Let us take utopic or dystopic imaginations, for example. Waiting for a better future or for the worst scenario, respectively, share the same sense of rhythm and temporal knowledges surrounding their conceptions. They follow a linearity

moving towards a sense of progression. For better or for worse, they are oriented towards a future and they are bound to time as reproductive of singular scenarios. Historical narratives follow this rhythmic sense of archive generation. New ways of materialising time can engage in excessive temporalities, as a counterpart to singular temporal outcomes, while they also address their dressage. New archives conformed by different temporalities can also involve a radical form of generation of experiential alternatives.

5.   Renounce announcements: Archives.

What's the connection between the archive and the question "Where are you from?"? Martin F. Manalansan indirectly poses this question when speaking about the potentiality of queerness as a mess. Departing from an ethnographic approach of the observation of a group of six queer undocumented migrants in NY, Manalansan writes about the disentanglement of certain stereotypes often attached to queer POC experiences. In his analysis of these housemate bondings, Manalansan uncovers the ways in which fixed ideas of categorical subjective moves, such as those linked to migration or queerness, are also present in the reproduction of the official way of archiving. Returning to the question at the start of this section, Manalansan writes that "'Where are you from?' is the question posed to the foreigner, the noncitizen, and the queer. It comes from a power-laden state-centred vantage that demands a fixed reference, origin, or provenance from anyone seeking recognition." (2014: 103). Giving a fresh vision of the *documented* lives in archives, he states that archives attend to institutional aspects of the subject, either in their officiality or their divergence. As Manalansan explains above, archiving is granting certain structures, already present, or presenting them as fitting inside its narrative, as the question 'where are you from?' forwards. The question does not seek an answer but a commitment without a necessary consensus of fitting the interlocutor into one's discourse. Manalansan returns to authors such as Derrida, to speak about the sense of order through the archive, and thus historicity processes for collective memory,

Archives are vested with authority, as Jacques Derrida has astutely pointed out in *Archive Fever*, in terms of ordering time and space and storing. Robert Vosloo, in a critical reading of Derrida's work, reemphasizes the need to recognize the archive not only as a site of power but also as a vantage for promoting social justice and ethical responsibility. Such responsibility involves an "openness to the future" and a recognition of the limitations and exclusionary impulses of state and other institutional archives that seek to "officialize" and tether historical knowledge or understandings of the past in terms that do not engage with views from below. Following Vosloo, this essay is a way to center the lives and spaces of the Queer Six to promote a more sensitive and nuanced understanding of queerness and migration by upholding a particular notion of an archive enmeshed in clutter and disarray. (*Ibid*)

The mess, the queer, the messy queerness and the queering tanglement get recognition via the diffraction that Manalansan performs through the queer six (the group of subjects of Manalansan's research). I intentionally use *recognition* away from its usual connotations of *visibility* or *signification*. Following identity politics as a close example, some readings of *recognition* are directed to making visible, being significant/signified and/or being understood for interpretation. Along these lines, even if these concepts are taken as correlative in critical studies (recognised-visible-significant-understood), the acknowledgment of someone's experience here deviates from their entering a specific set of signification. This is the point where Manalansan breaks with the officiality of the archive, recognising wayward cohabitations without making these lives fall into the evidence of the archive. Or to put it very simply, the messy archive cannot be commodified under regulating records. This impossibility is not related to futile devices, but rather to its going beyond the opposition between "refusal" or "engagement" and standing in their excess, their messiness. As he writes, the look is posed "to gesture to the workings of chaos, mess, and morass in ways that deflect simplistic questions of origins, functions, and value as part of a queering of the archive." (2014: 104). It exceeds the questions that track down one's life, document it while undocumented. It does not engage in binary understandings of being visible or invisible. The impossibility of messiness has its own movement. It

moves *weyond*, terming the beyond in a plural pronoun. It unfolds "new ways of understanding history from below and fosters more expansive notions of queerness and migration (...) unfolding new vistas for what is significant and (im)possible for building new coalitions around immigration and queer issues" (2014: 105). In addition, this impossibility exposes the multiplicity and multilayered experiences to be taken into account in the archive. This impossibility, which is not one, follows up other movements involved in this critique, such as practices of translation. As Jacques Lezra explores this through the concept of *untranslatability which- is-not-one*, which accounts for untranslatability as a way of resistance,

> The notion is paradoxical in some of the ways in which Luce Irigaray's famous title is – *Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un*, translated into English as *This Sex Which Is Not One:* not a sex; not a single sex; not a phallically single sexual organ but lipped, more-than-one-thing ones. (2017:2)

Untranslatability is in a tandem with impossibility because of their untraceability. Impossibility is not one and only, even if reframing the sense of ontologic terms used in our studies, theories and approaches. It speaks of fragments that are kept from dislodging, of units of entities working at once.

As explored in *The Practicing Refusal Collective* by Saidiya Hartman and Tina Campt, negation can be, in fact, a potential force of finding alternatives to one's own experience. As Campt explains from this potentiality in negation "the decision to reject the terms of diminished subjecthood with which one is presented, using negation as a generative and creative source of disorderly power to embrace the possibility of living otherwise." (2019).It is interesting how the focus in these propositions stands in connection to experiences, from that phenomenology of the self, rather than tracing the stability of identity. Identity is held in its radical importance as a centrality to one's embodiment which changes and shapes differently in time, space and relationality.

Returning to Manalansan and the queer six case, documented archives take a double bind meaning. Manalansan's anti-officalising move tries "to avoid normalizing

notions about the relationship between persons and things" (2014: 104). By dialoguing with Sara Ahmed's idea of *phenomenology* (2006) and José Esteban Muñoz's *ephemera* (1996), Manalansan reclaims a new vision of queerness even inside academic studies. Manalansan uses these elements to speak about queer negativity and messiness. He posts remote ways of envisioning queer experience, breaking with the official and normative understanding of the good queer. Through the analysis of the experiences of the undocumented queer six, he engages in communalities without kin, bonds that go beyond desire. These new images collect edging experiences and manage to break with the stereotype of queers as caring, queer-kin, affective, desirable and desiring subjects. The way six people engage in life having to remain in cohesion is not only about resistance. It is a question of the relation to matter, as in an archive. *Where are you from?* is rejected here not only because it entails a most controversial exposure of undocumentable experiences, but rather because it loses its meaning when understanding extra-official ways of being in life and the impossibility of grasping singularity in experiential answers. Quoting Esteban Muñoz, Manalansan writes,

> ephemera go against pre-established disciplinary formations of evidence since it speaks to illegibility and lack of clarity. Ephemera are to some extent about mess and clutter — of seemingly disposable and trivial stuff. Finally, ephemera, he elegantly offers, are about "traces, glimmers, residues, and specks of things (2014: 105; Muñoz, 1996)

Alterations in the archive represent new temporalities that go beyond the "no future" of privileged understandings of queer divergences (Edelman, 2004). The futurity of messiness is not tied to fixed categories that are instrumental to productive archives and fulfil them. An archive should serve not only as a cultural memory, as in *past*, but also as construction of our ideas of temporality, as in *progress*, as in *rhythm*, as in *disjunction*, as in *significance*. In my opinion, Manalansan exposes quotidian practices of signification in which material cultures and non-living agents are agential to the construction of the archive. Chronotropic archives of everyday practices are held to situatedness. They are a performative steadiness of a recollected experience. They are

only stable from their time-place-relational location. They are significant when we claim their performative activation. They fold and unfold continuously. They are both embodied and ephemeral. These archives are insignificant because they refuse to be fixed into established positionings. In this sense, they are insignificant but not irrelevant. Muñoz analyses the queer('s) archive in disruption, writing that

> While seriously engaged in establishing an archive of queerness, it simultaneously disrupts the very notion of officially subsidized and substantiated institutions (....) It is not an image that is epistemologically framed and grounded, but, instead, is performatively polyvalent. The fundamental indeterminacy of the image made me feel that its ephemerality and its sense of possibility were profoundly queer.
>
> Central to performance scholarship is a queer impulse that intends to discuss an object whose ontology, in its inability to "count" as a proper "proof", is profoundly queer. (1996: 6)

The impossibility is framed into inability, a loss of control from discursive infrastructures. Halberstam's *failure* connects with this idea, since the inability to fulfil a proper proof, for the queer archive, is a possibility of escaping its reproduction of the stability and normativity it criticises. Hence, the impossibility becomes a possibility. Escaping from commodifying visibilities and intelligibilities, Muñoz uses ephemeral acts as transitional testimonies of queer existence and as defeating institutional "rigour-mortis". Muñoz defines his use of ephemera as "linked to alternate modes of textuality and narrativity like memory and performance: it is all of those things that remain after a performance, a kind of evidence of what has transpired but certainly not the thing itself." (1996: 10). This evidence is related more to the method than to the solidity of the "the thing itself". As Muñoz recalls from Raymond Williams, the object in our analyses is mediated by "tropes of emotion and lived experience that are indeed material without necessarily being 'solid.'" (Williams in Muñoz, 1996:10). In the diffraction modality my analysis takes, ephemera is here merged in the way in which the second chapter (first case study) uses concepts as methodologies.

When looking at the untraceability and the impossibility of a reunited archive, time also comes into question as another element which fixes historical narratives under very particular patterns. In a divergent account of physics, time represents an impossibility regarding its constitution as an organising element while being consumed as an ontological material. Thus, time seems naturalised. In his account of untraceability and the impossibility of translations, Mark Rifker speaks about "temporal sovereignty" which he explains as

> [T]he effort to track the force exerted through processes of temporal recognition (including the insertion into dominant periodization schemes, treatment of Native opposition as an eruptive aberration, reorganization and privatization of personal development, reorientation toward the market economy, and subjection to anachronizing models of Indian realness) while envisioning Native being and becoming as nonidentical to these imposed frames of reference, even as Indigenous temporalities are affected and shifted by such colonial imperatives. (2017:179)

Rifker calls on Ahmed's *Orientations* in order to offer a glance of what this sovereignty might look like. His thought takes us to a reconsideration of ways of being and ways of being seen, embracing opacity and invisibility, in their connection to impossibility and negativity as they deviate from common representationalism, as strategies of resistance. What cannot be consumed by the white experiences is already targeted as duff. In Rifker's words, this impossibility is connected to untranslatability, and that is primordial to this particular application of decolonial framings of temporalities. At this point, untraceability and untranslatability speaks about that stereotyped "epistemological opacity (...) rather than (*viewing these alternative temporalities as*) material expressions of another mode of reality with its own dynamics and temporality/ies, including that of prophecy." (2017: 144; *my clarification*).

The above takes me to Sara Ahmed's account of a queer phenomenology. Ahmed invites us to different readings of officialised moves in social lives. In their reading of Merlau-Ponty, Ahmed stresses the messiness that we see in Manalansan and the queer six as a disruptive alternative for otherwise-experiences. The messy stuff that Manalansan references in alternative archives connects through his reading of Ahmed with Ponty's critique to the theory-centrism, in which the value is given to the way something is consumed and becomes knowledge and not the entity's experience in itself. As Ahmed reads from Ponty, "the intellectual experience of disorder, but the vital experience of giddiness and nausea, which is the awareness of our own contingency and the horror with which it fills us' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 296 in Ahmed, 2006: 4).

While addressing negative dialectics in Franz Fanon's work, Ahmed achieves a critique which acknowledges communality without falling into the trap of docile subjectivities. With this, I mean that even if common arenas of actions are desired or needed in many experiences, mainly those traversing racial, gender, ability and class orderings, Ahmed remains critical about assuming these bodies as already docile, disempowered or kin to kinship. As we see in Manalansan's analysis, this is already a fantasy driven by exclusionary practices, where the other is either isolated and fishy or communal and complacent, caring, efficacious. As Ahmed reads from Fanon,

> [T]he experience of negation, of being stopped or feeling out of place, of feeling uncomfortable at home, does not "stop" there. It is around such experiences that bodies gather, getting together, acting, refusing this inheritance of whiteness, refusing even the desire to follow that line. We learn this from Fanon's phenomenology of being black. By accounting for the "I cannot," for the body that is stopped or held up, we also attend to the condition of possibility for the emergence of a collective form of activism. We act by collecting together such moments of being held up and being held back (2006: 155)

Negativity also takes distance from normative productions of time(s). The linearity of past present and future is distorted by this alternative frame. Still, memory and the archive, and potentiality and horizons, are possible. This is made available through new considerations of the connection between these temporal lines, involving past and future not as cause-effect but rather as intra-dependence. After all, time is also constituted from an anthropocentric dimension within an ideology of human exceptionalism. Here, from an antiracist and decolonial perspective, Ahmed reorients temporalities by dislocating them. Returning to the future can mean, quite simply, going back to new pasts. In her words,

> [O]nce unsettled it might be impossible to return, which of course means that we turn somewhere else, as a turning that might open up different horizons. Oddly enough, it is the backward glance that confirms the impossibility of this return, as we face what is behind us. You go back, to move on. (2006: 155)

This dizzying of time that Ahmed articulates also serves as a way of unravelling certain affects from the illusion of ontologic and intrinsic ways of a body's action and reaction. In Ahmed's proposals negativity is not linked to a melancholic position but rather insists on the normative and compulsory ways we are taught to feel (Ahmed, 2010). This is particularly interesting because, although from sociological and anthropological perspectives ontology and epistemology are often separated, the affective dimension of lives breaks such separation.

Ruha Benjamin has explored the effects of the coexisting pandemics of anti-black police violence and COVID-19 (2022). In her initial analysis, still during the lockdown period, Benjamin insisted on the approach towards affective theories, acknowledging affects and emotions not as intrinsic values of the human body, but rather as actions that have very much to do with someone's agency. Benjamin's reading is essential for me since it breaks human exceptionalism and speaks about the affective constructions that we are compiled in. Thus, in an imaginary conversation between Ahmed and Benjamin, I read affectivity disruptively, granting affects a life of their own and also a cultural structure that locates them. I read Benjamin's work as

negative optimism since she writes that "hope, joy, love, aren't simply things to FEEL. They are things to DO." (2020: webgrafía).

How we feel and the emotions which emerge in our personal experiences are political. Thus, they can also become actions of resistance. Such is the case with hope when used by Jonathan Lear in his move beyond optimism or pessimism. Lear speaks about a beyond positioning, related to precarious and violated experiences such as those of first nation communities. Such experiences can overcome the simplifications of negativity or positivity, adapting to new realities while remaining critical of the violences suffered in these forced changes. As Lear writes,

> What makes this hope *radical* is that it is directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is. Radical hope anticipates a good for which those who have the hope as yet lack the appropriate concepts with which to understand it. (Lear, 2008:103).

The illegibility, the lack of significance, the negativity of discourse, are here performed by disrupting affectivities. They are disrupting because they lead to different timings, rhythms and temporal hiatus, without an enclosed signifier or signification. Affects are *in* negative because their side B speaks about their activation and not their nature. They are in connection to different time locations without a discourse that complies with their understanding. Muñoz's horizon is, indeed, a happening, a performance of ephemeral enaction that unfolds a transitional sense of the notions used in these pages. The radicality of *radical hope,* as I have explored in one of my previous research dissertations, "is related to a situated understanding of hope which, rather than disrupt the material conditions of its contexts, exceeds them, maintaining the consciousness of its own location." (2018b).

In the resistance from tracking down what a body feels- including a range of corporeal experiences, disabled, racialized and queered inhabitations of the flesh (Wong, 2020), is reframed. Along similar lines, hope is also used to break free from hetero-normed futures, as Jack Halberstam theorises. Halberstam uses *queer failure* as a radical concept to criticise the "Heteronormative common sense [*that*] leads to the

equation of success with advancement, capital accumulation, family, ethical conduct, and hope" (2011: 89).

Reminder: "Normalcy is the *evil* side of homosexuality".

Jack Smith.

Queer negativity is connected to the refusal to fit inside any kind of mould. The normalcy which haunts the queer experience watches over the subject of its interest as its possible ingestion. In Halberstam's view the act of failure is a choice, a refusal, a manifestation of queer existence (Halberstam in IPAK Centar, 2014). Hence, the refusal of normalcy is much deeper than a simple rejection of the norm, of the assimilationist project of normalising queerness. It is a rejection of power, an embrace to failure as a way of success through non (re) productive forms of being in life. As Michael Warner exposes when accurately explaining how the concept of normality is already a deviation of actual identitarian facts, since no one can completely fit inside its ideal, the importance of pointing out the specific connection between normality/normativity and power is clear when he writes "[t]he history of the movement should have taught us to ask: whose norm?" (1999: 59).

Queer as a range of realities links to the ambiguity not only of its form but from an ontological view, where identity is both a recognition of the body as well as the norm that we should fly off from. Thus, queer theory, in all its possibilities, needs constant revision of critical theories so as to situate it in a context that frames a time, a location and the relations that occur in it. Queer theory poses similar questions to identity politics but the answers to these questions are radically different. Because of the openness of its responses, queer theory positions in a more frictional understanding of identities. Identities are seen as free bodies capable of escaping the demonised norm and also as marked ones, that can be the same bodies that in the former contexts are capable of refusal and in others have a need to respond to the materiality of their situation.

This is the position I want to stand with, a frictional response "beyond the 'binary stalemate' of having to choose between resisting the hegemonic fantasy of the homosexual or acceding to it" (Nyong'o, 2008:107). As Nyong'o does while speaking up the multiple critiques of the sometimes normative application and approaches that queer theory establishes, I have a special interest in these counter theories that stand next to/against/behind/before the beloved Queer. Following this assimilation of negativity and failure in our own forms of life as queers, my interest in this application is also on examining how forms of power, hierarchies, violence, normativity and oppression can also be found in critically constructed places. As the critiques to white queerness have brought to the surface, the singularity from which identity is consumed is problematic since it evicts certain subjectivities from a continual revision of their own positioning in the world. In Cathy Cohen's words, the "concern, instead, is with any political analysis or theory which collapses our understanding of power into a single continuum of evaluation" (1997: 452).

When thinking about the (re)production of bodies in societies to attend to national forces and power structurations, negativity is easier to understand in connection to the queer radical project. Insisting on the critical element in this queerness, negativity is directed towards many stances where productivity is framed, like natalism, patriotism, work, colonialism and rhythm, to name but a few. From an anarchist view of queerness as negativity, Nova Ishtar Daggers-Drawn writes:

> Queerness is not a contribution to this society but the negation of one of its colonial dimensions– the cisheteronorm. This dimension is the capture and capitalization of human bodies to create pairs that will reliably generate individuals who can be subsumed to the needs of productive forces. These ideal bodies are binarized, heterosexual, white, able, and educated– that is, they are domesticated. (2019: 5)

The liberation of temporal accomplishments, such as the idea of future that entangles many other subjectified notions, is taken as a central pillar to work through these otherwise refusal perspectives. In connection to antiracist and de-colonial direction to these negative hopes, impossible futures and detained realities, to refuse is attached to

disjoined temporalities. They are disjoined from official moves towards the future in obvious accounts and uses of the past. To refuse these localised rhythms is to acknowledge that archives, in their preservationist form, can dispossess many other pasts. To archive is not only to select (and hence to leave out). Archiving means the validation of certain moves towards how to preserve something, someone somehow. These disjoined temporalities are, nevertheless, activated, but not completely understood, translatable or graspable and they work in what Vine Deloria articulates as "time of its own" (1997) when referring to sacred indigenous spaces, that are normally commodified inside temporal notions of futurity preservationist approaches to memory. Indeed, the future is not a container of every potential force, but rather, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos puts it, it is contracted while the present is expanded. In de Sousa's overture we read,

> I propose, in order to combat metonymic reason, a sociology of absences. What does this mean? That a lot of what exists in our society is produced actively as non-existent, and this is why our biggest trap is to reduce reality to what exists. In this way, we immediately share this lazy rationality which in its absence actually produces much of the reality that could be (2006: 23, *My translation*[63])

New ways of temporal accounts of experience and experimental rhythms that work through reason and memory in other ways, taking into account the voids that appear in those processes and engaging in them in a saturated present rather than obsessing with their filling up with futurity. This is what ephemera looks like: it is about allowing it in the present in ungraspable forms of commodifying it. The activation and deactivation of concepts together in an ephemeral phenomenology, on an Ahmed ft. Muñoz, is vocally connected to the whole of this work, and particularly engaged in the first case study.

---

[63] "Propongo, para combatir a la razón metonímica, utilizar una Sociología de las Ausencias. ¿Qué quiere decir esto? Que mucho de lo que no existe en nuestra sociedad es producido activamente como no existente, y por eso la trampa mayor para nosotros es reducir la realidad a lo que existe. Así, de inmediato compartimos esta racionalidad perezosa, que realmente produce como ausente mucha realidad que podría estar presente." (2006: 23. *Original*.)

6. Void as presence and fictional ontologies:

In these multiplications of absences and their multilayered meanings, the void can also be saturated by a presence thought through a temporal futurity. I would like to briefly introduce what I refer to as "fictional ontologies" since it is central to my understanding of art and performance applied to my case studies in the thesis. To claim an absence from the present of utopic other timing saturations is hard to grasp. However, if we think about fiction applied to 'reality', we can start engaging with what potentialities exist through the juxtaposition between these two realms- reality and fiction.

Fictional realities engage the fact that art can be used to understand experiences in different tones; on the other. Fiction is sometimes as real as reality. It is well known by many engaging in critical race studies and antiracist theory, that the use of fiction in black literature can help look for lost genealogies. Such is the case with, for instance, afrodescendent authors seeking for the dreamt "feminist genealogies" and finding it impossible to locate the archives of their ancestors since they were lost because of their enslavement. These circumstances have led many of these authors to use fiction as a site of past exploration. To name only a few, Whitney Battle-Baptiste from an archaeological perspective (2011), or Octavia Butler (*Kindred*, 1979) from a literature background, have shown the many ways in which oral histories, distorted memories, imagined futures and impossible desires constitute much more accurate narratives than historical records in the recovering of the lost archives of people who were enslaved. This is testimony of the importance of claiming history as multivocality and also and it also demonstrates that the way someone narrates, navigates and imagines can sometimes provide more information of that person's experience than the fitting boxes of identity, particularly in the above cases which reduce the sought for subjects to "enslaved identities". In this sense, "fictional ontologies" are meant to use fiction as a site of ontological construction so that ontology is both deconstructed and reshaped. It

is dealt with as yet another site of anthropocentric and white construction of the world, but it is also centred in the importance it has to explain the world in different ways.

In the take of these contributions of negativities, impossibilities, voids and avoidances, the transition between the case studies that are constituent of the following chapters has emerged. As in what follows, the concurrence between language interiority that the first case study addresses is connected to the *non-institutionalized but already contained* in a system motions which are entangled in activism. This connection can be understood through void and avoidance that both cases carry in themselves: they are empty in saturated ways. This saturation is directed towards an excess of affectivity in the transition between the second and third case study. This excess, that does not refer to an amount but rather an pervasive affectivity that takes negative affects into account, is in connection to non-human exceptionalism that articulates embodied memories in the third case study. Archivist work in this thesis comes in many forms: it is located and absent at the same time. It works both with material ontologies while giving a central importance to those invented forms of memory that have the potential to speak about the past in pluriversal ways.

1. CASE STUDY 1: Valor y cambio: Contesting power in public art spaces. Liminal p(l)aces, diverting methodologies and observant participation in *Valor y Cambio*[64].

1. Introduction

This chapter diffracts the reading of the *¿Archivo Queer?* from Museo Reina Sofía through the triggering of particular readings which are born by the analysis of the interview with Frances Negrón-Muntaner about the project *Valor y Cambio*.

¿Archivo Queer? is an initiative from the Museum Reina Sofía built by authors and activisms Sejo Carrascosa, Lucas Platero, Andrés Senra and Fefa Vila Núñez. The genesis of this archive was the Research Residencies organised by the Museum in the years 2013 y 2014. Resident to the "Biblioteca y Centro Documentación" of the Museum, the project highlights the importance of counter-archiving and remembering differently, recovering those activist voices which have been neglected until recently. The insistence upon the impact these groups had in the public space was why I chose this case study: art and activism. In conversation with the last case study in which this conjunction between art and activism is performed in a decisive way, we see a sort of artivism in the *¿Archivo Queer?* which reflects upon the space of art as a space of potentiality for subversive experiential accounts.

Valor y Cambio, a project directed by Frances Negrón-Muntaner, which will be explored in the following section, was a project held in Puerto Rico after Huracan María provoked a burst not only of material lacks and loses but also the many subtle ties the USA has over the country. Through this project, the questions of the archive,

---

[64] A large part of this case study was published as an article as "Contesting power in public art spaces. Liminal p(l)aces, diverting methodologies and observant participation in Valor y Cambio." (2021) SOCIOLOGÍA Y TECNOCIENCIA, 1.1: 39-55

decolonial thinking and the importance of connecting the material and the symbolic are main to understand its impact.

1.1 A Cartography of actions.

"What power epistemologies are confined inside concepts?". This was the first question that came to mind when wondering on a starting point for this chapter. Although inspired now by the Covid-19 aftermath, the idea has indeed been part of my research since long ago and it is, actually, imbued in the analysis of the limits of theories and genealogies conducted in the preceding chapters. It is my intention now to explore in a most concrete way how the methodological part of our research practices unfolds in itself as a theoretical landscape to explore in this particular case study.

As I am kin to do, I want to recall a memory. It was during a feminist theory seminar I attended six years ago that I first had the opportunity to problematise the use and abuse of the most influential critical concepts. I insist upon the fact that this moment represented an opportunity, since, after many years of theoretical studies, practical application and personal experiences, I was able to face academic research from an ethical integrity attitude. The group's opinion at the time was that these concepts were intrinsically associated with the "big names" who had coined them, and that the resulting conceptual architecture was built on power and privileged chronotopes. This, together with the immutability of the concepts themselves, generated our suspicion of our mechanical use of such concepts in our own research. In a sort of time trade, the experience also triggered a process of reflection, which has eventually given birth to the present contribution.

Two other considerations have been added to this discussion since. One: that when we conduct research we often neglect the colonial epistemologies embedded in our sources of reference; and two: that we assume certain configurations as naturally

rooted in the concepts we employ, which, in turn, may have a distorting effect on the transference of research results to the arena of social activity and political motions.

This chapter, therefore, sets out from the conviction that concepts are more than mere passive agents helping us explain the world we are immersed in. The way we put concepts together does not only unpack them as methodologies but also gives them a space and a place for recognition, a point of departure for a new (con)figuration. It is my opinion that only by choosing to break with monistic/centric (con)figurations of concepts can we progress towards a real decolonization of epistemologies and, hence, embrace a constellation of methodologies we may refer to as "eccentric". They are eccentric since they do not occupy the centre by standing there stagnantly. Rather, they function by diffractive patterns that speak more about cartographies of action than about static border maps.

Inspired by the above, the present chapter examines Frances Negrón-Muntaner's *Valor y Cambio* installation/experience as a case study on counter-hegemonic narratives and diverting/eccentric methodologies for social and academic change. Among other aims, in this case study I intend to explore new gender approaches to material culture[65] and to the decolonisation of cultural epistemologies and spaces[66] so as to deconstruct art spaces as containers of cultural concepts.

This chapter presents my response-able three-month long observant participation of *Valor y Cambio* as a public space transnational installation. Attending to the significance of spacing and also taking the cue from the queering of temporalities (Esteban Muñoz, 2009; Berlant, 2011), it is my intention to re-conceptualise these spaces as what I would term "liminal p(l)aces". It is from this vantage point that we can contemplate present contexts by breaking rigid chronologies and opening up, in turn, the possibility of revisiting public art spaces and art education disciplines as

---

[65] Following González Marcén et al., 2012; Alarcón García y Sánchez Romero 2015 among others.

[66] Following Lugones, 2008; Mezzadra, 2012; Rizvi, 2018.

eccentric forms of social transformation. New understandings of materiality and material cultures can, indeed, lead to new collective forms of transgressive living, with the generation of new knowledges emerging from the decolonizing and liberation of urban spaces and with projects of circular economy, such as the one under investigation here. By making room for multifarious identities and positions, the active engagement of "life otherwise" (Gómez-Barris, 2018) is reactivated, reshaped and materialises in the political imagination of the people who happen to affect and be affected (Barad, 2014).

In my connection to disciplines concerning the narratives of the past[67], I delve into material culture and cultural artefacts to see their potentiality for unlocking *otherwise* narratives. This chapter conveys the specific enquiry into the epistemic assumptions from which academic material is created and into how it expands in all directions and temporalities. As I have already questioned in the previous chapters, disciplines concerning history engage into specific epistemologies. The way *we* look at history, at its material culture, from traditional archaeology and history disciplines, also proves the epistemic belief that concepts are intrinsic to situations and that meaning is prior to action. As has been examined in the methodology, decolonisation is not a metaphor but rather a praxis (Tuck and Yang, 2012). Engaging in the need to decolonise knowledge and following Gayatri Spivak's arguments (1988), Uzma Rizvi talks about "epistemic injustice and violence", which she relates to the "construction of a colonial hermeneutic" (2018: 56). It is, therefore, necessary to bring action into discussions on knowledges in order to attain epistemic justice and such action can be attained by reimagining concepts as methodological locations.

1.2 Presenting the case study.

Created by Frances Negrón-Muntaner, writer, film-maker, professor of cultural studies and coordinator of both the project and the Center for the Study of Ethnicity

---

[67] In Art History and Archaeology.

and Race (CSER) and with the collaboration of artist Sarabel Santos Negrón, *Valor y Cambio* was conceived in 2019 as "a story-telling, community-building, and solidarity economy project [which] is out to spark a broad conversation about what is a just economy and how to foster collective empowerment in the face of austerity and neoliberal policies locally and nationally" (https://www.valorycambio.org/abouttheproject).

The project, which started in Puerto Rico, was launched with the circulation of its own currency, conceived as a tool for exchange and transformation within the community at all levels. These "pesos of Puerto Rico" were dispensed from an ATM-style machine and different Puerto Rican personalities, such as activists, educators, athletes or communities, feature on them. In order to access the pesos, people had to answer questions about what they valued. They could then choose to extend their participation in the project by continuing the circulation of the currency by exchanging the pesos for products or services, or they could just keep the pesos as a cultural memento of the figures they featured.

After the initial Puerto Rican phase, the project was intended to come to Harlem in the Spring of 2020 as a collaboration between Columbia University and the New York and Harlem City Councils and I had planned my visit to Columbia so as to conduct my observant participation in this phase. However, Covid-19 made its unexpected appearance instead and with it many things changed. The structure of my research has to be adapted as a consequence of the new circumstances. The result was in itself queerly eccentric, since it got me into peripheral practices. My initial goal was the examination of how *Valor y Cambio* could have a transformative impact/affect upon: 1. the academic unit participating in it, the Media and Idea Lab (MIL) within the Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race (CSER) at Columbia University; and 2. the city of New York and the Harlem neighbourhood in particular. However, with Covid, research became an action that had to depart, now more than ever, from my own position. Faithful to my main goals of unpacking my practices and remaining self-critical, I became involved in two singular projects. The first one was my contribution to a series of films and videos, "Days With(in)", a joint project developed by Columbia

University students attending Prof. Frances Negrón-Muntaner's "Video as Inquiry" course at CSER in the Spring 2020. In it we reflected upon quarantine, self-isolation and an inquiry into new futures. The second one was the interview/conversation with Negrón-Muntaner on *Valor y Cambio* which inspires this chapter and how the project tackles the concepts I am researching into (2020b).

Nevertheless, the triggering research questions which have guided me through this case study, and which I explore in this chapter, remain the same as intended before the pandemic started. They are questions such as: Is academic direct-action possible? Can we talk about a conceptual turn in academia towards active/eccentric methodologies? What does non-binarism imply in this turn and/or as a concept when trespassing the dichotomy gender/space (Preciado, 2014)? And throughout the discussion of the meaning of power: could this trespassing be approached as a disruption of both, a *beyond*, the horizon of Spinozian "potentia" which may also be embedded in "potestas" (Weheliye, 2014)?

Plans and intentions had to give way under the pressure of the sudden transformation of our lives with Covid. I, like anyone in a housing situation, had to take shelter within the limits of the domestic space. I realised that the new situation was disturbing the basic premises of the social divisions of space and of cultural public representations which had originally inspired me to undertake a research experience on public art spaces at Columbia University and the City of New York. What came next was the unexpected generation of public conversations and joint creation during the times within and under the constraints of the private.

1.3 "Valor y Cambio" and the radical idea of active concepts.

In the context of this visit- and of the enormous inspiration that Frances Negrón-Muntaner's work has meant to my own research- the following section analyses some fragments of the interview/conversation I had the opportunity to engage in with her on 29 June 2020 and which you can find transcribed here as annex 1. The

fragments I close-read and discuss here touch upon social problematics and their possible solutions through *artivism*[68]. They engage in the contradictions researchers involved in critical theories have to deal with when confronting the tensions between academic production demands and our desires to deconstruct the foundations of these ways of knowing. The fragments selected tackle this conflict and discuss possible transformations in a search for new horizons to move towards.

Before analysing the encounter, let me start by exploring the roles played by "eccentricity" and Karen Barad's diffractive shift in the re-activation of concepts I propose in this chapter. Barad's diffraction can help problematize the centrality of concepts and the mindset which legitimises them according to the logics of maps, whose borders validate some of them while excluding others. I propose that the logics of cartographies can help replace exclusive borders with inclusive liminality and that a diffractive approach to the use of concepts inside hegemonic spaces, such as academia, can trigger their radical transformation into actions. Following Trinh T. Minh-ha's (1990) rejection of the levelling out of differences conveyed by hegemony, I maintain that concepts as actions, and within actions, can unleash translocutions, transfluctuations and translocations of performativity.

Translocution involves a diffraction of the notion of space and a re-configuration of the concepts of maps and borders. It opens up understandings of spaces as eccentric cartographies which involve the eliciting of their performance of power. Thus, on the one hand, from the stance of critical theory this article uses space to engage with situated knowledges (Haraway, 1988; Csordas, 1994). On the other hand, material locations are reconceptualized here through an approach to physics as hypothetical simultaneous possibilities, or in Barad's terms, a quantum superposition of potentialities (2014).

---

[68] *Artivism* refers to the joining of the two concepts of art and activism, dealing with practices of political and social change and agitation which are held through art practices.

In this trend, I reject physics as the study of what *there is* and I propose a transgression of the ontology of this concept. In a similar vein, I reject the idea that one should just limit oneself to the act of *speaking* about paths of knowledge rather than taking action on them. It is as if the material part of existence would blur into the fluidity of postmodernity, into all its misleading words as momentum reactions with no consequences[69]. In this sense, my formula would be to use an onto-epistemological approach so as to break free from "geometries of absolute exteriority or interiority [...] remaining resolutely accountable for the role 'we' play in the intertwined practices of knowing and becoming" (Barad, 2003: 802).

From here, I move on to a consideration of *p(l)ace*. I use this concept in order to show the intersections between *place* and *pace*, interwoven in the title of this article, as the blending of matter and consciousness, a junction of space and its inner rhythms. The practices of concepts have to start articulating the performative part of their "becoming", a queer becoming, serving as a tribute to José Esteban Muñoz's queer horizons, words that combine and transition with no need for fixed arrivals. This understanding and use of 'becoming' has the potentiality of performing specific actions that are both evolving and located.

Following the arguments outlined above, another aspect in the dismantling of centrality is the urgent need to pay attention to the multiciplicity of meanings in language. Concepts exist because they are articulated through language. Their polysemy gives them a potentiality for manifold uses and relationalities. As language, concepts are both located and can (re)locate and in this sense language plays tricks on us. Take for instance the concept of *identity*, which derives from the Latin *identificare*, a combination of two terms: identicus + -ificare (equal + to fix). The connotations of

---

69 Let me illustrate this thought with the following example: We are constantly told by scientists, that the essence of science is impossible for "us" to access. In this sense, this "us" refers to "others", the uninvited guests to academic research and practices dictated by scientific powers whose hegemony depends on exclusion. This exclusion cannot be attained without the use of a specific type of language, encrypted to everyone other than the scientists who designed it.

fixation, stasis and permanence are evident in the original Latin term while they are covert in the English one. Hence, when using the English language, the concept itself functions as a shield to attempts to enliven it, give it fluidity and movement. Language is, therefore, finally responsible for the way policies based on concepts, such as politics of identity, tend to get stuck in space, time and relationality once the initial motion which generates them is over.

Breaking with a monistic understanding of concepts and choosing their plurality of meaning entails also breaking free from their oppositional usages and resisting their commodification. Just like free radicals, concepts can be used as ramifications which outreach and escape the control of institutions, academic and others. In other words, I question the rhizomatic meanings we encounter in concepts when attending to how they interpelate and are interpelated by the material cultures in which they are used. We can question, for instance, whether we can work through the concept of "anticapitalism" in cases where the concept of economy is itself rooted in logics other than those of accumulation, as is the case with *Valor y Cambio*. It is about decolonizing the concept of economy and its imbrication within the state and the system.

1.4 What do you value? *Valor y cambio*

Valor y Cambio started in February 2019 in Puerto Rico and then was taken to New York, in 2020, partly because of the large Puerto Rican community who have been living in the city for over a century now. It contains more action than many other academic projects. It is a solidarity collaboration between different communities which destabilises what we understand as living in a society. It reappropriates and gives new force to diverse concepts, such as *value* and *exchange*, that give the project its title.

Negrón-Muntaner started by posing the following question to the people participating in the Puerto Rican experience at the first stage of the project: "what groups or persons do you know about that do what you value?" on which she comments

172

> This seemed to be the most difficult question to answer. People participating in the experience responded they did not know anyone that did what they valued, or their answer was *Valor y Cambio*, the experience that they were living through at the moment. (2020b; 5:11-5:23[70]).

The difficulty to respond to the question is not due, in her opinion, to their not really knowing what matters, since, as she explains,

> Most people know what they want but they do not know how they want it. It is amazing that the largest amount [90%], regard education, after family, as the most valuable asset. And they don't mean education as a means for social mobility, they mean education in the sense of their own relation to the world, with themselves and with others. (2020b; 12:50-13:26)

This was an interesting point in the project, because it suggested many aspects from which to depart. As Negrón-Muntaner states, people knew what they valued. It was the how, the means, the method, that they had not thought about. This is exactly what my research was looking for: eccentric thinking, a radical break from hegemonic mindsets for which the end, usually, justifies the means. I wondered about the commitment of the participants, particularly those involved in public education. As she explains,

> I realised that the teachers and students from schools in Puerto Rico had come in an autonomous way [….] What we did was two workshops of forty educators each and it was amazing because they rapidly saw the possibilities of using the exchange notes as a way of involving the whole school in the education process.

---

70 Subsequent references to the interview are indicated as Negrón-Muntaner (2020b), followed by the minutes in the recording.

Some of these teachers have other ecological projects or other types of projects that integrate different subjects. (2020b; 7:07- 9:15)

Teachers perceived *Valor y Cambio* as an educational methodology in itself, or as I read it, a making of connections, not only between people and their experiences, but also between different realms of knowledge.

The fact that Puerto Rico has been and still is "a Caribbean Archipelago that has been subject to US colonial-capitalist rule for more than a century" (Negrón-Muntaner, 2020a: 171), has political specificities that also impact the project. Negrón-Muntaner comments on the way politics are differently lived and experienced in Puerto Rico as compared to the USA. In Puerto Rico, she notes, the period of elections is felt many months before they take place, in contrast with the USA, where the tension is concentrated in the last period, only weeks before the event. Hence, her intention was to return to Puerto Rico in 2020 to investigate the changes in the people's consciousness one year after. As she explains,

After the protests [of summer 2019], in one of which one million people participated, new names and groups of people appeared in the scene. Then, I wanted to test whether the new protests scenario had generated changes in the people with respect to those groups who were acting on what they valued. (2020b; 5:25- 5: 46)

With all this in mind, I thought of the connection with the ongoing protests taking place in the USA that erupted after George Floyd's murder at the hands of the police a few weeks before our interview. I wanted to speak about the link between the resistance I perceived in Negrón-Muntaner's project and those protests, both touching, in my opinion, on the concepts that constitute socio-political ways of living, both aiming to transcend official responses and to have an effect on everyday action. Commenting on this, Negrón-Muntaner remarks that the atmosphere of resistance has been growing for a long time, and, more specifically, during the past two years. She

recalls some of the factors that have generated the specific climate and reflects on the importance of language and terminology

The move to rethink justice also includes rethinking the levels of incarceration, police brutality and further rethinking. Another factor is the increase in the understanding of racism as a systemic problem, which is interesting since media has recently been discussing what terminology to use when talking about anti-racist movements. If the catchword 10 years ago was *African-American*, the claim now is *Black*. This change is strongly influenced by the BLM movement, a radicalization of perspectives which responds to systemic racism and white supremacy. Regardless of its different shapes, both of these are just as present as they've always been and keep the same roots as before. All of this, added to a situation of economic polarisation, of less options for the youth to access the job market […], and COVID, makes people more conscious of the neoliberal impact on them. And then, George Floyd's murder triggers and explodes it all. There is an interesting thing about Bernie Sanders's campaign concerning terminology and concepts. He offered a vocabulary to speak about what was really happening in the USA which was not accepted by most African-American electors. This means that the category of race and racism is not so much terminology which emanates from class but the way inequality is thought. Sanders spoke about a revolution, an insurrection, but he did so using a vocabulary which could not generate it (2020b; 17:50- 20:48).

Here Negrón-Muntaner touches upon the main concerns of my research: the importance of language and its capability to materialise itself into living concepts. In order to work through these resistances, an important step is the analysis of the way concepts structure our lives and are maintained and sustained through space and time. As she continues, in relation to *Valor y Cambio,*

The project and other projects of the kind […] respond to a need to transition from an economy based on exploitation, accumulation and extraction to one that puts the welfare of the community at its centre [….] The crisis has generated a

number of new mutual-help projects which are not always about creating a social currency, but there are notions that coexist and insist on the need for a transformation. If you speak about capitalism from a colony, your perception and experience of capitalism won't be privileged. You see things that a person in NY wouldn't, because even if you are poor in NY you are in a place of abundance. (2020b; 20:50-22:24)

The concept of economy as used by Negrón-Muntaner, transitioning towards communal welfare, emerges here as an example of what I mean by reclaiming concepts as cartographies of action. Some of its components, such as circular economy or solidarity economy, are activated while others, such as economy as exploitation, accumulation and extraction are discarded. And in this Macarena Gómez-Barris's "life otherwise" (2018) theories come to mind since she proposes an ecological praxis of memories and new understandings of experiencing and materialising pleasurable lives.

Valor y Cambio is a breath of fresh air because it brings about a multiplicity of records, perspectives and experiences. The way economy is perceived from colonies, from neoliberal spaces and from other locations where the concept of economy does not even exist queers the very definition of economy. I see this as a project that also works through imagination, and in this respect I wanted to bring the project's relation to art into the conversation. I suggested to Negrón-Muntaner that Walter Mignolo's division of *Aesthetics* and *Aesthesis* (2010) could be a pertinent parallel to *Valor y Cambio*, since they both go beyond the idea of progress and its connection to futurity maintained by hegemonic aesthetics. Mignolo's division, as I see it, speaks about a type of political imagination that can reconceptualize concepts that are basic to many social structures, such as those of economy or art. In this sense, *Valor y Cambio* had an artistic base from the start, following this idea of political imagination. After researching and asking herself about the best way to introduce the project to the public she realised most people, and in particular activists, were tired of speaking about problematics,

They denied any form of conventional thinking: they didn't want assemblies or meetings. They didn't want to talk to other people doing what they were doing. They said they felt exhausted, they had no energy left and all they wanted to do was continue their work in their communities. I then started thinking of other ways of having these conversations which would not feel like work, which would not drain their energy. The question then was "how to circulate a new currency and with it a new set of ideas and narratives?" [….] There are lots of people who think art can't have that impact, and that's not always so, since in our case art has been an essential component [….] The best thing that can be done is to generate an experience which is not felt as an imposition. (2020b; 24:23-28:46)

The attention to agency, an essential point in the interview when rethinking academic practices and hegemonies, took me back to the times when I was being trained as an art therapist. My work as an art therapist made me see the potentialities of other forms of communication which centrifugate languages towards borderlands (following Gloria Anzaldua, 1987). Alternative forms of communication, such as art, allow for diverse forms of accessibility into the experience conveyed by those languages. Therefore, new artistic figurations provoke new agencies and epistemologies. Along these lines, Negrón-Muntaner suggests that

> [*Valor y Cambio*] demystifies and challenges the idea that art is an elitist experience. It can be, and indeed it is, so if we speak about art hierarchies, Museums and traditional institutions with all their conflicts. However, people also give value to artistic experiences as precious knowledge. In the Puerto Rican context, many people prefer artistic interventions because they value artists more than they do other representatives, such as politicians [….] I have been thinking about that lately. James Baldwin came to mind because he has been forgotten for decades, partly because of his homosexuality, partly because he did not respond to the same hero paradigm as Martin Luther King or Malcom X did. Still, recent transformations in social demands make him an important voice now. Thus, we must preserve these materials, circulate them and make them accessible for future use. We know that the tree may take its time to grow

but this doesn't matter since the process is an ongoing one. (2020b; 32:30-
36:20)

The very idea of the archive is here revalued and re-written from new temporalities. It
lets us speak about its value using it as a power tool. The eternity of the process of
creation, a queer horizon to which the genealogy of knowledge aspires, makes archives
eccentric methodologies because of their disobedience to the idea of progress and
futurity contained in the traditional understanding of genealogies. This, in turn, leads
to a decodification of traditional ways of creating and learning about life and forms of
living, and opens up the experience of what Negrón-Muntaner calls *Decolonial Joy*.
She narrates that when she started the project her idea was to bring "out" what she had
learned from debt

[And] take it to the streets. But, what happened was that the streets provided me
and others with a space to reconsider other things, for example the concept itself
[*decolonial joy*], which I think would not have emerged from my academic work.
It emerged from the space we created and shared (2020b; 38:23-38:58).

Decolonial joy is collective and is a response to a colonial past and present. It enables
very diverse forms of thought,

[*In the designing of the currency*], color [*was*] also very important. Every color
communicates something different. Colour is also loaded with knowledge. It
connotes stories, archives, perspectives, theorizations, actions, emotions, etc.
[….] How people speak and express themselves, not only what they say, is
fundamental for the complexity of thought and action. (2020b; 59:10- 1:02:03)

Inspired by this, I spoke to Frances about my own conflict with the archive since my
own research was not only a result of academic knowledge, but also the outcome of
my relationships. The people I have encountered in my life have embodied and
generated my ideas. Speaking of the way non-academic influences should also be cited

in my work, Negrón-Muntaner reminded me that theories depart from practice. In the case of gender, for instance, she remarks that "movements and the way people theorise about their bodies is where these theories emanate from, not the other way round. Academia organises and links these thoughts" (2020b; 41:42-42:03).

This was a salient issue to me. I mentioned the concept of genealogy and the meaning of heritage, particularly inside the discipline of Archaeology. Responding to this, Negrón-Muntaner explains that one of the principal aims of the project was to generate a new genealogy from the currency notes by displaying historical figures that had been dismissed in the historical narratives coming from Puerto Rico. One of the main groups of figures was the Cordero*s*, a group of siblings who dedicated their lives to education. These sisters were unspecific figures, unknown by the vast majority of their country and this was so because of the way genealogies and historical canons are constructed: while Rafael Cordero's students were boys who then grew up to become literate men and could leave precise records of his life, the 12 sisters' students were girls who, as Negrón explains, "grew up being women and, later on, wives who did not write about their teachers" (2020b; 52:15-52:23), hence the absence of historical records which also extends to the image realm:

> There are no images of these women […] while Rafael Cordero was captured in different paintings[….] The dilemma here was, "what can we do?". We looked for photos and paintings at the time, we did research on Rafael's face and we invented them. It is complicated and generates questions. It doesn't resolve, but at least it opens up questions (Negrón-Muntaner, 2020b; 53:43-54:48)

It is a question of imagination, of political imagination. The situational aporia also unlocks paradoxical forms of knowledge. In this regard, Negrón-Muntaner remembers how emotion and affect was another way to access these new epistemologies. Thinking of other forms of archive, I wondered what potentialities exist inside spaces of recognition, or to translate this thought into Spinozian terms, what *potentia* can be found in *potestas*. In a way, this multiplicity of positions has been pivotal to Negrón-

Muntaner, recognizing divergent genealogies inside academic frameworks. As she recalls:

> Coming from a black genealogy, the archive has been of great importance. Counter-archives have meant a source and basis for the construction of discourses against white supremacy, for example. This is not to say that it is free of contradictions, but it is a strategy for subaltern power [….] How you look at it, how you use it, how you relate it, is key to working through these materials. You see a link in things you hadn't considered previously (2020b; 1:05:23- 1:06:01)

A response-able[71] attitude to genealogy also implies that, as Negrón-Muntaner highlights, the archives must subserve a strategy against hegemony.

1.5 Cartographies of action: Some transitions into new mutations

As illustrated by this case study, and as seen above, we need renewed images, concepts as cartographies of action, which can bring political imaginations to disrupt our hegemonic methodologies. What follows is a summary of the new concepts which emerge from the *Valor y Cambio* experience.

The liminal p(l)ace of contradictions: the private and the public

---

[71] Response-ability is a fragmented term to insist upon the more relational ethics, politics and practices to live in a world which counts with more than humans. The conceptual feminist tradition of the term is sustained by many scholars, such as Donna Haraway (2008), Natasha Myers (2012) or Hayward (2010) and stresses the fact that feminist praxis is related more to learning how to respond than an essentialist idea of being (responsible). In this sense, the way of touching upon practices rather than stagnated identities regarding ethics is what Haraway refers to as "Staying with the trouble" (2016).

To rethink through counter-archives, as Negrón-Muntaner proposes, is a necessary eccentric move in our decolonial practices. Taking response-ability for the genealogy we each depart from is an ongoing process that brings forward continuous contradictions: our different identities from a queerness of the self, the diverse spaces we inhabit and perform, even the conflict that can be found in being a member of Academia, as Negrón-Muntaner recognizes from her own experience. Still, though conflicts and problematics are present, contradictions can become joyful if we manage to provide space for them. Hence, although archives may be generated from inside institutions they can still provoke motions of resistance. The contradictions and frictions of their being outside-within allow for a diffractive space of relations that can enact a "cutting together apart" (Barad, 2014: 176).

As I have introduced in the previous chapters, in a deeper theoretical way, *space* has attracted my attention since I first came to the field of feminism. *Space* as a physical, astrological, social, relational, fictional and figurative scenario. Here I want to put it into action by interrupting the binaric conceptions from where *space* is assumed. Indeed, one of the first claims of hegemonic feminism has been the reclaiming of public space in contrast to the private, read as domestic, sphere. Years have passed since then and a number of situations have taught me that the spaces of militant resistance cannot be limited to this binary division between the private and the public. I now maintain, after militant years of cruising through different feminisms, that identity is manifold and that, therefore, spatial dynamism should not be assumed as delimited but as liminal. This is perfectly exemplified in the case of *Valor y Cambio* which confirms my belief that this binary does not make sense any more. The material and relational intimacies generated by the *Valor y Cambio* experience make the private blend with the public so that the former stops responding to the logics of capital, ownership, accumulation and the latter stops signifying the power of institutions. I propose to call this a *liminal* concept: *anticapital private-spaces of desire*. I find another illustration of this idea in the current antiracist protests taking place in the USA.

These new readings of spaces as liminal takes us to epistemological edges, transversed maps and failure methods of imagining, as Jack Halberstam would put it

(2011: 89). It is an alliance towards a flux of openings, an ejaculation of possibilities, a "potentia gaudendi [....] as an orgasmic force [that does not seek] any immediate resolution" (Preciado, 2008: 38, *my translation*). Liminality leads to eccentricity, dislocating centres and activating cartographies without N-S referential points, transitioning towards the acknowledgment of asphyxia, of combat breathing (Fanon, 1959).

Dislocating temporalities into archives of desire

Combat breathing, or to hashtag it through the actions #ICan'tBreathe, is the urge to identify non-linear temporalities, non-passing reparations, and to accept that violence towards certain bodies keeps going. The current transition from *Black Lives Matter* to *Black Livings Matter* is a move towards accountability in everyday actions and experiences that become accountable. It is also a queering of the temporalities of production since bodies are given meaning outside the production-consumption logic, and are valued for every inch of their flesh (lives) and experience (livings).

In this sense, queering temporalities enables the establishment of new archives, new genealogies, new histories, and thus, new identifications. It is not about a particular destination, but a horizon of desires, an uncessant process. *Potentia* and *potestas*, in the oppositional Spinozian terminology, come into conversation, examining what possibilities open up when reconceptualizing the notion of power itself.

As an Art historian and Artherapist, one of the most important connections I have made in my research and practice has been the constant friction between fiction and reality. History is both the most fascinating imaginative tale and also the best way to approach not only present materialities but also past periods, times and rhythms.

In the defence of an eccentric approach to the archives which give form to what we interpret as our *reality* at present, one of the most engaging methodologies used in *Valor y Cambio* is the new currency with the images of Puerto Rican figures overlooked in history, such as Rafael Cordero's twelve sisters, previously known by

most people as unspecified figures associated with their well-known brother. The exposure of the re-imagined figures of those forgotten sisters is certainly a decisive dissident move towards decolonizing the collective imaginary. The deserved recognition of neglected local agents of change, revolution and organisation, attained by their spotlighting, is essential for Negrón-Muntaner's *decolonial joy* and what Horacio N. Roque Ramírez refers to as *a living archive of desire*. Taking his association of the concepts of desire and archives, I would like to bring up counter hegemonic narratives in order to allude to the messiness and embodiment which I read as main ingredients of counter hegemonic archives (2005). I use this joining, the concept of *archive* with the concept of *desire*, to the resulting conceptualization becomes a transformative affect which could engage communities in more radical ways. Touching upon the activation of concepts, which I have proposed in the methodological chapter, there is a constant proposal of concepts becoming *cartographies of action*.

Beyond aesthetics: Art, material Heritage and linguistic rituals

Transforming the concept of archive also implies a conversion of material culture. Heritage comes into question, and with it the remains of matter that in *Valor y Cambio* shape into a communitarian currency. I have brought about the need to decolonise material heritage by calling on Mignolo's division between *aesthesis* and *aesthetics*. What is recognised as preservable, as artistic, is an assumption of a legitimate and official way of representation, a system that sorts out what is valuable from what is disposable.

Imagination and art concoct differently from the way aesthetics and art do. When art becomes a language, concepts enact affect, and consequently art evolves as a decolonial practice, a constellation of epistemologies communicated via an infinite number of paths. As in Gloria Anzaldúa's *La Frontera*, eccentric forms of knowledge are not always made accessible, but remain in-between experiential codes which do not want transliteration.

This opens the path to a cartography of action which resorts to language as ritual, as repetitive procedures, and, ultimately, in Byung-Chul Han's words "a home in space"[72] (2020, *my translation*). Concepts as linguistic rituals can facilitate fluidity of communication and exchange between bodies, including other than human. They become tokens of recognition, as liminal identities from where to explore life.

PART 2: TRIGGERING.

In the reading and experiential narrative of the case study here explored, there is a triggering of concepts which emerge from it and help me dialogue in a new way with the public-cultural space of the Queer Archive of Museo Reina Sofía.

As I have announced previously, because of the circumstances of Covid-19, my subjugated experience in the project, which was initially planned for my on-site participation, finally took the form of an interview/conversation with Frances Negrón-Muntaner. This final form of connection to the project of *Valor Y Cambio* made me involved and evolved in unexpected ways. My positioning stood towards a generation of tools of action which could conceptually help me disentangle certain ideas from the archive, rather than an experiential resolution, as it was planned in the first place. As I see it now, the conceptual triggering taking place through this situation is in correlation with the derridean understanding of Hauntology. Hauntology is here re-read through the defence of negative notions. This is, I embrace "being haunted" by certain concepts as a *potentia* to reacting and facing the archive in fresh manners. In this movement, there is an impressionist account of experience, acknowledging the affective value of art, which leads to the active considerations of theories throughout my analysis.

Reminder:	For oft, when on my couch I lie
	In vacant or in pensive mood,

---

[72] Los rituales "[s]on en el tiempo lo que una vivienda es en el espacio" (2020, original)

184

> They flash upon that inward eye
> Which is the bliss of solitude;
> And then my heart with pleasure fills,
> And dances with the daffodils.
> William Wordswordth, "I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud", 1802.

As the spontaneous encounter with daffodils in Wordsworth's poem, concepts emerge from the case study of *Valor y Cambio*. The notions that rise from these flashings work as relational frames from where to analyse experience in new ways. The triggering concept in this experience is the notion of value, which is considered outside the signifiers of capital production and worth, and is, by contrast, in connection to the claim of joy. A critical, decolonial, queered and non-normative joy.

I want to engage fully into the representationalist critique in connection to my own research cases. Since I find a specific issue in addressing alternative discourses and concepts as closed solutions to certain issues, it also coexists with the need to activate these alternatives, that as seen above, should be engaged as limited and transitional, ephemeral and radical. This discussion also opens the path to the following case studies, where the dissemination of how concepts are performed in my research has only been clear after finishing the present analysis.

Very often, in critical studies- in which queer and deviant studies may be included- representation and discourse are seen as a forefront category to their analysis. But, above all, there is a certain concern with the intertwine between these construction categories and the ontologies present in different scenarios. Ontologies in extension, as I explain further on, are not simply located in "being" but also include physics as "what there is", engaging in the human trace of the discipline itself; and also epistemologies of "what is meant to be", that already engages in this particular human positioning. In the account of the nature of *queerness*, in which the simplest binary between nature and culture (through the butlerian resignification of sex and

gender) is challenged, the way in which ontology is also differentiated from epistemology is something to be questioned. The representationalism that is sometimes followed should not be taken as a counterpart to what "there is" but rather another way of engaging (in)reality. Also, as I will explore further on, this categorization between ontology and more perceptive angles is a feature of our anthropocentric inheritance, a human mindset of superiority, that makes us delusional. The confusion that happens while thinking we can escape the simplification that representation involves has much to do with an epistemological foundation that lies upon a construction of ontological fantasy that thinks of the human as the discrete entity capable of engaging, and connecting with the "real" and adapting (*to*) it.

It is following these concerns that NM, as a displacement of the human as central to any expression of reality and beyond, are important for my account of the limits of our critiques inside academia as another representational system. In this sense, and as it has been broken up in the previous parts, the representational system here exceeds the cultural articulations that we are used to talking about when speaking of descriptions of the world that happen through art. It is involved in an anti-anthropocentric account that reality and its ontology is bound to our epistemological ways of representing it.

Hitherto, NM have remained contained into brief accounts of their general application. Here, I go deep into the factors that are directly used in my work and that have given many responses to the questions that for me were impossible to handle from established metaphysics.

The poststructuralist shift that Karen Barad takes deep in their work (2007, 2014, 2016) also retakes the conceptualizations about the human, matter, agency and identity. All these new considerations of different world entities become imbricated within the ontological turn present in their work. In their phenomenological conceiving of matter as entangled in discursive expressions, Barad starts by speaking about the inseparability between ontology and epistemology.

Onto-epistemologies, through the application of agential realism, represents the individualistic sense of metaphysics' implosion. In this sense, the combination of these 4 concepts into two groups -ontology and epistemology; and agency and realism- induces the reader to understand the limits of our representationalism in the world. In this trend, Barad and NM will explain how objects and subjects do not precede, *per se,* their interaction, but are the result of their combination and *intra-action-* Barad's main neologism (2007)-. In this application, a series of "taken-for-granted", i.e. ontologized notions, are confronted. Such are the concepts which are intertwined with aspects of space, time and energy, as we can understand from their writing:

> I aim to dislocate the container model of space, the spatialization of time, and the reification of matter by reconceptualizing the notions of space, time, and matter using an alternative framework that shakes loose the foundational character of notions such as location and opens up a space of agency in which the dynamic intra-play of indeterminacy and determinacy reconfigures the possibilities and impossibilities of the world's becoming such that indeterminacies, contingencies, and ambiguities coexist with causality. (2007: 225)

The deviation that Barad encourages through their writings reshapes the analysis of social inequalities and violences, grasping them not as pivotal full existences preconceived to any relation- i.e. essentialized-, but entangled in their inter-play to phenomenological accounts and circumstances, or as they put it, examining them "without the need for the usual anchor to some conception of fixity." (*ibid*). This is key in their keeping politics of locations at the centre of the critique, since this walk away from notions of entities as essentially existing and constituted can be used as in deviating human responsibility and accountability from issues that are located particularly in this exceptionalism and representationalism.

In this reconsideration of the human as the centre of action, Barad also works from that posthumanist tendency that NM engages with, while addressing the particularities that are locked in this new framing. In their analysis of the aftermath of

anthropocentric research and standards, Barad announces other ways of engaging into ontology and epistemology, building into the use of agential realism to "*take* into account the fact that the forces at work in the materialisation of bodies are not only social and the bodies produced are not all human" (*ibid*). As explained in the introduction, there is a large use of Foucault's account on *power* and this remains primordial in my recognition of the works that have influenced my research. Still, there is also a jump towards other considerations and questions which Foucault does not address in his considerations regarding power dynamics, and that are, nevertheless, a central piece of feminist critiques. These are, quite simply, questions regarding *dynamism* and *difference*. As Barad arranges in their own thinking, there is an ambiguity in the assumption in which "the notion of dynamics is a settled and unproblematic concept. Agential realism entails a rethinking of both notions: power and dynamics" (p, 233). The way in which NM regards movement and agency restructures the implications that discursive practices have in feminist theory analysis. As we can see from these applications of other ways of encountering agency, materiality here is more than "an effect or consequence of discursive practices" (*ibid*). This is important at this point because this chapter will be engaging in the reworkings of language and concepts as such. Sometimes these are *puncepts* [73]able to recognize further critiques of the traditional use of the parts involved in this junction, while simultaneously becoming sediment in their own making: concepts as methodologies and puncepts are, at once, rooted and fugitive at once.

A rethinking of not only the author's uses, but also the genealogy of concepts and the specific parts of theories is central to this chapter. Such is the case of the explicit critique of the pre-fixed formulas that certain conceptual turns have used to deconstruct specific epistemologies but, nevertheless, are in need of new rhythms. What I mean by this is that the ways in which post/anti/neo/new are cited here also respond to particular understandings of History and sometimes go beyond the time of

---

[73] A concept which is borned by the pun, the blending, of two other existing terms. In the works by theorists Jaques derrida (1967) or Karen Barad (2014), puncepts represent a main methodological use of concepts.

historical narrative. As such, the insistence upon rhythm becomes structural since it problematises the temporalities which get involved in these conceptual "turns". To track this down, if we think about how the *post* in certain critiques (such as the post used in colonial critique that has been dismantled because of its problematic use as if we were in a parallel dimension to coloniality), correlatively the *new* in *materialisms* is also sometimes taken for granted. Even if Barad and other related theorists are essential for my own work- also given the materialist genealogy I come from- there is also an omissive move in the use of New Materialisms. As in the critique to prefix additions to concepts which sometimes mask conceptual turns which have resisted the use of normative ways of applying concepts, the newness of materialisms works in such a mode, sometimes neglecting the genealogies of otherwise materialism which have existed outside capitalised cultures. In reading Kim Tallbear's work, among other many decolonial scholars who question certain westernised and whitewashed systems of knowledge, she states how

> indigenous peoples have never forgotten that nonhumans are agential beings engaged in social relations that profoundly shape human lives. In addition, for many indigenous peoples, their nonhuman others may not be understood in even critical Western frameworks as living. "Objects" and "forces" such as stones, thunder, or stars are known within our ontologies to be sentient and knowing persons (this is where new materialisms intersects with animal studies) (Tallbear in Muñoz, 2015: 234)

To grasp is to misunderstand. As Tallbear unapologetically warns readers, even from critical positions, white systems and western thinking has to acknowledge the impossibility of experiencing and understanding of entities in indigenous cosmovisions. Here, a step into this critique is to recognize how certain translations involve a fantasy of recognition fulfilment that is, nevertheless reifying other world arrangements. To move beyond a system of epistemic and value control is also to disregard many other systems or ways of being that have followed other paces. Without romanticising the many ways and different forms of social and communitarian organisation, these are not collected inside the dominant and normative institutional

forms that "we" criticise and take for granted as universal forms of life and relationality. Thus, NM is here used inside this politics of location recognition, where the insights towards matter, animals, environmental justice and other non-human forces come from very specific formulations and spaces, which I have encountered within my human experience.

2.1.5 Performing the method: performativity, queerness and the sense of language:

The importance of performativity when it comes to terms of how to activate alternatives of research is a central task in this thesis. It engages more in *a doing* than in a set of prearranged tools. Performativity, in Butler's sense, is generated here through the recognition of the contextual limitations of my own dissertation: concepts are held as methods, and thus, only permeate the time/space/mattering of this thesis. In Barad's words, "Gendering, Butler argues, is a temporal process that operates through the reiteration of norms. In other words, Butler is saying that gender is (...) an iterated doing through which subjects come into being." (2007: 57). Barad engages directly into Butler while reshaping the butlerian tradition and genealogy while using the specific hiatus Butler's performative theory has granted. Barad takes performativity into NM terms through its link to representationalism and the human exception critique that can be developed between Butler's lines. Barad continues addressing the issue exposing how

> It is possible to develop coherent philosophical positions that deny the basic premises of representationalism. A performative understanding of natural cultural practices is one alternative. Performative approaches call into question representatioanlism's claim that there are representations, on the one hand, and ontologically separate entities awaiting representation, on the other, and focis inquiry on the practices or performances of representing, as well as the productive effects of those practices and the conditions for their efficacy (2007: 49)

Performativity, in this applied sense, means quite simply a situated knowledge. Let me explain: performativity comes as the counterplay for other practices of representationalism, which, as Barad writes, are immersed in an outsider's position. The way of engaging in representationalism does not recognize how, at the first step of our accounts, we are already part of that reality we, as researchers, deep into. As Barad explains further on,

> A performative understanding of discursive practices challenges the representationalist belief in the power of words to represent preexisting things. unlike representationalism, which positions us above or outside the world we allegedly merely reflect on, a performative account insists on the understanding thinking, observing, and theorizing as practices of engagement with and as part of, the world in which we have our being (2007: 133)

Outside this anthropocentric representationalism, in which the human is seen as the full entity consuming an external world, performers of thought, such as Barad, make us face how we are already a grammatical part of a world's meaning. We are not the unity of a syntagma, but part of it. Concepts are not full but rather re-emptied and refilled in each of the cases. Words stand in performative positions that, at once, change the whole view but are fragments of the whole. The hole, the whole. Is there a difference?

2.2 From reflective concepts to diffractive applications: Ephemera as a queer conceptual turn.

In my proposal of concepts as methods takes place a ramification of Esteban Muñoz's *Ephemera* (1996). As it has been stated already in the previous chapter concerning the void and negativity, the use of potential markers with impossible traces is interesting

in its rejection of being and becoming commodified. Concepts as method work from this premise, in their distinction between being and becoming. They are at a temporal-space-relationality that cannot be held in time as a sequence. They exceed the present since they also work inside, within and towards other temporal signifiers (such as them having effects or them being affected by other concepts that overcome presentness). At the same time, they reject *becoming* as a site of tracing, coding, stagnating and commodifying. *Ephemera* stains this whole thesis, in that their case studies can only be drawn from this alternative paradigm. Ephemera works from the terminology of negativity, but as the appropriation of our own recognition as fagots and dykes, negativity is here held in an accountable way, not becoming barren but neither symbolizing genesis to inheritance discourses.

I now want to focus on the physical shift that I intend with introducing the performative part to concepts. As I do in the rest of this case study, my main literature are NM theories and in particular Karen Barad's account on queer implementations of quantum physics. I use the particular distinction between reflection and diffraction that Barad accounts for. As they write in their acclaimed article "Diffracting Diffraction: Cutting Together-Apart" (2014)

> While returning might have the association of reflection (how light returns from where it came once it hits the mirror), re-turning, as I hope to develop this notion, is about diffracting. The play here between reflection/returning and diffraction/ re-turning, separated only by the mere mark of a hyphen, is an important reminder that reflection and diffraction are not opposites, not mutually exclusive, but rather different optical intra-actions highlighting different patterns, optics, geometries that often overlap in practice. (184-185; *notes*)

Along these lines, reflection here is abandoned in favour of the specific and multiple effects that a diffractive reading of a concept can delineate (2007: 135)

2.3 From concepts in interaction to concepts that intra-act.

192

The exchangeable positions I twist through certain conceptual theories, such as the case in nomadic subjects (Braidotti, 1994) respond to very specific internal moves. This is, the twist that appears in chapter 3, when diverting from nomadic subjects to subjective nomadities is not only a change in the order, thinking order as timely linear -thus the adjective being sustained through the noun- but rather are responsive to prior conceptual understanding of their use. There is an intra-active shift within the inside that has effects on the whole from outside views. Barad explains this twist through their intra actions theory, explaining how

> The notion of intra-action (in contrast to the usual "interaction," which presumes the prior existence of independent entities or relata) represents a profound conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of the components of phenomena become determinate and that particular concepts (that is, particular material articulations of the world) become meaningful. (2007: 139)

Phenomena is here structured as an impossible ontology, not because of what "it is" but rather because even if being a central fact to intra-active agents, phenomena is also imperceptible, a priori, from the human mindset, since it happens "without a preexistent relation". Phenomena, defined as "dynamic topological reconfigurings I entanglements I relationalities I (re)articulations of the world." (2007: 141) relates phenomena to a performative of things in the world.

It has already been mentioned in other parts the importance of the introduction of relationality when speaking about certain framings in which time and space are analysed as fundamental to the specific setting. The gendered chronotope that Del Valle proposes (1999) is, in this sense, related to Barad's intra-actions (2007), as already specific ways of naming the intra-dependence of entities. Sara Ahmed does her rounds when reading intra-dependency reading of intra-dependency through her queer phenomenology project. As it has been introduced in the previous chapter, Ahmed seeks to engage into a specific queer experience, writing,

Neither the object nor the body have integrity in the sense of being "the same thing" with and without others. Bodies as well as objects take shape through being orientated toward each other, as an orientation that may be experienced as the co-habitation or sharing of space.

Bodies are hence shaped by contact with objects and with others, with "what" is near enough to be reached. Bodies may even take shape through such contact, or take the shape of that contact. What gets near is both shaped by what bodies do, which in turn affects what bodies can do. (2006: 54)

In this analysis of orientations, Ahmed looks for a redirection of queerness and queers the directions towards this project. The matter of history, of knowledge and of experience remain entangled, unfolding significatory excess, marking orientations and intra-dependencies as ways of unblocking otherwise happenings. This is, with these entanglements, another kind of knowledge about "what there is" and "what has been" is enacted, beyond the limits of discursive practices and intellectual significations. As she reflects, "Orientations are about the direction we take that puts some things and not others in our reach." (2006: 56), inscribing phenomenology as a new site for queer realities (connection to onto-epistemologies). In a fictionalised connection to Richard Fung's *Orientations* (1984)[74], Ahmed opens up towards a phenomenological account for intimacy as a groundbreaking of globalised schemes of applying certain notions. In the case of Fung's research, it speaks up about the specificity of the Aasian sexual consumption, not as mere pornographic material but more as the idea that leaks through the notion that "gay people are white people" (http://www.richardfung.ca/)

In the sense of space direction, and following the importance towards "orientations" that queer geography highlights (Bell and Valentine, 1995), Ahmed's use of the concept becomes a site to reinscribe the importance of phenomenology

---

74 meaning that the connection exists in my own practice and not in an actual conversation or conscious connection between the two authors.

inside feminist and queer critique and revision. Ahmed talks the reader into a commitment to this "oriented" method of location when explaining how

> Phenomenology can offer a resource for queer studies insofar as it emphasises the importance of lived experience, the intentionality of consciousness, the significance of nearness or what is ready-to-hand, and the role of repeated and habitual actions in shaping bodies and worlds. (2006: 2)

Situated knowledge becomes situated again, Intersectionality is oriented towards a real critique and the diversity of concepts engages into the impossibility of expansion, recognizing the limits of distance and the potential of certain notions being activated through proximity, and thus, having a specific temporality. In this sense, the temporal rhythm of queerness is also recentered as a site of resistance. Muñoz's Ephemera is replaced even if being active through new orientations. Reading from Muñoz's use of Sylvia Wynter's work, I resort to use the idea of the deciphering turn when thinking of the concepts as intra-active. As Wynter writes,

> [A] deciphering turn seeks to decipher what the process of rhetorical mystification *does*. It seeks to identify not *what* texts and their signifying practices can be interpreted to *mean* but what they can be deciphered to *do*, and it also seeks to evaluate the "illocutionary force" and procedures with which they do what they *do*. (1992: 265-266)

The meaning is substituted, not in its totality, but in its quality and value, by action. What is generated is centred above the discursive intelligibility. It is interesting the way in which these accounts to other forms of materialisms, say NM theories as can be shunted from these sections, also give new forms of time-space understanding. As Barad formulates, these "dynamics" account not so much for the movement present in non-deterministic understandings of time and space, but rather acknowledge the importance of certain activations that involve the exclusion of other movements, not "once and for all" but from an agential cut. To put it more simply: the fact that an

exclusion could be seen as not determinant, but rather a site of dynamics and agency, also reworks the sense of time and space as intra-active. As Barad explains,

> Intra-actions are temporal not in the sense that the values of particular properties change in time; rather, which property comes to matter is re(con)figured in the very making/marking of time. Similarly, space is not a collection of preexisting points set out in a fixed geometry, a container, as it were, for matter to inhabit [....] What matters is marked off from that which is excluded from mattering but not once and for all. Intra-actions enact specific boundaries, marking the domains of interiority and exteriority, differentiating the intelligible from the unintelligible, the determinate from the indeterminate. Constitutive exclusions open a space for the agential reconfiguring of boundaries. As boundaries are reconfigured, "interior" and "exterior" are reworked. That is, through the enfolding of phenomena, as part of the dynamics of iterative intra-activity, the domains of "interior" and "exterior" lose their previous designations. (2007: 180-181)

It is a matter of concern to me in this section that these reworking of the limits between boundaries that are constitutive of binary understanding of worlding views are applicable to conceptual formations. As we can see in the fragment above, the senses of *inside* and *outside* are blurred in favour of a more performative understanding of matter. There is a certain activation that engages in the "left-out" parts, giving them a central importance as *already constitutive* parts for the mattering of what is materialised. In the case of concepts and the words we use, spread and domesticate in academia, activism, and other multiple locations, they respond to an activation of those concepts as central tools of enactions. This, apart from reinscribing language as a *dispositif* that is used and essentially changed pending on certain facts of time-space-relation, also drives towards the importance of concepts not as ontologically-epistemological elements, but as *momentum* activations that have mattery effects. Time and space, here, are as dependent on relationality as this sense of interaction implicit in relational views of knowledge is reliant on time and space. Interaction is, thus, reframed into intra-action.

The activation that I refer to is used in order to escape the impossibility of working out of the human-exceptionalism implicit in metaphysical accounts of experience. Activation involves a consciousness of the limits of the epistemologies we engage with and also re-generate through our specific scientific representationalism. This representationalism, that works through a constant representation and perception of the significance of the object of study (and not the object itself as raw material) is a limitation of this fantasy of exceptional account of the worlds that permeates our studies. The way of relating concepts in my work, the formula of concepts as methods, has the primordial tension of acknowledging that already their bonding is a human fantasy. As Barad makes us reconsider, through their concept of *thingification*,

> [That is] the turning of relations into "things," "entities," "relata"—infects much of the way we understand the world and our relationship to it. Why do we think that the existence of relations requires relata? (....) On an agential realist account, it is once again possible to acknowledge nature, the body, and materiality in the fullness of their becoming without resorting to the optics of transparency or opacity, the geometries of absolute exteriority or interiority, and the theoretization of the human as either pure cause or pure effect while at the same time remaining resolutely accountable for the role "we" play in the intertwined practices of knowing and becoming (Barad, 2003: 812).

The reactive entanglement performed in the bounding of the concepts in my work respond more to a breaking of dualities between these elements (interiority-exteriority; transparency-opacity; cause-effect; human-other; Human-human) while remaining accountable for the limits of this knowledge I present. This does not enact a new metaphysics. It rethinks it, asks for it, questions it, and leaves it unanswered. As Barad writes further on, these perspectives reject "the presupposition that language and measurement perform mediating functions" (2003: 813). I think of this as a very interesting word in use: mediation. Barad has the ability here to pin-point the particular articulation of knowledge as a dispositif of human-exceptionalism. The agential realism that Barad informs in their work activates a new metaphysical understanding,

in which phenomena are "ontologically primitive relations—relations without preexisting relata." (2003: 815).

These new directions, made concrete in my work by agential-cuts, using Barad's terminology, to a situated solution, in this case with concepts by particular naming enactions. in this sense, the attachment of more-than-one concept, in their intra-action, is situated not only in space, as the traditional monism of the concept of space would imply, but evolving two more elements: it is also situated in time and relationality. This concreteness is often strategic and involves agential cuts. As Barad explains,explains this e concreteness that is sometimes strategic and involves these agential-cuts explaining that,

> A specific intraaction (involving a specific material configuration of the "apparatus of observation") enacts an agential cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object) effecting a separation between "subject" and "object." That is, the agential cut enacts a local resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological indeterminacy. (2003: 815)

This is all inside Barad's purpose on a performative metaphysics, in which performativity is seen outsides the constraints of human intelligibility. In this excision from humanist metaphysics, Barad reflects upon the question of meaning itself. In this regard, we find how the problem with words and concepts is more than a mere reworking of their conjunction. It also has to do with the way in which meaning and signification maintains its property domain to the human group. Following this disarticulation of the concept of meaning, meaning is not under the unique domain of discursive practices. Here we see an example of the ambivalence of the usage of a concept: discourse. It is potential at the time it limits our views of significant elements in our world making. As Barad notes

> Discursive practices are often confused with linguistic expression, and meaning is often thought to be a property of words [....] Meaning is not a property of individual words or groups of words. Meaning is neither intralinguistically conferred nor extralinguistically referenced. Semantic contentfulness is not achieved through the thoughts or performances of individual agents but rather through particular discursive practices (2003: 818)

Individuality is here cornered, as it unsettles the human as the epicentre of generation of world meaning. Yet, as it has been noted before, there is an insistence within these alternatives on the importance of not equating this non-monism that human exceptionalism represents with releasing certain humans and subjectivities as accountable for particular enactions. Or to put it very frankly, the fact that the *human* as a category is disengaged here should not disjoint "us" from remaining responsible and accountable for violences, oppressions and power "we" produce.

The anthropocentric placing of significance is dislocated. "Discursive practices are not anthropomorphic placeholders for the projected agency of individual subjects, culture, or language. Indeed, they are not human-based practices" (Barad, 2003: 821), and it is in this replacement that not only space, but also temporalities and relationalities that are involved are also rethought.

3. Resolution: archive Reina Sofía.

As I have said at the beginning of the previous section, the frames which haunt me in this chapter unpack different readings of the particular public art space of the *¿Archivo Queer?* in the Reina Sofía Museum, which I visited in 2019 and 2021. The locational resolution of the reading of the archive, as a historical material which has the possibility of transforming experience, happens through the reconsideration of these spaces/artefacts as concrete pieces of a non-common past. This is, the practices of locations applied to these archival genealogical encounters are considered through the notion of activation, in which the value of the archive consists in its instability and

irreducible quality, acknowledging that the archive is only one of the many possible traces/histories/narratives that are part of the past they intend to preserve.

3.1 Archaeological record running into the archive of homes and other epistemological encounters.

Taking this cartographic image, the use of language as a home in space, as a point from where to proceed, I want to analyse the importance of household archives to speak about these architectures of responses. Through archaeological theoretical texts engaging in the space of homes and households, I will reflect upon the importance of these intimate spaces of signification and how they are containers of specific conceptual uses. Through these readings, I want to grant the critique to language at the same time as maintaining an acknowledgment of material needs. This is, to identify, to name, to remember are, in many cases, experiential needs of embodiment even if their stagnation is somehow a question we need to embrace from critical positions. In this sense, the conceptual twist between border and cartography is an imaginary I follow for this revision, where location is somehow a bodily condition as it is also a situational state. Pragmatic visions of how a body is/experiences (in)space are problematic as they disregard so many experiences and conditions that do not fit in their theoretical approximations. As it will be explored further, to ontologize what motion means, what movement involves and the agencies surrounding these actions is reductive to very specific world-viewing.

Continuing with this methodological approach I have proposed through this case study, "concepts as methods", and in the wake of accounting for the specificity of its application to the archive in connection to identity, I am entering in the following paragraphs the matters of historical recognition. All around the academic background relating to history, archaeology and other disciplines that are based on the narratives about past events, identity has served as a monolithic from where to depict and reproduce certain ideas of different human groups. In this sense, archaeology has proven to be another spectre of white, many times male, and normative supremacism,

and has helped to re-create stereotypical views of bodies throughout history. In the case of histories of resistance, the historical narrative aligned in these disciplines has failed to recognize the multiple layers of existence that the different human experiences have created. This is easily recognizable to anyone that has engaged in History somehow: how the past is told is archived through specific identity categories that, anthropologically, gives us a quick image of the time-space they represent. In the European identity construction, we only have to think about how philosophy and later in time politics have been handled to our identification in naturalising ways from Greek and Roman histories respectively. Naturalising because they have been so connected to certain names, features of personality and concepts that the fact that our logics are permeated by these specific historical moments is overlooked because it seems obvious as our genealogical pasts. It is quite common nowadays to align with researchers that criticise this excessive identification with selected memories. The Roman Empire is consumed in vast forms throughout our heritages- mostly in their capital value of consumption-, but the theoretical critique of it is becoming more and more present. Nevertheless, the critique falls into confusion and is abandoned when the temporalities and spatialities are somehow dislocated. More contemporary time framings and locations that are present and invisible at the same time seem too uncomfortable for some narratives to hold in critique and most of the time are abandoned or dismissed as unimportant. This is the case of captive life in the USA. The motivation behind the use of this particular example is drawn from a specific text I will analyse hereunder that was a turning point in my understanding of how Histo-fantastical narratives construct us and *where to find them*. As Alexander G. Weheliye reflects upon, the narrative of captive life and its consequential identitarian generations has been reduced to a simplistic view of victimisation and infantilization of the racialized captive body (2014).

Before analysing the specificity of the text *Black Feminist Archaeology* (2011)- Whitney Battle-Baptiste's analysis of the archaeological record from The Hermitage- let me unfold some ideas that are linear to these drifts. It has been longly discussed the responsibility- taking its dissected terminology as that of a capability of response- of historical disciplines to impact in 'the present' and its notions. Even if heritage

practices- such as Museums, exhibitions, patrimonial popular knowledge, to cite some of the most generalised ways of historical disciplines entering societies- are being rethought for a more active inclusion of the non-specialized public (Smith, 2006; Moshenska, 2017; Almansa, 2021) it is still common to find these disciplines tied to remote pasts without linking them to contemporary issues. As in the previous example, it is easy to connect with Greek iconography, but this gets tangled when it comes nearer periods. In the wake of woke perspectives inside academia (Stottman, 2011; Flewellen, 2019), there are many committed scholars that are reworking through the idea of what we could call archaeological activism. This enaction, even if having its limits because of its conjugation through many institutional links, is refreshing for both, past voices, and present utterances.

In the line of an affected research, I want to vindicate here the importance of domestic and intimate locations when it comes to archaeological terms. To illustrate how affectivity and self-ethnographies are necessary inside academic landscapes has a special tone inside archaeology: it means that small histories, the untold, the ephemeral spaces and the sites of social conjunction are as important to look at as to reconsider the positionings and locations from where we enter these intimate spaces.

To work through the notion of *home*, as critical archaeology brings forward, also restructures the materially essentialized ways of reading household archaeology through a gender theory lens. What I mean by this is that maybe reconsidering how the notion of home works and is active in many different forms depending on the time-space-relationality context can also achieve fresh readings on how the historical opposition between public and private is fuzzy. Again, to deontologise here means awakening other kinds of artefacts that may come through as insignificant. As Jamie M. Arjona notes, following James Baldwin's tradition, the ambivalence of 'home' "teeters between claustrophobia and homesick longing." (2017: 44). This ambivalence is a disposition to engage in, not try to erase it. In this sense, the vindication of public spaces against private-domestic invisibility is taken as only one of the oppositions that may be active in an archaeology of household and space, giving place to many other experiential circumstances that can be lived through this 'home' archaeology.

To reclaim space is also to reclaim entering a post anthropocentric viewing. This is, to engage into the ways in which spaces, such as homes, take a particular significance because of their affectivity (their capacity to affect and be affected) disrupts thi anthropocentric worldmaking, in which the monistic derivation is the human body. The ways in which households, homeplaces and other intimate locations are affected by and, in turn, affect their inhabitants leads to reconsiderations of matter as agential to the archaeological process. In an intra*active attachment (Barad, 2007), the artefact is significant beyond its material property, but rather as interlocked with the environment, where the human body is agential only as an element forming part of this conjuncture. Object and subject, under this envision, form part of a total, of an *affective arrangement* (Slaby et all. 2019[75]).

Space is never only a physical place. It also involves other temporal inhabitations. That is the deviant connotation between *house* and *home*. A home is always haunted. A home is never present, but rather subsists in different temporalities and is, simultaneously, hidden and visible. In a mixed tone between stream of consciousness and its solvent in documented references, Carmen María Machado breaks down the space of *home* as the demonym of their intra-gender violence experience. The space of physical intimacy is addressed from many angles and metaphors in their analysis. This compilation reenacts the ways in which space is normally thought about. It is the locus which gives birth to the topics of specific scenarios of violence and not the other way around. In one of these twists, Machado speaks about *being haunted*, a notion that reversibly haunts this thesis. In reflecting upon the sense of haunted in its metaphysical meanings, they write

---

[75] For the authors, an *Affective arrangement* is mediated by affect, being its central core. Affect in spinozian terms, arranged through affect and being affected, is the main motion in these arrangements. This means it does not add to pre-existing arrangements, but rather these arrangements exist because of the affective state in itself.

What does it mean for something to be hunted, exactly? [....] It means that metaphors abound; that space exists in four dimensions; that if you return somewhere often enough it becomes infused with your energy; that the past never leaves us; that there's always atmosphere to consider, that you can wound the air as cleanly as you can wound flesh. (2019: 146)

The sense of atmosphere which they refer to in this fragment is directly inspired by the work by Bennett Sims, in which the *being haunted* surpasses superstition and releases the undisciplined atmosphere which exceeds human authority.

Picturing some canonic literary devices, such as Chéjov's gun principle- which Machado also uses in their own writing and by which an element which is not extraordinary and fundamental to the plot should be cut off, the ordinary, the elements that have been haunting, become visible. We can read from Machado's account to intra*gender violence how this structure, a dynamic that continually moves towards many places, is contingent on (meaning it is conditioned by) unimportant elements. These elements, that work in the atmosphere level, are simultaneously a void in the plot at the same time they saturate its meaning. Again, connecting to the ideas followed in the previous chapter, a void is not a lack, but rather an impossibility to face, to look at.

Histories of violence, static notions of race, gender, ability and structural forms of engaging in temporal meaning such as past or potential futures are conditional to these elemental leeks that seem unimportant. In this wake, material cultures of particular experiences that may be read as unimportant are fundamental pieces to reclaim in order to modify our rhizomatic pasts and precise histories for reparation.

Following alternative narratives of these histories, Battle-Baptiste, that represents a strong foundation in ethical and politicised archaeology, has deconstructed these reduced identifications and has provided new methodologies and records from the slavery landscapes in the USA. Helped by not always written archives and traditions, Battle-Baptiste started reflecting upon what agency and resistance

meant for people under the subjugation and property of white bodies. Speaking about the *homespace*, she explains how

> It was a place to regroup, to learn strategies of survival, find strength, and create thoughts of resistance (....) I began to think about my homespace as my environment, the spaces that shaped my experiences and memories. I did not grow up in an individualized place; in many ways there was a collective nature where I grew up. (2011: 95)

Battle Baptiste inhumates the formalism in normative accounts to History when imbricating her own world viewing and the way the material record in the archaeological site of The Hermitage is reinterpreted. The intimacy of her own experience is brushed towards the understanding of a genealogical past that, nevertheless, has been interpreted through white visions of history.

This also throws new considerations of what *counteraction* might mean when disentangling from preconceived notions of identitarian communities. In this sense, counteraction is normally conceived as taking place within universal viewing of oppression, which are historically outside the archive. This also engages with what *resistance* might look like if new parameters are thrown in critical discourse. Resistance, silence and hidden archives (Satlhgren in Stottman, 2011: 96) Battle-Baptiste starts de-ontologizing the captive-life narrative, while addressing material culture and maintenance activities that disentangle experience from archetypes of popular living. When speaking about certain artefacts that dislocated this idea of essentialized identities, Battle-Baptiste writes,

> to food preparation, cooking activities, and leisure related items such as clay and ceramic marbles, a harmonica part, several straight pins and buttons, three mouth harps, and fish hooks. This meant that at this location all genders and ages came together to make music, play games, and do other activities like prepare food, make soap, and sew worn clothing. Most important of all was the in-ground cooking that was done at this site. These were all activities that left

some archaeo- logical trace, and which not only distinguished this area from any other place excavated on the plantation, but opened up the dialogue about daily life in a central gathering place. (2011: 104)

Going deep into this idea, the interpretative consequences here are also decentralised, giving importance to the taken for granted elements that are thrown into certain subjectivities but depart from an hegemonic existence. Concepts associated to family roles, masculinity, patriarchy and, again, agency, are here retwisted and highlighted from new positions, giving them new meanings and values,

I needed to understand how captive African families maintained an existence within a normalized, but impossible to emulate, Western patriarchal family structural system. By this I mean that in a social atmosphere where women and children were protected by men as property and dependents, the captive African family operated at a great disadvantage. There was a social expectation of man as head of household; yet realistically, captive African men were usually restricted in their ability to protect, provide and "rule" over their household on any plantation. They were captives, property of another man. Therefore from the beginning, their role as patriarch was virtually impossible to exercise. (2011: 94)

The abstraction of how certain concepts introduce and induce our experiences is challenged through these ruptures Battle-Baptiste finds using the archaeological records and its artefacts. Following what has been already framed as the epistemological coloniality, from the theories driven by Anibal Quijano or María Lugones among others, gender binarism and patriarchal values that are the main elements criticised inside heteronormative views, is an effect of colonial expansion and infestation. Battle-Baptiste achieves a strong critique that follow decolonial and antiracist paths, when addressing this emulating impossibility, drawing from fanonian tradition (Fanon, 1952) and, thus, exposing the futility and incoherence in using reciprocally heteronormativity and heterosexuality.

Battle-Baptiste's analysis of how certain heteronormative values are settled in very specific heterosexual contexts- in this case those related to freedom, whiteness and monogamy, among others-, is connected to Cathy Cohen's critique to privileged understandings of what resistance might mean in the eyes of gender and sexuality. In Cohen's case, sexuality and gender are always already imbricated with other identitarian schemes, such as race, that attend towards different ways of experience. In Cohen's analysis, while addressing specific problematics they point out in this text, they write

> In queer politics However, my concern is centered on those individuals who consistently activate only one characteristic of their identity, or a single perspective of consciousness, to organize their politics, rejecting any recognition of the multiple and intersecting systems of power that largely dictate our life chances (1997: 440)

In this sense, maybe this is the fragment where we can really understand the analysis to specific monistic understandings of critique that have been reviewed over the years, such as the application of negativity by white homosexual scholars Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman, which were analysed in the previous chapter. Within matters of saturation against the narrative of *nothingness* that these two scholars engage in their theoretical framework, negativity was restructured to attend to the principles of privilege involved in its claim (of negative queer studies). The sole view of a gendered and sexualized body was problematic since it didn't attend or take responsibility for their already saturated whiteness in their corporeal experience. In this chapter, this idea comes back giving space to intersections beyond the traditional application of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989; Lorde, 1984). The application I am referring to here is the one that is appropriate by white scholars and that has invisibilised the genealogy of intersectionality in itself. The singular points from where identity concerning gender and sexuality have been addressed has impeded to apply a true intersectionality that would be in use while escaping its appropriation by identities that should be embedded in its theoretical frame as generators of those inequalities (Nash, 2008; Cho & Crenshaw, 2013). To disappropiate a concept does not mean to abandon it. As Nash

reminds feminist scholars engaging in intersectional discourses, intersectionality is a doing, a methodology, that needs to be reframed inside its political action without taking identity for granted or tokenizing people's experience. To remain critical of how we appropriate concepts does not entail an abandonment of them, but rather a revision of how we inhabit those in our research practices that are cut by our corporeal experiences (Ibid). To rethink how concepts are appropriate and disengaged from their initial political use is equivalent to rethinking how we can use concepts bound to problematic genealogies that have lost, in their genesis, their political action but the notions that are used can be reappropiated in fresh ways.

Returning to Cohen's analysis, they remind their readers that the activation of identity as a singular form of reclaim is problematic not because of a strategic choose of action, that would be understood, but because it escapes any kind of elsewhere consideration of how identity is never about particular traces but rather an imbrication of different elements that can or cannot be active simultaneously. This also unfolds other issues that have been analysed in the previous chapters: translation and otherwise materialisms. How translation and translatability can be dangerous for the totalization of how certain concepts, movements and positions are viewed will be further analysed at the end of this chapter. The way in which detonations of otherwise identities that exceed totality and monism is unravelled hereunder departing from the application of Karen Barad's theoretical frameworks.

When rethinking of singularity, exceptionalism, supremacism and a universal idea of the *self*, other kinds of entities are also activated in this reshaping. As it has been introduced and analysed previous to this chapter, NM may not have been always new, but they have been radical in their engagement with experiences and epistemologies that exceed this anthropocentric singularity. In the critique to colonial and white supremacist mindset, as well as other gendered critiques, there is a particular take inside this scheme since on the one hand there is a human-exceptionalism that is working and shaping these categorical settings, but on the other, the same human exceptionalism is problematized cannot be disentangled from specific human doings. This means that even if NM are a fresh understanding of the whole idea of humanism,

it cannot disengage from specific human systems, traditions and generations, such as those engaging in violence, oppression and supremacism.

Engaging into those theoretical takes from NM that rework the idea of universalism, Karen Barad also enters this space when writing that

> The idea that beings exist as individuals with inherent attributes, anterior to their representation, is a metaphysical presupposition that underlies the belief in political, linguistic, and epistemological forms of representationalism. Or to put the point the other way around, representationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they support to represent (2007: 46).

In their critique to representationalism, Barad explodes the binary understanding between the ontological entity to be represented and its representation, where the human exceptionalism holds itself to, engaging in this delusional distinction between object and subject that impregnates other relationalities that exceed a direct representational system, such as those to non-human animality, plants and inert bodies. Following the phenomenological tradition of perception and consciousness (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Dreyfus, 1992), Barad engages in the fundamentals of the human body as already knotted inside this material entanglements. Representationalism being a perception fantasy of exceptionalism is dealt with in Barad's work by exposing its own impossibility, reshaping notions of universality, comprehension and apprehension.

Battle Baptiste also follows this divergent regard to the past when engaging in the notion of *absence*. In this connection to NM and beyond-anthropocentric perspectives, Black Archaeology finds a particular way of entering research spaces at the same time as it also unfolds the impossibilities of translation and translocation. The oral histories Battle-Baptiste uses are present in intimate ways in their text and not necessarily function from visibility standards. Furthermore, certain conceptions of intimacy are left expanded only in material terms while maintaining their untranslatability to the general public. The whole of the book looks at the past in its ambiguity between possibility and dubious when it comes to visibility terms. As they

write, "[i]n looking further, I decided to also think about the impact of material on places they were found and places where no artefacts were discovered. The absence of material being as important as their presence" (2011: 86). The voids in this epistemological reconstruction are decentralising since they are not material for their representationalist consumption from academic landscapes. The impossibility here is related to a chosen limitation that Battle-Baptiste works through: redoing a specific stagnated narrative while allowing its intimate existence outside white-supremacist logic of knowledge consumption. This limitation will be explored further on under the conceptual tools of translatability and translation at the end of this chapter.

3.2. Proper language, property language.

Returning to the use of the notion of *emulation* that Battle-Baptiste takes from Fanon (1968) to apply it to their own academic renaissance, the way words are used is a consequence of how concepts are held and possessed. In this regard, while speaking about the cultural and symbolical uses of concepts in certain discourses, the materiality of concepts is sometimes disregarded. As it is sometimes overseen in decolonial and antiracist theoretical practices, economics and their critiques, as are used inside capital frameworks, are rooted in a colonial and racial system where property and accumulation are at the core of specific violent and oppressive practices held throughout history. As Cedric Robinson has plainly exposed (1983), the extraction of social, economic and labour forces are at the ground of our economic systems and their critiques. This also exposes the need to reconnect these elements in order to address how those systems of property also include the use of discourse and knowledge practices. In this light, concepts need to be studied as property, where language becomes a landholders scenario.

Insisting on how the activation that is used in this work is the way in which methodology is imbricated in the use of concepts, also engages on deeper reflections of certain uses of language that go beyond discourse. In this manner, words are already entangled in worlding activity, not needing their link to big discourses to be held into

account. That is, words in themselves are never insular, even if held in singular uses. Rather, words have a history, an epistemological ontology; they are contaminated and while they can be reviewed in isolation, words are never alone.

The activation that is performed here is the material production which certain conceptual uses and understanding of knowledge impress in our contexts. For example, language as property is a performed effect I activate in this section. To animate this perspective, I want to introduce the work by Cheryl I. Harris "Whiteness as Property" (1993), being a crucial text on critical race studies and theories. In her text, Harris addresses the wide and sometimes blinded effects of whiteness, contributing to the understanding of whiteness as a system. In this analysis, the perpetuation of certain effects of this system contaminate reality and, as Harris specifies, the particularity of property. Who owns is not only rooted on who is authorised to a certain *worlding*- intended as world making, which is a central issue when thinking about representation- but it is also a material account of a direct connection between an economic system we sometimes forget we are immersed in and the racial and colonial implications that merge from it. To address whiteness as a system that also operates in an economic ideology of privatisation and property, can take us to rethink about the property of language and concepts. Who owns concepts also includes who is legitim to unfold them inside a cultural/experiential context. Or we can put it more directly: how and which words circulate are directly informed by privileged scenarios.

Taking the concept of *emulation* in itself to focus on this logic, the way in which concepts spread also unfolds the identities that are compiled into their uses. Battle-Baptiste speaks about emulation, as we have seen some paragraphs above, when addressing the issue of the impossibility of the non-white subject to be inserted into a white system, that does not only expand to a material layer, but also connects to the uses of languages, the meanings of words and the cultural forms they expand towards to. In this case, and following the importance of recognizing these uses inside the pragmatic existence of property, who owns masculinity is pivotal to grounding how the concepts that surround this notion are required under a certain activation of the concept itself. Masculinity having been built from a white supremacist paradigm will

211

be impossible to emulate to the subjects outside its identitarian label, making other notions surrounding masculinity, such as patriarchy, heteronormativity and others only performative aspects of this impossible emulation. This is, the way in which the property of certain cultural notions is compiled inside limited subjectivities (that of white people) can also expose how the critiques driven from these colonising concepts are imbricated in this logic. As Battle-Baptiste or Cohen remind us, there is an imperative requirement to situate concepts, even if these are birthed in critical spaces. To use heteronormativity as a universal disruption takes for granted that the imitation game of masculinity is accessible, possible and desired by everybody.

As I disseminate in the case study hereafter, the alternatives of conceptual turns are sustained in tension to disruptors of language held by critical thinking, that restructure, a priori, outside exercises of power. Even if this is the case, in an account of more-than-human material forces, I do think these disruptions work inside certain circumstances of possibility, momentum where a time-space-relationality transpire and possibilise a hiatus. The claim of more-than-human forces is not to claim certain paradigms of power as coming "from nature" but rather, following Foucault's account of power, imbricated in an institutional system of invisibility. In this sense, I do think that the effects of these human hierarchical movements go off-track of our own human capacities. The material codification from colonial and racist understandings of language, have to remain accountable at the time we also have to work from the impossibility, sometimes, of pinning down the specific epicentre of these practices, since they are in general pollution.

3.3 Beyond "Anthropobsession": from anthropy to entropy.

In this light, my application of ethico-ontoepistemologies (Barad) is here transferred to my own questioning of the use of words, and in specific, of concepts. I engage in a recognition of how ontologies and epistemologies exist in an impossible divide, where what there is already structured through what we grasp. My way of thinking about concepts as methods is a recognition of the limitation I already find in the act of

conceptualization, where translation, as it has been discussed above, in both a spatial and a linguistic sense, is a way of reproducing this idea in which *specific humans are* seen as the saviour to knowledge and reality. Translation is bound to a certain rhythm, where the time-space acknowledgment also includes in their equation energy as a main element for this temporal frequency, as Henry Lefebvre has proposed ([1992]2004). As his main theoretical input in *Rythmanalysis* (ibid), Lefebvre writes "[e]verywhere where there is interaction between a place, a time and an expenditure of energy, there is rhythm" (p, 15)

Concepts as methods are directly connected to the critique that Barad posits on *representationalism* as a system of knowledge. Returning to the importance of a view that decentralises not only space but also species, representationalism and the critique to the centrality of words also reframes this understanding of *anthropobsession*. As they express, "[r]epresentationalism, metaphysical individualism, and humanism work hand in hand, holding the worldview in place" (2007: 134). Even though I will not disseminate here my view towards animal and antispeciest studies, this example goes back to the idea that, even if *a priori* knowledge is compartmentalised, fields are and need to be connected to challenging stagnated world viewings.

As it has been explained hitherto, performativity is here used as an alternative to normative considerations not only of gender- as would be proposed by a butlerian reading- but of how epistemology and ontology are perceived. The distinction between both has its base in the centrality that language and semiotics has been granted for the last centuries. The cartesian distinction between mind and body is performed through traditional epistemologies by assuming a constant distinction between the ontological object that is, nonetheless, perceived as already represented. This anthropocentrism implicit in the representationalism involved in our research and knowledge practice is questioned in these "turns"[76]. As Barad explains in another article when addressing the particular question of *performativity*,

---

[76] I remain sceptical of the many "turns" that have taken place in the past decades and that are as important as they ratify the anthropocentrism involved in the discursive centrality of our critical analysis, leaving matter in a second row.

[I]t is possible to develop coherent philosophical positions that deny that there are representations on the one hand and ontologically separate entities awaiting representation on the other. A performative understanding, which shifts the focus from linguistic representations to discursive practices, is one such alternative (2003: 807)

Human exceptionalism is here put into question through the connection to feminist discourses on how the body is a social construction, a historical formula that has been, nevertheless, important to some political disruptions. Even if this being the case, the focus on the human mind as superior to the body's matter is a dichotomy that reasserts a human exceptionalism, where reason is given a centrality that demarks it from everything else. These new accounts of matter, even if still engaging in the importance of acknowledging how matter, and within it the body, is constructed, it also has a "life of its own" that decentralises the human.

Other accounts of the human are, in this light, a necessary step to address human exceptionalism as a mindset. As it is reconsidered at the end of this chapter, I remain very sceptical of certain uses of posthuman thought, considering it has been sometimes used as a state to be generally achieved, as if the universality of "being human" could escape the material distances between those same humans. The posthumanism perspective here used is just identifying a preliminary requisite to a later move towards animal studies and antispecism. I adhere to Barad's use of posthumanism, in which they state that

No uncritical embrace of the cyborg as the ironic liberatory savior is at issue here. Posthumanism, as I intend it here, is not calibrated to the human; on the contrary, it is about taking issue with human exceptionalism while being accountable for the role we play in the differential constitution and differential positioning of the human among other creatures (both living and nonliving).

> Posthumanism does not attribute the source of all change to culture, denying nature any sense of agency or historicity. In fact, it refuses the idea of a natural (or, for that matter, a purely cultural) division between nature and culture, calling for an accounting of how this boundary is actively configured and reconfigured. Posthumanism does not presume that man is the measure of all things. It is not held captive to the distance scale of the human but rather is attentive to the practices by which scale is produced. (2007: 136)

The difference Barad refers to is committed to a dismantling of particular arrangements that divide the same notion of the human. The *dividuum* fragmentation works upon the base of similarity, while individuality is reinforced by exceptionality and integrity (Deleuze, 1992; Raunig, 2016; Desiriis, 2018). In their critical application of posthumanism, Barad redirects the analysis to a diffractive reading of experience, in which the non totalizing manner of researching different situations achieves a more-than-human approach that still remains accountable for the differences among those referenced humans.

In fact, the importance of destroying the sense of monism throughout conceptual history is also linked to these other ways of engaging in the human body beyond humanism. In this sense, when reading indigenous authors and a straight critique to our white systems of body control and human episteme, there are encounters with other ways of being, of being in the world. These may regard, as is the case with indigenous ontologies and cosmologies in North America, other non-human and non-living entities that are beyond the cisnormative divide nature-culture. Cisnormative because, as I have defended throughout the previous chapters, the binary cosmology from where our exceptionalism and supremacism has been constituted makes these divisions (sex-gender, nature-culture) part of the same equation of bodily control. As Kim Tallbear addresses in her work, "[n]ature and sex have both been defined according to a nature-culture divide" (Tallbear in Muñoz et all, 2015: 234). Expanding this idea, we can also see the bond in western and white genealogies between the meaning of humanity and their sex-genderized values. This connection has its basis in the idea of how concepts are never isolated, but rather have a life of their own, being

already in connection with other concepts that contaminate them. They become diffractive concepts in intra-action (Barad, 2007). In this manner, we can see how the notion of humanity, as it is lived from white contexts, is already polluted through concepts regarding sex and gender, that seem to be intrinsicate and ontologically ascribed to the human body. In this case, the very disintegration of human exceptionalist framework helps to disentangle the pre-established ideas of humanity, the body experience and the notions bound to these. The fact that intracation, as a tool to otherwise materialisms, decentres the human as the centre of any agential experience in our contexts, helps to disorganize the monistic linkages that are at the base of our use of concepts.

In connection to the way in which History is used in these alterations of concepts in their meaning and discourse, from the reading of the linear temporalities, the anthropocentric value of interpreting the past is simultaneously potential and problematic. This ambivalence can be seen in the example used previously of archaeological artefacts and their interpretation. Archaeology seems to be a particular epistemological scenario where we can find some potentialities that convey as problematics, and vice versa. They resist in a liminal place between the impossibility of bringing steady solutions while they activate otherwise narratives. In this sense, the human genitals have been the specific excuse for historians and archaeologists to speak about forgotten identities in the past. As we can see in the feminist archaeological tradition, to find bodies with certain genitals in different spaces has been read as potential destructuring of certain stereotypes linked to identity issues, some of them that have been silenced throughout traditional Histories. This, being in some cases a potential tool to address these invisibilisations, where the category of gender is crucial (Scott, 1986), becomes a shortcut in other contexts where it is activated because it is perceived and constructed as intrinsic to the human body. This leaves unattended other categories that may be the ones functioning in that context, or may have more weight. As I have previously announced, gender is not only constructed, but has a very specific genealogy: colonialism. María Lugones in her radical input of the coloniality of gender (2008), makes visible how the gendered body is a colonial invention. This forces a rethinking of the categories that may be active in otherwise contexts, distant in time,

space or discursivity, and that may be linked to difference but not necessarily to oppression. Archaeological revisions of our material cultures have been appearing in the past decades, allowing these new interpretations in which difference is not necessarily linked to oppression and violence, gender is not taken for granted as an ontological category and the conceptual present is engaged as a factor of impossibility of escaping from our cultural bias.

We face a difficult critique, and once again, in connection to the impossibility of concepts being fixed in time, that takes place in the ambivalence and changeability of the strategies evolving the critique and theoretical alterations. As Enrique Moral de Eusebio has unapologetically defended in their research, gender as a category of analysis should be distanced from gender as culturally active. In other words, the way in which gender and queer studies can be helpful to face certain inquiries and otherwise readings does not mean the contexts studied are always functioning from gender and queer activations. As Moral de Eusebio illustrates through the deconstruction of the interpretation of the archaeological record,

> In relation to the age, we must clarify that gender does not remain fixed in someone's body in an homogeneous and immutable way, but rather varies throughout different situations and social contexts [...], partially because of the performative character of gender, which demands its continuous practice[....] Thus, the archaeological record, must take into account that death, and with it the burial goods, only shows the last stage of someone's life, not the whole vital trajectory of the inhumated person (2014: 260, *my translation*[77])

---

[77] En cuanto a la edad, es necesario aclarar que el género no permanece fijo de por vida de manera homogénea e inmutable en el cuerpo en el que se inscribe, sino que varía a lo largo de diferentes situaciones y contextos sociales(...) en parte porque el carácter performativo del género exige una práctica continua (....) En el registro arqueológico, por tanto, es imprescindible tener en cuenta que la muerte, y con ella el ajuar, muestra sólo la última etapa de vida de los sujetos, no la trayectoria vital completa de la persona inhumada. (2014: 260)

Tre intra-action existing in concepts takes place also through their fragmentation. It is not only that concepts are already activated through one another, but that these intra-actions keep modifying, as we can see in the interesting dichotomy between the identitarian moment of life and death. As I have already analysed through the chapter of the void, QDS have maintained a critical formula to attend to other forms of life and experience that exceed biological and animating understanding of both states, while addressing the particularity of each vibrant entity. In their destruction of simplified and, in many cases, privileged notions of ontology, Marietta Radomska, Tara Mehrabi and Nina Lykke (2000) speak through the westernised conceptions of life and death, assembling new categories, forms and uses of these concepts while decoupling them with monistic traditions. In their analyses, they write how their field of studies, QDS,

> does not discuss ontologies of death as a fixed moment that marks the end of life, bounded to a human subject (a white, able-bodied, heterosexual man) whose life is imagined within a linear temporality marked and defined by birth, reproduction and death. Rather, death becomes meaningful in terms of assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 2004) and intra-actions (Barad 2007). Death is materialised and becomes meaningful at a particular time, in a particular place and in relation to other processes. Thinking about death in terms of relations then leads to questions not only about the ontology of death and the binary of life and death, but also about human exceptionalism, in which human death is approached as unique. It questions Western linear temporality, in which birth and death are defined as the two opposites marking the beginning and end of the subject. (pp, 89-90)

Going beyond these linearities and structuring conceptual uses also takes care of decolonial perspectives, where more than human experiences and *otherised* human experiences challenge human exceptionalism which lays upon the ideas of humanity that not only exclude other earthly living or animated entities, but also some humans that are only taken into account as anthropos. This differential formula is seen through the construction and use of race as a primary category, as Alexander Weheliye explains when speaking of the difference between the narrative of having a body and being a

body (2014), or the divide that Nishitani Osamu draws between anthropos and humanitas (2006).

In the merge of power and action, the importance of inciting in iterative language is here followed by Mel Y. Chen's work unfolding the importance of language as a constituent of animacies. Animacy, as has been explored in the previous chapters, refers to an activation rather than a certainty. As Chen describes it "Animacy is a craft of the senses; it endows our surroundings with life, death, and things in between" (2012: 55). Animacy is the endow that initiates our surroundings. Animacy speaks about ontologies, but walking away from ontologisation. On this basis, iterative power and its languages are called to the centre. Thus, conceptualising and naming is a way of animating. As Chen explains through this move, this "conceptual 'mattering' is ontologizing in the sense that it has a relation (which is however sometimes nonidentical) to the considered 'reality' and is hence eminently consequential." (2012: 37). The insistence in ontologisation, rather than ontology that is already reified, builds the category of realness is intertwined with this configuration. Yes, this sounds controversial on many levels, but it is so because of language dynamics and hierarchies that have, as Chen proposes, material effects and thus their ontologisation is reinforced as their natural movement in invisible ways. This is the case of the constitution of parallel uses of certain concepts and their notions, such as the highly discussed case between *objectification* and *dehumanisation*, that I have already recalled in the previous chapters. This mixture of both terms, that are contemporary present in many discussions surrounding topics of race, corporeality, animal studies as fresh forms of engaging into matter (such as NM), is problematic because of obvious reasons: racism, colonialism, white supremacy and human exceptionalism have used ontologized and naturalised forms of concepts as notions imbricated in social understandings. This is, the way in which languages surrounding animality, humanity, embodiment and objectification have been naturalised, have made these acts invisible in themselves. This is, the unpredictable ways in some cases, invisibilized in others, use of the materialisation of these languages are used to enact particular ways of discrimination and violence that, because of their very ontologisation, are displaced as configurations per se. In this panorama, to exist in a white system seems a paradigm rather than a

constitutive constant enaction. To be racist seems far from everyday activity and is expelled from social consistencies into isolated actions that seem to be enacted by insular identities.

The problem with parallel uses and synonym concepts is that we are unable, or too dull, to unpack the animacies behind these conceptual bonds. Again, concepts don't exist in themselves but rather are fixed to an intra-activity that gives them meaning in the actual move of mashing them within certain notions or divorcing them from others. This praxis constitutes a binary move towards a metonymic recognition or a disidentification. Hence, the importance of bringing new connections between these notions into 'life' is important. In this sense, the understanding on how notions are both bound to their genealogies but also potential to disentangle from them is made more clear.

Returning to the specific example of animalization, dehumanisation and objectification, Chen explains what dehumanisation may entail, where

> [o]ne form of what is understood as dehumanization involves the removal of qualities especially cherished as human; at other times, dehumanization involves the more active making of an object. Indeed, perhaps the most unsparing dehumanization is an approximation toward death. (p, 43).

In this last case, Chen is referring to critiques of Disability Studies, where the body is narrated as a corpse and dehumanised through an objectification of 'it' becoming property. The body is dependent, in many layers, on other humanised and inert ones. An example of this is the state as an inert and animated entity at once and, being inert and animated at the same time, controls embodiment from invisible positions. Nevertheless, and as it has been thought through by the reconsideration of both bio and necropolitics, the direction of a body towards death and destruction is not only a matter of organic forces in hold, but also the organising contingency surrounding bodies' meanings. As explored through Ruha Benjamin's thought further on, the assets in this part is the importance of life outside biological means. Afterlifes (Benjamin, 2018) and otherwise experiences are centred here, in an address of the need to

disentangle an orchestra of social constructions surrounding concepts and giving them new notions.

As in the case of sexual abuse, rape culture, women's objectification, pornography, sex work and prostitution, that seem to fall into the metonymical trap referred to before, the problem is not located in the source of objectification, that happens at so many levels and is not bounded to the sexualized feminized body. Instead of this monistic construction of objectification experiences, there is here a call into question of the actual negativity of objectification in itself. Against its "monolithically condemned" considerations, animacy here works to take into account the ways in which exteriority and interiority, or agency and inaction, are elements we depend on when speaking about these constructions surrounding the notion of the human, the animal and the subject. It is then disentangled from parallelisms and uncritical analogies dressed up as intersectionality, that bound radically different corporeal experiences to the same social choreographies. As I have decided throughout the work, the situations which are paired and put into conversation in the work, to step out these violent analogies, are referred to as communalities. In this way, the situations can be addressed from points of connection without matching them as similar, equal or analogous. To deontologise objectification from its monolithic negative categorization does not mean to abandon the critique of how certain bodies are constrained to it as an inherent category. Here *inherent* is not used in the anthropocentric sense of being tied to organic notions of life and death, but rather to the materiality of the concept, that gives us the idea of a body that even if organically functioning is agentially expelled.

Following the importance surrounding the use of activation and animacies, I would like to introduce animal studies and antiracist researchers and activists, Alph and Syl Ko, because of their brilliant bridging of the problematics and tensions existing between these two conceptual uses. Their critique of how intersectionality has been abused by white traditions, has taken them to engage in antispecist views, i.e. beyond humanist and anthropocentric theoretical perspectives that do not fall into analogies. In this sense, the problem with engaging in post-anthropocentric perspectives is sometimes that the intersections that are discussed are connected as analogies, rather

than generating particular debates that can disentangle their normalisation from the social construct. In this sense, even if human exceptionalism and racist and colonial practices and mindsets are connected in fundamental ways, since they have a "common source of oppression, which is systemic white human violence" (2017: 11), to treat the specificity of how they are produced at the same level is fundamental. As Syl Ko writes,

> There's a troubling aspect present in (...) the interpretation of blackness or brownness as essentially *bodied*. In other words, the mainstream (read: white) tendency to find us visible insofar as we are regarded merely as bodies is a tendency that we have internalized and on that we now perpetuate (....) Understanding beings as 'bodied' becomes a problem when beings are viewed *primarily* in terms of their bodies. That is, reducing conscious, active beings with viewpoints, interests, and/or projects-*subjects*-into merely the biological frame that houses the source of this activity-*objects*-is destructive to those beings (2017: 1)

Going beyond human exceptionalism is intrinsically linked to white supremacism. It may not be new to critical theory to face how the ideas of the human bodies are standardised by references of normative ways of inhabiting flesh. The critique that goes beyond this account and is sometimes uneasy to track down is how the posthuman turn hasn't remained critical about this universal human takes. As I have said before, the climate crisis has proved these ideas in its reframing towards theories regarding the anthropocene, veganism, posthumanism or futurity, in which the sense of moving beyond a problematic scenario is caught inside the white parameters of official subjects. As Zakiyyah Iman Jackson asks, "[w]hat and crucially whose conception of humanity are we moving beyond? Moreover, what is entailed in the very notion of a beyond?" (2015: 215). This is important to bring into question here because resistances concerning posthumanisms, that are mostly linked to the factual and actual climate issues (resistances such as antispecism, veganism, climate justice, etc) are sometimes taken for granted as a position against discriminatory and violent practices. The particular issue with these resistances is that normally the subject involved in

resistance is different from the one that is being disposed for liberation, i.e. animal. To resist is viewed and consumed as to be thrown out of the discriminatory logic. This is constructed in a binary schema where the person resisting is regarded from the illusion of having moved beyond a situation of power, an abusive position from where they started but having also achieved its escape from it. This is problematic because of the two poles it essentializes: to be part of an injustice system and to radically change one's position. This, translocated to If you think about it, what happens towards those subjectivities that are violated as part of this human exceptionalism philosophy, such as first nations peoples and communities, that seemed to be also another piece of this critique to human universalism. At the same time, other issues regarding corporealities such as white people against racism are also depicted as if these activists were escaping a situation of power and violence, making them exempt from racism just by identifying with antiracist practices. To be an antiracist white person can also coexist with being inherently racist, even if checking on one's self constantly. In the reading of Gloria Wekker's *White Innocence* (2016b) and in the listening of her lectures (2016a) during my erasmus year in Utrecht, I understood the many uncovered ways in which racism subsists inside spaces which are constructed against racism, such as the Netherlands in itself. In her references to Fanon, Wekker finds the options on how to expose the performativities which are required of the non-white subject to fit in these "liberal" spaces. I am writing this as a white antispecist vegan and an anti racist racist, defending that I do acknowledge human exceptionalism as a part of our species identity, and the political and direct actions move that can dismantle white supremacism, and yet, I don't defend anthropocene to include everybody at the same level of responsibility as human-other divide, nor do I extract myself from racist values and systems that I am part of.

3.4 The new material for the reading of reina sofia:

What I take from antispecism is not a claim of an ethics to consider non-human animal rights- that I do activate in my personal life-, but the interesting deconstruction of ontologisation as a consequence of traditional archiving and hegemonic narratives of the past. What I mean by this is that, as I have explored in the previous chapters, the

critique which I apply in this research is the way in which ontology has been constructed as "reality as a whole", linking it to an essence which seems uncontestable and which is, nevertheless, another product of human exceptionalism. In line with this constitution of what is assumed as "reality", as "what there is", the disciplines concerning the past and world genealogies, such as History, Archaeology or Anthropology, work in tandem to this control of how reality functions. Disciplines which are considered as scientifically distant, such as physics and history, become entangled in this critique to how the world, research and the *stuff* of archives (Manalansan, 2014) are all part of the same rubrica: human supremacy and exceptionalism. This goes without saying that this superiority and exceptionality, consequently, construct certain bodies as being part of this excellence, while others have been narrated from the location of otherness. In the vindication of *otherwise* epistemological thought, as Macarena Gómez Barris explores (2017), other readings and possibilities emerge to materialise these located and chronotropic counter-archives. Without a linear temporality of futurability, there is an enacted horizon where to move towards. Dislocated and ephemeral. In new directions. Not forward but towards (Muñoz, 1996; 2009).

- Phenomenal methods, deviant orientations. Remixing concepts. buzzwords. and a transition to the second case study.

Reminder: The possible is obvious, what is desired is the impossible.
What is not is what drives what is, and transforms it into itself.
What is becomes what is not and what is not becomes what is and what is not.
The future is always here, in the past.
Amiri Baraka (1995: 255)

In a return *loop* to Frances Negrón Muntaner, I want to consider some of the concepts which arose from my conversation with her, such as *decolonial joy*, *resistance*, *time*

ordering, *archives* and *value*. In my understanding of her work lives my own considerations about the *¿Archivo Queer?*, which have only become visible and intelligible to my ephemeral understanding after working through the notions that were born through this conversation. In my analysis of the *¿Archivo Queer?* in the Reina Sofía Museum, the element of <u>translation</u> becomes essential to understand under what critique I highlight the limits of this specific archive. Even if it is true that this particular archive is, in comparison to others, radical, it also folds into the limitations of institutional representationalism.

The main political groups featured in the *¿Archivo Queer?*, LSD, Radical Gai and RQTR (that are only a few of the many groups included in this collection) are included in this archive which tenses the traditional idea of archive. Through a vast amount of material, including fanzines, manifestos, pamphlets, photographs, posters, stickers and several audiovisuals, we learn about the activity, actions and activisms enacted by these movements in the 90's. The queer archive in Reina Sofía has achieved this by taking into account several ideas which I find interlocked to the theories and frames exposed in the previous section.

I would say that the first idea which engages into the achievement of a counter-archive is the disclaimer that the meaning driven from the prefix (*counter*) don't actually exempt this archive to be outside the limitations, commodifications and control of any kind of archive. It is so because of the recognition of the space it takes form in, one of the most important Museums in the Spanish state, but more importantly, because any kind of material stabilisation already involves a potential cut. In Barad's account, this could be considered as an agential cut (2014), recognising the ambiguity of this material as simultaneously potential and confined. Maybe it is this ambiguity that is emphasised through the interrogative form the title takes, which also bounces towards other questions such as "Is Archiving Always Radical?" (Díaz, Dorrego, Sesé & Voltà, 2016). Through this particular question, which is locational to the *¿Archivo Queer?,* the authors reflect on the limiTs of the act of archiving, also relating to the idea of impossibility which I have analysed in the previous chapter, and corresponds to an alternative way of constructing knowledge from the past, in the present for the future. In this sense, in a distortion of the historical value of colonial

archives, the future is inhabited to imagine a present which can impact the past. These archives become eccentric beyond the limits of time and space. In this sense, the counter-archives presented are not located in a margen-centre binary or a future utopian reading, but rather are eccentric in their dislocation and their ephemeral space-time valuing.

When we speak about the actions involved in this archive, one of the fundamental ideas which come to mind is a system of value. In the ambiguity which was exposed above, when speaking about the double bind of the counter-archive, the criticism of what is valued allows new ways of desires, meanings and significance in, at the same time as this also becomes another stabilising movement. As Sejo Carrascosa and Javier Saez wrote at the start of *Por el culo* (2011),

> Cuando hablamos de un régimen de poder o un régimen cultural, heterocentrado por ejemplo, o machista, no se trata de un poder vertical y jerárquico que planifica el odio a las mujeres, o el odio a los gays o el odio al hecho de ser penetrado. Es un régimen de discursos y prácticas que, simplemente, funciona, se ejerce, se repite continuamente en expresiones cotidianas, desde múltiples lugares y momentos, y que crea realidad (y que hiere) a partir de esa mera repetición. Se aprende el valor antes que el objeto o el acto en sí. Es más, es ese valor negativo el que crea el objeto, y no al revés (p, 8).

In this sense, what we value is controlled by a representationalist system which, as Carrascosa and Saez expose, discipline the relation towards the object prior to the contact itself. As an alternative, what enters to be valued and desired from the notion of *difference*, also enters a politics of translation which adapts the desire, the object in esteem, to be understood. It gives it significance. It limits it from its atemporal potential. In both senses, from a disciplined or from a release from this control, meaning and intelligibility are central to both discussions. The meaning is substituted, not in its totality, but in its quality and value, by action. What is generated is centred above the discursive intelligibility. The counterpart to this product of intelligible

consumption, referring to the archive, is the fact that the people involved in its creation are people situated inside its own genesis narrative. In many cases, and following a colonial orientation of epistemologies and histories, the stories which are recollected from other times and other spaces are disconnected from the subject curating these archivings. They are, quite simply, others to the material in the archive. To find an insistence towards the location and identification of specific subjectivities going into these narratives makes the prefix counter alive.

When speaking about the limits and problematics of translation, there is a reference to different motions, since the concept and its practices comprise different spaces in these relocations, linguistically or geographically. In this shift, translation does not only post issues as its practice matter, but goes deeper into rethinking what are the concepts, ideas, notions and experiences that are put into motion in the first place. To make it clearer, the problem with translation in its various forms is not so much the politics surrounding the movement that happens when it is performed, but rather the bias of what elements are selected to enter this dynamic. In the use of Anzaldúa when engaging into the impossibility of transliteration that its proposed through la *Frontera-* which I have mentioned in the previous parts-, the radicality of the proposal does not consist only in this warning, but is built upon the intrinsic rejection of entering certain language paradigms, rejecting specific notions and their uses and engaging into experiential discourses that *happen to be* rather than *are*. In this intake, and in the constant revision of how my work commodifies certain theoretical backgrounds, I want to engage in prosaic concepts of everyday practices that have made me grasp certain critiques in horizontal and confronting ways.

Taking as a centre the text by Petra R. Rivera-Rideau, *Remixing reggaeton* (2015), I here want to embrace "unrefined" forms of words (p. 4). The author does a revision of how reggaeton has been a medium to challenge and transform the notions of blackness in Puerto Rico. As Rivera-Rideau does in her brilliant beat, my use of concepts as methods stand in favour of a constant mashup, different *featurings* and, above all, an ensemble of "unpurified" understandings of these. In the *¿Archivo*

Queer? the unrefined forms are structural for the archive, taking shapes which are, for many, uncomfortable to think through in a Museum's archive.

With the reinscribing of "obscene" genres and significances, highly recognizable in the case of her case study through Reggaeton, scholars such as Frances Negrón-Muntaner, Raquel Z. Rivera or Rivera-Rideau- among others-, have recovered the political life of these "unruly" and "deficient" paradigms of existence (Negrón-Muntaner & Rivera, 2007: 36). From a Puerto Rican perspective, these authors have polished an anti-classist and anti-racist critique to the way in which culture is not only produced but also consumed. Without an oversimplification of thinking of reggaeton as a "unitary expression of Puerto Rican identity" (Rivera- Rideau, 2015: 20), the way in which popular but explicit forms of words have polluted the genre from the start has served as an excuse to gate-keep its popularity, drawing it as apolitical and criminal (Negrón-Muntaner & Rivera, 2007: 36-37). Still, as the authors decipher, the conglomeration and saturation of themes that reggaeton achieves to impress in its hearers, dancers and producers is nothing but political. Such is the case of the *¿Archivo Queer?*, where unruly stories are told, "obscene" identities are the main characters and the historical "criminal" imagination saturates the archive[78]. As Negrón-Muntaner and Rivera claim,

> Reggaeton's story, then, holds the hope that even under dire conditions, the people of Puerto Rico can find creative ways to make a mark in the global economy. In capturing the imagination, it also tells us much about what kind of nation Puerto Ricans are imagining and inhabiting in the global era. For starters, reggaeton calls attention to the centrality of black culture and the migration of peoples and ideas in (and out of) Puerto Rico, not as exotic additions but as constitutive elements. If Puerto Ricans and other Latin

---

[78] This refers to the law "Ley de Vagos y Maleantes" (law of lazy and criminals), approved the 4th of August 1933 during the II Republic but was modified to include homosexuals inside these repressive actions in the law. In this sense, in the Spanish State, the words of criminality and laziness have historically been associated with the queer body.

Americans have celebrated Spain as the "motherland," reggaeton redirects the gaze toward Africa's diasporas (2007: 39)

Reggaeton, a secular language of resistance and joy, is here politicised and, still, does not fall into the romanticization that recognition sometimes assumes. To cross reference with Negrón-Muntaner's thought, this is what decolonial joy looks like: it celebrates while resisting. The fact that reggaeton is in these analyses allowed its fair position as a genre of social contestation does not mean it is proclaimed as an unproblematic scenario. But then, no genre can be recognized as aseptic. As she reminds the reader, Rivera-Rideau explains that

While reggaetón may challenge the racist underpinnings of hegemonic discourses of racial democracy, it also reinforces some problematic hierarchies, particularly regarding gender and sexuality (....) At the same time, it is important to remember that reggaetón is not the first pop u lar music in Puerto Rico (or elsewhere) to have a vexed relationship with questions of gender and sexuality. (2015: 17)

The linguistic turn in this rework of genres is more focused in its use than in its form. The same happens with concepts as methods, which are located in the turn to the attention to the places and paces of their use than of their aesthetic signification. Also, rescuing what was said at the start of this part, the use and practice also includes the departign point of what concepts are selected in this shifting methodologies, such as the case of choosing reggaeton as the epicentre of social and decolonial questioning of the use of languages, its forms and consequences.

As Rivera-Rideau historizes, reggaeton is already remixed in its ways of bridging together very different existences compelled in the experience of colonisation and diasporic motion. Taking Juan Flores's concept of "cultural remittances" (in Rivera-Rideau, 2008), Rivera-Rideau alludes to the importance of the singularity and situation of certain cultural expressions, that can be erected from the quotidian but are

charged with political significance. In this account of situated expressions, she addresses how

> Reggaetón thus developed in Puerto Rico as a cultural practice of diaspora. Here, the term diaspora addresses both the histories of migration that are crucial to reggaetón, and reggaetón's articulation of diasporic links across different sites, particularly between Puerto Rico and elsewhere in the African diaspora. As a cultural practice of diaspora, reggaetón must be understood in relation to both global and local factors— a music "routed" through various geographic sites that has become "rooted" in local communities as an expression of particular understandings of race, class, gender, and national identities. (2015: 16)

The global and local references here mentioned are entangled within specific social paradigms and bound to different pre conceptual understandings, but nevertheless engage into a constant motion. In the long distancing motto "where there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault, 1978: 95–96), in this prosaic way of engaging into theories that can disentangle certain conceptual and discursive states, the theories, authors and ideas mentioned throughout this chapter commit to everyday practices of questioning language.

This unaturalising, unrulying or unrealizing stand for acknowledging a distance from certain materializations. Not that this equals abandoning matter as a site of resistance to over-productive human locations, since it is one of the main stands of this work, but rather a rejection to ways of performing our being(s) in the world. To realise how realisation stagnates and reificates certain ways of bodily existences contributes to a desnaturalisation from unruly positions. Anarchic views of nature that, at once, accept our limited human locations and, from here interact in an engaged way of changing certain aspects of sociality. In the connection of these unruly materializations to gender and trans matters, I activate the work by Susan Stryker, "My Words to Victor Frankenstein Above the Village of Chamounix." (1994), one of the fulcrum texts to trans studies. As she places trans existence and resistance through her own words,

Hearken unto me, fellow creatures. I who have dwelt in a form unmatched with my desire, I whose flesh has become an assemblage of incongruous anatomical parts, I who achieve the similitude of a natural body only through an unnatural process, I offer you this warning: the Nature you bedevil me with is a lie. Do not trust it to protect you from what I represent, for it is a fabrication that cloaks the groundlessness of the privilege you seek to maintain for yourself at my expense. You are as constructed as me; the same anarchic womb has birthed us both. I call upon you to investigate your nature as I have been compelled to confront mine. I challenge you to risk abjection and flourish as well as have I. Heed my words, and you may well discover the seams and sutures in yourself. (1994: 240-241)

The monstrosity of trans is both a limited and potential exclusion, where certain bodies, unnaturalized ones, are also a call into imagination, making basal questions about what stands for "natural" in society that is, quite simply, already a place of construction.

The anti-normative movements included in the *¿Archivo Queer?* deal with the negativity involved in queer history, which includes discussions of HIV, stigma and violence. As in the previous chapter, where from queerness there is a new value added to negative notions, these topics in the archive are surrounded by other forces, also allied to queer history, such as resistance, joy and communality. Joy and desire, as it has been recalled from works by Frances Negrón Muntaner (2020b) and Horatio Roque Ramírez (2005) respectively, are key notes to regain every queer potentia which has been lost throughout the normative narratives involved in our experiences. In this sense, it deconstructs the *dressage* of History, and recovers those eccentricities which are capable of twisting dynamics concerning representation, justice and relationalities. It is important to mention this particular focus on time since, as Henri Lefebvre argues "[w]herever time, space and an expenditure of energy coincide, there is rhythm" (2004: 15). Concentrating in the concept of *Dressage* creates an incision in the concept of *diffusion* and disentangles power from its understanding as an act performed by

singularized bodies. Lefebvre relates the concept to a process of repetition that is linked to a training process (*le dressage*) where the subjects commodify themselves from an action of agency rather than a reaction to a particular force. As he explains,

> One can and one must distinguish between education, learning and dressage or training [*le dresagge*]. Knowing how to live, knowing how to do something and just plain knowing do not coincide. Not that one can separate them. Not to forget that they go together. (2004 :39)

The innovation in Lefebvre's work is the importance that he gives to rhythm as a new way of analysing bodies in society and how these are marked by constructed timing, in particular the rhythm of repetition, when speaking about dressage. "It is through rhythms that this model establishes itself" (Lefebvre, 1992: 41) and the way we adapt and learn how to live suitable to particular norms is marked by a rhythm and, hence, by an active movement. It is important to bring this consideration of time in relation to the notion of *impasse* which is treated in general theories regarding power. This connects to the self-criticism the *¿Archivo Queer?* does of itself, maintaining it as a living archive, one that recognises its limits while keeping its own motion. The queer reading of Ahmed's phenomenology (2006) is here reinforced. Reality, or what is consumed as such, is also erected upon a structural sense of time. This takes us to the revision of queer temporalities and temporal dissonances as a site of resistance to this rhythm. What I mean by this -and as it has been introduced in the theoretical chapter through José Esteban Muñoz-, is that unnaturalizing identities, narratives and conceptual uses also need of *otherwise* temporalities. The sense of (re)productive performativity is adhered to new ways of engaging in linear sense of chronological experiences, that break with normative understandings of how the past is consumed to address a particular sense of future. In the case of the *¿Archivo Queer?* through narratives of death, resistance, anti-reproduction, lust and, upon all, a continuous sense of movement, the normative sense of rhythm is distorted. As Elizabeth Freeman writes in *Time Binds* (2010), this sense of chrono-normativity shifts to "alternative temporalities, and sexual dissidence in terms of temporal dissonance" (p, 142). This dissonance, a term that becomes central to chapter 3, touches upon the importance of maintaining the archive alive. As it is reflected in ¿Archivar es siempre radical? (Díaz

et al., 2016) there is a deconstruction of the normative sense of archiving that has "tried to open up a spectre of what is archivable beyond the document, integrating what has been called 'living materials'" (p, 7. *My translation[79]*). These living archives cohabitate with the art piece in the shared place of the Museum and this stands as a space of liminality. This junction dialogues and disentangles the stagnant aesthetic which traditionally involves the space of the Museum. The interesting part of this archive is its continuous motion and multiple transitions which take it to new standpoints in a frequent tense, stressing the idea that an archive is something alive. In this aspect, the *¿Archivo Queer?* also invokes Jose Esteban Muñoz's notion of ephemera (2008), breaking free from the "rigor-mortis"[80] (p, 7) expected from the traditional way of historical evidence. Building up Muñoz's epistemological world, this ephemeral awakening not only keeps the archive alive, but it also disindentifies it from traditional uses (1999). It also connects to New Materialisms since this temporality of agential cut also entangles further understandings of the archive's materials while leaving open the notion of the archive having a life of its own. In the application and translation to the way concepts can be disordered, stagnant applications are abandoned in favour of more situated functions of these, that not only respond to space but also to located time-orderings and situated situations. Again, space is queered through the inclusion of time and relationality.

The transitional chronological collapse we see in the Derridian hauntology activation is here embraced through the engagement with other time orderings and temporalities that can bring forth other subjectivities. In this sense, the enaction of these chrono-*illogical* modes recognizes the need for both attending for a material presence while re-turning and twisting other tempos. From these positionalities, concepts become a site of explorative disclosure, pending on a specific setting but also allowing for their transportation to other situations. In this sense, concepts as methods

---

[79] "Se ha tratado de abrir un espectro de lo archivable más allá del documento, integrando lo que se ha venido a llamar 'materiales vivos'" (Díaz et al., 2016: 7. *Original*)

[80] Used in Muñoz's work as a criticism to the notion of rigour demanded in academic research.

recognize their temporal existence while enabling their use through time-space-relational modifications. Thus, concepts as methods are never applied in the same way from one situation to another, but do own up to their accumulative genealogy.

In this turn of the methodologies of concepts, there is a radical move towards the application of queer and deviant theories to case studies that are not primarily focused on gender- or at least, not the parts I question/rescue-, exists the potentiality of engaging into new significances that are implicit and occult inside these circumstances and the elements that hold them together. Not that a general signifier is uncovered. It is more a question of engaging in their own praxis on constituting as part of our ontologies. For example, what is there of *difference* as channelled through *conflict*? or the *separation* through *exclusion*? My focus in these questions come from the examination of NM theories and, in particular, the salient text by Trinh T. Minh-ha "Not You/Like You: Post-Colonial Women and the Interlocking Questions of Identity and Difference", written in 1988[81]. In her critique to essentialist values that westernised analysis had imprinted in feminist issues, Minh-Ha recaptures the possibility of difference, as a multilayer of circumstances that would rescue it from simplistic views equating it to exclusion. In this respect, she states that

> To work against this leveling of differences is also to resist the very notion of difference, which defined in the Master's terms, always resorts to the simplicity of essences. Divide and conquer has for centuries been his creed, his formula of success (....) Conflicts in Western contexts often serve to define identities. My suggestion to this so-called lack is: let difference replace conflict. Difference as understood in many feminist and non-Western contexts, difference as foregrounded in my film work, is not opposed to sameness, nor synonymous with separateness. Difference, in other words, does not

---

[81] The text was first lectured and delivered at *Viewpoints: A Conference on Women, Culture & Public Media* at Hunter College, New York, in 1986. Later it was published in The Independent (Film & Video Monthly), May 1987.

necessarily give rise to separatism. There are differences as well as similarities within the concept of difference. One can further say that difference is not what makes conflicts. It is beyond and alongside conflict. This is where confusion often arises and where the challenge can be issued. (Minh, 1990: 172)

Difference is all, reason, consequence and external to conflict and exclusion and this multiplicity is fuzzy for theoretical enclosures. In the combination of certain concepts that are bound together through significance there is also a working definition of binary oppositions. Even if being decentralised through similarities- since here we are talking about significances that work in pair/together- the opposite part to these, and upon which they sustain themselves is a sense of similarity that works in contrast to difference. The bounding of concepts is also a reassurance of the cut towards the contra-concepts. The taken-for-granted duo of "divide and conquer", as Minh-Ha writes, works through mimesis, and this "formula of success" also acquires the essence of otherness.

Minh-ha criticises assimilationist values of difference (1990; 1996), which, following the anthropophagic values of colonialism and domination, try to ingest otherness and adapt it to the mainstream culture. The other, the exclusion part, is generated through similarities on the other side of the equation. As Barad reflects on Minh-Ha, "What is needed, Trinh emphasises, is a disruption of the binary, a way to figure difference differently." (2014: 170).

New materialisms, and in particular Barad's approach in diffractive analysis, cuts free from these oppositional understandings, using quantum accounts of what we perceive as "real", or "scientific" to modify the very sense of ontological framing. As they explain,

> diffraction is not only a lively affair, but one that troubles dichotomies, including some of the most sedimented and stabilized/stabilizing binaries, such as organic/ inorganic and animate/inanimate. Indeed, the quantum understanding of diffraction troubles the very notion of dicho-tomy – cutting

into two – as a singular act of absolute differentiation, fracturing this from that, now from then. (2014: 168)

The use of diffraction questions the dichotomous thought system, or as Barad puts it, the onto(epistemo)logical status, where things are taken as whole and continuous in this ontological construction of pre-existent entities. Instead of this, Barad abandons the binary part towards fragmentations -following the logic of the alternative theory to wholeness and continuity in this critique to traditional physics and ontology- to speak about the very phenomenology of the intraaction, that avoids speaking of the entity in itself in favour of the entities already in intra-active forces. About difference, Barad then explains how

> Difference is understood as differencing: differences-in-the-(re)making. Differences are within; differences are formed through intra-activity, in the making of "this" and "that" within the phenomenon that is constituted in their inseparability (entanglement). (2014: 175).

In this challenging new form of antiassimilational praxis, there is also an unsettling of the identity categories which are sometimes fixed in relational studies. In this case, the many scholars who have engaged in this return to the identitarian deconstruction and the use of diffraction as a way of refusing this forced assimilation. Kathrin Thiele engages into diffraction to face the particular issues of this planetary moment, as a response to they're concerns while writing "[h]ow *to live* a world of difference(s), a world in/as ongoing differentiation (...) so that new senses of commonality are envisioned?" (2014: 202). It is under this consideration that Donna Haraway also pairs in the use of diffraction or reflection when speaking about the subjectivity of otherness. As she writes,

> [T]o be an "inappropriate/d other" means to be in critical, deconstructive relationality, in a diffracting rather than reflecting (ratio)nality as the means of making potent connection that exceeds domination. To be inappropriate/d is not to fit in the taxon, to be dislocated from the available maps specifying

kinds of actors and kinds of narratives, not to be originally fixed by difference. (1992: 299)

Haraway overcomes the binary opposition to difference in their situated perspective (1988) while staying with the trouble (2016), engaging in difference without seeking closure and speaking up for other forms of identity politics and practices which fiercely stand against assimilationist conquests.

Zygmunt Bauman's conceptual other is here reworked through the importance of the concept of entanglement. Entanglement draws us to think about inseparability between elements that are, but, not constrained to continuity. In fact, continuity had been conceptually ascribed to proximity, is here blurred in favour of other ways of be-coming together, in which intertwined entities are, at the same time, fragmented. And again, this fragmentation does not respond to their independent existence, but rather holds in it the insistence of maintaining their capable activity in being entangled simultaneously to other realities. The binary, the dichotomy, is rethought, returned.

These methodologies driven by concepts take us to a fundamental transition between case study 1 and the two following ones. I this light, I wanna draw attention o the way in which queerness, as a method, is transitioned to case study 2 not in an gender-sexuality application of identity, that would be the traditional way of using the conceptual mindset of queer theory, but as an arrangement to analyse experiences that would benefit of a queer sense of disrupture (of the analyses, not the reality per se). This is explicit in Ahmed's analysis of queer phenomenology, when stating that "[a] queer phenomenology might turn to phenomenology by asking not only about the concept of orientation *in* phenomenology, but also about the orientation *of* phenomenology" and states that "to queer phenomenology is to offer a different 'slant' to the concept of orientation itself" (2006: 3-4). Here, as it has been explored through the application of orientation as an important site to address critique from a recognized point of departure, or more simply put, situated knowledge and critique, the direction we take towards an object can be more revealing than focusing on the objects we turn to/towards/on/back.

Looking back and looking away depart from the same sense of haunting. Haunting concepts are withstanding to this project. It is so because it resists the pertinent way in which Fisher described our era, writing that "our zeitgeist is essentially hauntological. The power of Derrida's concept lay in its idea of being haunted by events that had not actually happened, futures that failed to materialise and remained spectral." (Fisher, 2014: 100). We are haunted by uses and expectations that are phantasmagoric not only in their form but mostly in their capacity of execution. We are expecting to live something we are not capable of. Capable of experiencing, grasping, understanding or even letting it affect us without sculpting it to an intelligible morph for our recognition. In this sense, and translating it to the conceptual problem exposed through a critique to the materialities of language, the way certain (most) concepts are used is haunting. We follow specters without remains. We speak about materiality while bumping into invisibilized objects we succeed to avoid them once and again. In this thesis, places are haunted by embracing their minimum forms, their mythical existence, their subtle and futile traces. A hauntology embarks us in different temporalities, where the presences of the past possess us to redirect our gaze.

CASE STUDY 2: MORIA AND THERMI AS SITES OF DIALECTICAL DISRUPTIONS.

"The flesh is nothing less than the ethereal social (after) life of bare existence."

Alexander Weheliye, 2014: 53

1. Introduction

This case study is probably the one which I am more attached to. It is so because, even if the pandemics blocked my visit to the contexts that are here discussed, it was through this spatial binary which I started imagining queer theory could be applied beyond queerness. Even though Butler will play a more central role in the triggerings of the following chapter, their conception of grieving and mourning (2004) have been primordial for me to take a clear position inside this Case Study. MORNING TAKES ME TO MEBEMBE AND THE APLICAITON OF The necropolitics that I apply from Achille Mbembe's work (2003) in my investigation here evolve towards affectivity. This is, I do not analyse necropolitics so much from the point of view of death but from a consideration of how these, in certain circumstances, have more to do with who is griefed and mourned, and other public feelings.

Together with these frames, I centralise this chapter upon Rosi Braidotti's work. In her use of nomadism, I see a great deal of potential surrounding the notions and uses of space. Space here is used in the mapping notion of the division between inside and outside, and the consequences which go from inclusion-exclusion to citizen-refugee, and which are complicated if analysed in relation and not as oppositional terms. In a way my proposal is a disentangling of Rosi Braidotti's work, by recognising the ambiguity in my use of her theories, using them, again, in a diffractive way which can allow the cracks I have seen in their application to be momentarily resolved for my own use.

1.1 A story

Since this chapter deals with heritage, I would like to begin with a memory. In no particular order: I remember waking up to the burning down of Moria, the largest refugee camp in Europe. Furthermore, I remember writing about space in ancient Greek *polis* and surfing through Google Maps to check the exact distance between Moria, which had that morning caught my attention, and Thermi, an archaeological site, both located on the Greek island of Lesbos. The 7.1 km distance from one to another did not come as a surprise. However, their proximity made me feel very uncomfortable. I realised a dissonance resided in the contradiction between their cohabitation of the same space and their diametrically opposed significations as "historical" locations.

*Hi*story, and its consequent cultural and heritage manifestations, are framed by time and constructed within a chronological narrative. It is particularly important to take this point into consideration in relation to the case study examined in this chapter – the distances existing between Moria and Thermi that go far beyond the material ones– because of the discursive impossibility to which these two places are bound. For this case study, the impossibility is already assumed by the specific location from where this chapter departs – the space of research. The concept of discourse is pivotal for the theoretical framework of my analysis. I further give weight to the use of concepts as

methodologies, as stated in the methodological chapter and case study 1, as a medium to be used as

> more than mere passive agents helping us explain the world we are immersed in. The way we put concepts together does not only unpack them as methodologies but also gives them a space and a place for recognition, a point of departure for a new (con)figuration. (Harris, 2021: 41)

In order to contextualise historically this case study, I would like to begin with providing the readers with the necessary background information on the sites analysed in this chapter. Thermi is today famous because it is one of the most prominent and best-conserved prehistoric settlements not only on the island, but in Greece. It was founded *c*. 3000 BC and is one of the first examples of urbanisation in the whole Mediterranean. With the plain of Thermi being one of the most fertile territories on the island, it is not unanticipated that a large community flourished here throughout the early and middle Bronze Age. It is also relevant to mention the strategic position of Thermi in relation to the flux of cultural influence articulated by the Balkans and Troy to the North, and Cyprus and its connection to the Egyptian world to the South; and a strong connection with the Cyclades and continental Greece surrounding its seas.

The other space touched upon in this chapter is the refugee camp of Moria, founded in 2013. As a bureaucratic and symbolic entrance to the European *ethos*, in 2015 Moria became a refugee and migrant hotspot, as well as a registration and control centre. While far from concepts such as "cultural palimpsest" or "urbanisation" which are essential to the site of Thermi, Moria has gained a central position with respect to other life situations, accommodating a particularly large population. According to media reports, at the time of the tragic events of September 2020, twenty thousand people were dwelling in a camp that had been constructed with the capacity to host a maximum of 2800. The majority of its inhabitants were relocated after the fire, some to the camp of Kara Tepe, most to other fragments of camps around the territory. Moria

was a geopolitical explosion of contemporary conflict. It was a space in which to conceal European shame in the name of justice and reparation for the effects of wars which were created, as in dystopias, years before.

In the approximation towards these two liminal spaces, I started to read a large number of texts concerning Archaeology and Contemporary conflicts, coming to texts by Senake Bandaranayake (1974) Uzma Rizvi (2006) or Yannis Hamilakis (2007; 2017). My navigations in the field were also increased by some of the teaching I was doing some years ago inside the Archaeology Department, at my home University, which became an incentive to delve into a field of research I was not expected to include as much as I finally did in my thesis. My first idea was to find a connection with the Island, from a historico-archaeological perspective which could allow me to be at the terrain to study the spaces I was dealing with and their materiality. In this first motion, I came into contact with Hamilakis, with whom I exchanged some messages where the possibility of a collaboration was spoken about. Since Moria was burned down, and the pandemics started, I reflected on how to speak about this circumstance while also accepting that I was not ready to commit to a study in a field that would escape the sensationalist and privileged view of a European white body visiting the camp. I decided to reflect upon these dichotomies and contradictions from my own location in Spain.

In these active movements towards a use of Archaeology in contemporary debates, I came into contact with a group of activists all around Europe that were challenging, through artivism, the invisibility and silence which was impressed in the refugee camp of Moria. After some conversations with a group of them, based in Berlin, I unofficially came into the activist project of "Now You See Me Moria", interventions which are partially framed through Annex 2. The project, which started as an instagram collaboration, was born in August 2020 with the intention of making public to the European citizen what was happening in the Island and never covered by media. With the contributions of many artists, the project got a great number of posters which highlighted the devastation and failure of the European narrative of freedom and "civilisation" by exposing the actual situation of millions of lives.

Some months after these urban interventions, my department director proposed that I participate in the contest "My Thesis in Three Minutes" (edition 2021), which challenged 20 doctoral candidates to explain their thesis in an accessible way to the general public in only three minutes. Even if my first reaction was a great fear of not knowing how I would be able to face this challenge, it was this activity which gave me the opportunity to locate the concepts I would use in this chapter and bring them down to earth, so they would not be too philosophical for their application to the case study. In this conjunction between the activism I did related to the situation in Moria and, later, Kara Tepe, and the structural theories I applied for the study, I found a way of discussing the contradictions I perceived between these two spaces. In this sense, the point of connection and departure for my own analysis, as the title of my presentation in the contest, was the sharing space of a map, which held in it many signifiers that were in need of discussion, engaging in how a shared geographical context is also a space of differences and disruptions. The triggering to this chapter is, then, to be found in the material consequences which maps inside border logics have in the constitution of space as identity. I will first analyse the bases of fragmentology and coloniality to then engage fully in his analysis of spatial ordering and geographic apparatuses.

2. Triggering

2.1 Theoretical Fragmentology: dissonance in Histories.

Since a comprehensive theoretical genealogy of epistemological power would exceed the length limits of this chapter, I have decided for this part to work through a particular leading text, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) by Michel Foucault. In this book, Foucault deals with a great number of notions that are all part of a collective critique and theoretical frame that focus upon the process and generation of discourse, knowledge, and power. My main point in this use is to examine the ways in which dissonance resides in contemporary conflicts and their material culture and to explore how an analysis of these aspects can explode and expose the dissonance hidden in seemingly harmonious historic heritage. This dissonance may be unveiled through

juxtaposing this heritage with the ways in which current discourses are active and generative of subjectivities and specific ideologies. Foucault's *oeuvre* is used out of a need to situate and locate the limits of the epistemological constructions of my own research. Using in this section *The Archaeology of Knowledge* as the main reference for my mapping of concepts, I understand discourse as a set of relations that exceeds the historical record it contains and has more to do with the analysis of how this content shapes meaning, produces knowledge and accumulates power. In this sense,

> discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined. It is a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed. (Foucault 1972, 55)

Discursive knowledges then, as we can see in Foucault's work, are related to certain bodies and subjectivities, not only as elements bound to these particular identities but, more importantly, as elements that produce the circumstances of these identities. In other words, when something is stated, it amplifies and evinces a set of structures existing a priori and interdependent in an invisible web, a connection that does not depend upon continuity. In this sense, when a historical object is created, it happens / occurs through a set of practices and repetitions that are not just a question of describing an ontological fact, but the impossibility of escaping the epistemological construction to which they are attached. In the following sections, I will revisit this searching for its connections with the concept of *performativity* and will examine them through a queer lens. I will further work with the concept of *fragmentology* as the theoretical accountability for the use of certain fragments that escape the notion of theory as a whole, as a unity. I choose to work with those pieces of Foucault's text which can be used to study the case of Moria as an object of *H*eritage *St*udies and its relation to the embodied case of Thermi. In terms of discourse and signification, this relation works through tension and friction.

The limitations of these assumptions of theory as a unified whole are evident when we recognise how spaces and material experiences that are bound to a contemporary temporality are refused to be considered as historical remains and heritage. There are situations that entangle in ways that make their particularities and independent aspects dissolve in a general sense of their existence. In other words, the way we narrate, connect and juxtapose situations and their surrounding elements, sometimes hide the individual pieces that conform those experiences and that are parts that exist outside the need of becoming history.

Following the essential role played by temporalities and chronology in the construction of the epistemologies we work through and with, I would like to refer to Foucault's clear-cut division between presentness and actuality. This dichotomy may be construed as representing the signs performed in the discourses surrounding Thermi and Moria. On the one hand, even if Thermi is inscribed in a past distant from the present, it is also inscribed in the actuality of its cultural significance, and thus, constitutes an epistemological fact; on the other, Moria, even if placed in the presentness of current contemporary conflicts, is not a decisive factor for contemporary *Hi*story.

Placing Karen Barad's work on *diffraction* (2007)- which is in central use in the whole of this project-, in conversation with Foucault concept of continuity, that is mentioned above, I focus in their interesting connection as fundamental to these critiques since the fragmented narratives we are referring to are tied to this sense of diffracted temporalities. The notion of continuity,

> is a paradoxical one: because it is both an instrument and an object of research; because it divides up the field of which it is the effect; because it enables the historian to individualize different domains but can be established only by comparing those domains. (Foucault, 1972: 9)

(Dis)continuity is construed here not only as an object of study, but, more importantly, as a tool, a lens, through which to dig into the past in relation to the

present(ness). In this chapter, I employ (dis)continuity as a methodology of approximation to the analysed case study. (Dis)continuity is what resides between the present and *Hi*story in the case of Moria and Thermi. It also represents the consciousness of an impossibility, because of the very presentness, for Moria, of both being and imminently becoming history.

In this sense, it needs to be emphasised that this impossibility is not an inherent status of the situations that I examine in this chapter. Rather, the specific circumstances determining the construction of knowledge within fields such as *Hi*story, *A*rchaeology, or *He*ritage *S*tudies, evict the possibility of facing certain realities that exist but are difficult to deal with through traditional research methodologies, which ultimately function as genealogies of thought. Therefore, the impossibility also encloses and contains the potentiality of a critical opening up of these fields towards these contemporary sites of conflict and dissonance in order to prevent them from disappearing from any historical account. My call for such an opening is not a claim towards the aesthetics of ruins and conflict (a topic that should also be discussed), but a demand for justice in the face of indifference and an act of response-ability from our/my own privileged locations. It is a form of side-taking in the face of injustices that should not be silenced by the historical distractions that we perpetuate through constructing exclusive research.

Discourse, therefore, is a genealogical practice, a machine of material generation. Thus, when speaking about these two locations as pseudo-shares, we observe that the discursive narrative about prehistoric Greece generates a reality that is tangible in contrast to the impossible narration that throws Moria into a non-place. Non-place is understood here in the sense of Marc Augé's (2008) theories about spaces that, because of their lack of signification, preclude an anthropological vision. The theoretical impossibility here is important because the constructed subject it produces also responds to that lack of location and is thrown into anonymity. Following the above-mentioned potentiality, the void that certain *topoi* represent, their discursive absence, already manifests a rule in order:

> The discursive formation is not therefore a developing totality, with its own
> dynamism or inertia, carrying with it, in an unformulated discourse, what
> it does not say, what it has not yet said, or what contradicts it at that
> moment; it is not a rich, difficult germination, it is a distribution of gaps,
> voids, absences, limits, divisions. (Foucault 1972,119)

This way, absences, just as accumulative presences, are constructed and produced. The amplification of these absences connects to another of Foucault's concepts, the *principle of rarification* – a rarity which has more to do with the criteria that allow atypical statements to enter the conversation than with what these statements enunciate.

As heritage is the field which is most directly affected by the arguments of this chapter, I will approach it as the dispositive that allows the formation of certain identities within chronotopes. Heritage helps reify those identities through the claims of culture and *Hi*story, maintaining the epistemological order of things and the authority of certain constructions of knowledge over others.

I would like to use Laurajane Smith's idea of "Authorized Heritage Discourse" (2006) to speak about the assumptions and assimilations that the hegemonic understanding of heritage reproduces on a daily basis. The discourses in which authorised heritages are embedded use and assume that cultural remains are entangled in a time-framing of the past as the pivotal element to render it meaningful to a community or group of people assembled and connected through this past. Thus, the identification between the past and heritage is an assumption implied in historical discourses. This construction of the past and *Hi*story is another example of how knowledge, meaning, significance and epistemologies merely constitute the perceived reality, demonstrating /and demonstrates their potentialities and limitations.

Theories on power, hegemonies, and on how they are implemented through discourses in different fields of studies are many and diverse. I will not, therefore, stop at those parts of Smith's argumentation regarding who has the power of enunciation. Instead, I would like to highlight a specific aspect of this text which so far has been

overlooked: the temporality construction that heritage has absorbed from its constitution. As Smith re-evaluates through an analysis of John Urry's "How Societies Remember the Past" (1996), out of many boundaries that we can find in the construction of this official discourse making, "[o]ne boundary disconnects the idea of heritage from the present and present-day values and aspirations so that it becomes something confined to 'the past'" (Smith 2006, 12). We need to rethink heritage along these lines as a continuum that reaches to the present.

2.2 Entanglements: Race and Coloniality in Authorised Heritage Discourses

In this section of the chapter, I focus on the particularities of certain categories in the construction of the two analysed spaces, Moria and Thermi. I suggest that their relationality resides in the way they can be put together, bonded with each other, as this chapter proposes. The ontological reasonings that we sometimes find intrinsic to certain experiences, situations or examinations would not respond to the logic of a comparison between these two different spaces. What links them in entanglements is rather the performative action of looking at them as *chronotropically* similar locations, following Nigel Thrift's stance on how performativity unsettles our normative visions of materiality:

> Spaces can be stabilised in such a way that they act like political utterances, guiding subjects to particular conclusions. But, as a counterpoint, the fabric of space is so multifarious that there are always holes and tears in which new forms of expression can come into being. Space is therefore constitutive in the strongest possible sense and it is not a misuse of the term to call it performative, as its many components continually act back, drawing on a range of different aesthetics as they do so (2003, 2022–2023)

According to this view of space as performative, we can distance ourselves more easily from the rigidity of the historical construction of places of significance. A detailed examination of the categories at work in each of these two cases demonstrates that

*Hi*story is not an activated element in Moria, nor does race play a role in the case of Thermi. The non-substantial significance of these categories in the analysed cases does not mean, however, that they do not have impact on or are non-existent in each of these places. In other words, the fact that race and *Hi*story are not made visible in the narratives about Thermi and Moria should not lead to conclusion that there is no racialised construction of the justified body for *A*rchaeology, or that the void that Moria represents for contemporary historical records right now will not have historical consequences in the future. Even if at present, these consequences appear as absences and are not marked as historical landmarks, they are there in the making.

The construction of race and otherness in the case of Moria and Thermi responds to a reflection on the existing discursive dynamics of exclusion-inclusion. Indeed, the element of race in the case of Thermi is active in invisible ways. This is so both because of the construction of inclusiveness that – in the identity that Thermi represents – is taken for granted, and because of the temporality it informs, a past that is consumed in the present. I am particularly intrigued by the way in which the construction of time, in general, and the past, in particular, functions as a dispositive that allows certain subjects to escape the visuality of their very representations. What appears to happen in Thermi, in opposition to Moria, is that the condition of the past constructed through the present allows the subjectivities related to it to neglect the necessary revision of their own construction. Instead, these subjectivities are already shaped beforehand, not through a material analysis of remains, but rather through the discarding of critical issues of our present such as the construction of race. This is not to say that there is no translocation of present identities to the past, but rather that the construction and ways by which those identities are constituted are elements that exceed the temporality of the past. Thus, the ways in which prehistoric times are equalised through historical discourses to an idea of European ancestors – that of White, male, abled subjects – overlooks the way in which race is still active and helps the construction of an authorised past in our presentness. What I mean to emphasise here is, once again, the dichotomy between the activation of certain categories in the present and the form in which they are transformed and mitigated through their introduction as *Hi*story, thus past. In the account of these discursive practices of civilising, which are read through

the eyes of performativity, I want to cite Barad to set in the analysis the positionality I take. This location is a privileged distance from the actual spaces I am examining, and through this positioning I intend to get closer to the materiality of Moria and Thermi, and not only speak of these spaces from a theoretical perspective. As Barad writes about this understanding of performative discursivity,

> A performative understanding of discursive practices challenges the representationalist belief in the power of words to represent preexisting things. Performativity, properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything (including material bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is precisely a contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real (....) [P]erformativity is actually a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind that grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve (2003: 802)

Performative discursivities work as entanglements. The entanglements that exist between situations that, a priori, do not seem to have connections with other constructions and intersections of social categories, have an immediate effect upon the way a body, and its identity construction, is at the same time perceived and ignored. It is perceived in that it is recognisable even if viewed as external to normative patterns of identity. It is ignored since the different assembled elements that conform to that particular identity are not recognised, and this provokes the distancing between that body and its identity. I use the concept of assemblage in the sense formulated by Jasbir Puar to focus on how biopolitics enacts the differentiation between the historical corpse and the bare-life bodies. Borrowing Giorgio Agamben's concept of bare life, I place emphasis on the way in which bodies in Moria stand in opposition to the subjectivities related to Thermi through their meaning. What matters in Moria is the biological dimension of the bodies while Thermi is based upon acts of signification attached to discursive practices. As conceptualised by Puar, "an assemblage is more attuned to interwoven forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, coherency and permanency" (2007, 212).

In her critique of the conception of identities as stable and named, Puar proposes to work with an idea of identities as affected, enacted, and performed by/through circumstances that go beyond the monism of the body. An identity is hardly ever a fixed category that works outside of the world conditions in which it is inscribed. Instead, identities are in/a continuous contamination in which the body functions as subject and object of that permeation, exceeding the human exceptionalism which anthropocentrism has inscribed in identity studies. Puar reworks the theories related to intersectionality, popularised through the work by Kimberlé Crenshaw, and proposes an intersection between assemblage and intersectionality. In her view, intersectionality has been important as a site of resistance to dismissed identities – a strategic focal point from where to fight back their oppressive representation, but it has also reinforced the idea of identities as fixed categories through time-space. In Puar's own words,

> to dismiss assemblage in favor of retaining intersectional identitarian frameworks is to miss the ways in which societies of control apprehend and produce bodies as information, as matter that functions not or predominantly through signification, as modulation of capacities, as individuals in populations with any array of diverse switch points […] and surveilles bodies not on identity positions alone but through affective tendencies and statistical probabilities. (2013, 387)

Puar stresses the idea of affective identities and this proposal checkmates the image of identities linked to bodies as islands, perceived as isolated non-places. Examining the two cases central to this chapter through the lens of assemblage, we can see, then, that the historical accounts and discursive elaborations of these two spaces are determined by affective circumstances that entangle and intertwine with the bodies connected to each of these locations. As I have stated at the beginning of this section, the ways in which these two spaces are assembled in one case study is a circumstantial decision that goes beyond their intrinsic relationality with each other. Following the idea of the instability of connections between the elements that conform with both the interiority

and exteriority of these spaces, the assemblage also works as a cartographic methodology according to which categories, such as race and heritage, that are symbolically external to these two places, become attached to them through a specifically generated chronotope common to both. The racial architecture of the dominant identitarian genealogies in Thermi is revealed in this performed cartography. At the same time, the lack of genealogy in the dominant historical discourse in Moria is also evinced. Race and heritage become inseparable elements to confront and challenge.

These assemblages also highlight the dissonant temporalities of these two locations. Memory and genealogy work in different directions here, since the fact that Moria is not allowed a future does not mean it is erased from memory. Specifically in this case, the construction of Moria as a place outside temporality coexists with its potentiality as a space of memory. But not yet, not now. This potentiality is established in its accountability as a historical fact, as a necropolis, as an archaeological site, once it becomes past.

As experienced throughout different current examples of dissonant heritage in post-conflicts, there is an urgent need to activate and vindicate realities that were silenced or erased from memory. This is recurrent in many of these examples. With this goal in mind, I examine the ways in which heritage, memory, and identity are constructed through a fixed idea of what the past means. These constructions and fixations are embedded within knowledge formation and therefore, they are linked to research practices and places of epistemological generation. In this sense, the responsibility we have as academics, researchers, and political subjects to act as the advocates for situations of contemporary conflicts, dissonant histories and heritages, is an important act of accountability. Through connecting two very different realities coexisting in a liminal place, the archaeological site of Thermi and the refugee camp of Moria, I have engaged into questions of how the binding of these two places together works in a performative manner, allowing categories that have not yet been activated to enact and become significant to *H*istorical genealogies and *H*eritage *S*tudies. The vindication of present dissonant spaces of conflict, such as Moria, opens up approaches to *H*istory

that exceed the linear temporality in which it has traditionally been inscribed and disrupts the power structures to which *Hi*story responds. This claim, ultimately, interpellates new considerations of memories and identities, and provokes response-able reactions to unjust situations which we often tend to ignore when looking at them from our privileged positions.

With the deconstruction of a normative understanding of time and temporality inside disciplines dealing with *Hi*story and memory, this chapter tries to dislocating the present in order to anticipate significant silences. These currently created voids encapsulate potential dissonances in a (not so) distant future. In this sense, the way in which *dissonance* has been used in this contribution is inherently dissonant: it speaks about a heritage and a memory of the future. Or, in other words, it faces material injustice in the present to foresee cultural dissonance yet to come.

2.3. Borders: spacial divisions, motion and mobilities.

After examining the fragments which conform *Hi*story and the colonial tricks which are to be found in between these pieces, I would like to engage in the specific materiality which triggered this case study: maps inside border logics. The many paradoxes that are locked inside *border theories*, include a specific one which calls my attention, giving my analysis: as Anzaldúa wrote long ago, contemporary borders are not reduced to geographic divisions (1987). Departing from the text by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Nielsen "Between Inclusion and Exclusion: on the Topology of Global Space and Borders" (2012), this case study analyses in which ways the oppositional binaries between inclusion/exclusion and identity/counter-identity depict the a critique inside identity politics. These theories, that have already been problematised and diffracted (following Karen Barad's *theories of diffraction*, 2007) via Jose Esteban Muñoz's *disidentification theory* (Muñoz, 1999), are reshaped to give a new ordering of space that can attend new significances of spatial limits but also of its connections. The theorisation of the border as a rediscovered *topos* in the middle-space, a nomadic setting (following Rosi Braidotti's *Nomadic Theory*), trapped me inside a dilemma that I am still dealing with every time I encounter a text that is

relatable to theories and politics of identity. The depiction of the border as a site of possibilities is based in its *potentia* -as a station for becoming-, where identities, subjectivities, resistance, power hegemonies and intersections are stressed and intensified in a way that reveals, drags and performs all these processes. As I have analysed in the previous chapters, my understanding of a method -as the border method here applied from the studies by Mezzadra and Nielsen (2012, 2013)- is one that does not refer to it as the ultimate solution. There is more to be gained of a method when using it as a critical point from where to analyse and locate these assemblages, diffractions and nepantilism.

As I have examined in the previous chapter, my dissidence regarding the nomadic border is not related to the understanding of a necessary breaking of the 'wall' metaphor (even if its dystopian image-metaphor is being materialised) and a questioning of the processes that are performed in that motion. Instead, I am concerned with the responsibility that is placed upon these nomadic subjects. I want to problematise this depiction of the border as a resistance place that projects two ideas which are open to big misunderstanding: one comes from the fact that it seems as if this "nomadism" came from one's own agency of being in an "in between" space. The other follows some of marxist György Lukács's theories, as Peter Drucker reflects in his "The Politics of Some Bodies" (2017), where the responsibility is placed upon the person under oppression reproducing the idea that a struggle "guarantees revolutionary consciousness" (Drucker, 2017: 3). These two ideas, which have been exposed in the previous chapter, are here embedded in a new location, that of a friction of two spaces of liminality: Moria and Thermí.

I have found the exploration of these two limits- and the possibility of a critical assemblage view of them- in the horizon that Jose Esteban Muñoz proposes in *Disidentifications (*1999). While reading the text from a diffractive methodology of examination (Barad, 2007), the dissing, dizzing and dissident aspects of Muñoz's motive have their means in the negotiation of the contradictions and paradoxes that appear when talking about disruptive identities, such as that of the border-crosser, for

some, the nomad. Muñoz brings new light to the world making of (*some*) queer identities through disidentifications, examined by queer performances as Case Studies.

The counter-identity approaches proposed by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson through the "border method", and by Rosi Braidotti in her "nomadic theory", are important sites of reflection on in-between chronotopes. They need a conversation that can remain critical of the dregs that become sediment through theory and discourse. In the nomadic space of the border "there is a certain intensification of political and even existential stakes that crystallise relations of domination and exploitation, subjection and subjectivation, power and resistance" (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2012: 60). From a queer analysis of identity formation, it is interesting to see how the border can be read as a place of concentration of power hegemonies that work in the subjects that occupy it. Still, the border can be many other things when disentangling it from identity. On the one hand, even if it is true that the border is drawn as a locus of possibilities, on the other, the border is still functional to a particular identitarian apparatus which generates through its liminality an oppositional understanding of space. Going into the first case, the potentiality of the border stands "as parameters that enable the channelling of flows and provide coordinates within which flows can be joined or segmented, connected or disconnected" (Mezzadra and Nielse, 2012: 59). Still, this possibility, the *potentia* for new becomings, is framed in an uncritical way that permeates and establishes the border as a place where agency and consciousness are the variables of the equation that sustains the action occurring in it. The subject in the border is here understood as a subject in struggle, as a hybridity that "def (ies) notions of uniform identity or origins (...) [and] catches the fragmentary subject formation of people whose identities traverse different race, sexuality, and gender identifications" (Muñoz, 1999: 31-32). A critical disruption of this idea is found in *disidentifications*, as it recognises the struggle and sometimes inertia that the nomadic position implies. As Muñoz examines,

> Disidentifications is meant to be descriptive of the survival strategies the minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of normative citizenship. (Muñoz, 1999 :4)

255

Muñoz depicts the disidentification system of identities as a strategic negotiation that minority subjects have to perform in order to survive breaks with the uncritical style that nomadic theories have to speak about this oppressed position as a site of possibilities. The disidentifying project can be connected, instead, to this other aspect of borders, which is not centred upon identity. In this alternative, and following the lines of critical border studies, I apply Paulina Ochoa Espejo's bold project *On Borders: Territories, Legitimacy, and the Rights of Place* (2020). Ochoa Espejo challenges the universalising idea of "No borders" reflecting on the deeper layers which are locked inside the motto. Their approach decentres identity and works through the possibilities of borders as tools for situated politics, which also restructure the problematic of neoliberal practices of governability and the abstract understanding of justice. In this aspect, Ochoa Espejo asks what might solidarity mean in every place taken into account and why inclusion, as a concept of political activation, is not always the synonym for solidarity. If we think about first nations and indigenous communities, or spaces that are contemporarily occupied, being the case of Canada and the USA or Palestine, respectively, we understand that exclusion sometimes means, quite simply, the preservation of living otherwise. As they remind, "[i]f the theories of self-determination wish to remain consistent, then they (explicitly or implicitly) must rely on the natural borders of polities." (2020: 101). It is interesting how Ochoa's perspective, by focusing on place similarities rather than subjective identifications of space, questions the universalisation of identitarian pre-conceptions of different worldings. In this, they also criticise the alternatives of these statal-border geopolitics, based on identitarian rhythms of land, which conceive certain populations as naturalised and conditioned to the "good and natural subject", which also reproduce certain patronising misconceptions. This is also in connection to the human exceptionalism so deeply criticised in this work, since it also works from the delusional idea that people that are natural of a place, such as indigenous subjects, work in the opposite side of culture, as if they were ahistorical and timeless. In this, Ochoa also forms a deep critique on the prejudices of identitarian categories which build up the migrant and refugee model subject, which far from reality, is reduced to this inclusion by exclusion, i.e. its understanding only inside its rejection. As many others have analysed, the reduction of some subjects to their condition of being outside nation-

state active locations, such as the case in people inhabiting a refugee camp, reproduces ableism and cis-heteronormativity (Loyd et al., 2023).

Having revisited the assumptions of spatial division and fragmentation, I would like to return to the question of motion and mobility. When critically examining these topics, the acknowledgement that the agency in this motion identity comes from a struggle does not only revisit the normative spaces from where these subjects are diasporically thrown out, but also where they are sometimes thrown in. This recognition of situational motion opens a variety of possible strategies of resistance. Hence, within these, when speaking about forced mobility, such as asylum or migration, there is also space to talk about normativisation as one possible strategic need of survival or resistance.

As I have announced previously, in the last few years I have grown very interested in critiques and counter-critiques on politics of identity. Concepts such as *homonormativity* (Lisa Duggan, 2002) or *Homonationalism* (Jasbir Puar, 2007) have become very popular in queer theory. The obvious conjunction between state and identity is primordial to these studies, since they work from both non-straight and non-static perspectives. Criticism of the privileges that stand behind identitarian discourses is necessary and it should be directly connected to the privilege that also stands behind the depiction of the border and the nomad as the radical possibility of breaking apart from the system(s) of power. As Peter Drucker elaborates, "many queer critics of homonormativity are middle-class, and many working-class lesbians [*or other queer identities*] are attached to gender roles and family" (Drucker, 2017: 3). Disidentification stands in the diffractive positionality from where to encounter these terms in a rhizoma of possibilities, calling into recognition the complexity of anti-capitalist struggles that the dissident identity might encounter (Drucker, 2017: 3). Moreover, di(zz)ssing these theories calls attention to a revision of how these possibilities are also connected to a sense of responsibility which is imposed over the subject under oppression and surveillance, hence reinforcing the power structures that stand behind the struggle itself. In a crisscrossing mode, the oppositional binary is broken by these alternatives in their problematising and recognising the subjects inside

a system of control. From these new locations, identity is more connected to an intersecting fiction rather than a generative epicentre.

Muñoz reads along with Michel Pêcheux's work in breaking this oppositional understanding of inside-outside the system while talking about the political determination of the subject inside the ideological system of representation. Pêcheux builds over three ways in which the subject is constructed: The "Good Subject", the "Bad Subject" and the "disidentifying Subject". The danger that the "Bad Subject" presents is determined by the "counter determination" that

> validates the dominant ideology by reinforcing its dominance through the controlled symmetry of "counterdetermination". Disidentification is the third mode of dealing with dominant ideology, one that neither opts to assimilate within such structure nor strictly opposes it; rather, disidentification is a strategy that works on and against dominant ideology. (Muñoz, 1999: 11)

Identity is a complex assemblage of tensions between the subject and its relation to what it comes in contact with. As such, identity cannot be framed as a monistic cause from where the subject enacts. Following Michel Foucault's theorising of power in *The History of Sexuality* (1976), these frictions also speak about how hegemonies appear in a multiplicity of chronotopes. This dislocation of power, which appears in disidentifications through the tension between cut-stick in respect to the system of representation, is a claim to the recognition of the privilege that stands behind theorising. It also reclaims the necessity of remaining critical about how to imagine utopian futures outside normative systems of identity, while, at the same time, attending to the material conditions of the location from where these possible becomings are imagined. Using some queer performances examples (in this case, Marga Gomez's *Marga Gomez is Pretty, Witty and Gay,* 1992), Muñoz speaks about how the constructed "minoritarian" subjects come into the fiction of representation, stating that "Spectacles such as those that Gomez presents offer the minoritarian subject a space to situate itself in history and thus seize social agency'' (Munoz, 1999: 1). The danger of the fiction of representation is then getting trapped in the system, as expressed by Jack Smith's sentence at the start of the book: "Normalcy is the evil of

homosexuality" (Muñoz, 1999: ix). Disidentifications confront this trap as they propose, from a privileged state of consciousness and agency, a fiction in drag that brings together (for those who find it possible) survival and resistance. Activism has to be informed by these diffractive theorisations and disidentificatory optics that turn "to shadows and fissures within the text, where racialized presences can be liberated from the protective custody of the white literary imagination" (Muñoz, 1999: 29). Disidentifications, thus, are methodological strategies that I find primordial in order to bring together theory and activism in a way that keeps the border as a critical place from where to act in friction, talking of how not only does light have to be brought into shadows, but also of how, sometimes, shadows need to permeate lights.

2.4 The temporality of the "unreal": time as space. Temporal viscosities, waiting.

In the continuation from the previous section, my particular interest in disidentifications in Muñoz's sense is the connection to subjectivities which, through specific movements and significations, become unreal. In the unity between Muñoz's ideas and Fanon's theories regarding the "violence of derealization" (1968), some ideas arise for the comprehension of this Case Study.

The dislocation mentioned above speaks distinctively of the temporality shift this chapter deals with. Speaking about heritage and identity, the sense of chronology appears as more viscous than rhythmic time. The dislocations of the meaning of the present, which eventually become significant pasts, is also tied to the temporalities of the subjects involved in this coevalness. This is important to deal with because of the futuristic alternatives which are constantly shaped in research and academia that try to give 'solutions' to contemporary problems, but lack an attention to identities which are bound to a temporality of present, to the human flesh and to the material possibilities of representation. In the claim of affect over discourse, this work sees the potentiality of understanding, engaging and dealing with the multiple ways of embodiment response. By this means, affectivity becomes crucial in these new temporal considerations, where the immediacy and restriction are also fundamental

markers for new embodied rhythms. As Laurent Berlant thinks through their theorization of *Cruel Optimism* (2011), state that this projects tries

> looking at the complexity of being bound to life. Even when it turns out to involve a cruel relation, it would be wrong to see optimism's negativity as a symptom of an error, a perversion, damage, or a dark truth: optimism is, instead, a scene of negotiated sustenance that makes life bearable as it presents itself ambivalently, unevenly, incoherently. (p, 14)

In Berlant's analysis, there is a strong commitment to remaining critical of the circumstances involving optimism, which can also derive in other optimistic structurations such as normative understandings of identity, temporality or affects. *The promise of happiness* in Ahmed's critique is shaped in Berlant's work through the notion of attachment. As they write, "attachments are optimistics. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic" (Berlant, 2006: 1). Following this use of attachments, the bounds to certain temporalities is the main focus of this section. The optimism in Berlant's scheme is not tied to a promise of a future, but rather to a "waiting" present. Ghassan Hage's development of the notion of *Waiting* (2009), reviewed in the previous chapters, relates to this other temporality or temporal others. Hage's use of waiting speaks of a state of stuckedness. In this identitarian way of shaping bodies through different temporal rhythms, Hage's idea connects to Alexander Weheliye's development of viscosity: the bare life recovered from Agamben's theorising of the *Homo Sacer* is directed towards the ways in which racialized assemblages nurture from accumulative processes which give shape to certain embodied experiences. These accumulations involve temporalities, affectivities, relationalities and visual racialization/genderization/commodification, which become sticky and stuck in bodies.

2.5. Waiting, motion and orientations.

As I have analysed previously (the void), the notion of *waiting* is interesting to direct the critique towards motion in different orientations. Nomadism is criticised in Braidotti's formulation and figuration because of its impossibility to attend the ambivalence of movement it holds within. Taking Ghassan Hage's use of *stuckedness*, I want to point out at one last element, since this is the connection to the next case study, that of Lesvos and the friction between historical artefacts and uncomfortable contemporary material culture. Hage, through the twist of the established formula "critique of crisis" to the "crisis of critique" achieves to explain the way in which being stuck does not intrinsically entail a lack of mobility. Hage makes a distinction between existential stuckedness and social stuckedness. As Hage explains, "just as there is an imaginary existential mobility, there is an imagined existential stuckedness. This form of stuckedness is existential in that it does not necessarily coincide with lack of social mobility" (2015: 5). This is particularly interesting to apply here because Hage reaches a fresh way of facing motion. While speaking on how mobility is symbolically central to the construction of the white established subject, to be stuck, to lack mobility, does not mean the same from a social point of view, that could be exemplified by people migrating and establishing in "new" landscapes, than from an existential perspective. To be nomadic, understood from certain theoretical constraints, can fall into this trap. One could say "I feel trapped" because they are stuck in an established form of life, production, love and so on. Even if this can be read as a lack of agency, to equal the locations from where these lacks can be very dangerous.

The temporalities Berlant engages in, from queer motions, extend to the analysis of the normativity which is inscribed in time and the materials derived from it. Time becomes a phenomenon, seen through the many examples of the stagnant materials that generate from its ordering, such as Heritage, space or the displaying of concepts. Space exists in time. Geography exists inside chronological apparatuses. The fact that time is held as active is also part of a logical way of thinking about time. In their analysis of queer temporalities, Berlant thinks about the time continuum which is broken towards a wither understanding of time on hold. In the intersection with the

temporality of *waiting*, the question arises: what does it mean to wait and how do we speak about the temporalities of time halt?

Time unfolds identity. "Waiting to perform" and "waiting to belong", respond to radically different schemas, the first responding to an active waiting, while the second is recruited in passivity. These equations that are not equals are, nevertheless, sometimes overseen without recognizing how, as Derrida would already predict through his *spectres*, time is a changing agent. How one waits, for History or for historicity is different. The first schema waits for a recognition of existence. The latter already contains in it the epistemological truth of a narrative.

As the compilation of thoughts on the topic, Hage's *Waiting* makes us engage in unassumed perspectives of agency through rhythm. They formulate the question "Is waiting an exercise of agency or a lack of it?" (p, 2). Something as daily as *waiting* can come from very different sites and have radically diverse effects. We do not all wait for the same things, at the same times or in similar tempos. In regards to this pending human temporality of *waiting*, the question for this case study stands in this direction: what is the vibrancy of an active waiting? How does a passive temporality give new meanings of death even through living bodies?

When speaking about temporalities, it has already been reviewed the consequences of hegemonic narratives and Authorized Heritage Discourses (Smith, 2006; Rizvi, 2006, Hamilakis, 2007), which lock out from their records certain historical events. The sense of disruptive temporalities is here performed also because of the dichotomic breakdown just referred to above: the dead-alive. Following this idea, it can also be understood the way in which a linear temporality of production and reproduction, of hope and imagination, is held in suspense in the space of the refugee camp. It is so because of many reasons. One important case is the fact that the space of the camp is always signified through a temporality of exception, a rhythm of urgency and an outlook to moving elsewhere. Still, as it has been proved in each case, this is never the case, being the camp and its inhabitants holders of yet another layer of indistinction (Bülent, 2004: 93).

These ideas are also important to take into account when applying basic concepts such as biopolitics or necropolitics. In applying other ideas of the human, there is a crack in its assumed exceptionality, a disruption that comes both, from a possibility, from a critical perspective, and from an impossibility, as the limitation of some bodies which are only accountable as flesh. Other than human ways of living, being affected and materialising, are needed for these potentialities but also to remain accountable for what bodies are meaningful. The biopolitical twist which Achille Mbembe applies to his understanding of contemporary state control of bodies, in his formulation of necropolitics (2011), points out the ambivalences and contradictions of bodies in modern societies in which the very notion of life has switched. As we can understand from Georgio Agamben's considerations of bare life and the exploration of the figuration of the *homo sacer*, enter a zone of "irreducible indistinction" (1998: 9) between elements which seemed concrete in other philosophical traditions. In particular, the generalisation of life in Foucault's work is here challenged in Agamben's work by speaking about this undistinction between bio and *zoe*, included and excluded, or ultimately life and death. As he writes,

> What defines the status of *homo sacer* is therefore not the originary ambivalence of the sacredness that is assumed to belong to him, bit rather both the particular character of the double exclusion into which he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself exposed. This violence-the unsanctionable killing that, in this case, anyone may commit- is classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither as the execution of a condemnation to death nor as sacrilege. subtracting itself from the sanctioned forms of both humans and divine law, this violence opens a sphere of human action that is neither the spere of sacrum facere nor that of profane action (1998: 82-83)

Agamben's project is interesting since it goes a step ahead of the simplification seen in a generalised bio-value in Foucault's understanding of life. Nevertheless, it still fails to recognize other assemblage layers. The omnipresence of power and how it has been theorised had a limit in the way in which the sovereignty and modern state control was somehow pictured as impossible to contest. In this sense, Agamben does pair with

Foucault's understanding of institutional power in which there is "nothing in specific to blame but everything involved to think about". The problem with this analysis, which Agamben posits in the dominant narrative of Europe's holocaust, is that the sovereign power was not working just from a possibility of violence, domination and power to act, but rather laid in a genealogical understanding and working of a racialization and stereotyping of jew subjectivities. This is essentially important in this case because the way in which self-panocticum works in contemporary societies makes everyone entangled in a system of values responsible for a reproductive idea and the consequential violences and invisibilizations derived from them. As the case here, where the refugee subjectivity is reduced to flesh, it is not only the bad practice of a war and the power institutions and states reacting to it, but a set of layers assembling, normalising and legitimising a practice. This is obvious in the present moment, where the layer that built upon the present conflict involving Russia and Ukraine sustained a more inclusive discourse of the people living through the conflict. This inclusion was held by a racialization similarity which worked directly in the importance in social conversation regarding the war, but yet a difference in class and proximity was finally activated when the conflict lasted longer than what empathy allowed to our system of values.

Racializing assemblages encounter other forms of consideration which go deep into their generational roots. Through the readings of Jasbir Puar, Hortense Spillers and Alexander Weheliye, we can dis-assume the ways in which bare life is a universal value that divides the state and its citizens. This erasure of the importance of contemporary categories involving ability, racialization, gender or property is contested by these authors by maintaining an active critique to how some bare lives are more naked than others. In Spillers antiracist reading of the distinction between *zoe* and *bio*, she proposes the opposition between flesh and body. Through her analysis of these categories in her path breaking text "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe" (1987), we understand how both terms work in opposition through a chronological matter and not a discursive one. This is, *flesh* is not oppositional to *body*, but rather prior to it. As she states,

> I would make a distinction in this case between "body" and "flesh" and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject-positions. Before the "body" there is "flesh," that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse or the reflexes of iconography [....] We regard this human and social irreparability as high crimes against the flesh, as the person of African females and males registered the wounding. (*Ibid*: 67)

The flesh, which is a located ambivalence from non-white embodiments, is both saturated through visibility and ignored. As Alexander Weheliye examines through their proposal of racializing assemblages, the non-white flesh, which is already categorised prior to the "body", following Spillers theories, is sticky in its own signification. It is saturated by meaning but meaningless. Racializing assemblages is Weheliye's proposal to speak about race "not as a biological or cultural classification but as a set of sociopolitical processes that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans." (2014:12). In a mix with Puar's analysis of assemblage, Weheliye insists in the flux that marks racializing assemblages, which are, simultaneously tied to territorialization and deterritorialization (2014, notes: 104). Puar's take on assemblage is unprecedented because of the historical momentum it ties to, a post 9/11 war terror and how homonational practices served from this generation of alterity to gain privileges from state systems. It is radical because it speaks outside the box of representation, giving space to a double move where, retaking Butler's theoretical break, what matter also matter. Puar, in their reading of Arun Saldanha of the viscosity of the body, attempts a broadening of the representational status, in which social schemas of power, sexuality and race are saturated by much more than a mere code or sign of pre-signification. This means that, while representation happens to matter, the importance of attending to how that matter is actually productive without a need of a prefiguration, can disentangle these assemblages in more effective ways to respond. As they write,

> Signification, narrative, and epistemological coherence—known or unknown—is what subtends and mediates the stickiness, or slipperiness, of objects [....] Must bodies already be signified as something sticky in order to become even stickier? Is stickiness only a product of signification, of epistemic formation rather than ontological properties? (2017: 188)

Stickiness, which Puar addresses from the affective reading of Ahmed's use of the term, is here relocated into viscosity, used as a property which opens much more to the circumstantial (de)activation and to that ambiguity which works in certain bodies that do not always need of historical signifiers to hold to. There is a particular non-place which exceeds the human understanding of *place* itself. This non-place is beyond a cartography and resides in the practice of embodiment. Viscosity is taken by Weheliye as a guiding concept to their work, when attending, from Sylvia Wynter and Hortense Spillers' reading on the flesh. Weheliye writes

> the flesh epitomizes a central modern assemblage of racialization that highlights how bare life is not only a product of previously established distinctions but also, and more significantly, aids in the perpetuation of hierarchical categorizations along the lines of nationality, gender, religion, race, culture, sexuality, and so on. (2014: 33)

In this statement, they pair with Puar in the insisting mattering of deeping into the ontological activity of social schemas, such as race, and how these fleshing experiences do not only respond to pre-established settlements but rather get enacted and reinvented in a vibrant connection to other schemas.

2.6 Non-places

The two places here analysed can be examined through the object of non-places from Marc Augé's use when speaking of supermodernity. Moria and Thermi, following Augé's theories, could be defined as non-places. The many reasons behind this framing are related to the subjectivities habitating those locations, the

dawdling rhythm and the space of saturated voids and avoided saturations. This meaning is in saturation following this idea of void which doesn't equal nothingness but rather an indeterminacy, which is prior to the human significations of scales (Barad, 2012).

Non-places are defined in many ways and respond to different factors involving the acceleration of supermodern times applied to space. One of these elements- which is active in both of the places but in very different ways-, is the anonymous signification of the people inhabiting the space. It is different since it is palpable the way in which anonymity is ambiguous in the case of Thermi, where the space works as a cultural place of encounter, as a Museum, a domestication space where to consume the "European roots of civilization". Nevertheless, it remains a concrete space which informs other spaces, i.e., it gives significance to the rest of the places which saturate through the idea of a civilised territorialized Europe. The idea of non-place seems much clearer when referring to Moria. In contrast to its comparable example, the refugee camp lacked agency in its formulation since the saturation of signification it held always came from discursive others outside the camp. The anonymity, thus, in the case of Moria entangles many other factors which are far trickier and more dangerous to speak about. As Fanon writes about these fake dialectics zones of distinction,

> The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of a higher unity. Obedient to the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible, for of the two terms, one is superfluous. The settlers' town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town (1968: 37-38)

This exclusion is what takes place in the opposition between the two places of signification, one being filled by its recognised meaning, the other hiding its saturation through an impossibility to being perceived as significant. As Nolan Oswald Davis unsettles in their project "No Conciliation is Possible" (2018-

ongoing), using Fanon's passage, reflects on the state of a possibility, that of reparation, which is frequently envisioned from the Norths, whiteness and privileges. These lack a consideration of the many present absences and silences which locate in one of the sides of the opposition, speaking about reconciliation from a dialectics which takes, in a fake way, the two sides of the binary to be equally meaningful.

The place of indistinction Moria is held in is where identitarian notions of living-dead contrasts between bodies get fuse. It is so since the inert bodies haunting Thermi are active in ways the living ones in Moria are not. The spectrum of the ghost is more vibrant than the organic embodiment of an actual living body. This instance gives new information about this specific dichotomy: the alive and dead as consequential categories that correspond to action and inaction respectively.

The non-place active in Moria worked from an outside consumption of the place and from a reproductive formulation of application of the *homo sacer* identity to the people residing in this place. Obviously, here anonymity and impersonal signifiers are not referred to the inhabitants of this refugee camp, which certainly held strong relations among their families, their neighbors and the workers of the place. Here anonymity is applied to the way in which the 'refugee' identity, reduced to this monistic category, is consumed as anonymous, as an embodiment of un-intimacy. It is then clear I am not trying to pin down the experience of the people having inhabited this place, since I don't think it is my task in this thesis, but rather to see the cultural formulations and maturations that work in threshold of many layers of signification which ultimately generate a particular reading. At this point, I want to address the specific idea which Augé speaks about when referring to the "totality temptation" (1995: 48). This totality is referred to as the reduction to a coherent image which is drawn from a cultural place of signification. As it is clear to recognize, the anthropological, ethnographic and archaeological tradition has been coupled to this tradition in their way of signifying through archetypal subjects, artefacts, practices and places. This totalization is enacted by a

delineate signifying [*of*] spaces in the world, societies identified with cultures conceived as complete wholes: universes of meaning, of which the individuals and groups inside them are just an expression, defining themselves in terms of the same criteria, the same values and the same interpretation procedures. (1995: 33)

Thus, identity reifies into a consumption based on recognition, similarity and inclusion through exclusion. The identities constructed inside these liminal spaces are devoured as outside within. Outside the space of identification with but within the system of control. These identity thresholds follow the position of onto-epistemologies (Barad, 2014). In this topography, identities are not spoken about as totalized understandings of a subject but rather an understanding from figuration which are active from the specificity of particular locations. Again, the person in the situation of refugee or asylum is not described here but rather the configuration of these experiences inside the white exceptional European subjectivation. Following Johannes Fabian's analysis of the constructed Other, the analysis here responds to "a temporal concept [...] a category, not an object, of Western thought" (1983, 2014: 18). These ideas, as Augé reminds us, follow the coherence of wholeness to allow a straight idea and signification of their value inside those specific worldviews.

Alocronism is defined by Fabian (1983, 2014) as the epistemic terrain of knowledge where the contemporary Other, understood from a white anthropological tradition, is displaced to a different temporal location. This temporal dislocation activates a distinction between subject and object, in the traditional division of research knowledge. As Maxwell Uwusu also points out in his exceptional article "Ethnography of Africa: The Usefulness of the Useless" (1978), the distancing of the other in time is sustained and emerges from other generative practices of otherness, such as language detachment, which is not simply a generalised critique to communicative gaps, but rather the culturally separation which is usually informed by the oppositional construction of the viewer and the viewed. This insistence on time dislocations from normative and powerful epistemological positionings takes us in very different directions. Here, through this connection of the generative other through the negation

of coevalness, I want to switch to a consequence that can look, at first, contradictory. This is so because, through the case study here presented I want to focus on how some others, those ontologically prehistoric, i.e. iron age citizens, are granted a historicity of the past that locates them in a present, while in the case of Moria, their presentness saturation makes them un-discoursively expelled from a time cohabitation. My main interest in Archeological studies is this, since the discourses of the past which taint traditional and mainstream archaeology do not assume the generative exclusionary practices for the present. This is, while Archeology is a potential discipline to transform injustice into situations of civil and state responsibility, its bond to the past and the discourses surrounding this narrative have also been productive of distancing this potential from actual action. In the past years, thanks to antiracist and decolonial, and feminist and queer archaeologies, the discipline has been exposed to a more committed way of working through knowledge. Authors such as Jaime Almansa (2011), Gabriel Moshenska (2017) or Ana Pastor Pérez and Margarita Díaz Muñoz (2022) have for many years insisted in the importance of making archaeology accessible to the general public, for purposes of critical heritage generations and conservation but also to insist upon the particular strength the discipline has to relate the present to the past in ways which can inform contemporary debates, conversations or conflicts in more resolving ways. Authors such as Margarita Sánchez Romero or Paloma González Marcén (2018) or Margaret Conkey (1991) have taken this narrative to the ground of feminist and gender studies, insisting in the need of a deconstruction of the past which can locate and imagine women and other identities in the past besides the masculine cis-heterosexual body which informs our public imagination. Enrique Moral de Eusebio (2012) or Barbara Voss (2000; 2012) with queer archaeology. The highly referenced Whitney Battle-Baptiste (2011), other like Marison de la cadena (2009), Yannis Hamilakis (2007), Uzma Rizvi (2006), Timothy Pauketat (2007) or Zoe Todd (2016) have also had a high influence in my understanding of other approximations to material culture that break free at the same time as remain conscious of contemporary colonial configurations of their materiality.

2.7 Memory studies and non-human actors.

In the intersection between *Datamatics 2.0* and the theoretical diffractions which are used at the start of this chapter, I use memory and its temporality from the perspectives of New Materialisms. These theoretical approaches, which I have analysed already in many places of the thesis, help me explain aspects which are of my political and personal interest. Memory appears as trauma, as fiction, as agential, and as a consequential. Memory is here used from a historical sensibility, which draws attention to both the social and the personal links of how the past is recalled. The importance of such "new" studies in the use of NM is attached to something distant to the value we overdose innovation with. Thus, my use of "new" materialisms is connected to other issues that are linked to the human but exist in not-always-human expressions. In such a way, I ask myself what parts of memory are not-human, or not only human. In this sense, even with historical memory, reparative justice and other historical accountabilities of the violent praxis of some human communities, the way we approach the past is difficult because it takes us to spaces and places that are not present, and that are involved and evolve with/from other non-human actors. As in the case study here analysed, the spectral presence of the long-lost prehistoric figurations and the inert objects surrounding the tents are, for Thermi and Moria respectively, vibrant in ways human bodies are unable to be. These vibrant spectres can be read through the notion of agency used in NM, connecting the broad theoretical corpus of memory to these "new" accounts to matter. As Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische discuss in their article *What is Agency?* (1998) the narrowing of the discussion surrounding materiality has worked through the division between structure and agency. This way, the complex discussion surrounding agency and structure have been flat in this comparative pairing, forgetting the many ways in which both sides shape social realities (p, 963). Following this argument Carm Knappet and Lambros Malafouris also retake this question of agency and apply it to the Archaeological records and to disentangle the discipline from the basis of anthropocentric interpretations (2008). In my reading of these theorists, I explore how records of the past are vibrant through the present because of a flowing energy between structure and agency, which is not to be thought about only through the human embodiment.

Memory studies are linked to these ways of engaging in vibrancies. And as Maria Zirra notices,

> [D]espite de profusion of objects and other non-human actors in memory studies, the non-human still presents a significant gap in critical discussions of how societies remember. Be they archaeological, archival, museal, or architectural, objects have been explicitly presented as the matter and media of memory (Zirra, 2017: 458)

The importance Archaeology and disciplines regarding the material past have granted to artefacts is inaugurating also the discussions of how space is part of these materialising memories. Space and memory hold a place of their own since it is through a shared landscape that we can navigate non-present temporalities. As critical geographies, and in specific queer geography, have for years treated, space is far from being neutral. From the recognition of the intertwined formula identity shapes space and, inversely, space generates identities, this part is focused on how an application of queerness in the study of a certain location is important even if the site is, a priori, not gendered. With this, I mean that we sometimes think that spaces and experiences that are lived from an cisheteronormative standpoint have nothing to do with gender. This, being one of the main claims of queer theory applied to geography, is far from accurate since, obviously, a given for granted and legitime identity is, already, a gender act of construction. Still, I do think that gender is not a centre of conflict in all cases. Even if I do recognize that gender is one of the components of lively constructions, I do also see that it is not the main schema of conflict. Here, at the time I use queer studies in space (Bell and Valentine, 1995) I also engage with other theories regarding, for example, how normative temporalities can be a main factor of conflict in some of the situations I encounter here.

In a personal account, it was many months after starting to write about the friction between these two intra-acted spaces that I came upon a specific article by Yannis Hamilakis speaking about Moria, "Archaeologies of Forced and Undocumented Migration" (2017). Even knowing their work in anticapitalist and

critical archaeology, I had not read their analysis and application of archaeological methodologies to contemporary refugee and migrant camps. Reading their work, I verified my long appreciation for Hamilakis' work, again testing how some archaeologies can remain critical. In the reading of *Archaeologists as Activists: Can Archaeologists Change the World?* (2011) a compilation edited by M. Jay Stottman, I came back to these rooted intuitions. To maintain a critical positioning towards historical disciplines which engage into material cultures as potential remains to activate certain memories and knowledges for the past is also to engage in an idea of these as permeable and in constant flux rather than static, as they are many times studied and taught in our academic contexts. Returning to Hamilakis' analysis of the refugee camp as a site of cultural significance inside the European identity construction, there is an interesting point they make referring to language and theory surrounding these circumstances. As we can see from the non-extensive bibliography treating the topic, the majority of scholars and authors deeping into these critiques are documented white citizens. This is important not only at a symbolic level of representation, something that should also be revisited in a more active way so as to think what is reproduced when these contexts are analysed from privileged positions, but its direct consequences, such as the interpretation that it is given through these perspectives. As Hamilakis writes while using Agamben's conceptual tools, "while Agamben (1998) and others, especially through the concept of migrants as 'bare lives', seem to emphasize citizen rights [...] that category may not be relevant for many migrants today, as some invent their own versions of being as they go along" (2017: 126). This is relevant for political and activist discourses which go into the analysis of aftermath wars and extraction since the language which is used in these contexts is highly influenced by a state control which universalised the idea of the refugee and the migrant as in their desires of inclusion and their ideas of futurability.

Heritage, memory and identity are constructed through a fixed idea of what the past is and means. These constructions and fixations are embedded with knowledge formation and are, thus, linked to research practices and places of epistemological generation. In this sense, the responsibility we have as academics, researchers and political subjects to be loudspeakers for situations of contemporary conflicts, dissonant

histories and heritages, is an important act of accountability. Through the connection of two very different realities coexisting in a liminal place, the archaeological site of Thermi and the refugee camp of Moria, both on the island of Lesvos, I have engaged into questions of how the binding of these two places together works in a performative manner, allowing categories that have not yet been activated in each case, to enact and become significant to Historical genealogies and Heritage Studies. The vindication of present dissonant spaces of conflict, such as the Moria, opens up approaches to History that exceed the linear temporality in which it has traditionally been inscribed and disrupts the power structures History responds to. This, ultimately, can allow new considerations of memories and identities and provoke response-able reactions to unjust situations which we often tend to ignore when looking at them from the vantage privileged positions.

Bouncing forward to the conversation I held with Franck Chartier, as one of the directors of the artistic piece analysed in the following chapter, I remember speaking about undesired memory. As he explained through the particular case of going back to a bitter memory, a trauma, a loss, we sometimes take for granted people want to remember, that they want to travel to the past. We assume the present temporality is so strong they won't get affected in uncontrolled ways. Describing how fear of loss was sometimes "super confronting" because it was not speaking about an actual experience but rather the experience of concern, I reflected on how narratives from the past, in History, in memory studies, universalize the desire to remember. As I read from Hamilakis, "while archaeology valorizes such material traces, out of which it produces an 'archaeological record' and an archive, such valorization is not necessarily shared by the migrants themselves." (2017: 133). This reflection throws us back to the question posted in the previous chapter concerning the materiality of memory: archives. The question here travels from a materialistic account of documents "Is Archiving Always Radical?" (Díaz et al., 2016) to a materialising aspect of subjectivity: Is remembering always radical?.

2. 8 Haunted Heritage and possession. go back to the non-huamn agents:

There is an interesting intersection between identity and material heritage in this case study that is linked by the terminologies of possession. Let me explain: at the time we are speaking of different types of historical and archaeological sites of memory and cultural heritages, we happen to be inside a frame of identitarian discourse. My interest here is to think on how also a critique has to be posted in the way in which identity, in singular, is seen as the ultimate site of heritage, privatisation and possession. This connects to the next Case Study, where I delve into specific aspects of the implications of the liberation of private spaces in how to live commonality.

In Macarena Gómez Barris analysis of indigenous phenomenology, in specific andean phenomenology, she sees how the subject building in these realities has "less emphasis on the making of individual subjectivity, since embodiment is defined as thoroughly sensitive, and as being in haptic touch with the surround" (2017: 49). As it was been discussed in the previous section, the centrality which some non-human agents have in the construction of someone's experience, deals through unrecognised (from our globalised white epistemologies) forms of identity.

Connected with the "ulterior" projects of the posthuman, as happens with the direction of contemporary conquest logics, the dynamics of possession and privatisation are to be found in these alternatives to make clear the ambiguities and risks that any project is to have. This idea deeps into the notion of possession applied to identity and derives from the combination of "features that are usually perceived as opposing, namely the possession of a sense of identity that rests not on fixity but on contingency" (Braidotti, 1994: 31). In this regard, relating identity to a sense of privatisation is still an idea standing outside identity politics' agenda. Nevertheless, the activation of this perspective is essential to also throw new considerations regarding the commodification of identities and bodies which serve for statal, capital and dominant projects of social control. This discipline happens through a normalisation that is possible through the essentialist idea that subjectivity is private and, thus, external to ultimate systems of control. As María Lugones exposes through

the "coloniality of gender" (2008), identity is yet another site of colonial use for domination.

As it has been discussed previously, this re-vision also speaks to the posthuman and other traditions that challenge human exceptionalism, which nevertheless fall into anthropocentric considerations of the world. It challenges them by decentralising the human agency as coherent, central and unlimited entity of experience. At the same time as it questions the exceptionality of the human body it challenges the functioning notion of exceptional identity by which subjectivity is sometimes forced to find coherence in its own identifying process. This stagnated idea is in check mate through the present Case Study. It is so by normalising the fragmentation of a body's identity while, at the same time, problematising reiterative practices that are perpetuated through these fractures. This is, while engaging in a multiplying and multilayering notion of identity, it also aims to remain accountable for those fragmentations in which specific practices of oppression are practised.

As Ta-Nehisi Coates voices while speaking about historical narratives driven from power, "[i]n America it is traditional to destroy the black body. *It is heritage*" (2015: 103). The fragmentation of the non-white body happens prior to a disengagement, as proposed in alternatives to singular and monistic views of identity. The black body lacks integrity inside dominant narratives. To speak about fragmentation in this case becomes precarious. The risk of totalising experience is at stake. The alternatives to identity, particularly when written from white embodiments- such as the ones proposed by Butler, Braidotti and many others, including myself-, have an urgency to recognise this limitation. Here, the limitation is not referred to an ontological one, but rather the acknowledgment that even research, academic spaces and knowledge which follow the guidelines of diversity, utopic alternatives to reality are nevertheless thought through white supremacist imaginations.

As it has been exposed above in this chapter, the way History, Heritage, Anthropology or Archaeology (to name only a few) have marked certain violences and oppressions against non-power bodies is part of their gained value (value here is as in

276

power). Following Laurajane Smith (2006), Senake Bandaranayake (1974) or Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (1983), heritage is thought as one more fictional practice of History. This does not mean History or heritage studies lack importance, since they are structural paradigms from which to think about our pasts and contexts and work in identifying ways. Instead, it exposes that these disciplines on the one hand have been used for colonial and national identitarian projects of cohesion, which had the excluded counterpart of non-identified subjects that lacked a cultural memory framework, on the other it engages in the ways these disciplines have been invented for the purpose of these ideologies. It is so because, through identitarian recognitions, they achieve an invisibilization of the movements which persist besides: As Coates speaks up, the way certain bodies are excluded and violated is heritage. Violence towards the black body is rooted in the American dream.

In their arguments surrounding the flesh and viscosity of the social body, Alexander Weheliye delves into the meanings and spatial possibilities of mourning and reparations. In their magnificent attempt to write about the particular experiences of the racialised subjecting terms of their sociality, Weheliye also calls into question the particular ideas surrounding violence, mourning and loss, stating that

> [w]hile thinking through the political and institutional dimensions of how certain forms of violence and suffering are monumentalized and others are relegated to the margins of history remains significant, their direct comparison tends to lead to hierarchization and foreclose further discussion. (2011: 17)

As it has already been introduced in the previous parts of this work, Weheliye's main argument stands in the consideration of how the non-white embodiment suffers from a viscosity that renders the flesh outside any category of the human from where recent considerations depart from. In this sense, posthumanism, animal studies and the anthropocene, just to name the few working in this thesis, have their genesis in a consideration of the human archetype which lies on white supremacism and exceptionalism.

As we can see from this case study in connection to the ideas driven by the Datamatics 2.0 performance- and in intra-reading to the next Case Study through *Adrift-*, the binarisms between human and non-human, inert and alive or vibrant and inactive are deactivated by new considerations existing inside all of these categories. In this sense, to exist in opposition to humanity does not necessarily entail a non-human body, as to be dead is sometimes more productive than a living bod, as we can see from the late embodiments referred to as the cradle of western civilisation, through the space of Thermi, while inactivity might entail vibrances which are imperceptible to the "human" eye, such as the agencies surrounding the materials in the late refugee camp of Moria.

As it has been discussed in the previous sections, there is a problematic with the parallelism between the regards to matter agency and human de-responsability. The conjunction of both moves, taking their bounding for granted, has in many cases stopped us, in the queer agenda, from thinking about environmental issues and animal rights. This is not the case at the present moment, since there is an important shift in these violences. But it is still difficult sometimes to maintain separate the specific reparatory claims of marked bodies throughout history, those of racialised and queerised experiences for example, and the opening of subjectivity, that could engage in other forms of live and to reconsidering how inert matter can still be a constitutive agential part of our social regards. There is a certain fantasy when these two new approaches come together. The queer inhuman that has shifted the posthuman idol and the death drive that has dislocated the human body as the epicentre of any world quake are the examples of how queer and gender studies have been approaching these issues differently during the past years. Here I am specifying the space of Academia, since the rhythm outside institutional thought has been otherwise, having claimed these problematics many years ago. The fetish of examining queer inhumanities through queer death studies, and the other way around, could be the narrative of vanilla diffractively meeting kinky and becoming kinky itself.

2. 9 The senses of *beyond* in humanism: how a body is translated to be understood.

Still, to think outside the human mindset does not always mean to engage into animal or matter theories. As Jose Esteban Muñoz writes in his contribution to *Theorizing Queer Inhumanities* (2015), while explaining his *The Sense of Brown* project, the importance here is posted in the need to think as a latinx body outside the human paradigm. In this sense, the inclusion project into humanity is here retweeted, implying that the category itself is the problem, since it is limiting to bodies being fitted in it rather than flourishing in different directions. In his words of what the "queer inhumanity" is, he states that

> To think the inhuman is the necessary queer labor of the incommensurate. The fact that this thing we call the inhuman is never fully knowable, because of our own stuckness within humanity, makes it a kind of knowing that is incommensurable with the protocols of human knowledge production. Despite the incommensurability, this seeming impossibility, one must persist in thinking in these inhuman directions. Once one stops doing the incommensurate work of attempting to touch inhumanity, one loses traction and falls back onto the predictable coordinates of a relationality that announces itself as universal but is, in fact, only a substrata of the various potential interlays of life within which one is always inculcated (Muñoz in Muñoz et al., 2015: 209)

This reconsiderations of human exceptionalism takes into account many different realms of critique, throwing a central light on the abandonment of the colonial and racial critique of many environmental paradigms of analysis, that have thrown into the general box of the anthropocene many bodies that yet are struggling to remain in their lands and are far from extractivist logics, such as indigenous people in Turtle Island. As we read from Jinthana Haritawor's reflections on the queer non-humanity,

> "[i]t once again seems important to consider the uneven terms on which bodies interpellated as "queer" or as "racialized" are sorted into various biopolitical and necropolitical molds (....) There is a certain temptation to scapegoat critical race theorists as anthropocentric, correlationist dupes of the species binary with

an irrational investment in humanity and a lack of acknowledgment that objectification and animalization remain necessary objects of investigation" (in Muñoz et al., 2015: 212).

This is the point: the binary of inclusion and exclusion from critique is also working here, in which scholars- and others- speaking about the problematics of objectification and animalization of certain bodies are targeted as anthropocentric and part of the human exceptionalism device, falling into the oppositional trap of construction that this logic maintains. To work in the friction between decolonial and antiracist reparations and the reconsiderations of otherwise forms of being in the world is unabled in this inclusion/exclusion simplification. The shift moves towards "the potential to tackle anthropocentrism and dehumanisation simultaneously, as relational rather than competing or analogous paradigms" (Haritaworn in Muñoz, 2015: 213), outside the oppositional inclusion/exclusion gauge. Here anthropocentrism re-engages with its centre, centred in whiteness and ableness (Puar in Muñoz et al., 2015). The human, as it has been eluded, is a fractal paradox, being contained under certain biopolitical parameters but yet formed by infinite components that gives the impossible illusion of what the body is. In this attention to both factors, the limited and the infinite, is where the potentiality of thinking outside the human category has found its trap. To think outside anthropocentrism does not equal a distance towards reparations that we need to face once and for all. Then, to have a body should be prior to the significations that the body is given and achieved through different actions. In this light, viscosity of certain aspects of bodily lives get stuck between the hegemonic concept of humanism and the escaping of such categories to other beyond and post formulas. As Alexander Weheliye has recognized while attaining the centrality of the body as the material aspect of our identity, there is here a shift of the institutional *habeas corpus* to a disentanglement of the potential in turning towards *habeas viscus*, the neologism Weheliye introduces in their work (2014).

To expose power as a direct generator to violence is not new to academic critiques. Nevertheless, to name particular forms of power that come through this recognition of *habeas corpus* and which are determinant to how knowledge functions is less common and more uncomfortable. To position epistemology (de Sousa Santos,

2006) and translation as elements that have enabled modernity (Vázquez, 2011) is to open a space for rethinking that the way knowledge is approached can enact violence.

Long ago, Spivak spoke about the colonised embodied minds fruit of epistemic violence (1988). To situate the notion of translation that is active here, I use Vázquez's account of it. He writes, "[t]ranslation designates the permeability, the movement at the borders of a given language, a given system of meaning and more generally, of a given epistemic territory (....) translation performs a border-keeping role and expands the epistemic territory of modernity." (2011: 27). Modernity's counterside, its hidden one, coloniality, is at stake here. Since language, its given use, forms, practices and actions, lies in the taken for granted forms of modernity, these more subtle forms of arranging language for others, adapting certain experiences for a dominant whole and making visible certain codified forms of living concepts is proper of a colonial mechanism.

> [T]he epistemic territory of modernity determines the parameters of legibility, of recognition in accordance with modernity's metaphysical principles such as the notion of time and its rule of presence (....) The epistemic territory of modernity establishes its field of certainty, its reality, by a movement of incorporation that subdues the multiple, the discontinuous, difference into the realm of presence. (2011: 28)

Somehow, to name is to present, not only in a scenographic sense, but more accurately, it follows the temporality of the word in itself. To name is to force a concept, a notion, in the present. The impossibility here is the bonding that case study one and two find in their connection. While untranslatability (Lezra, 2017) is equated here to the impossibility of transplanting certain notions from Thermí to Moria, the untraceable component of this activation has to be acknowledged. This is, while reclaiming the activation of certain notions to situations that are evicted from particular languages-such as historical-archaeological-archivistic languages in the case of Moria-, their untranslatability forces them into an untraceability that sticks to them, making

practices that are beyond-discourse and language necessarily tactical for the reconsideration of these experiences. They become sticky, viscous.

Translation being a machine of cultural control, as it has been explored in the theoretical chapter, untraceability would also represent, among other things, a disruption of systems of representation. I say "among other things" because I acknowledge the troubles with the constant suppression of certain experiences, insisting on the disruptive elements as only one among many other readings that untranslatability can mean. The archive is saturated and empty at once, as it has been previously explained. The detectable parts may exceed language. The traceable elements may work in saturation. The leaking parts, outside the archive as a containment, could be new centres from where to restructure their memory.

3. Resolution.

Taking Ryoji Ikeda's *Datamatics 2.0* performance, in this part I would like to explore the potentialities that this performance offers to the reconsideration of subjectivity and body in the geological era that we inhabit, the anthropocene. Without dismissing the impact that the earth has suffered from our side, I want to rescue other problematics and subjections that are entangled in this "era".

I explore how the dialoguing of two critical theory works written at different periods allow these theories to maintain their critical character. Therefore, following a non-straight (re)productive temporality (Muñoz, 2009), I am assembling two works by Rosi Braidotti: *Nomadic Subjects* (1994) and *The Posthuman* (2013). Following DeLanda's use of *assemblage* and Barad's ideation of *intra-action*, I am working driffractively through the ideas of *immanence* and *irreducibleness* in both texts.

As DeLanda explains in their use of *assemblage*, the properties that happen in it are irreducible because while they emerge from the actual interaction between its parts, they cannot be ascribed to any of its parts. And they are immanent because if the components of the assemblage ceased to interact its own properties would cease to exist (2018: 3). This existence through persistence that appears in this double feature in assemblages is at the core of Barad's work, where intra-active forces are concrete at the same time as they happen in the very fact of connection between two or more elements. Thus, this assembling is here used to see how categories such as the human, mobility, subjectivity or identity are also intertwined in the anthropocene era.

For this analysis, I continue using theories of NM to work in the frictions between the importance of recognizing the agency of matter and the reconsiderations of subjectivity itself. The force of Ikeda's work can bring these thoughts into action in times where self-organisation and activisms are necessary to enact *life otherwise*, following Macarena Gómez-Barris' idea (2017), which I go deep into further on.

I have been trying to figure out what it was that I conceptualised as a shift in the blast of *subjective nomadities*. In the amalgamation of two works that have been entangling in me for more than 7 years was the question of how I had matched them together in a way that could sustain their own potentiality while addressing the problematics and evictions of certain issues that existed in them. The thing with things is that we would rather work through a monistic conceptualisation of them, in a pre-existent conception prior to their coming together. At an anxious moment of trying to understand what I wanted to do, I resorted to a revision- one of many that have happened throughout my academic years- of Karen Barad's work. I then grasped the way in which the very combination of both theories would materialise only by their

own meeting, breaking their temporal distance, and arriving at a new scenario where motion was beyond subjectivity and subjectivity, in turn, was beyond the understanding of "the human". *Subjective nomadities* squirt in the patient way which characterises water and other fluids, moulding to different objects with no resentment at all.

Being representative works related to theories of location and theories of posthumanism, they are written with a lapse of 20 years. This temporal characteristic also has driven me to new considerations of the texts while using the very notions and theories that derived from them. Such is the case of bridging two texts that are distant in a linear consideration of time, but put in dialogue when making them nomadic in time and exceeding a symbolic human rhythm. From this reading my take is that the divergent correlation between text and theory in both cases is what causes the lack of a critical positioning in Braidotti's words towards categories and realities concerning race, class, ableness or nationality. The understanding of these realities seems to be radical in their own way of conceptualising themselves, of creating new epistemologies, still without addressing the materiality and ontologisation which perpetuates certain paradigms of new epistemic generations. This is, in the use of a deleuzean-spinozian division between *potentia* and *potestas* (1968, 1677), the epistemologies driven from these two texts are at once potential in their own existence but respond to specific reproduction of powers which are necessary to bring into discussion so this potentiality can become situated. It is in this tension where I look for the constitutive parts of each of the theories used in the *puncept* of *subjective nomadities*. The nomadic subject and the posthuman are juggled with in order to create a new scenario from which to demystify both figurations in Braidotti's work.

I am aware that there is a certain consciousness of privilege in Braidotti's work, and it is for me important that there is a recognition of a necessary stable point of identity from which to operate, that can "allow one to function in a community" (Braidotti, 1994: 33). Still, and not only focusing on her work, this compulsory flexibility and fluidity is sometimes corseted in very tight ropes. And, as it continues - and although being aware of the political context in which this text was written- to

state that "the nomad has no passport- or has too many of them" (1994: 33) is somehow out of debate as an impossible comparison of situations. But, keeping in mind that "[n]omadic cartographies need to be redrafted constantly" (1994: 35) I will use Braidotti as an example on how these cartographies ought to apply this change for them not to become maps. Through the consideration of three levels of sexual difference, that of difference between men and women, that between women, and the differences within each woman, she proposes a practical alternative for feminist analysis and transformative thinking. Braidotti states through three levels of sexual difference that,

> If you translate these three levels of sexual difference on a temporal sequence, following Kristeva's scheme that I have already quoted, you can argue that levels one and two belong to the longer, linear time of history. Level three pertains to the inner, discontinuous time of genealogy. The problem, however, is how to think through the interconnectedness between them, that is to say: how to account for a process of becoming, while empowering women's historical agency? (Braidotti, 1994: 168)

Interconnecting the texts, the genealogies, the identities performed in each one of those texts and the ideas breathing through them, that is the process of this intra-reading diffractal becoming while keeping specific responses as cut which are needed to give located responses to specific questions.

I use the text of *Nomadic subjects* based on the fact that although the text was written nearly 3 decades ago, the nomad, as a feminist figuration, still plays a most salient role in studies and politics regarding its feminist agenda. As she writes, a figuration "is a politically informed account of an alternative subjectivity" (1994: 1) and as such, figurations constitute essential scenarios where the fiction of utopian politics clashes into material actions. That is why I deem it essential to reconfigure these personae. And within this frame of mind, the *posthuman* also configured as a persona that questions more than what it claims, still needs to do its round of critique. Braidotti writes that "cartographies [are] a sort of intellectual landscape gardening that gives [*us*] a horizon, a frame of reference within which [*we*] can take [*our*] bearing, move about, and set up [*our*] own theoretical tent" (1994:16) and only a bit further "It

is crowded at the margins" (*Ibid*: 20). The immanence that surrounds Braidotti's work, that insistence upon the politics of location for different conceptions of many subjectivities, can also lock conceptions of the human in those edges that rather than create cartographies keep reproducing more and more maps. I am not subtracting immanence as a centrepiece from where to position ourselves, but rather trying to think of how these locations happen through certain assemblages. The human exceptionalist conception needs motion itself to think about other subjectivities and entities existing in many corporealities other than human ones.

In this light, some questions are concretized, such as: what kind of agency would be triggered if the very sense of the nomad, its material move, was read in the posthuman figuration? What if the post locks up much more than a new agency towards fresh epistemologies? What nomadisms and motions are linked to extractions, dispossessions and evictions? What if a performance was to give an account of performativity that could include ontology in its own understandings, its foundation of a new scenario of reality?

These questions set a particular need to relate rhythm and time, something that is performed when dissolving 20 years for this mix. I use Zygmunt Bauman's *liquidity* (2000) because it allows me to place emphasis on how fragile theories are at the mercy of normative temporalities, and on how it is only by the blending of periods, locations and relationalites that these can become a located instrument of activism, enaction and critical thinking. The friction between the materiality of the present and the potentiality of non linear-productive temporalities appears in the deliquesce between the motion of the nomad and the fiction of the posthuman corporeality.

Ryoji Ikeda's *Datamatics* unchain disparate happenings in their performances giving space to this *otherwise* timing. Ikeda's world is built upon "pure data as a source for sound and visuals, datamatics combines abstract and mimetic presentations of matter, time and space" (https://www.ryojiikeda.com/project/datamatics/). *Datamatics* "explores the potential to perceive the invisible multi-substance of data that permeates our world" (https://www.ryojiikeda.com/project/datamatics/). The

borders of subjectivity become nomadic in time, in a posthuman mode of understanding the framing of reality, while contesting to nomadic and material happenings. The performance works against straight temporalities, exceeding the normative notion of identity time. As Jose Esteban Muñoz asserts in their wonderful writings, this linear and swallowed tempos move against non-(re)productive encounters. The counter space where the nomad stands, in that horizon that Braidotti stares at, becomes in Jose Esteban Muñoz's reading a drift, a topos in flux that moves simultaneously through the potentiality of utopic horizons at the same time it follows current rhythms. As Muñoz magnifically casts up through performative art in *Cruising Utopia* (2009), the force generated through this temporal motions is "a modality of knowing and recognition among audiences and groups that facilitates modes of belonging, especially minoritarian belonging" (p, 99).

In Ikeda's piece, a queer horizon is generated through the dizzying and disidentifications through data information that escapes the memory of subjectivity and plugs interpretations. The temporality of the actual performance finds situation in further times, places and relationalities, "never [being] just the duration of the event. Reading for potentiality is scouting for a 'not here' or 'not now' in the performance that suggests a futurity" (Muñoz, 2009: 99). The stage where the performance is activated becomes a specific chronotope without boundaries involved, and this very undistinction between the matterings, data and subjects also allows new temporalities of potential happenings. The contact with matter, with data, with electronic vibrations connects with a memory that is inspired from horizons more than with twilights, with the notion of futurity without delimiting its imaginaries.

In these rhythms there is nothing to grasp, or at least no language to hold on to. There is the whole human and at the same time no human involved. In this sense, it is data that shapes the terraces of the theatre and not the other way round. The stage, after some minutes of performance, shifts to our side, leaving us impotent while translating us into pure action, moving inside languages that we would never understand, being only a part of that genealogy that created data working in rhizomatic vibrations. Ikeda's late motive resists uncritical materialism through images that are music and music that we are quite unable to listen to. Following this idea, as Jussi Parikka writes, there is a

binding of "media and nature [together] as co-constituting spheres, where the ties are intensively connected in material nonhuman realities as much as in relations of power, economy, and work" (2015: 14).

My critique to knowledge and translations is built in parallel to specific critiques which have deepened into these questions. Such is the work by Quentin Meillassoux , who applied the term correlationism to that critique to a philosophy of knowledge and, here I would add, anthropocentrism. As he defined it, it is

> the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call *correlationism* any current of thought which maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation so defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say that every philosophy which disavows naïve realism has become a variant of correlationism (2008: 5)

Through this idea, in the performance the discursivity of agency distracts this "correlationism", dialoguing with the ideas brought by theories of NM and involving the untranslatable materialities present in the space of Moria. The anthropocentric obsession is situated from the vector of knowledge, bringing into questions what happens when a human-centred understanding is abandoned. What opens and what unblocks. Mering towards also located critiques of modernity being based in the sole image of a particular model of humanity, the anthropocene as a line of thought is interesting to bring into discussion. In the anthropocene, or as Jussi Parikka would twist it, the "anthrobscene" on speaking about the effects of media geology and digital garbage, NM is essential to a reconsideration of the constitutive parts involved in the binary between human activity and natural agency.

Using a dislocated temporality of these so-called "new" materialisms, what would breaking this dichotomy between human activity and natural agency mean? In the first place it would sustain the recognition of different kinds of anthropocenes as geological scenarios from which to criticise different human activity, not only towards the earth but also towards other bodies living otherwise. As Macarena Gómez Barris

exposes in criticising the monistic use of the anthropocene, the term is used "too generally, addressing 'humanity' as a whole without understanding histories of racial thought and settler colonialism that are imposed upon categorizations of biodiversity, spaces where the biotechnologies of capitalism accelerate" (2017: 4). In a decolonizing push towards the application of a rhizomatic reading, this understanding of multiplicity when talking about the anthropocenes also relates to the intra-actions that Karen Barad drives forward in the radical considerations of new relationalities that come to matter. The relation between the human public on the one side and the datamatic schizophrenia on the other generates new agencies in corpses that become enacted in that particular chronotope, matter that is "less an intrinsic property than a situated capacity", as Chad Shomura notices (2017b: 1)

Art and more specifically performance could bring into action not only theories but also new considerations of the human which is the central subjectivity surrounding the use of these frames of thought. In this manner, the anthropocene formulations would find a critical way of considering not only the violences that the earth has suffered from human profit, but also further violences that entangle in this extractive logic towards bodies and entities that do not always get included in the standardised idea of humanity. I am speaking not only about animated bodies but further matter that relates to them and has a life of its own. In *The Extractive Zone* (2017), Macarena Gómez Barris presents this "global North psyche" as an "artificial separation of life into organic, inorganic, mobile. Immobile, animated and inanimate matter" (p, 41).

This is somehow the connection to the next case study, where this interior-exterior debate is blurred in recognition of other inds of movements and actions which materialy take place inside the institutional amalgama of possibilities while contaminating these spaces by politics otherwise. As Braidotti also posts in her analysis of the ambiguity of motion in her nomadic project, and as Butler tests through the reconsiderations of performativity, the statements of change always depend on who reads this change and how they perceive it.

CASE STUDY 3: BOLOGNA AS A SELF-EXPERIENCED UTOPIC OTHERWISE.

1. Introduction

In the present case, the material culture of activism, is taken as a medium rather than as an end. Matter and its evidence through non-official spaces is not analysed as an object of signification but as a method to connect to other forms of social experiences. Some may call these evidences excesses, since they saturate the spaces they occupy by inhabiting them while being omissive of significance. They saturate space while already standing inside the means of lack. With this in mind, the case study henceforth corresponds to a void, not so much because of the lack of visibility of these experiences inside popular discourses but rather because of the latter idea: there are experiences that stand in this tension between lack and saturation. As we could see from the last part of the previous chapter, the fragmentation and intraactions of these particular pieces are in themselves the focus of my analysis. It is not the pieces involved in the articulation of certain experiences here analysed, but how these particles are held and intraacted together while being evinced through fragmentology.

Drawing from three focal points, the concepts of kinship otherwise, violence and affective negativity, I want to introduce the activist experience that I lived in first person during the days surrounding the 8th of March, 2017.

1. 1 The experience.

As was already a tradition within my group of friends during my first MA year in Bolonia, we had arranged to go to Cassero[82] that night. Being our first official contact with Gender Studies in a specific curriculum, that year we were constantly brought into different discussions about queerness, visibility, sexuality and pink-washing, this last one being our main critique of Cassero. Midway between disappointed and turned on, we left the club in the middle of the night. Saying goodbye is always a sort of liturgy among queer friends. It is a ritual of checking in, offering a half-walk together, but also a farewell, a quick recollection of your friend's gestures, just in case.

While squeezing in a shared hug, some voices in lethargy filled the air. It may have been less, and my night vision is not the best, but I remember 7 of them, filling a couch, in the middle of the street.

It was the 8th of March and we were all too excited to handle a conversation. We were throwing words and moving nervously without knowing how to cool it down. When we got to the piazza, we got confirmation of our excitement, looking at each other amazed, looking in every possible angle. During the demonstration there were too many emotions involved and asking each other how we were, it was only ceremonial since no one was fully capable of knowing how to respond. By the middle of the route, some friends were talking about this transfeminist squat that had been occupied during the day and needed support to resist for their first hours after the space liberation. Many hours later, someone proposed to go and so, without any awareness of the place we were about to enter, we had our first contact with the space.

We come by, moving slowly towards them, deciding whether to embrace their tough expression or the tired positions. They have been there for 2 and a half days, resisting alone after an explosive first moment of success, the géiser effect which taints

---

[82] Cassero is the provincial committee of Bologna's Arcigay NGO, a political circle which has been active for more than 40 years. This place has become an official location for LGBTQA+ activities, parties and events of all kinds, being controversial inside the political dissidence in the city.

social movements in their outset, but unable to last over time. They are fighting against an eviction signed not only by the government but also by the rest of the city, by those who were their companions in the olden times but who, today, have surreptitiously rejected their queer reality.

In a polyvalent voice, I say *hello*, trying to mix with each one of the faces and humours that are resisting at 4 a.m. waiting for the blue lights that will finally put an end to this no longer abandoned garage. To be fair, it is quite big. There is at least space for 15 cars and 120 unruly bodies. The next two hours go by quite fast and without thinking that the moment would actually arrive, the cars park next to the poster, where you can read the transfeminist queer name which to them is only a meaningless code. We have decided we will stand for a passive eviction, trying to avoid the violent reactions that other (non-queer) squats have had lately. We receive them sitting down, watching how the blue lights are off and the helmets are still sleepy in their hands. We are ready- or I am trying to convince myself we are-. We are ready to respond to their aggressiveness, to their mean faces forcing us to immediately leave this place.

I am scared, but I am still able to put on my best face. With a defiant expression I follow the songs that we are singing as a way of rejecting their eviction. Some are laughing, and there is one yawning. It is still very early and he didn't have a coffee and, by the looks of things, the yawner didn't even need one. When his mouth is closed again, there are 9 more people out of the place. I have also been moved by two gentle uniforms. Our body weights are not as important for them as the light amount of resistance they have found in the street where we are. Our anal pleasure, and its applied passivity, have again made them silence us. *Them*, not (only) cops, not (only) lawmakers, but our (non-queer) radical *comrades*.

2. Triggering:

2. 1 Assembly/assemblage.

Political feelings have never grown up from the infantilized vision over which they have been constructed. As Lauren Berlant observes, it is something "made of and for children" (Berlant in Nyong'o, 2008: 104). Developing from the normative constructions of kinship, in this respect, politics have been thrown out the backstreet. The front door, in the meantime, remains restful in a straight temporality that not only determines what relationships are to enter the alliance of kinship but also how and for how long these "other" associations should exist. The straightness of the temporalities that sustain these alliances entail both a sense of longevity and reproduction. These translate in the cultural notion of the family, that especially during adulthood converts all the relational possibilities to normally singular and permanent alliances that become the ones to care for. Jack Halberstam points out how outside these confinements that work through "an authenticating notion of longevity renders all other relations meaningless and superficial [*the family*](...), by virtue of being early bonds, seem more important than friendships" (Halberstam, 2007: 317). The effects of a productive surrounding is felt in the notion of futurity that is implicit in our political temporalities. In this futurity, besides the procreation sense of reproduction, stands the hope for replicas of the ideas that conform our understanding of our own identities. They are identities that are marked by location, desires, demands, shapes and other circumstances. Regaining the interesting parts of Lee Edelman's analysis of straight temporalities, as he proves in his notion of futurity, "we are no more able to conceive of a politics without a fantasy of the future than we are able to conceive of a future without the figure of the child" (Edelman, 1998: 21). Forcing myself away from the inimical feeling of these analyses, I continually recognize the way in which political bodies are infantilized, dramatized and patronized following the fantasy of the child. This concentration of the child imaginary and its family signifier becomes "misleading and mistaken, and, ultimately, it blots out a far more compelling story about cooperation, collectivity and non- heterosexual, non-reproductive behaviors" (Halberstam, 2007: 315). The triviality applied to these political bodies depends on how these bodies are marked, not only singularly but also as they participate in

collective imaginaries. As Butler wonders in *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly* (2015),

> [W]hen bodies gather as they do to express their indignation and to enact their plural existence in public space, they are also making broader demands: they are demanding to be recognized, to be valued, they are exercising a right to appear, to exercise freedom, and they are demanding a liveable life [....] How do we understand the form of signification that such protests seek to convey in relation to how they are named by those they oppose? Is this a political form of enacted and plural performativity, the workings of which requires its own consideration? (Butler, 2015: 26).

And, indeed, we were performing a form of resistance that had nothing to do with the long debates during our infinite circles or the shared beers after hours of consciousness raising. "Us" as a marked sexual identified group; as a feminized and, consequently, disempowered group; as unequal to the real squatting scene; as an "us" without power within itself. Maybe claiming for violence would not be the best way to put it, because it would be another way of ontologizing our collectivity into concluded parameters. Still, to be accountable in a state of violence is to be exposed to these risks when, as Butler also remarks, at this moment "the body risks appearance not only in order to speak and act, but to suffer and move" (Butler, 2015: 87). Our exoticized bodies read as monistic existences of sexualities, as if there were nothing more to them but the ways we fuck, as if fucking was the only mark of our gendering, as if sex was implicitly sexual.

Our openings to the world also imply anal coalitions that are not only sex-making but also, as Paco Vidarte coined, *analethics* (Vidarte, 2007), converting our rectums in "our political instrument, the fundamental slogan of another LGBTQ militancy, to design a very basic anal politics: all for the inside, to receive everything, to let everything penetrate you and only throw shit and farts to the outside, this is our eschatological contribution to the system" (Vidarte, 2007: 20). Raised fists and ass openings that work as a resignification as they are "not marked by gender or sex" (Saez, 2011: 111), that are not only understood as sex markers but as black holes

capable of absorbing great amounts of matter(ings). We were read as passive, we were constructed as passive, and we actually were. But it was the kind of passivity that rejects a systemic participation, the kind of passivity that seeks an ongoing penetration of intersecting existences, the kind of passivity that refuses to be kind anymore. We were wanted isolated in our own gathering, and in some way, we were wanted and expected to be docile in our transfeminine manner. We were denied violence. More than a claim to violence, I call for a further and wider opening of the understanding of its presence.

2..2 Violence/non-violence.

Violence, that is not ontologically opposite to pacifism, has been created as its opponent, giving singular epistemological readings of violence that have achieved its hegemonic use. When inverting violence into pacifism, as Peter Gelderloos does, it can be noticed how pacifism an ideology comes from a privileged context. It ignores that violence is already here; that violence is an unavoidable, structurally integral part of the current social hierarchy (....) Nonviolence refuses to recognize that it can only work for privileged people, who have a status protected by violence, as the perpetrators and beneficiaries of a violent hierarchy. (Gelderloos, 2007: 24)

As passive, as unproductive, we were also equated to futile devices, to sterile movements that didn't find significations in the city, not as a political threat- in the face of authorities- but neither as radical allies- with regard to comrades. Working through queer failure means facing the dissidence we sometimes choose in our movements, the constant rejection of accountability and the way we, still as radical queers, acquire to identities which we receive from the outsiders, from them who construct our passivity not as a refusal to the state we day by day denounce, but as a rejection to the outrage of our responses. But, again, who is "us"? There is a choice in wildness, in a guerrilla organized back action that answers their violence, their way of imposing us their futurities, their destructive way of reading our fiascos. There is a choice in our BDSM exchanges, in our submissive relations, based upon outgoing

conversations, in spanks that find strength in shared words and spaces. There is a choice to reinvent places again and again, to speak up the violence that we continue to suspend in our comrades, to reproduce identity norms that keep our movements full of borders. There is a choice in renouncing to cops and their patronizing smile, and there is also a choice to find this same smile in the middle of our occupied utopic locations.

The notion of violence is not unique; not in its forms but also not in its definition. This idea is also explored by Butler in *The Force of Nonviolence* when attesting that "we cannot race to the phenomenon itself without passing through the conceptual schemes that dispose the use of the term in various directions, and without an analysis of how those dispositions work" (2020: 14). What is considered a violent act, as well as what is considered resistance, is dependable of particular discourses at work in the context in question.

To claim that violence is, somehow, an impossible term to define does not mean the particular forms of violence that are here call into attention and given a wider perspective are impossible to grasp. In this sense, and as Jennifer Mills recovers from Hannah Arendt's analysis of violence while reading Butler's proposal, "violence is not a tool but a practice" (2021 https://sydneyreviewofbooks.com/review/malm-pipeline-butler-nonviolence/). This is important to remind as to give space for critique to the critiques of violence that justify its futility and dispensability as if violence was somehow an apparatus rather than an exercise. In this sense, the diffraction of gender performativity and repetition does not exempt drag of reproducing misogyny and sexism, but is held in its potential of exposing gender as a social training, violence here is not assumed in categories of morality but rather expel from this simplification from where it is normally conceived and analyzed. As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes in *The World and Me* (2015), the representation of violence is violent in itself. In his analysis on how structural ideas of the practices of violence are imposed into some already violeted bodies, Coates rethinks the possibilities existing regardless these structural and statal traditions of violence against black bodies. Nevertheless, decir algo del libro.

2.3. Affect

The encounter with affect in this chapter is important in a personal note. It is not hard to see how the previous chapters are already dealing with affective theoretical stands. The methodology, the circumstantial emptiness of some case studies because of the pandemic or the vulnerated communion of bodies in the dialectics between Moria and Thermí are affected and infected by affectivity. Both, the experiences that are collected and the way of archiving that I follow are dealing with visceral ways of facing these encounters. But it is in this chapter that the relation between the collected experiences and the way of narrating them is blurred, since it is my personal experiences that are depicted here.

The perspective that I follow, much of it driven by the imperious analysis during my master's about affect theory, engages into negativity as an extension of disruption. Disruption is meant here as an antinormative exercise of defamiliarization from compulsory feelings and ways of feeling them (Ahmed, 2010). Shared feelings of hope, fear and vulnerability are directly intertwined with systemic practices. Negativity, as I have explored in the void chapter, is not about despair but rather acknowledges the practice in feelings, pointing at them as actions rather than mere intrinsic effects of the body.

As I explored before, the affectivity that is lived through these cases has already been affected by the personal facts that infect this work and, also, the momentum lived in the aftermath of COVID-19. This is important here because, as memory studies have taught us, the way we remember things is not only factual in as much it is the 'real' memory of the present, that is already more material than the past, but that collective livings also infectate our ways of looking back.

Affective life and other emotional bonds to relationalities is important for my analysis since it decentralizes the particular normativity criticized through their traditions of both family and heterosexual notions. White abled systems of power have,

as we have seen in the previous paragraphs, legitimated through the idea of restricted kinship that was able for too long to control our affective and emotional lives. Theories and practices surrounding other forms of affectivity also entail new relationalities. They also give space to a genealogy of traditional ways of familial bonds that have, nevertheless, rooted through community organizations and emotionalities.

Affect can be considered, as a first hypothesis, as a power to act that is singular and at the same time universal. It is singular because it poses action beyond every measure that power does not contain in itself, in its own structure, and in the continuous restructurings that it constructs. It is universal because the affects construct a commonality among subjects. In this commonality is posed the non-place of affect, because this common-ality is not a name but a power; it is not the commonality of a constriction or a coercion but of a desire. Here, therefore, affect has nothing to do with use-value, because it is not a measure but a power, and it does not run into limits but only obstacles to its expansion. (1999: 85)

Affective labor modifies general feelings and, as a surplus of social experiences, it influences specific zeitgeists. As Negri follows through, since postmodernity being *value* outside any kind of every measure (p. 86), its reification is to be found in other places for its control, such as the place of affect. In his commitment to renovate marxist theory, Negri uses the economies of affective labor as a pretext to deepen into affective state of affairs that are conformed inside capital systems of production. This alternative analysis does not only focus on parts of a functioning system which counts on invisible actors that also shape its means, such as affective labor historically brought through in house scenarios by women. It also insists on the non-material affairs which have a decisive role in this system, holding itself together through economics but also outside the direct elements to them. A system based upon feedback: To affect and to be affected.

The affective turn, which calls into attention the urgency of returning to affects, has proposed both, a theoretically and a praxis approach to the matters. Affect matters in a butlerian double bind: it is significant as it also has a material sense to it. As power,

affect is productive, extensive and multifocal. This is its potentiality but also its urgency. Affect affects and is, at the same time, affected. Following Deleuze and Guattari's take on spinozian potentiality, Patricia Clough explains affectivity as "a substrate of potential bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in excess of consciousness" (2007: 2). Potential, sometimes drawn as intensity, such as in the case of Brian Massumi's work (1995), is the drive to this centrality affectivity has in our lives.

As Anne Cvetkovik has enlightened affective and critical scholars for many years now, the affective turn is an amalgama of inquiries that have been claimed inside the institution of academia and broadly meant to also look at them outside it with fresh eyes, engaging in,

> cultural memory and public cultures that emerge in response to histories of trauma; the role of emotions such as fear and sentimentality in American political life and nationalist politics; the production of compassion and sympathy in human rights discourses and other forms of liberal representation of social issues and problems; discussions of the politics of negative affects, such as melancholy and shame, inspired in particular by queer theory's critique of the normal; new forms of historical inquiry, such as queer temporalities, that emphasize the affective relations between past and present; the turn to memoir and the personal in criticism as a sign of either the exhaustion of theory or its renewed life; the ongoing legacy of identity politics as another inspiration for the turn to the personal; continuing efforts to rethink psychoanalytic paradigms and the relation between the psychic and the social; the persistent influence of Foucauldian notions of biopower to explain the politics of subject formation and new forms of governmentality; histories of intimacy, domesticity, and private life; the cultural politics of everyday life; histories and theories of sensation and touch informed by phenomenology and cultural geography. (2012: 3).

Following the standards of new materialistic theories, affect does not pre-exist the relation, but rather get activated through it (QUOTE). This relation, which exceeds the human parameters and can also appear between human and inert or other animal bodies, is …algo sobre lla autonomia pero por otra parte el no preexistir.

The importance of affect theory here goes beyond its emotional agenda. The connection that the affective turn went through when engaging into trauma and memory studies is here taken into a central account. As Clough reminds the readers in the introduction to the Affective Turn monograph (2007), memory is at the base of affective life and vice versa. As María Torok and Nicolas Abraham (1994; 1979) broke the ground on memory and trauma studies, their "transgenerational trauma" haunts bodies in imperceptible ways. How these affective experiences are acted through renewed in unconscious ways is a radical link between affect and memory. There is a haunting and there is an entanglement, as Petar Ramadanovic states (1998), while addressing the particular issue when bringing memory into affective analysis: there is an impossibility to disengage. In its many layers, affective life takes different forms also in its connection to memory, such as in the case of repression, in which the concept of loss or the affectivity involved in this memory is haunting, as it is present in ethereal forms.

Such is the case with the affectivity involving the memory of stolen and occupied land, or the image of an impossible body outside cisnormative corporations. The senses of memory, of trauma or hope are bound to other multi facial circumstances that have to be taken into account in the reminder that affectivity does not pre-exist the relationality, but rather gets enacted through it.

Affect theory has relocated these social feelings and reactions in other levels of *responsibility*, as in the concept's internal knot of the ability to respond that a body has. The consequences of these relocations also engage in(to) the sociality of the affects involved in these interactions. Insisting on how affects exist through an interaction, to look into their sociality for their situatedness seems impossible to elude. It is not only the multilayers existing in each of the sides of these interactive parts, but

301

also the social significance at a social level that certain interactions and the affects projected by them may effected from them have.

At the same time Sara Ahmed taught us while engaging in rage and uncomfortability when resigning from Goldsmith in 2016 after the institutional incapability of responding to sexual harassment, she also achieved to rescue the many 'ugly feelings' evicted from further considerations. Sadness, rage, depression, anxiety, awkwardness, are some of the feelings that affect theory has posted as central for this critical redoing of affectivity. As Anne Cvetkovich, they then become 'public feelings' (2012). In Cvetkovich's analysis of this sociality of affect, they also engage into the negativity presented as potentiality by queer theory, that was analyzed previously, and gives a new sense to this application of the breaking of the binary that is quintessential to queerness thought and praxis. As they put it,

Binary divisions between positive and negative affects don't do justice to the qualitative nuances of feeling that are only crudely captured by such designations. Queer theory's focus on negative affect has created some of the same kind of sparring generated by the antisocial thesis, although such criticism sometimes seems to miss the persistently reparative and dialectical dimensions of much of this work. (2012: 6)

In this defense of affective experience as already entangled in identity politics and social structures, Cvetkovich addresses the need of this potentials that go beyond the critique of co-optation of radical movements, inhabiting the spaces where "it feels like there is something else happening" (p, 6) while remaining aware of the framework(s) of action one has residency in. Following the lead of these claims towards public feelings, Caleb Luna's article starts with a radical statement: "I am a depressed person, but depressed is a verb. I consider my depression to be the result of social positions and the inevitable history of colonization, of racism, of fat stigma, discrimination and antagonism" (2018). Feelings are public, which means they are activated and involve an action. Feelings are verbs which exist in their operative movement. They are not just there, but rather activate in specific interactions that happen in the social. The radical way of embracing frustration as the impossibility of

responding to normative demands regarding able production, gender performances, racial apparatuses, turns towards the idea of finding in *failure* a concrete potentiality that doesn't necessarily reside in the future or in a specific space (Halberstam, 2011). This way of affecting our politics and researchs is to remain with the conflict, to work through contradictions, "staying with the trouble" (Haraway, 2016).

Affectivity affects the ideas linked to the feelings connected to certain notions and structures. Such is the case of kinship and family bonds. Returning to the critique involved in the construction of the family as another site of white exceptional and supremacist conjugation, Ahmed also enters this analysis while addressing the sexual and gendered politics entangled in this construction. PONERALGO:

What needs closer examination is how heterosexuality becomes a script that binds the familial with the global: the coupling of man and woman becomes a kind of 'birthing', a giving birth not only to new life, but to ways of living that are already recognisable as forms of civilisation (salto pagina) To make a simple but important point: orientations affect what it is that bodies can do. Hence, the failure to orient oneself 'towards' the ideal sexual object affects how we live in the world, an affect that is readable as the failure to reproduce, and as a threat to the social ordering of life itself. (2014: 144-145)

Ahmed proposes a destructure of productive and reproductive experiences, that also turns the question back to what kind of affectivities are entangled in kinship and what typologies of kinships are allowed these affectivities. (CALEB LUNAR TREATING FRIENDS AS LOVERS). Halberstam's failure is here turned into an affective strategy to decompose the elements entangled in normative structures of relationality and assimilative ways of breaking from them. As he writes, "while failure certainly comes accompanied by a host of negative affects, such as disappointment, disillusionment, and despair, it also provides the opportunity to use these negative affects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life" (2011: 3). The meritocracy which Halberstam refers to here is now tainted by the importance of

symbolic and more invisible affective effects. How the social already structures our lives is beyond a material understanding of the problem, which has been the central analysis for the past century, locating the critique in an anticapitalist perspective. At this point, I want to emphasize something that seems to be overlooked by the theories I have just mentioned, and this is the fact that affects are as economic as wages, and economy is bound to affective effectivities from where things get arranged, interlocked and reproduced.

This idea explodes in Ahmed's analysis of capital feelings. Capital not in an economic sense but rather in the sense of its centrality. In *The Promise of Happiness* (2010), Ahmed reveals the activity involving emotions of expectation and their economy. In this sense, happiness is one of this kind, being explosive in the way it organizes affective life at the time it responds to other motions and notions that are associated with it. As Ahmed writes,

> The history of happiness can be thought of as a history of associations. In wishing for happiness we wish to be associated with happiness, which means to be associated with its associations. The very promise that happiness is what you get for having the right associations might be how we are directed toward certain things. (2010: 2)

The promises of happiness, the expectations and the idea of hope that draws from them are in association with other forms of sociality that intra-act. These associations speak about affectivities in ways that deviate from the normative expectations that involve emotions and corporeal reactions to situations. It modifies the general vision since affective life is already in a intertwine between the symbolic and the material. It exposes how emotions do not pre-exist nor they are consequent of a body's identity, but rather are already involved in the general movement, breaking the opposition between the inside and the out, between precession and effect. In following this idea of socially desired feelings, Ahmed also points out the displacements of certain affects, such as hope, which are sometimes lived through the expectations on another person's experience. In the case of happiness, or success, as we see inside the traditional ideas

of kinship and family, "the parents defer their hope for happiness to the next generation in order to avoid giving up on the idea of happiness as a response to disappointment" (p, 59). The promise of the next generation, the pending hope in a reproductive temporality and, as a result, the intensification of the orientation towards legacy. This marking of the future through this promise of success is directly linked to the idea of heterosexual systems of control since it continues this idea of inheritance which is marked by a specific but sometimes hard to recognize value towards transgenerational memory, in which the discipline of a body to accomplish this promise has to do with a temporality of domestication that is easy to think through the lack of agency that is associated to childhood. The inheritance that is here analyzed refers to a priviledged white experience, where this promise of future generations drives in from a traditional logic of domination and supremacism. The idea of persistence through future imaginations works on different levels in the case of communities, populations and relationalities that exist already in resistance, as Jhonathan Lear explores through the idea of radical hope, in which he analyzes how indigenous worldings work through a different notion of *hope*, one that is radical as in both rooted in a specific context and different to other dominant ideas of it. As Lear addresses, this sense of temporality is based on the "hope of a future in which things (...) might start to happen again." (2008: 52). In this rearrangement, the diffractive reading of these concepts involves a failure in the reappropiation of some 'unwanted' affects that are reoriented towards a potent horizon. The connection of Barad (2007), Halberstam (2011), Ahmed (2014), Preciado (2008) and Muñoz (2009) is entangled in fictional yet imaginable ways. To round it up, just for now, just here, all five of these thinkers, all departing from gender studies, deviate their application and orient it to forms of sociality and experience exceeding gender, such as the production of economy, the economy of time, the time of reproduction, the reproduction of reality and the reality of production.

Reconsidering the otherness of affective life needs also a breaking from the binary opposition between possibility and potentiality. This means that not acknowledging the material conditions in which any subjectivity lives and the affects surrounding these experiences is also another extension of privilege. Imagining these new possibilities is an option when there is not an immediate struggle to keep on living,

when there is something beyond the mobilization of what could be considered as combat breathing (Fanon, 1959). Following Perera and Pugliese's text,

> the target subject's energies are fully committed merely to survive; as such, the logic of state violence is predicated on ensuring that the subject cannot begin to expend their energies in resisting, contesting or subverting the power of the state (2011: 2)

2.4. Resistance as privilege

In this light, the very act of conscious resistance becomes a privilege. As in Franz Fanon's analysis while explaining the naturalized notion of breathing, it has become a priority for critical movements to think through the differences involving the organization of subjects in public while being assumed as an organic action of any living body. In the aftermath of George Floyds murderer by hands of not only a police structure, but also by the white supremacist state of mind surrounding the events, the effects and affects surrounding breathing, combat breathing (Fanon, *ibid*), become a political terrain from where to fight against white supremacism and brutality, a system in which I have been held as a constituent part. This chapter goes deep into this contradiction, the space lying between the possible and the desired. In this sense, I also go deeper into the critique of different theoretical apparatuses that have been active in my work from different positionings. Such is the case of Rosi Braidotti's work engaging nomadism (1994) and posthumanism (2013), which I analyze hereafter.

As has been said in the previous analysis at the start of this chapter, the ways of association tend to reproduce the normative ideas that come with kinship when drawn from essentialist ideas. This is, it is not only the romantisation of certain forms of biological association, but also the configurations that these follow. The family,

306

understood in a traditional way as a form or (re)productive association is also a structural paradigm of certain ideas of how to inhabit the world. As it was analyzed through the works by Battle-Baptiste or Cathy Cohen, the critique to the relationality that normative understandings of sexuality and gender is also intertwined with other assumptions. These assumptions, such as the idea of monogamy, the sexual orientations and organization, the production and reproduction involved in this association are some of the ideas connected to the normative family which is criticized when working against heteronormativity.

In the application of the theoretical and practical twist which affect theory proposes, the occupation of new ways of relating and kinshiping is directly related to the reclaim of certain intimacies that have been removed as possible affects. Lauren Berlant's work is primordial in the challenge to normative and hegemonic ways of living affects. The concept of "cruel optimism" that she uses to describe "multiple modes of attachment, endurance, and attunement to the world and to the contemporary world of spreading precarity and normative dissolution" (Berlant, 2011: 13), engages with renewed organization formulas for the present. Escaping from an essentialist consideration of attachments, Berlant works in a relational consideration of these *dressaged* bonds, arguing that the cruelty of these approximations does not reside in its optimistic component in itself but rather at "the very pleasures of being inside a relation have become sustaining regardless of the content of the relation" (Berlant, 2011: 2). The cutting-edge of Berlant's considerations of affects, such as "cruel optimism", finds force in the turn towards relationality that she introduces in her thought. Without using relationality as an alibi to narrow down the infinite discussion about affects, Berlant allows affect a certain power: that of excess.

Affects, in Judith Butler's terms, can take the shape of performative drag happenings. Drag is here understood as a mode of "queer performance that subversively 'allegorize' (...) heterosexual melancholy, thereby revealing the allegorical nature" (Salih, 2002: 96) of, in this case, affect hegemonies. This doesn't mean I think of performativity as a representational theory that can be applied to different critical thoughts from an intersectional perspective13. Aware of the many

needed critiques on the construction of performativity, that is drawn from privileged locations that do not acknowledge more than one sense of agency incapable of finding situatedness, I do find a potential refusal of normativity in performative acts, such as my writing of this thesis, not as a resolutive action to escape dispositifs of power, but rather as a strategically located fictional tool, that can help unveil these dispositifs.

As it has been previously considered through the many uses of the affective turn, the power in affect is seen in its reciprocal movement, in which affect drives both ways as in affecting and getting affected. The "capacities to affect and be affected" that Anderson uses as an initial definition of affect already gives us a relational formula of how affective life, and the apparatuses sustaining it, are bidirectional and, somehow, relational. Taking Deleuze's 11 notion that the body can be anything, Anderson follows his concern with researching in affect by this principle, that, however, he does not reduce to a closed pattern of analyses but rather uses as this basis to speak about how power operates through affects in certain bodies, marking them. I would suggest to call these operations "hegemonies of affects". The dynamism of the theories that Anderson revisits in his work is directly connected to the concept of "free radicals" that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has used to speak about the radicality of affectivity seeing that affects are continuously moving throughout bodies and, at the same time, they "become attached to ... almost anything" (Anderson, 2014: 6). The defense of an affective turn comes then after this type of considerations, considerations which observe that affect is involved in a peculiar double bind, a potentia that has a radical possibility of social action but that, at the same time, needs of deep analysis and reflection in order to escape the parts where it establishes itself as potestas (Spinoza, 1958).12 Following Anderson's line of thought regarding the importance of finding the friction between relational considerations of affects and attachment theories, I go side by side with the critique that Claire Hemmings makes on the generalized application of affect in this analytic turn as the "only path" to liberate bodies living under oppression. As she remarks, "[w]e are effectively caught in culture. Critics viewing poststructuralism in this way advocate not a material return but an ontological one, a revaluing of individual difference and capacity for change over time" (Hemmings, 2005: 554). The critique to elitism inside these post-structural theories,

theories that seek to find a working material tension that could ground them in a practical terrain, also brings into question the based- on positive affects that these theories have mainstreamed. It is here that the engagement with Lauren Berlant's work is primordial in the challenge to normative and hegemonic ways of living affects. The concept of "cruel optimism" that she uses to describe "multiple modes of attachment, endurance, and attunement to the world and to the contemporary world of spreading precarity and normative dissolution" (Berlant, 2011: 13), different searches for fulfilling attachments in the organization of the present that entail a social desire that commodifies the self and simultaneously brings a body near to this object of attachment that "is actually an obstacle to [its] flourishing" (Berlant, 2011: 1). Escaping from an essentialist consideration of attachments, Berlant works in a relational consideration of these dressaged bonds, arguing that the cruelty of these approximations does not reside in its optimistic component in itself but rather "as the very pleasures of being inside a relation have become sustaining regardless of the content of the relation" (Berlant, 2011: 2). The cutting-edge of Berlant's considerations of affects, such as "cruel optimism", finds force in the turn towards relationality that she introduces in her thought. Without using relationality as an alibi to narrow down the infinite discussion about affects, and parallel to Anderson's rejection of this kind of docile critiques, Berlant allows affect a certain power: that of excess. Affects, in Judith Butler's terms, can take the shape of performative drag happenings. Drag is here understood as a mode of "queer performance that subversively 'allegorize' (...) heterosexual melancholy, thereby revealing the allegorical nature" (Salih, 2002: 96) of, in this case, affect hegemonies. This doesn't mean I think of performativity as a representational theory that can be applied to different critical thoughts from an intersectional perspective13. Aware of the many needed critiques on the construction of performativity, that is drawn from privileged locations that do not acknowledge more than one sense of agency incapable of finding situatedness, I do find a potential refusal of normativity in performative acts, such as my writing of this thesis, not as a resolutive action to escape dispositifs of power, but rather as a strategically located fictional tool, that can help unveil these dispositifs. So as to bridge to the next component of this personal analysis, I would like to speak about the concept of happiness as the clashing affect and term with that one of failure, that I have followed

to pollute the application of queer as dissident in this work. In the light of Sara Ahmed's theories regarding cultural affects and happiness in particular, affects are directly linked to the fantasies of living a "good life". As Ahmed indirectly reveals through a number of questions, "[d]o we consent to happiness? And what are we consenting to, if or when we consent to happiness?" (Ahmed, 2010: 1), the imperative call to be happy in contexts that are informed by the basis of neo-liberalism and productivity speak of the attachment to normativity that then manifests in material consequences as those of oppression towards dissident bodies.

2.5. Self panocticum and Invisibility.

It is relevant at this point to remind us readers that our activisms do not expel us from the critique. This means that our political actions should not be essentialized as entities incapable of reproducing structures of violence. As it has been explored before, to read critical race and decolonial theories and work side by side with other non-white antirracist activists does not exempt white people from being simultaneously racist. The assumptions of queer activisms being impervious of racism is something to be revisited, let alone antiracist and decolonial movements, which count with a lot of white people in their organizations. The question of privilege and reproductive racism seems, in the first case impossible, since the white queer subject is taken as already oppressed and, thus, incapable of any other identity direction; in the second it becomes uncomfortable, since whiteness would have to be addressed in a non-white environment. The question of allies becomes fundamental to scan.

Who we decide or are forced to fight with sometimes is a matter of temporality. This is relevant in connection to this case study since the overlapping of significations a body can have. To bring it down through the case study, this means that the same person fighting in a particular eviction together with you can be the person making you uncomfortable and asking catchy questions to you and your NB friends the following Friday night. *Staying with the trouble* (Haraway, 2016) is one of the solutions. I mean, the same as the reflection with concepts, that are excessively framed following their authors' lives should be redirected towards a more active way of using

them, or reshaping them, the way in which we acknowledge that, as Cohen reminded us, other less visible parts of our identities, such as my own white and abled categories, might also invisibilise the ways in which my corporeal race and ableness constructions are in no need of alliance. Here I want to quote Patrick E. Johnson when speaking about kinship,

> For example, my grandmother, who is homophobic, nonetheless must be included in the struggle against oppression in spite of her bigotry. While her homophobia must be critiqued, her feminist and race struggles over the course of her life have enabled me and others in my family to enact strategies of resistance against a number of oppressions, including homophobia. (2001: 6)

The de-romantisation of kinship is something central to this analysis, since it stays within the contradiction while working through it. It exposes the way relationalities are always tainted and saturated with signifiers that activate and deactivate depending on specific chronotopes. Allowing new connections between circumstances that, a priori, seem oppositional such as the case Jhonson writes about between homophobia and queerness. The fact his queerness intra-acted with other many markers of identity made it possible for him to extract resistances which her homophobic grandmother taught him. Making visible or rather, seeing with other eyes. Seeing *otherwise* (Macarena Gómez Barris, 2017). The connections that Jhonson speaks about here take us to thinking about other ways of visualizing certain categorical subjects that are inserted in networks that function in pre-established prototypes rather than seeing their own ways of working. Cohen and Jhonson speak to us reminding us that heterosexuality and heteronormativity are not the same and that to suffer from homophobia is, in many cases, not the only violent tangent working within a body. This means, intersectionality also exposes the ways in which a body is both oppressed and oppressive. It is interesting how other ways of visualizing are opened here.

As I have examined in the chapter of "The Void", the importance of choosing invisibility is one of the factors that is active in this case study. In this sense, there is also a conjunction to trans-negativity, that is also one of the vectors to some of my political activism. This is, the connection between visibility and human

exceptionalism, which Eva Hayward speaks about in her encouraged statement "Don't exist" (2017). In her words, Hayward reminds us that 'Don't exist' breaks the ontology of nothingness, in that there is a movement, an agency put into practice, a decision to not become, a taking of the power of someone deciding your own ontology. Don't exist "articulates an attack on ontology, on beingness, because beingness cannot be secured" (2017: 191). But only a few lines further, Hayward speaks of this "conundrum: [*which is*] terrible violence directed at the nonexisting, the never having existed" (ibid). In this impossible contradiction, the opposition between visible and invisible is reframed outside their associations to existence and non-existence. This is, the correlations and assumptions in the associations between existence and visibility being read as positive are here negotiated, working outside these normative correlations of significations and giving space to the contradictions existing in the tensions between concepts. The acknowledgment that non-existence drives to violence does not mean its flip side, existence and visibility, have opposite consequences. In this take, 'Don't exist' is also a new reframing of visibility, in which to not be seen can coexist with a saturation of presence.

As Castro Samayoa points out, the question then resides in a 'willfull opacity' (2017), from where to resist in a saturated but yet queer negativity. Castro Samayoa and Esteban Muñoz are here activated in conversation, in which Castro's Willful opacity and Muñoz's ephemera are entangled. As Muñoz reminds us, the secrecy of queerness,

> [H]as everything to do with the fact that leaving too much of a trace has often meant that the queer subject has left herself open for attack. Instead of being clearly available as visible evidence, queerness has instead existed as innuendo, gossip, fleeting moments, and performances that are meant to be interacted with by those within its epistemological sphere—while evaporating at the touch of those who would eliminate queer possibility (1996: 6).

Okupations are served from this sense of ephemeral evidence, locating on a sense of temporality that goes beyond the ordering of time through past, present and future. It maintains a continuous activation towards horizons that are not always tangential or

materialized, but moves the body towards ongoing locations and this is its potentiality: moving *weyond*.

2.6. Haunting experience.

Reminder: "Sadly, The Future Is No Longer What It Was."
Leyland Kirby

It would seem appropriate to think about this haunting of the lost space as a place of desire, of anarchist futurism and imagination that is, nevertheless, an utopian haunting project. In this sense, I do not pair with the idea of a nostalgia- turning to certain spaces but rather a melancholia of attachment to the object that is always present in a not-yet memento. As Mark Fisher claimed,

In Freud's terms, both mourning and melancholia are about loss. But whereas mourning is the slow, painful withdrawal of libido from the lost object, in melancholia, libido remains attached to what has disappeared (….) Haunting, then, can be construed as a failed mourning. It is about refusing to give up the ghost or – and this can sometimes amount to the same thing – the refusal of the ghost to give up on us. The spectre will not allow us to settle into/ for the mediocre satisfactions one can glean in a world governed by capitalist realism." (2014: 19)

Melancholia doesn't give up. Still, there is a delusional component to it that we cannot ignore. He then writes, "[t]he power of Derrida's concept lay in its idea of being haunted by events that had not actually happened, futures that failed to materialise and remained spectral." (2014: 59). Melancholia finds a political dimension that refuses a giving up while addressing itself in an impossible temporality.
In this sense, and following the libido understanding of the attraction to the object that melancholia enforces, melancholia here is somehow the *potentia gaudendi* force that

313

Paul B. Preciado uses in his alterity manifesto (2008). I explore this connection since the example that derives from this initial analysis of the space of a city is related to both, a sense of political imagination that follows melancholic paces, while also engaging in the orgasmic force that anal liberation movements have supposed for the past decades. The haunting not of a nostalgic past, but of the specters of those who were able to imagine in the present a better future from where to activate.

Hauntology is not just about the presence, but about the space that it occupies. We do not regard only spectres, but their capacity to trespass locked doors or even visit us in dreams. Fisher already thought about this when merging hauntology with the sonic realm. In one of his famous posts, "Home is where the Haunt is: *The Shining*'s hauntology" (2006), K-Punk warns that "hauntology is a question of hearing what is not here, the recorded voice, the voice no longer the guarantor of presence (....) Not phonocentrism but phonography, sound coming to occupy the dis-place of writing" (2014: 67).

The connection between a 'politiziced melancholia' that Fisher announces, and the orgasmic force contained in potential gaudendi from Preciado's scheme drives from this shared sense of being lost in the horizon of a futurity that nevertheless makes us move, groan and erect. The void, as it has been said in the previous chapters, is not only saturated by ghostly presences, but rather serves as a *milieu* to get lost in exploration. Jumping into the void is time-travelling to a past where there was a saturation of futurities.

The experience that builds up from this experience in Bologna is a very particular chronotope. The briefness of this experience, a momentary okupational queer transfeminist space, breathes through briefness not as its impossibility to last in time. As it is known, this is the main temporality of okupation experiences. Rather, there is an importance to recognize how this experience was central only to that part of the Bologna scene that was involved not in it but in its topological requests: an anal liberation that could converge with other intersecting deviant experiences, such as class, race, ableism or health systems of control.

In this importance to the attachments to the past of the present, a future no longer seems possible. The specter, in Fisher's words, "cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is *no longer* or *not yet*'" (2014: 18). Following Martin Hägglund's analysis of Derrida's work (2008), when arguing that the hauntological project is a reformulation of time, where the ontological present identifier is abandoned in favor of other dislocated presences, the no longer and not yet are combined in a recognizable way that exceeds the limits of human perception. The specter is haunting and is haunted in order to bring new understandings of the hauntological presences that embrace in 'present' experience.

2.7. Emergencies in emergence: Intimacy. terrifying romance through Intimacy.

I want to start this section by quoting an impressive and inspiring thought that I read in Homi Bhabha's introduction of Franz Fanon's *Black Skins, White Masks* (1952; 1986), writing that "the state of emergency is also always a state of emergence." (1986: foreword, xi). Bhabha, in an impressive interpretation of Fanon's work, acknowledges the dialectics of oppression without providing a standardized response-ability to the subjects involved. This idea has been explored previously when disentangling queer poc identities from certain values and affects of visibility, responsibility and positivism, as it is framed in Manalansan's analysis (2014). This formulation is paramount for a woke critique since it triggers reductive ideas of deviant subjects whether in or out of state processes and institutional disruptions. This way, woke and oppressed positions flourish in an amalgamation of possibilities, where the singular view of the adequately oppressed subject remains critical of both, the subject's attitude towards violence and also grants further understandings of violence that may not be officially recognized. The affectivities involved in these disidentifications, following Muñoz's formula of identity cracks (1999), are ugly Ngai, (2005), fail to fit into the identity programmation (halberstam, 2011) and are dislocated in their orientations (Ahmed, 2006).

In her celebrated text, *The Spirit of Intimacy* (1999), Sobomfú Some rescues all those alternative forms of intimacy that go beyond the generalized notion of love through romantic love. As she writes,

> Romantic love is an attraction that cuts up spirit and community, leaving two people to invent a relationship by themselves. It is the opposite of a relationship that lets spirit be the guide. Romance ignores all the stages of a spiritual coming together, where we begin at the top of the mountain and gradually travel in unison to the top (.... salto de página) The elders teach us that if our relationship with people around us is focused on sexual attraction, it diminishes our capacity for friendship and our eyes will not allow us to see others as they really are (p, 96-97)

The taxonomy of the public space is sometimes open to new scenarios for intimacy. Such was the case in the protests of BLM after the murder of George Floyd, as I have analyzed in the previous chapter. In this case, the sense of the public sphere is fragmented and disordered to give new ways of relations that exceed the fundamental rigidities of association that relate to statal systems and modern western ideologies. Following communicative action which taints Jürgen Habermas' work (1962), his notion of bourgeois generation for the public sphere as a place of connection and a dismantling of traditional confined states of affectivity, is replaced by social contemporary movements.

The private space which was challenged in the previous chapter is here developed through the particular concept of intimacy. Intimacy, and the disarranged locations where it takes place, are the spaces of possibility I engage with when speaking of a queer utopian, merging with José Esteban Muñoz's temporality (2009). As it is driven from the experience, the intimacies moved from community resistance challenge ideas of how bodies come together and what temporalities are involved in these conjunctions. As Laurent Berlant evaluates while deepening in other forms of relationality (1998),

> [D]esires of intimacy that bypass the couple or the life narrative it generates have no alternative plots, let alone few laws and stable spaces of culture in

which to clarify and to cultivate them. What happens to the energy of attachment when it has no designated place? (p, 285)

The impossible here becomes an imagination out of time and space. In Muñoz's words, "Unlike a possibility, a thing that simply might happen, a potentiality is a certain mode of nonbeing that is eminent, a thing that is present but not actually existing in the present tense" (2009: 19). A political possibility which is out of order. A space from where to move towards a horizon that has no fixed direction and disidentifies without a compulsory recognition. This rhythm without a fixed temporality is also *failure* in its potential figurations (Halberstam, 2011). Time dislocations happen in these affective arrangements. As Rita Monticelli points out when speaking about memory, it is "a process, also includes the future as one of its dimensions" (2011: 136). In this relating *otherwise* (Gómez Barris, 2017), memory is activated through a futurity and utopian rising works through presentness.

Following these other forms of affectivity and intimacy in the relation towards others also includes a specific critique to the taken-for-granted values of familiar kinships that are dealt with as already existing, possible and desired. In this sense, some familiar bonds are unwanted, as we have seen in the explosion of queer childhoods and subjectivities and other identities that are uncomfortable to handle sometimes inside the limits of a familiar norm. In other cases, the impossible existence of a family comes from stories of forced or wanted migrations and other global movements that appear as barriers to this relational typology. The affectivity and intimacy I work through here is generated from desire, a desire existing inside the privilege of a loving and present traditional family who has also sustained my impulses towards other forms of association in this world.

2..8.Translatability and the exterior-interior binary.

As it has been tested, this thesis is very much about property and other possessions. The way in which identity, culture, narratives and language is possessed haunts human reality. In the use of Chartier and Carrizo's opera, I found ways of detaching from

oppositional ways of thinking about self and other, finding more complex ways to sustain exteriority in interiority and vice versa. The beautiful way of thinking about how to connect and combine conflicts regarding exteriority and those that are more related to the inner self, is drawn from the recognition of the breaking of the categorical distinction between both spaces, in and out, as it has been argued in other sections of this work. In this sense, and allowing ourselves to connect the issues from identity in its more social part to identity in its most psychological way, and seen they are not rooted but rather rhizomatically bounded, it essential to see what strategies open up to balance desires and potentialities while accepting the conditions that are possible at a specific situation.

Politics of translation have been in my journey inside gender studies fundamentals, not only for purposes of language barriers, but also to post questions of how language is much more than a main set of words and symbols that articulate us in communication. Rather, translation is also a question of codes and ways of making ourselves accountable in conversation as well as available to make bonds to the other. One of my main concerns with Braidotti and Butler's work, that in other regards I find exceptional and radical, is their way of translocating and comparing situations that are very different in nature. In this sense, the politics of translation of a posthuman and non-violente reformulation of being. In the case of posthumanism, the becoming other-than-human is difficult to justify, since the human resists in its privileged construction of human exceptionalism through anthropocentric visions of knowledge, epistemology and ontology. In the translatability of non-violence, it has been made clear how an ethical alternative to affective responses is problematic in its whole formulation. Claiming that becoming-animal (2014: 67) is a posthuman solution is problematic not because of its purpose itself, but in the impossibility of its method, and thus, of the translation of the human to the post-moment Braidotti presents as already-here. In this sense, even if Braidotti proposes a way outside the pivotal strategy of humanism, that of language, she still reinforces the exceptional vision of the human by attempting to find a solution that dissolves the human of its species privileges, without taking a further notice of this impossible task. Braidotti, in the following pages to her post-anthropocentric views, does recognize the still in force and vigilant forms of

exploitation of animals with respect to humans. Somehow, the problem here is that she fails to explain how these forms of violence and exploitation are exacerbated and more evident and active than in any other age, not necessarily because of the numbers behind scenes, that also account for this statement, but more interestingly, because of the disconnection of the relation with consumption animals, that works in late capitalist contexts.

The language claimed in this chapter departs from a claim of a remix of concepts that can rebound them to new meanings and applications. Departing from my formulation of concepts as methods, the way of reading concepts through one another, breaking their linear temporality, has helped me use them in fresh ways. In this transition, this last part stands in its polarity of the impossibility of certain translations. Following Rolando Vazquez's terminology, when writing about *Translation as erasure* (2011), I want to engage in this aspect for this last part of the present section, as a way to translocate the critique to the following case studies, where concepts as methods are sometimes visibilizing ways of engaging in change, but in others stand for this impossibility of translocations and translation. In Moria, because of a physical void and a signifier erasure, in Thermi because of the sense of archiving otherwise.

2..9 Through translation: translocations and translocators .

Returning to the aspects of void, negativity and impossibility, framed in chapter 3, the void, I want to activate a specific term: opacity. Opacity helps understand the improbable connections between the parts in dialogue in this work. The tracing of temporal constructions found between these two separated case studies, Thermi and Moria, are here forcibly entangled, working through theories approached in chapter 3. Some of the ideas drawn from these theories are concerned with otherwise temporalities, which walk in deference to supremacist formulations of History. Mark Rifker's defense of 'temporal sovereignty' (2017) speaks directly to the critique of history implied in many disciplines related to the tracking of the archive and its way of being narrated, consumed and taught.

In relation to this exploration of negativity, opacity and derealization are key elements treated in Rifker's work (2017: 176), and are centered practices to a different doings of the historical narrative. Recovering Castro Samayoa's formula of willful opacity (2019), this opacity connected to untranslatability codifies structures to denmark them outside renewed ways of capital consumption. Translation becomes untraceable. This does not mean these strategies escape the trap of dominant forces that (we) white subjectivities represent. Negativity and impossibility takes us exactly here: there is resistance, but this may also entail the acceptance of failure.

As in the case of alternative Archaeological records, such as the studies by Whitney Battle-Baptiste, the imbrication between Moria and Thermí are here paired while accepting the impossibility of a fair trace of Moria's archaeological archive, since its burning in 2019. This trace goes beyond materiality, while claiming it.

2.10. Dissidentifications:

The publisher's note in Muñoz's *Disidentifications* (1999) states one of the most paradigmatic sentences in identity studies: "There is more to identity than identifying with one's culture or standing solidly against it". This statement is solid to the queer critique and experience since it exposes the main problematics that have been central to our studies for so many years: queer normativity and the binary reproduction of ambiguities between, for example, existence and resistance. Being both driven from the same knots, the conflicts with queer normativity, such as in the critiques by Lisa Duggan's notion of *homonormativity* (2002), have exposed the mislead in the link of queerness to revolution, linked to another paradigmatic 'taken for granted'. As Peter Drucker reflects in his text "The Politics of Some Bodies" (2017), and following marxist György Lukács´ theories, to be under a struggle does not guarantee a critical and political consciousness, and this is sometimes the case in queer experiences. This has a direct link to the second question in discussion, that of working through the binary contradictions between inside and out or normativity and disruption. In this case, the multiple parts working in these subjectivities that reproduce normative social standards are also allowed a space for consideration. In Muñoz's consideration of

identity disarrangements, the multiplicity of pieces that ensemble in one's subjectivity is granted a wide space. Muñoz queers identity theories by means of these disidentifications, that go "a step further than cracking open the code of the majority; it proceeds to use this code as raw material for representing a disempowered politics or positionality that has been rendered unthinkable by the dominant culture." (Muñoz, 1999: 31). Disidentifications shift the idea of identity formation and speaks about intra*active entanglements of agential cuts, "which do not produce absolute separations, but rather cut together-apart" (Barad, 2014: 168). This diffractive understanding of identity also allows for a rethinking of the contradictions of being outside*within, breaking the binary position between identity and counter-identity.

The shifting of paradigm that can be seen here also emphasizes another fact: to disidentify is not always possible, desired or allowed. To break with certain paradigms of identity and corporeal traditions also speaks about a particular politics of location. The assumptions that link in an essentialist trend queerness to radicality is driven from already violences surrounding these bodies, where the queer subject, in the social imaginarium, is bound to a certain infantilization and intrinsically kindness. The queer subject is rejected from the idea of agential violence while it is saturated by ideas of excessive presence. It is saturated by visibility at the same time it is invisible.

The friction between visible and invisible was axiomatic to our experience. Beyond the institutional killjoy (Ahmed 2010 in Nicolazzo 2017), we weren't even regarded as a political component of affective life, that invisible component that leftist activism does permeate with. What I mean by this is that even if the normative masculinity denies any kind of affective feeling when leftwing and liberating activism directs action, in a sort of communitarian affective life, queer bodies are infantilized and disempowered in a way in which they are not constituent to the affective feeling of being threatened by someone checkmating the status quo. Queers are too sissy to be taken seriously under attack. This double bind, that uses this opacity while also being affected by this invisibility, takes us very much far away from institutional killjoys. Yes, we do make people uncomfortable, but this often takes place at a more 'personal' and 'intimate' level.

In this analysis of the deviant body as infantilized and rendered impossible as an unreal threat, as a disruptive fantastical force, I want to induce a reconsideration of Butler's *Performativity* (1990, 1993) through the concept of *Drag* by applying to it the notion of saturation. I use *saturation* as an organizing concept, following C. Riley Snorton and Hentyle Yapp's account of the word in their book *Saturation: race, art, and the circulation of value* (2020). Butler's drag is connected to an excess of gender's performativity that explodes an image of gendered structurations and their repetitions is understood as a potentiality of being exposed in sociality. Nevertheless, these theoretical pillars are supported by an idea of motion that is taken for granted in their move. To drag excess is to already perform a signification soaking. To introduce *saturation* in the direction that Snorton and Yapp accompass is to involve other rhythms in these excessive representations and presences. The imitation game is canceled to give space for motionless, parody is not mocked. Saturation includes race as an entangled element to performativity's critique. In their words, "The concept of 'saturation' refers both to a materiality of pigment and to the sense of something becoming so full that it is weighed down, rendered immobile, or unable to be added to—a reading that suggests current paradigms cannot fully encompass the complex contemporary reality of race." (2020: xii).

The queer body disidenfities at the same time as it is disidentified from the outside to certain motions of resistance granted to other sexual and gendered subjectivities. To resist power, to respond to violence, to enact wickedness, are only some of the faces of a cishet envy. Violence, evilness and power are constructed in negative through the queer subject and gain significance in their construction as oppositional to certain bodies. As in the case study explored here, the queer disidentification becomes a double bind: on the one hand it allowed us, as a queer corpus, to embrace and imagine the city differently, while, on the other, it evicted us from its signifying. With particular interest in this topic, the masculinization of violence is in itself linked to many other signifiers which build up this particular rejection of queers and trans having access to other than victimizing and infantilizing resistance. As Peter Gerdeerlos while exploring how non-violence is apart from many other tangents, patriarchal and racist write,

> The entire idea that violence is masculine, or that revolutionary activism necessarily excludes women, queers, and trans people is, like other premises of nonviolence, based on historical whitewashing. Ignored are the Nigerian women occupying and sabotaging petroleum facilities; the women martyrs of the Palestinian intifada; the queer and transgender warriors of the Stonewall Rebellion; the innumerable thousands of women who fought for the Vietcong; women leaders of Native resistance to European and US genocide; Mujeres Creando (Women Creating), a group of anarcha-feminists in Bolivia; and British suffragettes who rioted and fought against cops. Forgotten are the women from the rank and file to the highest levels of leadership among the Black Panther Party, the Zapatistas, the Weather Underground, and other militant groups. (2017: 69)

That history has failed once and again to recall the multiplicity of responses to conflicts and events while only attending to historical milestones is somehow known to critical researchers defying the historical narrative. Still, the significations that are derived from these silences and overlooked experiences is sometimes held back in response, many times finding conceptual traps which we contradict by our experience. Violence, even when removed from some bodies, is active in many parts of our queer archives. When we were dismissed as possible dangerous subjects for the status quo, another layer of subjectivity was inflated in our bodies: we were not allowed violence because violence was to masculine for us to perform. In this cut of imagination, I reflected during all these years what was it that bothered me about this particular outcome. In connection to the assumptions that the queer body is granted with, when these are rearranged and abandoned, other forms of resistance and action come to be considered beyond enduring formulas. In the words of Alexander Weheliye writing about the subject,

> [A]agency and resistance are completely irrelevant in this context, just that we might come to a more layered and improvisatory understanding of extreme subjection if we do not decide in advance what forms its disfigurations should take on (....) Why are formations of the oppressed deemed liberatory only if they resist hegemony and/or exhibit the full agency of the oppressed? What

> deformations of freedom become possible in the absence of resistance and agency? (2014: 10)

The way in which oppressed and violated . Exploring this line of thought, to think how queer subjects of color are at the center of this relook is fundamental. As Muñoz reminds their readers,

> disidentifications is *not always* an adequate strategy of resistance or survival for all minority subjects. At times, resistance needs to be pronounced and direct, on other occasions, queers of color and other minority subjects need to follow a conformist path if they hope to survive a hostile public sphere. (1999: 5)

The intersections surrounding queerness interlock the multiple queer experiences in their own reading and addressing. Queers are both saturated through violence and ejected from its possibilities. Queerness, as a different experience for those living it through whiteness with respect to queers of color, becomes strategically in different points. The possibilities and potentialities of queerness are infinite since the queer experience is multiple.

In the particular case of the experience here narrated, to disidentify is already interlocked to identification processes. Probably the most important moment from this experience is not the reading of the statal forces of power that were activated against our existence, but the absence of other companions solidariszing withto our cause. Here, to disidentify happens after a first level of identification in which certain subjects that have been ensemble form the outside and have resisted together from an internal angle, disentangle from this general force. Following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's thoughts on identity, "[T]o identify as must always include multiple processes of identification with. It also involves identification as against" (1990: 61). This idea highlights the multiplicity that exists in the identifying process, which many times is read as a singular movement, a critique that works in parallel to the theories working outside the singular aspects of identity, such as Cathy Cohen's work, previously analysed.

When a new level of identification is added, the social assemblage shakes. This movement does not mean the group moves together to new parts. Rather, it is important to note the specific levels of identifications that are added and the subjects and bodies surrounding them. This is central to our critique since the levels of identifications that are brought and thought by bodies holding the privilege of representation will be introduced in a perceptible way. By the contrary, those identificatory incorporations driven from marginal thoughts will be easily hidden and camouflaged by a general vibration.

After this analysis through Braidotti's work, we come back to the idea of those emotions and affectivities that are negative in unruly forms. In this sense, as the different negative affectivities that appear from a privileged position to other negativities that are entangled in oppressive experiences, the notion of motion that is driven form this counter-analysis also detonates a different of subjective experience, in which the movement does not only entail a potential of permeable position, but also other limitations which are sometimes external to a body's agency to move. Not every disruption can be radical in its method. Sometimes these fissures are just followed, and possibility and desire are not always part of the same movement.

Sianne Ngai's theoretical frame bends this ambivalence into new meanings while addressing ugly feelings that exceed the powerful location of dynamic negative feelings. This analisis brings into attention those negative feelings that are powerful in their own motion, since they reside in dynamisms which make them enter the normativity of action. It is in this critique to the general sense of motion, of nomadism, that I find Ngai's work evolving, since the feelings the author brings into question are related to a state of suspension that may allow a place for their imbrication to impossibility. Anger, as they describe, is adequate to a mobility of possibility that allows these negativity to be visible and, thus, consumed. On the contrary, expressions of affective live evolving other more ambiguous emotions such as anxiety, invisibility, guilt, ambivalence,... are linked to a blockness tied to their impossibility to be regarded centrality and, therefore, speak up their tie to other socio-historical circumstances

which are intra-active in their own existence. Bringing into question the notion of anxiety or uncomfortability, can be seen as such a negative feeling which is not tied to systems of normative-visibility since it is ambiguous in its performative value. Following Ngai's paradigm of thought, while addressing the representation of racialized and oppressed subjectivities, this means that such affective experiences are "at once an excessively 'lively' subject and a pliant body unusually susceptible to external control" (p, 12). While, as Sianne Ngai's analysis of negative feelings locates them as "saturated with socially stigmatizing meanings and values" (2005, p, 11), it is also "these multiple levels of negativity that make the ugly feelings in this study so useful for conjoining predicaments from multiple registers" (Ibid, p, 12).

2..11. kinshiping other bodily circumstances:

Returning to some questions that have been explored in the previous parts, there is also a direct correlation between non-violent alternatives and whiteness. Given our (white) centrality in violence- through extractivism, wars, racism, colonialism, imperialism, cultural appropriation, paternalism and so on-, it would be delusional to say that this means that whiteness is related to non-violent alternatives. What is here intended is to explain the whiteness involved in these theoretical revelations. As it was discussed in the previous chapter when speaking about kinships, in plural, to assume the heterosexual family as a universal category of oppression is just one more site of white supremacism that is incapable of finding in heterosexual associations any other kind of non-normative resistance that can go beyond the gender-sex bias. In this sense, and correlating from the previous example, the strategies for recognition after suffering from oppression and violent acts in themselves are, also, not universal. In this analogous consequence, to assume pacifist or non-violente acts of resistance that are, nevertheless built upon rage, is to universalize systems of experience in which an emotional and affected structure is thought-thrown, domesticated and unified, i.e. whitened. Some embodied experiences react to causes in different ways and are also conditioned by the contextual morphologies that surround them. To assume violence as already rhymed and cautioned by certain discursive structures of pacifist

alternatives is to extricate them from momentary responses and their multiple possibilities.

In this light, we can understand how many alternatives engaging into non-violence and non-cisheterosexual kinships are rooted in categories that depart from a privilege, in the first case allowing a docile response to violence and in the second grants a reproduction of the singularized category of gender-sex, driven through the heterosexual family, as the main site of violence. This is highlighted in this case study since, as a queer theorist, I find it primordial to apply our theoretical grounds to researches which speak of oppression beyond the gender-sex dilemma. This is also central to this case since refugees" embodied experiences are sometimes reduced to a mobility and militar violence while assuming them as normative in any other identitarian category involving, for example, sexual, gender or abled identities. As Loyd, Secor and Ehrkamp explore in their research through the terminology of *ablenationalism* (2023), biopolitical control also entails certain body experiences, such as disability, as exceptional. Departing from theories engaging in national identity boundaries, such as homonationalism (Puar, 2007), they use the notion of ablenationalism, introduced by Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell (2010), in order to explain those naturalises features that a body would cover to be included as a citizen. This seems particularly important to point out in a location where the population has escaped from a war circumstance in which disabling practices are enacted. Following Helen Meekosha's analysis of the coloniality of disability claims (2011), it is urgent to speak about the effects of contemporary colonisation and extractivism in the uninterrupted exercise of disabling bodies located in the global south. In this aspect, another layer of critique becomes clear when speaking about alternatives to violences: that of accumulative forms of violence which are quieted down by dominant narratives. As we can read from decolonial queer and gender studies, seeking to expose how the gender binary was a colonising project (Lugones, 2008), other authors, such as Adria L. Imada explains how the abled white body was built as the model which also produced a moral and capacitous division between the coloniser and the colonised.

Rosi Braidotti recognizes her use of anti-humanism to shift towards posthumanism. Judith Butler does too when addressing the structuralist stand of the importance of language in the generation of reality, while working from a poststructuralist tradition. As each of them state,

> [T]he posthumanist position I am defending builds on the anti-humanist legacy, more specifically on the epistemological and political foundations of the poststructuralist generation, and moves further. The alternative views about the human and the new formations of subjectivity that have emerged from the radical epistemologies of Continental philosophy in the last thirty years do not merely oppose Humanism but create other visions of the self. (Braidotti, 2014: 38)

In Butler's words,

> For surely it is as unacceptable to insist that relations of sexual subordination determine gender position as it is to separate radically forms of sexuality from the workings of gender norms. The relation between sexual practice and gender is surely not a structurally determined one, but the destabilizing of the heterosexual presumption of that very structuralism still requires a way to think the two in a dynamic relation to one another (1993: 239)

I recognize these two authors as main leaders of my thought. Braidotti and Butler are part of my epistemological tradition and this contestation to some parts of their works is only possible thanks to these very operas. Following from my discussion of Braidotti's texts in the previous chapter, I now intend to look at Butler's discussion on bodies, violence and precarity in the above-mentioned works.

I will focus on Butler's text framing how bodies come to matter through specific embodied responses. This exploration also includes a reflection on how bodies are materialised from the outside by engaging in a critical understanding of resistance and its specificity through the notion of violence.

2..12. On violence and non-violence

Studies researching violence have, most commonly, been reduced to a very specific type of violence. as happened in the simplification of spatial divisions, which are only seen as statal movements which have identitarian consequences, violence is also framed inside the normative aspects involving the action of a body against other, reducing these bodily matterings to, again, a binary division which leaves unattained questions which need to be problematized.

The impossibility of entering discursive practices, which Butler addresses through gendered and sexualized subjects in their first writings, is abandoned in their more recent projects regarding non-violence. This happens in the denying of violence as a possible response for those bodies which are outside of discourse due to materialities that go beyond gender and sexuality. As I was examining in the previous case study, the denial of certain bodies to access violence as a site of resistance goes beyond the invisibilising of the violence of action they are exposed to in the first place; it also hides the way in which these bodies are, in many layers of significations, infantilized and constructed under the paradigms of non-violence in an ontological manner. This is, the non-violence expected from some bodies is not marked by their own capacity to agentially respond beyond violence, but rather the expulsion of any sense of violence as intrinsicate to those embodiments.

The notion of violence is not unique; not in its forms but also not in its definition. This idea is also explored by Butler in *The Force of Nonviolence* when attesting that "we cannot race to the phenomenon itself without passing through the conceptual schemes that dispose the use of the term in various directions, and without an analysis of how those dispositions work" (2020: 14). What is considered a violent act, as well as what is considered resistance, is dependable on particular discourses at work in the context in question.

To claim that violence is, somehow, an impossible term to define does not mean the particular forms of violence that are here called into attention and given a wider perspective are impossible to grasp. In this sense, and as Jennifer Mills recovers from Hannah Arendt's analysis of violence while reading Butler's proposal, "violence is not a tool but a practice" (2021 https://sydneyreviewofbooks.com/review/malm-pipeline-butler-nonviolence/). This is important to remind as to give space for critique to the critiques of violence that justify its futility and dispensability as if violence was somehow an apparatus rather than an exercise. In this sense, the diffraction of gender performativity and repetition does not exempt drag of reproducing misogyny and sexism, but is held in its potential of exposing gender as a social training, violence here is not assumed in categories of morality but rather expel from this simplification from where it is normally conceived and analysed. As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes in *The World and Me* (2015), the representation of violence is violent in itself. In his analysis on how structural ideas of the practices of violence are imposed into some already violated bodies, Coates rethinks the possibilities existing regardless of these structural and statal traditions of violence against black bodies. Nevertheless, decir algo del libro..

Butler tries hard to input a twist in the considerations of bodily response to violence, which can also entail aggressive responses to it. In their proposal, aggression is considered as a response but is conceptualized outside the conceptual uses of violence. As they write, "[a]lthough some people confuse aggression with violence, it is central to the argument of this book to foreground the fact that nonviolent forms of resistance can and must be aggressively pursued. (2020:23). Being already a significant shift from traditional understandings of bodies reacting to violence, it nevertheless lacks a commitment to those resistances which can happen outside discourse. Only some pages after, they go on writing that,

> obvious. In this way, it can be understood as a practice that not only stops a violent act, or a violent process, but requires a form of sustained action, sometimes aggressively pursued. So, one suggestion I will make is that we can think of nonviolence not simply as the absence of violence, or as the act of

refraining from committing violence, but as a sustained commitment, even a way of rerouting aggression for the purposes of affirming ideals of equality and freedom (2020:27)

Butler centres their analysis on discursive practices: in their reconsidering of other responses which do entail aggressiveness, as ontologically distinct to violence, they once more give centrality to structurations which can be significantly different to traditional ways of acting on violence. Still, where are all of those responses which happen outside these discursive formulas?

Butler makes an accurate distinction between aggression and violence and delves in the fact of a "normativity of violence", which opens the violent spectrum to a multiplicity which unfolds it from its historical simplification. Still, they are also incapable of holding a space of defiance for those violent acts which come from non-normative contexts. It would seem as an imagined aftermath in Butler's project a state in which violence, after an aggressive deactivation of it, through non-violence, would at some point be expelled from a specific conflict. In this sense, Butler works through a political temporality of futurability, in which their own identity remains spectant of a future without a specific violence (seen both as structural or as circumstantial violence). Butler does not take into account those many precarious subjectivities which's bodies only matter in the tension of their actual presence. This is, some bodies, their material surrounding, cannot be held in this non-violence response since it is not assured a sense/idea/hope/desire for future results. Again, this seems to post the task of social change in the precarity of certain subjectivities, since it is not only their identity which is permeated as the site of resistance to violence and a place from where to enact change. Rather, it is specifically those parts of their identities which are triggered which are the location where to shift certain structures. Butler writes,

how aggression is crafted makes the difference for a practice that resists violence and that imagines a new future of social equality. The imagination— and what is imaginable—will turn out to be crucial for thinking through this

331

argument because we are at this moment ethically obliged and incited to think beyond what are treated as the realistic limits of the possible. (2020: 29).

This statement is important since it works through an idea of reality which Butler sustains in the framing of imaginations. As they explain, the possible, what is actually materialised and becomes "real" is directly related to the imagination. The limitation of Butler's understanding of action and reaction is their disregard to those experiences which do not count on an a given temporality for a future, an imagination for hope or a desire for change. In this sense, there is a strong relation between this critique and other theoretical approaches to matter, such as the propositions of NM, which lack a specific critique to subjective agency in these reconsiderations of ontology. The nomad's motion, the understanding of unfixity, the mobility of a critical mind, is here turned into a more subtle sense of how bodies react to different circumstances. Bodies that matter are here turned into bodies that materialise, that enact different senses of reality by agentially cutting together-apart: they separate from violence while nevertheless remain entangled and responsive to the conflict. But again, there is already an abstraction of agency which lacks a wide consideration of possible bodily responses.

I am not defending a queer negativity of no-future in Edelman's direction, but rather paring with a sense of direction that cruises, that moves without a specific path or rhythm, in which the future loses senses because of its adequation to the norm of desire, expectation and possibility. Such is the case in *Bodies that matter* (1993) in which Butler reflects on the impossibility of addressing all of gendered identities from a theory of performativity, as it is explored in *Gender Trouble* (1990), and engages in more material aspects of the body and how gender also modifies and mortifies the body. With this, Butler also goes on to reflect the essentialist part of performativity and discourse and their role inside social and critical studies. This chain of thought which Butler enacts in the jump from performativity to materiality (1990 and 1993) can also be applied to *Precarious life* (2004), in which the centrality is posted upon

precarious experiences rather than gendered identities. As happens in the abstraction of the notion of the human in Braidotti's introduction of posthumanity, in comparison with her nomadic figuration, the precarity which Butler speaks about in their more recent analysis also loses the precision of their 90's research through the specificity of gender,

> If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, if fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never 'were' and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness. The derealization of the "Other" means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably (salto pagina) spectral (2004, 33-34)

In this manifestation of other sedimented social norms, Butler opens a possibility to explore: the way in which violence can also be sustained, understood and implemented. In this sense, a performative violence is what Butler criticises in their two texts here analysed, (2004 and 2020) in which precarious and non-visible lifes become the direction that violence takes. Nonetheless, as in *Gender trouble* arises, other sedimented social forms of bodily materializations, through violence in this case, are left unattended. Such is the case in forms of violence in which more materialistic aspects that exceed agential redirections to bodily responses are taken into consideration. This is explored in *Bodies that matter*, in which Butler writes that "theory would restore a figure of a choosing subject- humanist- at the centre of a project whose emphasis on construction seems to be quite opposed to such a notion" (1993: x). Interpellation becomes the invisible side of discursivity. This is, the direct effects on subjectivity which happen in an interpellative action are far from a discursive understanding of bodily responses, where the agency may be driven from personal experience but, in most cases, is detached from the actual circumstance. To put it very simply, the alternatives to violence are, in most cases, based on a temporal, spatial or identitarian disengagement from the circumstance to respond to, and thus,

are at best unrealistic, at worst unconscious of this detachment privilege. The application of the notion of interpellation tangled in violence makes it more complex than a question of decision. Politics of location, of mobility, of nomadism, exceed the self-centred paradigm, while responding to apparatuses in which these are already constrained by multiple intra-active layers which become, as foucauldian institutional powers, difficult to pin-down.

3. Resolution

Following my methodological approach to reading theory through art and to using fictions to understand better 'realistic' and material situations, here I use two instruments as response to the first case study of dissident heritages in Moria vs Thermí. The first is a piece which had a significant weight in my upbringing as a theorist. I am using *Side B: Adrift*, a performance driven by the Peeping Tom company, directed by Franck Chartier and Gabriela Carrizo as the art piece that will intra-act with the case study to engage into specific signifiers. I would like to see how the concepts triggered from the case study theories that I relate to in this case study can be my methodology to approachbe read and applied to different perspectives and scenarios, as happens in the performance in question.

Following the conclusions of the diffractive reading of Rosi Braidotti's Nomadic Subjects (1994) and The Posthuman (2013), examined in the previous chapter, I will add a new layer of diffraction. By connecting three works by Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter* (1993), on the one hand, and *Precarious life* (2004) and *The Force of Non-violence* (2020) on the other, I will think of other materiality for resistance and will apply the inaction involved in Butler's last book so as to give new understanding of the 'living' body and its vibrancy in the *Side B: Adrift* performance. Both diffractive readings will help me connect with the questions and concepts above and apply them toextract the elements of this performance so as to act upon specific readings for a case study that hard to grasp.

334

As Rosi Braidotti recognizes her use of anti-humanism to shift towards a posthumanism, and Judith Butler does while addressing the importance of the structuralist stand of the importance of language in the generation of reality while working from a poststructuralist tradition, I also recognize these two authors as main leaders of my thought. As each of them state,

> [T]he posthumanist position I am defending builds on the anti-humanist legacy, more specifically on the epistemological and political foundations of the poststructuralist generation, and moves further. The alternative views about the human and the new formations of subjectivity that have emerged from the radical epistemologies of Continental philosophy in the last thirty years do not merely oppose Humanism but create other visions of the self. (Braidotti, 2014: 38)

In Butler's words,

> For surely it is as unacceptable to insist that relations of sexual subordination determine gender position as it is to separate radically forms of sexuality from the workings of gender norms. The relation between sexual practice and gender is surely not a structurally determined one, but the destabilizing of the heterosexual presumption of that very structuralism still requires a way to think the two in a dynamic relation to one another (1993: 239)

I also recognize these two authors as main leaders of my thought. Braidotti and Butler are part of my epistemological tradition and this contestation to some parts of their works is only possible thanks to these very operas. Following these stands, I intend to Gabriela Carrizo and Franck Chartier*: Side B: Adrift*. Butler, and Braidotti as seen in the previous chapter, create a theory framework that will allow me to explore how bodies, minds, self and other(s) are treated in the case studies. In the case that occupies us right now,y on a modern dance creation, they can help solve the tensions discovered in the assembled bodies experience which opens this chapter.

I first encountered *Side B: Adrift* in November 2017 while on my GEMMA mobility at Utrecht University for the 2017-18 academic year. It was a show run by

the Netherlands Dance Theatre in its main theatre at the Hague. My mother had bought the tickets since she happened to be at the Hague for an European meeting and coincidence had it that her hotel was next door to the company headquarters. I had always heard her talk wonders about NDT, her favourite dance company ever…which coming from someone who was once a professional dancer, was to be listened to. What I witnessed that day, however, was something I did not expect. A sensual experience which reached me very deep and made me write about it immediately afterwards. One of my final papers at Utrecht was, in fact, the result of the many meditations triggered by the experience and the origin of what I include here now.

As it presented in the theatre's pamphlet, "We think we remember correctly, but then it turns out we've given shape to a story as we see it in present or even future time" (NDT, 2017:4). In this, the borders of subjectivity become nomadic in time, in a posthuman way of understanding the framing of reality. These borders also respond to a performative sense of the body and a complex manner of engaging in its subjectivity and subjectivation. Following this combined formula between inner and outer through the merging between subjectivity and subjectivation, explored in the previous chapter, there is also a going beyond the normative conception of the self. In this performance subjectivity is engaged with an infinite amalgama of possibilities, that again break the borders between reality and fiction, past and future, self and other destroying, at the same time the binary system of understanding the subject.

I will focus on Butler's text framing how bodies come to matter through specific embodied responses. This exploration also includes a reflection on how bodies are materialised from the outside by engaging in a critical understanding of resistance and its specificity through the notion of violence.

3.1 On violence and non-violence

Studies researching violence have, most commonly, been reduced to a very specific type of violence. as happened in the simplification of spatial divisions, which are only seen as statal movements which have identitarian consequences, violence is also

framed inside the normative aspects involving the action of a body against other, reducing these bodily matterings to, again, a binary division which leaves unattained questions which need to be problematized.

The impossibility of entering discursive practices, which Butler addresses through gendered and sexualized subjects in their first writings, is abandoned in their more recent projects regarding non-violence. This happens in the denying of violence as a possible response for those bodies which are outside of discourse due to materialities that go beyond gender and sexuality. As it was examined in the previous case study, the denial of certain bodies to access violence as a site of resistance goes beyond the invisibilizing of the violence of action they are exposed to in the first place; it also hides the way in which these bodies are, in many layers of significations, infantilized and constructed under the paradigms of non-violence in an ontological manner. This is, the non-violence expected from some bodies is not marked by their own capacity to agentially respond beyond violence, but rather the expulsion of any sense of violence as intrinsicate to those embodiments.

The notion of violence is not unique; not in its forms but also not in its definition. This idea is also explored by Butler in *The Force of Nonviolence* when attesting that "we cannot race to the phenomenon itself without passing through the conceptual schemes that dispose the use of the term in various directions, and without an analysis of how those dispositions work" (2020: 14). What is considered a violent act, as well as what is considered resistance, is dependable on particular discourses at work in the context in question. To claim that violence is, somehow, an impossible term to define does not mean the particular forms of violence that are here called into attention and given a wider perspective are impossible to grasp. In this sense, and as Jennifer Mills recovers from Hannah Arendt's analysis of violence while reading Butler's proposal, "violence is not a tool but a practice" (2021 https://sydneyreviewofbooks.com/review/malm-pipeline-butler-nonviolence/). This is important to remind as to give space for critique to the critiques of violence that justify its futility and dispensability as if violence was somehow an apparatus rather than an exercise. In this sense, the diffraction of gender performativity and repetition does not

337

exempt drag of reproducing misogyny and sexism, but is held in its potential of exposing gender as a social training, violence here is not assumed in categories of morality but rather expel from this simplification from where it is normally conceived and analysed. As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes in *The World and Me* (2015), the representation of violence is violent in itself. In his analysis on how structural ideas of the practices of violence are imposed into some already violated bodies, Coates rethinks the possibilities existing regardless of these structural and statal traditions of violence against black bodies.

Butler tries hard to input a twist in the considerations of bodily response to violence, which can also entail aggressive responses to it. In their proposal, aggression is considered as a response but is conceptualized outside the conceptual uses of violence. As they write, "[a]lthough some people confuse aggression with violence, it is central to the argument of this book to foreground the fact that nonviolent forms of resistance can and must be aggressively pursued. (2020:23). Being already a significant shift from traditional understandings of bodies reacting to violence, it nevertheless lacks a commitment to those resistances which can happen outside discourse. Only some pages after, they go on writing that,

> obvious. In this way, it can be understood as a practice that not only stops a violent act, or a violent process, but requires a form of sustained action, sometimes aggressively pursued. So, one suggestion I will make is that we can think of nonviolence not simply as the absence of violence, or as the act of refraining from committing violence, but as a sustained commitment, even a way of rerouting aggression for the purposes of affirming ideals of equality and freedom (2020:27)

Butler centres their analysis on discursive practices: in their reconsidering of other responses which do entail aggressiveness, as ontologically distinct to violence, they once more give centrality to structurations which can be significantly different to traditional ways of acting on violence. Still, where are all of those responses which happen outside these discursive formulas?

Butler makes an accurate distinction between aggression and violence and delves in the fact of a "normativity of violence", which opens the violent spectrum to a multiplicity which unfolds it from its historical simplification. Still, they are also incapable of holding a space of defiance for those violent acts which come from non-normative contexts. It would seem as an imagined aftermath in Butler's project a state in which violence, after an aggressive deactivation of it, through non-violence, would at some point be expelled from a specific conflict. In this sense, Butler works through a political temporality of futurability, in which their own identity remains spectant of a future without a specific violence (seen both as structural or as circumstantial violence). Butler does not take into account those many precarious subjectivities which's bodies only matter in the tension of their actual presence. This is, some bodies, their material surrounding, cannot be held in this non-violence response since it is not assured a sense/idea/hope/desire for future results. Again, this seems to post the task of social change in the precarity of certain subjectivities, since it is not only their identity which is permeated as the site of resistance to violence and a place from where to enact change. Rather, it is specifically those parts of their identities which are triggered which are the location where to shift certain structures. Butler writes,

> how aggression is crafted makes the difference for a practice that resists violence and that imagines a new future of social equality. The imagination—and what is imaginable—will turn out to be crucial for thinking through this argument because we are at this moment ethically obliged and incited to think beyond what are treated as the realistic limits of the possible. (2020: 29).

This statement is important since it works through an idea of reality which Butler sustains in the framing of imaginations. As they explain, the possible, what is actually materialised and becomes "real" is directly related to the imagination. The limitation of Butler's understanding of action and reaction is their disregard to those experiences which do not count on an a given temporality for a future, an imagination for hope or a desire for change. In this sense, there is a strong relation between this critique and other theoretical approaches to matter, such as the propositions of NM, which lack a

specific critique to subjective agency in these reconsiderations of ontology. The nomad's motion, the understanding of unfixity, the mobility of a critical mind, is here turned into a more subtle sense of how bodies react to different circumstances. Bodies that matter are here turned into bodies that materialise, that enact different senses of reality by agentially cutting together-apart: they separate from violence while nevertheless remain entangled and responsive to the conflict. But again, there is already an abstraction of agency which lacks a wide consideration of possible bodily responses.

I am not defending a queer negativity of no-future in Edelman's direction, but rather paring with a sense of direction that cruises, that moves without a specific path or rhythm, in which the future loses senses because of its adequation to the norm of desire, expectation and possibility. Such is the case in *Bodies that matter* (1993) in which Butler reflects on the impossibility of addressing all of gendered identities from a theory of performativity, as it is explored in *Gender Trouble* (1990), and engages in more material aspects of the body and how gender also modifies and mortifies the body. With this, Butler also goes on to reflect the essentialist part of performativity and discourse and their role inside social and critical studies. This chain of thought which Butler enacts in the jump from performativity to materiality (1990 and 1993) can also be applied to *Precarious life* (2004), in which the centrality is posted upon precarious experiences rather than gendered identities. As it happens in the abstraction of the notion of human in Braidotti's introduction of posthumanity, in comparison with her nomadic figuration, the precarity which Butler speaks about in their more recent analysis also loses the precision of their 90's research through the specificity of gender.INTRODUCIR CITA: THE URNEAL OTHER.

If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, if fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never 'were' and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness. The derealization of the "Other"

means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably (salto pagina) spectral (2004, 33-34)

In this manifestation of other sedimented social norms, Butler opens a possibility to explore: the way in which violence can also be sustained, understood and implemented. In this sense, a performative violence is what Butler criticises in their two texts here analysed, (2004 and 2020) in which precarious and non-visible lifes become the direction that violence takes. Nonetheless, as in *Gender trouble* arises, other sedimented social forms of bodily materializations, through violence in this case, are left unattended. Such is the case in forms of violence in which more materialistic aspects that exceed agential redirections to bodily responses are taken into consideration. This is explored in *Bodies that matter*, in which Butler writes that "theory would restore a figure of a choosing subject- humanist- at the centre of a project whose emphasis on construction seems to be quite opposed to such a notion" (1993: x). Interpellation becomes the invisible side of discursivity. This is, the direct effects on subjectivity which happen in an interpellative action are far from a discursive understanding of bodily responses, where the agency may be driven from personal experience but, in most cases, is detached from the actual circumstance. To put it very simply, the alternatives to violence are, in most cases, based on a temporal, spatial or identitarian disengagement from the circumstance to respond to, and thus, are at best unrealistic, at worst unconscious of this detachment privilege. The application of the notion of interpellation tangled in violence makes it more complex than a question of decision. Politics of location, of mobility, of nomadism, exceed the self-centred paradigm, while responding to apparatuses in which these are already constrained by multiple intra-active layers which become, as foucauldian institutional powers, difficult to pin-down.

3.2. kinshiping other bodily circumstances.

Returning to some questions that have been explored in the previous parts, there is also a direct correlation between non-violent alternatives and whiteness. Given our (white)

centrality in violence- through extractivism, wars, racism, colonialism, imperialism, cultural appropriation, paternalism and so on-, it would be delusional to say that this means that whiteness is related to non-violent alternatives. What is here intended is to explain the whiteness involved in these theoretical revelations. As it was discussed in the previous chapter when speaking about kinships, in plural, to assume the heterosexual family as a universal category of oppression is just one more site of white supremacism that is incapable of finding in heterosexual associations any other kind of non-normative resistance that can go beyond the gender-sex bias. In this sense, and correlating from the previous example, the strategies for recognition after suffering from oppression and violent acts in themselves are, also, not universal. In this analogous consequence, to assume pacifist or non-violente acts of resistance that are, nevertheless built upon rage, is to universalize systems of experience in which an emotional and affected structure is thought-thrown, domesticated and unified, i.e. whitened. Some embodied experiences react to causes in different ways and are also conditioned by the contextual morphologies that surround them. To assume violence as already rhymed and cautioned by certain discursive structures of pacifist alternatives is to extricate them from momentary responses and their multiple possibilities.

In this light, we can understand how many alternatives engaging into non-violence and non-cisheterosexual kinships are rooted in categories that depart from a privilege, in the first case allowing a docile response to violence and in the second grants a reproduction of the singularized category of gender-sex, driven through the heterosexual family, as the main site of violence. This is highlighted in this case study since, as a queer theorist, I find it primordial to apply our theoretical grounds to researches which speak of oppression beyond the gender-sex dilemma. This is also central to this case since refugees" embodied experiences are sometimes reduced to a mobility and militar violence while assuming them as normative in any other identitarian category involving, for example, sexual, gender or abled identities. As Loyd, Secor and Ehrkamp explore in their research through the terminology of *ablenationalism* (2023), biopolitical control also entails certain body experiences, such as disability, as exceptional. Departing from theories engaging in national identity

boundaries, such as homonationalism (Puar, 2007), they use the notion of ablenationalism, introduced by Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell (2010), in order to explain those naturalises features that a body would cover to be included as a citizen. This seems particularly important to point out in a location where the population has escaped from a war circumstance in which disabling practices are enacted. Following Helen Meekosha's analysis of the coloniality of disability claims (2011), it is urgent to speak about the effects of contemporary colonisation and extractivism in the uninterrupted exercise of disabling bodies located in the global south. In this aspect, another layer of critique becomes clear when speaking about alternatives to violences: that of accumulative forms of violence which are quieted down by dominant narratives. As we can read from decolonial queer and gender studies, seeking to expose how the gender binary was a colonising project (Lugones, 2008), other authors, such as Adria L. Imada explains how the abled white body was built as the model which also produced a moral and capacitous division between the coloniser and the colonised.

3.3 Franck Chartier interview.

The diffraction of these three text readings can be cut by some of the reflection drawn from my conversation with Franck Chartier, the 23rd of November 2022, in the Teatro Nacional de Cataluña. Having introduced myself as a queer researcher, I explored together with Franck a series of elements which had been of interest for me the two times I had seen the piece, back in 2017, in the Netherlands. My personal circumstances had shifted in 5 years and so had my theoretical foundations. To refer to Franck by his name is a decision based on the gratitude of finding connection and intimate conversations in research and sometimes being able to break the distance existing in research interviews. As another layer of disruption, such as the ones I experienced through the piece and that took me to choose it as a central infrastructure for my thesis, this conversation also disturbed my way of thinking about theory. It was so thanks to the caring way in which Franck would divert sometimes from my theoretical apparatus, bridging to his own positioning in the piece.

Starting from the materiality of the body in *Adrift*, I would like to reflect on my bridging of the diffractive reading I do from Braidotti's theoretical framing to Butler's. Along this line, the corporeality of the bodies in the scene is beyond the sensorial feeding of human exceptionalism, a central point to Braidotti's posthuman figuration. As Franck explained in their way of directing the dancer's bodies as one of the directors,

> I have a phrase that I like to… that they have it in the mind is like "go where you never been before" (....) With this "go where you never been before" I think it's bring you to your extremity of your body but you can go more, you know, you can go… and it's interesting also because we destructurate also the human body and we try to find a way to move that it's really personal because each dancer will go where they have never been before and he will find movements very personal and them, yeah, this is also nice to be there, to create new movement.

The limits of the human body are here expanded towards no directions in particular, with no concrete rhythms and in the wholeness of being in the present without future expectations. Nevertheless, the element of memory, which serves as a narrative ordering, keeps the body bound to its surroundings. This awareness, which works besides agential consciousness, is the potential element which I claim from *Bodies that Matter* (1993) to be rescued for butler's more recent theoretical approaches. This awareness, which is connected to body affectivity rather than discourse (following the idea that it is an awareness that moves beyond the simplification of consciousness), is important to retain as central not only in gendered and sexualized schemes, but also in other embodied experiences, such as those surrounding precarity driven by forced mobility.

In my words, affectivity. In Franck's, tripping. The conjunction of both give sense to the morphology of the piece, which stands in the liminality between memories and the oneiric. The mashing. The missing door, the lost room and the hidden floor- the name

of the three pieces that compound the triptych of Adrift-, are consequential to a mashing of reality that also takes place in hidden ways. As Franck stated,

> for us it's nice because we can shift from a reality to the memories or the fears, I don't know what, and play with a super realistic but something strange that happened, that is not in reality…it's not possible. And then *whhhoap*, come back to reality and we don't know if it was the reality or not and this instability between is its reality or memories or fear or… this we like to play with this because then it makes the audience a bit unstable and, I don't know, if I actually responded. (cite)

The bodies on stage, which are nomadic in their crossing of time and space, travel from the characters to the dancers, in fluid formulations that allow the spectator to blur this distinction between reality and fiction. They are bodies that matter in many senses. They matter as subjects to their own memories, giving a different sense of time and a new experience of the past, which does not frame as a cause of the actions taking place but rather as a consequence. This is, the past is dislocated in its meaning since what's happening on stage is actually the facts that are shaping these past memories. In this sense, the reconsiderations of Butler's 90's texts are also framed as consequential to the reading of their most recent writing: reconsidering the critique to violence and alternative disruptions to it is what actually informs the reading of *Bodies that matter*. Using diffraction in Barad's sense, the past is here materialised, transformed and informed through elements from the present. This specific aspect is activated in the diffractive reading of Mortia and Thermí, which are bounded not through comparison but bu meshing their temporalities together and allowing a reading of a present space of conflict through the cultural interests from the archaeologies present in Thermi, and testing Thermí through the presentness of Moria. In this sense, the bodies which inform these two spaces, as it will be analysed afterwards, are not fully dead or alive, but rather activate or not in different forms. They are not real or fictional bodies, but instead they are symbolically triggered when applying to each case the elements which sustain their opposite: What means to apply concepts evolving vibrancy, life and

motion in Thermí? What gets stimulated when culturality, discourse and memory is, conversely, activated in Moria?

The piece, being staged for over 5 years, has had consequences in the actor's life. It is so since, following this idea of tripping, of submerging into deep intricate emotions, to abandoning reality, the frontiers between the actor's life and its character are somehow moved. Following performativity, as proposed by Butler, the fact that a body exercises itself in repetition, afterall has material consequences in its identitarian stands. This being applied to the case study, it gives new information of the agency of a body itself. What I mean by this is that, even if the bodies referred to in the case of Thermi, those belonging to iron age Greece, are culturally performed in ways that render them vibrant in directions which the Moria subject cannot follow. Here, I am not speaking about identity, which again would be problematic as to draw a specific line of what being a refugee means or not. This also follows the critique of how people in refugee, migrant or undocumented positions are reduced to these mobility-legal categories. As Evyn Lê Espiritu Gandhi explains while speaking about the complex notion of refugee settler (2022), defining that

> fraught positionality of refugee subjects whose resettlement in a settler colonial state is predicated on an unjust dispossession of Indigenous subjects. This entails examining the ways the settler colonial state puts refugees in a structurally antagonistic relationship to Indigenous decolonization struggles (ibid)

What is here explored is the fact that outside identity there are other many forms of constituting and materialising someone's experience. This is interesting because it goes back to the critique of Butler's work when obsessing through gendered and sexualized identities while leaving uncontested other forms of body significations which are not, a prior, linked to identitarian factors (such as the case with responses to violence).

Human exceptionalism is revised, speaking of agency which exceeds someone's body, but still attains to the reproductive forms of violence and oppression which do shape and domesticate someone's body or the idea which is drawn from it.

In its connection to NM, this critique forges a view of more complex ideas of space. In the analysis brought some pages above, in which Ochoa Espejo reflects on the many ways outside identitarian marks in which space can be divided or organized, there is also a strong critique to the paternalistic and infantilizing perspective of certain subjects whose identity is reduced to one categorical activation, in this case the precarious migrant/asylum seeker; and on the other outside the forms of culture and time. Following Steve Shaviro's critique of the anthropocentric divide between culture and nature, I want to emphasize the problematics involving these binarism which can be rethought through queer deconstructions. In Barad's recollection of Shaviro's words

> Where did we ever get the strange idea that nature—as opposed to culture—is ahistorical and timeless? We are far too impressed by our own cleverness and self-consciousness… We need to stop telling ourselves the same old anthropocentric bedtime stories. (Shaviro in Barad, 2003: 120)

Human exceptionalism and anthropocentrism, which are also entangled in the roots of these structurations of what subjects count and how they do so, is also questions through the aspect of language. As Barad warns their readers, "Language has been granted too much power" (2008: 120). This is true and its notice has been felt by many scholars of this linguistic tradition. Butler's ideation in the newest research also works in these lines of thought, getting detached from language and discursivity. It is noticed in the time gap of the text here analysed, where this decentralisation of language is felt in their latest attempts to conceive new forms of civil responses to oppression and violence. In *Triptych*, language also loses its joint. As Franck stated,

> with theatre you feel that you can go deeper because [*with*] just 2 or 3 words, one phrase you can go *whoa,* you can put a layer on top of it that's more… yeah you can go deeper in the story and the scenario, but maybe because we come from the dance world for us it was more effective to do it than to tell it, you know, to tell the story (....) We know where we are (...) what we don't know is who we are. We are in this situation that is quite like this (*gesturing the stage*),

> it's not a garden, it's something quite, eh… But who we are we don't know. We
> have to create it.

There is somewhat a capacity in this non-prefixed ideation of the character to find new forms of becoming. Still addressing the fixed discursive categories existing already in an embodied subjectivity, while Franck spoke about the liminality between actor/dancer and character, he also spoke of the potentialities of being outside the rhythm of language. By the movement of dance, the motion on stage, the looseness of being lost on the non-character, the body can also explore other material possibilities which, then, can build up into a character. With Barad in mind, while defending this search for materiality, long lost in the linguistic and discursive turn, I recognize what it is in Butler's shift which does not quite sustain from my point of view. It is that of the actual abandonment of anthropocentric values to language and discourse. Again, this is not to say discourse and language can be completely evicted from a human body, but it is a claim to speak of bodies in non-universal and reductive forms which speak of what bodies can or cannot do in still discursive terms. In this sense, the alternatives to violence are still fixed in the discursivity which marks Butler's tradition and is coherent to their previous work. Still, to speak of bodies as actually materials which can also react outside discursive apparatuses, is something which is left unexplored, and thus, leaves without many experiences lived from precarity, oppression and desire. I insist on desire because I don't want to reproduce the idea that only bodies cut by violence can react to it from their bodily materiality.

In the values of the materialism which Barad proposes, I find in Chartier and Carrizo a concentration of energy of new imaginations for how to conceive the body. They ask, "[w]hy are language and culture granted their own agency and historicity while matter is figured as passive and immutable" (2008: 120 Ibid). In the mediation between language and matter, Barad finds the alternative of performative discursivity, in which discourse is granted a more fair amount of importance by restructuring the means of performativity. For Barad, performativity

is not an invitation to turn everything (including material bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is precisely a contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real. Hence, in ironic contrast to the misconception that would equate performativity with a form of linguistic monism that takes language to be the stuff of reality, performativity is actually a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind that grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve (2008: 121)

Representationalism is displayed as another approach to reality, and uses performativity in a fresh way, maintaining in outside the oppositional use which draws a line between ontological presence and exceptional representation. As seen in chapter case study 1, where there is a deep analysis of the links between human exceptionalism and representationalism, these alternative critiques to how we are deep into research, as part of the representational frame, have already been part of its structure (of representation). In this sense, the idea of engaging with embodiment as already a structural piece of this representational system is, quite simply, to say the human body is not exceptional but rather constituent. Carrizo and Chartier's pieces are intrigued by this cognitive limitation. They hold the spectator as part of the memory, undoing the representational opposition between scenario and the terraces, sinking in reality through memories. Franck explained how they

shift from a reality to the memories or the fears, I don't know what, and play with a super realistic but something strange that happened, that is not in reality…it's not possible. And then *whhhoap*, come back to reality and we don't know if it was the reality or not and this instability between is its reality or memories or fear or… this we like to play with this because then it makes the audience a bit unstable and, I don't know, if I actually responded.

The presence of bodies, the present of one's body, the past someone remembers through a false memory or the future which unfolds but is retained as a hostage are simultaneously working in this experiential dissonance. In Barad's line, they blur the

line between "representation, and entities to be represented" (2008: 123). In this case study, the responsibility of acknowledging representation is primordial to avoid falling in the trap of stereotypes and reduction of experiences to standardised assumptions of these embodiments. As the flyer reads, "While soundscapes of everyday noises turn into lost rhythms, the man performs a lonely battle with time, space, and those who are absent". Absent presences, extinct rhythms, saturated positions and forgotten noises come into the scene as tools to experience bodies and their mattering otherwise.

CASE STUDY 4. CONCLUSIONS. IRELAND AND ANTHONY HAUGHEY'S INTERVENTION AT THE YPA.

> "People are trapped in history and history is trapped in them"
>
> James Baldwin, "Stranger in the village" (1953)

Introduction:

The reasons why this case study has been framed as the last research chapter for this thesis are many. These reasons for it to represent a kind of closure can be summed up in two main movements: the need for a rounding case study, given the structure of academic research, and the recognition of my own change as a researcher throughout the years. The first refers to how an initial requirement surrounding the form of this work has taken me to further reflections that, rather than forced, have also been situated from the personal decision to acknowledge this division. In connection to this idea, the second refers to how I have found in this chapter a temporary gift of finishing with new feelings towards some inquiries that date many years ago.

As you can see, the idea of time and space being important when analysing them in connection to their relationality towards others is consolidated here. Here you can see a particular location, which could be any other, and a concrete time, which does not close in its own temporality. I have come into calmness with some disruptive parts of my political life assuming that the transpositions I have experienced throughout these 5 years are also applicable to the many strategies resistances can find.

I have understood the cohabitation between potential and limitations as political subjects. I have come into peace with art and its uses as disruptive tools. In a temporal tension between circularity and avoidance, I have come to understand what aspects I can, for now, engage with when making use of art. The circular rounds up through this coming back to past anxieties which are momentarily softened. The evasion of certain topics has also found flexibility in new rhythms: I have come back to questions which were held in dead end roads, but in different paces.

After many years of self-reflection and criticism, after many hours debating on whether abandoning academic landscapes and dedicating myself to other non-powerful spaces of action- spaces which do not seem possible outside fantasy-, after many conversations with amazing social activators, it is now that I come back to the theoretical corpus and the impulsive chapter of The Void and the consequent Case Studies. In doing so, I expect to haunt these chapters in more organic ways, letting them breath outside a promise of hope. As it will be analysed further, this chapter is circular in its coming back to the spaces of power from where I started and allowing them an alternative. After seeing how power has been reproduced in spaces which stand outside its logics, relationalities which had become alternatives and imaginations which became concrete at some point, I want to grant a place to those official locations where power is steering but, at the same time, are saturated by disruptive subjects. In this Case Study, as you will see, these spaces being schools, Museums and their connection to official politics (symbolically but also physically), are taken into consideration because of their content identities of under-aged adolescents, radical scholars and navigating discourses.

Coming back to these theoretical questions becomes crucial to issues regarding aesthetics, surveillance, power and strategies of disruption. It is through these terms that this case study lives, since it is only through the friction between my past signification of those concepts and the meanings that they have taken in the past years which have allowed me to stand firm in this final analysis. In this sense, my own positioning and location has become gentler at the time as more critical, and has allowed me to embrace the breaking of the binaries which have inhabited this work:

interior-exterior, official-activist, self-other, and so on. This breaking means standing in the ambivalence between both poles rather than walking away from these binary formulas. These are challenged in the way they inflame through both their own *potentia* and *potestas*.

In this ambivalence, the value also stands in the contradictory critiques to these working opposites. The panopticon and other surveillance considerations give space to think of them as apparatuses of control which are present in many social structures. The panopticon complicates the way surveillance and control are spoken about. The complexity of these notions becomes in my own work referents on how not only *potestas* is engaged in a rhizomatic understanding of control, surveillance and power, but also the *potentia* is to be found in derived forms, exudating through them. As the complexity of power contaminates many other places which deontologise the identified locations of power - such as institutions, governmental buildings, and bureaucratic systems- these extend to activism and anti-statal practices (to name some analysed examples). In this widening of the consideration of places of power and control, the holes in these systems also need to deontologise and see how they can take form in official places such as schools, Museums or political places, being three of the locations embedded in this case study. The propositions here are far from resolving themselves through the official places they are enacted in. Rather, they are another node of action and activation for momentary conjunctions.

1.1 Case study.

This case study stands in a space of liminality, physically, temporarily and symbolically. It holds in the middle space these signs of potentia read through potestas and vice versa. In its position, it is interesting the space we occupied for the project since the Museum is contingent on the Leister House, the Irish Parliament. Symbolically it is interesting to stand between this potentiality of changing things from the inside but also remaining conscious of the officiality and institutionalisation that is performed through these movements. Temporarily, because this is only a momentum, a transitional response to specific demands, not a paradigm for action.

1.2 Introducing the artist.

Anthony Haughey is an artist and an educator. In the alliance between these two positions, and because of my own reflections upon the experience of the "Young People's Assembly" (YPA), I would add that Anthony is also a mediator. I mean this since I think mediation stands in the intersections of art and education. As an artherapist, this bridging of two disciplines is essential for the practical and political uses these two fields can originate. Art beyond aesthetics and education, beyond productive discourses, finds its connection through mediations of practices between them two which can bring a more responsible and potential use of both. His work deals with the multiple contestations of inequalities surrounding topics such as class, gender, race, ableism and conflicts. These contestations, for Haughey, happen in the intersection between the inside and the outside of the cultural spaces of the Museum and Academia. Working as a radical thinker and a political activator, Haughey has researched the contestation of many historical narratives, mostly the ones lived through the space of the Museum but also affecting the liminal places surrounding it. In my conversation with him, I recall many references to the intimate and personal connections with the people involved in the projects that brought discussions to its development. In many cases, these people and discussions were not directly reflected on the results of the activity but did taint decisively the construction of it.

As a social institution for knowledge and responsibility, the Museum has stagnated into the aesthetic project of coloniality. The processes through which the Museum has the potentiality of moving sociality beyond and finding accessible ways of knowledge and identity, are frequently disregarded. Thus, the artistic landscape becomes another site of cultural commodification. Cultural commodification is here referred to as the discursive process through which societies are constructed around cultural values, these being reflected on divisions between who is included in this knowledge process and who is locked outside.

Haughey reflects upon these many questions, engaging in memory, archives and art interventions as momentary and unsettling responses. In his work, he uses his acknowledged privilege to give space for people to explore politics otherwise. In the present case study, the liminal space selected for the intervention speaks up these quests, deeping into the functionality of space, as symbolically capable of materialising new experiences. In the "Young People's Assembly" (YPA), the location is dislocated. It is so because the project does not only take place in the venue of the recordings, which is already something to study in detail, but of its posterior video projection through an installation, which loops the intervention in a new temporality.

The intervention, commissioned by the artist, took place from the 29th to the 31st of March, 2023. It decentralised his authoritative discourse figure to engage into other voices, those of under-aged adolescents and recognized academics, which came into debate, assemblage and conversations.

Taking place in the Ceramics Room at the National Museum of Ireland, the interesting liminality in this case is that the Museum is the adjacent building to the Department of the Taoiseach, the head of Ireland's government. The video documentation and interviews with assembly members, the conversations around the table and the "Manifestos for the Future" are the main material for an art installation which will open in the National Museum in the future. The particularity of this space was reminded by Haughey every morning before the assembly started. As he stated during these days, the importance of making the Museum available to the public, in particular to young people, is reciprocal to its way of also, as a space, coming out to social issues. This continuity between in and out disrupts the fixity of space, especially a place like a Museum, and the symbolic spatial opening of the archive.

In the context of the "Decade of Centenaries artist-in-residence", one of the Museum's programmes, dedicated to the past century, Haughey proposed this action. His proposal was focused on the presentation of the "Manifestos for a Future Ireland", written and read by the groups of students, which materialised an archive of the sessions. The conversations were held between the students from Scoil Mhuire

Ennistymon, Co Clare, St Attracta's Community College, Co Sligo, Oldbawn Community School, Tallaght, Coláiste Feirste, Belfast and Castletroy College, Limerick; comedian Martin Beanz Warde and historians Dr Síobhra Aiken and Laura McAtackney. These conversations dealt with issues of memory, remembering and how these narratives are put into circulation. Together with the ongoing dialogue with the out-of-scene activators, the three conjoined alliances generated through the three days of work. The topics connected the narratives of the past, through histories, archaeologies and material cultures from the past, and the factual concerns based on the presence of the political thinking of the youths in the assembly.

1. 3 Those days.

I participated in the project as a spectator. It was a position which allowed me to be near the groups of adolescents while also having time to analyse their words, gestures, anxieties, nervousness and desires.

The first day I got there, I remember seeing the big circular table, still pretty much empty. Only some sentences had been written by the facilitators inspired in the conversations that had taken place prior to the intervention. These conversations were meant to prepare the debate and ideas that, then, during these days, would emerge in a more organic way. These sentences are important to describe, since they are exemplificatory of how these days had an agency, a life of their own. The first sentence I saw was related to women's freedom and equal rights. This set my level of expectation right where I was waiting for it to be: gender and sexuality at the centre of the conversation. After this, I read sentences referring to rights for affordable and dignified housing, the claims for shelter for homeless people, rights for a working public health system, language and cultural rights referring to the specific situation of the two Irelands, and labour rights.

I recall how I started thinking about all those bathrooms I have registered over the years in which love, hate and claim stories are narrated. The material of the table

was something that brought my attention. I remember thinking: "this is not gonna work out. I don't think that table will be near to full by the end of this".

The first group arrived. They entered the backroom where Anthony had a moment to speak to everyone. This was the first time I saw how he faced the group. It was interesting because he was giving instructions and reminding people of the dynamic for the session that they had gone through beforehand. But in all this process and by asking the group how they felt and reassuring them the whole time with the constant phrase "anything which happens is fine", I understood how they had prepared the youth groups. They had prepared groups normally outside these spaces to speak about politics not by attending to the conceptual tools for them to speak about political and social issues but by giving them the strategies and strength to be confident about themselves. There was an activation of a "safer" space, in which everyone was invited to speak their own concerns and ideas.

When the session started, I understood exactly how this was going to take place. I say so because, even if my projections to the session were located in my own political interests on gender and decolonial thinking, this activation which Anthony had allowed in the groups made people diverge from what I was expecting to be the main topics.

In the second group, and the groups after that, gathered the following days, my reflection was suited by this idea, and I was reflecting on these personal dissonances. In the discussions, the invited historians and researchers were also introducing other ideas that were not central to the Youth's discourse. But, somehow, even if been external issues from the discussions they had been debating on for weeks, they had arrived at an ability to stand inside those crucial conversations. From my analysis a month later, I can see how the central piece of an activation of "safer" space is key for any topic to be held in confidence and be challenged. I reflected on how maybe responsibility, in the sense of the ability to respond, starts with the activations of those spaces of imagination where people who are not normally inside those discursive dynamics can find a place from where to become respondent.

The many issues which were brought up by the groups were broad and included antiracism, gender and sexual rights, identity, Ireland's multiculturalism of Ireland (from both, a historical perspective and a more contemporary idea), the housing crisis, mental health issues and the problems with the public health system, among many others. As it will be analysed further on, the sentences which started saturating the table were not only connected to these issues, but more importantly show the confidence of a youth which was taking agency of their own experiences.

2.   Triggering:

As I have announced in the introduction, the twist which takes form throughout this Chapter is my own reflection about the thesis in general and the possibilities which are driven from it. If I had to point to a trigger to this Case Study that would be the many activations from the uncertainty of the project which lead me to very specific concerns: who was I leaving outside while only reclaiming spaces from underneath the institutional atmospheres? It is through this particular question from where a necessary diffraction through an intra-reading with the previous chapters takes form.

2.1 Art and activism: aesthetics and aesthesis.

As a trained art therapist, my use of artistic practices in connection to social purposes has a long trajectory. It is so since my background as an art historian already seeked to perceive the cracks in which art would breathe other possibilities exceeding capital culture and accumulation. In my reconnection to art through my education in art therapy, I relocated art as that space of active engagement in social issues, not from a victimising consideration of vulnerabilities and oppressions, but rather making the subject under those circumstances gain agential power in the process of justice. Many are the stories I recall from that era. In some cases, they are critical stories of the lacks I sensed in the discipline and in my practice in particular. In other cases, these self-vulnerabilities gave me new meanings and knowledge of what it is to position oneself inside different practices. In any case, art in conjunction to activism, what is referred

to as *artivism*, is something I hold in importance and whose value keeps updating when coming into contact with different experiences entailing these uses. For many professionals working with art for different aims, through therapy, mediation, activism, and so on, "[a]rt can often function as a framework. [*It has*] [t]he ability to contain and hold" (Lev, 2020: 3, *my clarification*). As an academic, art representing a mediation to intimate stories which become political is the possible discursive deconstruction which becomes available for my own practices as a researcher and an educator.

In Nisha Sajnani's work (2016) an interesting concept arises, which is relational aesthetics. What Sajnani refers to by this notion is how practitioners of art involving social changes can make audiences relate in unpredictable ways. This enacted proximity is important in this case study to centralise since, when in the experience the members of the YPA were speaking about personal questions, the distance between members, facilitators and material entities had been dismantled. In this aspect of how to create a "safer" space, taking into account that a context will never be a safe space for everyone, helped them enter certain conversations which were held from vulnerability, exposure, joy and confusion. As Haughey reminded them at the very start of every session, "anything which happens is fine".

My conflict with art was multivocal. At the same time, it had to do with very particular issues concerning power. What was signified as artistic, aesthetic, meaningful or beautiful had a direct link and effect on my way of thinking about bodies, the one held by self and the one viewed in others.

The terminology of *aestheSis*, proposed by Walter Mignolo (2010) and together with others, like Vázquez (2013), marks a term in the praxis surrounding artistic experiences. As it has briefly been put in the case study 1, *aestheSis* emerged as a response to the colonial representational system, starting from the 16th century

interchangeable market from Abya Yala[83] to Europe, and up to the present day. As Vázquez and Mignolo explain,

> Decolonial aestheSis is a movement that is naming and articulating practices that challenge and subvert the hegemony of modern/colonial aestheSis. Decolonial aestheSis starts from the consciousness that the modern/colonial project has implied not only control of the economy, the political, and knowledge, but also control over the senses and perception. Modern aestheTics have played a key role in configuring a canon, a normativity that enabled the disdain and the rejection of other forms of aesthetic practices, or, more precisely, other forms of aestheSis, of sensing and perceiving. Decolonial aestheSis is an option that delivers a radical critique to modern, postmodern, and altermodern aestheTics and, simultaneously, contributes to making visible decolonial subjectivities at the confluence of popular practices of re-existence, artistic installations, theatrical and musical performances, literature and poetry, sculpture and other visual arts (2013, online[84])

This revision of the visibility-invisibility device is a constant intervention to apply to contemporary assumptions. The ideas surrounding representational systems, which stand upon strong genealogies, reproduce the forms in which we experience the world through the visible aspects which inform this experience. When speaking about aesthetics, we are not only speaking about beauty. As we can extract from a vast number of feminist critiques, beauty and the issue of the body in feminized corporealities have been at the centre of its agenda (Young, 1979; Bordo, 1993; MacKinnon, 2006). The notion of beauty comes into activation in its connection to certain bodies, which are required to be arranged as beautiful to become visible. But

---

[83] Abya Yala is the name that is used to refer to America by indigenous communities. It means "matured land" or "blossomed land" in Kuna language and it is a term which highlights the presence of native communities in this land prior to colonisation.

[84] https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/decolonial-aesthesis-colonial-woundsdecolonial-healings/ (Last Access 02/06/2023)

the question of aesthetics in connection to visibility goes way beyond. Sometimes these aesthetics require an arrangement through notions of ruin, horrid, shocking or messy to become visible. In the case studies seen in the last two chapters, the hegemonic aesthetics at work require these elements arranged through chaotic and confused elements for them to fit in the aesthetics linked to their signifiers.

The turn towards *astheSis* holds in its value the immediacy of the sensation drawn from the *aestheSical* experience. As the term unfolds, and diverges from normative aesthetics, the importance is in the stimulation which emanates when we come into contact with some other entity that activates this sensation. Thus, *aestheSis* also connect to the different sense of temporality which was evoked in the previous chapters. In these otherwise temporalities, the holding of a past and a future, which is locked into the aesthetical experience, is disentangled. The past is liberated by dismantling the traditional form which has been saturated by aesthetical signification. In this manner, the future, as an idea of progress and happiness, is dropped when leaving aesthetics aside and deeping into other stimulations.

This immediacy also arises from the development of practices which go beyond anthropocentric foundations. Towards the engagement in the immediacy of the relationality between body and entity is placed an independent agency between elements, which come into existence in their very contact, rather than pre-existing to it (Barad, 2007; 2014). As Haughey suggested to the groups through the openness of the possibilities which could take place during these three days, the momentary agential-cut which is captured in the project was immediate in its causality ("Anything which happens", meaning everything/nothing could have taken place). Immediacy is not based on a present instant, but rather, that contact placed of that time and space, could have been felt in other locations of time. The instantaneous contact can be felt in the future, affecting the past, or digesting the past, as Oswald de Andrade imagined (1928).

In this case, the aestheSical project has more to do with other forms of materialities, New materialisms and otherwise, than to traditional understanding of

aesthetics. The re-existence notion, referred to in Vazquez and Mignolo's quote above, is taken from the proposal designed by Adolfo Albán Achinte, who also worked through the fresh paradigms of aesthesis as the field of sensible multiplicity. As he writes,

> It is maybe at this point when we can think about the aesthetics of re-existence, first understanding aesthetics as aesthesis, i.e. as the vast world of the sensible and the re-existence as any dispositif historically generated by communities to re-invent life in opposition to the patterns of power which have determined the way these communities should live and to their systems of representation which have been invalidated through the occidental conception of art, delegitimize by institutions which are given the power to decide what is and what is not an aesthetic/artistic expression. (2012: 290; *my translation*[85])

These other forms of representation, which are not rooted in the bases of representationalism since they are disruptive in their fundamentals, give new understandings of the possibilities that emanate from the friction between reality and imagination. In the case study, this was the case, also connecting to my own expectations, since they also had an aesthetical form. The discourses surrounding critical studies which I was waiting for were dropped and with them every closed-reading to the sentences that started permeating the table.

Walking through this tension, the liminality between both spaces, the material and the fictional, is sustained into accountability while also addressing the ways in which reality, as that ontological category, is already impregnated by the ideas held by traditional representations. As Albán exposes, these new *aesthesical* morphologies are in

---

[85] "Es quizá en este punto donde se pueda pensar en las estéticas de re-existencia, primero entendiendo la estética como aiesthesis, es decir, como el amplio mundo de lo sensible y la re-existencia como todos aquellos dispositivos generados históricamente por las comunidades para re-inventarse la vida en confrontación a los patrones de poder que han determinado la manera cómo estas poblaciones deben vivir y a sus sistemas de representación invalidados por la concepción occidental del arte, deslegitimados por las instituciones que se abrogan el derecho de decidir qué es o no es una expresión estético/artística." (290, original)

counterflow to the narratives of cultural, symbolical, economical, socio-political homogenization, which are located in the frontiers where there is a difficulty for institutionalisation to co-opt the autonomies that are constructed and in these liminal spaces where power is fractionated and reveals its own impossibility of fully realizing. (Ibid, 292; *my translation*[86])

Power is everywhere. Still, a decolonial account to power stands both from impossibilities and also from potentialities. As we read in the last part of this quotation, power can be everywhere. Nevertheless, power cannot be fulfilled completely. The cracks are always there to be found. In the recognition of multiplicity which other ethical approaches to sociality stand for, the account for different possibilities helps to disrupt with totalizing ideas of experiential paradigms. In power, we can also sense a further recognition of the fragments in which power can be dismantled. This does not mean that power can be once and for all erased, but rather that in the recognition of the many forms that power is shaped in, viewing them also in motion, can also be read the spaces where certain deactivations of it. As such, representation, which is both needed and undesired, sees here other possibilities which are held in that liminality, that immediacy, which addresses social responses in a transitional way, engaging in this value ambiguity and maintaining an active critique to keep on finding new forms to enact itself. As it is discussed from this case study, the strategic use of art in this experience is also positioned in this in-between space, physically, symbolically and temporarily.

---

[86] "contracorriente a las narrativas de la homogeneización cultural, simbólica, económica, socio-política, las que se ubican en las fronteras donde a la institucionalidad le cuesta cooptar las autonomías que se construyen y en esos espacios liminares en que el poder se fractura y deja ver las fisuras de su propia imposibilidad de realizarse plenamente." (2012: 292)

Those in-between spaces are held accountable for their own materiality, since liminality is not only that place from where to negotiate realness, but a material space in itself. In between can also mean a Middle Passage[87].

2.2. Art Other-wises: decolonial joy and "Fictional ontologies"

My use of *aestheSis* is reparative rather than informative. Let me explain: the fact that I use decolonial and antiracist propositions responds to a reparation justice and not to an impregnation of information. My task, while remaining conscious of the genealogical avoidances which have informed my consciousness, is far from wanting to saturate these theories from my white embodiment. In using these theoretical alterations, and even if I let them penetrate my research, I renounce guiding these arguments. This rejection has its limits, of course, since as a legal, working, abled, privileged person I do direct on many occasions, through classes, political representation, activism, and so on. Still, I want to remain aware of this following, which is destructuration of my theoretical conceptions of the world, "reality", affects, experiences and resistances. This is central when speaking about the healing wound, which Robbie Shilliam offers as a reparative resistance for colonised subjects. It is important since my positioning in healing is external and only accountable from a recognition of the necessity of white people, as genealogical colonisers, to do their round in repairing these systems of power. In this direction, a concept which connects both movements is the notion of melancholy. Melancholic affects, which haunt the white body, serve as dikes for active reparations and recognition of present problematics concerning racism, colonialism, imperialism and whitening. In reference to this, Shilliam writes that "[m]elancholy guards against the entrance of healing

---

[87] Here the middle passage is meant to stand by both, the liminal signification of spatial realities, and the historical event of the African diaspora and the forced trip of enslaved people to the "New World".

agencies into white publics and facilitates the deferral of responsibility for historical injustices" (2013, online)[88].

On the employment of art as a way of collective healing, Shilliam works through decolonial and antiracist embodied histories. In their account for other worldings, Shilliam does not necessarily work through an imagination of novelty, but rather "*renew* the world by retrieving and redeeming *aestheSis* that have been dismissed by colonial masters as superstitious, irrational, ugly, and primitive" (ibid). In a reflection on the Case Study in question, when bringing down to earth possible actions and reparations towards justice, I see this account of renewed imaginations. In this account, these artistic interventions, "even if entangled with colonial-modernity, such redemptive works-of-art do not follow the logic of inside or outside society/modernity: their logic is other-wise" (ibid).

In this "thinking otherwise", Macarena Gómez Barris comes to mind. Her work, already analysed in the previous chapters, is imbricated in the decolonial practices of artists based in Abya Yala and is intentionally revisable of this binary inside-out. Instead, she proposes a "refute to the monocultural imperative" (2017: xvi). Macarena Gómez Barris offers a methodology of "beyond" in her use of submerged perspectives. These otherwise landscapes of knowledge are submerged in that they are "transitional and intangible spaces as geographies that cannot be fully contained by the ethnocentrism of speciesism, scientific objectification" (2017: 12). As such, these find new ways of looking which can decentralise a human gaze, universalized through colonisation, using, for example, a fish eye perspective.

In a look beyond commodifying theoretical uses, Gómez Barris exposes how the idea of "el buen vivir", which permeated local cosmologies in Abya Yala, has been desvirtuated from its roots and used to serve for governamental excuses which lead to extractivism (2017: 24). As it has been present as the *leitmotiv* for the thesis, the use of concepts as methods tries to engage in momentary responses to situations which can

---

[88]   https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/be-bop-2012-black-europe-body-politics/   (Last   Access 07/06/2023)

also avoid conceptual commodification for statal uses. Such as in the case of the misuse of intersectionality, cut from its antiracist genealogy in many feminist uses, "el buen vivir" is still another example of dominant ways of domesticating language.

These ideas pour into the Case Study, in a dialogue with the situated use of concepts as methods, since the notions brought to the assembly table were constructed as ephemeral islands of thought, giving more information about the potentiality of a communal thinking than a building of political language.

In these new circulations, Gómez Barris explores other possibilities which already take place in decentralised realities. In explaining the case of indigenous phenomenology, she goes back and forth to the construction of Western and Anglo-Based critiques. In this analysis, the author displays examples in which, opposite to the individual construction of subjectivity of the West, these otherwise experiences delink from this individual biological idea of the human body (2017: 49). This idea, which connects with the deconstruction of the body as property, analysed in the previous chapter, gives new meanings at the same time as it decentres signification from human embodiment. In this tandem, it is interesting to explore how this disarticulation of signification does not abandon the claim of human embodiment rights, but rather connects these embodiments to more complex systems of relations, activating collectivity in encouraging ways. This was the central piece for action in the YPA experience, as Haughey tranquilised the group with the repeated phrase "anything that happens is ok": anything was ok because already so much was contained in the communality lived through the circle.

Through these bodies *otherwise*, Gómez Barris explores the hidden archives of submerged perspectives. The fish eye episteme, which seeks to see below colonisation, serves to this subversive analysis to think beyond the limitations of domination, which taints nearly every structure of our paradigms of thought and epistemologies in the Global North. In these perspectives, the widening of vision, the materiality of the body and human exceptionalism are forgotten in favour of remembering and lifting up other imagined ontologies where a colonial background has not shaped every epistemological praxis. As in the case of Gómez Barris, my research also uses artists

and performers to bring these otherwise ecologies to the front, defending that not only academics and activists should merge on this task, but also those seeking for what I call *fictional ontologies*. These otherwise ontologies use fiction as a way of dealing with time, space and relationality. In this line, *fictional ontologies* use time working through the ephemeral utopic horizons of José Esteban Muñoz (1996; 2009): they deal with the space of material imaginations and relate beyond identity. This way, *fictional ontologies* are fed by the onto-epistemological proposition that Barad works through (2007), giving importance to material realities but also amplifying their ontological meaning.

There. There are. There are possibilities. There are possibilities of doing things. There are possibilities of doing things differently. There are possibilities of doing things differently, outside the logics of conquest. As Negrón-Muntaner shouts out, this is decolonial joy.

2.3 Once more, affecting: On humanism and agency through decoloniality.

On the basis of this joy, affective life and emotions seem to be central to these reconsiderations. On the healing process Shilliam insists upon, there is a shift of the affective paradigm in use. People engaging in activisms normally have resistance as a notion in constant use. Resistance and rage are the main elements of activation. Still, as Shilliam reminds their readers, the way resistance is never thought together with healing is somehow ineffective, since, they ask, where does rage take resistance if it is not for an affective reparation? Healing orientates our struggles and resistances into a specific intention, which in their words is "an intention to transcend the coloniality of power" (2013[89]).

It seems of importance to centre the affected frame from where these pages are written. It comes and goes, enters and leaves, the way in which autoethnography permeates the way in which I am writing. The circularity of this last chapter, since it

---

[89]   https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/be-bop-2012-black-europe-body-politics/   (Last   Access 07/06/2023)

comes back to the abyss which haunted me for years, has thrown me once more in an affected writing. It is interesting how this chapter is also written from the vibrancy of affect. These are, the propositions of art which work as points of sensorial affectivity.

As it has been explored in the previous chapters, the tradition of critical studies has remained unaware of reproductive visions of the world which entailed power visions of the body. The human body, the non-human one and the inert entities have been deeply shaped from an anthropocentric tradition which is rooted in colonial values of expansion and exceptionalism. In this account, the use of fiction through artistic pieces as sites from where to imagine differently also lock other visions of the human body, which are beyond the reductive possibility of rejecting humanity itself, as the posthuman project has sometimes been confined. When Shilliam refers to the renewed worlding, rather than a new one- as in original-, they also imagine other forms of accounting for the materiality of the body, writing that

> [T]here is no path towards a true humanity that can be charted through the immanent contradictions of colonial modernity; instead, the cultivation of a "new humanism" must be outrageous, resistant, and restorative all at the same time. Thus, rather than apprehending shock/outrage, resistance, and healing as elements in a dialectical relationship, I hold them as threads that weave diverse works of art intentionally and intuitively into a decolonial aestheSis. (2013, online[90])

This multiplicity of artistic purposes and possibilities, which works through the notion of "fiction as method", reviewed in the previous parts, is what it is in claim in this part. What I think of as "healing dialectics", bridging Shilliam's concepts in use, is what pours over the experience: these affected conversations took place through experiential differences and embodiments. These differences, which are sustained through this dialectical healing, become in this way a site of potential answerings and momentary responses. These deviant identities based on gender, racialisation, capacitism, age and

---

[90] https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/be-bop-2012-black-europe-body-politics/ (Last Access 07/06/2023)

class, were maintained in the conversation because of those healing forms of this generated "safer" space.

The reflections of these Case Studies recognize the self-determination of populations while also engaging into other contemporary conflicts, issues and political interests which go beyond the centrality of independence which is perceived when speaking about Irish political imagination. The intervention here accounts for a multivocal and multifocal way of understanding politics and social change and allows a vision of how sociality and its expectations are entangled in different morphologies which are worth examining. Following Karen Barad's use of agential cuts (2007, 2014), this is not to disentangle each phenomena from their nodes, but rather to engage in transitional responses which help multiply our imaginations as citizens. As Pilar Villar Argáiz manifests in her own account of the particularities of the Irish location, it is important to examine this space, "'rethinking' nationhood and belonging, by a process of denaturalisation of the supremacy of white heterosexual structures" (2018: 10), a consideration which can also be applied to other places of independence reclaims.

Following the standards of epistemic violence, explored by Gayatri Spivak (1988) or Ramón Grosfoguel (2013), colonial knowledge in deeping into the works by Vandana Shiva (1990), Edgardo Lander (1993; 2000) or Homi Bhabha (1994), and the problems with translation, opposed by Rolando Vázquez (2011), alternatives to these colonial greeting spaces challenge these foundations. The account of different visions of the past and the future, in connection to the present, also breaks the temporality of synchronicity. Aas Bhabha writes, "[t]he present can no longer be simply envisaged as a break or a bonding with the past and the future, no longer a synchronic presence: our proximate self-presente, our public image, comes to be revealed for its discontinuities, its inequalities, its minorities" (1994: 4).

In a sort of aftermath from colonial epistemic settlements, there have been many scholars referring to the specific role of academia and places of knowledge power to respond and activate in different ways, i.e. decolonial and Indigenous ones. Many have been walking this path for years: Henry Giroux with his recovering of the

369

hidden curriculum (1990), Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang (2014), Ashley Woodson (2017) or Leilani Sabzalian (2018), just to name a very few. In the specific case of my own cultural context, and as it has been mentioned in the initial chapters, the elimination of the cultural traces of the past are also submissive to these racist, xenophobic and colonial standards, but not only. In the case of Granada, my place of action in the three relational, epistemic and activist senses, the uses of certain pasts overstep invisibility by the means of capital extraction and assimilation. Let me explain: the fact that the cultural values of our muslim past give Granada (and many other places in the peninsula) a high rate for tourism and cultural significance, sometimes results in a false inclusion of this past. This is so since the past is used as an extractive source, never attending to the ways in which the colonial expansion to Abya Yala and the elimination and expulsion of Arabs from the peninsula root together through the figures of the Catholic king and queen.

The curriculum inside universities, schools, tour centres, Museums and other places of cultural significance poorly engage into a responsible commitment to these past histories and possible reparations. These facts are also sustained by the way in which other realities and presences are ignored in the cultural and historical discourses. Roma and Gypsy communities are disregarded from any kind of episteme or social presence. Although the situation is changing because of the extractivism present in the uses of flamenco culture for tourism, the xenophobic and racist attitude of payos is imbricated in overlooked ways. Aurora Muñoz Moreno, author and activist through the account of @gipsycode, or José Hernandez (@josico.hernandez), have highlighted the many ways in which to decolonize the curriculum and media. Muñoz Moreno also engages in a decolonial and anti-classist epistemology in which other factors of knowledge are valued, such as the archive of dancers, customs, gypsy allies and parties. To search for references is not always easy, but to decolonize and to apply the inclusion of indigenous communities in our own research means searching for these researches otherwise.

As in the case of the YPA (Young People's Assembly), the initial stands of antiracist and decolonial claims and curriculum stand through these elements: presence

of diversity in the groups, in terms of racialization, gender, sexuality, abled and classism, the anti-etarian factor, which links the conversations to topics which decentralise from research theoretical standards, and the temporal understanding of the conversation, which attends to an important but transitional response as a way of engaging into politics.

2.4. The decentralisation of the "author": the artist as facilitator.

In the account for a critical aesthetics, there is also a task to tackle down the ways in which heritage, possession and privatisation contaminate the settling figuration of the artist. Let me explain in further detail. As I have examined in the previous chapters through the idea of how identity, in its reduction to a singular, is sometimes seen as property, something to possess, the figuration of certain performative identification is also subsumed to this critique. In this sense, the figure of the artist, which becomes a cultural signifier for identity, also falls into this trap, generating the idea that art is possessed and decided through these property aesthetics: who acts, enacts, interprets and gives the affective meaning to the art piece seems to be the "recognized" artist. In their critique of this whiteness of property, possession and authorship, artists and researchers Marisol Norris, Britton Williams, Leah Gipson (2021) challenge this idea. From their embodied black experiences, they address the multiple meanings of possession and the entangled alternatives to it. As they write,

> [T]he word dispossession in two forms: (a) as an act of dislocating Black people from their physical land and sense of place, as persistently enacted with Indigenous peoples through violent means, and (b) as an act of depriving Black people of their autonomy, legacies, and genealogies. Both forms can be subjected to ideologies that create the meaning of what it is "to possess" and "be possessed." (2021: 9)

This resistance against white exceptional supremacist expressions of meaning, heritage and authorship goes back to the distinction between aesthetics and *aesthesis*.

To speak about critical aesthetics, or to embrace other alternatives, such as *aesthesis*, means also to reconfigure what the central figure of the artist stands for. In the claim of other forms of aesthetics and art values, the artistic process is given attention and the centrality of the final product and, thus, the power of the figure of the artist, are questioned. As in the case of my proposition of "concepts as methods", the powerful role of identity as possession is reviewed here. In this sense, the inheritance of certain genealogical processes, and the property of many notions are disentangled from these identitarian processes of possession and breath through other taking on the concepts, the art pieces.

In a similar way, my finding in Anthony Haugheys' value was precisely this: how I viewed him as powerful in his unpowering role as the artist. In the many faces of oppression, Augusto Boal's project on decomposing arts for the people was radical in many ways. It decentralised the artist from its ivory position: aesthetics were dealt in different ways, communitarian thinking was central to the artistic meanings and the identitarian performativity engaged in both the importance of one's own subjectivities and their multiple existences. In this sense, the person coming into the opus is not just a body of aesthetic consumption, but is also part of the artistic imagination which is active then and there. This turning of spectators from passive entities to their intertwined in the piece as "spect-actors" (Boal, 1997: 13), is what takes place in this dislocation of the artist's axis.

As Roland Barthes develops through his famous "The Death of the Author" (1968), the object of writing loses its authorship centrality under the stances of a critical analysis of the text, while giving a main role to the receptor of those words: "The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination" (p, 148)

Amid such a particular historical moment and territory, Haughey seems to take a connector. The ongoing context of the two Irelands, the trauma histories located in past conflicts, divisions, the Magdalenes laundries, the effects of Brexit in the whole territory and the political concerns of the younger generations, sustain the contextual

multiplicity of this place in particular. As Haughey himself thinks about his own positioning,

> I see my role in the Museum as a kind of mediator. A person who invites people in, to get involved in the culture of the Museum; and also bring the Museum out, to bring a reciprocal relationship to the wider public (2021: min, 00: 40).

Haughey decentralises his own power by searching for new forms and positionings. Anthony's work is embedded in working with people, it is compromised to new ways of narrating rather than finding lost narratives. In the way of looking at the materials which are "already loaded" (min, 6:50) with many histories, Haughey attends to the importance of materiality, in ways which also reflect upon the stabilising alternatives which are found through his work and projects, such as the materiality of the table in the project studied in this case study.

2.5. Material culture and the materiality of the table: the limits of translation.

The conversations held through the sessions become materialised through the table installation designed by Haughey, following the idea of material trace in which the words, ideas and discourses could be grasped somehow after the days of intervention. The saturation of wordings and worlding of this artefact, which can be seen in annexes, engage in the idea of presence and absence in as far as it deals with an actual tangible result in an ephemeral temporality.

In his account of materialising representation, Haughey attends to the fact that in Ireland there are over 90 languages spoken. In his proposal to design "own flags", Haughey deals with the limits of representation and translatability, both in linguistic and spatial terms. During my years of research, projects of self-definitions have caught my attention because I sense in these a concrete potentiality of dealing with a particular context but still connecting it to desired potentialities. In my collaboration with Pedro

Lasch[91], a mexican artist based in the USA, during my study in Bologna University, back in 2017, the topic of flags was touched upon and brought into material, by creating a happening in the city, with the topic of "abstract nationalism/nationalist abstraction".

Through our own figuration of "digna rabia", a fictional actor with whom to react to the experiences throughout the city, Lasch, as Haughey years later would do, made me think about the cultural signifiers which make identity and inclusion more complex situations than the way they are sketched sometimes in theoretical settings. In this summer school, the spatiotemporal account of Harvey's consideration of political action, which came through the concept of *dialectical utopianism* (Harvey, 2000: 182), was raised as central to our debates and actions. Utopia, as an affected state of these artistic interventions, was viewed from these dialectic shapes as in need of concepts but also in need of transgression. David Harvey, being present both as a lecturer in our classes but also- and I would say more importantly- as one more spect-actor (Boal, 1997), handed us these possibilities to think with him of forms of critical imaginations of political alternatives. In the dialectics Harvey activates, Lasch finds confronting ways of introducing new dialogues, such as the works cited above engaging new forms of spatial inclusion beyond nationalism, or other projects ("Black Mirrors", 2007[92]) which engage in a performative mimesis, in which reflections from colonial and precolonial art pieces engage into this conversation between aesthetics and aesthesis.

Haughey gives great inspiration for conceptual turns in memory studies and archaeological research. It is so since he gives a main role to materials involved in different processes. In his research of the triangulation of three conflicts, those of

---

[91] I was part of the Bologna Summer School, the Laboratory being held during June 27-29 and July 4-6, in 2017.

[92] Black Mirrors is a series which began when the Nasher Museum of Art commissioned the exhibition "From El Greco to Velázquez". Its play of transparencies and reflection, engages in the impossible resolution of past-present, in the pre-post colonial divide. In this sense, the confrontation of pre-columbian and colonial art pieces dialogue in confronting ways which end the standby colonial reparations.

North Ireland, Bosnia and Kosovo (2006), he seeks to explore the remains and artefacts which are outside the limits of aesthetics but are "framed markers of the conflict" (Wells, 2011: 184). As Alfredo González-Ruibal states, "there is nothing closer to experience than materiality" (2012: 2). Apart from this, materiality, in a post-anthropocentric vision, has an agency of its own, such as Carm Knappet and Lambros Malafouris remind us (2008). In the account of the entanglement of things and humans, or humans and otherwise, we sometimes fall into the trap of categorizations. To categorise is to exclude, since the epistemics of ontology have relied on the existence of a monistic state of things. What I mean by this is that sometimes it is hard for us to think of entanglements, when applying these novel studies, as dependence and dependency (Hodder, 2012). What this translates into is the dissolution of the conflict between keeping human actors accountable for certain actions/events and speaking of their bodily entanglement to other non-human agents that are also involved in these enactions. It is true that sometimes these transhuman theories have been used to overcome certain responsibilities of, say, historical accountabilities of neo colonialist actions. This is what is criticised here since keeping the tension between human agency and non-human force is, maybe, an ethical point from where to think about this 'vibrant matter' (Bennet, 2009). As Ian Hodder proposes, "[e]ntanglement can thus be defined as the dialectic of dependence and dependency" (2012: 89).

Applying this importance of material culture, which is inspired in my work by postprocesual archaeologists and critical thinkers, I see the table as the central piece of material remain in this experience. Haughey also seeks for a fresh account of the temporalities involved in heritage and memory processes, since it calls for a precise attention to an archaeology of the present, of contemporary conflicts and issues. In the artefact of the table, the vibrant mattering of these days (Bennet, 2009) were solidified.

After having spoken about time, thinking about the materiality of the final table, and how it ended up the third day of intervention, I recall the work by Jian Neo Chen and Micha Cárdenas in "Times to come: materializing trans times" (2019). In the inspiration of Chen's work, which I had the privilege to see in N.Y. together with Dora Santana and madison moore, during my research stay in 2020, I always learn

how to trust the questions which arise when listening to them. In the use of Santana's "returning" (2017), I want to engage in otherwise temporalities which do not fix on the promise of a progressing future. In the use of this specific article written by Chen and Cárdenas, I am interested in the decolonial temporality which decentralises straight time. In this, I see a connection on the topic which appeared in the final material of the table (Annex. 3). The messages, the sentences, the music lyrics, names, numbers and paintings had little to do with my theoretical appetite. Thinking of the younger generations, those that have normalised questions touching upon antiracism, gender and queerness, disableness, I expected these topics to be central in their conversations. As this was not the case, at first I was shocked by the promise of generational newness, another consequence of settler futurism and the quiet hunger for progress.

The elements and ideas appearing these days were directed to a multiplicity which I was incapable of grasping at first. This was maybe due to the greatest lesson apprehended in these days: it was then that I realised how regulated my line of critical thought was. In this sense, I recognized how it was based on a linear idea of genealogical production, in which only topics related to my theoretical background where introduced in my political desirability and this, at the same time, was bounded to an idea of superation, unconsciously invoking an optimism which, far from experience, thought of the future as exempt of any forms of power.

The untranslational perspective is also connected to this chapter in unsuitable ways. In art, in its fictional account of otherwise perceptions, there is also a potentiality of openness, of meaninglessness, of letting go from discursive closeness. In the interview held by Matshidiso to Sasha Huber, deeping into Māori genealogies, they reflect upon non-anthropocentric language. The fact that in Māori languages there are many non-words is a reflection on the fact that "people are there to take care of the earth, that is why they don't name things after themselves" (2022, min.15). As they continue analysing through the interview, the work by James Baldwin gets mixed in their conversation, when speaking about heritage and memory. Language is heritage, translation stands in tension with erasure and concepts commodify the subjects involved in language. In Baldwin's words, this "authority which (...) *relies in*to

everything they have—however unconsciously—inherited." (1953: 3). As it has been examined in the previous chapter, quoting Coates, this heritage goes as far as a heritage of violence: "it is traditional to destroy the black body. *It is heritage*" (2015: 103).

The artefact of the table is powerful in my own political building, since it binds concepts and heritage. The fact that the languages performed and arranged in the table are, in many cases, codified by the historicity of the moment in which they were written in, make it clear how the critique to translation is also enacted through the case study. This codifying is not only related to the fact that many messages from the actors in the assembly were written in Irish, a language which many have been forced to forget, but also that the quotes, music citation, intimate calls, acronyms hiding friendship conversations and relational political thinking. In the search for alternatives which can manage transitions at the same time as material responses, the writings of both Paul B. Preciado and Karen Barad come to mind. In Preciado's case, in reflecting upon the transdisciplinary and multifocality of positionalities, he writes,

> A philosophy that doesn't use the body as an active platform of technovital transformation is spinning in neutral. Ideas aren't enough [...] Only art working together with biopolitical praxis can move. All philosophy is intended to be a form of autovivisection—when it isn't a form of dissection of the other. It is an exercise in self-cutting, an incision into subjectivity (2013: 359)

These cuts into subjectivity unfold in Barad's use of agential cuts. These agential cuts, which allow us to understand these transitional responses, allow

> a contingent resolution of the ontological inseparability within the phenomenon hence the conditions for objective description: that is, it enables an unambiguous account of marks on bodies, but only within the particular phenomenon. Strictly speaking, there is only a single entity-the phenomenon- and hence the proper objective referent for descriptive terms is the phenomenon (2007: 348).

The agential "does not disentangle the phenomenon into independent subsystems" (ibid) but rather enacts a local determinacy which can allow for the account of the continuous exchange and transition which the situation requires and apply this regard to the strategies in use, which can go from material objects, such as the table in this case, or the use of certain concepts in circulation for the specific case. This exposes words which refuse to become commodified through heritage but are still recollected as an important way of accounting for other ways of archiving time. In this untrained translatability, the temporal edges become liminal to the temporality of the intervention.

These also speak to the impossibility of translation, which can be used in many experiences but should not be taken as an emblematic action. In the YPA, the fact that there is a contestation to governmental powers also relies on these elements, in which untranslatability and transitional uses of concepts are meant to serve as tools for the time being. These two circumstances illustrate what "concepts as methods" engage in: the recognition of a passing shared language to move elsewhere.

2.6. The temporality of the intervention. Dislocation and liminality.

Following Nolan Oswald Davis in their project "no conciliation is possible" (2018-ongoing), the liminality seen in Moria and Thermi we go back to the idea of an impossibility. The impossibility of conciliation resides in the fact of a settling time, which sees into the future rather than dealing with a momentary practice which, in linear terms, could be structured for the present. As in this case study, the intervention which this case study treats follows this transitional idea of the friction between impossibility and action. No conciliation is possible, but still there is an activation for momentary responses. It is important to connect this to the transitional ages which the subjects of the intervention represent, since an adolescent, they stand in this limbo, untrue age, accelerated at the time as iced rhythm, of contingency, not been politically represented while, at the time, informing politics and sociality in decisive ways.

The importance of place binded to time has been explored elsewhere in this PhD Thesis. It is so while acknowledging the connections between two distinctive locations which, nevertheless, are bound to their limited temporal signification, such as the case in Thermí or Moria, or the volatile chronotope of a squat. In the further exploration of this combination, it further examines the colonising spatial strategy of looking to the future, or as the introduction of *Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet: Ghosts and Monsters of the Anthropocene* (2017) - the collaborative project between Anna Tsing, Lowenhaupt Nils Bubandt, Elaine Gan, and Heather Swanson- reads,

> They looked straight ahead to the future, a singular path of optimism and salvation informing their dreams and deeds. This future is a characteristic feature of commitments to modernity, that complex of symbolic and material projects for separating "nature" and "culture." Moving toward this future requires ruthless ambition—and the willingness to participate in great projects of destruction while ignoring extinction as collateral damage. The settlers looked straight ahead as they destroyed native peoples and ecologies. The terrain carved out by this future is sufused with bad death ghosts. (Ibid: G7)

As Mark Rifkin nominates the particular connection between time and space (2017), here we can also notice how settler time is bound not only to a territorial linearity of past-present and future but, more importantly, to its geographies of both territorializing and deterritorializing. Following critical reflections over space and time, such as the studies by Tim Ingold (1993) or Susan Alt and Timothy Pauketat (2019), land and space are here viewed in their commitment of disentangling the meanings, activities, dynamics and enactions which take place in them. In their use of fish epistemologies, which detach the human exceptionalism from any epistemological or effective centre, Macarena Gómez Barris (2017) and Zoe Todd (2014; 2016) go on to explore the otherwise connections to the land which also imply re-adapting to non-normative temporalities. Linear time, straight time (Halberstam, 2011) is a settler practice of human rhythm domestication. In the face of this, to generate responses from material presences, and be affected by their emotional modulations such as joy or anger -which was explored in the previous chapter- deforms these arrangements.

The many ways in which temporality can be read through this case study are imbricated through a series of deconstructive perspectives which deal with antiracism, decoloniality, etarism[93], agency, queerness and critical thinking. Haughey, being the artist in residence being part of the project "Decade of Centenaries Programme 2012-2023" also speaks about the disruptive rhythms which Ireland has experienced throughout these years. In conversations with him, Haughey insisted on the fact that the ways in which the territory has changed has also made him think about history in different ways beyond the most recognized territorial reclaims. In an interview, Haughey explains how

> A hundred years later, when we think of Ireland, cultural identities are much more complex. When we think of cultural identity I don't mean ethnicity. I also mean the broader scope of what people mean by sexuality, and class, and gender and all these kind of questions. (2021, min 1:00)

The case of the temporality of the case study read by the age of the participants is also interesting since etarism is usually abandoned as a position from where to think about justice. It is so not because underaged actors are not referenced through politics. We can recall the many cases in which the child is used as a space of political futurity. But it is this sacrality surrounding the infancies and youth which also taints these ages of invisibility, in terms of agency. When thinking about underaged subjects, there is generally an impossibility to think about their active role in societies. This, together with the fact that the legal age system is arranged in different forms across the world, is nevertheless distant to the fact that infancies, adolescents and other youths are focal points of action in living societies. As gender and feminist archaeology has been dealt with for decades, childhood has become a central agenda for their research. It is easy to think how the imposed link between maternity, childhood and feminism has helped feminist archaeologists to delve into these topics.

---

[93] Unfair treatment of a person because of their age. Discrimination based on age systems of difference.

In the compilation of researches surrounding childhood in archaeology, in *Children, Spaces and Identity* (2015), Margarita Sánchez Romero, Eva Alarcón García and Gonzalo Aranda Jiménez try to bring forward historical analysis which has broken another layer of silenced subjectivities. In a conjunction of authors thinking about the many directions childhood identity lives through, I am particularly interested in the agency subjects under legal age have in the generation of social realities. In this case, as they write in the first part of the book, children are

> considered not as an object of study, but as active subjects within societies of the past [....] The main issue [*is*] the invisibility of children in the interpretation of historic processes, which undermined their potential to contribute to social history in general. (2015: 2; *My clarification*).

Without falling into the trap of a "promising future", the agencies evolved in the experience of this case study speak about the communality of political life in which the diversity concerning differential generations is primordial to account for. This critique uses Edelman's analysis of the future, in "The Future is a Kid Stuff" (1998) but engages in other temporal possibilities which do not get stuck into the muddy present. The ages coming together in the YPA follow this issue. In doing so, it also reaffirms the decentralisation of the figure of the artist, which becomes a mediator and loses the leading role, for Haughey left complete freedom to explore what topics were central to these groups of young and, to a high degree, unrepresented people.

As I was speaking to Haughey, I realised how the notion of failure, as a political praxis, was active during this whole process. When I asked about the possibilities of something going wrong or just not happening, Haughey would reply "That's also ok". In those reaffirmations, I viewed the actual way of letting things happen and the role of art in those "letting go". When Chen and Cárdenas write about this temporal non-direction they do so by relating it to the study of transness. As they dismantle,

> If trans implies a movement from one gender toward a different location, then transness is always imbricated with forward time and cannot exist without

linear, teleological time. Yet if we imagine transness to be not about a crossing from one location to another but about a multidirectional movement in an open field of possibility, then time and its direction become more fluid. (2019: 473)

I found the vibrancy to read the ideas brought forward during these three days project inside the multidirectional way transness is read by Chen and Cárdenas. In the multivocality, entropy and confusion, these experiences were joyful since they gave new codes to reconsider the momentum as a site of organisational resistance without it becoming stagnated. For the time being, let it be. In the use of this temporality of impetus, which is related to a present outside the linear ordering[94]. It is a momentum which is related to a future while it might not identify to it. It is a potential which stands in the present matter while disengaging with the inheritance logic of the times to come. It is incapable of producing consequential experience from the momentary response, but it also keeps actualizing these responses as time goes by. It entails failure since it is incapable of reproducing at the time it maintains active for its re-location. If this is failure, then let's fail.

In Santana's use of "returning" I see the potential of archiving in fresh ways, where going back does not serve a programming of the future, but rather goes back to make the past present again. This returning breaks with the idea of centrality and rather looks back at the margins; it looks back by turning them forward again (2017: 186). The chrononormativity challenged in Elisabeth Freeman's analysis of queer temporal disruptions in *Time Binds* (2010) is claimed through this return. Historical codifications are confronted with other temporal arrangements, in which the past is emancipated from discursive regulations. This use of otherwise temporalities contaminates Freeman's work when using the temporal drag, a figuration attaining the excess of drag beyond gender mobility. As they urge to think,

---

[94] The linear ordering of time and temporalities in which the present becomes significant through its relation to the past and the future.

> [W]hat happens if we [...] reconsider "drag" so central to theorizing the mobility of gender identification and the visible excess that calls the gender binary into question, as a *temporal* phenomenon? As an excess, that is, of the signifier "history" rather than of "woman" or "man"? (2010: 62).

Drag in Freeman's work is in an active dialogue with Butler's account of gender performativity, revealing new forms of the past which can be relevant to the present. This works beyond the setting temporality of progressive time, in which the past is always overcome by the present. Such as in the case of many historical narratives, as the ultimate example of the neolithic revolution, the past is thrown off as unsophisticated and paradigmatically different to the present. In the case of gender and other political frame of actions, time has sometimes been used in this progressive sense, in which the past is something to conquer, centralising novelty over anachronic analysis. To understand this point better, I quote Freeman explaining this point:

> Butler tends to read these as consolidating the authority of a fantasized original, even if citationality itself unsetdes the idea of an origin: in *Gender Trouble*'s "repetition with a difference;" the crucial difference seems to be novelty, not anachronism (....) Moreover, to reduce all embodied performances to the status of copies without originals may be to ignore the interesting threat that the genuine past-ness of the past- its opacity and illegibility, its stonewalling in the face of our most cherished theoretical paradigms - sometimes makes to the political present. (Ibid: 63)

The excess used in Freeman's work is based on these necessary dislocations of sometimes illegible matters. In the Case Study I was part of, the temporality which I experienced was beyond the genealogical past of identitarian novelty through queerness, as a main frame of reference in my work. Instead, my settling ideology felt interpellated by otherwise momentary strategies in which claims that were distant to these central topics for myself were relocated as sites of political resistance. Engaging in anachronic distancing was important in order not to dismiss the responses given by the actors of the project. This is not to say that the voids and lacks existing around

certain conversations, such as those regarding racism in some of the round tables, are not to be contested. It rather stays with the trouble, locating certain notions to interplay with other critical thoughts. As such, the sometimes overseen gender and queer dilemma in politics, was resonated through other political inquiries, such as the housing situation or the mental health system, which are material and discursive experienced by these participant groups.

2. Art in the temporality of joy.

As often as the critique is expelled from our institutional spaces, so does the resistance in joy. This is due not to the fact that as critique disappears from a central location of dialoguing, so do our aspirations to happiness, but more because of the fact that even in critique, imagining this joy is sometimes banned from our imaginations. When speaking about the term, some utopian narratives arise, for it is inimaginable to speak about violence and joy at once. In this sense, joy is at the same time adjacent but far away from Laurent Berlant's *Cruel Optimism* (2011). On the one hand, it is near the concept since it engages in the bittersweet reality it holds in it, while navigating through sometimes contradictory affects. On the other hand, nevertheless, it walks far from the concept since it reworks this optimism into critical happiness, making the sarcasm of disciplinary optimism considerate for living otherwise.

In the use of art, we see this use of otherwise responses to justice and reparative situations. Being other the temporality of art, in its linking to the notion of joy also adjusts it to this other temporality, in which the future is retained for discursive practices and thus, dislocated from the temporal rhythm of joy. As it has already been dealt with, the project of *Remixing Reggaeton*, by Petra Rivera Rideu (2015), shows this otherwise languages which are provided through artistic expressions which overstep from power and aesthetics. As Edna Martínez wrote for *The Funambulist*, "culture through dance and music, partying and popular enjoyment" (2021, online[95]).

---

[95] https://thefunambulist.net/magazine/music-and-the-revolution/champeta-a-colombian-caribbean-cultural-resistance-2 (Last Access 22/05/2023)

In this temporal disruption of affective joy, its reshaped notion also binds with the theorizations of Queer Death Studies (QDS), in which the promises of the future and the compulsory happiness are abandoned in favour of a wider view of affective phenomenology which engages traditional negative feelings, experiences and mornings, such as death, in queering ways (Radomska et al., 2020; Lykke, 2022). In the operation of joy as an uncomfortable disruptor, there is a break of the comfortable position of the exclusion from the cultural significations of active sociality and the sustained "positive" effects by oppressed subjects. In this choice, I pair with Paul Preciado in his use of *potentia gaudendi* (2008). Having used this term as to explain the potence of the propositions of my research, in this last chapter I want to return to this route as to give some ideas from my final positionings, after these 5 years of research. Even if explored in more detail in the conclusions, the orgasmic force which is used by Preciado to understand alternatives to embodied politics resonates to the specificity of the case study in question, since it builds upon the theoretical marks of the previous chapters and engages in a specific material circumstance which stands simultaneously inside and out institutions, in that liminality with habitats my own identity as an academic and an activist.

Coming back to the questions of identity and possession explored above, and the relationship to the case study in which intimacy, identity, heritage and authorship are questioned, potentia gaudendi appears as that jump which challenges the limitations of potential horizons. As fiercely explained by Preciado,

> What characterizes *potentia gaudendi* is not only its non-permanent and highly malleable character, but rather, and above all, its impossibility of being possessed and preserved. Potentia gaudendi, as an energetic fundamental to pharmacopornography, does not allow itself to be reduced to an object, nor can it become private property. It is not only that I can't possess potentia gaudendi of someone other, but also I can't even posses the one that appears as mine.

Potentia gaudendi exists only as an event. as a practice relationship, a becoming[96] (2008: 39; *My translation*[97]).

Potentia gaudendi does not stand in terms of possession, neither holds singular identifications, but it does not even match an exterior-interior divide of strategies of resistance. This is not a claim for ambiguity and ideological interpretation, but rather a call to the exploration of how to orgasmically contaminate any place, ingesting, digesting or puking its meaning.

The problem of translation, which has been named in many connections prior to this moment, is essentially driven to a different level in connection to this case study, since it is one which deals and engages in the institutional potentiality and thus, deals with questions of recognition, visibility, representation, equality and so on. As mentioned in other parts of this PhD Thesis, translation lives many problematics in its two directions: the linguistic transformation and the spatial transfer. As it has also been discussed in other parts of this work, one of my main interests are certain practices of refusal, which, nevertheless, live through certain paradigms of representation. In this case study, as the ultimate and more-officialized one, the practice of refusal exists in the temporality of the intervention and the transcendence of its material. The discourses here born are given a chronotopic importance, attending to their validity in connection to the time, space and relationality existing in it. As a practice of refusal, it directs itself to "recognize a system that renders you fundamentally illegible and unintelligible" (Campt, 2019[98]).

---

[96] Lo que caracteriza a la *potentia gaudendi* no es solo su carácter no permanente y altamente maleable, sino, y sobre todo, su imposibilidad de ser poseída o conservada. La *potentia gaudendi*, como fundamento energético del farmacopornismo, no se deja reducir a objeto ni puede transformarse en propiedad privada. No solo no puedo poseer ni conservar la potentia gaudendi de otro, sino que tampoco puedo poseer ni conservar aquella que aparece como la mía. La potentia gaudendi existe únicamente como evento, relación práctica, devenir

[97] "Lo que caracteriza a la *potentia gaudendi* no es solo su carácter no permanente y altamente maleable, sino, y sobre todo, su imposibilidad de ser poseída o conservada" (2008: 39. original).

[98] https://www.womenandperformance.org/ampersand/29-1/campt (Last Access 03/06/2023).

This is a transition, a transitional translation, a transactional transitional translation, a transgressive transactional transitional translation. In all their contradictory parts, this is an event, a relation, a practice, a becoming (ibid): a body in excitation, an orgasmic force which "is the sum of the potential for excitation inherent in every material molecule. Orgasmic force is not seeking any immediate resolution, and it aspires only to its own extension in space and time, toward everything and everyone, in every place and at every moment" (42). In short, this is a transitional state which stabilises through its own way of changing.

3. Resolution.

3. 1 diffracting the void.

I am going to challenge this last case study through the diffractive application of the ideas concerning the chapter of The Void. In doing so, while the previous chapters are dialoguing with each other in using specific artistic material to draw a resolution to the triggerins, this chapter comes into a diffractive space-time-relationality with The Void as another artistic material which emerged from an emergency. Taking The Void as a piece of creative writing, I want to reflect on how to bring material solutions to the case study in question. At the same time, this chapter also intra-reads through the previous ones by offering them a concrete image of how to merge some of the topics together in an artistic intervention. In a way- in many-, YPA in connection to the further projects that were edorsing the project, touches upon many landmarks placed in the previous chapters. On the one hand the void and negativity are intra-read through this Case study to give it a concrete application. On the other, this Case study intra-acts with the previous ones: the ephemeral archive in Case Study one finds its moment, the collective activism in Case Study two is organised and the critical liminality of Case Study three is located.

At this point, I would like to coin a term to give sense of the many triggerings and explosions which have happened throughout the Thesis in order to retake the

multiple diffractions. The term is that of *transplosion*, a notion which I think as transitional burstings and trans detonations, this chapter is the first moment of the conclusions. It serves as a detonant for the conclusive part at the time it is, in itself, a bursting of concepts as methods. In this way, *transplosion* helps me find milestones which only help in the momentum, engaging in a transitional location. In this history is important, but it does not get stagnated.

Coming back to the chapter of the Void, I want to reflect and diffract some ideas which can allow me to settle the concepts as methodologies in use in this last Case Study. I explore the void in that mix between impossibility and agency which I explained in its chapter. This junction between both perspectives refers to the way in which the absences, abandonments, negativities and other voids are featured here not only as a response to an impossibility but also as decisions, agential cuts (Barad, 2014). I have decided to introduce these aspects to speak about the limitation of the Thesis in itself.

Taking into consideration my application of chronotopes, including the third element of relationality (apart form time and space), I have understood only in this final part how my own chronotope could not escape certain contacts. Contacts to privilege, to academia, to work, to income and to the state. Throughout the thesis I have explored the disruptions that came in form of questions, interrogations, insecurities and anxieties regarding my double position as an activist, but also as an educator. In this diffractive part, the reflections on these topics have come to a resolution, through these agential cuts that I was referring to, so as to conciliate through the impossibility of conciliation, as Nolan Oswald Davis explores (2018-present).

In the re-reading of Oyeronke Oyewumi's critique to westernised and colonial ways of looking for gender (1997)- in contexts in which gender may not be central or perceived in the same way as in the space of domination from where these analyses are made-, I have also set down some practical ideas. As I was able to grasp from the experience in the YPA in Dublin, and as has been explained throughout the chapter, my limitation as a researcher dealing with critical thought was to expect certain

discourses to raise up from these conversations. After nearly 400 pages speaking about the importance of space and the centrality of meaning in activation, I was unable to let go from personal expectations and swim towards what was arising from the context in itself. It was after some weeks when I came to the understanding on how queer, decolonial and disruptive this experience was, without it being saturated by questions surrounding these topics (gender, race and non-normativity, among others). On thinking about Oyewumi now is clearer since I have, in fact, engaged on how even if certain topics are important to build upon, taking for granted their being active in different chronotopes leads us to an epistemic delirium. As you can see, here I am not speaking so much of an impossibility, but rather of an agential decision of letting go, of materialising through disidentified discourses, following José Esteban Muñoz's ideas (1999).

In this path of disidentifying, and retaking the critique to the archive as a piece of colonial construction and time ordering, I also re-visit the question "is memory always a desire?", reflecting on how critical studies have also meant a certain contamination of the building of how to resist in life, without sometimes challenging internal ideas in these theories. In this sense, and exploring how memory in this linkage to colonial *H*istories, is not always something from where to explore resistance, since there are many experiences in which desire comes from forgetting and an agential amnesia. Following these thoughts, and in the conjunction with the reflection on the specific temporality of this case study, which is active through the age of the participants, the idea of officiality ad disruption is also diffracted. Even if my whole analysis during this thesis has challenged alternatives which were linked to institutions, normative relationalities and counter-spaces, the agency of these participants, citizens which were not-yet-recognised in an active way by the system, also changed some of my considerations from these ideas. Through them, I understood how many official places are saturated by non-normative identities. I am not speaking only about adolescents which are inside the law without being active creators of it, but also about many subjectivities which are in need of these official discourses, because of material limitations or affective ones. This is, the way I have been thinking about activism was another way of colonising its own movement.

Significance is empty as it is also full. The void is many things and works at many levels. The void, even if empty, is saturated with avoidance. Saturation speaks about those points of excess that remain uncovered and have their *potentia* on being restructured, rethought, redone or reimagined. In an account of *saturation* as a central concept for deeping into the complexities of race and representation, Soyini Madison explains through her application of fractal thinking's horizontality,

> [o]ur thinking and creating together will exceed saturation points of what we either already know, want to protect, or want to dismantle about race, indigeneity, identity, and institutions, because the beauty of it all does more than hold our attention and intensify the present. (Madison in Snorton and Yapp, 2020: 253)

This issue of being in and out of language (using concepts while destroying their singular points of signification, saturating meanings and imagining other forms of interactive intimate forces that oversee discourse), are what I return to in the next chapter when speaking about saturation beyond performativity, in that it represents other ways of disrupting normativity that do not assume prearranged gestures, such as compulsory movements or conclusive responses.

The interaction with the negativity explored in the Chapter of Void is important to bring into discussion in this chapter, because the potential uses of practices and theories which expand affirmative politics. It is also important to consider the fact that to reclaim negativity is not the same as a politics of pessimism, such as Mark Fisher reminded in his writings (*Crack magazine*, 2014). From this idea, we can build the many spaces which have been opened since the chapter of the Void was sketched, and which deal with very particular uses of negativity. As I was already skeptical about in past reflections, there is a sense of negativity which I locate in privilege. Going back to Angela Jones, there are any emancipatory politics which come from experiences that cannot allow themselves to be inside the logics of negativity. It is true that claiming negativity is a multiple ethics and it can mean many things. But here, what I am claiming in a specific way, is the fact that many bodies in need of these liberations

are, somehow, bounded to the officiality of governments, institutions, normative relationships and so on. As we can see through the adolescents, bounded to a minor-age which keeps them under the parental/tutor/statal control, this subjectivity can be expanded to many others. This means that we are not anymore criticising Edelman's obliviousness in his own ideological position, but a deeper critique to many extra-official movements, which sometimes lack an understanding of the need to insist upon official spaces where these disruptions are also present.

I would not like to romanticise this through the recovering of certain ideas such as governments, states, grants or institutions, because I do not see in these spaces a possibility of disruption from powers and hegemonies. What I mean is that I do find important to engage in and not abandon the many identities which may be trapped in those places. In this sense, we see negativity can be used in the sense of Saidiya Hartman and Tina Campt's use of *refusal*, which does not abandon, but rejects any sort of commodification. Where we situate negativity and these practices associated to it, is also a practice of disruption.

Power in Public Art Spaces. Frictions, Performativity and the Generation of Counter-Hegemonic Narratives.

Bibliography.

This bibliography is an extensive archive of the representative theorists appearing in this thesis.

After many years discussing how to mention hundreds of references by people outside academic places, I have decided to include a SIDE B bibliography which organizes acronyms which can sustain a minimum recognition of all those untheorized experiences which have given me fresh orientations from where to live and get affected by the main theoretical corpses in the thesis. Some names are fictional, since many are missed encounters at bars, bathrooms and demonstrations. Others are nicknames of intimate people which are part of my organizing affective life. Others are invented names for people included in the official bibliography, which also form part of this personal theoretical encounter. In this last case, the fictional name is intended to differentiate their contributions between one and the other bibliographies, rather than a simple form of making them anonymous.

This bibliography stands in the liminality between a genealogical consideration of our theoretical archives but also deals with the problematics of captive concepts which would be used in fresh ways if delinked from their neological authors. The consciousness of some concepts being radically important to be read by their own genealogies, such as the concept of intersectionality, stands also in the rejection of assuming others through the epistemological power of certain figures, such as Michel Foucault, which, while engaging into the power of knowledge, also reproduces a certain image of an authorized speaker.

As another pair of model authorship states, "[a] book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: intro 3)

In another order of thought, during the last days of my writing a class with professor Sayak Valencia came to mind (Sep. 2019). While engaging in the gore capitalism and

the strategies of necropolitical systems, Sayak made us reflect on the importance of unofficial forms which allow new identities to enter into our powerful academic spaces. With powerful I do not mean potential, but potestal power, which commodifies the imagination of whom we use in our researches. In this account, I finally decided to include the whole name in the reference, and not only the initial, as I had been archiving for the past 5 years. In doing so, I would like to support an opening of the images and imaginations which come to our mind when thinking about references theorists, artists, writers and friends. In this sense, I am skeptical of gendered binary reading of names. On the contrary, I would like readers to unlearn the instant white cis-maled image which is invoked when thinking in these theories.

In the mixture of initials which are codified for anti-institutional reasons, authors who refuse to be written under capital and pseudonyms, this bibliography is the most precious thing in this thesis, since it speaks about the entangled genealogies in this work, and breaks free from the innovative pressure. It engages in the importance of memory, of looking beyond, recovering voices and engaging into new paradigms of thought.

Side A Bibliography.

Abraham, Nicolas. and Torok, Maria. (1994; 1979). *The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psychoanalysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Adorno, Theodor W. (1987) "Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?", in V. Meja, D. Misgeld and N. Stehr, eds, *Modern German Sociology*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Adorno, Theodor W. (1966; 2004). *Negative Dialectics*. London and N.Y.: Routledge.

Agamben, Giorgio. (1998). *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford, California:Stanford University Press.

Ahmed, Sara. (2010). *The Promise of Happiness*. Duke University Press.

Ahmed, Sara. (2014; 2005). *The cultural politics of emotion* (2nd ed.). Edinburgh University Press.

Ahmed, Sara, (2006). *Queer phenomenology : orientations, objects, others*. Durham :Duke University Press.

Ahmed, Sara (2007). "Multiculturalism and the promise of happiness". *New Formations* (63) 121-137.

Alaimo, Stacy (2010). *Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Alarcón García, Eva and Sánchez Romero, Margarita. (2015) "Arqueología feminista, de las mujeres y del género en la Prehistoria de Andalucía". *Menga: Revista de prehistoria de Andalucía, Nº. 6:* 33-59.

Alarcón García, Eva. Aranda Jiménez, Gonzalo. Sánchez Romero, Margarita. (2015). *Children, Spaces and Identity*. Oxford; Philadelphia : Oxbow Books.

Albán-Achinte, Adolfo (2012), "Estéticas de la re-existencia: lo político del arte", en Mignolo, Walter y Gómez, Pedro Pablo (comps.), *Arte y Estética en la Opción Decolonial II*, Bogotá, Edición de la Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas.

Almansa Sánchez, Jaime (2021). "Cuando el futuro corre más deprisa que nosotros. Reflexiones en torno a los diez años del futuro de la arqueología en España" *Complutum, Vol. 32,* Nº 2, 2021, págs. 261-273.

Almansa, Jaime. (2013). *Arqueología Pública en España*. Madrid: JAS.

Alt, Susan M., & Pauketat, Timothy R. (Eds.). (2019). *New Materialisms Ancient Urbanisms* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351008488.

Anderson, Ben. (2014) *Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Andrade, Oswald de. (1928). "Manifiesto Antropofágico". *Antropofagia* 1, maio.

Anzaldua, Gloria ([1987] 2012). "La conciencia de la mestiza." In: Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. San Francisco: Aunt Lute books, 99-113.

Appadurai, Arjun, (1996) *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis, MN :University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Arjona, Jamie M. (2017). "Homesick Blues: Excavating Crooked Intimacies in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Jook Joints". *Historical Archaeology 51*:43–59.

Austin, John L. (1962). *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Auge, Marc. (2008). *Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*. London: Verso.

Bakhtin, Mikhaíl. (1981). "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel". *In The Dialogic Imagination. Four essays*. Austin: Univ. Texas Press, 84–258.

Bakhtín, Mikhaíl. (1937, 1989). *Las formas del tiempo y del cronotopo en la novela*. Madrid: Taurus.

Baldwin, James. (1953). "Stranger in the Village" *Harper's Magazine*.

Bandaranayake, Senake (pseudonym A. Gidtri) (1974). "Imperialism and Archaeology". *Race & Class* XV. 4: 431–459.

Barad, Karen. (2003). "Posthumanist performativity: toward an understanding of how matter comes to matter" *Signs: Journal of Women and Cult in Society, 28* (3) (2003), pp. 801-831

Barad, Karen. (2007) *Meeting the Universe Halfway. Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning.* Durham - London: Duke University Press.

Barad, Karen (2012). "What Is the Measure of Nothingness? Infinity, Virtuality, Justice" *100 Notes, 100 Thoughts. Documenta Series 099.* Bilingual edition. Verlag: Hatje Cantz.

Barad, Karen (2014). "Diffracting Diffraction: Cutting-Together-Apart." *Parallax 20(3)*: 168-187.

Barad, Karen (2015) "TransMaterialities Trans*/Matter/Realities and Queer Political Imaginings" *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 21,* Numbers 2-3, pp. 387-422

Barad, Karen (2016) "Karen Barad: Troubling Time/s, Undoing the Future" *Youtube.* Faculty of Arts, Uploaded by Aarhus Universitet. June 2, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBnOJioYNHU.

Barad, Karen, (2019). "Troubling time/S". Lecture Belgrado Summer school for Sexualities, Cultures and Politics 2019. 18-23 August 2019.

Baraka, Amiri (1995). "Jazzmen: Diz & Sun Ra". *African American Review Vol. 29,* No. 2, Special Issues on The Music (Summer, 1995), pp. 249-255.

Barthes, Roland (1968; 1977) "The Death of the Author". *Image, music, text* 1st ed. New York: Hill and Wang. pp. 142-148.

Battle-Baptiste, Whitney (2011). *Black Feminist Archaeology*. California: Left Coast Press.

Baudrillard, Jean (1981). *Simulacres et simulation*s. París: Éditions Galilée.

Bauman, Zygmunt (2000). *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Beliso de Jesús, Aisha M. & Pierre, Jemima (2019) "Special Section: Anthropology of White Supremacy." *American anthropologist Vol. 122*. N. 1 Pp: 65-75.

Bell, David., & Valentine, Gill. (1995). *Mapping Desire:Geographies of Sexuality* (1st ed.). London: Routledge.

Benjamin, Ruha (2018) "Black After Lives Matter: Cultivating Kinfulness as Reproductive Justice" in Clarke A. E. & Haraway D. J. (2018). *Making Kin Not Population*. Prickly Paradigm Press.

Benjamin, Ruha. (2020). "Black Skin, White Masks: Racism, Vulnerability & Refuting Black Pathology." *Princeton University: Department of African American Studies*.   Online Class. April 15.
https://aas.princeton.edu/news/black-skin-white-masks-racism-vulnerability-refuting-black-pathology

Benjamin, Ruha (2022). *Viral Justice: How We Grow the World We Want,* Princeton: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691222899

Bennet, Jane. (2009). *Vibrant Matter: a Political Ecology of Things*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Berardi, Franco Bifo, (2009). *Precarious Rhapsody*. London: Minor Compositions

Berlant, Lauren. (1998). "Intimacy, a special issue". *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Intimacy, pp. 281-288.

Berlant, Lauren. (2006); "Cruel Optimism". *differences* 1 December; 17 (3): 20–36. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/10407391-2006-009

Berlant, Lauren. (2011). *Cruel Optimism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Berlant, Lauren & Edelman, Lee (2014). *Sex, or the Unbearable*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Berrigan, Caitlin (2022). "Kinship Is Anarchy". Online *E-flux journal*. Issue #130. October https://www.e-flux.com/journal/130/491388/kinship-is-anarchy/

Bersani, Leo. (1995). *Homos*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv19m61fb.

Bhabha, Homi K., (2004). *The location of culture*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Boal, Augusto (1997). *Jeux pour acteurs et non-acteur*s. Paris: La Découverte.

Bordo, Susan (1993). *Unbearable Weight*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Braidotti, R. (1994). *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Braidotti, Rosi. (2006) "Affirming the Affirmative: On Nomadic Affectivity" http://www.rhizomes.net/issue11/braidotti.html (03-11-2017).

Braidotti, Rosi. (2006) *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Braidotti, Rosi. (2013a). "Nomadic Feminist Theory in a Global Era". *Labrys, études féministes / estudos feministas, vol. 23.* https://www.labrys.net.br/labrys23/filosofia/rosibraidotti.htm

Braidotti, Rosi (2013b) *The posthuman*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Braidotti Rosi. (2019). "A theoretical framework for the critical posthumanities". *Theory, Culture & Society*, 36, 31-61.

Buchanan, Ian & Lambert, Gregg. (2005). *Deleuze and Space*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bülent, Diken (2004) "From refugee camps to gated communities: biopolitics and the end of the city". *Citizenship Studies, 8:1*, 83-106, DOI: 10.1080/1362102042000178373.

Burguillos Martinez, Ferrán & Frías Montoya, José Antonio (2006) "Bibliotecas y diversidad sexual Presentación del dossier". *Educación y biblioteca*, Año 18, n. 152, p. 48-49

Butler, Judith (1986) 'Sex and Gender in Simone De Beauvoir's Second Sex.' Yale French Studies 72: 35-49

Butler, Judith (1987). *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*. N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

Butler, Judith. (1988). "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory". *Theatre Journal*, *40*(4), 519–531.

Butler, Judith (1990). *Gender Trouble*. New York: Routledge.

Butler, Judith ([1993] 2010). *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'.* N.Y. and London: Routledge.

Butler, Judith. (2004). *Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence.* London: Verso.

Butler, Judith. (2015). *Notes Toward A Performative Theory of Assembly.* London: Harvard University Press.

Byung-Chul Han (2020). "Los ritos transforman el 'estar en el mundo' en un 'estar en casa'. Hacen del mundo un lugar fiable". *El Mundo.* 5 junio de 2020. https://www.elmundo.es/papel/lideres/2020/06/05/5eda56bd21efa02e4c8b4757.html.

De la Cadena, M. (2009) "Política indígena: Un análisis más allá de 'la política'." *Red de Antropologías del Mundo*, *4*, 139–142.

Cajete, Gregory. (2000). *Native science: Natural laws of interdependence.* Santa Fe, NM: Clear Light Books.

Calderón-Sandoval, Orianna Aketzalli & Sánchez Espinosa, Adelina (2021). "A Diffractive Analysis of Documentary Film No existimos: Making Visible the Invisible with an Eccentric Technology of Gender." *Sociología y Tecnociencia*. Vol. 11 No. 1, Seeking Eccentricity.

Campt, Tina (2019). "Black visuality and the practice of refusal". *Women and Performance.* Online article. https://www.womenandperformance.org/ampersand/29-1/campt

Caputi, Jane and Rusell, Diana E. H. (1992) "Femicide: Speaking the Unspeakable" (publicado inicialmente en Ms. Magazine. September/October, 1990). In Radford, Jill and Diana E. H. Russell: Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992. También en http://www.dianarussell.com/femicide.html.

Castro Samayoa, A. (2019). "Starting With Sexuality: Conceptualizing (mis) Translations of Sexualities and Genders as Willful Strategies of Organizational Survival at a Mexican University". In E. F. Henderson and Z. Nicolazzo (Eds.), *Starting With Gender in International Higher Education Research: Conceptual Debates and Methodological Considerations* (pp. 83–97). New York, NY: Routledge.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. (2000). *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (New Edition)*, i–vi. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chen, Mel Y. (2011). "Toxic Animacies, Inanimate Affections." *GLQ* 17 (2–3): 265–286.

Chen, Mel Y. (2012). *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering and Queer Affect*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Chías, Edgar (2013). *Ternura Suite*. Colonia Juárez: El milagro.

Childe, Vere Gordon. (1936). *Man Makes Himself*. London: Collins.

Cho S, Crenshaw KW, McCall L (2013) Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications, and praxis. *Signs* 38(4): 785–810.

Clare, Eli (2009), "Freaks and Queers" and "Stones in my Pockets, Stones in my Heart" in *Exile and Pride: Disability, Queerness, and Liberation*. Boston, South End Press. pp. 81-118 and pp. 143-160.

Clough, Patricia. (2007). Introduction. In Patricia Clough & Jean Halley (Eds.), *The affective turn: Theorizing the social* (pp. 1-33). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Coates, T.-N. (2015). *Between the world and me*. Text Publishing Company.

Cocks, Joan. (1989). *The Oppositional Imagination: Feminism, Critique and Political Theory*. London: Routledge.

Cohen, Cathy J. (1997) "Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?" *GLQ, Vol. 3*: 437-465.

Colebrook, Claire. (2010). *Deleuze and the Meaning of Life*. New York, London: Continuum.

Colebrook, Claire. (2014). *Sex After Life: Essays on Extinction,* Vol. 2. Open Humanities Press: Ann Arbor.

Conkey, Margaret. W. & Gero, Joan M. (1991). "Tensions, pluralities, and engendering archaeology: an introduction to women and prehistory". In *Engendering Archaeology: Women and Prehistory* (eds J. M. Gero and M. W. Conkey). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 3-30.

Crenshaw, K. (1989). "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics", in: The University of Chicago Legal Forum Volume: *Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Legal Forum. P.p: 139–167.

Crutzen, Paul J. y Stoermer, Eugene F. (2000). "The 'Anthropocene'". *IGBP News Letter*, 41 17-18.

Cruz Banks, Ojeya (2012) "Katherine Dunham: Decolonizing Anthropology through African American Dance Pedagogy". *Transforming Anthropology*. 20:2, 159-168.

Csordas, Thomas J. (1994). *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cvetkovich, Ann. (2003). *An archive of feelings : trauma, sexuality, and lesbian public cultures*. Durham :Duke University Press,

Cvetkovich, Ann. (2012). *Depression: a public feeling*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Daggers-Drawn, Nova Ishtar (2019) "Queer Revenge. The Social War, Queer Negativity, and All the Things You Were Never Supposed to Think About." *The Anarchist Library*. May 31st, 2019. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/category/topic/queer-nihilism.

Daring, C.B.; Shannon, Deric.; Rogue, J. Volcano, Abbey. (2012). *Queering Anarchism: Addressing and Undressing Power and Desire*. Oakland & Edinburgh: AKA Press.

Davis, Heather (2022) *Plastic Matter*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

DeLanda, Manuel (2016). *Assemblage Theory*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

DeLanda, Manuel. (2018). *Materialist Ontology*. unpublished.

Deleuze, Gilles. (1968; 2005). *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*. N.Y.: Zone Books.

Deleuze, Gilles. (1968) *Différence et repetition*. Paris: P.U.F.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1980; 1999). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by B. Massumi. London: The Athlone Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (1983). "Plato and the Simulacrum", *October* 27, 45-56, 53.

Deleuze, Gilles, (1992) Postscript on the societies of Control article on libcom.org. https://libcom.org/library/postscript-on-the-societies-of-control-gilles-deleuze

Deleuze, Gilles. (1995). *Negotiations, 1972-1990*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Deleuze, Gilles & Claire Parnet (2002), *Dialogues II*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Deleuze, Gilles. (1996) "L'actuel et le virtuel", in *Dialogues,* Flammarion Première partie.

Deloria, Vine (1997). "'Time of Its Own' – Clashing Worldviews at Devils Tower". *Sacred Land Film Project*. Video.

Derrida, Jacques. (1967; 1997). *Of grammatology* (corrected ed.) (G. Spivak, Trans.). Johns Hopkins University Press.

Deseriis, Marco. (2018) "The Politics of Condividuality." *Technecologies, transversal texts*. https://transversal.at /transversal /0318/deseriis/en .

Díaz, Andrea B., Dorrego, Nando, Sesé, Marta & Voltà, Gerard. (2016). "¿Archivar es siempre radical? A propósito del ¿Archivo queer? del Museo Reina Sofía." *Acta Informatica*, 1.

Dozono, Tadashi (2020) "The passive voice of White supremacy: Tracing epistemic and discursive violence in world history curriculum" *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies*. v. 42 n1: 1-26 DOI: 10.1080/10714413.2020.1721261

Dreyfus, H. L. (1992). *What Computers Still Can't Do*. N.Y. Evanston, San Francisco, London: MIT Press. ISBN: 978-0-262-04134-8.

Duggan, Lisa. (2002) "The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism." *Materializing Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural Politics*. Eds. Russ Castronovo & Dana Nelson. Durham: Duke University Press.

Duras, Marguerite. (2006) *Las conversadoras: entrevistas con Xaviere Gauthier*. Buenos Aires: el cuenco de plata.

Edelman, Lee (1998). "The Future Is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive". *Narrative, Vol. 6*, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), 18-30.

Edelman, Lee (2004). *No future: Queer theory and the death drive*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Emirbayer, Mustafa & Mische, Ann (1998). "What Is Agency?" *American Journal of Sociology*, *103*(4), 962–1023. https://doi.org/10.1086/231294

Eng, David. L. (2008). "The End(s) of Race". *PMLA*, *123*(5), 1479–1493. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25501948.

Lê Espiritu Gandhi, Evyn (2022) "The refugee settler condition: Vietnamese diasporas in Guahan and Palestine" was recorded on April 13, 2022, to be featured in The Funambulist podcast.

Fabian, Johannes. (2014; 1983). *Time and the other: How anthropology makes its object*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Fanon, Frantz. (1952). *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove Press.

Fanon, Frantz. (1959) *A Dying Colonialism*. New York: Grove Press.

Fanon, Frantz, (1968) *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York :Grove Press.

Fausto-Sterling, Anne (2000), "Chapter 1: Dueling Dualisms" in *Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality*. New York: Basic Books. pp. 1-29.

Ferguson, Roderick A. (2004). *Aberrations in black : toward a queer of color critique*. Minneapolis :University of Minnesota Press.

Fisher M. (2014). *Ghosts of my life: writings on depression, hauntology and lost futures*. Zero Books. Retrieved November.

Fisher, Mark (2014). 'Do you miss the future?' *Crack magazine*, 12/09/2014. https://crackmagazine.net/article/long-reads/mark-fisher-interview/.

Fleshing Out the Image (2020) "#3: Tina Campt in conversation with Alexander Ghedi Weheliye." viernes, 4 de diciembre de 2020. https://vimeo.com/487372030?login=true#_=_

Flores, Juan. (2008). *The Diaspora Strikes Back: Caribeño Tales of Learning and Turning* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203894613.

Foucault, Michel. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Foucault, Michel. (1976; 1978) *History of Sexuality*. *Volume I: An introduction*. NY: Random House.

Foucault, Michel. (1977) "The Confession of the Flesh" interview. In *Power/Knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings* (ed Colin Gordon), 1980: pp. 194-228.

Foucault, Michel. (1988). *Technologies of the self: A seminar with Michel Foucault*. London: Tavistock.

Foucault, Michel. (1995 [1977]). *Discipline and Punish: the birth of a prison*. NY: Vintage Books.

Foucault, Michel. (1994[1966]. *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Vintage Books.

Freeman, E. (2010). *Time binds: queer temporalities, queer histories*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Freeman, Elisabeth (2010) *Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories*. Duke University Press.

Fung, Richard (1984). *Orientations: Lesbians and Gay Asians*. http://www.richardfung.ca/.

Gelderloos, Peter (2007). *How Nonviolence Protects the State*. Cambridge: South End Press.

Gergan, Mabel, Smith, Sara, & Vasudevan, Pavithra (2020). "Earth beyond repair: Race and apocalypse in collective imagination". *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *38*(1), 91–110. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775818756079.

Gibson-Graham, J.K. (1999). "Queer(y)ing capitalism in and out of the classroom." *Journal of Geography in Higher Education*, 23(1), 80–85.

Giroux, H. A. (1988). *Teachers as intellectuals*. New York, NY: Bergin & Garvey.

González Marcén, Paloma, y Margarita Sánchez Romero. (2018). "Arqueología pública y género: estrategias para nuevas formas de relación con la sociedad." *Storia delle Donne 14*:19-42.

González Marcén, Paloma, Montón Subías, Sandra & Picazo Gurina, Marina (2007). "Continuidad y cambio social en la cultura material de la vida cotidiana" *Complutum, Vol. 18*: 175-184.

González-Ruibal, Alfredo (2012). "Archeology and the Study of Material Culture: Synergies With Cultural Psychology." Free publication.

Gómez Barris, Macarena. (2017). *The Extractive Zone. Social Ecologies and Decolonial Perspectives*. Durham and London: Duke.

Gómez-Barris, Macarena. (2018) *Beyond the Pink Tide: Art and the Political Undercurrents in the Americas*. California: University of California Press.

Gramsci, Antonio.(1980) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. 6th ed. London: Wishart Publications.

Gramsci, Antonio (1994). *Gramsci: Pre-Prison Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grosfoguel, Ramón. (2013). The Structure of knowledge in westernized universities. Epistemic racism/sexism and the four genocides/epistemicides of the long 16th century. *Human Architecture*. *Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge*, *11*(1), 73–90.

Grosz, Elisabeth. (1994). *Volatile Bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism*. Boomington: Indiana University Press.

Grzelinska, Jo. (2012) "Queer methods and methodologies: intersecting queer theories and social science research". *Culture, Health & Sexuality: An International Journal for Research, Intervention and Care*, 14:1, 113-115, DOI: 10.1080/13691058.2011.613199.

Habermas, Jürgen. (1989) [1962], *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, translated by Thomas Burger, Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Hage, Ghassan (Editor) (2009). *Waiting*. Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press.
Hage, Ghassan. (2015) "On stuckedness: critique of crisis and crisis of critique" in *Alter-Politics: Critical Anthropology and the Radical Imagination*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Hägglund, Martin (2008). *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life*. Stanford University Press.

Halberstam, Jack & Livingston, Ira (1995). *Posthuman Bodies*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Halberstam, Jack. (2005). *In a queer time and place : transgender bodies subcultural lives*. New York University Press.

Halberstam, Jack. (2007). "Forgetting Family: Queer Alternatives to Oedipal Relations" in G.E. Haggerty and M. McGarry (eds.) *A Companion to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Studies* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing): 315–24.

Halberstam, Jack (2011). *The Queer Art of Failure*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Hall, Stuart. (1990). "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity." in *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, ed. Kuan- Hsing, Chen and David Morley. pp. 411-441. London and N.Y.: Routledge.

Hamilakis, Yannis. and Duke, Philip. (eds) (2007). *Archaeology and Capitalism: From Ethics to Politics*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.

Hamilakis, Yannis. (2017). "Archaeologies of Forced and Undocumented Migration". *Journal of Contemporary Archaeology*, *3*(2), 121–139.

Haraway, Donna (1988). "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective." *Feminist Studies 14* (3), 575-599.

Haraway, Donna. (1992). "The promises of monsters: A regenerative politics for inappropriate/d others." In *Cultural Studies*, ed. L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, and P.A. Treichler, 295-337. New York: Routledge.

Haraway, Donna (2003). *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness*. Chicago, Ill. Bristol: Prickly Paradigm Press.

Haraway, Donna (2008). *When species meet*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Haraway, Donna (2016). *Staying with the trouble*. Duke University Press.

Harding, Sandra. (1993). "Rethinking standpoint epistemology:What   is 'strong objectivity'?" In *Feminist Epistemologies*, ed. L. Alcoff and E. Potter, 49–82. New York: Routledge.

Harris Sánchez, Angie (2018a) Book Review: "Death in the shape of a young girl: Women's political violence in the Red Army Faction" P. Melzer, New York University Press, New York (2015), 339 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4798- 6407-2. In Women's Studies International Forum, 70. September-October 2018. p.126.

Harris Sánchez, Angie (2018b) "Hegemonies of Power vs Affective Relational Anarchies: 4+ Self Case Studies." Master thesis, Utrecht University, Netherlands.

Harris Sánchez, Angie & Galindo Salmerón, Zahira. (2020) "Escape Room". In Aljowaily, H. and Herrera-Pereira, C. (coord.) *Days With(in)*. https://vimeo.com/channels/dayswithinseries.

Harris Sánchez, Angie. (2021). "Contesting power in public art spaces. Liminal p(l)aces, diverting methodologies and observant participation in Valor y Cambio". *Sociology and Technoscience; Vol 11 No 1 (2021): Seeking Eccentricity*. Pp: 39-55.

Harris, Cheryl I. (1993). "Whiteness as Property". *The Harvard Law Review*. <u>Vol. 106, No. 8</u>. pp. 1707-1791.

Hartman, Saidiya (2019). *Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Riotous Black Girls, Troublesome Women, and Queer Radicals*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Harvey, David (2000). *Spaces of Hope*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Haughey, Anthony (2006). *Disputed Territory*. *Dublin*. Dublin: Institute of Technology and Gallery of Photography.

Hauofa, Epeli (2008) "Our Sea of Islands" in *We Are the Ocean: Selected Works*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 27-40.

Hayano, David. (1979). "Auto-ethnography: Paradigms, problems, and prospects". *Human Organization,* 38, 113-120.

Hayward, Eva. (2010). "Spider city sex." *Women Performance: a Journal of Feminist Theory, 20*(3), 225–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/0740770X.2010.529244

Hayward, Eva S. (2017). "Don't exist". *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly*. Volume 4, Number 2. 191-194.

Heckert, Jamie, & Cleminson, Richard (Eds.). (2011). *Anarchism & Sexuality: Ethics, Relationships and Power* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203828441

Hernando, Almudena. (2005) "¿Por qué la Historia no ha valorado las actividades de mantenimiento?". *Treballs d'Arqueologia*, Núm. 11, p. 115-133.

Hernando, Almudena. (2012). *La fantasía de la individualidad sobre la construcción sociohistórica del sujeto moderno*. Madrid: Katz.

Herzfeld, Michael. (2016). *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics and the Real Life of States, Societies, and Institutions* (3rd ed.). London and New York: Routledge.

Hill Collins, Patricia (1991). *Black Feminist Thought: knowledge, consciousness and the politics of empowerment*. New York, Routledge.

Hobsbawm, Eric & Ranger, Terence (eds) 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*. Past and Present Publications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hodder, Ian. (2012) *Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and Things*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Holmqvist, Sam. (2018) "Trans readings: A legacy from myself to myself", *lambda nordica 23,* (1–2), p. 185–197.

hooks bell. (2000). *Feminist theory : from margin to center* (2nd ed.). South End Press.

Imada, Adria. L. (2017). "A Decolonial Disability Studies?" *Vol. 37 No. 3* (2017): Summer 2017

Ingold, Tim, (1993). "The Temporality of the Landscape", *World Archaeology*, 25(2): 152-174. Google Scholar 10.1080/00438243.1993.9980235

Ipak Centar (2014) "Jack Halberstam on Queer Failure, Silly Archives and the Wild" August. Summer school for Sexualities, cultures and politics.

Jackson, Zakiyyah Iman. (2015). "Outer worlds: The persistence of race in movement 'Beyond the human'". *A Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies 21* (2–3):215–8.

Jagose, Annamarie. (1996) *Queer Theory: an introduction*. New York: New York University Press.

Jameson, Fredric. (1992). *Postmodernism, or, the cultural logic of late capitalism*. Duke University Press.

Jameson, Fredric. (2009) *Arqueologías del futuro: El deseo llamado utopía y otras aproximaciones de ciencia ficción*. Madrid: Akal.

Jian Neo Chen & Micha Cárdenas (2019) "Times to Come: Materializing Trans Times". *TSQ* 1 November; 6 (4): 472–480. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/23289252-7771639.

Johnson E. Patrick. (2001). "Quare" studies, or (almost) everything I know about queer studies I learned from my grandmother. *Text and Performance Quarterly*, 21, 1-25.

Jones, Angela, Ed. (2013). *A Critical Inquiry Into Queer Utopia*. N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jue, Melody & Ruiz, Rafico (2021) Saturation. An Elemental Politics. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Kaprow, Allan. (1956). *Assemblage, Environments and Happenings*. N.Y.: N.H. Abrams.

Kendi, Ibram X. (2019). *How to be an antiracist*. One World.

Kim, Jinah. (2019) *Postcolonial Grief. The afterlives of the Pacific wars in the Americas*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Kina, Laura, & Bernabe, Jan Christian (Eds.). (2017). *Queering Contemporary Asian American Art*. University of Washington Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvcwnszk

Klein, Naomi. (2007). *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. London: Penguin.

Knappet, Carl & Malafouris, Lambros (2008). *Material Agency*. New York: Springer

Ko, Aph & Ko, Syl (2017). *Aphro-ism: Essays on Pop Culture, Feminism, and Black Veganism from Two Sisters*. Lantern Books.

Kovach, Margaret (2010). "Conversation Method in Indigenous Research". *First Peoples Child & Family Review*, *5*(1), 40-48. Retrieved from https://fpcfr.com/index.php/FPCFR/article/view/172

Labov, William (1973). "The Social Setting of Linguistic Change". *Diachronic, areal, and typological Linguistics II*: 195-251.

Lander, Edgardo. (1993) Ciencas sociales. Saberes coloniales y eurocéntricos. In: E. Lander (ed.) La colonialidad del saber. Eurocentrismo y ciencas sociales. Perspectivas latinoamericanas. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, pp. 11-40.

Lander, Edgardo. (2000). Eurocentrism and Colonialism in Latin American Social Thought. *Nepantla. Views from South*, *1*(3), 519–532.

Latour, Bruno (1986). "The Powers of Association" in *Power, action, and belief : a new sociology of knowledge?* ed by Law, John. London: Routledge, 264-280.

Lear, Jonathan (2008). *Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Lehman, Gregory (1997). "Life's Quiet Companion". *Island*. *(69)*, 54-61.

Lefebvre, Henry (2004). *Rhythmanalysis : space time and everyday life*. Continuum.

Lehner,Ace (2021) "Critical Questions and Embodied Reflections: Trans Visual Culture Today—A Roundtable," *Art Journal* 80, no. 4 pp. 38–52.

Leslie, Esther (2004). *Hollywood Flatlands: Animation, Critical Theory, and the Avant- Garde*. New York: Verso.

Lev, Michal (2020) "Art as a mediator for intimacy: Reflections of an art-based research study". *Journal of Applied Arts and Health 11*(3).

Lezra, Jacques (2017) *Untranslating Machines A Genealogy for the Ends of Global Thought*. London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Liang, M. (2022). "Playing with power: Kink, race, and desire". *Sexualities*, *25*(4), 381–405. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363460720964063

Lorde, Audre (1984). *Sister Outsider*. Berkely, CA: The Crossing Press.

Loyd, J.; Secor, A.; Ehrkamp, P. (2023). "Geopolitics of Disability and the Ablenationalism of Refuge". Geopolitics.

Luna, Caleb. (2018) "Romantic love is killing us: Who Takes Care of Us When We're Single?" *The body is not an apology*. https://thebodyisnotanapology.com/magazine/romantic-love-is-killing-us/

Lugones, María. (2008). "Colonialidad y género". *Tabula Rasa*, (09), 73-101.

Lykke, Nina. (2022). *Vibrant Death: A Posthuman Phenomenology of Mourning*. London: Bloomsbury.

Lyotard, Jean-François (2018). "Defining the Postmodern." The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. 3rd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W. W. Norton, 2018, pp. 1385–88.

MacCormack, Patricia, Radomska, Marietta, Lykke, Nina, Hillerup-Hansen, Ida, Olson, Philip R. & Manganas, Nicholas. (2021). What do we talk about when we talk about queer death? Theories and definitions. *Whatever: Transdisciplinary Journal of Queer Theory and Studies*, vol. 4: 573-598.

Machado, Carmen María (2019). *In the dream house: a memoir*. London: Serpenstale.

MacKinnon, Catharine (2006). *Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues*, Cambridge, Mass.: Belnap Press.

Marlins, Peta (2004) "Machinic assemblages: Deleuze, Guattari and an ethico-aesthetics of drug use". J*anus head 7 (1)*, 84-104.

Manalansan IV, Martin F. (2014). The "Stuff" of Archives: Mess, Migration, and Queer Lives. *Radical History Review*. 2014. 94-107. 10.1215/01636545-2703742.

Marak, Queenbala (2015) "Writing the 'self': Introducing autoethnography" *Man In India*, 95 (1): 1-10.

Martínez, E. (2021) "CHAMPETA: A COLOMBIAN CARIBBEAN CULTURAL RESISTANCE". *The Funambulis*t. online.

Massumi, Brian. (1995). "The Autonomy of Affect" *Cultural Critique, No. 31,* The Politics of Systems and Environments, Part II. pp. 83-109.

Matshidiso & Sasha Huber (2022). "On remembering with Sasha Huber." *Autograph*. Interview. https://autograph.org.uk/blog/watch-back/watch-on-remembering-with-sasha-huber/

Mauro, Joey (2022) "Black Historiography Versus the "Nostalgia Mode": Exploring the Limits of Fredric Jameson's Postmodern Critique Through Toni Morrison's Beloved." *The Albatross*. Pp: 69-77.

Mayo, Cris & V. Blackburn, Mollie. (Eds.). (2019). Queer, Trans, and Intersectional Theory in Educational Practice: Student, Teacher, and Community Experiences (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367816469.

Achille Mbembe (2003) "Necropolitics". *Public Culture* 1 15 (1): 11–40. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-15-1-11

Meekosha, H. (2011). "Decolonising disability: thinking and acting globally." *Disability & Society* 26 (6): 667-682.

Meillassoux, Quentin (2008). *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*. Translated by R. Brassier. New York: Continuum.

Melzer, Patricia. (2015). *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl: Women's Political Violence in the Red Army Faction*. NYU Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt15r405n

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. (1945). *Phénoménologie de la perception*. París: Gallimard.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1962). *The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith, London: Routledge Kegan and Paul.

Mezzadra, Sandro & Neilson, Brett. (2012). Between Inclusion and Exclusion: Topology of Global Space and Borders. *Theory, Culture and Sociology, 29* (4/5), 58-75.

Mezzadra, Sandro & Neilson, Brett. (2013) *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Duke University Press. *JSTOR*, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1131cvw. Accessed 5 May 2023.

Mignolo, Walter (2010), "*Aiesthesis* decolonial", *Calle14* 4(4): "Arte y cultura", ed. Pablo Pedro Gómez, Bogotá, Mar, pp 10-25.

Mignolo, Walter & Vázquez, Rolando (2013) "Decolonial AestheSis: Colonial Wounds/Decolonial Healings" *Social Text Online*, July 15.

Minh-ha, Trinh. (1988; 1990). "Not you/like you: Post-colonial women and the interlocking questions of identity and difference". In Anzaldúa, G. (1990). *Making face, making soul/haciendo caras: creative and critical perspectives by feminists of color* (pp. 371-375). San Francisco: Aunt Lute Foundation Books.

Minh-ha, Trinh T. (1996). "An acoustic journey." In J. C. Welchman (Ed.), *Rethinking borders* (pp. 1-17). University of Minnesota Press.

McKittrick, Katherine (2015). *Sylvia Wynter: Being human as praxis*, ed. K. McKittrick. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Monticelli Rita. (2011). "(Counter)Theories and Gender Studies in a Transnational Perspective" in: Fortunati, V; Cattani, F. *Questioning the European Identity/ies*.

Deconstructing Old Stereotypes and Envisioning New Models of Representation. Bologna: Il Mulino, PP. 133 - 151.

Moore, Jason W., (2016) "Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism". *Sociology Faculty Scholarship*. 1.

Moraga, Cherry & Anzaldúa, Gloria. (2015). *This bridge called my back: writings by radical women of color*. Fourth edition. Albany, State University of New York (SUNY) Press.

Moral de Eusebio, Enrique (2014), "¿Es el sexo al género lo que la naturaleza a la cultura? Una aproximación queer para el análisis arqueológico", *ArqueoWeb*, nº15, pp. 248-269. Recuperado de: http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/arqueoweb/pdf/15/Moral.pdf

Morris, Rosalind C., & Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (2010). *Can the subaltern speak?: Reflections on the history of an idea*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Morrison, Toni. (2007). *Beloved*. Vintage Classics.

Moshenska, Gabriel (Ed.). (2017). *Key Concepts in Public Archaeology*. UCL Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1vxm8r7

Muñoz Moreno, Aurora. (@gipsycode) (2023). "Fiestas gitanas: reivindicación como pueblo, historia, cultura y celebración a la naturaleza". [post] https://www.instagram.com/gipsycode/

Muñoz, José Esteban. (1996). "Ephemera as Evidence: Introductory Notes to Queer Acts," in "Queer Acts," special issue, *Women and Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory 8,* no. 2*: 5 – 11.*

Muñoz, José Esteban (1999). "Introduction: Performing Disidentifications" in *Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1-34.

Muñoz, J. E. (2009). *Cruising Utopia*. N.Y. and London: New York University Press.

Muñoz, José Esteban, Haritaworn, Jin; Hird, Myra; Jackson, Zakiyyah I.; Puar, Jasbir K.; Joy, E.; Halberstam, Jack. (2015). "Theorizing Queer Inhumanisms". *GLQ - A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies*, *21*(2–3), 209–248.

Myers, Natasha (2012). "Dance your PhD: Embodied animations, body experiments, and the affective entanglements of life science research." *Body & Society, 18*(1), 151-189.

Nash, Jennifer C. (2008). "Re-thinking Intersectionality". *Feminist Review 89 (1)*:1-15.

National Museum of Ireland (2021, September 17th) "Anthony Haughey in conversation with the Director of the National Museum of Ireland, Lynn Scarff". https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ih4t4ZfpMUk&ab_channel=NationalMuseumofIreland

Negri, A. (1999) "Value and Affect" in *boundary 2*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Summer, 1999), pp. 77-88.

Negrón-Muntaner, Frances, and Rivera, Raquel Z. (2007) "Reggaeton Nation." *NACLA Report on the America*s 40, no. 6 (November/December 2007): 35-39.

Negrón-Muntaner, Frances (2020a) "Decolonial Joy: Theorising from the Art of Valor y Cambio" in *Theorising Cultures of Equality*. London and N.Y.: Routledge. In press.

Negrón-Muntaner, Frances (2020b). Interview with Angie Harris Sánchez. Held via Skype on 29th July.

Ngai, Sianne (2005). *Negative Feelings*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press.

Norris, Marisol, Williams, Britton, Gibson, Leah, (2021) "Black Aesthetics: Upsetting, Undoing, and Uncanonizing the Arts Therapies." *VOICES: A WORLD FORUM FOR MUSIC THERAPY | VOL 21 | NO 1 | 2021.*

Now You See Me Moria (2020-ingoing). "Now You See Me Moria project".https://nowyouseememoria.eu/story/

Nyong'o, Tavia. (2008). "So you want Queer Theory (or Do You Want the Truth)? Intersections of Punk and Queer in the 1970s". *Radical History Review*. *Issue 100* (Winter 2008), 102-119.

Ochoa Espejo, Paulina (2020) *On Borders: Territories, Legitimacy, and the Rights of Place*. NY: Oxford University Press.

Omilade Flewellen, Ayana (2019). "African Diasporic Choices: Locating the Lived Experiences of Afro-Crucians in the Archival and Archaeological Record." *NTIK*. *Vol. 8*, No. 2, 2019. pp: 54-74.

Osamu, Nishitani. (2006). "Anthropos and Humanitas: Two Western Concepts of 'Human Being'." *In Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference*, edited by Naoki Sakai, and Jon Solomon, 259–273. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Oswald Davis, Nolan (2018-ongoing) "No Conciliation is Possible"

Oyewumi, Oyeronke. (1997). *The Invention of Women. Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Parikka, Jussi (2015) A *Geology of Media*. Minnesota: Minnesota University Press

Pastor Pérez, Ana & Díaz-Andreu, Margarita (2022). "La evolución de los valores del Patrimonio Cultural." *Revista de Estudios Sociales*. In press.

Pauketat, Timothy R. (2007). *Chiefdoms and Other Archaeological Delusions*. Rowman Altamira.

Pausé, C., Wykes, J., & Murray, S. (Eds.). (2014). Queering Fat Embodiment (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315603285.

Pegues, Juliana Hu (2021). *Space-Time Colonialism: Alaska's Indigenous and Asian Entanglements*. University of North Carolina Press.

Perera, Suvendrini & Pugliese, Joseph (2011). 'Introduction: Combat Breathing: State Violence and the Body in Question' in *Somatechnics*, 1(1), 1–14.

Pinder, Ruth (2015) "The Meddlesome 'I'. Between Rhetoric and Sophistry in the Brad Saga". *Man in India*. 95 (1) pp: 11-26.

Povinelli, Elizabeth (2006) *Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Preciado, Paul B. (2008; 2013) *Testo Yonqui. Sex, Drugs and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era*. N.Y.: The Feminist Press.

Preciado, Paul B. (2008), *Texto Yonki*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

Preciado, Paul B. (2014). *Pornotopia: An Essay on Playboy's Architecture and Biopolitics*. New York: Zone Books.

Puar, Jasbir K. (2007) *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Puar, Jasbir K. (2012). "I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess: Becoming-Intersectional in Assemblage Theory." *Meritum: Belo Horizonte. v. 8*, n. 2, P.p: 371-390.

Quijano, Anibal. (2000). "Colonialidad del poder, eurocentrismo y América latina" en *Colonialidad del Saber, Eurocentrismo y Ciencias Sociales*. 201-246. CLACSO-UNESCO 2000, Buenos Aires.

Ramadanovic, Petar (1998) ''When 'To Die in Freedom' Is Written in English,'' *Diacritics 28.4*. pp: 54-67.

Radomska, Marietta. (2020) "Deterritorialising Death: Queerfeminist Biophilosophy and Ecologies of the Non/Living in Contemporary Art" *Australian Feminist Studies 35*: 116–137.

Radomska, Marietta, Mehrabi, Tara, and Lykke, Nina, Eds. (2019). "Queer Death Studies: Coming to Terms with Death, Dying and Mourning Differently" – special issue of the journal *Women, Gender & Research 3-4*.

Radomska, Marietta; Mehrabi, Tara; Lykke, Nina (2020) "Queer Death Studies: Death, Dying and Mourning from a Queerfeminist Perspective". *Australian Feminist Studies*. Volume 35, pp: 81-100.

Ramírez, Horacio N. Roque. (2005) "A Living Archive of Desire: Teresita la Campesina and the Embodiment of Queer Latino Community Histories". *Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History*, edited by Antoinette Burton, New York, USA: Duke University Press, pp. 111-135.

Raunig, Gerald (2016) *Dividuum: Machinic Capitalism and Molecular Revolution,* Vol. 1, (A. Derieg, trans.), Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).

Rifkin, Mark (2017). *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia (2018). *Un mundo ch'ixi es posible. Ensayos desde un presente en crisis.* Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón.

Rivera-Rideau, Petra R.(2015) *Remixing Reggaetón: The Cultural Politics of Race in Puerto Rico*, New York, USA: Duke University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822375258

Rizvi, Uzma. (2006). "Accounting for Multiple Desires: Decolonizing Methodologies, Archaeology, and the Public Interest". *India Review*, *5*, 394-416.

Rizvi, Uzma. (2018). "Critical Heritage and Participatory Discourse in the UAE". *Design and Culture*, *Vol. 10*, n.1 (2018) – Decolonising Design: 55-70.

Robinson, Cedric (2000) [1983]. *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition.* University of North Carolina Press.

Robinson, Dylan (2020). *Hungry listening : resonant theory for indigenous sound studies.* Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Roque Ramírez, Horacio. (2005), "A Living Archive of Desire: Teresita la Campesina and the Embodiment of Queer Latino Community Histories," in *Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History,* ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 111 – 35.

Rosiek, Jerry Lee, Snyder, Jimmy & Pratt, Scott L. (2020). "The New Materialisms and Indigenous Theories of Non-Human Agency: Making the Case for Respectful

Anti-Colonial Engagement." *Qualitative Inquiry*, *26*(3–4), 331–346. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800419830135

Sabzalian, Leilani (2018). "Curricular standpoints and Native feminist theories: Why Native feminist theories should matter to curriculum studies." *Curriculum Inquiry, 4*(3), 1–23. doi: 10.1080/03626784.2018.1474710.]

Saez, Javier & Carrascosa, Sejo. (2011). *Por el culo: políticas anales*. Madrid: Egales.

Sajnani, Nisha. (2016) "The Arts and Science of Reflective Practice." [Lecture], Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma Master Class, Orvieto, Italy, April 10-16.

Sakai, Naoki. (2006). "Translation". *Theory, Culture & Society*, *23*(2–3), 71–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276406063778

Salih, Sara (2002, 2006) "On Judith Butler and Performativity". In *Judith Butler*. London and N.Y.: Routledge. pp: 55-68.

Santana, D. (2017). "Transitionings and Returnings. Experiments with the Poetics of Transatlantic Water" *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly * Volume 4*, Number 2 * May 2017 181 DOI 10.1215/23289252-3814973.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2006). *The Rise of the Global Left, The World Social Forum and Beyond*. London: Verso.

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2006). *Renovar la teoría crítica y reinventar la emancipación social (encuentros en Buenos Aires)*. Buenos Aires: Claeso.

Schalk, Sami (2022). *Black Disability Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Scott, Joan Wallach (1986). "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis". *The American Historical Review*. 91 (5): 1053–1075. https://doi.org/10.2307/1864376

Sedgwick, E. K.(1990) *Epistemology of the Closet*. Berkeley :University of California Press.

Segato, Rita L. (2006) "Qué es un feminicidio. Notas para un debate emergente". Departamento de Antropología, Brasília: Serie Antropología.

Seigworth, Gregory J. and Gregg, Melissa. (2010) "An Inventory of Shimmers". *The Affect Theory Reader*, edited by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, New York, USA: Duke University Press. pp. 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822393047-002

Selvaraj, K. (2021). "Being Queer and Brown: A Queer, decolonial, arts-based, autoethnographic enquiry into art therapy pedagogical institutions and spaces". *JoCAT , vol. 16*, number 1. pp: 66-76.

Shaviro, Steve. (1997). *Doom Patrols: A Theoretical Fiction about Postmodernism*. New York: Serpent's Tail. Available online at http://www.dhalgren.com/Doom/.

Shaw Jon K. & Reeves-Evison Teo. (2017). *Fiction As Method*. Berlin: Sternberg Press.

Shildrick, Margrit (2002) *Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self*, London: SAGE.

Shildrick, Margrit. (2012). "Critical Disability Studies: rethinking the conventions for the age of postmodernity" In *Routledge Handbook of Disability Studies* Editors: Nick Watson, Carol Thomas and Alan Roulstone.

Shilliam, Robbie. (2013). "Be.Bop 2012. Black Europe Body Politics. Decolonial Aesthesis." *Social Text Online*, July 15. https://www.socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/be-bop-2012–black-europe-bodypolitics/.

Shiva, Vandana. (1990). Reductionist science as epistemological violence. In A. Nandy (Ed.), *Science, hegemony and violence. A requiem for modernity* (pp. 232–256). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shomura, Chad (2017a) "On the Limits and Promise of New Materialist Philosophy" *Forum: Emergent Critical Analytics for Alternative Humanities* ssue *6.1;* (Spring 2017). New Materialist Philosophy.

Shomura, Chad. (2017b). "Exploring the Promise of New Materialisms". *Lateral*, *6*(1). https://www.jstor.org/stable/48671694

Simpson, Audra (2017). "The ruse of consent and the anatomy of 'refusal': Cases from Indigenous North America and Australia". *Postcolonial Studies*, vol 20: 18–33.

Slaby, Jan, Mühlhoff, Rainer, & Wüschner, Philipp. (2019). "Affective Arrangements". *Emotion Review*, *11*(1), 3–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073917722214

Smith, Barbara. (1983), *Home Girls, A Black Feminist Anthology*. New York: Kitchen Table; Women of Colors Press, Inc.

Smith, Laurajane. (2006). *Uses of heritage*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Snorton, Riley C. Ed. (2017). *Black on Both Sides. A Racial History of Trans Identity*. Minnesota: University Of Minnesota Press.

Snorton, C. Riley and Yapp, Hentyle (2020) *Saturation : race, art, and the circulation of value*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Snyder, S., and D. Mitchell. (2010). "Introduction: Ablenationalism and the geo-politics of disability." *Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies 4* (2):113–26.

de Souza Ávila, Eliana (2017) "DECOLONIZING QUEER TIME: A CRITIQUE OF ANACHRONISM IN LATIN@ WRITINGS" *Ilha do Desterro v. 70*, nº1, pp. 39-49, Florianópolis, jan/abr.

Spillers, Hortense J. (1987) "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book." *Diacritics* 17.2: 64. Web.

Spinoza, Baruch. (1958). *The Political Works*. Wernham, A.G. [Ed., Trans.],Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Spinoza, Baruch. (1996). *Ethics*. Curley, E. M., & Hampshire, S.

Spinoza, Baruch. ([1677] 1993). *Ethics and treatise on the correction of the intellect*. (A. Boyle, Trans.). London: J.M. Dent.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1988). "Can the subaltern speak?" In N. Carry & L. Grossberg (Eds.), *Marxism and the interpretation of culture* (pp. 271–313). Urbana-Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Stottman, M. Jay (2011) *Archaeologists as Activists: Can Archaeologists Change the World?* Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

Stryker, Susan. (1994), "My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of Chamounix," *GLQ 1,* pp: 237 – 54.

Stryker, Susan. (2008). "Dungeon intimacies: The poetics of transsexual sadomasochism." *Parallax*, *14*(1), 36-47. https://doi.org/10.1080/13534640701781362.

TallBear, Kim. (2021) "Identity is a Poor Substitute for Relating: Genetic Ancestry, Critical Polyamory, Property, and Relations." In Brendan Hokowhitu, Linda Tuhiwai-Smith, Chris Andersen, and Steve Larkin. *Critical Indigenous Studies Handbook*. Routledge, 467-478.

Taylor, Sonya Renee (2018). *The body is not an apology: The power of radical self-love*. Berrett-Koehler.

Thiele, Kathrin (2014). "Ethos of diffraction: New paradigms for a (post)humanist ethics". *Parallax 20*, 3: 202-216.

Thrift, Nigel. (2003) "Performance and…", *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 35: 2019–2024.

Ticineto Clough, Patricia. & Halley, Jean. Ed. (2007). *The Affective Turn: theorizing the social*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Todd, Zoe. (2014). Fish pluralities: Human-animal relations and sites of engagement in Paulatuuq, Arctic Canada. *Études/Inuit/Studies*, *38*(1-2), 217–238. https://doi.org/10.7202/1028861ar

Todd, Zoe (2016). "An indigenous feminist's take on the ontological turn: 'Ontology' is just another word for colonialism". *Journal of Historical Sociology*, *29*(1), 4–22.

Tsing, Anna L., Bubandt, Nils, Gan, Elaine, & Swanson, Heather A. (Eds.). (2017). *Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet*. University of Minnesota Press.

Tuck, Eve and Yang, Wayne (2014) "Unbecoming Claims: Pedagogies of Refusal in Qualitative Research". *Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 20*(6) 811–818

Urry, John (1996) "How societies remember the past", in S. Macdonald and G. Fyfe (eds) *Theorising Museums*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Utrecht University Graduate Gender Programme (2022). "Relation(al) Matters Archive IV - Eva Hayward" 9 may 2022.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kgWr1u3L4Q&t=1s&ab_channel=UtrechtUniversityGraduateGenderProgramme

Valencia, Sayak. (2010). *Capitalismo Gore*. Barcelona: Melusina.

Valencia, Sayak (2019a) "Necropolítica, Políticas Post-Mortem/ Trans-mortem y Transfeminismos en las Economías Sexuales de la Muerte" *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly * Volume 6,* Number 2 pp: 180-193. DOI 10.1215/23289252-7348426

Valencia, Sayak (2019b). "Del Capitalismo Gore a la Política Snuff". 30 de septiembre. Masterclass in Gemma Erasmus Mundus, Granada.

Del Valle, T. (2000) "Procesos de la memoria: cronotopos genéricos", en Teresa Del VALLE (coord.), Perspectivas *feministas desde la antropología social*. Barcelona, Ariel, 243-265.

Del Valle, (1999) "Procesos de la memoria: cronotopos genéricos" en *Areas Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales (19)*, pp. 211-225. Murcia, Universidad de Murcia.

Valor y Cambio. https://www.valorycambio.org

Van der Tuin, Iris (2014). *Generational feminism: New materialist introduction to a generative approach*. London: Lexington Books.

Vázquez, Rolando (2011). "Translation as Erasure: Thoughts on Modernity's Epistemic Violence". *Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 24* No. 1.

Vidarte, Francisco Javier (2007). *Ética Marica. Proclamas libertarias para una militancia LGTBQ*. Madrid: Egales

Villar-Argáiz, Pilar. (2018). "Introduction: Irishness on the Margins—Minority and Dissident Identities." In: Villar-Argáiz, P. (eds) *Irishness on the Margins. New*

Directions in Irish and Irish American Literature. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74567-1_1.

Voss, Barbara L. (2000). "Feminisms, Queer Theories, and the Archaeological Study of Past Sexualities". *World Archaeology, Vol. 32*, No. 2, Queer Archaeologies, pp. 180-192.

Voss, Barbara L. (2012). "Sexual Effects: Postcolonial and Queer Perspectives on the Archaeology of Sexuality and Empire". In *The Archaeology of Colonialism: Intimate Encounters and Sexual Effects*. (Voss, B. L., and E. C. Casella, eds.) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp: 11–30.

WAI Architecture Think Tank (2021) "History doesn't exist". *The Funambulist*, 21 June 2021. Last Consultation: 1 feb. 2023.

Warner, Michael (1999). *The Trouble With Normal: Sex Politics and the Ethics of Queer Life*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Wayne, Eve & Wayne Yang, K. (2012) "Decolonization is not a metaphor". *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1*, No. 1, pp. 1-40.

Wells, Liz (2011). *Land Matters Landscape Photography, Culture and Identity*. N.Y.: I.B. Tauris.

Weheliye, Alexander. G. (2014). *HABEAS VISCUS: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Wekker, Gloria. (2016a) "Chapter 2. The House That Race Built". *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race*, New York, USA: Duke University Press, pp. 50-80. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822374565-004.

Wekker, Gloria (2016b). "White Innocence" Lecture. Tuesday January 26, 2016: Profesor Emeritus Gloria Wekker. Utrecht University, NL.

Williams, Raymond. (1977). *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wolfe, Patrick (2007). "Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native." *Journal of Genocide Research, 8*(4), 387-409.

Wong, Alice. (2020). *Disability Visibility*. New York, NY: Crown Books for Young Readers.

Wordsworth, William (1977). "I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud." *William Wordsworth: The Poems*, Vol.1. Ed John O. Hayden. New York: Penguin, 619-20.

Wynter, Sylvia. (1992). "Rethinking 'Aesthetics': Notes Towards a Deciphering Practice". In *Ex-Iles: Essays on Caribbean Cinema*. Ed. Mbye Cham. Trenton, New Jersey: African World Press Inc.

Young, Iris Marion (1979). "Is There a Woman's World?- Some Reflections on the Struggle for Our Bodies", *Proceedings of The Second Sex- Thirty Years Later: A Commemorative Conference on Feminist Theory*, New York: The New York Institute for the Humanities.

Yusoff, Kathryn. (2018). *A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None*. University of Minnesota Press.

Zene, Cosimo (2013). *The Political Philosophies of Antonio Gramsci and B.R. Ambedkar: Itineraries of Dalits and subalterns*. N.Y.:Routledge.

Zirra, Maria (2017) "Shelf Lives: Nonhuman Agency and Seamus Heaney's Vibrant Memory Objects". *Parallax*, Vo. 23. Pp: 458-473.

Power in Public Art Spaces. Frictions, Performativity and the Generation of Counter-Hegemonic Narratives.

Annexes.

Annex 1.

This conversation with Frances Negrón-Muntaner was held during the 8th of April, 2020, during the first confinement, after the state of alarm was declared by the government the 14th of March that same year.

Angie Harris Sánchez: Uno de mis casos de estudio va a ser, evidentemente, *Valor y Cambio*, y después tengo el capítulo que nos han pedido desde *researching* y *eccentric methodologies*, que estamos escribiendo cada persona de del doctorado estamos escribiendo sobre algo. Entonces yo basándome en valor y cambio como caso de estudio estoy haciendo como una introducción como una teorización y después se evidencia en una entrevista contigo una serie de preguntas que son generales, pero para que vayamos charlando y a partir de ahí como que voy cuestionándome diferentes cosas que me planteo no. Una de las cosas de las principales cuestiones cuando estamos hablando de *eccentric methodologies*, qué significa el uso de conceptos, a lo mejor históricos, pero que realmente no tienen como acepciones decoloniales, feministas, etc. ¿cómo conceptos revolucionarios, o que lo han sido anteriormente, cómo pueden ser reconceptualizados o reactualizados en el tiempo. Entonces, a partir de ahí pues claro la experiencia de *Valor y Cambio* evidentemente al ser un proyecto de economía comunitaria alguna o circular, como como se pueda como conceptualizar, realmente supone darle una vuelta de tuerca al concepto de economía

Frances Negrón-Muntaner: ¿Las preguntas aparecen como entrevista o tú las incorporas como citas digamos?

A: Yo tengo pensado que tengamos una conversación y en base a eso no podemos o directamente poner preguntas específicas o yo decirte qué piensas sobre el concepto de reconceptualizar el concepto de economía no eso lo puedo poner y después como

435

transcribir lo que tú me vayas diciendo y a partir de bueno eso va a aparecer como en la última parte del artículo pero sobre todo este artículo es porque va a aparecer como en la tesis entonces va a ser una un pequeño fragmento de la tesis de pues eso, la experiencia en *Valor y Cambio* que realmente pues tendremos o sea ya tendré que ver como forma parte de otra forma se puede ser audio nada más porque si no me tengo que peinar sí… sí, sí te lo pongo con el móvil entonces si quieres vale… vale… vale genial pues espérate vale mira te voy a hacer una serie de cuestiones vamos charlando yo básicamente tenía el… el esquema de la entrevista estaba basado en antes de llegar a Nueva York ahora con todo el tema del COVID con todas las protestas de pues antirracistas en Nueva York y en todo Estados Unidos como que la he ido modulando un poco vale así que lo que vaya saliendo. Lo primero que te voy a preguntar es, yo más o menos he estado leyendo la última las últimas noticias que ha estado presentando el tema de introducir *Valor y Cambio* a un nivel más institucional desde la educación puertorriqueña entonces ¿cómo está la situación actual o cuál es el panorama actual? ¿dónde está situado *Valor y Cambio*?

F: tenemos la cita con la Universidad de Puerto Rico para hablar sobre el valor y circular la moneda después de las protestas del verano del 2019 y la razón que eso me parecía relevante es que *Valor y Cambio*, entre otras cosas, quería proveer una plataforma para que la gente se cuestionará este concepto, pero las protestas proveyeron otra plataforma para la agencia hacerlo entonces queríamos ver si había cambiado y si te acuerdas la tercera pregunta que hace la… la experiencia es ¿qué persona o grupos tú conoces que hacen lo que tú valoras? Esa fue la pregunta que más personas tuvieron dificultades en responder. No conocían a nadie, o decían que no conocían a nadie, o ninguna organización … o muchas veces decían *Valor y Cambio* era lo… la experiencia que estaban teniendo al momento. Luego de las protestas, que una de las cuales trajo casi 1000000 de… tal vez 1000000 de personas a la calle pues empezaron a circular el nombre de grupos de personas que están haciendo este trabajo. Yo quería saber si ese escenario de protesta había de alguna manera transformado a la gente en la asunción que tenían de grupos y personas haciendo lo que ellos valoraban. Entonces queríamos ir en febrero. ¿qué pasó? Bueno, en febrero pues ya habían varios meses de… de los llamados *swarm* de terremoto, más de 3000 terremotos y todavía

está…ayer hubo otro o sea que eso continúa. Entonces… precisamente había afectado el lugar que queríamos ir porque la primera vez que estuvimos para *Valor y Cambio* en Puerto Rico mayormente estuvimos en San Juan, queríamos salir de San Juan y queríamos ir a Ponce, queríamos ir a lugares del sur que fueron de los más afectados por los terremotos. Entonces dijimos "bueno OK, no vamos a en febrero" pero abril era nuestro punto límite porque las elecciones que iba a comenzar. En Puerto Rico las elecciones no son como Estados Unidos donde tú no sientes las elecciones hasta prácticamente dos o 3 semanas antes de votar. En Puerto Rico las elecciones comienzan 6 meses antes de noviembre y se sienten en todo el país. O sea, se sienten en la calle, se sienten en la… en los medios, es una tensión. Es otra cosa. Entonces no queremos que el proyecto se confunda con esa … con esa coyuntura vamos a ir en abril. Bueno, pues en abril ya no era posible porque el COVID. Entonces esa esa parte la… la última visita de *Valor y Cambio* a Puerto Rico está pendiente. Es posible que si abre el Museo de Arte contemporáneo que también es parte de la exhibición de "Dialéctica y anarquía del deseo" es que entonces nosotros podemos hacer de esa una base para hacer un Tour final, pero eso está pendiente en este momento. Mientras tanto el museo y yo habíamos hablado sobre cómo nos dimos cuenta que los maestros de Puerto Rico y los estudiantes los chicos habían venido al proyecto autónomamente. Nosotros no hicimos ningún output particular, pero ellos se aparecieron. Entonces nosotros queríamos explorar eso más y hablamos sobre hacer lo que llamamos el *Valor y Cambio* Kit que era este … unos materiales que los maestros podían usar para utilizar los billetes como forma de… de enseñar… de aprendizaje de distintas cosas. Entonces lo que llegamos es hacer dos talleres que lo hicimos por … dos talleres de 40 maestros cada uno, de escuelas de Puerto Rico y fue increíble, fue increíble porque los maestros pues rápidamente vieron la posibilidad de usar los billetes para integrar prácticamente toda la escuela en la enseñanza y algunos maestros que ya (o maestras. Casi todas son mujeres) eh que… que ya tenían proyectos ecológicos, que ya tenían este… distintos proyectos que integraban asignaturas. También, por ejemplo, había en la primera reunión de 40 maestros ellos se dividieron en pequeños grupos y de este…de esa sesión salieron cuatro proyectos de moneda social. Uno de los cuales estaba perfectamente diseñado desde el principio porque era una maestra que ya tenía un proyecto de reciclaje en una escuela (estamos hablando de niños de cuarto grado, quinto grado,

niños pequeños y ella veía el uso de la moneda para expandir el proyecto e incorporar eh … agricultura agroecológica. Entonces vamos a decir que tú eres un nene que participas, tú haces tu reciclaje, te dan monedas, usas esa moneda en… en estos otros espacios y la circulas ¿no? integras la comunidad y de paso enseñas matemáticas, economía, historia, etcétera ¿no? y los maestros rápido vieron que el proyecto podía permitir la integración de aprendizaje de todas las asignaturas, incluso el idioma también porque por ejemplo tú puedes hablar del proyecto en inglés, puedes hablar del proyecto el términos de historia, de literatura, de migración, economía, salud pública, o sea todo. Entonces pues ese proyecto ahora mismo, después de ahí el éxito que tuvimos con el diálogo, el museo nos pidió una propuesta para el museo y nosotras, Sarabel y yo directamente apoyar al menos 2 proyectos en las escuelas aparte de crear el recurso que cualquier maestro puede usar. O sea que eso es el frente de las escuelas. Entonces está al frente a New York que hay un grupo constituido que se llama *JustXchanges* que está lanzando la moneda social de Nueva York que se va a llamar justX que suena como *justice* pero es JustX. Ese proyecto pues ya se hizo el código para que las personas entren porque va a empezar con una moneda virtual dado el COVID. Ya existe el código, la página web ya casi está terminada…hubo una actividad, una intervención preliminar un poco anunciando *soft lunch* anunciando un poco, pero va a haber más en el futuro y ¿qué más? pues la moneda de…del paso del caño Martín Peña continúa. Claro, bajo el COVID pues no hay tanto movimiento y demás, pero esa ese proyecto continúa. Entonces personalmente yo estoy aparte de como *advisor* de los proyectos yo estoy terminando la película que es *Valor y Cambio, the movie* y lo que es cómico de la película es que como sabemos la experiencia en Puerto Rico del proyecto fue muy emotiva y…y alegría y demás, uno de los tonos fundamentales de la película es la comedia porque enfrentamos muchas … enfrentamos retos y cómo lo resolvemos, ya que añade humor a la trayectoria. Y en lo otro que estamos trabajando es el informe de lo que contienen las grabaciones y ya están las grabaciones que son como 2000 están transcritas y… estoy trabajando con los estudiantes y con un bibliotecario d*e Digital Humanities*, para para poder analizar la data. Es decir, vamos a hacer un informe de quienes participaron de la data que recogimos, qué valoran, cuáles son los obstáculos que ellos ven y qué es lo que ellos piensan quién… quién ya hace lo que ellos piensan y vamos a compararlo por género,

por edad, por educación, por localización (si están en Nueva York o están en Estados Unidos) y preliminarmente hay… es interesante… Nueva York es un lugar mucho más heterogéneo. Puerto Rico fue más homogéneo en sus respuestas y la que la gente dijo pues yo creo que el punto de hacer el informe aparte de devolver el narrativo a la gente es también proveer un punto de partida para que la gente vea que a pesar de que eh…cómo traducir eso a política pública y a infraestructura política pues es mucho más complejo que simplemente decir. Yo creo que el informe sugiere que la mayor parte de la gente está de acuerdo en lo que quiere. El cómo es otra cosa … es mucho más… pero es… es increíble que la mayor parte… estoy hablando de 90% de la gente, piensa que la educación, después de la familia, es lo más que valoran y no quieren decir educación como movilidad social. Quieren decir educación en el sentido de…de cómo se relacionan con el mundo, consigo mismo y con otros. Y eso también fue interesante porque claro… se dice hay que educarse para tener un buen trabajo, para hablar, pero eso es lo que la gente estaba diciendo y eso es muy interesante.

A: Y creo que eso es como muy importante ahora mismo con todas las protestas de Estados Unidos con… con todo el tema de George Floyd y todo el reclamo antirracista, decolonial, etcétera, creo que es muy importante centrarse en eso no cuando tú haces un reclamo y resistes y te activizas no desde…desde eso desde esa movilidad social que al final es como el escape del sueño del…del proletariado que tenemos en Europa que es el sueño europeo de edúcate, edúcate, edúcate, trabaja, trabaja, que algún día no pertenecerás a la clase obrera ¿no? y al final el reclamo de *Valor y Cambio* es otro. Es valora, transforma estos conceptos y resiste desde aquí ¿no? y al final reconceptualiza. Y una de las cosas más interesantes que te oí decir en una de las conferencias fue al final eso mismo ¿no? cómo la Academia o vosotras lo que estabais haciendo era simplemente ser un medio que estaba poniendo posibilidades en un espacio que podríamos conceptualizar como público, pero que al final las relaciones que se estaban creando de ahí eran privadas, pero no desde ese espacio privado de propiedad privada, sino íntimas ¿no? Me acuerdo un día que estabas diciendo "la cola al final no era lineal sino que se había creado una especie de círculo más asambleario" casi, podríamos decir y eso me llamó muchísimo la atención ¿no? porque ahí era como la reconceptualización del binario de lo público y lo privado, de qué es fuera de la

Academia y dentro, qué es tener contacto entre…entre barrio que… que a priori no tienen, porque a lo mejor tienen otras temporalidades también de trabajo y sobre todo eso ¿no? el … el sueño de escapar de la situación social que te ha tocado vivir y no resistir desde ahí… que se está viendo eso mucho en la noticia de George Floyd .. es como 20 o 22 días (no sé cuánto lleva la gente de la calle) y el reclamo no es superar una situación sino reclamar y resistir desde ahí. No sé cómo lo estáis viviendo desde allí o si ves algún tipo de conexión con …con eso.

F: Bueno, la crisis del Covid… una persona que está estudiando a Puerto Rico nos preparan de una manera diferente a ver lo que está ocurriendo en Estados Unidos porque cuando de momento ciudadano neoyorquino se da cuenta "ah, nuestra infraestructura de salud es problemática porque se le ha quitado tantos fondos … porque está privatizada" se empieza a dar cuenta de una serie de cosas que desde Puerto Rico nosotros lo sabemos muy bien y llevamos mucho tiempo organizándonos. Entonces es curioso. Yo escribí una cosa que se llama "staying alive in Puerto Rico" porque era como el COVID ciertamente pues presentaba una nueva coyuntura, unos nuevos retos, pero por otro lado, hay una continuidad con la crisis de María, con la crisis de los terremotos, con la austeridad, porque ya Puerto Rico ya más de una década tratando de mantenerse vivo literalmente. Entonces el COVID da otra otra… otra manera de vivir eso, pero no es una lógica nueva, por lo tanto la gente pudo responder inmediatamente porque ya saben que el punto de la política de… transformadora en Puerto Rico es mantenerse vivo y hacer un *over-turn* o sea transformar las condiciones de vida de raíz. No hay reforma. O sea, realmente la reforma mientras que en Estados Unidos es la primera parte de esto que, antes de George Floyd, que fue el COVID … bueno teníamos que echar *patrás* también porque fue la campaña yo pienso de Bernie Sanders. O sea, si estamos pensando en la corta duración hay… hay una serie de cosas que han ocurrido en los últimos par de años que yo pienso hicieron que este terreno fuera fértil para lo que está ocurriendo ahora. Ciertamente ha habido, hay un movimiento de… de repensar la justicia que incluye los niveles de encarcelamiento, o sea sabemos que las tasas de encarcelamiento, mayormente de los hombres, pero de las mujeres también, son de… o sea altísimos, sabemos que Estados Unidos tiene el sistema de… o las tasas de encarcelamiento más alta del mundo y por más tiempo…

entonces había ya un movimiento cuestionando eso, claro cuestionando la brutalidad policial pero es un todo no es solamente los policías ¿no? Entonces eso era como una parte. Segundo es cada vez más atención a la… al racismo como sistemático y este es interesante porque me preguntaron si quería participar de un… de un grupo de periodistas para ver qué terminología deben usar los periódicos en español para hablar de este tema y una cosa interesante que en … en lo que les mandé que no había pensado hasta ese momento realmente es cómo durante el …qué sé yo… hace 10 o 15 años atrás hubo como una suerte de… de cambio donde la gente prefería que se les llamara afroamericanos o African American, hay una preferencia hacia esa término y ahora el péndulo regresó a Black y parte de eso es liderado por *Black Lives Matter* pero es porque hay una radicalización de la perspectiva que se… se… la revolución es realmente (repensar en cómo) la supremacía blanca, la organización racista jerárquica de la sociedad ha cambiado de forma pero no de raíz este … o sea que eso… eso ya también se venía gestando este… por varios años. Entonces le sumas a eso la situación económica de la polarización, los jóvenes cada vez con menos opciones de trabajo, aún con la educación y con educación avanzada, el COVID que hace consciente a mucha gente de lo que es… ha sido el impacto neoliberal sobre el Commons de todo lo que es o lo que debe ser común … y entonces tienes el *trigger* digamos de George Floyd que dentro de ese contexto pues explota. Y hay una cosa también, la campaña de Bernie Sanders es interesante también porque Bernie Sanders ofreció un vocabulario para entender lo que estaba ocurriendo en Estados Unidos que no fue apoyado por lo por la mayor parte de los electores afroamericanos y lo que se impone en… en esta coyuntura es el vocabulario racial para pensar… no el vocabulario de clase …y eso te indica nuevamente que es que la… la categoría de raza y racismo son las formas en las cuales se piensa la desigualdad no … no… en este momento y por muchas décadas … no la terminología… o sea que en ese sentido Bernie Sanders hablaba de una insurrección o de revolución pero en el vocabulario que no la iba a poder generar. Pero de todas formas sí contribuyó al llamar la atención sobre elementos estructurales económicos.

Pero bueno, entonces *Valor y Cambio* dentro y…y las proyectos que han salido luego como yo JustXchanges pues obviamente ven en esa nueva conciencia o… de más gente… más gente tiene la conciencia de que hay unos cuestiones estructurales del

capital y que hace falta hacer una tras una transición una transformación de raíz desde una economía basada en la explotación la acumulación y la extracción a una que pone al centro el bienestar de la comunidad y cada vez hay más gente, vamos a decir, que está de acuerdo con eso versus, digamos, antes del Covid. Por otro lado la crisis misma… que la gente había perdido tantos empleos este que el gobierno haya respondido con tampoco apoyo ha generado muchos proyectos nuevos de ayuda mutua, por ejemplo, que no es exactamente es lo mismo que una nueva moneda pero son nociones que muchas veces coexisten y que inciden en la necesidad de la transformación, o sea, que a las preguntas sobre la economía pues ciertamente cuando tú miras el capitalismo desde una colonia que pues entonces tu… tu versión o tú o tu perspectiva y experiencia del capitalismo este… no es aventajada, entonces ve cosas que el que está en Nueva York incluso le da mucho más trabajo ver porque aunque tú seas digamos pobre en Nueva York tú estás en un lugar de gran cantidad de abundancia mientras que aunque tú tengas dinero en una colonia tú no estás en un lugar de abundancia entonces esas esas *disjunctions*, disyuntivas, disjunctions, tú sabes, pues proveen perspectivas diferentes sobre cómo funciona el capital, la intensidad es diferente.

A: Supongo que cuando estamos hablando porque… evidentemente *Valor y Cambio* tiene un componente artístico como decolonial ¿no? decir como que se basa en lo que podríamos decir cuando creo que Walter Mignolo habla del *aesthesis* y *aesthetics*, ¿no? cuando al final la estética del arte se ha conceptualizado desde un panorama de esa modernidad, de ese proyecto de futuro, de esa temporalidad siempre que va avanzando y *Valor y Cambio* lo que hace es reconceptualizar eso y decir, "bueno no, estamos usando el arte como imaginación política" y supongo que esa imaginación política a través, por ejemplo, de un concepto que puede ser tan básico como el de economía cambia radicalmente entre una colonia entre una persona pobre emigrante o racializada en el centro de Nueva York y cambia en no sé o lo podríamos decir cambia en sociedades indígenas donde el mismo concepto de… de economía ni siquiera existe ¿no? entonces ¿cómo opera ese… es decir qué cambio hay en esa imaginación política desde ese punto de vista más artístico en *Valor y Cambio* entre la experiencia en Puerto

442

Rico y la de Nueva York (antes de analizar eso esos resultados)? Es decir, las sensaciones que da en ese momento.

F: Yo tomé la decisión de… de utilizar o de diseñar un proyecto artístico a modo de proveer esa plataforma o ese espacio precisamente porque había hecho una … un sondeo entre activistas y los activistas habían dicho que… o sea rechazaban todas las formas convencionales de pensar en… por ejemplo no querían asamblea, no querían reuniones, no querían, ni tan siquiera irse a un campo a algún sitio para pensar, no querían hablar con otra gente haciendo lo mismo o parecido es… articularon que se sentía exhausto, que no tenían más energía, que lo único que podían hacer era dedicarse a lo que estaban haciendo en la comunidad donde estaban y que no querían hacer otra cosa. Entonces eso me planteó "necesitamos otra forma de tener esta misma conversación que no se sienta como trabajo, que no se sienta que… que no te drene la energía". Entonces en ese proceso pues fue que yo empecé a pensar en diseñar una moneda. Entonces la pregunta era ¿pero cómo usamos la moneda para conversar … para circular otras ideas, otras narrativas? y poco a poco pues fui llegando a…al concepto de …de *Valor y Cambio* como intervención artística y… yo describiría el éxito es estrategia. Uno, la prensa el principio pues no nos entendía ¿verdad? porque nunca habían oído de lo que era una moneda social etcétera. Pero una vez conseguimos la atención de algo periodistas tanto en la televisión como en la prensa impresa e hicieron artículos, yo te puedo decir que en 24 horas desde la prensa no cubrirnos y la prensa cubrirnos yo entraba a espacios y todo el mundo estaba hablando de moneda social. El concepto que desconocían el día anterior. O sea, que eso amplificó el mensaje, circuló un nuevo vocabulario. En Puerto Rico eso es particularmente importante porque en Puerto Rico la política es… tiene una intensidad y una violencia que tiene que ver con el contexto colonial en gran parte y…y pues la traición o la cultura política del país, mientras que este nuevo vocabulario que estábamos presentando era bien diferente en relación al colorismo que Puerto Rico se…se limita a la idea de si eres… si apoyas la estadidad para Puerto Rico la independencia… gente de todo tipo, en relación a ese debate, podía participar de este vocabulario que no tenía el bagaje, ese bagaje en ese contexto. Y entonces eso fue increíble, o sea, estar un día completo explicándole a la gente que era una moneda social y al otro día entrar en

otros espacios donde la gente está… ya estaba manejando los conceptos y viendo qué aplicación podrían tener y demás, eso fue un asunto. Claro, antes de eso sería la manera que el proyecto constituyó nuevas comunidades y nuevas posibilidades que no llevan tal vez al tercer asunto que es la adopción inmediata de … de la idea de moneda social para suplir necesidades o necesidades locales inmediatamente ¿no? Y claro, así el proyecto se fue conociendo más allá de Puerto Rico, pues hizo posible otro tipo de colaboraciones a nivel global porque sabemos que está… como la economía capitalista es una economía global, el activismo alrededor de su transformación también va a ser global para poder este… tener el impacto que queremos. En fin, o sea, que esas son… hay un debate muy grande muchas veces sobre alguna gente creen realmente que no puede tener ese tipo de impacto... pues depende, honestamente. En nuestra experiencia, en todas las otras opciones que hubiésemos tenido, que pensamos: asamblea, reunión, activistas, este… protesta, qué sé yo, no creo que hubiesen tenido el impacto que tuvo esta intervención en los participantes y en todo el… y por eso estamos haciendo la película y por eso estamos haciendo el informe entre otras cosas porque queremos compartir la experiencia para cualquier persona en cualquier sitio que diga "bueno, tenemos este reto ¿cómo lo hacemos? pues a veces lo mejor que puedes hacer es diseñar una experiencia que no se sienta como que le estás imponiendo nada a nadie, que la gente pueda intercambios, y que realmente no existe la experiencia sin la participación o sea yo… yo hubiese si hubiese puesto eso allí y nadie hubiese venido no hubiese pasado nada.

A: Sí, sobre todo la, o sea, la parte que nos toca como a lo mejor peña privilegiada que también tenemos otra forma de comunicarnos a través pues, a lo mejor, del lenguaje estructural o post-estructural casi… y cuando llegas… yo me acuerdo cuando estaba haciendo arteterapia que… que fue la primera vez que reconocí como una persona privilegiada a través de esa epistemologías más tradicionales ¿no? porque yo no me daba cuenta que la manera de comunicarme también tenía una raíz muy concreta aparte de ser blanca pero también en un contexto muy concreto de una educación privilegiada de unos padres con un nivel adquisitivo que me había permitido tener un círculo de apoyo X transfeminista, decolonial, etcétera ¿no? y muchas veces me planteaba "¿cuál es el punto de… de activación, como políticas, en gente con la que me estoy

relacionando que no tienen ese *background* concreto desde el privilegio epistemológico?" ¿no? y el arte se abrió como eso… como otra forma de comunicar en la que la persona no necesariamente tenía la responsabilidad como tienen en asambleas, por ejemplo, de tener que expresar o comunicar realmente lo que de alguna forma ha hecho en …en como en la transcripción hacia el arte ¿no? Entonces había como una creación artística que por una parte les servía como el lenguaje pero era un lenguaje que no tenía por qué tener acceso nadie a ese lenguaje ¿no? Casi como *La Frontera* de Anzaldúa: "yo decido quién accede y quién no ha este texto", y me parecía como un reconocimiento también de otro tipo de epistemologías ¿no? y al final la pregunta que me hago también es, porque yo muchas veces sentía cómo… como personal investigador de la Universidad de Granada o Complutense o donde esté en ese momento ¿no? cuando hacemos de alguna forma acciones directas en…en porque estamos haciendo pues… al final estamos haciendo activismo académico ¿no? y estamos haciendo acciones directas o las estamos llevando a cabo, estamos iniciando el proyecto por eso mismo porque hay muchas comunidades que todavía por lo que sea no tienen contacto entre sí entonces parece interesante como, a lo mejor, hacer proyectos de poner en contacto ¿no? pero muchas veces me… me queda como las responsabilidad de "vale yo no soy o no voy a ser una figura constante en …en este espacio como concreto" ¿no? de… de… de una localización concreta, ¿cuál es la responsabilidad de que esto no sea simplemente como una marca investigativa y después cuando me vaya simplemente se deshaga el proyecto porque realmente no… hay gente que no tiene tiempo como para seguir reuniéndose, o seguir haciendo asamblea, o seguir haciendo arte, o seguir haciendo lo que queramos implantar? Entonces eso es una cosa realmente que como ¿cuál es la responsabilidad que tenemos ahí de… de implantar proyectos que realmente no sabemos si van a seguir fluctuando en el tiempo o se van a quedar estancados?

F: Bueno, hay un par de cosas que quería decir. Una era que cuando yo empecé cuando empecé a ver que gente lloraba y se emocionaba cuando le salían los billetes y yo les decía preguntar porque mucha gente me dijo que era porque era arte … que el billete era arte, y es interesante porque sabemos que una de las primeras cosas que los gobiernos neoliberales hacen es cortar todos los programas de arte, todos los fondos

para el arte eh, mientras que la gente que vino y… y por lo que vemos a hasta la fecha de… de los datos que recogimos de quienes a los participantes, pues muchos de ellos tenían grado universitario no todos pero era todo el mundo tenía una apreciación y un reconocimiento de que la …la experiencia … que una de las razones que la experiencia era valiosa era porque era arte. Entonces eso es un poco de crítica y… y resignifica y reta la idea de que el arte es una cosa elitista… o sea, lo puede ser, y obviamente la manera que se manejan los museos, las jerarquías de arte y todo eso, pues son todas problemáticas pero que hay una también una valorización por parte de la gente de la experiencia artística como modo de conocimiento, valioso. Y lo segundo que habría que decir en el contexto de Puerto Rico que muchas veces la gente está más abierta a una intervención artística por, precisamente porque el… los artistas a veces se valoran más que otros agentes de representación como los políticos, vamos a decir. Entonces los artistas se ven como un grupo que interviene que… que aporta … que produce algo de valor y que le provee continuidad a la colectividad que trae preguntas que son urgentes, que no tienen al menos el mismo proyecto de… de poder de … de otros sectores y no… no tiene los mismos objetivos y hay una apertura a ella. Sobre las preguntas de asuntos sobre uno comienza algo y se va… Bueno, a mí… yo empecé este proyecto y no sabía que iba a tener digamos un éxito que tú puedes decir inmediato … o sea que puedes ver el impacto inmediato a algún nivel, yo no lo sabía. Me tropecé con el trabajo de Rubén Albés que era un brasilero que … que estudiaba la religión eh… después fue… o sea, dejó de hacer trabajo académico y mayormente se accionaba como poeta. O sea, seguía teorizando y seguía pensando, pero de otra manera. Y él tiene una línea en un poema o dos, que dice que hay que sembrar aún sabiendo que no vas a ver lo que el árbol va a producir. Usa el árbol de dátiles ¿no? tú siembras un árbol de dátiles y no… no vas a ver el dátil… tú no lo vas a ver. Y yo a veces pensaba…terminaba describiendo el proyecto como una semilla. Entonces por eso son sin embargo la diseminación y el dejar estas… estos trazos de lo que tratamos de hacer que ¿por qué lo hicimos? ¿qué ocurrió? ¿que pensamos que ocurrió? y de tener múltiples registros de la experiencia y hacerlos disponibles a la gente porque a lo mejor, por ejemplo, ahora … ahora mismo hay impacto. A lo mejor de aquí a 10 o 15 años no, pero queda el *record*, queda el material que hay para accesar y la gente puede retomar porque no es lineal ese proceso ¿no? Recientemente estaba pensando en eso

también porque pensando en cómo una figura como James Baldwin, que había sido bastante olvidada por décadas, en parte por su homosexualidad en parte porque él no…él no era el mismo paradigma del … del héroe digamos como Martin Luther King o… mientras que transformaciones que ha ocurrido políticas y sociales y demás ahora lo hacen a él y su voz mucho más importante. Por lo tanto, hay que mantener hay que mantener estos materiales y que circulen y que tenga accesibles para …para ahora y para luego y…y sabiendo que a lo mejor el árbol se tarda en crecer y…y no importa porque el proceso es eterno.

A: Sí, sí. O sea, a mí me parece, De hecho, como te lo estaba preguntando por eso mismo ¿no? porque muchas veces desde la Academia hay muchos proyectos que se llevan a cabo pues a nivel de calle, a nivel de activismo, y realmente ahí como casi una mente de masturbación de "voy a este sitio, implantó algo, hago un análisis de los datos y luego como que me lavo las manos y me voy" ¿no? Entonces la raíz de realmente de dónde nace ese proyecto está en la propia investigación académica y no en simplemente que haya como una conversación entre la calle y…y la Academia no y en este caso como que lo veía muy… radicalmente diferente. Hay una recogida de datos, hay como conversaciones entre diferentes lugares y al final sí como que se crea esa esa idea de semilla no es decir "yo tengo la responsabilidad puesto que parto de un privilegio como material, en este caso, voy a dejar esta semilla y después como queda de alguna forma delego, sin saber exactamente qué va a pasar" porque no sabes si se van a crear asambleas comunitarias, si se van a crear casas ocupadas como para que haya comunidades de cientos de personas , o si va a haber realmente como una comunidad que sea… partiendo de un barrio… realmente ahora sea cohesionan 20 barrios entre sí ¿no? Entonces la forma que será no tienes por qué saberla, pero sí, de alguna forma, no ir con… con la cosa de "bueno, hago mi investigación y luego desaparezco sin más" ¿no?

F: Claro. El tipo de trabajo que yo hago. Si yo estoy haciendo estudios decoloniales en grandes rasgos, si yo estoy trabajando asuntos de jerarquía coloniales y raciales y de género y demás, y yo no hago un esfuerzo porque eso … ese pensamiento, esas reflexiones, eso … esos caminos sean compartidos con otros, no solamente para

diseminar, porque eso es otra cosa muy importante. Cuando yo empecé el proyecto mi idea era sacar lo que yo había aprendido sobre la deuda, el concepto de moneda social etcétera, sacarlo de la Academia y ponerlo en la calle. Pero lo que ocurrió fue que la calle… o sea, hicimos eso ¿verdad? pero lo más importante al final fue que la calle me proveyó a mí y a otros un espacio para repensar un montón de cosas. Por ejemplo, yo no creo que el concepto *decolonial joy*, alegría de colonial, hubiese surgido de mi trabajo académico. Surgió del espacio que creamos el espacio que compartimos, lo que sentimos. O sea, que no solamente no … no es tampoco todo pensamiento en el sentido de cartesiano. Eso también fue un espacio de… de… de sentir de conexión, de transformar el espacio, el imaginario, o sea porque eran muchas cosas más allá de lo que llamamos pensamiento en la tradición occidental. Y… y cuando yo me siento, o sea cuando yo estaba haciendo ese proyecto con esas reuniones con talleres con los maestros etcétera, o sea, es un intercambio, o sea, que tú estás sembrando su semilla y…y… pero lo pero también estás recibiendo semillas de… de otra gente y de otras … otras perspectivas y … y no me …no… no entiendo por qué una persona escribiendo estos temas se va a dedicar a escribir para otras personas en su disciplina o en su área de estudio cuando este conocimiento y lo que… lo que hace posible lo necesitamos todos. Entonces mi proyecto desde que yo entré a la Academia era como salir de la Academia.

A: total, total.

F: Es más, como exploro esos recursos y tu hablabas de los privilegios y demás, cómo usar esos recursos eh… para hacer transformaciones dentro y fuera de la Academia.

A: sí y sin necesidad de… Es decir, yo también cuando terminé el máster GEMMA me planteaba mucho, cuando estábamos escribiendo el TFM, era como "¿cómo cito toda la gente que no tiene ningún tipo de renombre dentro de la Academia? No tienen ningún libro publicado, etcétera, etcétera, pero realmente esta tesis está escrita por elles". O sea, es decir, esta tesis está escrita por todos los activismos que he ocupado que… que he gestionado, que he formado parte, saliendo por la noche pues a lo mejor no dentro de ningún tipo de institución o de legalidad, pero eso es lo que realmente ha

formado el pensamiento crítico que tengo hoy en día. Aparte de la base teórica que haya podido apoyar las teorías para que tengan validez dentro de la Academia. Pero realmente quien formaba todos esos pensamientos más radicales eran la gente que no tenía ningún tipo de nombre y apellido.

F: Pero…la Academia es un dinosaurio. Las teorizaciones siempre siguen a la práctica, no antes, no son anteriores a la práctica. O sea, ¿de dónde salió la idea del… el género como performance? Pues de décadas de travestismo. O sea, no es que la teoría se inventó y ahora la vamos a aplicar. Los… los movimientos, la forma en que la gente ocupa el espacio, las… las formas que la gente se configura su cuerpo, esas… esas teorizaciones salieron de ahí, no the other way around. O sea, que en ese sentido la Academia lo que hace es organiza, vincula cosas, las reproduce, hay unas funciones que los…los académicos y la Academia tienen. Pero si te pones a ver los conceptos fundamentales, no es que salen de la cabeza de los académicos.

A: Sí. O sea, como los conceptos que pueden estar comodificados, de alguna forma normativizados desde la Academia sí creo, es decir ,como que es la dificultad o como la problemática que yo tengo, por ejemplo en el activismo como queer en España ¿no?, que realmente como que se comunican conceptos como puede ser lo de *dragizar* algo o *queerizar* algo y está partiendo de una experiencia que te han contado de terceras personas jugándosela delante de la policía pero tú lo estás usando para ganar dinero a través de un artículo, por ejemplo, ¿no? Y ahora, dentro, por ejemplo, del… del departamento de prehistoria y arqueología, en el que estoy, conceptos como por ejemplo el de patrimonio ¿no? *Heritage*, que podría como considerarse entre patrimonio, herencia, etcétera, muchas veces cuando yo estaba pensando en *Valor y Cambio* decía "eh, veo la problemática como dentro del… de este mismo concepto dentro de la arqueología" ¿no? Cuando tú estás hablando de algún tipo de genealogía histórica, como estás hablando en arqueología, muchas veces empiezas a pensar "bueno, ¿y qué significa patrimonio? ¿qué significa una herencia? ¿qué significa una genealogía? y ¿quién está creando esa genealogía?" ¿no? Porque tienes todo el conflicto, por ejemplo, indígena en Australia, donde hay gente que no puede usar las cuevas donde hay pinturas de hace miles de años porque se van… se van a

desestructurar y entonces el ritual que tienen asociado al lugar no se permite porque de alguna forma como que se da prioridad a los turistas ¿no? que es otro movimiento colonizador. De alguna forma me planteaba ¿cuál es el tipo de *heritage*, patrimonio de herencia, de… de genealogía que se crea a través de proyectos como el de *Valor y Cambio*? en el que hay una autogestión del propio conocimiento con… en esa línea que no viene del pasado, presente y futuro, sino que realmente hay una temporalidad que se *queeriza*, nunca mejor dicho, ¿no?

F: Bueno, es muy interesante porque hay un componente del proyecto que estaba trabajando esa misma cuestión. Es las historias que circulan los billetes. Y bueno, y …y cómo lo hicimos, hicimos una encuesta informal e identificamos cuatro valores: equidad, solidaridad, justicia eh y… me falta uno. Y entonces lo que hicimos con esos valores fue la encuesta: ¿qué figura o qué lugares, lo que sea, tienen estos valores para ti? Entonces de eso nosotros cogimos las 6 figuras. Pero el que… el objetivo también de las 6 figuras era es circular la idea de que Puerto Rico había enfrentado crisis anteriormente peores que las actuales, porque hay una cuestión de cuando hay una educación colonial, tu perspectiva histórica es muy limitada. Yo me acuerdo cuando en el 1998 que fue el aniversario del centenario de la invasión de Estados Unidos y en una encuesta en Puerto Rico le preguntaron a la gente qué pasó en 1898 y la mayor parte de la gente no sabía. Y si hay un dato que se reproduce y te lo dicen en la escuela 20 veces la gente no se acordaba, no… no sabía. Entonces era decir "sí la crisis actual es… es en cierto sentido nueva, en algunos sentidos nueva, pero en otro sentido no y está enraizada en crisis anteriores". Lo segundo es que como siempre hemos vivido en algún tipo de crisis colonial, hemos producido un conocimiento sobre eso de cientos de años que no se nos enseña, que no se nos transmite, que no tenemos acceso y que ese… esas maneras de afrontar estas crisis coloniales son diversas. Por ejemplo, una cosa de los billetes en que tenías tanto unos negros libres en el siglo XIX cuya fe cristiana era el fundamento de su labor educativa hasta tener un anarquista feminista a finales del siglo XIX, principios del XX, que era organizadora laboral que… etcétera, hasta, digamos, un pelotero negro de Puerto Rico que utilizaba su fama y sus recursos para aliviar la pobreza y dar más opciones y ayudar a hacer trabajo de ayuda humanitaria y demás. O sea, que había varias maneras de articular qué era la

problemática y cómo se debería acercar y que eso es conocimiento que no se nos da. Y, si te fijas, la mayor parte de los billetes son afrodescendientes negros o afrodescendientes mulatos y recuerdo que alguien me hizo la pregunta que si eso había sido adrede o apropósito, haber incluido más figuras negras que blancas y realmente no fue a propósito sino que cuando nosotros dijimos quiénes son las personas que tienen estos valores y actuaron sobre ellos y actuaron sobre puntos que todavía son crisis actuales, como la salud y la educación, etcétera, pues, la realidad era que muchas de esas figuras eran negros mulatos. Y no era coincidencia, yo pienso. Por ejemplo, según la investigación que hicimos sobre los hermanos cordero y Rafael Cordero en el principio del siglo XIX ya sabía que había una conexión entre raza, falta de acceso a la educación e ir a la prisión. Él le tocaba la puerta a la, prácticamente las llamadas madres solteras negras, pidiéndole por favor que mandara a su hijo a la escuela porque si no iba a terminar en la cara. En la en la teoría académica o en la en la en las guías académicas y cuando se empieza a hablar de ese el el reason to el (…) Hablando de esa cuestión de la genealogía académica, de quien sigue a quien, Rafael Cordero es un señor a principio del siglo XIX cuya educación… era un hombre educado, pero, o sea, la educación aquel momento era saber leer, escribir, aritmética y en el caso de él un fundamento cristiano a través de La Biblia y demás. Este señor ya entendía la relación entre raza, educación y…y la prisión que es digamos que en la historia académica es algo que se empieza a hablar hace unas décadas atrás ¿entiendes? O sea, que por eso digo que este educador en esa … en ese contexto, ya había de relacionado… nunca escribió sobre eso. Ahí vamos a la otra cuestión del archivo ¿no? Nunca escribió sobre el asunto y mayormente conocemos sobre él a través de sus alumnos, los que eran blancos y educados que sí escribieron. Pero por eso te digo que… que hay una diferenciación entre lo que el cómo se produce el conocimiento político, por ejemplo, que pienso que es en la práctica fundamentalmente y que se recoge luego por el por… académicos, por escritores, por periodistas, etcétera, por personas que escriben, por ponerlo de alguna manera. Y entonces la importancia del archivo. Entonces, la pregunta de tu estar diciendo que tu tesis se escribe desde el activismo, pero personas que no solamente escribe o que no tengan récords, que sí que te puedas citar. Peor ahí está el labor del académico, contar el cuento, circularlo … este… qué era lo que los billetes estaban tratando de hacer: ese "vamos a contar estos cuentos, vamos a

familiarizar a la gente con la idea de que hemos tenido otro reto", tenemos un amplio conocimiento de confrontar este tipo de retos y podemos hacer de más de perspectiva. O sea, que no es cuestión de imponer una… una posición ideológica sino, si usted si… si usted mira la realidad desde un punto religioso usted puede radicalizar su fundamento, si usted es organizador de laboral o feminista o… médico, en el caso de Betances abolicionista, etcétera, ¿no? hay muchas maneras de producir conocimiento y muchas maneras de llegar a…a un conocimiento transformador.

A: Total Cómo se llamaba la persona de la que me estaba hablando que, en el siglo XIX, el educador.

F: Rafael Cordero. Con ese billete hicimos varias cosas. Contamos la historia de Rafael Cordero pero hicimos también otra cosa, que va también al asunto del archivo. Se celebra ampliamente a Rafael Cordero porque Rafael Cordero llegó a enseñarle a chicos blancos hijos de familias de dinero y esos chicos crecieron para hacer pues, va a ocupar sus lugares hegemónicos en la sociedad y escribieron sobre él. Pero él tenía doce hermanas que administraban y…y enseñaban una escuela de niñas. ¿Por qué sabemos menos o casi nada de ellas? Bueno, porque las niñas crecieron a ser mujeres y siendo esposas de estos señores ¿no? No escribieron sobre sus maestras, por ejemplo, Este… hay *record* de una de ellas y son *records* en cartas del Cabildo y es un documento de extraordinario. Si va a la website del proyecto se ven las cartas al cabildo exigiéndole apoyo a la escuela de niñas, exigiéndole un salario, haciendo exigencia, una mujer negra, cuando la esclavitud todavía… ella no es esclava, pero la … la esclavitud aún es la ley bajo el imperialismo español; exigiéndole al estado que esto es lo que había que hacer. Eso es extraordinario. Entonces parte de lo que hicimos fue incluir a las hermanas. O sea que ese billete son los hermanos Cordero. Todos trabajaban, en algún sentido, juntos en esta… en esta… esta de fundar la educación pública en Puerto Rico. Entonces eso nos confrontó con un dilema que poca gente da cuenta y es que no hay imágenes de las mujeres. No hay ni una. No hay una descripción física. No hay nada. Mientras que de Cordero al menos hay… hay… varios e imágenes pintura incluso. Una de las pinturas más famosas del canon del siglo XIX por Francisco Oller, que se llama *El Maestro Rafael*. Entonces que el dilema era "no hay imágenes,

¿qué haces?". ¿No las representas? O te las inventas, qué fue lo que hicimos. O sea, nos… nos… buscamos todo lo que pudimos, fotos de la época, este… obviamente las imágenes de Rafael y nos las inventamos. Y claro, eso… eso es complicado y…y genera nuevas preguntas y…y demás. No es que se resuelve nada, ¿no? pero lo hicimos y…y así se abre la posibilidad de hacer las preguntas y las críticas y tal vez no hay… algún día alguien encuentra otra cosa porque lo pusimos… este… de esa forma ¿no?

A: Sí. Es casi como … estábamos…. estábamos en un seminario de Sayak Valencia y nos decía que una de las responsabilidades que ella tenía como profesora de Universidad de temas decoloniales, antirracistas, etcétera era, dentro de las normas APA, que siempre te viene como el apellido y el nombre con el punto, ¿no? Decía "yo siempre que estoy poniendo o estoy haciendo estudiar a alguien en clase, siempre adjunto una imagen de esa persona" porque al final no cambia el … el imaginario colectivo ¿no? Es decir, eso ha pasado muchas veces en las clases que estaba dando en este año sobre todo en arqueología, en figuras históricas, en figuras revolucionarias, que como siempre pones el nombre punto, no sabes que esa persona a lo mejor no es identificada como un hombre, necesariamente, ¿no? O que esa persona es una persona negra, ¿no? Y eso todavía les explota en la cabeza. Cuando estás leyendo a lo mejor, que lee el quinto texto de una persona, te da ya la curiosidad, vas y dices ¿cómo una… cómo una persona antirracista puede ser al mismo tiempo como … (evidentemente puede ser racista, ¿no? porque a mí todavía me pasa)? Es decir, estoy leyendo sobre alguien lo busco y todavía me choca y digo "joder, sí. Y ¿por qué no se me había ocurrido antes? ¿por qué todavía ese imaginario colectivo no lo tengo?", ¿no? Pues porque nunca nos han enseñado a… a tener en cuenta a ese tipo de figuras. O si sí, bueno pues la han tachado como, vale… como si fuera de alguna forma casi anecdótico, ¿no? esa figura que aparece… Malcom X, pues que tienen también como nombres extraños, pero no tienen apellidos que tú vayas a reconocer o a citar en tu bibliografía. Entonces me parecía como una…como una cosa como esencial para meter en …todo el tema del imaginario de… de representar… de la imaginación política también de que si no existe la figura o la imagen de esa persona totalmente interesantísimo inventársela ¿no? porque por lo menos al final va operando algo nuevo.

F: Claro. Entonces la cuestión de la imaginación, el archivo y la cuestión de la imaginación, es que el proyecto en sí era un ejercicio de imaginación. Primero, plantearse que uno pueda inventarse un dinero cuando la gente tiene esta idea que el dinero es lo más concreto y lo más material. En verdad no. El…el dinero es nada y lo único que nos mantiene utilizándolo es nuestra confianza en lo que representa y en el sistema en general. En el momento en que tú dejas de usar una moneda, la que sea, pues se cae, se colapsa, porque en sí misma no tiene nada: no… no tiene fuerza, no tiene materialidad. Entonces, en ese sentido el dinero es …es *Good to think with* porque porque para…para tu producir dinero, hacerlo circular y usarlo, necesitas una gran imaginación. Y es que el dinero también es una tecnología que vincula a la gente y crea entonces relaciones sociales. Esa era una de las preguntas las tres preguntas que yo tenía sobre el dinero: ¿qué es? ¿cómo adquiere valor? y ¿sirve para otra cosa especular, tener interés, explotar? o sea existe… puede usarse de otra manera, ¿no? Pero todos esos son preguntas de imaginación, como tales, preguntas de imaginarse cómo eran estas personas, como es imaginación decir "pues ya voy a colocar estos elementos en una nueva narrativa" porque, por ejemplo, nosotros en la confección del billete también incorporamos la fotografía, que una forma de incorporar el archivo, incorporamos narrativas, incorporamos color, por ejemplo, los billetes cada uno de esos colores está pensado. Por ejemplo, el billete de Betances es… porque es otra manera de comunicar…. el billete de Betances tiene los colores de la bandera de Lares, que fue una de las una de las actividades anticoloniales que más conocidas de él, que fue la revuelta más ambiciosa en Puerto Rico en contra del colonialismo español en el … en el siglo XIX. O sea, que el color también tiene conocimiento. El billete de Luisa Capetillo es blanco y negro porque ella era anarquista, ¿no? O sea que el color connota historias, archivos, perspectivas, teorizaciones, actividad, emoción, porque cuando… cuando uno asocia a colores con ciertas cosas que uno también produce …le produce una sensación … sensorial. Entonces, volviendo al archivo… porque en otros proyectos, sabes que yo soy curadora de un archivo en la Universidad, y estoy escribiendo un libro sobre una persona que fue el que construyó el archivo más importante y más grande. O sea, que se convirtió en el archivo más grande y más importante de la diáspora africana. Entonces, yo pienso que esa es otra tarea importante, tanto para la conversación que tenemos de la semilla como para

producción de conocimiento. O sea, sabemos que los archivos históricamente han sido producidos por el poder, por el estado, por el… por el *establishment* médico, por lo que sea, pero hay que hacer, encontrar otro tipo de archivos y…y yo he traído como 10 archivos a la colección y cada vez que yo interactúo con esos archivos en una revelación. Yo estoy escribiendo ahora mismo la introducción a un libro de presentando la … la obra de Manuel Ramos Otero al público angloparlante. Fue el primer escritor *openly* gay ¿verdad? en la historia literaria de Puerto Rico. Y, pues, se ha escrito bastante, al menos en Puerto Rico, sobre él y mucha gente lo conoce. Yo he hablado con mucha gente que lo conocía, pero cuando yo empecé a leer el archivo de él y empecé a leer las cartas, él murió de sida, cuando enfermó, empiezo a leer las cartas de cómo estaba tratando de distribuir lo que él tenía, su pensión, su apartamento y como le respondía la gente. O cuando miro que él siempre estaba *pelao* porque no podía conseguir trabajo o no podía…este… conservar los trabajos y tú sabes… tú empiezas a leer todo eso y te da dimensiones a lo que ya supuestamente se conoce e incluso puedes retar lo que ya pensamos que conocemos. A mí me parece una práctica sumamente importante y por eso pues, cada vez que tengo la oportunidad, yo trato de entrar al archivo. O sea, a través de esa historia oral, a través del arte, a través de lo que sea, que… que, o sea cualquier medio a mi disposición para que estas perspectivas se conserven porque desde cómo la gente habla, no solamente lo que dice, cómo habla, cómo se expresa y demás es fundamental para la complejidad del pensamiento y de la acción.

A: Y sobre todo eso como lo vinculó mucho al, cuando estás hablando de alguna forma parece como que el conocimiento ha sido institucionalizado ¿no? y llegas al punto en el que dices "bueno puede ser un archivo radical?"… un … un concepto opuesto a todo el tema de las…. de las instituciones de las que ha teorizado por ejemplo Foucault. Pero de alguna forma, también como desde un privilegio de reconocerse dentro de un imaginario de conocimiento. Entonces poder renegar de esa institución ¿no? pero realmente bueno … ¿cuáles son los sujetos que introduces cuando está re-contextualizando el mero concepto de institución, no? Porque al final también es como lo que estábamos hablando un día, que me acuerdo que estábamos diciendo "bueno, entre esos conceptos spinozianos de *potestas* y *potencia* ¿no? que al final es "yo puedo

ser anarquista pero también tengo el privilegio de poder no reconocerme dentro de un estado". Pero ¿qué es la *potencia* dentro de esa potestad de Estado, no? o … o ¿quién se reconoce? Porque también hay mucha gente que … que no tiene la posibilidad de… o que necesita ser reconocida …o que necesita que radicalmente las instituciones y los archivos cambien. Y esa es la re-conceptualización de la que hablo en el artículo ¿no? Me parece muy interesante lo que acabas de decir.

F: Es muy compleja porque yo por ejemplo tengo posiciones y…y entro en mucho conflicto con mi institución, que es donde está el archivo ¿verdad? Me doy cuenta que… que reproduce mi propia posición dentro de esa estructura y demás y yo pues he reconciliado esos conflictos hasta cierto punto siendo una especie de Robin Hood, ¿no?, tomando de la institución y distribuyéndolo a espacios que no tienen ese acceso. Pero eso no resuelve todas las contradicciones, ¿no? Ni todas las problemáticas. Los materiales que he traído de Puerto Rico pues…siempre está crítica y que hace sentido, que uno está removiendo de Puerto Rico a los Estados Unidos, aunque sea un lugar donde hay más de un millón de puertorriqueños y ha sido un lugar de asentamiento puertorriqueño por más de cien años, pero aun así…aun así entran en unas contradicciones políticas en el sentido de poder, ¿no? Pero, por otro lado, teniendo la experiencia como cineasta en Puerto rico de buscar materiales de archivo y ver cómo los botan, o los dejan deteriorar, o se evaporan, entro en la contradicción. Entro a sabiendas que es una contradicción y una problemática de…de al menos estar en algún lugar. Está en algún lugar, y tendremos muchas más peleas en el futuro sobre dónde deben estar, y cómo se deben organizar y quien debe custodia de esos materiales y demás, pero tendremos la posibilidad de tener esa discusión. Y claro, hay gente que, que tiene otra posición, pero en mi caso, como investigadora y como cineasta…yo lo encuentro un gran recurso. Y viniendo de esa… esa genealogía negra que aquel archivo ha sido de tanta importancia porque ha sido esos contra-archivos eran las fuentes y fundamentos de una elaboración discursiva en contra de la supremacía blanca y demás, este… y de nuevo, no es que esté libre de contradicción sino que es una estrategia más de… de poder subalterno. Y claro… y cuando estás en la institución y estás en todos esos asuntos que describiste pues entonces es más el cómo uno, mira esos materiales, cómo los usa, cómo los relaciona. Por ejemplo, el tener material que están ahí ahora tú

empiezas a ver relaciones entre cosas que antes. Por ejemplo. Ahí hay correspondencia de dos personas que tuvieron una gran pelea y puede… tienes los materiales de ambas colecciones. Hay materiales de Jack Agüeros que era un poeta neoyorquino puertorriqueño haciendo reseñas sobre el trabajo de Manuel Ramos Otero y se decía antes de que no había ninguna conexión entre escritores puertorriqueños y los escritores *nuyorican*. Pues ahí tú tienes…Jack Agüeros que es más diferente a Ramos Otero no puede ser, escribiendo reseñas sobre su performance 70' en una publicación como el bridgeport entonces pues esos… esos detallitos de… de inmediato te complejizan la historia, retan lo que piensas se abren otras posibilidades de investigación, de… de pensamiento y de acción

A: Sí. Al final, claro se me viene a la cabeza cuando José Esteban Muñoz hablaba ¿no? del cruising utopía ¿no? que al final es la ruptura de la temporalidad de progreso en el que tienes que llegar a un archivo concreto, un concepto concreto y un estado revolucionario concreto. Al final estamos hablando de conceptos que de alguna forma ponemos en conjunto, estamos hablando de espacios liminales que siempre están en esa transición y estamos hablando de esos archivos que son espacios de reconocimiento, pero no tienen por qué ser los…los últimos espacios de reconocimiento. Es decir, no significa que siempre se vaya a quedar en ese espacio institucional, sino que necesitamos ese archivo para seguir recontextualizando y para seguir estrechando ese concepto utópico que nunca tiene por qué llegar ¿no? que al final es la perspectiva de la… de la temporalidad queer.

F: Y además que si lo tratas…si tratas demasiado de llegar, tendrás distopia, ¿no?

A: Claro, total.

F: Y si lo tratas de hacer de verdad, en ese sentido pues sabemos en qué queda eso. Pero sí, definitivamente yo no lo veo como… es más, en mi práctica incluso yo nunca lo pienso "que aquí se va a quedar por siempre". Aquí está ahora.

457

A: Pues en esas estoy yo diciendo ¿qué me interesa? ¿escribir una tesis o escribir artículos? Porque al final es mucho eso… escribo una tesis durante 5 años y al final tiene que tener como una coherencia o cohesión entre todas las partes o escribes artículos que de alguna forma estén como localizados y situados en el tiempo y en situaciones concretas.

F: Mira, mira, te voy a resolver el problema. No lo plantees de forma binaria porque yo he escrito… Mira, ahora mismo yo voy a empezar una revista, Asterix, una revista latinX y…y lo estoy conceptualizando como un espacio que va a tener, podcast, que va a tener escrito, literario, ensayo, de todo. Ahí van a ser lo que sea. Y estoy también… hay movimiento, un pequeño movimiento ahora dentro de la industria editorial que yo creo que… que resuelve en parte este problema que estás planteado que es este libro corto, lo que se llama un panfleto, que es un libro de menos de 100 páginas o 125 páginas. Y, de hecho, hoy precisamente voy a hablar con alguien que acaba de empezar una línea de editorial de libros cortos. Yo creo que eso resuelve un poco la cuestión de *timeliness*, este… vas a escribir un libro de 400 páginas académico. Cuando ese libro salga pues, a lo mejor, la coyuntura pasó, o sea, es otra cosa. Pero, yo pienso que es cuestión de decidir. Por ejemplo, yo… mis preguntas, más temprano en mi carrera, "¿esto debe ser un libro, un artículo o una película?". Y poco a poco ya yo voy discerniendo, o sea ya no me es tan problemático decir esto tiene que ser una película por X razón y esto debe ser un artículo por X sea razón, y en ese sentido teniendo un repertorio de posibilidades, porque también es cierto que lo… la tecnología del libro no solamente llega a más gente en cierto sentido. Es una tecnología que se… se circula de una cierta manera. También te provee un espacio sostenido para pensar en una caja más grande, ¿no? Un artículo breve *you can do so much*, pero a lo mejor eso lo que hay que hacer en ese momento. Es posible que termines haciendo distintas cosas para distintas coyunturas. La tesis es un requisito para obtener un grado y yo creo que si la ves así no tiene por qué tomarse miles de años. Y de la tesis tú creas un fundamento para hacer un libro corto o un libro académico. De la tesis pueden salir varias cosas pero mientras tanto… por ejemplo, una persona como…este… ¿cómo se llama ella? ¿la bloguera cubana? Yoani Sánchez. Yoani Sánchez perfeccionó el artículo de 3 párrafos. ¿Tú has visto su trabajo alguna vez?

A: No.

F: Búscate *generación G*. Era su blog. Ahora ya tiene un periódico que se llama 14 y medio o algo así. Pero, por muchos años, ella tuvo un blog y ella escribía muy frecuentemente pero ella escribía unos artículos de 3 párrafos que tenían una efectividad porque… o sea, era una manera de comunicar una idea con mucha potencia, mucha… ella también tiene mucha destreza literaria y fue el blog más leído en el mundo…porque la gente en todas partes del mundo lo traducía. Tienes que buscar lo viejos, porque ahora es un periódico y es otra cosa. Y es impresionante que era traducido a como 30 idiomas. [….] Pero te comento eso porque es un ejemplo de una persona que se adaptaba a la coyuntura.

A: esto ha sido una entrevista inspiradora, inspiradora. Pues Frances, yo creo que con esto… no sé si quieres decir algo más

F: Te quería decir que yo escribí una cosa que se llamaba "Decolonial Joy", te lo he mandado, donde puedes encontrar las cosas que te he dicho articuladas. Yo empecé a escribir una cosa con una amiga, que se llama "Adiós a la economía". No creo que esté demasiado presentable en este momento pero puedo eh… también buscar algunas cosas que articulan … por ejemplo, nosotras lo que estamos ahí es cogiendo el concepto de economía y viendo cómo, cuándo y con qué efectos se empezó a equiparar con capitalismo. Porque sabemos que la raíz de la palabra economía, *Oikos*, era la administración del hogar. Entonces ese concepto fue cambiando hasta el punto digamos para el siglo XIX que ya empezaba a equipararse con capitalismo que es lo que… y bueno pensamos en la coyuntura actual cuando la gente dice "hay que abrir la economía". Están hablando eufemismos. O sea, que el concepto de economía fue… fue de concepto, a eufemismo a capitalismo. O sea, que no es mi concepto yo diría y yo… yo lo tengo que ver casos de permanencia en mi Universidad de la… la escuela de… de Business o del departamento de economía ves como que en esas disciplinas realmente son auxiliares al capitalismo y no tienen pensamiento autónomo porque asumen que la economía es el capitalismo. Entonces no… no pueden salirse de esa.

Pero puedo investigar ahí si hay algo que podría abundar algo sobre ese tema de la economía, que me preguntaste. Entonces te mando esas dos cosas. Si te hace falta algo visual, fotos, no sé…

A: me parece interesantes fotos de la máquina. Que haya un cajero físico.

F: En la *website* hay algunos artículos, no sé si los viste, hay cosas…hay un artículo que escribió una mexicana, Bárbara Curiel, que es de los mejores que se ha escrito hasta la fecha.

A: Gracias, Frances. Muchas gracias

Annex 2.

Images from the "Now You See Me Moria" project, an intervention done in Granada in March, 2021, photographed by BirBophoto.

VirBophoto, March, 2021.

VirBophoto, March, 2021.

VirBophoto, March, 2021.

VirBophoto, March, 2021.

VirBophoto, March, 2021.

Annex 3.

This conversation was held with Franck Chartier prior to the representation of Adrift. November, 2022, Teatro Nacional de Barcelona.

Angie Harris Sánchez: We apply queer and feminist studies to cultural facts are not intertwined with gender necessarily so even if maybe you're not speaking about sexuality, gender identity, in a very like explicit way we do apply things that we think that are breaking laws for example, like the conception of breaking the binaries and breaking the boundaries between that oppositional gaze we sometimes have of reality. The subjects in this performance break, like I perceive them, test this simplification by addressing the liminality between reality and fiction. All of this I connect it to the conversation between dance and theater on the one hand, and physicality and emotion, on the other, which I see through this piece in particular. This is the actual potential which I see in the piece and use for my own analysis. And this happens also with other pieces, also structured by those trilogies, that were a point to start thinking of the possibility of interviewing you while also thinking through the fact that maybe this analysis didn't resonate with your own process of creation.

Franck Chartier: During these 20 years we… we remarked that with the company we went with more with theatrical. It's not that we lose interest in movement and dance because we love this but we were more attracted to the story. from the beginning with Gabby we … we create Peeping Tom because we was really attracted by scenarios stories… yeah… try to go deeper in the reality and to go deeper in the theathrality, characters in the family to go to talk about taboo or talk about something that we never talk and we was always attracted to for this we call it Peeping tom, to show something that we hide inside of us and to talk about things that's we never talk and this was then more and more we went more with theatrality we was more attracted by it and when we arrived to NDT when we create this piece it was the first time that we were confronted with pure dancers that were not used to do theater. When we took a dancer in the company it's not just a dancer, it's also to create your character and of course with sometimes memories from their own personality with personal movements. But

464

when we were writing NDT there were amazing answers and I for us it was a yes to them also because of this because we really like the way they move and the intelligence of the company is quite super hot. Also they are used to work with so many different choreographers and it's really this rich aspect of their work. of course we for them it was really new to touch the more the technical part they never did so much and for me it was quite new to golly deep in the movement and the virtuosity and I really enjoy it a lot and this was a big confrontation because working with the we was with the company was working more theatrical and more the situation and here I was more concentrated on the movement and it needed more work for me to find my theatricality in the story but I had the chance that for example gabby made missing door the first piece and it was quite clear they said it was the cinema set and the characters were in their private life and then the person that they have to play then didn't develop so much as an artists but more like a character. but there was this two… two sides of reality and fiction and this I really liked. I tried to develop it also with them but more the external point but it didn't work because there were no actors, there were only dancers. I realized quickly that, "Ok, let's focus on inside the movement" and then with these missing doors make me think where do these doors go? I imagined working around it and imagine a sea and I was like "OK maybe it's a boat", you know, it's a big boat done and then I said "let's go in there and follow this woman, who is dead, and where do we go next" and I think "OK let's go in a room" and team liked it. It was also important the idea to come back rivers in the time and to see what's happened before and if you were to reverse and pass all the trauma maybe the characters had what would happen? And this was basically the base for *lost room*. Of course, a main focus was to give this trilogy naturality. The room has a bed, there is a closet there, and this makes it hard to not make theatrality. when you are in a set so realistic you know you're not going to make just movements it's easy to start to invent what's happened, you know, and especially coming from the piece of Gabby where there the character is already dead and she will be free by reversing and seeing what's happened the last day of her life, what's happened before she died, then it was easy to make it a bit. we try to we reach the border between dance and theatrality because for us movement is not just virtual movement or conceptual. We are attracted by something in the connection with the character. With this woman, for example, we asked, how she going to react? what's

going to happen in her body? If she is scared, should she say so? which is the sensation in the body. We try to analyze also with the textuality how is she going to move. You know, you can see every human basically having a unique way to move, to work, to give place to, and you can read in the body already what's happening in their mind and this idea of being able to read the thought of the people when they move, in French we say "la pensée et le mouvant", the movement and the thinking in the movement. you can read the thought of the… the… this person when this is something we try to be always to work on it to be and the border it's really thin. How dance starts: now I do a movement, for example, it can become a dance, but you have to work through this border, we try to erase it, the possibility from the actual move we chose to keep. For example, with the dancers is the same. In *Hidden Floor* someone falls in the water of the scenario and because he tries to survive, he drinks some water and he start to move from this starting schema. You don't know what direction he is going to go, but in the end, he succeeds to make amazing movements, and always comes back with this sensation of coldness from this first movement from the water, we try to hide the movements in the theatrical situation to erase the border. we don't see only like a solo dance. For example the guy who can't put he's coat and breaks into cold continuously, gives you the sense that sometimes it starts from a real situation which you try to apply and sometimes we tell them "take care of the theatrical. Of course, don't forget the amazing movement you have". Don't forget the amazing dancer with amazing movement, the women entering the memory is a moment when we are just trying to find the "wow movement". Sometimes we look just for a wow movement without any situation, but after, when we see the piece, we say 'oh, maybe, when you did this situation we can add this movement, add this layer on top". Also sometimes you can move and from there can start after situation that's but it has to be the same character it… it has to be technical sometimes in the movement as it take… take care stay… stay… stay in the theatrality, don't go for the movement, and is this also before the show I always stimulate them or try to sometimes, you know, we play nine time it's hard you know and you play a lot to be to enjoy your to… and it's also my role to feed them to next they… they have excitation and they find something to… to… to meet every night so anyway you know then it's… and sometimes it's this it's like if they are in a trip on stage you'll be going to trip in the characters if they make mistake with the

movements we even should we don't see because it's clearly a woman and you can see she's in her trip in her stuff and if she do something and she fall and something it's human it's very normal we… we… we don't we don't see it we don't after if you're not in your trip and you make movement and you fall and you see actually fall the ballerina fall you know they don't perform is this I think if you theatrically are in your trip then you can do whatever mistake we will believe in it since the character is this you know is… you play with it…but if you're not in a trip you're not in your character and you make mistake or you know we see it was a mistake. I try to tell them go into trip, you know, going to the character, in the theatrality, forget the movement (they will never forget because they are dancers). Try to go in a trip. Also is for this that we call our name on stage it's more easy for us to… to be realistic or to be more in the persons now what's happened now I'm on stage now and we take care when we believe that the situation is strong, then you don't have to play you don't have to… to… to carve in around the painting you know the painting is strong you don't need any she around you know you… you just need to do this situation normally like you are today now in the persons and they don't play just have to be normal and… and… and if one day you're tired. But this situation is strong. Or… or if you were super nervous and do it more nervous when they… why not it's nice to but be present be in the trip going a trip in in your feeling and the theatrality is always super present even if it's just pure movement. Sometimes it's clear, they Make Love or, in the end, they have to be all in there to die and making love and then they have to freeze, cold freeze, and it's this is clear you Make Love in the water, that is fucking cold and you will die of freezing in the water. And they know theatrically what they have to do. We have a good trick, you know, they have to shake before the before the… the freeze, but they can also do whatever they want, you know, they can the trip in this cold and then they have the freedom to do it and for them I think it's nice also because they go in the theatrality, they go in their story there's no just making movements.

A: yes, the choreography part it's broken or lost in that sense. But I mean for example when we are speaking about identity or the identity of the character and the author or the author of that movement, that is the artist, do you think that's like the breaking of that boundary between who is acting and the character that they are performing, I

mean, because when we speak about *tripping* when we are dancing when we are closing our eyes when we are going into the character, how much of our own identities are played also in the scene? I mean, how are actors allowed that part of like personal trip inside those characters? have they got agency to decide on the characters or is it something that the director has to focus very much in pinning down what are the main points of the character? is it something that embraces the character with the artist for the dancing in this case or the actor in this case?

F.C.: right, I don't know if I understand well the question, but maybe I answer you and you tell me if it's what you want to know. For example, now we play nine time and… and… and some dancer they're not used to… to play so much theatrical you know the it's a bit new for them and so they need to be dead for two hours on stage every night and to be in love with somebody else and for them it's confrontation you know. I don't mean that they fall in love each other but it's possible you know it's possible that they start to depress (*themselves*) because they are dying every night and he did like this every night and then you start to feel depressed and is this it's because they are dancers and they are not used too much to act to play. As I said before I like to be in the present and in the mood where you are today and this is really and something has happened on stage because you're true, you don't fake it…and we feel real from doing this thing and then we try to be super realistic and… and of course the… the borders are more dangerous because you are in this horrible scene. With the experience I… I can but unconsciously I'm not no… I'm not sure that I can still make the difference I constantly I think it's effective and it's really interesting. With them is different because they create a, create your own. we give them out 10 minute to think an idea this shows the idea. What I mean is that the it's their situation the… they have attitude and me I just write the situation and we interfere and then like if I flash some something I can guide them continue these reaction or another. But the material come from them, not everything, but a lot come from them. then it's also something very close to them the material. Then it's also this, after, when they have to play, they play something that it's really close to them because they want it, they found it, then it's also really special and really interesting also because sometimes you make creation and you talk about something and two years three years later it will happen in your private life and you're

468

like "shit". We create something and two years later it's happening now it's really interesting. The next piece we are going to make is a triple stage where we explore the relation between the actors and the personalization of the characters.

A: that that was exactly what I was referring to like how obviously we think about posthuman theories that maybe you're not familiar with but are

FC: What is it?

A: Well, theories that are not focus only in the human but also how nature and sociality and the context and maybe like the boat and not the character is the one that has influenced the character more than the other characters so the human is not the center of everything but there's other elements of life that intertwin. For example, there's a wish and we don't know if you are the creator of that wish, we don't understand and are outside discourse but are things in reality or in ontology that are happening and we don't even understand them. You were peaking of characters, and maybe there is a violent scene, and you think, who is it that is being violent in my life now, the character or is it frank? who is the agential part there because the actor and the character are both in fiction but are also co-creators of what's actually taking place in the scenario. That was the most radical idea that I grasped the first time that I saw the… the piece because it was like "I have no sense of what the human and the character is in this piece anymore" I think the public was challenged to think about the body and identity in the scene.

F.C.: when we create we know that, and we and in the period of creation first you create because you have to find idea every day and every hour and it's in the beginning it's a bit superficial you know you look a bit around you and you finally… you know, you in the street and you see this woman what she's doing: "OK I will try the same" or you see you movie and then you think "oh this is good". This is the most superficial (*part*) and after one month you start to be a bit empty because you don't have any idea then you try to look more on yourself and in your family, what's happened in your family, and then it's more interesting. This goes also with the thought. The thought is

really important and it's really super nice motor of course in creation you have to take care that's it doesn't go to a depression, but the thought is super nice and then everybody goes in himself. Of course, it's not that every creation we're going to create a new a new Frank or a new Conan or a new Lorena. It's just that we use some… for example I smoke and I want to make a scene where I just never stop to smoke. You also appreciate some part of yourself, and you appreciate presently so I don't want to just to see or to deny. It's not that the character is really clearly a part of myself but still yeah it's very… because it's a part of us and sometimes I can ask them also for example, I ask this couple of Sabina and J. I wanted it this image of this beautiful girl and a man which is hyperviolent to her, she will be the hyper victims, you know. I was from the beginning looking for it and in the end in the piece it's really a little departure you know he's really a *motherfucker*. This was already the plan from the beginning I asked him "can you look for this? sometimes we can have a clear indication that guide them. Of course, Josh is not like this, you know, but I can understand it for him playing this piece after five years, wow. This also can be super hard because I'm sure I consciously to be motherfucker like this and to be violent, I'm sure it's there is some question like "now am I Connan in this moment?"

A: yeah. I mean like things from repetition for me are very important like I'm I have a formation in art therapy and I think one of the most important parts in my job was at first changing repetition acts in everyday life for people to act different in their own life character because obviously your identity, my identity now, daily is already a character. This parts of repetition and little repetition everyday repetitions would have an impress in that person's personality at the end of the day, so I think this connects very much with what you're saying, like "what are the consequences of someone acting violent during five years? like because they have to have a very strong resistance to violence and to jealousy and to romanticism or whatever… to first not be violent to their partner or not fall in love with Someone You are meant to fall in love every night (in the scene), you know, like what's real? is it real that you're in love from 7:00 to 9:00 o'clock at night or is it real that you don't love them the rest of the day? what's the fiction there?

F.C.: Yeah, specially on this character there is another layer because, in France there is a TV series in the 80s, Derrick, it's really famous, but it was an inspector, police inspector that he I think he did it I don't know how many season but all his life he made this serious inspector and I don't know how it come but maybe you know you so much your inspector for everybody then maybe you will buy bread in the morning, and people say hello to you saying "hey, inspector, ç ava?" and after a moment he was sure that he was the inspector Derrick. And for his wife and the children he was inspector Derrick, and they call him inspector. We talk about this because when the set is… when the piece is finished and we change the set the audience stay there you don't understand, you don't understand that it's a game… and you see her girlfriend to go and place a new set and he's lost until the end of the show, when the audience bow and at the bottom of the situation he is still on stage looking at them and…and he's still there "what's happened?", you know. He talked about this and also for him it's hard because he has to play also like this: he is a guy that is lost but he can't go out anymore and he's afraid also because there is a door going out of on stage to go and he's looking, and he don't wanna go he's afraid… he's afraid to come back to reality. it's very interesting I really like this.

A: yes, I had a friend that was playing for five or six years he was performing a drag and in the end he was having a conversation with me because he was saying like I do have an identity as a man but I cannot rely or deny my identity also as a woman because five times a week at night I am a woman, so in the end I go into gender for example, we're going also to violence and going also to… you have a partner in real life but then you have a partner in fiction and then you have to have a conversation with your partner because it's not just "I'm acting", it's what you said about "I am going so much into the character, I am shipping so much into the character that in the end there's a sense of real love that it's happening in the scene" and that's something that also like when I was speaking with the public the first time that I saw it people didn't understand because they were like "as an spectator I cannot consume this this piece as normally I would because I cannot grasp anything for real". It's just like pieces and fragments of things are just happening and the way that we consume art is very structural sometimes, you know, you need the character and a character that is fully entered in the character.

When the character is fragmented and like the scenario is more a character than the character itself because it's just like this animality of movement it's just like as an spectator there's also a breaking of the boundary between who is the scenario and what's the theater stand? you know, because the stand was just like thought what's going on? There was this agitation in the public because people didn't know how to consume art in a very traditional way of consuming theatre. You know, you go like to a traditional theater and then you see like this is the character, this is the structure of the relationality with the characters, but here the relationality between the characters is just like it's drifting all the time, you know, it's just soaked with water and you cannot grasp anything so it's like the narrative there also is lost into fragments and are very like intuitive fragments that come into your mind and just like makes you mind move in different ways there's not like… I cannot write an essay from this.

F.C.: it's also this we go to repeating itself. It is also this because for the movement, for example, we really love when…you can see the personality and the thought of the person when they move and the personality and for this we can see directly the answer if he go from class to class with some professor across the board or somebody that work along you know where I can see directly and for us it's much more interesting somebody that work around and somebody that work with classes because to develop his own personality movement and it's also this everyday we warm up and we don't never have somebody in the centre. Everybody warmup alone and do whatever they feel with how they feel this morning and what they need and they followed their body and they do it alone. I have a phrase that I like to… that they have it in the mind is like "go where you never been before" when you warm up because they do this warming every morning…some habits that you do every morning and to warm up and then open the legs like this and then this and then 45 minutes, we have some good things that we do every day… but it's this, you know. If you try to go where you never been before you can go there but maybe you never turn your head here (*directing their head to the back*) and then turn the head somewhere else and the day after "well I… I've been here yesterday, then maybe I want to go there" … and then the movement start and then I can go there and then the movement starts, I start to… to… to move and to make new movements and is this this phrase "go where you never been before" is the bottom

because already in the warm up they start to create and they start to open their artistic brain and they have to… to go where … they, they go so in the extreme in the body because if you really take care of this you can see you can go more extreme. And of course you work also with your extremity of your body and this is for so the right thing because we were working with the girl that was in the Olympic Game, artistic gymnastics, named Carolina, and well it was a big lesson for us coming from dance because, of course, she had a technique of stretching… it's super it's crazy it's it's much more explicit than the dancer. But it was really interesting for us because they they don't have the limit. They don't say they have limits very quickly… They said "yeah but I can go more". With this "go where you never been before" I think it's bring you to your extremity of your body but you can go more, you know, you can go… and it's interesting also because we destructurate also the human body and we try to find a way to move that it's really personal because each dancer will go where they have never been before and he will find movements very personal and then, yeah, this is also nice to be there, to create new movement. And we like the extremity. For us is… we like to… we don't like…it can be minimalist and it's no problem but depends. We like to have a balance between extremity, virtuosity and also very intimate if it's really small and it's has a reason and. For example, in *Tryptich* now we made a scene, I mean I will never put it on a piece as script, but because this scene was built when the piece was already made and then I fell to have this on but it's really stupid … she's doing ventriloqual, *whua whua*, as if the baby crying and she calm the baby and then the cleaning woman comes and goes *achuu* (*sneezes*) and wake up the baby and then the baby. It was in the middle of two scene and there was this moment and then and now I developed it like this because… because it comes from a super strong scene before, then I need a bit of rest, you know, a little bit of nothing, and they're very talent scene like this and very… I think it's also movement sometimes can be really… depending what you want… we work with dancers or Bill, who is 82 years old or a child, or Simon that he's 70 and we work also in the movement which is not from a dancer, because it has an emotion that the dancer will never have, you know, because there is an identification process that the non non-dancer will bring more emotion and we will give (*at this case*) a shit of the movement but it's just, the intention will be there and it's touching and it's and the dancer will sometimes don't succeed to do this, because

he has some rules that he can go there, and he has to stay straight. The non-dancer is in this fragility and the contrast is… one hour of virtuosity and you are bored… but the contrast when you see 5 minutes of virtuosity and then you see somebody who is not a dancer making an intention super clear it's like "wow", it's the same effect of the and then when the virtuosity will appear again we will say "wow", it's then this balance of minimalism-extremity also is important

A.: And like the thing that maybe the contortion of the body is not only by virtuosity but also by, you know, like how someone that weights 100 kg can also be very brutalist or extremist in their own movements by not doing nothing more than someone that can stretch their backs in a way that is super *contortious*, someone that is from the circus, for example, you know and I think that that contrast I didn't see it but it's… another like limit place that you created in the scenario.

F.C.: In this piece we don't use it because we was in NDT then there was just dancers. I think tonight is more like a dancers. You can see it changes depending on the company.

A.: I will see it in a bit. It's at 19:00, no?

F.C.: Yes.

A.: I have a lot of questions more, but I know that you have to go in.

F.C.: No, it's OK I have time.

A.: Yeah? Ok, so I want to go in a last question, in the case it's also a question for you, if not we can keep it open because obviously I'll be writing about this and it's also my own interpretation of how I feel the piece, but like how important it is in these kind of like pieces of art of what's the lexicon like the lost lexicon, the non-word, and without the discourse, but just by the shouting and the ventriloquy parts are sometimes more communicative than a word in a piece of theater art ,for example, like how important

it is also when the bodies are smashing into the water: like the sounds of the water are more effectively communicative to the public or to the dancers themselves than a word, a script or a dialogue, like traditional art pieces for example.

F.C.: I was working with a company, and it was really after a time I was a bit… I also wanted to change a bit because they want to explain the situation and so this heater, I don't know … they need to explain this like "the woman arrived and the man come and then you will shrink and then she said…". They explained this situation and I was like "why can't we do it, and it's gonna be maybe even stronger than just explaining it", it's shocking sometimes, but why can't we just do it? and it's this it's sometimes, of course, with theater you feel that you can go deeper because just 2 or 3 words, one phrase you can go *whoa,* you can put a layer on top of it that's more… yeah you can go deeper in the story and the scenario, but maybe because we come from the dance world for us it was more effective to do it than to tell it, you know, to tell the story to and it was a dream for me to start from a book you know because we're always praised the story with the dancers, with the creator, we know where we are we start with the sets then in the beginning of the day on vacation and that we know where we are now we're gonna start dictation in January I know exactly where we are working on the set and generate could be ready we have the settings but what we don't know is who we are. We are in this situation that is quite like this (*gesturing the stage*), it's not a garden, it's something quite, eh… But who we are we don't know. We have to create it. But to work with the scenario with the text so it's a book it's like "*wow*", it was always a dream for me, and it's for this I say yes for this opera also because we have a libretto, the story was a white man story but that's OK, we found a way to change it and to find them more interesting story in it, you know, but it was nice to start with some restriction of … it was always a dream but… and is this the I think it didn't make me afraid…for example the blindness in this book of Saramago, or to to start for example from some story like this it's like "*wow*". It can be super restricted and super… and there is already some scene, there is something we can just… it would be nice to do this but I'm afraid. And when I talk with theatrical people is the inverse: they have the book and for them it's like "*ugh*". I still have something, you know, I'm super afraid to start with nothing and to create. I have my book, my story, then I have something

some text to stick to… I don't know, I don't know how to do setup piece, I have no idea. Sometimes we use the dancers, creators, use a lot of texts in the scene and when we like this situation we always try to curate it. we say "OK, this scene was really theatrical", and we discuss why we like it: "We like it because this and this". And then we think "Why don't we try to put away all the rest?" and to keep… to see if it's work with these phrases and sometimes, because we are not actors, for us it's more easy to make it physically, and to make the situation, to…do the situation instead of telling them.

A.: And also, going back to Saramago, and the question of like how…there is another engagement with the kind of senses that you enact in the public for example, because for me it's also like a blindness when you're speaking of that dream, of that oneiric part, of the piece that, you know. When you're dreaming and when you're in a coma, when you're in a state of mind that you lose the senses of reality, or of one particular sense because you're blind, there's this kind of movement. This is the vision that you have when you're dreaming, right? There's only a path but that path is possible of everything. Also going into the part where you're speaking about memory: is memory already oneiric? Like, how do you remember? is memory already something that is impossible sometimes to grasp into like a book or a script or something tangible? Because how do you write about the past? and how do you write about the future? and how do you write about your dream or something like these other senses that are performative?

F.C.: I don't know when we discovered this in the creation… we really want to put the audience in like in the movie, we say "OK, we're gonna work on this", first with the songs to really make the audience be with us. After, we try to hypnotize the audience also, and because we change countries, and the language also changes, we try with the music. For example my sister they was listening to Pink Floyd when I was young and if you put me a Pink Floyd now today, I remember clearly when I was younger, and the vision of my sister dancing and singing this and then "OK, I will take it" and we use it like this, you know, we put some music that maybe in your past will make you in this kind of…and we rearrange it. We rearrange it and sometimes it's a relaxing list

or we transform it a bit, new arrangement, with new instruments. Then we have music, there is another layer it's not exactly… it's not the same. And we try to zoom like a movie, to try to zoom in the… in the character, and but zooming in cinema it can be 20 centimeters. In the stage you still need 20 meters (*from the audience to the character in stage*). Then we said "OK, why we don't zoom in the head of her and see what she thinks and then we…we try to … for example with the lights, now we are outside it's hard to explain, but if we were on stage and suddenly we…we make a focus on you and everything becomes dark and then suddenly you turn your head and you see somebody coming in. And it's also who can go in your mind, it can be with a song that is in your mind, in your head, maybe we transformed the song that is passing through the radio, Pink Floyd, maybe we make an effect on it and then the Pink Floyd (sounds of a part of PF), you fall away, you know. We try to make a zoom that Jones is clearly making go inside your head and then we see this man coming in and then this, after we can play it can be your memory, can be your ex-boyfriend, the day he did this to you, and we can do the same. Or it can be the fears of you new boyfriend or girlfriend doing this now to you, or you feel that maybe she will do this or then it can be maybe, I don't know, the situation can be the fear that you have or it can be memories, can be fears, can everything or maybe something that you dream. It can be a super nice scene that you will never have in your reality and then we…we went out of you … come back to reality and it's fucking horrible because the reality is not the same at all … or the inverse. Is this kind of zooming the thought of the person…we like this because it's…we don't use it always like this and it's a way that the audience can understand that we are in the head of this woman… in this piece we don't play like this, but it's… for us it's nice because we can shift from a reality to the memories or the fears, I don't know what, and play with a super realistic but something strange that happened, that is not in reality…it's not possible. And then *whhhoap*, come back to reality and we don't know if it was the reality or not and this instability between is its reality or memories or fear or… this we like to play with this because then it makes the audience a bit unstable and, I don't know, if I actually responded.

A.: It's…its totally that. And this is like a personal fact but I…like when I saw the piece…in the last five years I have been grieving loss, like death loss, of bodies that

have disappeared from my life and like that sick part that I see sometimes not pieces… it's not like I recognize a Pink Floyd memory that reminds me of my grandfather necessarily, but the way that you zoom in and out in this scenario makes you recall the important facts of grief or of emotionality and affect that is happening in your life and it's…it's quite shocking that someone or a lot of people can generate that in a so diverse public, because everyone is going through a very diverse process, but then that everyone has a very particular and intimate way of relating to the piece it's just like "*wow*", super effective, you know. Like, for me, it was super synesthetic of moments where I was just like holding in my chair because, again, it was in the moment of consuming art in a way of "oh went to this piece of art and then it's the narrative was a woman that was slapped by a man". No… I couldn't tell what I had seen because it was so connected to my own personal process they was like "fuck, I cannot write a critique of this right now because it's…it's like so personal, so intimate".

F.C.: I remember when we created the salon, we were playing with Gabby together, it was the second piece we made in Peeping Tom, and we just had a child and she was three months and we said "well, we're not gonna give her to…we're gonna bring her to the studio" and we were creating a scene and, yeah, Gabby, the mother, the first fear that she has right in this (that) moment it was to lose her baby… and all the scene she made was around this. And then, in the story, in the end, it was this. It was a bit unclear in the beginning because there was this this painting, this portrait of this little girl on the wall, but it was clearly a couple that's loosed the baby, because the baby after moments in the piece disappeared and then it was clearly the baby died and…how the parents deal with this with the situation of losing a baby. And Gabby for her life. It… it was amazing the scene that she made on this piece it was… Every night I was on stage I was crying every night. I don't know if it was because I was the father but I think also was to was super confronting because she made seem super sad and it was really super strong. And, of course, it happens sometimes after the show that we talk with the audience and they ask "who is the baby?" and this is also super confronting, you say "oh shit, sorry", you know? because you talk about something that's fears that you have but it's happened to people so … and it's… I remember once there was an old man in the house, and the piece was around this, and then always, after the audience

would speak of "oh, yes, it was my father". Yeah, it's hard, because we… we talked about fears that we don't talk because they've happened in our life, but people after confronting…confronting to these, they are living this in their life and some people pitch to stay sometimes. I remember some woman that left the audience when the piece in the salon because… I don't know what's happening in their life…maybe they lost a child, I don't know. And this, of course, is… it's a bit dramatic. But for us is important because I don't know… Or in the salon Simon he is 60 and it's the first time that he's been in pain. For us it's important to talk, or in dance is common that we…we don't talk on contemporary dance, then for us it was important there to talk about this and…and because Simon when he created he was coming more from the theater, and he wanted to do a child and he tried, tried, tried, but we didn't find any interesting parts … and then he loses his father during the creation and then he was one weeks super sad, he was not able to create. He was in the studio but he was really sick. Then, one day we said "why don't you play your father before he died?" because he always talk about him and he was saying super strong situations, you know? because he was a bit…he lost a bit his head, and he was telling stuff. And we said "why you don't talk about your father? maybe showing this would maybe…?" and then he said "OK, I will try" and it was very nice for him and then it was ticket, ticket, ticket, ticket. Everything he showed was on the piece, it was amazing what he made and then he played his father on stage and he's super touching. Then we like humanity. We like to use the stuff that's happening now. Like *Kinds*, when we were creating it, the company there was two Brazilian, and it was when Bolsonaro won the election. Then they were super touch. They were really depressed, they were not able to create. And we insisted, "make a scene about this" and this… For us is always… always to talk about how you want to see intimacy, topics we are afraid to talk about, its what's interesting for us… And in the company is crazy because we are so much… because when you were looking for material like this for five months of creation, you are much closer to each other than maybe your boyfriend or your girlfriend, or your parents or I don't know… because you…you do some stuff or you say some stuff you never said to nobody and then we are super close and we have rules to protect each other. We need to find this context where we are free to express and to talk these things and not judge because we are looking for a character… it's not you gonna make this thing, it's you character

who's gonna make this, you know? Then everybody's involving in the process that we give everything and it's based on reality on what we live now and today and tomorrow we'll make the new scene because tonight I dreamt about this thing, and … and it's really relaxing something human, something special or so. It is, of course, a bit extreme because if you talk about something that you never talked, it's gonna be something that affects you.

A.: I'll write from this perspective of grief, actually. I don't want to relate to the pieces in a very like high theory, like academic and university language. I mean, this is a conflict I have right? because I'm speaking about my own experience being affected by the performances and by pieces, but at the same time in society it has to be *(written about)* in a very particular language so it's like you know I think this is super inspiring… how to generate new languages also in academia which haven't got to be scripted, you know? like I haven't got to speak about this piece in a particular way but in an affective way and I think this is like the most interesting part of how I view as an spectator and experience these kind of events in my life or we experience it, right? because today I'm gonna see after five years… I don't know what my emotions are gonna be today, if I'm more anxious, if I've lost two more people in my life how is this gonna come to me and how I'm gonna confrontate it.

F.C.: Yeah, and this is interesting and sometimes we discover new things and it's really interesting also because when you create, when you are a performer creator , like me, I am writing and you make scenery and I will say "OK, we keep for your character. Keep this thing and this try to make more in the end. You can start with this thing will work really well if it's after this one because if it's before it has no sense. Let's try to make this for a moment." And then suddenly you realize that you were three months of research of material. You went everywhere you know and sudenly there is this character and it comes to life. Its super surprising to see who is the character you create instinctively. You can create something that you like a lot of something and me I will just keep this part and not this part that he was dreaming. Sometimes people hated me in the end because I just choose this and not this because … and because you create something you love this scene and you want to make the

following part in that but maybe for me… maybe I love it, but for the piece it doesn't work, I don't know, for the story…then I will just keep this but… Sometimes I really like them, and I try to put it after or before. But being on creation is really hard. They really need to believe on you because it can be really… I remember somewhere right in the studio it's like the revolution they are looking like this because we made it a showing the day before and I cut the scene they liked. It's this, you involve yourself in a in a character and you give so much and … when you create you discover in the end what you create and, for example, in the first part Gabby put a little light in the door and then I used the same effect in the next piece, the little light. I never saw the meaning, but then I was like "oh, is the lighthouse, you have the harbor"

A.: Yeah, the orientation.

F.C.: I never thought about … "ah, it is …it's like a like a lighthouse". I never thought about it, but it has a sense, you know? and sometimes it's instinctively you do stuff and you don't know… you like it you don't know why and two days ago I realized this (*the lighthouse symbolism*). To see you show, the perspective that you have, for me I see it all the time, but I discover new stuff and sometimes… I mean, yesterday I was in the mood and after the show, I stood up, I walked a bit and I almost faint. I sat again and my head was like… its affected me. And it is different in each city. Depends on the audience. Depends on the perception and the mood you are.

A.: Like similar to what happens when you were speaking about how two bodies are making love or just like fucking, in a more like very like particular way and then because they're cold they're just like shaking and there's kind of non-control. And it's not a rational control like you're in an act of love or of communication with another body but then, obviously, there's obviously something happening in your body and it like paralyzes you know. Again, going back to the post viewing of the first time in the Netherlands it was like… I saw it twice. Once with my ex-girlfriend and another time I took my mother and it was super different because in one I was just like bound to control myself in front of someone that I was meeting at that point because we were starting to love each other, and then I was like … "I… I cannot have a date right now.

I know that we have to have some beers now and we'll go to her house and we'll have sex but I'm too affected to just relate now in a rational way". And then with my mother because she knew all the history that was coming from that moment I was like "OK, I'm in a mood. I don't want to be stressful with you, but I don't want to speak" and it was super different because then I went the second time and when it had ended and I was going back in the bus and I was like without speaking for half an hour thinking "OK, I'm super depressed right now and I can… I can allow myself to be depressed".

F.C.: Yeah. We always have this image of making a tattoo in the brain, you know? And the role is not to change people. But making a "tattoo in the brain" to make the connection nobody has gone there before…to shake a bit the brain, you know?

A.: Yeah… that's my question constantly. Does art change the world or does it change me?

F.C.: Maybe yes, the revolution, I don't think we have so much power on it. But I think changing somebody emotionally or changing the world, or the political way maybe not, but changing people yeah I think we change people. We change the sensibility. First it affects us, and this is the thing that I like. It will shake a bit people.
We were doing a scene, in *Le Sous sol*, and it was someone that was 80, and there was a scene where I torture her, and that day, because something else, she has a little bit of blood on the dress white dress and then the article was around this "yeah they torturate her, and she has blood on her dress" and she was super angry said "what? we talk about this", we talked to shake the society. A woman of eighty years old, she can play on stage like a normal actress, she can have a dance on the piece, she was like super active person, and you break everything with your stupid article. She phoned and she said "what did you write? We are fighting to change the society, to change its old people's image of sitting all day" and then the other person was like, "sorry, sorry".

A.: Totally. I think we can leave it here. Well, Frank it was still so nice meeting you.

F.C.: Yes, if you want to talk after the show.

A.: Of course.

F.C.: To see the feeling you have.

A.: Bye, good luck. *Mucha mierda*, as you say in Spain.

Annex 4.

These photos were taking by myself at the end of the three-day intervention of YPA project. They represent the material archive which remained after the experience.

Power in Public Art Spaces. Frictions, Performativity and the Generation of Counter-Hegemonic Narratives.