

Rethinking Martin & White's affect taxonomy

A psychologically-inspired approach to the linguistic expression of emotion

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Utterance production/interpretation depends unmistakably on emotional contexts. This makes the analysis of emotion in language fascinating and difficult, as it permeates all levels of linguistic description. Appraisal Theory is a powerful instrument intended to capture the subtleties of emotion in discourse. Its status as an open-ended tool, though, reveals a need for more sharply defined categories. Whilst the APPRECIATION subsystem has already been elaborated, AFFECT seems to require further refinement. In this chapter, we do so by using corpus evidence and drawing inspiration mainly from three psychological approaches to emotion: appraisal theories, construction theories and neuroscience. In emphasizing the notion of goal as the foundation of all emotion types, our revised model aims to describe emotional instances in more detail.

Keywords: appraisal, affect, emotion, psychology, linguistics

1. Introduction

When Martin & White (2005) developed Appraisal Theory, their aim was to comprehend the linguistic construction of social relations through alignment, which they reported to be realized by engagement, graduation and attitude.¹ The scholarly attention attracted by the latter is probably due to its focal nature and its complexity. Attitude helps classify emotion and emotional talk through AFFECT,

1. This chapter has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (research project FFI2016-79748-R). Our thanks, as well, to Prof. Miguel Pérez García for having made us aware of the role of neuroscience in the understanding of emotion, and the anonymous readers of the chapter. All the remaining mistakes are solely ours.

JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION. There is growing consensus about the desirability of treating AFFECT as conveying self- and other-report emotion, with JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION expressing opinion through emotion by attending to ethics and esthetics (Bednarek 2009a: 181). This refinement to the current theory was preceded by Bednarek's (2008) exceptional corpus-based modifications to the original AFFECT sub-system.

However, to our eye, despite the improvement represented by the latter proposal, it still appears to rely on folk concepts and intuitions to account for the substantial influence of emotion on all kinds of discourse. This said, we believe that the semantic domain of AFFECT should be enriched through a more explicit focus on affective psychology, as this may help to provide categories that can describe any instance of emotive language more accurately. As Thompson (2014: 64) argues, the flexibility and open-ended nature of the model leave much scope for endowing the current classification with greater reliability and fine-grained detail.

In view of the above, in this chapter, we examine the existing categories, redraw the boundaries between some of them, specify those that are only broadly defined and, at times, propose new labels. Before presenting our adjustments to the AFFECT subsystem, as inspired by psychological emotion theories and data from the *British National Corpus* (henceforth, BNC), we address some questions arising from our detection of several inconsistencies within the current taxonomy, hopefully, to fill in some clearly challenging theoretical gaps. In this respect, one of our main priorities is to overcome the fuzziness of areas such as un/happiness and dis/satisfaction. Accordingly, for instance, we have come to conclude that pleasure, or the lack thereof, cannot be taken as one emotion subtype but a dimension that cuts across all the categories forming part of the AFFECT continuum. Likewise, as is well known, the adaptive function of emotions contributes to human survival and development; and at the core lie human goals, needs and values. In our scheme, in fact, goals now play a significant role. Given their crucial influence on our emotional experiences, they must also be regarded as the mainstay of the linguistics of emotion.

2. Appraising and re-appraising AFFECT

2.1 Rethinking ATTITUDE

Martin & White's (2005) **PRASAL theory** offers one of the most comprehensive classifications available to explore linguistic evaluation. Its division into three areas allows researchers to delve into people's interpersonal construal of the world through their alignment with particular discourse entities (i.e. ENGAGEMENT),

their positive or negative assessment of them (i.e. ATTITUDE), and their modulation of the evaluative responses pertaining to both former domains (i.e. GRADUATION). Of the three layers, ATTITUDE is the one that often receives most attention, so much so that it is treated as “focal” (Martin & White 2005: 39). At the heart of this area are feelings. AFFECT, one of the three ATTITUDE sub-systems, concerns our emotional reactions, while JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION capture our evaluation of people and things through their ethical or esthetic qualities, respectively (Martin 2000: 147; Martin & White 2005: 35). In their view, AFFECT is crucial to understanding the two other areas in that our evaluations are driven by the feelings generated when participating in any discourse practice (Martin & White 2005: 45).

Language, one very complex human phenomenon, does not occupy an unconnected compartment in our brain. Like any other cognitive process (e.g. decision-making), discourse processing and production are always filtered by emotion (Plutchik 2003: 48; Klann-Delius 2015: 141; cf. also Alba-Juez & Mackenzie, this volume). This is illustrated in Example (1), where, in response to the question *How are you?*, the speaker produces an utterance that, depending on the context, will be interpreted as worry, annoyance or some kind of underspecified negative affect.

- (1) I've been waiting for you for six hours (BNC, H7A)

Even explicitly evaluative adjectives denoting JUDGMENT (e.g. *awful* in (2)) or APPRECIATION (e.g. *good* in (3)) seem to derive from one's affective state at a particular moment.

- (2) And he has this **awful** friend, called Claude. (BNC, H7F)

- (3) But it's a really **good** place to go to. (BNC, G4U)

Opinion statements convey the impression that the qualities ascribed to any entity are their inherent properties (e.g. *He is inherently awful as a friend*). However, psychologists and neuroscientists (Forgas 2003; Barrett 2017: 75) argue that our opinions stem from how we feel in relation to the entities concerned (e.g. *I don't like him; hence, he is a bad person*). This being the case, we believe, in line with Bednarek (2009b: 410–412), that one of the first steps towards a more psychologically-inspired Appraisal taxonomy could be to substitute AFFECT for ATTITUDE. *Attitude* in the psychological literature features as a global, sustained and stable standpoint in our memory associated with any entity of relevance to us (Forgas 2003: 596; Ferguson & Bargh 2008: 290). On these grounds, examples such as *I hate smoking* or *He is my best friend* encode generalized attitudes ingrained in the speakers' minds. Nevertheless, compared to these examples, where it may

be hard to recall what triggered the emoters' reactions, (4) is less enduring in its denotation, as the emotion conveyed results from a particular situation.

(4) I **hated** you when you said he was like an angel! (BNC, FS2)

The term *attitude* thus seems too narrow in its scope, as it applies to generalized stances, but fails to capture the more temporary, event-driven nature of many instances. *Affect*, by contrast, extends to any feeling experienced as relatively un/pleasant and de/activating through which we communicate specific moods, attitudes, emotions, etc. (Ochs & Schieffelin 1989: 7, Lindquist et al. 2016: 580). Promoting AFFECT to the superordinate node in Appraisal involves reconsidering the labels for the original attitudinal regions. In this respect, Bednarek's (2009a: 181) division of the evaluative space into EMOTION and OPINION is undoubtedly useful. EMOTION encompasses terms referring to highest ranked emotion categories (e.g. *happy, sad*); and to the expressions ascribed to particular emotions based on their encapsulation of a range of triggering situations (e.g. (1) above), and/or physiological, motor and/or cognitive responses (e.g. (5a-c)).

- (5) (a) *sweating, blushing*
 (b) *jumping, hugging*
 (c) *feeling helpless, in control*

OPINION statements such as (2) or (3) above also originate from AFFECT, but, unlike instances of EMOTION, the focus is on the evaluation of sentient and non-sentient entities by reference to our ethical or esthetic norms and values. Whilst all OPINION statements indicate valenced judgments and our feeling state (i.e. pleasant or unpleasant), only if the surrounding co-text affords a clear EMOTION reading should we double-code the example as both OPINION and EMOTION. Example (6) illustrates one such case; while the passage explicitly denotes OPINION, the highly loaded opinion terms used (in bold) and the sense of injustice conveyed evoke an EMOTION script of anger in the reader's mind.

(6) That **bastard** Harley **dumped** me after I'd looked after him for nearly ten years [...]. (BNC, CS4)

Be that as it may, the potential of OPINION statements to signal specific EMOTION readings is an area deserving more attention from linguistic and psychological research; such collaboration would prove extremely fruitful in endowing the Russian doll syndrome that "bedevils" (Thompson 2014: 64) appraisal coding with a higher level of reliability. For space constraints, this will not be further pursued in

this chapter;² in the remainder, our focus will shift to the structure of Appraisal's EMOTION component.

2.2 Rethinking EMOTION

Table 1 outlines the changes discussed in Section 2.1 regarding ATTITUDE. In our attempt to make the current taxonomy more psychologically inspired, we delve into the building blocks of the EMOTION component.

Table 1. The previous ATTITUDE system and the new AFFECT system

ATTITUDE	AFFECT	AFFECT	EMOTION
	JUDGMENT		OPINION
	APPRECIATION		

Martin & White (2005) divide EMOTION into four groups: dis/inclination, un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction. This classification originated in Martin's observations of his young son's evolving engagement with the world, particularly relative to his distress calls. These were interpreted as demands for his bottle (dis/satisfaction), his parents' affection (un/happiness) or his favorite blanket (in/security) (Martin 2000: 150, Martin 2017: 31). Whilst not denying the appeal of these categories, Martin (2000: 150) acknowledges that, in the absence of a "more principled basis for classifying emotions", the taxonomy should be treated as hypothetical, thereby offering scope for its improvement. One major attempt at re-considering the current boundaries is Bednarek (2008), whose use of corpus data leads to a scheme whereby emotion terms can be classified "more realistically" (Bednarek 2008: 169). Her modifications, concerning in/security and dis/inclination, are summarized as follows:

- i. *confidence* is re-labeled as *quiet*;
- ii. *surprise*, originally under insecurity, is promoted to superordinate status;
- iii. *distrust* occupies the gap left by *surprise*, featuring as the opposite of *trust* within security;

2. Semantic and discourse prosody (e.g. Low 1993, 2000; Morley & Partington 2009), as well as some other concepts such as Schwarz-Friesel's *emotional implicatures* (e.g. Schwarz-Friesel 2015), are key to understanding the workings of EMOTION-OPINION, particularly in relation to their implicit realisations (e.g. where explicit OPINION implicitly evokes EMOTION, and the other way around). In Benitez-Castro & Hidalgo-Tenorio (In progress) we will test the revised taxonomy presented herein and, in so doing, will elaborate on the usefulness of applying psychological parameters to linguistic analysis, and on how these may help to uncover implicit EMOTION in discourse.

- iv. *fear*, originally under disinclination, becomes part of *disquiet* within insecurity;
- v. the gap left by *fear* is filled with the new subcategory of *non-desire*, becoming the opposite of *desire*.

Table 2 presents the taxonomy resulting from these changes. In our refinement of Appraisal's EMOTION, we draw on Bednarek (2008).

Table 2. Bednarek's (2008) EMOTION system

Dis/inclination	Desire	Non-desire
In/security	Security:trust	Insecurity:distrust
	Security:quiet	Insecurity:disquiet
Dis/satisfaction	Satisfaction:interest	Dissatisfaction:ennui
	Satisfaction:pleasure	Dissatisfaction:displeasure
Un/happiness	Happiness:cheer	Unhappiness:misery
	Happiness:affection	Unhappiness:antipathy
Surprise	Surprise	

In order to identify and address the gaps and improvement areas in the taxonomy, we must first examine the key defining features of each category:

- i. *Dis/inclination* encodes instances of volition to engage with a stimulus (e.g. *aspire to, desire*), and unwillingness to do so (e.g. *refuse to, reluctant*). In Martin & White (2005: 48), *dis/inclination* encapsulates affectively positive desire (i.e. what you want to happen) and affectively negative fear (i.e. what you do not want to happen). Bednarek (2008: 166), by comparison, argues that, unlike the other EMOTION types (*surprise* excluded), this does not involve an affectively valenced distinction, but one based on polarity.
- ii. *In/security* includes affective states pertaining to our "ecosocial wellbeing" (Martin & White 2005: 49), as in the tranquility experienced when the outer world is in sync with ourselves (i.e. quiet; e.g. *untroubled, at ease*); the feelings of safety derived from our belief in the reliability and goodness of another person or a future event (i.e. trust; e.g. *confident, optimistic*); the feelings of agitation when perceiving a threat (i.e. disquiet; e.g. *afraid, worried*); and the feelings of reservation concerning the reliability and goodness of another person or future event (i.e. distrust; e.g. *suspicious, pessimistic*).
- iii. *Dis/satisfaction* is a set of emotions concerned with "the pursuit of goals" (Martin & White 2005: 49). Depending on our success level, we will feel interest or ennui, and pleasure or displeasure. We feel the former if our attention fluctuates between active engagement (e.g. *carried away, spellbound*) and

disengagement with ongoing stimuli (e.g. *bored, uninterested*); and the latter, after attaining our goals (e.g. *enjoy, content*) or failing to do so due to something impeding our progress (e.g. *annoyed, frustrated*).

- iv. *Un/happiness* is the first group people mention when asked to list emotion types; that is why Martin & White (2005: 49) regard it as the most cognitively salient. Concerned with “affairs of the heart”, it draws on a distinction between undirected moods and directed emotions. Moods signal feelings whose cause one may be unaware of, and are typically realized by relational processes (e.g. *I am happy*); conversely, directed emotions involve a trigger, and are realized by mental processes (e.g. *I like you*) (Martin & White 2005: 47). Although both are introduced as part of a subsystem that cuts across all EMOTION categories, their relevance is underscored within un/happiness in that cheer and misery (e.g. *glad, happy; sad, dejected*) are treated as moody emotions turning into affection or antipathy when directed at another entity (e.g. *like, admire; dislike, hate*) (Martin & White 2005: 49).
- v. *Surprise* has been the subject of debate in the psychological literature, with some arguing that it is an affectively valenced state with distinct physiological and motor responses (Plutchik 2003; Soriano et al. 2015), and others describing it as a neutral cognitive state linked to the perception of novelty but lacking the physiology and expressions of emotions (Ortony & Turner 1990; Power & Dalgleish 2008). Martin & White (2005: 50) treat it as a negatively valenced state within *insecurity*, based on the sudden disruption of one's affect and cognition produced by any unexpected stimulus. Bednarek (2008: 164), however, posits that surprise is not intrinsically positive or negative; valence resides in the triggering event, but not the feeling. Martin (2017: 37) counters Bednarek (2008) by asserting that, whilst the lexical item *surprise* is associated with positive and negative affective states (e.g. *surprise and pleasure vs. fear and surprise*), there are other lexical items denoting surprise with a clear intrinsic valence (e.g. *stunned, astounded*). Corpus evidence reveals that some of the terms not investigated by Bednarek (2008) refer to positive or negative states.³

In redrawing some boundaries, Bednarek (2008) manages to overcome some of the ambiguities in the original taxonomy, as all categories (*surprise* excluded) are structured around polar opposites. This being the case, however, her revised classification still “incorporates fuzziness and gaps” (Bednarek 2008: 169). Although such fuzziness is to be expected given people's prototype-based construal of

3. In the *BNCweb* we can see that *shocked* and *stunned* generally conjoin with negative emotion terms (e.g. *shocked and angry/appalled/outraged; stunned and bewildered/speechless/angry*).

emotion concepts (see Section 3), the question arises as to whether, in refining the structure of *EMOTION*, we should focus solely on the need to provide categories accounting for authentic linguistic data (Bednarek 2008: 169), or whether we should strive for categories inspired by both linguistic and psychological authenticity. Bednarek (2009b and 2009c) brings the cognitive component into SFL *EMOTION* when discussing the importance of affect, emotion schemata and psychological cognitive dimensions (see Section 2.1), but does not reassess the validity of the existing SFL *EMOTION* taxonomy in light of the cognitive research reported in the articles.

Following our review of the current system, we will now identify the areas that seem to be in need of refinement. These will set the foundation for the more psychologically-inspired *EMOTION* system presented in Section 3. Of the five groups in the taxonomy, the way in which dis/satisfaction and un/happiness are conceptualized raises doubts from a psychological perspective. When applying the system, we are often faced with the difficulty of deciding between happiness:cheer and satisfaction:pleasure:

- (7) She was completely **happy** that her semaphore message had saved Joe. (BNC, B0B)
- (8) I'm **glad** that you got here so quickly. (BNC, H0D)
- (9) Erika smiled, **pleased** that the little cloud had passed over. (BNC, A7A)
- (10) I remember feeling really **satisfied** that we were changing the world. (BNC, HSL)

If we use the goal-based criterion that characterizes satisfaction:pleasure, all four examples above involve a feeling of achievement resulting from a successful move towards certain objectives relevant to the speaker or somebody else. Adopting the mood criterion of happiness:cheer also affords a satisfaction:pleasure reading: these instances are triggered emotions, as evidenced by the *that*-clause following each head adjective. However, Martin & White (2005) and Bednarek (2008) classify *happy* and *glad* under happiness:cheer, and *pleased* and *satisfied* under satisfaction:pleasure.

Bednarek (2008: 182) hints at the problematic nature of this dichotomy arguing that “there is some overlap between dis/satisfaction and un/happiness”. To address this overlap, we must explore the psychological validity of the dimensions underlying both categories. The points raised in the following discussion are structured around a range of questions that, to the best of our knowledge, are relevant to refining and rethinking SFL Appraisal categories:

- i. Do we not feel pleasure when we are happy?
- ii. Do we not feel satisfied when we are happy? Why is happiness not also goal-related?
- iii. Do we not feel momentarily happy after enjoying a good meal?
- iv. Why are happiness and sadness treated as moods?
- v. Do our feelings of affection and antipathy derive from happy and sad moods respectively?
- vi. Do we feel satisfied when something interests us?

2.2.1 *Do we not feel pleasure when we are happy?*

One of the most striking features of the satisfaction/happiness distinction concerns the inclusion of pleasure only within satisfaction. Dictionaries define *pleasure* as “the feeling of happiness, enjoyment or satisfaction that you get from an experience” (*Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*; henceforth, *LDCE*), suggesting its link to any positively valenced affective state. This is corroborated by dimensional emotion models, where emotions are said to derive from more basic affective components. One of the most salient dimensions is *valence*, i.e. the amount of pleasure/displeasure attached to a feeling as evoked by a particular trigger (Ellsworth & Scherer 2003: 577; Scherer 2013: 17). *Valence* is also crucial in neuroscientific research, as the hedonic tone of a stimulus activates the appetitive (approach) and defensive (avoidance) behavior guiding our emotional responses (Lang & Bradley 2008: 52, Kringelbach & Berridge 2015: 231). The language we use does not remain unaffected by our subjective experience, since valence, along with arousal, lies at the core of our conceptualization of any vocabulary item (irrespective of its more or less explicitly emotive nature) and our construal of verbal reports of emotion (Osgood et al. 1957; Barrett 2004; Fontaine et al. 2007). From this evidence, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that pleasure/displeasure is not unique to dis/satisfaction; it affects the entire EMOTION domain, happiness included.

2.2.2 *Do we not feel satisfied when we are happy? Why is happiness not also goal-related?*

If *happy*, *glad*, *pleased* and *satisfied* in Examples (7) to (10) indicate pleasure, the question remains as to the status of satisfaction and the role of goals in the taxonomy. The *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (henceforth, *OALD*) associates *satisfaction* with “the good feeling that you have when [...] something that you wanted to happen does happen”. The *Encarta Thesaurus* (2001: 1121–1122) lists it as denoting pleasure and elation, along with *happiness*, *delight*, etc. This is also shown in several psychological studies into people's structuring of the emotion lexicon, where *happy/happiness*, *satisfied/satisfaction* and similar items are grouped into

one broad prototype family (Storm & Storm 1987: 812; Barrett 2004: 267), even to the extent of regarding *satisfaction* as one of four basic emotion categories (including *sadness*, *fear* and *anger*) (Kemper 1987).

In appraisal emotion theories, *satisfaction* is understood in its sense of “fulfilling a need or desire” (*OALD*). From this perspective, all triggers are evaluated in terms of their relevance and contribution to fulfilling our goals and needs. The more relevant and conducive an event or situation is to our goals and needs, the more satisfied we will feel; this general feeling of satisfaction, or lack thereof, may be labeled and modulated more specifically as *elation*, *contentment*, etc. Goals, therefore, do not determine only specific groups of emotions, as SFL Appraisal claims; psychologically, they constitute the hinge upon which we evaluate and respond emotionally to the world (Stein & Trabasso 1992: 227, Roseman 2008: 347, Ellsworth 2009: 37, Keltner et al. 2014: 4). Goals are emotion anchors even when they are not our own, but somebody else’s; this other person, however, should be relevant to us for some reason. Our goals are also hierarchically structured, with some emotional experiences being triggered by higher-order motives (e.g. our bodily integrity) and others by more immediate ones (e.g. passing tomorrow’s exam) (Ellsworth & Scherer 2003: 578). Returning to our two initial questions, happiness seems to be most likely an emotion category built upon a more general feeling of satisfaction triggered by our success in attaining relevant goals.

2.2.3 *Do we not feel momentarily happy after enjoying a good meal?*

Under Appraisal, the lexical items in bold below would be coded as satisfaction:pleasure. The goals and triggers involved, however, differ noticeably: (11) and (12) denote short-term states of sensory pleasure, or lack thereof, following one’s consumption of more or less tasty food; (13), and especially (14), express more ongoing triggers and states where the feeling of sensory pleasure is rendered more complex by an active and conscious reliance on the emoter’s socio-cognitive schemas.

- (11) Got something nice for tea [...] I done some fresh plaice and some scallops
[...] I so **enjoyed** it [...] (BNC, KBE)
- (12) [...] the mound of teacakes began to go down, but not everyone was **pleased**
with what they were given. (BNC, ACK)
- (13) González, who said that he was **pleased** by the progress made [...] in
stabilizing the economy, announced further measures [...] (BNC, HKU)
- (14) I very often miss nursing. I thoroughly **enjoyed** it. [...] I didn’t ever seem to
get the same sort of **satisfaction** [...] as I did out of seeing a patient recover,
which was something you’d helped them to do. (BNC, EBR)

Previous psychological research on happiness has shown that feeling happy encompasses the physical pleasures resulting from our satisfaction of a range of bodily and sensory needs (e.g. enjoying a drink, a movie), as well as the more social pleasures evoked by our achievements as members of particular social groups (e.g. enjoying your job, winning a race). This translates into a contrast between two kinds of happiness: *hedonic* and *eudaimonic* (Power & Dalgleish 2008: 322, Berridge & Kringelbach 2016: 133).

Eudaimonic happiness transcends hedonic feelings to incorporate a more conscious assessment of the social purpose and meaning of the activities we engage in (Dolan & Kudrna 2016: 441–443). In this respect, Csikszentmihalyi (1990: 50–52) argues that physical pleasures do not guarantee happiness; we need enjoyment to lead truly fulfilling lives. To feel enjoyment, we must do activities we feel capable of but which are challenging enough to keep pushing us towards a more complex version of ourselves; once our psychic energy is fully focused on one of these activities, we will start experiencing *flow*, a kind of eudaimonic happiness. Example (14) above nicely illustrates this type of happiness, as shown in the enjoyment derived from helping patients *recover*. To answer our opening question, when saying that we enjoyed a good meal, we are revealing our happiness, although of a short-term hedonic kind that stands in contrast with a more socially-oriented sense of meaningful and purposeful achievement.

2.2.4 *Why are happiness and sadness treated as moods?*

The psychological literature distinguishes *moods* from *emotions*, based on their being more long-lasting and lacking a specific trigger (Frijda 2009: 259, Scherer 2013: 24). This description is echoed by Martin & White (2005: 47), except for their emphasis on the lexicogrammatical realization of moods by relational attributive processes and of emotions by mental processes. In their view, the central position of the trigger in a mental process (i.e. Direct Object: *She loved the idea*; Subject: *The idea pleased her*) justifies treating the example as a triggered emotion; nevertheless, when functioning as Complement in a Subject Complement (e.g. *I was sad about that*), the affective state is claimed to be mood-like. We believe that, although for coding purposes, it is interesting to consider the trigger's syntactic realization, we cannot use this criterion to distinguish between moods and emotions, since mood-like adjectives such as *cheerful* or *miserable* may be construed as moods (see (15)) or triggered emotions (see (16)). We agree with Storm et al. (1996: 289) that, whilst certain adjectives favor either moody or triggered realizations (e.g. *gloomy* vs. *distressed*), this distinction depends on the saliency of the trigger, with many words accepting both readings.

- (15) I felt **cheerful** and reasonably well during the first pregnancy. (BNC, CCN)

(16) She's **miserable** that it all has to end. (BNC, FYV)

2.2.5 *Do our feelings of affection and antipathy derive from happy and sad moods respectively?*

In Martin & White (2005: 49), affection and antipathy feature as two emotions triggered by “the moods of feeling happy or sad”. This description, however, begs the question of whether our likes and dislikes are distinct emotions, or preferences construed on happy and sad moods. The emotion literature supports the happiness origin of affection or liking. In Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989: 99), Power & Dalgleish (2008: 342) and Fontaine & Scherer (2013: 119) love is a happiness-driven non-basic emotion. As for hatred, its corresponding basic emotion is not sadness, as in SFL Appraisal, but anger (Power & Dalgleish 2008: 285, Fontaine & Scherer 2013: 119) or disgust (Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989: 99, Plutchik 2003: 74). Its association with the former is understandable from examples such as (17), showing how we often construe punctual displays of anger in hatred terms.

(17) ‘You’re lying! I **hate** you!’ she shouted **angrily** [...]. (BNC, GWH)

Nonetheless, this connection does not always apply, as you may hate someone without feeling angry, and feel angry with someone you do not hate (Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989: 99). Similarly, we may like or love somebody or something without feeling generally happy, since perhaps several other areas of our life lack the meaning and purpose underlying eudaimonic happiness (see Section 2.2.3). From this standpoint, affection and antipathy might be described as a separate group. Unlike sadness or anger, which are typically event-driven, affection and antipathy are identified as generalized interpersonal relations, attitudes, plots, preferences and stances felt vis-à-vis particular entities (Storm & Storm 1987: 812, Ekman 1999: 55, Scherer 2013: 24). These are akin to attraction and repulsion forces compelling us to approach or avoid the entity in question (Talmy 1988; Kövecses 2000), as based on several previous un/pleasant associations with the entity (e.g. being irritated or praised by somebody every day) (Berridge & Kringelbach 2016: 136) or on intuitive preferences such as liking somebody or something without knowing why (Mcclure & Riis 2009: 313). Further evidence proving the separate emotion status of affection and antipathy lies in their distinct social functions. Affection rests on a general motivation to affiliate with other people and entities, and to maintain such bonds, while antipathy reveals a hostile motivation aimed at moving away from whatever may pose a danger to our in-group (Fischer & Manstead 2008: 457, Keltner et al. 2014: 41–42).

To conclude, all the evidence in this section appears to prove the feasibility of rethinking affection/antipathy in SFL Appraisal as a semantic area in its own right. The best candidates in this group are those signaling affection or antipathy

relations evoked by intuitive preferences, as in (18), or by generalized attitudes resulting from prior experiences, as in (19).

(18) I really **liked** your trousers [...] the material [...]. (BNC, KP3)

(19) I never **liked** his wife or the daughters, they always thought they were something. (BNC, KDN)

Example (20) below uses the same lexical item (*like*) but the emotion is more temporary: it refers to a feeling of enjoyment triggered by a particular event (i.e. meeting Albert Finney), justifying its treatment as happiness (see Section 2.2.3). This suggests a cline between clear affection/antipathy interpretations of a word, and other uses affording a more eventive and short-term reading.

(20) I really **liked** meeting Albert Finney. It was nice to sit there and have a chat [...]. (BNC, K4P)

2.2.6 *Do we feel satisfied when something interests us?*

The emotion literature has explored this question from two positions: interest as a positively valenced emotion (Tomkins 1962; Izard 2007) or as a cognitive state for which only arousal is salient (Storm & Storm 1987; Ortony & Turner 1990). In SFL Appraisal, the inclusion of interest within satisfaction indicates an adherence to the first position. Dictionary entries for *satisfaction/satisfied* and *interest/interested*, however, do not reveal such conceptual correspondence: *interest/interested* is defined as the feeling experienced when our attention is captured by a stimulus and we “want to find out more about it” (LDCE), while *satisfaction/satisfied* involves a feeling of happiness or pleasure experienced when “you have achieved something or got what you wanted” (LDCE). Similarly, in the Encarta Thesaurus (2001: 1121–1122), *satisfied* and *happy* or *delighted* are categorized as indicating Pleasure, whereas adjectives such as *interested*, *immersed* and *absorbed* are part of the Pensiveness and Interest family. Examples (21) to (23) illustrate the often tenuous connection between interest and satisfaction:

(21) I was **interested and depressed** [...] to read Richard Smith's editorial highlighting exactly why we have problems in attracting adequate candidates [...]. (BNC, EC7)

(22) 'I want you to join a scientific team [...]' Kim narrowed his eyes, **interested but also wary**. (BNC, G04)

- (23) [...] I was **curious** to see what she meant by ‘laying out’. So, avoiding Granny’s staring eyes, I watched Mum, Mrs Taylor and the big-bosomed woman [...] lift Granny with some effort out of her chair and up the creaky stairs. I stood **engrossed** by this until I heard the rocking chair creak [...]. (BNC, CDM)

Interest (i.e. *interested*, *curious*, *engrossed*) signals cognitive engagement with a situation or event, as well as a desire to learn more about it, but it may occur with states of unhappiness (as in (21), i.e. *depressed*) or distrust (as in (22), i.e. *wary*), which we would not associate with satisfaction. As regards (23), the speaker’s curiosity indicates a sustained effort to pay attention, but it is unclear whether, in witnessing this event, there was a feeling of pleasure or enjoyment. This evidence, however, does not mean that interest and enjoyment cannot co-occur; they do, but only when the event or activity in question evokes previous similar experiences where the cognitive and volitional effort derived from our interest triggered a feeling of pleasurable goal achievement. As Ainley & Hidi (2014: 212) explain, many medical students feel a mixture of interest and disgust when first facing corpse dissection, since, despite its novelty and complexity, it feels inherently aversive. Nevertheless, as they become more knowledgeable about the human body, their initial interest mingles with a feeling of pleasurable enjoyment. Examples (24) and (25) also show this initial dissociation and subsequent gradual conflation of interest and enjoyment. In (24), *even* indicates that *interest* and *enjoyment* are conceptualized as two separate states, with one expressing the attention Nellie was devoting to the trip and the other referring to the pleasure she seemed to derive from her eager anticipation. Example (25), in contrast, reveals how the activities we enjoy are also those that attract our attention.

- (24) [...] Nellie was beginning to **take an interest**, and **was even enjoying herself** as they sat in the bus. He asked if she was looking forward to the sea voyage. ‘Oh, I am’, she said [...]. (BNC, ATE)
- (25) What I **like** doing, what **interests** me particularly, is the fusion of different discourses. (BNC, G1N)

To better understand the interest/satisfaction distinction, we will turn to neuroscience. Some studies into the nature of pleasure have discovered a link between pleasure and liking brain systems, and between interest and wanting mechanisms (Kringelbach & Berridge 2015: 233, Berridge & Kringelbach 2016: 136). Liking systems bring into focus the hedonic impact evoked by our successful interaction with, or consumption of, a rewarding stimulus producing the calm sensation associated with satisfaction. Conversely, wanting systems propel us into engaging with our environment, giving us energy to look out for potential rewards. The

dopamine circuits underlying these systems do not produce the pleasurable sensations triggered by our liking mechanisms; they motivate us to assess the incentive salience of any novel stimulus. The more rewarding a stimulus appears to be, the more willing we will feel to engage with it. Silvia (2008: 58) argues that this willingness to become cognitively involved (i.e. interest) stems from appraising a stimulus as new, unfamiliar and complex, but within our grasp. If the stimulus is too complex or incomprehensible, we will feel confusion or anxiety; or boredom, when it is too easy or familiar (Csikszentmihalyi 1990: 72).

From the above, we can conclude that interest is a cognitive state of sustained attention occurring with a positive or negative valence, which energizes us to engage with stimuli that may prove rewarding. Psychobiologist Jaak Panksepp (1998) regards this state as forming part of a primitive neural circuit in our brain termed the SEEKING system. Considered as the “primordial emotional system of the brain” (Panksepp & Moskal 2008: 71), it arouses our curiosity relative to the new stimuli around us, focusing our attention, and subsequently making us want to explore potentially pleasurable ones. Thanks to this system, we feel interest and desire; without it, we may feel bored, unmotivated and, if it endures, even depressed (Webb & Pizzagalli 2016: 859). With this in mind, for the sake of psychological authenticity, the way dis/interest is treated in Appraisal could be reconsidered in terms of a new structure where it is moved out of dis/satisfaction and into a new cluster encompassing interest, inclination and surprise (see Section 3.1.). These three categories share their more explicit cognitive nature, their more ambiguous intrinsic valence and their association with people’s “internally driven search for novelty” (Ainley & Hidi 2014: 210). They differ in terms of the degree of salience of novelty and motivation. In surprise, novelty stands out, as the focus is on one’s momentary cognitive agitation following the perception of an unexpected event or situation, as in (26):

- (26) She looked at me, slightly **surprised**, as if she had not expected me to be interested. (BNC, CEX)

As for interest, the emphasis is also on the perception of novelty but, unlike surprise, it requires more active and sustained attention, and an ensuing motivation to learn more about the event or situation, as in (27):

- (27) The forlorn scene **fascinated** Eliot and in spite of the cold and the drizzle he stayed [...]. (BNC, EFX)

As regards desire, it is the motivational dimension that is highlighted, since the focus lies on one’s inner drive to engage with a stimulus perceived as potentially rewarding, as in (28):

- (28) [...] Alice **craved** and **longed**. Oh, she did so **hope** that Jasper would not be late [...], would **want to go out**. (BNC, EV1)

3. Towards a more psychologically-inspired EMOTION taxonomy

Section 2 has cast light on the descriptive power of SFL's EMOTION taxonomy. Its gaps and fuzzy areas, however, underscore the need to draw explicitly on the workings of our mind, as it is there where our emotion concepts are stored and our emotional experiences processed. Without an input from psychology, any attempt at capturing the linguistic expression of emotion will rely on folk conceptualizations that, whilst accurate from the researcher's standpoint, lack psychological validity (see Butler 2013). Similarly, a psychological study of emotion overlooking the verbalization of our affective experiences loses sight of the mechanisms underlying people's conscious awareness and communication of their emotions. In this regard, we share Reilly & Seibert's (2003: 535) view of the importance of combining linguistics and psychology to explain the nature of emotion (see also Alba-Juez & Pérez González, and Dewaele, Lorette & Petrides, this volume).

To make the most of this combination in our revision of SFL EMOTION, we need to explore the concept of *emotion* itself. Despite the wide-ranging views on their origin and functioning, psychologists agree that emotions are neurophysiological processes emerging from our perception of an event, situation or entity as relevant, beneficial or harmful to our goals, needs or values. In detecting the relevance of a stimulus, our physiological, motor and cognitive systems are set in motion to help us **respond** in a biologically adaptive and contextually appropriate way (Frijda & Scherer 2009: 142–144, Keltner et al. 2014: 27). The role of language is essential in this process, as it is the means whereby our emotion concepts take shape.

For the sake of cognitive efficiency, the spectrum of emotion labels language provides is mentally organized into more basic prototypes, scripts, scenarios or schemas through which we interpret our feelings (Fehr & Russell 1984; Shaver et al. 1987; Wierzbicka 1999; Izard 2007). In this sense, emotion terms such as *glad*, *joyous* or *ecstatic* tend to be conceptualized as part of one prototypical concept of happiness indicating any "successful move towards or completion of a valued role or goal" (Power & Dalgleish 2008: 99). Each emotion term is processed through its resemblance to the prototypical members of a given category, resulting in conceptual boundaries that are fuzzy and, at times, indeterminate. From this perspective, an emotion is not a biological entity with distinct neurophysiological fingerprints; it is a concept mediated through our culture and language that names "a population of diverse instances" (Barrett 2017: 39) with a common goal

(cf. also Wierzbicka 1999). Each major category is mentally structured around profiles or scripts summarizing the most frequent (but not necessary) behaviors and responses underlying the typical components of an emotional experience (Scherer 2013: 27).

An instance of extreme anger like (29) shows three of these components: the antecedent (i.e. *being told it happened earlier*), the awareness of the emotion (i.e. *I was furious*) and the subsequent motor reaction (i.e. *shouting*).

- (29) He told me it happened 10 days earlier. I was **furious** and shouted: ‘Why didn’t you come sooner?’ (BNC, AJU)

Not all experiences of fury, however, involve the same trigger or the same reaction; these are only part of prototypical instances to which the concept of *fury* may be applied. That is, they are “tactical, context-determined actions” (Lang & Bradley 2008: 53) typically co-occurring with certain labels, but not always; in (30) and (31), crying and smiling, prototypically associated with sadness and happiness, are here reactions to experiences of happiness and sadness, respectively.

- (30) He **cried with happiness** [...] (BNC, GUS)

- (31) The girl [...] **smiled sadly**. (BNC, FRK)

From the above, it follows that our linguistic encoding of emotion is “organized as a prototype [...], with core, better and worse members, and family resemblances” (Bednarek 2008: 168). Sections 2.1 to 2.6, however, reveal that the boundaries in the current EMOTION system are not as cognitively accurate as they appear. To help us **reconsider** some of these boundaries, we have drawn mainly on three psychological approaches to the study of emotion: appraisal theories, construction theories and neuroscience. Whilst we have been inspired by the basic or most general tenets of all three perspectives, our reformulation has been built up in the main on appraisal theories, especially on the Component Process Model of Emotion (Scherer 2009; Fontaine et al. 2013; see also Benítez-Castro & Hidalgo-Tenorio in progress).

Appraisal theories (Ellsworth & Scherer 2003) hold that our emotions derive from our evaluation of the impact of any event, entity or situation on our general well-being, or on specific goals or needs. Our appraisal of the relevance, goal-conduciveness and implications of the stimulus leads to the activation of our physiological and motor systems, producing a complex subjective feeling that reaches our consciousness and which we use to communicate our experience.

Construction theories (Barrett 2017) differ from appraisal theories in the more integral role assigned to linguistic categorization. In their view, our emotions are driven by conceptual acts whereby we interpret our inner core affect (i.e. valence

and arousal) in terms of families of emotion concepts formed from previous similar experiences. From this perspective, emotions are goal-related constructs rooted in our culture and language that help us **make** sense of our bodily feelings in relation to our goals (e.g. feeling unpleasantly agitated in an unfair situation, and interpreting the feeling as anger). Without these language-based concepts, we are experientially blind, as illustrated by occasions when we feel unpleasantness (e.g. *bad*) or activation (e.g. *restless*) but cannot ascribe this feeling to one emotion category.

The goal-related nature of our emotions is also highlighted by neuroscientists (Lang & Bradley 2008), who claim that our feelings of dis/pleasure are closely intertwined with the brain’s appetitive and defensive motivational systems.

Additionally, we have also turned to basic emotion theories to find out about the emotions most frequently cited in empirical research into their most salient motor expressions, and in listing experiments revealing people’s prototype-based construal of the emotion domain (Storm & Storm 1987; Ekman 1999). The most frequently mentioned emotions are happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise, in that order.

Despite some differences, the emotion literature agrees on the major influence of goals and needs in the antecedent stage of the emotional experience (i.e., Is the stimulus relevant to my goals and needs?), and in the motivation it engenders (i.e., Am I inclined to approach or avoid the stimulus?). Goals have also been emphasized in linguistic evaluation (Hunston 1993: 63, Thompson & Hunston 2000: 14), where the axiology of an entity or proposition is said to rely on its perceived contribution to achieving a goal (i.e. it is good, if goal-conducive; bad, if goal-obstructive).

Accordingly, to endow SFL EMOTION with more psychological authenticity, we need to promote goals from a subsidiary position in the current taxonomy (where they apply only to dis/satisfaction) to becoming the key organizing principle in our model. Based on the premise that the mind is a “functional, goal-directed system” (Power & Dalglish 2008: 131), we have divided the emotion spectrum into *goal-seeking emotions*, *goal-achievement emotions* and *goal-relation emotions*. Below we describe each conceptual group in turn.

3.1 Goal-seeking emotions

Table 3. The goal-seeking group

Goal-seeking emotions	Attention-grabbing	Surprise	
		Interest	Interested
			Uninterested
	Inclination	Inclined	
		Disinclined	

This category revolves around Panksepp's (1998) SEEKING system (see Section 2.2.6), which keeps us cognitively engaged with the happenings, situations and entities in our environment. To explain how our psychic energy is directed to particular stimuli, we distinguish between *attention-grabbing* and *inclination* emotional experiences. This suggests a cline from *surprise*, covering instances of immediate attentional focus on an unexpected stimulus; through *interest*, where our attention is captured by novel and complex stimuli making us want to invest a sustained effort to learn more about them; to *inclination*, where our mind is set on obtaining a potentially pleasurable stimulus. Surprise draws on the perception of novelty and unexpectedness; interest involves attention and motivation; and inclination is about motivation. The more marked cognitive focus of these affective states reduces the salience of the valence dimension, as one may feel surprised, interested or desirous, but perhaps not intrinsically pleased or displeased. In these instances, valence emerges from the co-text, particularly if the lexical item denotes high intensity. For example, *desperate* and *crave* below indicate an inclination that, from the harrowing context in (32) and the bleak situation in (33), could be interpreted as a negative desire akin to extreme concern in (32) and deprivation in (33).

- (32) But although I was in great pain, I was **desperate** to know if Magwitch was safe. (BNC, FPU)
- (33) Flora **envied** them because all the things she **craved** in life they could buy cheaply in the NAAFI. (BNC, CMJ)

With the exception of *uninterested*, all the other descriptive labels used here are taken from Bednarek's (2008) taxonomy. We decided to relabel *ennui* as *uninterested* to provide a term perhaps more transparent in its denotation, mirroring the morphologically negated opposites of the other categories. In line with Hupka et al. (1999: 256), we considered the possibility of including *expectedness* as the opposite of surprise. Nevertheless, we realized that, whilst sudden and unexpected events may trigger an emotional experience of surprise (Soriano et al. 2015: 438), expecting something to happen is an experience we could classify under the security group of emotions, because it signals a high level of confidence as to the likelihood of something happening.

3.2 Goal-achievement emotions

Table 4. The goal-achievement group

Goal-achievement emotions	Satisfaction	Security	Quiet	
			Trust	Confident
				Trusting
		Happiness	Hedonic	
			Eudaimonic	
	Dissatisfaction	Insecurity	Disquiet	Confused
				Anxious
				Fearful
				Embarrassed
				Unclear
			Distrust	Doubtful
				Mistrustful
		Unhappiness	Anger	Frustrated
				Angry
			Sadness	

In goal-achievement emotions, the valence dimension becomes essential, as the focus is on the feeling of dis/pleasure itself, derived from events or situations with a bearing on our goals, needs and values. We distinguish between *satisfaction* and *dissatisfaction* emotion categories, the former concerned with any instance of success in attaining or maintaining our goals, needs and values, and the latter with cases of inability, threat or blockage in trying to pursue or keep them. The SFL Appraisal dis/satisfaction dichotomy is thus retained, but now applies to a wider range of emotional experiences.

The in/security area, treated separately in the original taxonomy, is now within the bounds of dis/satisfaction, based on the cognitive similarity among *happy, satisfied, relaxed* and *quiet*, and among *angry, nervous, disappointed* and *sad* (Barrett 2004: 267, Plutchik 2003: 78). Security feelings arise whenever our outer and inner worlds are consistent with our goals, while insecurity stems from situations where our well-being or a specific goal is threatened. Although Bednarek’s (2008) dis/quiet and dis/trust remain unchanged in our revised system, for the sake of more descriptive detail, they are split into several subtypes.

The confident/doubtful contrast in our taxonomy rests on one’s certainty and assurance as to the truth and/or likelihood of a particular event or situation (e.g. *certain, optimistic, expect, foresee* vs. *uncertain, pessimistic, reservation, suspect*),

while the trusting/mistrustful distinction signals one's secure attachment to people inspired by a belief in their honesty and goodness. Therefore, *trust* in (34) would be coded as *security_trust_trusting*, while in (35) it would be analyzed as *security_trust_confident*.

(34) I don't ask about your affairs [...] I **trust** you. (BNC, FP7)

(35) I **trust** that with spring just round the corner you will feel better.
(BNC, ADS)

As to disquiet, the unpleasant cognitive arousal it denotes may be characterized in terms of confusion (e.g. *puzzled*, *mixed up*), signaling a perceived inability to understand something (Storm & Storm 1987: 813), as in (36); anxiety (e.g. *worried*, *troubled*), revealing our ongoing ruminations on vague and, at times, unfounded threats (Power & Dalgleish 2008: 177), as in (37); fear (e.g. *scared*, *petrified*), triggering a quick fight or flight response to an imminent or current menace (Labar 2016: 751), as in (38); and embarrassment (e.g. *abashed*, *ashamed*), or a feeling of unwanted exposure after something happens or we do something that violates a social (rather than moral) standard (Wierzbicka 1999: 113), as in (39).

(36) I knew I hadn't done anything to Joanna and at the same time I was totally **confused** as to how it could have happened. (BNC, A70)

(37) 'I often **worry** that my other two children are suffering [...]' However, Kathleen's daughters [...] are quick to contradict their mother. (BNC, EFG)

(38) [...] the clergyman's daughter [...] ran off **terrified** when she saw the fearsome-looking tramp [...]. (BNC, CBN)

(39) I'm all **embarrassed** cos my mac's all with the pee. (BNC, A74)

Turning now to un/happiness, satisfaction and happiness are now conflated into a more inclusive category. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, fleeting sensory pleasures, or *hedonic happiness* (e.g. (40)), normally related to our most basic needs (e.g. food, drink, sex), are distinguished from cases of *eudaimonic happiness* (e.g. (41)), where the fulfilment of more social needs is apparent (e.g. having friends, family, stability).⁴ Eudaimonic experiences trigger feelings of positive social fulfilment and purpose that transcend the mere pleasurable sensation linked to more basic hedonic states.

(40) As I **enjoyed** the stew I looked at my watch [...]. (BNC, A61)

4. See Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs.

- (41) I was **delighted** and **over the moon** to hear that I was the father of a blue-eyed, black-haired baby girl. (BNC, CH2)

Unhappiness, originally applying only to misery, now covers sadness and anger. This is based on dictionary evidence suggesting two senses: one of them synonymous with *sadness* and the other with your feeling “annoyed because you do not like what is happening in a particular situation” (*LDCE*). Further support for this modification lies in the combined influence of both emotions in episodes of emotional distress (Power & Dalgleish 2008: 229), as in (42):

- (42) I was **sad and angry** that he should want to place a bolt [...] **peev**ed that my own route-Centrefold-had been usurped. (BNC, A15)

Their potential co-occurrence, however, does not mean that they are cognitively and experientially alike. Sadness concerns our perception of loss or defeat in our attempt to achieve or maintain a role or goal (Webb & Pizzagalli 2016: 859). When feeling sad, there is little or nothing we can do to reverse the effects of the undesirable outcome, creating a sense of energy drain that makes us divert our attention away from other goals (Shaver et al. 1987: 1077). Example (43) illustrates the defeat, listlessness and attentional focus accompanying experiences of sadness. This is also evident in (44), where the perception of loss is verbalized.

- (43) If only she could have seen me [...] Sitting **drooped** over walls, utterly **dejected**. I felt the full force of her criticism. (BNC, FR3)
- (44) [...] Mrs Cooper [...] suffered two miscarriages [...] ‘[...] it takes time to unthink yourself pregnant. I felt really **down** when the baby was due and there’s still a sense of **loss**.’ (BNC, K54)

With anger, the emphasis shifts from loss or defeat to the thwarted attainment of a goal. This often results from an attribution of unfairness and deliberate provocation to a specific situation or person. Unlike sadness, where one feels incapable of changing the negative outcome, the angry person feels determined to confront the situation or person, in the belief that the obstacle can be removed (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones 2016: 776). In our revised taxonomy, we distinguish between two anger states: *frustrated* and *angry*. *Frustration* is a feeling of impatience derived from our perceived lack of control over a situation we thought to be manageable (Wierzbicka 1999: 72, Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones 2016: 779). When frustrated, we unsuccessfully try to change the undesirable situation by putting some effort into it, leading to a kind of unpleasant contained annoyance, as in (45). This sense of perceived irritability is also apparent in (46):

- (45) She was very, very **frustrated** cos she couldn't speak [...] And she couldn't write anything down. (BNC, KBC)
- (46) I get very **impatient** when I hear arguments about whether the whales are going to extinction [...] if you say 'no, they aren't', then to hell with them. (BNC, B04)

If sustained and reaching high levels of unpleasant arousal, our frustration may turn into *anger*, and, subsequently, aggressive behavior (Roseman 2008: 357, Berkowitz 2009: 188), as in (47) and (48):

- (47) [...] he was so **mad** that he got a knife to scare them. (BNC, K23)
- (48) The artist became so **angry** that he started to slash the canvas. (BNC, ANF)

3.3 Goal-relation emotions

Table 5. The goal-relation group

Goal-relation emotions	Attraction	Liking
		Affection
		Respect
		Sympathy
		Tolerance
		Repulsion
	Repulsion	Disgust
		Antipathy
		Disrespect
		Indifference
		Intolerance

As explained in Section 2.2.5, goal-relation emotions signal more or less instinctive attitudes permeating our interaction with certain entities, often going beyond specific events and situations where those entities were involved (as in the goal-achievement emotions) to a generalized valenced focus and stance on the entities themselves. We distinguish between two kinds of affective relations: *attraction* encodes instances where X feels positively attracted to Y, and *repulsion* refers to cases where the emoter's aversion is apparent. The *attraction/repulsion* contrast replaces SFL's *affection/antipathy* to accommodate a wider range of options. Particularly, *affection* involves a sense of care missing, for example, in cases of esthetic preference. The subcategories in each group are based on Shaver et al. (1987: 1068) and Storm & Storm (1987: 811–812 and 2005: 348).

As far as *attraction* is concerned, *liking* (e.g. *like, fond of, keen on*) applies to simple sensory, esthetic or intellectual preferences towards things, as in (49), or people, as in (50).

- (49) Those prawn things? Oh, I **like** them but I **prefer** the crisp ones. (BNC, KCA)
 (50) I **liked** him when I met him and I still **like** him now. (BNC, AAC)

Affection (e.g. *love, warm, attached to*) involves a high level of personal involvement, leading to X's willingness to look after and nurture Y. Example (51) illustrates the contrast between the sensory liking preference associated with sexual attraction, and the tenderness and concern accompanying affection. Example (52) shows these tender feelings of affection towards a pet:

- (51) Sabrina was the only person he had ever **loved**. 'It was more than just a **sexual attraction** between us. I **cared about** her [...]' (BNC, CEM)
 (52) [...] the emotionally more disturbing death of Minto's dog [...] they had grown **much attached** to him and could hardly endure the thought of his death. (BNC, A7C)

Respect (e.g. *reverence, awe, worship*) is more cognitive in nature; it implies our positive appreciation of another entity in terms of outstanding qualities, skills or achievements, as in (53). Respect and affection frequently co-occur, as in (54):

- (53) But I think some of the best photographers are women. I really **look up to** people like Mary Ellen Mark. (BNC, APL)
 (54) He was a forthright man who made enemies, but was **loved** and **respected** by his friends. (BNC, GUF)

Sympathy, bordering on sadness, is a feeling of fond attachment towards a distressed entity (e.g. *pity, compassion, empathy*). Example (55) shows a combination of this nurturing feeling (i.e. *sorry*) with the kind of sensory attraction coded as *liking* (i.e. *fancied*):

- (55) [...] I never saw him talk to anybody. [...] He had blond hair, light eyes and a thin face. I suppose I **fancied** him although I told myself that it was just that I felt **sorry** for him. (BNC, A0U)

Finally, *tolerance*, closer to the *repulsion* family, refers to situations where we accept certain people or things even when feeling aversion (e.g. *tolerate, accept, admit*). In (56) we can see the contrast between affection and tolerance; in (57), the connection between tolerance and antipathy:

(56) [...] we were the first to really ‘love’ children while other restaurants
tolerated them. (BNC, HC4)

(57) They had **despised** him, **tolerating** him for his share of the rent. (BNC, CEB)

Turning now to *repulsion*, *disgust* features as the most visceral kind of aversion (e.g. *squeamish*, *sickened*, *yuck*). It draws on our appraisal of the trigger's potentially polluting and noxious nature, producing a nauseating sensation that makes us reject any physical contact with the entity. Rozin et al. (2016: 817, 821) distinguish between the physical kind of disgust, termed *core*, and the *moral* subtype; this is linked to our evaluation of a person as “degraded, base, or subhuman” (2016: 821), based on their socially improper actions. Whilst moral disgust could be treated as anger (Shaver et al. 1987: 1069), we agree with Rozin et al. (2016: 822) on labeling it as disgust proper, since its physical sensations (metaphorically expressed) are often similar to those of core disgust. Additionally, the kind of motivation it engenders is one of rejection. Example (58) represents an experience of physical disgust evoked by the presence of dead bodies; conversely, (59) illustrates the moral subtype, as indicated by the embodied metaphors verbalizing the solicitor's reaction to the police's action.

(58) Another former passenger [...] said he was **sickened** by the smell last
October. (BNC, CH6)

(59) Police were accused yesterday of leaking a secret report [...] Solicitor James
Nichol said he was ‘**sickened and disgusted**’ [...]. (BNC, CH2)

Antipathy involves generalized hostility towards a person or thing, without the visceral component typical of disgust (e.g. *hate*, *abhor*, *hostile*). Although it frequently results from a series of angering events, we may hate somebody but not recall the cause, as in (60); what stands out is a feeling of antagonism towards the “mere existence of the hated” (Miller 2009: 204). Unlike reactions of disgust, which are more punctual, experiences of antipathy are normally more enduring (Power & Dalglish 2008: 285). This distinction is exemplified in (61); while *disgusting* signals X's gut reaction to one offensive stimulus, *hate* denotes an ongoing negative disposition towards Y:

(60) [...] for a panicky moment Maria couldn't remember why she **hated** him
[...]. (BNC, H9L)

(61) [...] I **hate** people that are biased, like the new Madonna book. That book's
disgusting! [...]. (BNC, KPG)

Disrespect is a special type of antipathy derived from a strong belief in certain entities' inferior status, making us feel that these deserve no consideration (e.g. *contempt, disdain, look down on*). Examples (62) and (63) are two cases in point.

- (62) When Benn puts himself in my face and tries to **discredit** and **disrespect** me, I take that *personally*. I am not a street fighter [...]
(BNC, ACP)
- (63) Most of the other mothers **looked down on** her because she was single.
(BNC, JY0)

Indifference (e.g. *insensitive, cold, unmoved*) involves a lack of concern towards an entity that perhaps other people regard as being in distress, as in (64):

- (64) [...] I don't think I'm the only one who gets slightly bugged by dropouts trying to make me feel like I'm **insensitive** and **uncaring** if I don't pay for their drink.
(BNC, HWX)

Finally, *intolerance* borders on antipathy and disinclination, as it expresses X's marked unwillingness to accept Y, often resulting in displays of contempt or disrespect, as in (65):

- (65) She was **intolerant and contemptuous** of the majority of the human race [...]
(BNC, HJH)

4. Conclusion

Emotion lies at the core of human behavior, as our experience and understanding always seem to be filtered through emotion. Even if we intend to hide it from interlocutors or onlookers, our facial expression and body posture, the tone of our voice or our silences may reveal whether we are happy, bored, disgusted or shocked, to name but a few; but it is by means of verbal language that we normally convey, either explicitly or implicitly, how we feel; and it is the lexicogrammar of the language we speak that allows others to interpret whether we are experiencing a particular emotional state.

In the last two centuries, the psychology literature has approached this phenomenon from diverse perspectives. These are nicely complemented by the analysis of the linguistic construal of emotional reactions initiated by Martin and White, and improved soon after by Bednarek. The undeniable descriptive power and utility of this tool is matched by its flexible and organic structure. As it happens, the authors' emphasis on its being to a certain extent work in progress encourages scholars to improve it for further use and investigation. That is in fact our driving force behind this chapter.

After detecting some discrepancies, we have reappraised the system of AFFECT, putting more emphasis on the notion of emotion as defined by psychologists. Many of the questions we have tried to answer arise from the fuzziness and closeness of happiness and satisfaction, perhaps the most controversial and key categories in the current taxonomy. Once the intricacies of both have been unraveled more or less successfully, our own proposal stems from the reformulation of the status and role of goals and pleasure. In our view, the former is the most strategic component of any emotion type, given that human beings are goal-oriented organisms. With regard to the latter, the empirical evidence suggests that it is a parameter that somehow or other shapes any emotional experience. The emoter's attention may be grabbed by any stimulus in the environment, or not; and subsequently, they may be disposed to approach it, or not. The emoter's achievement of the goal will lead to their satisfaction, realized in terms either of happiness or security; in contrast, the opposite will result in disquiet, distrust, anger or sadness. Finally, we believe that the emoter's goals, needs and values impel them to move towards stimuli from which they anticipate some pleasurable impact and to reject or distance **ourselves** from those where the impact is likely to be unpleasant.

Bearing the above in mind, we have classified emotions into three distinct groups: goal-seeking emotions, goal-achievement emotions and goal-relation emotions. We are aware that the labels may be questionable, that there may still be considerable overlap between the classes and that the combination of our taxonomy with a parameter-based approach inspired by emotion research (but see Bednarek 2009c and Benítez-Castro & Hidalgo-Tenorio, **in progress**) would certainly endow the tool with more descriptive detail. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that it was necessary to rethink SFL's AFFECT sub-system through more explicit psychological lenses; and, simply put, that is what this chapter is about.

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