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"Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees in The Diaspora"

"Alienación Política Entre Los Refugiados Palestinos En La Diáspora"

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Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees in The Diaspora

Alienación Política Entre Los Refugiados Palestinos En La Diáspora

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
Programa de Doctorado en Estudios Migratorios

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Dedication

Under the sky of the village of Al-Bureij in occupied Jerusalem in 1948, a young child, not yet eight years old, immigrated with his parents, carrying an olive branch and the remains of his smashed toy… In Arroub refugee camp, the boy grew up to be a man, and married my refugee mother from the village of Qazaza in Al-Ramleh, to become a refugee family, anxiously awaiting the return of the soon-to-be to their stolen homeland. A family, like other refugee families in the diaspora camps, embodies the image of the Palestinian refugee who has been languishing for years, dreaming of return and nostalgic to the homeland.

I dedicate this humble work…
To the soul of my beloved father who passed away without returning to his village where he was born,

To my beloved mother, who kindled determination in us,
To my wife and children, my heart and soul,
To our immortal and righteous martyrs, who enriched the land of our ancestors,
To the Palestinian refugees who never bowed their heads and to the true witness, the end of the dream and the outset of the return, the refugee camp,

To those who were my support and backbone, with whom I walked in the stormy seas until finally landing on the shores of safety, my dear brothers,

To the bleeding wound of the nation and its beating heart, the land of the prophets and the cradle of religions, occupied Palestine…..

Acknowledgements

Praise and thanks be to Allah (God) for granting me success

To the one who fought a fierce war in a grim road, to the owner of every curved back and wrinkled face embodying the pains of immigration, to the one whose parents were proud and who never bowed his head, the Palestinian refugee.

I would like to extend my deepest thanks and appreciation to Professor Francisco Entrena Durán for his inspiration, encouragement, wisdom, and understanding in helping me get this thesis off the ground and completed.

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Abstract

The current thesis aims to investigate the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the diaspora. The study approached on both the literature of theoretical and empirical work. The importance of the study is that it is the first topic, which proposes political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, to the author's knowledge using a large sample that covered all Palestinian refugees worldwide. The study is considered one of the pioneering studies that examined this subject due to the scarcity of studies that dealt with the issue of political alienation among Palestinian refugees. The study will constitute an important reference for researchers who are interested in the issue of political alienation in general, in addition to researchers interested in the issue of Palestinian question in particular.

To achieve the study aims, the study adopted the descriptive method used a triangulation approach of quantitative and qualitative designs, and a questionnaire, which is appropriate to the exploratory nature of the research, which will provide more meaningful in-depth data. The target population consists of Palestinian refugees in the diaspora during 2021 that includes 15,378,205 Palestinians. The overall sample composed of nine thousands five hundred and ninety-eight Palestinian refugees in the diaspora (5822 males and 3776 females) 15 years of age or above stratified selected, due to region. The participants were from, Palestine, neighbor countries, Arab countries, South America, Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia

Political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora was evaluated using an index of a 40-item scale. A 5-point Likert scale (Strongly agree, agree, neither, disagree and strongly disagree) was used to assess the political alienation among the sampled population through an online survey that was launched on May 19, 2021, and the data were collected for a period of twelve months. Data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS-23).

In total, nine thousands five hundred and ninety-eight were conducted. Respondents were above 15 and 87 years of age [Mean (M) 33.38, Standard Deviation (SD]; and the vast

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majority (82.9%) were married. Males represented 60.7% of the participants, while the remaining 39.3% were females. Half (49.4%) of the respondents had a secondary degree, and almost 48.3% had highly religious committed. The majority (57.4%) were working, and had on average of 5.56 family members, with a range of 1 to 15 (SD 2.45). Party affiliation represented 55.8% of the participants, while the remaining 44.2% do not have any party affiliation; and the majority (58.4%) were independent, (22.6%) were from Fateh, (13.6%) from Islamic trends (Hamas, Islamic Jihad), (3.7%) from left Trends (People's, Democracy, FDA, People's Party), and (1.8%) from other political fractions

The findings showed that, the political alienation as experienced by the sample of nine thousands five hundred and eighty-nine Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora was moderate (M 3.20 SD 0.54). Of the Palestinian refugees surveyed in the Diaspora, 64% preserved a moderate level of political alienation.

Furthermore, the study explored the demographic breakdown over the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora with the aim of identifying any differences. Findings showed that all of the study independent variables were significant predictors for the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora that are, gender, age, marital status, number of family members, educational level, religion commitment, relation to work force, Political party affiliation, fraction affiliation, and the religion commitment.

In light of the study results and the discussion, the study recommends, given the concept of political socialization the utmost importance in the teaching curriculum and the different media outlet, it is necessary to activate the political participation of the Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, by taking charge of the refugees themselves or choosing their representative in any future solutions to their just cause, activating all official and popular institutions to support the Palestinian refugee cause, which is the basis of the Palestinian cause, and since there is large proportion of politically independents, the study recommends the emergence of a new party linked to the Palestinian refugee issues, which will have a prominent role in the conflict solution, especially the political participation, the right of return, and the right to self-determination.. Given the concept of political socialization the utmost importance in the

Palestinian curriculum and the different media outlet. Holding the Palestinian elections as soon as possible with the participation of all Palestinian factions and all Palestinians in the Diaspora. Empowerment the role of women in the Palestinian political life through awareness programs and amending the mechanisms of the Palestinian political system.

Keywords: Political alienation, political socialization, political participation, Nakba, refugees, Diaspora, Palestine.

Resumen

Esta tesis tiene como objetivo investigar la alienación política entre los refugiados palestinos en la diáspora. El estudio se basa en una amplia literatura que tiene en cuenta tanto la investigación teórica como la empírica. La importancia de esta investigación radica en que es la primera que estudia la alienación política entre los refugiados palestinos en la diáspora. Para ello se ha utilizado una amplia muestra que, hasta donde el autor sabe, ha abarcado a todos los refugiados palestinos del mundo. Este estudio puede ser considerado uno de los pioneros en examinar el tema de la alienación política entre los refugiados palestinos, sobre el que son muy escasos los trabajos realizados. Por este motivo, se espera que esta investigación constituya una referencia importante para los investigadores interesados en el fenómeno de la alienación política en general, además de para los interesados en la cuestión palestina en particular.

Para lograr los objetivos de la investigación se ha adoptado una metodología descriptiva, a la vez que se ha utilizado un enfoque de triangulación de diseños cuantitativos y cualitativos y se ha pasado un cuestionario que resulta apropiado para la naturaleza exploratoria de la investigación, la cual ha proporcionado información en profundidad muy significativa.

La población objeto de estudio, que está formada por los refugiados palestinos en la diáspora durante 2021, asciende a 15.378.205 personas. La muestra global entrevistada se compone de nueve mil quinientos noventa y ocho refugiados palestinos en la diáspora (5.822 hombres y 3.776 mujeres) de más de 15 años, los cuales han sido seleccionados de forma estratificada por regiones. Los participantes en el estudio proceden de Palestina, países vecinos, países árabes, Sudamérica, Europa, Norteamérica, Asia y Australia.

La alienación política entre los refugiados palestinos en la diáspora ha sido evaluada utilizando un índice que comprende una escala de 40 ítems, Se utilizó una escala Likert de 5 puntos (muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo, en desacuerdo y muy en desacuerdo) para evaluar la alienación política entre la población de la muestra, la cual fue entrevistada a través de una encuesta online que se puso en marcha el 19 de mayo de

2021. Las entrevistas se llevaron a cabo durante un período de doce meses. La información obtenida se analizó utilizando el Paquete Estadístico para las Ciencias Sociales (SPSS-23).

Los nueve mil quinientos noventa y ocho encuestados tenían entre 15 y 87 años Media (M) 33.38, Desviación Estándar (DE) 13.64). La gran mayoría de ellos (82,9%) estaban casados. Los hombres representaban el 60,7% de los participantes, mientras que el 39,3% restante eran mujeres. La mitad de los encuestados (49,4%) tenía estudios secundarios y casi el 48,3% de ellos mostraba un compromiso religioso alto. La mayoría (57,4%) trabajaba y tenía a su cargo una media de 5,56 familiares, con un rango de 1 a 15 (DE 2,45). El 55,8% de los participantes tenía afiliación partidista, mientras que el 44,2% restante no la tenía. La mayoría (58,4%) eran independientes, (22,6%) eran de Fateh, (13,6%) de tendencias islámicas (Hamás, Yihad Islámica), (3,7%) de tendencias de izquierda (Popular, Democracia, FDA, Partido Popular), y (1,8%) de otras fracciones políticas.

Los resultados mostraron que la alienación política experimentada por la mayoría de la muestra de nueve mil quinientos ochenta y nueve refugiados palestinos en la diáspora era moderada (M 3,20 DE 0,54). Así, de los refugiados palestinos en la diáspora encuestados, el 64% de ellos manifestaba un nivel moderado de alienación política.

Además, este estudio ha explorado el desglose demográfico sobre la alienación política entre los refugiados palestinos en la diáspora con el objetivo de identificar cualquier diferencia a este respecto. Los resultados han mostrado que todas las variables independientes del estudio son predictores significativos de la alienación política entre los refugiados palestinos en la diáspora; es decir, el género, la edad, el estado civil, el número de miembros de la familia, el nivel educativo, el compromiso religioso, la situación laboral, la afiliación a un partido político, la afiliación a una fracción política y el grado de compromiso religioso.

Teniendo en cuenta los resultados de este estudio y la discusión y análisis de los mismos, se recomienda que se le dé la máxima importancia a la socialización política en los planes de estudios y en los medios de comunicación. Todo ello porque es muy necesario desarrollar la cultura política entre los refugiados palestinos de la diáspora y activar su participación política, ya sea directamente por parte de ellos mismos o a través de sus representantes

electos. Por estas vías se ha buscar cualquier solución futura a sus legítimas demandas, para lo que hay que implicar a todas las instituciones oficiales y populares con objeto de apoyar la causa de los refugiados palestinos que, al fin y al cabo, es también la causa de todos los palestinos. Además, dado que hay una gran proporción de palestinos políticamente independientes, este estudio recomienda la creación de un nuevo partido vinculado a la problemática de los refugiados palestinos, el cual deberá tener un papel destacado en la solución del conflicto, especialmente mediante la participación política, la reclamación y gestión del derecho al retorno, así como del derecho a la libre determinación. Hay también que dar la máxima importancia al concepto de socialización política en el curriculum educativo de los palestinos. Además, se recomienda la celebración de elecciones lo antes posible con la participación de todas las facciones palestinas y todos los que están en la diáspora. También hay que empoderar a las mujeres palestinas e incentivar su rol en la vida política a través de programas de sensibilización y modificando los mecanismos del sistema político palestino.

Palabras clave: Alienación política, socialización política, participación política, Nakba, refugiados, Diáspora, Palestina.

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Background And Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

The phenomenon of alienation experienced by individuals in public life and its negative repercussions on their health, vitality, and development attracted many researchers all over the world (Dawani *et al*., 1989). This is demonstrated by the volume of studies that they issued, which addressed alienation with its various forms through research. This is a result of the many developments that accompany this era, and their successive goals; we are accelerating with the pace of time and with a rise in the level of ambition and cultural change.

Rajab (1986) states that if linguists direct their devices to monitor what researchers and philosophers write in our time, then the word "alienation" will receive priority in terms of its frequency. This shows the extent of the prevalence and spread of the phenomenon of alienation in thought and contemporary studies.

It can be said that alienation is a human phenomenon whose existence has extended to include various patterns of social, economic and political life and all cultures. The feelings of this alienation increased and multiplied as a result of the nature of the era in which man lives: the era of contradictions, the era of competition and successive changes, the era in which matter prevailed, which led to suffering of the human being from many problems and disturbances, which then came in the forefront of the phenomenon of alienation, drew the attention of researchers and scholars and was the focus of their attention (Oweidat, 1995).

Historically, the term alienation has had various uses in religious, philosophical, psychological and political heritage. The concept of political alienation in the alienation literature was based on the idea of political agency, put differently, the individual's feeling of his/her ability to influence the course of the political process, whether at the level of the political decision, or the level of events resulting from it in the society in which he/she lives. Based on this, the individual who feels that there are few opportunities for him/her to influence this process in the community is considered a political alienation.

Azzam (1997) states that most of the studies that addressed the issue of political alienation revolved mostly around a major focal area, which is the behavior of voters and their attitudes towards the choices and opportunities available to them by the political systems in their societies, and their willingness to try to change the choices and political opportunities they do not like in these societies.

Palestinian refugees are living under very poor humanitarian conditions. Abu Sitteh (2001) mentioned that there is no crime in modern history equivalent to the crime of expelling Palestinians from their homes in 1948, which was later called the "Nakba of Palestine." The Palestinian refugees made many sacrifices, and are still paying, in order to realize their dreams on the ground, by returning to their original homes. However, as long as they waited and their dreams and aspirations were scattered, they fell prey to many problems and disturbances. In my opinion, the most important of these problems was political alienation, after they had heard a lot about political decisions at the international and local levels, after the Nakba, but to no avail.

Hence, the problem of the study lies in identifying the degree of prevalence of the political alienation among the Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. The researcher reviewed some previous studies, both Arab and foreign, which focused on the phenomenon of political alienation in the different contexts and different people categories and the extent of their participation in the political process. To the author's knowledge, there is not any study focusing on this category of the Palestinian people, who live under harsh and always unstable conditions.

The importance of the current study stems from the fact that it discusses a new and important topic in the Palestinian camps, where the Palestinians live in very difficult conditions, and are still waiting for a political decision to put an end to their pain and suffering. The study will be a very important reference to the researchers according to what the study will reveal of information on this subject.

1.2 The Palestinian Political System

The political ideology is a mirror to the political environment in which any society lives, and it changes with the changes that society goes through. There is no doubt that the Palestinian ideology is not far from this framework. It is difficult to say that the Palestinian society has adopted a single ideology despite the presence of common elements within the Palestinian ideology in the past and present. It is worth noting that the Palestinian ideology was initially very similar to the Arab ideology, taking into consideration the dilemmas faced by the Palestinian and Arab societies such as the national struggle against colonialism and the call for Arab unity (Muhaisen, 2006).

We can say that the Palestinian ideology passed through three stages due to the Zionist project, which sought to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, they are:

1. The first stage: From the beginning of the emergence of the Zionist scheme until 1948.
2. The second stage: From the establishment of Israel until the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964.
3. The third stage: From the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until the start of the peace negotiations in 1993 and the formation of the Palestinian National Authority.

1.2.1 The Palestinian Ideology Until 1948

The Palestinian political awareness of the danger of the Zionist-British scheme to establish a Jewish national homeland in Palestine started at the beginning of 20th century, through an ideological stance that reject this project, which helped crystallize the birth of the Palestinian national movement that resisted the Zionist project in various ways, and confronted the British colonial policy in Palestine. All strata of the Palestinian society participated in the Palestinian national movement, believing in their full and legitimate right to Palestine, and rejecting the Zionist idea calling for the historical right of the Jews in Palestine (Al-Hourani, 2000).

1.2.2 The Palestinian Ideology From The Establishment Of Israel Until The Establishment Of The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Despite the disappointment and frustration that afflicted the Palestinian people due to the Palestinian Nakba in 1948, and the uprooting and displacement of the Palestinians from their homeland, the deep belief of the Palestinian people in the justness of the Palestinian cause and the necessity of working to return to their lost homeland has not changed. At this stage, the Palestinians became involved in Arab parties and associations. As a result of this, the Palestinian ideology has developed and branched out due to the differences that existed among the Arab nationalist, Marxist and Islamic parties, to which different groups of the Palestinian people joined. Some of them saw that the liberation of Palestine passes through Arab unity, and some of them believed that its liberation could only come through the gateway to peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews. Others found that the Palestinian cause is an Islamic cause, and Palestine will not return without the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia). The cause of liberating Palestine remains the main concern within the Palestinian society; it has also moved to the Arab ideology, and has become the central issue of concern in the Arab world. Despite the intense suffering of the Palestinian society and those in Diaspora, the Palestinian ideology has not changed. The concern of liberating Palestine remains the main goal that preoccupied the Palestinian political thought (Ghalion, 1994; Muhaisen, 2006).

We can say that the experience of the Palestinian national movement before 1948 was simple, and therefore, it was a victim to a number of illusions. Its leadership was in essence an expression of the alliance of familial tendencies and traditional Islamic trends, and this leadership remained alienated from the movement of the society, and unable to create vital national institutions, hence, it failed in turning the political slogan into an integrated community project.

1.2.3 The Palestinian Ideology After The Establishment Of The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Until The Beginning Of The Peace Negotiations And The Formation Of The Palestinian National Authority

The Palestinian political thought developed in the sixties, and proceeded in two main directions:

1. Theorizing armed struggle as a basic method to liberate Palestine.
2. The emergence of the Palestinian entity and the Palestinian national identity along with the national concept of liberating Palestine.

This development resulted in changing the Palestinian ideology greatly from the literature that was prevalent before. Nonetheless, the issue of the right of return and the liberation of Palestine remained the main goal controlling the Palestinian political thought and its various currents.

1.2.4 The Political Organization Of Palestinian Society

Until the first quarter of this 20th century, there was not a single political organization leading the Palestinian national action, but rather national political figures who felt the Zionist threat and resisted it. These figures began to organize themselves through associations, and soon different political organizations emerged, based on the different people that lead them. An executive committee was formed in 1931 comprised of some members residing in Jerusalem with the aim of holding an Arab conference to discuss the issue of the Jewish immigration to Palestine, and several conferences were held in Palestinian cities for this purpose. Each time, Musa Kazem Al-Husseini was unanimously elected as the head of these committees until he died in 1934. Political parties, which were mostly family parties, also began to appear, such as the Palestinian Arab Party led by Jamal Al-Husseini, the National Defense Party led by Ragheb Al-Nashashibi, the Palestinian Arab Reform Party headed by Hussein Al-Khalidi, and the National Bloc Party led by lawyer Abdel Latif Salah. Most of these parties converged in resisting the immigration of Jews to Palestine, but they differed in the mechanisms and

tools of action against the British Mandate and the Zionist movement (Hilal, 1998; Al-Quds Open University, 2000; Muhaisen, 2006).

The acceleration of events in Palestine and the increase in Jewish immigration was the direct reason for the announcement of the Great Palestinian Revolution in 1936 led by Sheikh Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam, which prompted political parties and figures to form the Arab Higher Committee, which led the national action and the Palestinian people. This can be considered the first political organization, on the basis that the previous parties and organizations were scattered and did not work under a unified leadership. The Arab Higher Committee, led by Haj Amin Al-Husseini, continued to lead the Palestinian national action until the British Mandate government dissolved in 1937. The Palestinian political parties continued to work to crystallize a unified Palestinian position to confront the Zionist plans. But the existence of political pluralism at that time and the many differences between them weakened their ability to organize the ranks of the Palestinians. For the first time, the ideological political movements and parties began to appear in the Palestinian society to fill the political vacuum in the country, and they were far from traditional family leaders. At the forefront of these movements was the secret Qassam League, which engaged in organized armed struggle against the British Mandate forces and the Zionist organizations (Al-Quds Open University, 2000).

In 1946, at the Bludan Conference, the League of the Arab States recognized the Palestinian Higher Arab Authority, led by Haj Amin Al-Husseini, as a representative of the Palestinians, and received the support of the majority of parties and movements operating in the Palestinian arena. It was also considered as the representative for everyone. Accordingly, this body led the Palestinian national action at the political and military levels before and after the fall of Palestine, and it served as the only Palestinian political organization for nearly twenty years (Al-Hoot, 1986).

We notice that the Palestinian political organization was not organized in the years prior to the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as a result of internal factors

specific to the Palestinian society, and external factors related to the British Mandate and its repressive policy against any form of Palestinian political organization. Accordingly, the Palestinian political community did not enjoy a stable and long-lasting political leadership at this stage, which weakened the Palestinian performance.

After the establishment of Israel, matters worsened as a result of the Palestinian Diaspora, and some Arab countries fought for the Palestinian entity. It became difficult to talk about a single Palestinian leadership that leads the Palestinians, due to their lack of presence over one geographical location and their fusion in one political community. Palestinian efforts remained scattered until the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964.

1.2.5   Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

The Palestine Liberation Organization is considered the comprehensive framework within which the Palestinians have worked for thirty years, and the only political system in the Palestinian society and Diaspora that has led the Palestinian national action over the past years. The Palestine Liberation Organization was formed as a result of the weakness of the Arab Higher Committee, and as a result of the rise of Palestinian currents calling for the necessity of forming an independent political entity for the liberation of Palestine. Consequently, the Arab League took a decision to establish the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by Ahmed Al-Shuqairi in 1964. A new Palestinian entity emerged that led the Palestinian struggle with its various currents at that time, and became the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people for thirty years. The organization considered, as stated in Article 4 of the Basic Law, that all Palestinians are members of the Palestine Liberation Organization, performing their duty to liberate their homeland according to their capabilities and competencies, and that the Palestinian people are the base of this organization. At that time, the leadership of the organization began to consolidate the feeling of an independent entity among the Palestinians at home and in the Diaspora, and urged all Palestinian groups to join and support it. The organization also established its institutions among the Palestinian people, including The Executive Committee, the Palestinian National

Council, the Central Council, the Palestinian National Fund, and the Palestinian Liberation Army. The Palestine Liberation Organization was able to achieve several important achievements for the Palestinian people, which include: establishing an independent Palestinian entity, declaring the independence of the State of Palestine on October 15, 1988 in Algeria under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, defending the Palestinian cause, organizing the Palestinian people, and maintaining the military confrontation with Israel through its fighting groups, which kept the flame of the Palestinian struggle burning, and contributed to keeping the Palestinian cause alive among the Palestinian people and the whole world (Assaad, 1987; Al-Azaar, 2006).

There is almost unanimity in the Palestinian society that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the most important achievement in the light of the Palestinian revolution. It worked to achieve the strong presence of Palestinian patriotism in the Palestinian collective conscience as an objective challenge imposed by the eradication nature of the enemy, who found the presence of this Palestinian national identity and personality a real antithesis to his existence and legitimacy.

The party system was formed under the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in particular, from the resistance factions. Due to the formation of the organization outside its territory, the party system reflected the influences of Arab countries, and in terms of its intellectual references and organizational forms, it was affected by the revolutionary climates prevailing at the time. There were several Palestinian revolutionary movements such as Fateh movement, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and thereof. For its part, the Fateh movement was able to dominate the Palestinian political system based on its Palestinian national ideology, in addition to owning huge financial resources, which enabled it to transform from a gradual established faction to a dominant faction until it became the sole faction (Hilal, 2006).

Although the organization formed a coalition that is based on recognizing the legitimacy of political pluralism, and organizational, intellectual and financial independence, the democratic issue did not take priority in the field of the Palestine Liberation Organization

and its factions for several considerations. Therefore, the political and intellectual pluralism was reduced to what was known as the quota system (Hilal, 2006; Muhaisen, 2006).

With the return of the Muslim Brotherhood in the seventies of the last century, the relationship between the two parties witnessed intense competition, and sometimes turned into violent incidents, especially in student, social and union work, that is, in the stage of creating ideological hegemony. Since the first Intifada, the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip witnessed a major transformation from a religious missionary movement to a socio-political movement through founding the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas in 1987. This new movement has always been keen to distinguish itself from the Palestine Liberation Organization and from its factions. It seemed that it presented itself as an alternative, since its options ranged between falling under the banner of the organization and working from within it and trying to control and direct it in line with the Hamas program, or working from the outside and challenging it on the Palestinian representation front. This was the case until the formation of the Palestinian National Authority in 1993 (Muhaisen, 2006).

1.2.6 Palestinian National Authority (PA)

The Palestinian National Authority was established under the Oslo Accords, which was signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993 to be a temporary instrument of self-governance for the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority is different from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the latter is a political entity that is considered the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people according to the Arab Summit Conference held in Rabat in 1974, while the Palestinian Authority is an administrative and political entity to implement a limited autonomy agreement in some areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is considered the nucleus of the future Palestinian state, on a part of the historic land of Palestine that is the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Appendix A), with Jerusalem as its capital, which the Palestinian

people have long dreamed of. Under the 1995 agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, the West Bank was divided into three areas (Appendix B):

Area A: It is completely under the Palestinian Authority's security and administrative control.

Area B: It is administratively subject to the Palestinian Authority and security wise to Israel.

Area C: It is subject to Israeli control only.

Israel has retained control over borders, external security, Jerusalem, and settlements (Khamis, 1997).

Through the Oslo accords, the Palestinian political system entered a qualitative turning point represented in the establishment of a Palestinian Authority on its territory, which made the main conflict revolve around the borders of this territory and form a national sovereignty over it. Among the changes that this phase witnessed in the party system are the following:

1. Reproducing the hegemony of the Fateh movement by using multiple mechanisms such as building a security force, relying on an organizational base, managing the confrontation with the occupation, containing traditional formations and the struggle for hegemony over civil society institutions.

2. The rise of Islamic political organizations (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), and a noticeable decline in left-wing organizations.

3. The party system was formed in this phase from forces that support the Palestinian Authority, against opposing right-wing forces (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), and leftist forces (the Popular and Democratic Fronts) taking on power and authority, not its legitimacy and corruption (Hilal, 1998; Muhaisen, 2006).

After nearly nine years of self-rule, specifically in 2002, the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority was destroyed and a comprehensive siege was imposed on the headquarters of its late president, Yasser Arafat is entire existence was threatened, in an attempt by the Israeli government to stop the losses it had suffered since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. It considered that Arafat was directly responsible for the Intifada, particularly the martyrdom operations. The Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, did not find

in the Arab or international position a deterrent that would discourage him from proceeding with his plan to end the Palestinian Authority.

The most dangerous bombing operation was the attack on the headquarters of the Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat on March 29, 2002. This took place after a martyrdom operation carried out by the martyr Abdel Basset Odeh from Tulkarm Governorate on March 27, 2002 in the city of Netanya, which resulted in the killing of 29 Israelis and the wounding of more than 150 others. Sharon declared that the Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat is an enemy to Israel, and then imposed a siege on him. The Israeli army reoccupied all areas under the Palestinian Authority, and the Israeli forces prevented journalists from entering the city of Ramallah, which is currently the political and economic capital of the Palestinian Authority.

In view of the great political changes that the Palestinian, regional and international arena witnessed, starting with the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process that led to the outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada, in addition to the events of September 11, 2001 which resulted in the occupation of Iraq, and ending with the departure of President Yasser Arafat and the change of the Palestinian political system, Hamas' position changed to accept its participation in that regime. By participating in the second legislative elections in 2006, Hamas achieved a landslide victory over the Fateh movement, which ruled the regime for more than 35 years. Thus, Hamas was able to form the Palestinian government unilaterally, according to its own political program that is different from that of the PLO, which does not recognize Oslo as a ceiling for the legislative elections. This made Israel and the United States, along with the majority of the international community, impose a financial and political siege on the Palestinian government. One of the repercussions of this was the existence of a two-headed authority, the presidency and the government, with different programs and positions, and conflicting over powers. With this, the Palestinian political system entered a suffocating political crisis, which seriously threatened to cross red lines and cause internal Palestinian fighting.

The rise of Hamas to the top of the Palestinian political system after the second legislative elections was not of little importance, whether in terms of the relations and future of Hamas, or in terms of the nature of the Palestinian political system, and the conditions of the Palestinian National Liberation movement Fateh. The entry of Hamas into the political system was the culmination of a long and complex historical process. While the movement preferred to work outside the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization and compete with it on the Palestinian representation front, it refused to recognize the authority, and followed a strategy to embarrass it that included military confrontation with the occupation, in particular, through specific martyrdom operations and political confrontation with its leadership.

The second Al-Aqsa Intifada reinforced the conviction that everyone should participate in the Palestinian political decision, including the Islamic forces. Hence, the idea of forming a unified national leadership was proposed, and it gained wide popular acceptance, and put everyone before the reality of the corrupt Palestinian political system's need for radical treatments. As the leadership of the Palestinian Authority became unable to continue ruling, Hamas seemed willing and ready to take over. This desire to rule was reinforced after the death of Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat, and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as his successor. The latter followed a strategy that is based on the necessity to cooperate with Hamas; he offered Hamas with the opportunity to participate in the ruling and to integrate into its institutions. He was betting on one of two things: Either Hamas would submit to the logic of the authority in exchange of obtaining a legitimate umbrella that would protect it from the violence of the Israelis and the pursuit of the American administration in its war against those that it considers terrorists, or provide the justifications necessary to take deterrent measures against the movement (Bishara, 2006; Muhaisen, 2006).

So far, there has been no Palestinian consensus between the Presidency on the one hand and the government run by Hamas on the other hand. At the end of 2007, Hamas gained independence in the Gaza Strip and tightened control over it. President Abbas considered this a departure from the national ranks, so he dismissed the Hamas government, and appointed

an emergency government in Ramallah. This led to the presence of two governments: one in Ramallah led by Fateh movement, and the other in Gaza Strip led by Hamas.

1.3 Post-Oslo Era:

1.3.1 The Impact Of The Settlement Process (Oslo) On The Palestinian Identity (1993 - Present)

When the PLO leadership decided to engage in the settlement process in accordance with the unfair terms and conditions of Madrid, the first Intifada that erupted in 1987 was exhausted and nearing its end, especially after the American invasion of Iraq and the security and military control of the Gulf region. The Arab system was fragmented and divided following the stance on the invasion of Iraq, and the organization's isolation had worsened at the Arab and international levels.

Under these circumstances, the prevailing leadership in the organization saw that the signing of the Oslo Accord and the mutual recognition between the organization and the government of Israel would make a great "achievement" for the Palestinian people, creating for the first time in history a national presence for Palestinians over their homeland, believing that the factors of sovereignty can gradually gather, and that self-rule can develop after the end of the transitional phase to an "independent state of Palestine" (Al-Sharaif, 2008).

As for opponents of the agreement, they considered it "a framework that aims to change the foundations of Israeli control in order to perpetuate it"; because the imbalance of power inherent in the agreement will determine the end result, and will enable Israel to rid itself of the burden of its direct occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and forge a functional partnership with the weak and exhausted PLO (Al-Hoot, 1994).

1.3.2 The repercussions of the political settlement on the right of return

The acknowledgment of ending the conflict – in accordance with the preamble of the Oslo Accords – represents an acceptance of the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinians,

accepting the final abandonment of the unity of the Palestinian people in one homeland, and the difficulty related to ending the conflict by abandoning the unity of the people, and its connection to the "possible" solution as opposed to the "just" solution, when addressing the issue of the Nakba that befell the Palestinian people, as it is the most important component of the Palestinian narrative on which the concept of contemporary Palestinian identity is built. It is difficult to imagine the Palestinian identity, as we know it, without this tragic experience and its extension through more than half a century in various forms, because this experience and what resulted from it is considered the mainstay of the contemporary collective identity of the Palestinians, and an essential component for the production and reproduction of identity. Therefore, the insistence on adherence to the right of return, in the Palestinian collective discourse, may carry within it a fear of a new beginning that is not yet known, the elements of which are uncharted. It is as if abandoning the right of return is a self-denial, and the abandonment of one of its most important components. In fact, this fear and anxiety is justified, because preserving the right of return in the culture and political program alongside the establishment of two states, a Palestinian state and a "Jewish" state, is a matter of great contradiction, especially after the negotiation experience, which demonstrated that everything is negotiable, and in light of the official Palestinian position as well as the Arab one, which accepts solving the refugee issue on the basis of Resolution 194 as opposed to the implementation of Resolution 194, and the difference between the two is vast: the first subjects the issue to negotiation, while the second refers it to implementation, not to negotiation (Giacaman, 2001).

Perhaps this explains – among other factors – the negative attitude of the Palestinian Diaspora refugees towards the Oslo Accord. Sha'ban's study (1994) showed that only one-third of the sample of refugees in the refugee camps in Lebanon supported the agreement, and that less than one-fifth of the study sample believed that the agreement would facilitate their return to their homes. It also explains the reasons for the decline in the PLO's popularity among refugees following the signing of the Oslo Agreement, especially since this coincided with the decline in the organization's interest in the Palestinian Diaspora, and its involvement in the issues of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian interior, at the expense of caring for the issues and interests of refugees in the Diaspora (Sha'ban, 1994).

1.3.3   The Second Intifada (2001)

In view of the great political changes that the Palestinian, regional and international arena witnessed, starting with the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process that led to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, through the occurrence of the events of September 11, 2001 and the resulting occupation of Iraq, and ending with the departure of President Yasser Arafat and the change of the Palestinian political system, the second Al-Aqsa Intifada reinforced the conviction that everyone should participate in the Palestinian political decision, including the Islamic forces.

Hence, the idea of forming a unified national leadership was proposed, and it gained wide popular acceptance, and put everyone before the reality of the corrupt Palestinian political system's need for radical treatments. As the leadership of the Palestinian Authority became unable to continue ruling, Hamas seemed willing and ready to participate, and this desire was reinforced after the death of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as his successor, and the latter followed a strategy based on the necessity of cooperation with Hamas. He offered Hamas to participate in the authority and integrate into its institutions, and he was betting on one of two things: either Hamas would obey the logic of the authority in exchange for obtaining a legitimate umbrella that would protect it from Israeli violence and pursue the American administration in its war against those it considers terrorists, or provide the justifications for taking deterrent measures against the movement (Bishara, 2006; Muhaisen, 2006).

Israel also responded violently to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, and reoccupied most of the cities of the West Bank, imposed a comprehensive siege, accelerated the security control system that began with Oslo, and began building the separation wall (Appendix C), to ensure permanent control of the West Bank, and to eliminate the chances of establishing an independent to ensure the impossibility of an independent Palestinian state can't be established on the 1967 borders. It proceeded to snatch most of the lands of the West Bank; the map in (Appendix D) shows the erosion of Palestinian lands from 1948 until 2000.

1.3.4   The Second Legislative Elections in 2006

Hamas changed its position to accept participation in the Palestinian political system. By participating in the second legislative elections in 2006, Hamas achieved a landslide victory over the Fateh movement, which had ruled the regime for more than 35 years. Thus, Hamas was able to form the Palestinian government unilaterally, according to its own political program that is different from that of the organization, which does not recognize Oslo as a ceiling for the legislative elections, which made Israel and the United States, along with the majority of the international community, impose a financial and political siege on the Palestinian government. One of the repercussions of this was the existence of a two-headed authority, the presidency and the government, with different programs and positions, and conflict over powers. With this, the Palestinian political system entered a suffocating political crisis, which seriously threatened to cross red lines and cause internal Palestinian fighting.

The rise of Hamas to the top of the Palestinian political system after the second legislative elections was not of little importance, both in terms of the relations and future of Hamas, and in terms of the nature of the Palestinian political system, and the conditions of the Palestinian national liberation movement Fateh in general. The entry of Hamas into the political system was the culmination of a long and complex historical process. While the movement preferred to work outside the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization and compete with it on the Palestinian representation front, it refused to recognize the authority, and followed a strategy to embarrass it that combined military confrontation with the occupation in particular through specific martyrdom operations and political confrontation with its leadership.

The results of the last legislative elections in 2006 showed the desire of the Palestinians to change those in charge of the Palestinian National Authority, and restore the bond between the Palestine Liberation Organization abroad, which was still controlled by the Fateh movement, and the Palestinian Authority, which was divided between the Palestinian presidency led by Fateh and the Palestinian government led by Hamas. It emerged after the legislative elections in 2006, and for the first time, there was a presence of two leaderships in the Palestinian arena: the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the

leadership of the Palestinian National Authority, which weakened both of them. Noting that the overlap in the powers between the Palestinian presidency and the government – which existed before – was between the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat on the one hand, and his Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, who submitted his resignation due to his inability to continue his work due to the interference of the presidency in his powers. The same applies to his successor, Ahmad Qurei', who threatened to resign several times before Arafat's death. Arafat was forced to separate the Palestinian government from the presidency, due to American and Israeli pressures, under the pretext of distributing powers and carrying out reforms in the Palestinian National Authority (Panorama, 2005).

1.3.5   The Palestinian Division

The overlapping of powers between the president and the prime minister in 2007 contributed to the infighting and the power struggle between Fateh and Hamas. Among the most prominent of these overlaps are the responsibility for the security services, the conflict in relation to foreign policy, and the appointment of ambassadors and representatives of the PLO abroad. On February 13th 2006, the outgoing Legislative Council took a decision in an exceptional session to transfer the powers of granting the Palestinian President the authority to establish the Constitutional Court with its president and judges. This subsequently led to armed clashes between Hamas and Fateh, which ended with Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip, followed by the announcement of the Palestinian President on May 14th 2007 of dismissing the existing government and forming an emergency government, which was rejected by the dismissed government. This has created a new reality that had its effects on the Palestinian political system, and on all aspects of citizens' lives. In addition to its impact on the Palestinian cause in general, and on the foreign policy of the Palestinian Authority in particular (Abdel Aty, 2009). So far, there has been no Palestinian consensus between the Presidency on the one hand, and the government run by Hamas on the other. At the end of 2007, Hamas gained independence in the Gaza Strip and tightened control over it, which President Abbas considered a departure from national ranks. He consequently dismissed the

Hamas government, and appointed an emergency government in Ramallah, thereby resulting in two governments: one in Ramallah led by Fateh movement, and the other in the Gaza Strip led by Hamas.

1.3.5.1   The Impact Of The Division On The Palestinian Political System

The internal Palestinian political division has harmed the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian society. It has brought the Palestinian cause to a dead end, and increased the suffering of the Palestinian people who are under occupation and siege. The outcomes showed that the Palestinian political division led to an increase in international political pressure on the institutions of the Palestinian political system as well as a decline in the role of Palestinian foreign policy, which confused the Palestinian diplomatic corps and placed it in difficult political choices.

In light of the results, the researcher came up with a set of recommendations, the most important of which are: 1) Ending the file of division, and achieving Palestinian unity through dialogue and giving priority to the national interest at the expense of the partisan interest. 2) The necessity of liberation from the provisions of the Oslo Accords, which restrict Palestinian diplomacy to the framework of negotiations. 3) Reconsidering the negotiation path and searching for other alternatives. 4) The necessity of adopting a national political program that constitutes the consensus of the Palestinian forces and that constitutes a reference for diplomatic work. 5) The necessity of finding diplomats who are able to carry out their tasks with full responsibility, commitment and efficiency (Odeh, 2017).

1.3.6   The Deal Of The Century (The Trump Deal)

The deal of the century or the "peace plan", announced by US President Donald Trump, came in a context characterized by tension, whether at the internal Palestinian, Arab regional or international levels. This is the consequence of the internal Palestinian division between the

leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Islamic resistance movements, and the Arab dispersion due to the crises and internal wars that the Arab region was witnessing, such as Syria, Libya and Yemen. That is in addition to the international situation, which was defined by economic crises and armed conflicts. All of this made the United States bypass international legitimacy resolutions regarding the justice of the Palestinian cause, and the United Nations resolutions, which state the right of the Palestinian people to establish their Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, as well as the right of return of refugees.

According to Article 1 of the Middle East Peace Agreement of 2020, it will be implemented as soon as it is ratified by the Israeli occupation state, the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas. The plan mentioned the borders of the Palestinian state, which was to be called the "new Palestine", which would be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and of course it excluded the Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Appendix E). The new Palestinian state will not be allowed to establish a regular army, but its security services have the right to possess light weapons only, and the Israeli army will take over the defense of Palestine in exchange for Hamas handing over all its weapons. Beyond that, the Israeli occupation state will not give up Jerusalem and will not share it with the new Palestine. It is also forbidden for the two parties to buy real estate from each other; in addition to the supervision of the occupied Jerusalem over all sectors, except for education, which was left to the new Palestine government. In addition to holding democratic elections in the new Palestine a year after the signing of the agreement, and releasing the prisoners for a period of three full years. With regards to freedom of travel for the Palestinians, a seaport and an airport will be established in the New Palestine within five years, until then, the use of Israeli ports and airports will be facilitated (Oruc, 2019).

On this basis, the Middle East Peace Plan is based on ending the disputed issues around occupied Jerusalem, settlements, borders, refugees, and water, and resolving them without resorting to negotiations, especially with regards to Jerusalem. Where was this primarily implemented following President Trump's recognition, on December 6th 2017, of Jerusalem

as the capital of Israel, and the transfer of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem? (The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2018).

Additionally, a group of pivotal points can be summarized in the following elements (Hamami, 2018):

1. Liquidating the Palestinian cause, or rather ending the Palestinian cause, meaning a sovereign Palestinian state. Where was the possibility of forming a confederation with Jordan, or a temporary state in Gaza linked with the West Bank, or an alternative state project discussed?

2. Closing the refugee file once and for all by putting forward proposals for resettlement and mass displacement.

3. Public Arab normalization with the Zionist entity before the conclusion of peace agreements as a motivating motif on the part of the Israeli government to reach a comprehensive peace, which is a very dangerous clause, which contributes to the absence of the Arab position and the singling out of the Israeli occupier with the Palestinian issue, and its liquidation to serve the Israeli interest, through the signing of the UAE and Bahrain peace agreement with Israel as the beginning of the process of normalization with the Zionist entity.

4. Israel's entry into joint alliances with Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia to confront other regional actors such as Iran and Turkey; Contrary to direct negotiations between the two sides and the tripartite discussion mediated by the United States. The deal of the century document came to meet the ambitions of the Israeli occupier, away from the search for sustainable methods of negotiations that allow reaching a common solution that serves both parties together. In this regard, Jared Kushner described the Palestinians' rejection of the deal as a loss that will be added to the Palestinians' record of missed opportunities

1.4 Political Participation

1.4.1 What Is Political Participation?

It is difficult to define the concept of political participation, as it may be used to denote any action that refers to raising demands to the authority, or supporting that authority. The concept is not only limited to successful efforts to influence the government, or to choose its leaders, but it also extends to include the efforts of some groups and their attempt to change policies or programs on the one hand, or leaders and people on the other hand.

Despite the great interest in the issue of political participation on the part of scholars, there is no specific definition. For example, Almond defines political participation as "nothing but an increasing demand for participation in decision-making in the political system by different segments or groups within society" (Al-Fakih, 2009).

Participation is also defined as a voluntary or official process that expresses a general rational trend and includes an organized, legitimate and continuous behavior that reflects an informed awareness of the dimensions of the popular role in the world of politics and is armed with a deep understanding of rights and duties. Through this process, citizens embody a positive role in political life with regard to choosing political leaders at all levels, setting general goals, contributing to political decision-making, and following up on its implementation using the available methods of monitoring, follow-up and evaluation.

Levy Bruhl defines political participation as: "The symbolic identity that is shared between individuals for Brull represent the immaterial characteristics that unite individuals, and they are the political, ideological and ideological affiliations that unite individuals and determine their orientations, all of these are a criterion for which the group judges when evaluating individuals affiliated to it" (Al-Zayyat, 1987).

The concept of political participation includes many different connotations for individuals, and this is due to the culture to which each individual belongs in society. Samuel Huntington defines political participation as "the activity undertaken by certain citizens with the intent to influence the governmental decision-making process" (Imam *et al*., 1975).

As for the political science literature, it links the concept of political participation to some important concepts, such as elections, which are recognized as an important and universally agreed upon model for political participation, whereby the electoral system prevails in almost all countries of the world.

Some sociologists also see that the political participation in political life is of great importance to the case of social participation. It has to do with the standard of living, individual income, financial independence, independence in decision-making, social status, the expansion of professional responsibility, the high degree of education, and participation in organized groups (Huntington & Nelson, 1976).

As defined by the Dictionary of Social Sciences, political participation is "an action and procedure carried out by a group of organized movements that tend to influence the external world, aiming at a goal, and often expressing in social terms joint action, collective action, political action; these are actions in which a group of individuals participate".

Political participation is direct when resorting to non-political means such as strikes and alliances to compel the government to make social or political adjustments. It is indirect when it is represented in the efforts made by political parties to reach power through general elections to implement their political programs or to express their point of view on programs and projects ruling party (Badawi, 1992).

Myron Weiner defines political participation as "a set of administrative actions aimed at influencing public policy-making and managing community affairs. It also includes the actions through which political leaders are selected at all governmental levels, whether national or local, regardless of whether these actions are organized or unorganized, temporary or continuous, legal or illegal; and whether it succeeds in achieving its goal or not" (Weiner, 1965). In this sense, it is seen as a voluntary activity, aimed at influencing the choice of public

policies, or the choice of political leaders at the national or local level, whether the activity is successful or unsuccessful, structured or unstructured, continuous or temporary.

Figure (1): Myron Weiner's Model of Political Participation (Badawi, 1992).

Political participation is also defined as "a political behavior that includes the behavior of people or groups of individuals, and their reactions, in relation to matters of governance, and this individual or collective political behavior includes all other activities, including elections. Political participation is the individual's mental and emotional interaction with the group's position in a way that encourages him/her to do so" (Badawi, 1992).

Despite the multiplicity and diversity of its definition, it is evident from the aforementioned definitions that the concept of political participation means in general "the right of the citizen to play a certain role in the political decision-making process, by all legitimate means, and the individual's contribution to shaping the community's lifestyle in the economic, social and political aspects." Political participation is linked to the actions of the individuals as well, such as voting, and the right to participate in political life.

1.4.2   Indicators Of Political Participation

There are many indicators to reflect political participation; they can be summarized in the following: participation in voting, interest in political issues, participation in meetings, holding a political position, seeking a political position, positive membership in the organization, political dialogues and discussions, participation in making or taking a political decision, and passive participation.

In its narrowest sense, political participation indicates the citizen's right to monitor decisions and public policies, whether through the calendar or exactly after their issuance by the representative of the ruler.

1.4.3   The Economic And Social Situation And Its Relationship To Political Participation

Political participation is linked to the socio-economic situation in a society, such as the building components of a society. There is a lot of literature reviews that have focused on economic and social explanations for political participation, such as Almond and Verba (1987), who reviewed a number of important theoretical and empirical studies on political participation. It relied mostly on the economic and social model.

Almond and Verba (1987) also explain that political participation is primarily driven by the individuals' resources, which include time, money, and skills, and the individuals' attitudes towards themselves and towards the political system. Members of the upper classes in society, who live in high social environments, encourage positive attitudes towards political participation, and therefore, we find them more involved in the political process compared to the participation of members of the lower classes (Almond & Verba, 1987).

These studies also focused on the social characteristics, and concluded that individuals with

a high level of education are more involved in the political process compared to those with a lower level of education. Some researchers also point to the variation and diversity of participation rates for reasons related to gender, social custom and the economic status of the family.

Sayed (2007) explained that the model of the economic and social situation of political participation that Verba adopted when explaining political participation assumes that attitudes precede behavior. Put differently, the positive civic attitudes precede actions of participation. There are certain types of participation that support political trends including effectiveness and political efficiency, hence, measures of past trends are indicators that may be unimportant (Sayed, 2007). Individuals can be mobilized through electoral groups and can be motivated into political participation; this is necessary and sufficient for participation to occur.

1.4.4 Political Participation And Its Relation To The Concept Of Political Development

Political development is one of the contemporary concepts; it works on developing the capacity of the masses to clearly understand their problems, organizing the political life, following up on the performance of political functions within the framework of the state, and developing political systems and political practices to become more democratic, in addition to achieving political equality.

Some researchers consider that political development is a process that includes building institutions, expanding the base of political participation, and rationalizing the assumption of power "with the aim of achieving a measure of political stability" (Hilal, 1978). Political development mainly aims to build the political system, and carry out modernization processes for it, so that it becomes a modern and developed system, thus, transforming it from totalitarian regimes to democratic systems. Political development also refers to participation

in the political process through social formations.

For the actual implementation of democracy, we must focus on the components of political development, where political participation is a prerequisite for achieving political development, political pluralism and enabling individuals to develop, that is, achieving it through the individuals themselves, and that requires the existence of the so-called political options, or opportunities of political choice. This necessitates setting priorities and political options.

Political participation and citizens play an important role in political decision-making. In other words, it is an integrated collective process that is achieved through political participation, represented in providing an internal environment for decision-making. This environment consists of the prevailing social conditions, the political and economic system, the state, governmental organizations, and political parties.

1.4.5 Political Participation In Political Decision-Making

Decision-making is generally understood as how a reasonable working formula can be found among several competing alternatives. All decisions aim to achieve certain goals, or aim to avoid undesirable outcomes (Zahran, 2013).

It is clear from the above that the process of political decision-making, and taking decisions related to development and reform requires the presence of political participation from citizens because these decisions require conscious thinking and convincing others of its merits. The process of decision making, in nature, is the result of a joint effort of opinions and ideas based on a broad base of participation.

1.4.6 Mobilization And Political Participation

Several literature reviews discussed mobilization as a basis for studying political participation. Mobilization is based on the basis that political participation is a response to

political allusions and opportunities that are shaped by the environment of individuals, and that economic and social resources and psychological stimuli represent the elements and components of mobilization.

Mobilization results from the direct efforts of voluntary associations and unions, and civil society institutions. It may result indirectly through television coverage of political events and issues. Mobilization within partisan activities is the function of party communication, electoral competition, and social movement activities. Voluntary associations and unions embody an important and sensitive role in mobilizing individuals' political activity (Zahran, 2013).

It is clear from the aforementioned that the mobilization process is based on increasing the tendency of the individual to be a participant in political life. Voluntary organizations give the individual the opportunity to train for participation within the organization, and then transfer to political life. Political organizations have a strong influence on individuals and members, and this influence is reflected on its collective activity, advertising campaigns and voting process.

1.4.7 Forms Of Political Participation

There are many forms of political participation. Even though they differ from one political system to another, they are comprised of different dimensions and scopes. Political participation has taken many forms, perhaps the most prominent of which include:

1.4.7.1 First: Civic Participation

Civil participation takes many forms for individuals in a society. The individuals' attendance to political meetings is a form of political participation. Similarly, affiliation with a party, registration in electoral lists, and affiliations with organizations that address collective issues, such as unions, public institutions and associations is also considered a form of political

participation (Al-Louizi, 2009).

1.4.7.2 Second: Elections

Elections are the most important democratic mechanism for choosing rulers, and for this reason, democracy has historically been associated with elections, as it is the primary and only means of assigning power in contemporary democratic systems on the one hand, and achieving the right to participate in political life by members of the people on the other hand.

Political participation is associated with the democratic system as a political system. Individuals in society participate in the political system in order to influence public policy and political decisions. Therefore, elections are one of the most important components of the democratic system. Political democracy is for people to govern themselves based on freedom and equality.

1.4.7.3 Third: The Role Of The Media In Promoting Political Participation

The media is one of the means of political participation. Direct communication through the media has become of special importance for citizens, and this type of media has helped the individual obtain his civil rights, such as freedom of dialogue and discussion. The media allowed individuals to create an atmosphere that enables them to practice activities alongside organizations and parties; these means enabled the individuals to express their opinions, beliefs, and the ability to influence public opinion. That is, the media became supportive of the political field, which enabled the individual to participate in political life in a simple way. The media works to support political participation through several basic aspects, which can be represented in the following (Abu El-Hassan, 2013).

1. Creating a forum to allow for the diversity of opinions and discussions, and giving the public the opportunity to vote.
2. Allowing the citizen to be aware of the political activities, events and government performance.
3. Acting as a guard when detecting corruption and abuse of force by the government.

The media also helped civil society organizations present their activities and plans to individuals in society. This has achieved transparency for the work of these organizations especially that the media interacts and quickly disseminates this work. Media tools have become a strong and effective tool for civil society and human rights organizations. To elaborate, the media has helped to strengthen, diversify, and democratize new forms of public activities for the public, from which civil society can benefit, especially in supporting democracy and human rights (Abu El-Hassan, 2013).

The media has become a means of political participation. Reading newspapers, and following on news material gives individuals wide horizons to make the decision to participate in political life.

The media has become a public space frequently visited by people to express their concerns. It has become a space where political, economic and social events take place. The pages of the printed newspapers, the websites, and news articles are not that different from the public squares, where citizens practice direct democracy, and express their opinions freely. It has indeed replaced the public squares, even when it was impossible for individuals to gather there to put forward and present their issues and concerns (Mashti, 2010).

The media is open and available to everyone. It also works to improve the knowledge of the people, and to provide them with informs and actual events through various available means, which can be summarized as follows (Abdullah, 1997):

1. Increase the information the people receive due to the continuous flow of information.
2. Make the people more inclined to participate in politics. The media exercises its influence in this matter in addition to its main function, which is sharing news.
3. Help the public take decisions via adopting new values. Several field studies proved that the media has a key role in the process of spreading new ideas.
4. Accelerate the adoption of decision-making through persuasion.
5. Achieve harmony and compatibility during the transitional stages of sharing new

ideas.

6. The media has the ability to change the power structure in society through the transfer of information and knowledge.

7. Create a broad social participation that goes beyond political activity to social and economic activity.

8. Strengthen the national identity via strengthening the sense of belonging and the feeling of pride in one's identity, and the necessity of working to preserve this.

Political participation provides an important step towards achieving general and optimal goals, and it raises the degree of the people's interest in their societies and governments. Participation from a communicative and media point of view means obtaining information and participating in dialogue through various forms and means. It also means not making any decision unless those who are directly concerned with it are given the opportunity to express their views and opinions on that matter (Abu El-Hassan, 2013).

It is clear from the above-mentioned text that the media has an important role in political participation, as it works to raise interest in social and political issues, and to provide individuals with that kind of knowledge that raises their degree of understanding to the level of understanding the taken decisions. Moreover, it provides them with a greater opportunity to exercise supervision and control over the public environment, thus, increasing their desire and motivation to participate. On another note, the media helps create a positive atmosphere for participation and provides the members of society with appropriate and scientific knowledge, which guides them to channel their interests towards what benefits them in achieving their goals.

1.4.8 Rights Associated with Political Participation

Political participation is a human right. It is one of the political rights and public freedoms that the state recognizes in all societies and in all political systems, regardless of the practices of the political systems. All international conventions have declared this right. This affirmation falls within the international endeavors aimed at protecting and promoting human

rights, enabling the people to practice them, and giving them legal mechanisms that enable the people to participate effectively and benefit from them in accordance with the principles of the general policy of every free and democratic society, which strives to achieve maximum participation and diversity.

Participation is a right that is recognized by all international laws and regulations. There are also other rights, those include (Moawad, 1983):

1.4.8.1 First: The Right To Participate In Public Life

This type of participation is attained through the election of representatives that are chosen by the citizens. It is also based on the freedom to either run for election or vote. Moreover, it includes the right of the citizen to equally enjoy his/her right to secret ballot, free from any pressure or governmental influence. This shadows the participation of the elected members in the management of public life.

1.4.8.2 Second: The Right To Peaceful Assembly

The press works to activate this matter through collective actions and activating the public opinion. This right is linked to participation; it is a form of it, as it is exercised according to legal procedures. This gathering takes place in public squares, or closed places, according to the legal situation of each country is. In countries that are in a state of emergency, this right cannot be exercised in public places and is carried out in halls and closed places, it is authorized by the guardian.

In such cases, the presence of the press is essential so that the activities of the peaceful assembly are transmitted through media in writing, analysis and commentary. It is the best way to convey the voice of those in charge of the assembly to decision-makers on the one hand, and to the largest possible number of people on the other hand. Hence, the public opinion expands to be greater than the closed place, where the gathering was set up.

1.4.8.3   Third: The Right To Form And Join Political Parties

The political party works to connect people to the ruling authority. During this current time, political parties have a strong and effective influence, whether at the local or international levels. The party has a role in the development of the state and its positive growth. It can also negatively affect the growth and progress of the state.

This right is exercised equally without the regime resorting to the protection of a particular party or a syndicate at the expense of another, or without disrupting their activities, because this is a violation of the right to participation and to other human rights.

1.4.8.4   Fourth: The Right To Freedom Of Opinion And Expression

This right refers to the freedom of opinion as well as expressing it by all available means. The governments are required to provide the necessary material and human conditions for the establishment of media institutions on the basis of pluralism and diversity. The High Declaration of Human Rights affirmed this right in Article 19, which states that "[E]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression". This right includes "freedom to hold opinions without interference, and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of frontiers" (UN, 1948)

The most important issue about this right is freedom of opinion, whether verbally or in writing. Additionally, the right to comment must be based on equality. No ruler, individual, council, or political system has the right to monopolize information, facts and knowledge, except in what is based on the law to protect security and public order.

It has become clear through presenting the definitions of political participation that it is difficult to limit these definitions. The more one digs into this definition, new forms of political participation appear.

1.4.9 Factors Affecting Political Participation

Political culture and political upbringing are among the factors that affect the process of political participation, which must be taken care of in order to motivate the masses to participate, especially in political participation.

1.4.10 The Political Culture

The study of political culture is one of the most important approaches to the study of political participation, when examining a set of values, beliefs, feelings, and behavior patterns that pertain to governance and politics, which is a product of the historical experience of the whole society on the one hand, and the upbringing experiences of individuals on the one hand. The political culture also plays a decisive role in determining the speed of the transition towards democracy.

One of the first to introduce the concept of political culture into political studies was Almond Gabrie. He wrote an article through which he aimed to present a comparative classification of political systems published in 1956.

Almond (1956) assumed that political culture, under the enjoyment of a certain autonomy, is closely related to the general culture. Almond examined the concept of political culture, empirically, and defined it as a set of attitudes, and political perceptions of individuals in the context of their relationship to their political systems. This means that political culture is the political system through which the individual imbues the values of society and expresses it, via systems of perceptions, feelings, interpretations and perceptions that the individual acquires towards political life (Almond, 1956).

Almond postulated that there are trends that constitute three types of political culture (Almond, 1963):

First: The narrow type in which individuals enjoy a degree of awareness and low expectations towards the system of government.

Second: The dependent pattern, in which individuals are aware of the results of the ruling process, but they do not participate in the course of public life, which is usually the outcome and translation of political decisions.

Third: The participatory pattern, in which individuals are active and participating in the entire system, and they influence the political processes and their various outcomes.

Political culture is considered an important factor in influencing the various political processes through which political demands and interests are expressed and responded to. It also gains its importance from the fact that it can influence the processes of mobilizing social sectors, especially when the goal is to weaken or break the old aspects of the structures and patterns of social, economic and psychological commitment, in order to replace them with new structures and patterns of social organization and behavior that are more responsive to their interests, and an expression of their renewed aspirations. In addition to the impact of political culture on the process of mobilization, which facilitates communication between the ruler and the ruled, it also affects the processes of spreading political awareness, expanding political participation, establishing bases for new values and perspectives among the public, enhancing the quality of political life, and the possibility of generating and managing pressures for reform (Deutsch, 1961).

Many attempts have been made to define political culture. The concept of culture has been used by sociologists explicitly, but in multiple different ways. In 1952, Alfred and Cohen numbered 164 different definitions for the concept of culture. Along with various statements and phrases that may be associated with this concept, which amount to thousands, the idea of culture reflects two main directions (Thompson *et al*., 1990).

First: Culture as art, which is one of the trends that express a conservative view of culture, where it is seen as fine art, classical music and fine literature.

Second: Culture as life, which means a way of life, language, beliefs, values, trends, as well as the tangible features of the social behavior of culture. Hence, there are two meanings: the first is linguistic in the sense of cleverness. It is said that the speech is cultured, in the sense that it is understood immediately. The other meaning is procedural, and it is the subject of discussion and disagreement among scholars, based on the difference in their specializations and fields (Majzoub, 1983).

Accordingly, culture includes all models of social life, such as family models, economic, religious, moral, educational, collective, political, and linguistic models.

As for Maurice Duverger, he defined it as "an interconnected set of patterns of action, thinking, and feeling that make up the roles that determine the expected behaviors among a group of people" (Duverger, 1980).

Some scholars differentiate between culture and civilization: culture according to Thomas Mann (1920) is related to the spiritual aspects, aesthetic values and the arts, while civilization is related to models of material life such as clothing, food, drink and transportation, as well as scientific models (Majzoub, 1983) .

Roy MaCrides defines political culture as "common goals and acceptable general rules" (MaCridis, 1961). As for Dennis Kavanaugh, he sees culture as one of the four variables in the analysis of political systems, and notes that the components of culture include: values, beliefs, and emotional tendencies that determine what the government should be, and what it is actually achieving (Kavanagh, 1922).

As for Robert Dahl (1962), he referred to political culture as a factor used in explaining political opposition. The distinguishing elements of his political culture are:

1. Attitudes to solve the problem. Are they heading towards pragmatism or rationality?
2. Attitudes towards collective behavior or science.
3. Attitudes towards the political system. Are they honest, deep and loyal? Or are they dishonest, repulsive, and indifferent?
4. Attitudes towards the others. Are they confident or lacking in confidence?

As for Lucien Pye (1962), who is interested in political dimensions, especially those related to political development in developing countries, he sees that the indicators of a nation's political culture include factors such as: the fields of politics, the connections between the goals and methods in politics, levels or criteria for evaluating politics, and the values behind political behavior (Pye, 1962). Finer's definition of political culture appears to focus on the legitimacy of political rules, governance, institutions, and procedures (Finer, 1962).

In general, political culture is the particular pattern of attitudes with which we decorate the political system. Attitudes are prior preparations for political action, and are determined by certain factors that include: traditions, historical inheritance, motives, norms, emotions and symbols. These attitudes can be divided into the following elements and components (Muhammad, 1980):

1. The cognitive aspect, such as awareness of the political system.
2. The emotional aspect: Impression and influence.
3. The evaluation aspect: Judging the political system, such as the executive, legislative and judicial systems.

Based on what has been mentioned, political culture can be viewed as a pattern that is a comprehensive distribution of the people's attitudes towards political issues. When the individual does not find any relationship between him/herself and the political system, and does not have enough information, the political culture in this case becomes a limited culture.

If the political culture is only a part or tributary of tributaries of the comprehensive culture of society, it is a sub-culture.

Accordingly, it is clear that there is an importance of cultural and structural factors in explaining the nature, efficiency and performance of the political system. There are factors that affect power relations, the most important of which is the degree of balance between the social and governmental structures of the nation in achieving the stability of the political system.

1.4.10.1 The Components Of Political Culture

One can talk about a group of elements or components of the political culture, whether they are adopted by the state, the culture of the rulers, the official culture, and those prevalent among the members of the governed society, which is called the informal culture. These components include (El-Sayed & Mahmoud, 2000):

1.4.10.1.1 First: Reference

Reference is based on an integrated philosophical framework and a basic reference for political action. It interprets events historically, identifies the main milestones, goals and aspirations, and justifies the issues undertaken by the political system in order to grant it legitimacy.

Stability in the political system is often achieved by the unanimous consent of the members of society to the authority of the system. It is also achieved through the people's convictions about the importance of the state that express their goals and values. When there is a difference between the elements of the system about the reference, divisions and crises occur and threaten the legitimacy and stability of the political system.

1.4.10.1.2 Second: Attitudes Towards Public Work

There is a difference in attitude between individuals; there are individuals who tend to prioritize their personal interest over the public interest. The general interest refers to the idea that the public interest should prevail over the personal interest, and the belief in the importance of joint action and cooperation between the members of society in the political and social fields.

Attitudes towards public action requires a belief in the importance of teamwork, and a sense of political and social responsibility towards society and its issues, which is one of the most important components of political culture, because a sense of responsibility motivates the citizen to deal positively with issues that concern the whole community and increase the individual's sense of loyalty to the group.

1.4.10.1.3 Third: Attitudes Towards The Political System

Belonging to the political system and the belief in the necessity of loyalty to it are necessary for a sense of citizenship. The latter works to consolidate the idea of individual belonging to society in general, which is linked via a unified social, political and cultural link in the state, and rights and obligations it entails.

Political culture defines the general scope of political action, and the legitimate laws and procedures between public life and private life. This scope is determined by defining the individuals who are allowed to participate in the political process, as well as defining the functions of the political institutions, each accordingly.

Political culture also imposes knowledge of the limits of participation in this system, such as age, gender, social status, and material status. In addition, some political cultures are keen to define the political structures and functions in the state, as well as the agencies entrusted with achieving the objectives set by the state.

1.4.10.1.4 Fourth: A Sense Of Identity

The sense of identity and belonging to the state is one of the most important political beliefs. When an individual feels he/she belongs to the state, this helps to legitimize the political system, and ensure its survival and stability. It also ensures that it overcomes the crises and divisions that it may face.

A sense of loyalty and belonging to one's homeland helps to crystallize and develop a sense of national duty and acceptance of obligations, and enables the understanding of rights and active participation in political processes through one's active role in all areas of life.

It is clear from the above that the political culture is what supports the system and determines its frameworks. It feeds it with information derived from the reality of the environment and its privacy. It preserves it, and ensures its survival, which is too important to be ignored. Culture is able to determine and define the structures and behaviors of politics, and helps to understand democracy through analyzing the attitudes, beliefs, and political values of individuals and groups. It also helps to explain issues of the absence of democracy in society.

Political culture of attitudes, tendencies, elements and structures can be explained through contextual variables, such as the system of the government and the political, social, economic and historical factors, and can be also viewed as an indispensable means of analyzing and interpreting the way in which they interact and impose their presence in the form of patterns of perception and behavior, which in turn affect political life, and lead to the emergence of the democratic system.

1.4.11 Political Participation Crisis

The Political Participation Crisis takes different dimensions, both in terms of the scope or the forms offered for participation and its effectiveness. The phenomenon of reluctance to participate in political life is one of the most prominent issues that preoccupied those

interested in the future of democracy in general and elections in particular, due to the seriousness of its effects and the implications of its causes.

Crisis is a serious threat and disruption to the system of values and traditions. It materially and tangibly affects the work of the political system. It arises from external and internal factors beyond the will of the political system, which collectively constitutes a form of conflict and requires quick and urgent action to restore things to their balance by reshaping and developing those values and factors so that they fit with the changes in society when a temporary situation that all societies, whether developed or developing, go through. However, this case is more prominent in developing societies due to the conditions of underdevelopment and weak capabilities (Debo, 2011-2012).

Based on the aforementioned, it is noticeable that crisis is a condition characterized by imbalance and a state of tension that affects society and the political system. It requires a decision that entails new positions to contain the crisis and mitigate its severity.

1.4.12 Obstacles To Political Participation

The phenomenon of moving away from political participation is one of the most prominent issues that preoccupied those interested in the issue of the crisis of political participation, given the seriousness of its effects and the implications of its causes. There are elements that affect the process of political participation, the political system, parties, citizens, and the inability of any element to play its role in terms of participation, this leads to great challenges to the process of participation.

1.4.13 The Crisis Of Political Participation For Which The Political Parties Are Responsible

Political parties have historically embodied a role in political transformations across the world, whether in terms of liberation or confronting authoritarian governments, or through facing political parties in the contemporary world, especially in the Arab and Islamic world. Political parties have failed to build party organizations that are capable of efficiently leading the development process. Moreover, they lack the ability to present projects that serve

citizens, and they do not present programs of a strong developmental nature to help advance the individual and the society, which leads to a reluctance to care about politics and participation.

Parties do not present programs that serve the public interest, nor do they present real development projects for the benefit of society. They are only interested in providing personal gains to their members, which leads to a reluctance to take an interest in political participation. The lack of political stimuli directed at the individual reduces the possibility of his/her participation in the political process, for his/her participation depends on the availability of appropriate conditions and on the quantity and quality of political stimuli to which he/she is exposed, and the diversity of sources of stimuli from the media and electoral campaigns and thereof, all of which lead to greater effectiveness and a role in political participation. Political parties suffer from weak memberships, as a result of many reasons, which include the lack of conviction on the part of the majority of people in the effectiveness of the parties, and the understanding that most of these parties as parties of people whose programs are not clear and do not reflect the real issues of society (Al-Basrati, 2010).

1.4.14 The Crisis Of Political Participation For Which Society Is Responsible

The community embodies an important role in activating political participation. It has an important role in political socialization, starting with childhood as the most important and first tool for socialization. This role continues at various stages of life, whether at school, university, one's workplace and so on.

The citizen's lack of interest in political socialization for his/her children and the lack of political awareness leads to impeding the political participation process. The low level of political culture, which is the result of the deteriorating economic, social and political conditions, leads to a decrease in the degree of participation (Al-Basrati, 2010).

The community works to enhance political participation through political socialization. The socialization of individuals cannot take place in one way or in another. Considering that the process of upbringing begins with the individual from birth and continues until his/her death,

the individual during that time consumes information from sources and channels that may differ in their methods and tools of socialization, but in the end these tools have one goal, which is either the upbringing of the individual socially and politically, through which he/she is an active member of the society, or the upbringing process is negative, in which the individual becomes a burden on society, or is between these two extremes (Amer, 2014).

1.4.15 The Role Of The Military Institution In Deepening The Crisis Of Political Participation

This does not only comprise the institution seizing power, similar to what happened in some Arab countries, but also its impact on civilian politicians in the direction of considering the army as a model of what the institutions of society should be, especially the partisan institution.

In Samuel Huntington's and Joan Nelsons (1976) analysis of the impact of the military on the potential for democratic development in third world countries, he confirmed this impact with the reservation that it is not independent of political conditions. It increases in cases of corruption, stagnation and poor performance of civil institutions, especially when the military institution is broad and politicized, which makes building and sustaining democracy more difficult (Sayed, 2007).

The issue of military intervention in political affairs is a prominent issue in a number of countries, and particularly in the Middle East, whether it be direct or indirect. There is also a disruption of the democratic process as a result of these military interventions, and the impact of this on the delay in the rates of development in civil societies.

As for the relationship of military rule and democracy, it stems mainly from the rule that the function of military does not include ruling and authority, and that the basis for governance is the civil political authority that comes through election, or popular acceptance, based on the foundations of political legitimacy that may vary from one regime to another. In recent times, it has prevailed that rational legitimacy is based on rationality in governance and is

away from personalism in governance. It also stems from the fact that military values are based on obedience to orders, which is incompatible with democratic values that are based on political partnership, the renunciation of violence in managing power, and opposing the method of military coups as a means to gain power. The dilemma is not in the role of the military institution, but in the nature of the political system and its degree of democracy (Shurrab, 2011).

The origin of the relationship between military institutions and politics is the subordination of the military institution, because it is the strongest, most modern, most honest and valid compared to the civilian political institution. This is one of the manifestations of the democratic system of governance that preserves for the military institution its role in maintaining state security.

1.4.16 Reasons For The Crisis Of Political Participation

It indicates the extent to which citizens participate in political life and decision-making. In fact, there are multiple explanations for the crisis of political participation, the most prominent of which can be very briefly mentioned below:

1. The decline of political and social forces.
2. Fragmentation and scattering of efforts due to political and intellectual conflicts.
3. In the modern era, the nature of political participation in some Arab countries is described as being of a military nature and as mobilizing participation by a single party.
4. The high rate of illiteracy and ignorance. The high rate of illiteracy would negatively affect the rates of political participation.
5. The spread of poverty within large sectors of society due to the poor distribution of resources, which contradicts the standards of equitable distribution, and works on the low rate of political participation.

6. The weakness of political parties in urging the masses to participate and open new channels between the masses and decision-makers.

7. The economic crisis worried young people about their future; searching for work, running after providing a suitable housing, taking care of private matters, and dealing with these harsh economic conditions, so that they became reluctant or preoccupied to participate in political life.

8. Lack of political socialization, or negative political socialization.

9. Political indifference (weak patriotism and civil society).

10. Political isolation (feeling that the individual is marginalized and has no role causing reluctance to participate and withdrawing from political life).

1.5   Political Socialization

1.5.1   Introduction

Political socialization helps to form the political culture and culture in society, and to explain the differences in thoughts and feelings in society, which vary between groups in the political trends within the state.

The word political socialization was used in English literature in 1928, and it was intended to prepare the individual to adapt, live and interact within society. Its new use is based on the theories of four scholars who lived in the second half of the nineteenth century. These scholars include Sigmund Freud (1939-1856), who believed that the individual acquires his/her moral teachings in society through his moral subjectivity. The second scholar is Ji Jade (1931-1863), who focused on a basic problem related to the origin and function of the self in the social process. The third scholar is C. Cooley (1929-1864), who believed that primary group relationships are the basis for the crystallization and growth of the basic morals of the individual, such as justice and love. Another scholar, Bigt, believed that the symbolic processes of logical thought always derive from social interaction in a gradual and orderly manner (Denkin, 1981).

Political socialization is the process of inculcating an individual's combined values, standards, and concepts for everyone. The individual is indoctrinated or brought up by the individuals who surround him/her, and he/she acquires from them the social roles that are complementary to theirs (Denkin, 1981).

The theory of political socialization revolves around people and the tools that are used in the process of socialization, the ability of individuals to absorb experiences and information, individual differences, and socialization and social control.

Powell and Almond (1972) defined political socialization as the citizen's acquisition of attitudes, and the political values that he/she carries with him/her when he/she is recruited into various social roles, through which the individual learns to act in an acceptable manner within society. It also refers to the way in which the values and symbols of society become part of the thoughts and feelings of the individual (Powell & Almond, 1972).

As for the Department of Knowledge and Social Sciences, it defines socialization as a formal and informal indoctrination, planned and unplanned, political values and practices, and personal characteristics with political significance, during each stage of life and through various institutions. Political formation plays three main roles (Shamis, 1982):

1. Transferring political culture from one generation to another.
2. The formation of the political culture.
3. Changing the political culture to suit and support the preservation of the political system

In fact, the individual acquires the experiences of political socialization during the process of his/her exposure to the political system.

1.5.2 Institutions/Organizations Of Political Socializations

It is noticeable that the role of these institutions in socialization is an overlapping one. Put differently, it cannot be said that the role of one of them stops at the point where the role of the other begins. To elaborate, it cannot be said that the role of the family, for example, stops at a specific limit or stage, but it can be said that the role of the family decreases or increases at a certain stage in an individual's life. In the first stage of an individual's life, the role of the family appears to be the main and the greatest; the same applies to institutions.

The social and official institutions that carry out the process of social and political socialization can be divided into three groups (Shurrab, 1998):

1. Primary groups: It includes the family and the local organizations such as social clubs. The process of social interaction (here) is based on personal and direct confrontation.
2. Secondary groups: These include labor unions and professional groupings, where a large number of individuals are immersed in common institutions, but the relations between them lack a personal element.
3. Referral groups: They are not necessarily groups in the strict sense of the word. Referral groups refer to the social classes that an individual uses to define him/herself, and to rank social status. These groups may be based on gender, such as discrimination between whites and blacks, or based on ethnic or religious factors.

It is clear from the above that political socialization helps to acquire some political attitudes towards the political system. Moreover, political socialization works to preserve the system, its stability and the extent of its existing legitimacy through the formation of values, and through instilling ideas within individuals. These values and ideas become, with time, convictions in which the individual believes and which help in predicting the behavior and the political positions of the society's members, monitor them, and control these positions in the future.

It is also the way in which individuals become acquainted with the values and attitudes of society to which they belong. Socialization is a process whereby the individual is dissolved into the group, so that he/she qualifies for positive interaction and harmony within it.

Through political socialization, the individual acquires a political culture that helps him/her create a relationship between him/herself and the political system. In addition, political socialization entails the individual's acceptance of the authority of the system, that is, the acceptance of the governed individuals to the rulering authority.

Through the aforementioned concepts about political socialization, we note that political socialization is the process that develops emotional, cognitive and evaluative political attitudes in political issues, which work to transfer values from one generation to another, so that individuals acquire political experience and social attitudes.

1.5.3 The Nature Of The Political Parties

Political parties are the main axis in the democratic building, and it is difficult to build a democratic system without the presence of these political parties. Political parties have a role in the political reform process, in a way that leads to laying a foundation that allows the establishment of a democratic system based on political pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power between other parties.

Political parties in most Arab countries are still weak. They deal with the democratic situation with timidness, and if we exclude the ruling party in some of these countries, it is not easy to say that there are effective parties that have a tangible impact on the map of political action. Despite this, political parties in many Arab countries are able to embody an active role, impose themselves, and use their influence in the street and on governments to actively participate in the reform process. In spite of the disappearance of one-party governments in many countries of the world, and the change in the structure of their political systems, this phenomenon still exists in most Arab countries, where their regimes refuse to change their structure, style and tools, and refuse to absorb development and confront the requirements of

development and of good governance. At the same time, we find that it insists on the continuous possession of power in a world in which conditions and policies have changed, until these parties seemed very different and contradictory with their surroundings, and severely unable to solve the difficulties facing their societies and their political and economic systems in general (Al-Zubaidi, 2009).

One of the most important features of the so-called semi-democratic, or less-than-Democratic, or limited democratic systems is that they allow a degree of political competition and of democracy, but they fail to fulfill all the conditions necessary for full democratic development. It suffers from restricting competition and ending it at a lower level of power transfer, violations of freedom and integrity of general elections whose results do not accurately reflect popular preferences. Besides, an insufficient level of democratic development usually gives rise to limited political and civil rights and freedoms, and this deprives some trends and interests of expressing themselves, which negatively affect the degree and effectiveness of the elections and political participation in many Arab regimes (Samee, 2010).

In most countries of the Arab world, the political party system is based on the hegemony of one party. Therefore, despite the fact that these countries are officially based on pluralism, they actually do not allow the opposition parties to compete seriously.

1.6   Democracy
1.6.1   Introduction

It is known that the use of the word 'democracy' goes back to the Greek origin linguistically and in practice. As for the word, it is a combination of two Greek words, 'rule of the people' (Dahl, 2022). It was used to denote the Athenian system in which elections were held for a period to choose the rulers of Athens.

Democracy is based on a system of devolution of power, which includes elections, political participation, a system of individual and collective rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom to protest, the right and freedom of belonging, the right to housing, free life and privacy…etc., a system of pluralism, dealing with the majority and the political and societal minority, a system of equality before the law, the rule of law for all regardless of social status or political position, a system of separation of powers to limit the dominance of the executive authority, and to prevent the establishment of authoritarianism, and individualism in the government.

Democracy is a way by which political power is disposed of in society. It is supposed to have something that distinguishes it from other ways of disposing of political power, the most important of which is the consideration of the individuals who make up the political community as free and equal individuals. Equality means that all citizens have the right to participate in power, whether through elections, or by submitting proposals and putting issues on the political agenda, or in terms of equal treatment before the Law, or in terms of enjoying the protection of the law. As for freedom, it means that the political system does not limit the freedom of thought, expression and action in the political field (Bahloul, 2000a).

To add, democracy is a system of societal tolerance, it is the acceptance of equality and parity by all in a dialectic between multiple elements and factors that influence each other to produce a societal system based on the rule of law and the preservation of rights, and public and individual freedoms.

1.6.2   The Pillars Of The Democratic System

No matter the type of the democratic system, whether it is parliamentary, presidential, or a mix of both, it is based on three pillars when implementing the sub-systems of democracy with its components and values. These pillars are:

1.6.2.1   First: Elections

Elections and the freedom to participate in elections as candidacy or to vote is one of the basic and political rights constitutionally guaranteed to all citizens in democratic countries.

Elections are the first and most important pillars of the democratic system. They are based on the implementation of the system of rotation of power on the one hand, and the system of pluralism on the other hand. Every authority must be based on elections, and elections must be renewed with regular and close time differences, so that the rulers do not feel that they are independent from the ruled, and in order to keep their representation continuous before the ruled (Devergieh, 1980).

Elections are the basis of implementing democracy, provided that they are periodic with specific, regular and close time intervals, in order to ensure the renewal of the legitimacy of the rulers, and to hold them publicly accountable if they fall short, or commit mistakes during their rule. In such case, the electoral vote falls, and their programs – which the people no longer want – also fall with them.

Elections have two components (Devergieh, 1980):

1. Sorting the people's representatives, and giving them legitimacy to rule.
2. Holding the ones who failed from previous rulings accountable.

Popular representation through elections allows citizens to appoint rulers and not to keep them in power when their term expires.

To ensure the democratic approach, elections are held within a pluralistic system, especially political pluralism, which means the presence of different parties in the electoral process. Democracy cannot be representative unless it is pluralistic; the successful candidates take over the legislative authority, and the majority also holds the executive authority.

1.6.2.2   Second: Constitutional arrangements

The second pillar of the democratic system is constitutional arrangements for the democratic guarantee of freedoms and the three powers that make up the entire political system, which are: the executive authority, the legislative authority, and the judicial authority.

The executive authority always tries to dominate the course of things; sometimes it tries to take the role of legislation, and sometimes it takes over the tasks of the judiciary system in one way or another. To limit the dominance of the executive authority, the separation of powers is based on clear constitutional texts; this is to ensure the continuity of democracy, as each authority limits the influence of the other. The principle of separation of powers leads to monitoring each governmental body by the other. Authority limits authority, as we find that the legislative authority monitors the government (the executive authority), holds it accountable, approves the scales for it or rejects them, gives it confidence or withholds it, approves projects, plans and agreements; everything that the legislature does not approve cannot be pursued by the executive power.

1.6.2.3   Third: The Right Of Citizens To Hold The Authority (The Government) Accountable

The third pillar of the democratic system is the right of citizens to subject the political authority to pressure and to hold it accountable, so that the people know the actions of the political authority. In other words, they are not carried out secretly, taking into account the principle of transparency required in democratic practice.

This gives the citizens the right to be informed of matters, to press for change, and to hold the authorities accountable, taking into consideration the rule of law and the system of rights

and freedoms, which are among the systems of the democratic approach, especially that the main characteristic of democratic systems is the responsibility of rulers for their actions before citizens.

The pressured opinion is expressed through media, or direct public pressure, via gatherings, demonstrations, seminars and conferences. These and other means must be available to people without restrictions, so that the democratic system ensures that accountability is established transparently, and people know what is going on.

Public pressure that expresses the people's opinions is called public opinion, which expresses itself through multiple means. These same means are considered among the influencers that influence the public opinion, and among the factors of its formation. The press is a means of expressing public opinion, and influencing and directing it, in addition to other media tools (El-Gamal, 1990).

The system's transparency, and its constitutional reliance on accountability refers to the right of citizens to change when the election date comes. Negligents are held accountable through the election fund. The democratic political system is only complete when it legally and actually allows the exercise of legitimate pressure on political decision-makers. In the end, the political decision comes as a result of a complex process of interaction between multiple parties, the most important of which is the popular and partisan pressure forces, which always put the government in a position of accountability and before the necessity of bringing about change and construction for the public interest (Al-Jarbawi, 1999).

It is evident that accountability, in turn, enhances and develops the consolidation of democracy, resulting in the achievement of transparency, and the prevention of corruption, which leads to the deterioration of the society's conditions at various levels, especially the spread and increase of poverty, and the decline of the economy. Failure to achieve the principle of accountability perpetuates abuse towards citizens, as if the weak groups have to bear alone to pay the bill for corruption and deviations.

1.6.3 Democratic Transformation

Democratic transformation, or shifting from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes, is one of the literatures that has been widely used in political circles. Interpretations about it varied in terms of the degree of its occurrence and the conditions for its establishment.

This concept refers to the transformation and transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic system; which is a very complex process that refers to the transformation of structures, goals, and processes that affect the distribution and exercise of power (Hilal, 2003).

Others defined democracy as the process in which methods and rules for resolving conflicts are formulated in peaceful ways, leading to a democratic constitutional situation, holding just and free elections, and expanding the scope of political participation as a criterion and an indicator for the growth of the political system, its democracy.

There is a difficulty in dealing with the concept of democratic transformation. That is because it begins with the demise of authoritarian regimes, the emergence of modern democracies, and after that, the consolidation of these modern democratic regimes.

Huntington Samuel divides the stage of democratic transformation into three main stages (Sayed, 2007):

The first stage is the transition stage: When the elites in power decide to transition towards democracy.
The second stage is the replacement phase: When the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown by opposition groups.
The third stage is the transition stage, in which the process of democratic transformation and the consolidation of new democratic systems and values occurs.

Others divide the democratic transformation process into several stages that are represented by the collapse and disintegration of the authoritarian regime, liberal transformation, the transition towards democracy, and the consolidation of democracy.

1.6.4   Indicators of Democratic Transition

The concept of democratic transition can be measured through many indicators. These include the erosion of the control of authoritarian regimes, the prevailing political culture in society, the degree of economic growth, political participation, the peaceful transfer of power, the holding of free and just elections within the framework of political pluralism, separation of powers, freedom of opinion and expression in addition to freedom of the press, and the strength of civil society, which embodies a pivotal role in supporting democratic systems through the development of democratic culture.

Democratic transition is the transitional stage between a non-democratic system and a democratic system. The political system that is undergoing a democratic transition is going through a transitional phase from a non-democratic political system in the direction of a democratic system, starting a democratic transition. This signifies the beginning of smashing the old authoritarian regime and building a new one. This trans-formation occurs due to the failure of the old regime to create new policies, which generates great pressures on this system that pushes in the direction of democratic transformation.

It is clear from the foregoing that the concept of democratic transformation is the transition of society from one situation to another. Such transition is characterized by the principle of peaceful transfer of power, through the right of the majority formed through elections, pluralistic party competition, and the consolidation of the rule of law within the framework of respect for human rights and personal freedoms.

1.6.5   The Concept of Political Reform

1.6.5.1   Introduction

The concept of political reform varies from one society to another, and from one period of time to another within a society. Additionally, the areas of political reform vary according to the multiplicity of areas of the political system. We can refer here to a number of topics such as political development, political modernization, political change, leadership reform and political culture, changing the pattern of distribution of political power in society, changing policies, and reforming political institutions.

Political reform is defined as "all [the] direct and indirect steps [such that] the burden to implement them falls on the shoulders of governments, civil society, and private sector institutions, in order to move Arab societies and countries forward, without delay and hesitation, and tangibly in the path of building democratic systems" (Alexandria Conference, 2004).

Political reform is viewed on the basis that it is a change, or a modification for the better, that is, a radical or partial process of modification and development in the form of government, or social relations within the state and the framework of the existing political system, with the available means, and based on the concept of gradualism. Put differently, it is developing the efficiency and effectiveness of the political system in its surrounding internally and externally. It must be subjective from the inside and not imposed from the outside, with a holistic nature, carrying with it the character of continuity and realistically based on the reality of the state and the nature of the existing imbalances to be reformed (Al-Mashaqbeh, 2011).

Evidently, the concept of political reform is important for any existing political system that wants to continue and survive, that is, to develop the efficiency and effectiveness of the political system in its surrounding environment internally and regionally, and for society and the political system by the available means.

The concept of political reform overlaps with concepts that preceded it and was used, such as political development and political modernization. Therefore, there is a need to address some concepts in close relation with political reform.

1.6.5.2 The Relationship Of The Concept Of Political Development To Political Reform

Political development is one of the modern concepts. It is the development of the masses' abilities to clearly understand their problems, and their ability to mobilize all available capabilities to confront these problems in a practical and realistic manner. It is a process that includes building institutions, broadening the base of political participation, and rationalizing the assumption of power, with the aim of achieving a measure of political stability, or organizing political life, following up on the performance of political functions within the framework of the state, and developing political systems and political practice to become more democratic. Political development also means increased participation in the political process.

Therefore, it can be said that political reunification is the basis for achieving economic, social and cultural development, because its goal is for citizens to know their constitutional rights and duties, and to participate positively in political life.

Robert Berghinham gave the concept of political development five connotations (Hamdoush, 2009):

1. Legal significance that is concerned with the constitutional construction of the state (after a democratic one).
2. Economic significance: Achieving economic growth and a just distribution of the revolution.
3. Administrative significance: The necessity of a rational, effective and efficient management.

4.   Political significance: Participation in political life.

5.   Cultural significance: Related to modernization as a result of a specific political culture.

As for Lucien Pye, he defined political development as the necessary condition to achieve economic development, governmental change, build the nation state, achieve political participation, and build democracy (Hamdoush, 2009).

As for Ahmed Wahban, he defines it as "a multi-purpose political process aimed at consolidating the idea of citizenship", achieving integration and stability within society, and increasing participation rates for the masses in political life (Wahban, 1999).

Political development clearly develops the capabilities of the political system to address the problems and tensions that occur in society; thus, development is a national necessity in order to achieve the progress of society, and ensure adaptation in the face of the continuous changes that society is going through, that is, the ability of the political system to regulate the behavior of individuals and groups within society.

1.6.5.3   The Link Between The Concept Of Political Modernization And Political Reform

Modernization embodies an important role in the political development process. The concept of modernization is also linked to development, as modernization involves changing the system of basic values in society, that is, a change in the individuals' attitudes and their social, political and economic behavior in order to make a change.

Most writers disagree about the meanings of modernization, development, and change. The attention is usually on major political, economic, and social transformations. Modernization

includes changes that affect values in society, and individuals and groups within a society gradually accept such changes.

Daniel Learner defines modernization as an organized process that includes integrated changes in the demographic, economic, political, and cultural sectors of society. Modernization literally means "something taking place somewhere else that was accepted in the past as a way of doing things". The main point of the concept of modernization, is that it is the process of moving towards modern ideal relations, and into ideal types of social, political and economic arrangements (Salem, 2007).

Political modernization was used in four different ways (Salem, 2007):

1. Geographical, which refers to developed countries.
2. Linguistic, which links political development to the broad process of modernization; thus, political development is defined as political modernization synonymously.
3. Goal-oriented: Political development moves towards achieving the desired goals that the political regime sees, and among these goals are democracy, stability, legitimacy, political participation, mobilization, equality, security, welfare, justice and freedom.
4. Functional. The movement of the political system in a direction similar to the political process in the western industrial society, such as the presence of political parties and other societal organizations, as a functional necessity in society. The presence and development of these parties is an important necessity for the development of political development.

Consequently, the process of political reform is a process of planned social change that is achieved through a series of stages and procedures, and does not take place once. Any societal process that belongs to the entire political community in the state belongs to the rulers and the ruled. It is also linked to values and institutions to bring about a change that has a specific strategic vision, whose goal is to transform the totalitarian nature of political systems into democratic ones.

1.6.6 Elements Of Democracy

Democracy is based on several main components, which can be considered as partial components that together constitute democracy as a political and social approach. These components are necessary for the establishment of a true democratic system. They include:

1.6.6.1 First: The Power Circulation System

This is a system that includes political participation with all its components. Political participation means the right of the citizen to play a certain role in the political decision-making process. In its narrowest sense, it indicates the right of that citizen to monitor these decisions through monitoring and evaluation after their issuance by the ruler. Political participation takes place through elections that provide an opportunity for such circulation, as elections are a means to achieve the transfer of power as a sub-system of the constituent systems of democracy. It is these elections that produce the rule of the people for effective political participation: "The rule of the people at its various levels is essentially based on the prosecution, that is, the citizens' choice of representatives to represent them for a specific period of time in administration and governance. Choosing in this context is political in nature, and presupposes a multiplicity of opportunities before those who exercise this choice, i.e., the multiplicity of political trends from which they choose" (Ibrahim, 1987).

Political participation presupposes the existence of political parties that are engaged in a competitive democratic experiment to take over power, or to be in the opposition, if they are not among the majority forces that take over the reins of power. Democracy first and foremost means the possibility of legitimate and peaceful transfer of power. There is no sense in pluralism without the availability of mechanisms to manage the affairs of society. The direction that holds the majority has the power to implement a program that has gained support and public attitudes. Thus, providing mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power without coups or liquidations (Abdallah, 1997).

In order to achieve the peaceful and proper transfer of power, and ensure that the elections are held on time, in a free and just manner, an effective civil society is assumed as a pressure force on the political frameworks to stabilize the democratic situation and to keep the political community within the democratic approach.

1.6.6.2   Second: Civil Society

The concept of civil society has gained great popularity as an important factor to democratic transformation, and among the theories that have been circulating since the early seventies are those that propose that democracy flourishes in countries that enjoy an active civil society.

There is a problem with this issue that is two-fold: "The first is of a definitional nature, meaning that democracy is defined by the existence of an active civil society, or that civil society is defined as being part of democracy, the second is the ideological dimension that has come to characterize the term civil society" (Diamond, 2007).

Civil society is an important tool for the occurrence of democratic change, as it is what pushes the state towards democracy. Examples of this include Poland and Czechoslovakia (Slovakia and the Czech Republic nowadays), where "the intense mobilization of civil society was a major source of pressure towards the occurrence of democratic change." One of the most important functions of civil society as a tool to achieve democracy is its ability to monitor the authority, encourage political participation, and work to develop democratic advantages, such as tolerance, moderation and respect for opposing viewpoints, in addition to creating non-political channels for publicizing and representing interests. Moreover, civil society works to generate a series of interests that intersect with political conflict, and thus work to mitigate its impact. Furthermore, civil society prepares political leaders and monitors the democratization process. It also contributes to the dissemination of information and new ideas that can work on economic development. Finally, the presence of a civil society within the state ensures the citizen's respect for the state and a positive interaction with it, and vice versa (Diamond, 2007).

The establishment of democracy and the provision of conditions for its success as well as the continuation of its work stems from the nature of civil society; hence, civil society becomes the basis of the infrastructure for achieving democracy. Accordingly, democracy cannot be achieved without the presence of civil society institutions. The importance of civil society lies in strengthening the principle of voluntary and collective participation, the ability to express opinion and the others opinion, political participation in decision-making, periodic elections and achieving their integrity. Civil society also embodies a role in building democracy at the cultural, tactical and educational level.

1.6.6.3   Third: The Multiparty System

Multiparty is the distribution of power in society, and the lack of one party's dominance of power. Multi-partyism is against the idea of monopolizing power. Political parties are among the most prominent contemporary political institutions that affect the course of political events in society, and the results that these events have on its structure and its rise.

It includes pluralism in all its parts: political, religious, social, and even ethnic and national.

Political pluralism is represented by the multiplicity of political parties and the rotation of power between them, and the possibility of peaceful change. This type of political pluralism is based mainly on the existence of different parties, rejecting the idea of one-party rule, as it is not possible to imagine modern democracy without parties. Party pluralism is one of the pillars of democracy and political action (Ghalioun, 1993).

As for religious pluralism, it is the right of every religious group to practice its religious rites and spread it without restrictions or persecution.

Social pluralism provides equal opportunities for all in society, and allows for the establishment of different groups, such as frameworks that groups individuals according to their desires to belong, and to their privacy. It also accepts individuals for who they are by respecting their privacy and different ideas, without allowing for the possibility of disagreement. The values and systems of societal relations accept the individual for what he/she is with tolerance and without fanaticism, ensuring gender equality, and the provision of equal opportunities to all (Ghalioun,1993).

Ethnic and national pluralism is based on recognizing the right to exist for national or ethnic groups that differ from the majority and the minority politically and socially. The minority adheres to the decision of the majority politically with its right to oppose, and the majority respects the existence of the social minority. Despite the duty of the minority to abide by the majority's opinion, which it may not approve of, the minority still retains all rights under the principle of freedom and equality (Bahloul, 2000b).

Political parties were often formed as a result of the crisis of political participation, i.e., the demand of the rising social and political forces in society to involve them in governance, because social and economic transformations have upended existing political ties and organizations. The collapse of the feudal system in the West was accompanied by the demand of the rising middle class at the time to represent it politically in the government. Moreover, industrialization not only changed society economically, but also made the working-class demand that it, in turn, play an important role in deciding the country's policy (Al-Aswad, 1990).

The multiparty system clearly contributed to defending the social and economic interests of the different classes in society. To ensure the success of the multiparty system, citizens must understand its reality and objectives. The party system is nothing but a means to serve the country and citizens. All political parties must accept the principle of peaceful coexistence between them when implementing the democratic system, and adhere to the principle of freedom of opinion and thought. It is not allowed to establish parties that reject this, because

preserving democracy and securing its future requires preventing the establishment of parties of a dictatorial or authoritarian nature.

1.6.6.4 Fourth: Equality Before The Law And The Rule Of Law

Equality before the law indicates that all people are socially equal regardless of their social status or political position, and that the law protects this equality. Everyone is subject to the law, and equality before the law presupposes the rule of law and respect by all. What is meant by the rule of law is the subordination of the state, with all its structures and individuals, to binding rules. It is respected by the ruler and the ruled alike. The scope of its implementation includes all the governing authorities in the state. All public authorities are subject to the law and abide by its limits (Turan, 2001).

The rule of law requires effective accountability in political frameworks, as is the case in individual matters in which the judiciary decides. Here, it must be noted that the citizen's sense of safety, and providing him with security, is one of the most important foundations of the rule of law, and this is available only if the system allows the independence of the judiciary system and implementing its decisions.

1.6.6.5 Fifth: The Separation Of Powers

The separation of powers is a way to preserve democracy, and a framework to ensure the continuation of democracy. We consider the separation of powers from the constituent systems of democracy since it prevents the concentration of powers in the hands of the ruler. "The separation of powers is one of the pillars of democratic action in any existing political system" (Nassar, 2006), because it is the basis that limits the hegemony of the executive authority, and prevents the establishment of authoritarianism and individualism in governance.

The separation of powers is based on clear constitutional foundations that can be changed according to the need for development, without considering constitutional provisions as sacred taboos that cannot be overlooked. Therefore, constitutional provisions must be completely separated from the religious situation and the principle of sanctity. In other words, the constitutional foundations are not sacred, and therefore the concept of sanctity cannot be included in its provisions. The existence of a constitution with democratic provisions allows the separation of powers without the domination of one authority over the other, and it is one of the conditions required for the establishment of the democratic system.

The principle of separation of powers is one of the very important principles in democratic political systems. One authority does not have dominance over the other authorities, which leads to the tyranny of this authority over other authorities.

1.6.6.6 Sixth: The System Of Rights And Freedoms

This system includes freedom of expression regardless of its conflict with the prevailing opinion, or from different social and collective opinions, freedom of assembly, freedom to participate in public political life through parties or independently, freedom of protest, the right and freedom of belonging, individual rights to housing, free life and privacy, and other rights and freedoms (Turan, 2001).

Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty" (United nations, 1948)In addition to the foregoing, there will be no discrimination based on the

political, legal, or international status of a country or area to which an individual belongs, whether that country or area is independent, trustee or non-self-governing, or if its sovereignty is subject to any limitation.

The individual is the basic element in the state and society. He/she has the right to life and security, the right to equality, the right to freedom, the right to dignity and ownership, and it is the duty of the state to protect and provide these rights.

1.7 Political Alienation

1.7.1 Definition Of Political Alienation

Weakliem and Borch (2006: 415) defined alienation as "a feeling of poor attachment to the central institutions of society". Political alienation is regarded as a weak attachment to the central political institutions of society, that include the congress, elected officials, the institution of voting and thereof. Slattegard, Gammon and Oscarson (2007: 118) further explored this definition as the authors defined political alienation as a mixture of disinterest in political affairs and distrust of government officials. Reef and Knoke (1999: 414) claim that political alienation is "a social condition in which citizens have or feel minimally bound to the exercise of political power". Caitlin *et al*. (1975: 3) assert that political alienation is characterized by a "persistent sense of alienation" from political institutions, leaders, and values. It is important to note that one can feel alienated from individual political leaders or some political institutions without feeling alienated from political leaders and institutions in general. However, political alienation is a general feeling. It goes beyond rejecting individual politicians or institutions.

Political alienation can be defined as a general feeling of distance from the central political institutions, leaders and political values of society.

The importance of political alienation originates from it being seen as a topic of research and not a topic that constitutes a social problem at the level of social roles, which are expected

from the members of society. This is the case in normal situations. How is the situation with the Palestinian people in general, and the refugees, in particular, who live in very difficult conditions that resulted in their uprooting from their lands, and who wait impatiently for the political decision that will guarantee them the right to return to their homes since 1948?

Historically, the term alienation had various uses in religious, philosophical and psychological heritage. The idea of alienation appeared initially in Christian thought during the Middle Ages, in particular, in Protestant theology with Luther and Calvin. The diversity in the use of the term alienation appeared after that as a result of the accompanying different philosophical, psychological and sociological trends that were concerned with addressing this concept since its first philosophical use in the theory of the social contract. However, most contemporary analytics almost unanimously agree that the first systematic use of the term alienation was brought by Hegel in the German idealist philosophy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. After that, Marx used the term alienation in manuscripts in 1844, and in other parts of his writings (*Capital*) when analyzing the nature of social relations in the capitalist mode of production (Al-Zaghal *et al.* 1990a: 48).

The word alienation is derived from the Latin word "alienation", which means to transfer the ownership of one thing to another, or to extract or remove it. The Latin word and its derivatives have been used in French and English to denote several meanings, namely:

1) Legal: It refers to the transfer of ownership of something to another person.
2) Social: Expressing one's sense of alienation, whether from one's self or from others.
3) Psychological: It is a state of unconsciousness, impotence or loss of mental powers or senses.
4) Religious: This meaning is related to man's separation from God, i.e., related to sin and the commission of disobedience (Shacht, 1980).

It can be said that alienation is a human phenomenon that exists in various modes of social life. Despite the recent studies of alienation as a psychological phenomenon that expresses

suffering and conflict of the human being with him/herself and his/her society; the concept is not considered new. Alienation has been addressed through many researchers, and a lot of publications were issued by them on the subject of alienation. The following is a presentation of the most prominent of these researchers:

In his writings, Hobbes touched on the issue of alienation, indicating its legal meaning, whether by giving up something or transferring it to others. In the eyes of Hobbes, the individual cannot enter into the social contract unless he/she extracts from him/herself the right to do whatever he/she must do: he/she transfers to the other, who has absolute power and complete sovereignty, his/her natural right to use power as he/she wants, in order to preserve his/her private life (Rajab, 1986).

In his book *The Dragon*, Hobbes shows that alienation is a free voluntary act, or it is an inevitable sacrifice that the individual makes for his/her own benefit and interest. According to Hobbes' belief, the individual gains more than he/she loses when he/she transfers his/her natural rights to another human being, or a council of individuals, representing absolute power and sovereignty.

Locke echoed the idea of alienation in a similar way to that used by Hobbes. He refers to the idea of renunciation or surrender to words expressing the transfer of natural rights and handing them over to the authority of society (Rajab, 1986).

To sum it up, Hobbes and Locke agree on the essence of alienation, which is the idea of abandoning natural rights and handing them over to society as a free voluntary act, and as a willing sacrifice. Thus, alienation in this sense is positive, as it is a prerequisite for the individual to exit from the state of nature to the social state, in order to ensure the establishment of a civil and political society (Al-Fayoumi, 1988: 75).

The theory of the social contract is the main source in which the concept of alienation was used in the field of philosophy. Rousseau referred to the legal concept of alienation, stressing

the issue of renunciation or abandonment, whereby individuals give up some or all of their rights and freedoms to society, in search of social security within the framework of society. That's what both Hobbes and Locke affirmed. Rousseau is one of the most prominent modern philosophers, who spoke about alienation before Hegel, and in his book, *The Social Contract*, Rousseau talks about alienation using two meanings: the first is positive and the second is negative.

Rousseau explained the positive meaning of alienation as a process by which each person presents him/herself to the group and under the guidance of the general will, to become part of the whole. Hence, alienation in general, is a process in which the individual places him/herself for the sake of a noble goal for the group.

As for the negative meaning, Rousseau criticizes civilization and society, as he believes that civilization has robbed the individual of him/herself and made him/her a slave to the social institutions, which he/she created and constituted, and became subordinate to them.

From this idea, the individual loses organic harmony, as is the case in the case of nature, and problems arise between what a person should be, and what he/she actually is, thus, alienation occurs (Rajab, 1986).

Influenced by Rousseau's negative meaning of alienation, Schiller (1795) addressed the issue of alienation in modern individuals who suffer alienation and separation under inhuman conditions that resulted from the Industrial Revolution and became very threatening to them. In this life, individuals become a distorted image of the routine work that they perform and the complexities of this work.

Schiller stresses that the separation of the individual from his/her natural instincts and his/her mental abilities, is reflected within society in the form of moral chaos due to civilization.

Schiller also refers to another topic when he talks about positive alienation, where the self is separated from the external world and contemplates it as an aesthetic subject where it is liberated from civilization to become a unique and distinct self (Hammad, 1995: 45).

The use of alienation in the sense of separation was common in the German idealist philosophy, which originated the state of separation and established a system of opposite dualities. Hegel is one of the most prominent speakers on the separation inherent in the existence of the individual as a subject to the actions of the others. The alienated individual in Hegel's historical concept is the individual, who lives in a dead inhuman world, a world that Hegel described as "a moving life for the dead". Hence, he emphasized the necessity of robbing this prevailing situation (Hegel, 1967, 1998). Hegel also distinguished between the many types of alienation at the level of personality, social systems and culture. He raised a fundamental issue, which is that alienation of the personality lies in the clash between what is subjective and what is real, as is the case with the alienation of slavery (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Marx & Friedrich, 1976; Debnath, 2020).

The clash between the subjectivity and the objectivity of alienation results in the loss of individual control; that is in addition to intellectual or rational alienation which results in the submission of a person to another who exercises his/her powers and full authority over that person. Hegel's human history is a history of struggle for self-affirmation or for the other's recognition of one's self without the latter being able to deny the other's right to exist and survive (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Al-Yamamah, 2001).

Analyzing Hegel's work on alienation shows that his use of this concept has a dual character. Any use of it refers to the robbery of knowledge and deprivation of freedom. Hegel was the first to use the concept in this double sense when he spoke of consciousness, saying: "When self-consciousness restrains its haven or is indifferent to it, it reveals the simple freedom of the self. The alienated soul is the one whose consciousness is of a divided and dual nature, and is merely an opposing being" (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Al-Yamamah, 2001; Debnath, 2020).

If the goal of the individual, as Hegel noted, is freedom, then it is the state in which the self is willing, and in which it will recover itself. In the idea of dependence, Hegel sees that the first form in which consciousness takes history is not the form of a single consciousness, but rather a holistic (collective) consciousness. What it represents is the consciousness of a primitive group in which an individual emerges within the common society. Feelings, sensations, and concepts do not actually belong to individuals, but are shared by all, so that what controls consciousness is the common element, not the pure one (Taylor, 1975, 1979).

Hegel also refers to the separation of the individual from his/her essence. This separation is due to the individual's commitment to two states that are inseparable from the human world, as per Hegel's view; they are necessity and alienation (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Debnath, 2020).

According to Hegel, necessity means dependence on nature and the acquiescence of the individual to the limits it imposes on him/her. Will and necessity both lie within the individual experience as a rational factor. Thus, it is his/her necessity as much as it is his/her own will (Debnath, 2020).

If we closely consider Hegel's handling of the issue of necessity, we find that he directly criticizes the tendency of pleasure in all its forms. He sees that when self-awareness restrains its sanctuary or does not care about it, it discovers its freedom. This is because the kind of subject of which one's self is aware and which it regards as its true reality represents in Hegel's view what it necessarily means. Freedom, which represents the second dimension of the issue of alienation for Hegel, is understood through the dialectical relationship that combines the concept of freedom on the one hand and the concept of necessity and alienation on the other (Taylor, 1975, 1979).

The freedom of the conscious self does not conflict with the external nature, nor with the internal nature of the individual. The concept of freedom does not exist in freedom itself. The individual's action will also reveal the effectiveness of one's own self, because the consciousness of the individual will negate the content as an external or alien existence

through unification as between internal factors and external ones, which results in the individual not feeling obligated. And then enters the concept of knowledge as an element closely related to the concept of freedom on the one hand and an expression of complete alienation on the other. According to Hegel, knowledge helps the conscious self to find its basic reality, not as something else more than itself nor the theoretical abstraction of the ego, but the ego within which the other is, which results in the freedom of the conscious self that is not distinguished from the external existence, and which works without conflicting with it (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Debnath, 2020).

Hegel stresses that man does not develop and does not fear freedom, except in his relationship with that other person who holds him at the core of his existence. He also goes in his presentation of the idea of freedom that it is represented in one's ability to achieve it for himself from a certain viewpoint of a personality with tendencies and abstract abilities. These tendencies and capabilities depend on what the individual receives from the society in which he lives in both training and learning (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Debnath, 2020).

Hegel also believed that the first step towards man's self-knowledge and education is his recognition of his belonging to a historically developed society. In this way, Hegel sees that man is guided by oneself as an integrated human being, and accordingly he is concerned with two aspects of freedom: The first is the relationship of freedom with necessity, where obedience to the duties imposed by society is seen as just one aspect of self-education with the objective mind that is embodied in social systems and, here, the concept of dependence is mastered. This was not a single objective aspect in Hegel's view, but the human manifestations of the absolute spirit, in his view, are represented in art, philosophy and religion for they represent the areas of spiritual life (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Debnath, 2020; Rajab, 1986).

To conclude, Hegel derived the idea of alienation from the presence of man in the world. In his writings during his youth, Hegel focused on two basic issues: freedom and alienation. By freedom he meant the person's possession of himself, and by alienation he meant the

separation of man from himself and his actions, and from others. When Hegel discussed freedom and alienation, the Christian and Jewish religions in particular were criticized, which led to the alienation of man from himself whereby belief in a transcendent God from the world of man led to the alienation of man from himself and to losing his freedom and dignity (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Taylor, 1979; Debnath, 2020).

Hegel spoke about alienation in the philosophy of reality with its negative and positive sides, such that he communicates his concept of alienation as a single process in which man loses part of himself in the external existence. In this loss, both the self finds itself in the world it produced, and so it integrates with itself, or the world that the self-produced becomes alien to it and so the self does not belong to it resulting in it becoming an enemy to the self thereby causing destruction (Hegel, 1967, 1998; Taylor, 1975; Debnath, 2020).

Karl Marx (1844) is considered the first to deal with alienation as a historical social phenomenon, both in terms of its origin and development, and as a materialistic secular concept. Marx drew the concept of alienation from the works of Hegel, such that the starting point in his political and social thinking was the idea of man's alienation from the state as a citizen. He gradually reached his basic idea of alienation, which is the alienation of man from work through his understanding of the economic system. In his study of society, Marx was interested in realism and totalitarianism and the fact that the human being is the most important axis in economic processes. Marx addressed the alienation that accompanies productive processes from four angles:

1. Alienation of the worker from the product of his work.
2. Alienation of the worker from his work.
3. Alienation of the worker from himself.
4. Alienation of the worker from others (Marx & Engels, 1976).

From this viewpoint, Marx focused on alienation as a historical phenomenon related to the existence of man in the world whereby the source of alienation for him is man and not

technology. This is due to man is the one who puts the effort to produce things that he does not actually own, which causes alienation to him, and so the appropriate solution to this issue is socialism, in which man is liberated from the dependence of money and individual property (Marx & Engels, 1976; Hammad, 1995: 58-59).

As for Fromm, he spoke about alienation in general, and used many terms in his explanation of this concept. Fromm admits that Hegel formulated the concept of alienation, and that Hegel and Marx laid the basis for understanding the problem of alienation, and that he tries to apply Marx's concept of alienation to the predicament (Marx, 1844; Marx & Engels, 1976; Fromm, 1941, 1962; Shacht, 1980: 175).

In his book *The Sane Society*, Fromm states that "What is meant by alienation is a pattern of experience in which man himself lives as a stranger, and man is no longer the center of his world and the creator of his actions, but rather that his actions and their consequences become his masters whom he obeys or who may even worship them" (Hammad, 1995: 37). The phenomenon of alienation can be traced back to its historical roots in the Old Testament, especially in the Book of Genesis since the beginning of creation, where Fromm refers to the discord that occurs between God and man as a result of falling into sin or disobedience, and thus alienation occurs in man, which is what Fromm intended as the alienation of man from God (Fromm, 1941; 1962).

Fromm actually used the term alienation in all areas of contemporary life. He dealt with alienation in man's relationship with nature, with others, with society and with himself. He addresses this concept of the relationship of man with his work and with things (Miamoto, 1987).

In the relationship of man to nature, Fromm sees that man is able to transcend nature with what he owns and from others, so that man essentially finds himself naked (Fromm, 1962; Shacht, 1980: 180).

As for the alienation of man from society, Fromm meant that the structure of society was established in such a manner that meant that individuals are alienated in different ways. To this end, Fromm follows the example of Marx, who linked human alienation to the contemporary political economic structure, and that alienation is an effect left by capitalism on one's personality. Fromm agreed with Marx that alienation is conquered by making changes. Fromm focused in his discussion of the concept of alienation on the issue of human alienation from himself – knowing that Fromm's concept of the self is similar to that of Marx and Hegel – by focusing on the meanings of privacy, will and independence from external guidance. But Fromm stresses the need for self-development and the elimination of anything that prevents it. Self-estrangement, as Fromm imagines it, is represented in something similar to the absence or lack of a sense of self, spontaneity and individuality. In his discussion of the concept of alienation, Fromm spoke of other forms of alienation such as alienation from work, alienated friendships, and alienation of thought (Marx, 1844, 1977; Marx & Engels, 1976; Miamoto, 1987; Shacht, 1980: 1).

As for Emile Durkheim (1893), he dealt with alienation in the context of his analysis of what he called the phenomenon of anomie (anomy) or the breakdown of standards and norms. He believes that human happiness cannot be satisfactorily achieved unless his needs are commensurate or parallel with the means he has to satisfy them. If the situation requires more than he can obtain, or if it satisfies in a contradictory way what achieves his conviction, then he feels pain, disappointment and frustration. Durkheim's preoccupation is to show that industrial civilization, as it proceeds in its rapid development, suffers from a disease called anomie (loss of norms). The claim on which Durkheim relies is that the simple society lives in a specific system in which the interests of its members are subordinated to the benefit of the group, but modern development has eliminated this life, which is characterized by satisfactory work for the sake of the individual and the group (Durkheim, 1893; Oweidat, 1995).

The isolation of man from his traditional bonds and his distance from social solidarity is the source of his alienation in modern society. Durkheim points out that industrialization, mass

democracy and secularism have led to the individual tendency that has prevailed in modern history, whose manifestations are in despair, loneliness, self-fear, depression and excessive anxiety, which are manifestations of alienation (Durkheim, 1893; Oweidat, 1995).

Feuerbach (1881) has dealt with the issue of alienation based on his criticism of religion, where he deals with this issue from its negative side and confirms that alienation is a state of loss of original existence or exile. Although Hegel preceded him in this, the idea that religion is in the estrangement of man, his true essence, belongs originally to Feuerbach. Feuerbach's alienation is represented in the religious alienation between man and the Creator, which is the basis of everything, whether psychological, social or philosophical. The Creator, with His characteristics and capabilities, is independent of man. It is worthy to note that the solution from Feuerbach's point of view lies in the anthropological conception of religion, whereby the self has its own characteristics and existence (Feuerbach, 1881; Hammad, 1995: 57; Debnath, 2021).

In this regard, we must not forget the existentialists, since the root of the concept of alienation goes back in a large part to existential thought, especially Kierkegaard, the pioneer of existentialism. In his book, *The Present Age*, Kierkegaard deals with the issue of the alienation of modern man through his criticism of the individual's loss within the crowd, and his loss of his uniqueness and freedom. He asserts that when modern man sacrifices his freedom in exchange for the false reassurance of the public, he loses himself as a human being; That is, alienation is a loss of the person's self within the group (Hammad, 1995: 63).

Heidegger followed in Kierkegaard's footsteps in his concept of alienation and his hostility to the crowd, such that the presence of others and measuring things according to their standards is a waste of the true value of man (Hammad, 1995: 64).

Many thinkers have referred to the issue of alienation and delved into it with research and study. The contemporary thinker, Daniel, believed that alienation has a double meaning, which is alienation and reification. Alienation is a social and psychological state during

which a person senses the existence of a space from his community, so he is separated from it and is reificated. It is a philosophical proverb that means that the individual interacts as one thing, and turns into another thing, and is stripped of his personality (Al-Quraiti *et al.*, 1991).

Schneider (1964) emphasized that alienation is due to man's loss of his primary bonds and his isolation, and by these ties, he refers to man's relationship with his small community of friends and family, without which he turns into a secondary group. As for Scott (1964), he attributed alienation to a lack of commitment to values, a lack of compliance with social norms, a lack of defining responsibility, and an inability to control the available possibilities (Al-Quraiti *et al.*, 1991).

Thus, it becomes clear to us that the concept of alienation is as old as man himself, for it has been associated with it in all ages and times. The three monotheistic religions: Islam, Judaism and Christianity converge on a basic concept of alienation, meaning the separation from God (Al-Nawawi, 1979: 110).

If we review the topic of alienation in Islam, we find that the word alienation is not mentioned in the Holy Qur'an despite the fact that it was mentioned in the poems of the pre-Islamic era in the sense of being far from the homeland. According to the Qur'anic conception, man became alienated from God when he disobeyed his command and ate from the forbidden tree. He then fell from the sky and became present on earth living in a crisis, praying to his Lord God to have mercy on him and to help him until the Day of Resurrection (Rajab, 1986).

This is how the concept of alienation developed, increasingly being used in many fields, subsequently ending up being coined to a psychological phenomenon that spread among individuals, making them feel relatively separate from themselves and their societies. This prompted researchers to subject this phenomenon to scientific research to determine its prevalence, and to clarify its relationship to some variables. The banner of this trend was carried by some sociologists such as Melvin Seeman (1959). The proponents of this trend, especially Seeman, were interested in developing the definitions contained in the

sociological, psychological and philosophical heritage of the issue of alienation with the aim of adapting them to experimental work. Seeman (1959) dealt with the concept of alienation from a social point of view, and in his well-known research on the meaning of alienation, five meanings or dimensions of alienation appeared:

First: A loss of control or a state of powerlessness.

This meaning of alienation refers to the individual's feeling that he cannot influence the social situations with which he interacts. The expatriate individual here is unable to decide his own destiny, or influence the course of major events, or make important decisions that deal with his life and destiny thus he is unable to achieve himself.

Secondly: Meaninglessness or loss of meaning.

Here, alienation means the individual's feeling that he lacks guidance for behavior and belief. The expatriate individual here feels a huge emptiness as a result of the lack of basic goals that give meaning to his life, determine his direction and attract his activities.

Thirdly: Anomie or normlessness.

Here, alienation means the individual's feeling that illegal means are required, and that he needs them to achieve his goals. This situation arises when social values and norms disintegrate and fail to control individual behavior.

Fourthly: Social isolation or the state of isolation and non-belonging.

In this sense, alienation refers to the individual's feeling of alienation and isolation from the cultural goals of society. The individual does not feel belonging to the community or the nation.

Fifthly: Self-estrangement or self-alienation.

Here, alienation refers to the individual's feeling of inability to find self-rewarding activities. Meaning that a person does not derive much consolation, contentment and self-sufficiency from his activities, and loses his connection with his true self; and with time he becomes a

group of roles, goods and masks, and is unable to feel himself and his existence except in rare cases (Seeman, 1959; Al-Zaghal *et al*., 1990: 48-49).

According to this multi-dimensional sociological concept of the phenomenon of alienation, it is possible to consider the alienated person on the basis that he is a person who does not feel his effectiveness, importance or weight in life. Accordingly, he feels that he has no influence on the social situations with which he interacts. The alienated person feels that he lacks a guide for behavior and belief, and that the consistency of the values under his influence has become relative, contradictory, ambiguous and constantly and rapidly changing. In his relationships and social activities, the expatriate person feels that he does not realize himself and does not feel happiness, and he consequently turns to isolation and aversion to the self.

Through this theoretical framework, it turns out that the concept of alienation is a philosophical concept, to which various sciences, such as sociology, psychology, politics and economics, have contributed.

With regard to political alienation, many scholars have concluded that political expatriates usually do not tend to participate in politics, because feelings of political powerlessness tend to form psychological barriers that deter them from trying to make any effort that would support their integration with society and their participation in its activities. They are also not inclined to join the membership of political parties as a form of political participation; the idea of the party may seem rejected to them. Moreover, they are not inclined to participate in various social programs compared to non-expatriates, and they do not have the desire to become political leaders. Eckhardt (1967) explains the refusal of expatriates to participate in the political system as the only way they might have available to express their feelings of political powerlessness in societies where the political system usually has the power to deter contrary behavior. However, this position changes in the light of political pluralism, where this participation becomes the appropriate means of expressing rejection more than the means of rejection itself. He concluded that political inequality and non-participation in elections by expatriates is nothing but a position intended to influence the existing political structure.

Some studies show results that go beyond this range on the relationship of political alienation to political participation, as they have shown that the relationship between these two variables is clearer in the case of the low level of the social and economic status of the politically expatriate. Expatriates with a relatively low level of education are less likely to participate in general elections as a form of political participation compared to non-expats with a higher level of education (Eckhardt & Hendershot, 1967). Schnieder (1959) links political negativism and the Diaspora's withdrawal from political participation on the one hand, and their perceptions of the political situation on the other (Davids, 1955). He believes that the exaggerated idealistic perceptions and demands of individuals deepen the gap between the ideal political model and the existing political reality, which leads them to feel isolated from this reality, and thus tend to reject it, an idea referred to by Barakat (1969).

Others believe that the Diaspora's political inability to do any political action as a real helplessness, but rather a reflection of the firm belief that there is no benefit from any action. In contrast to the previous results, many studies reached a different conclusion. Some studies reported that political expatriates have shown greater initiative and inclination to political participation through elections; more than what was expected, which is not necessarily synonymous with negativity and a lack of political participation, as some believe. Political participation may be a means of criticizing the rejection that political expatriates exploit, in the sense that they may participate in order to reject in a positive way, and change the social and political conditions with which they are not satisfied.

Some revealed the relationship of political alienation with the weak channels of communication between individuals and the political system, and others linked it to discriminatory government policies in their relationship to members of society, which creates contradictory political tendencies for them.

Regarding the relationship of political alienation to gender differences, Ziegler (1988) concluded that men are generally more likely to feel political alienation than women (Swank,

1989) are, and this is what Barakat (1969) also found. The aforementioned is what some literature has suggested about political alienation and its connection to some variables.

1.8   Palestinian Refugees

1.8.1   Introduction

There is no crime in modern history equivalent to the crime of displacing Palestinians from their homes (Appendix F), which was called the "The Nakba of Palestine". After the 1948 war, which resulted in the establishment of the so-called State of Israel on 77% of the land of Palestine, and the uprooting of Palestinians from about twenty cities and 400 villages, approximately 700,000 Palestinians, equivalent to 66% of the population of Palestine at the time, became homeless. This was achieved with prior planning and support at the hands of Jewish gangs, and with political, military and financial support from the West, all of which led to the collapse of Palestinian society with all its components resulting in the existence of a new phenomenon in Palestinian society: that of "refugee camps" (Appendix G).

1.8.2   Palestine Through History

Palestine is located in western Asia on the eastern Mediterranean, and comes to the southwest of Greater Syria (Appendix H). The location of Palestine is strategically important because it connects the two continents of Asia and Africa, and is considered an important corridor from Asia to the Mediterranean Sea (Al-Budairi *et al*., 1990).

The first people to settle in the land of Palestine in the year 2500 BC came from the Arabian Peninsula, and from here came the first old name for Palestine, the land of Canaan. Palestine is witness to an ancient civilization exemplified by the city of Jericho, the city of the moon, which was considered the first city built in the history of human civilization around 800 BC (Ghouri, 1972; Haddad, 1987; Jibara, 1998).

The borders of Palestine have changed many times throughout history, but they usually indicated the land that lies between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The British Mandate fixed the borders of Palestine that are known today between the years of 1920 and 1923 (Suwaidan, 2005).

Palestine occupies an essential place for Muslims, as it is considered to be the most important locations for religions and heavenly messages. Many prophets lived in Palestine, beginning with Abraham (peace be upon him) and the last of them was our Lord Jesus Christ. The Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, visited it on the journey of Isra and Mi'raj. Moreover, Al-Aqsa Mosque is in Palestine, which is the first Qibla for prayer in Islam, and the third most important mosque in Islam (Amir, 2003).

The Zionist project was based on the idea of gathering Jews from all over the world and establishing a state for them. This idea was confirmed by the Torah, and accordingly, Zionism had to choose a place for all Jews worldwide to come to, and they picked Palestine for that purpose (Kiyali, 1985).

The Zionist organizations took advantage of the vital political transformations that the European countries witnessed in the 19th century in addition to the anti-Semitism movement, and they gained extensive control over all political, economic and media forums and programs. The increase in hostility to Jews in Eastern Europe contributed to the Jewish problem, which the Zionist organizations worked to exploit in order to deepen and consolidate the idea of a national home for the Jews in Palestine. Many Europeans and Americans sympathized with this idea (Salim, 1982).

Palestine was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire before 1920. By then, the Ottoman Empire was weak at the end of its reign, especially in the aftermath of the First World War. This has created the best environment to promote the idea of establishing a homeland for the Jews in Palestine despite the fact that there were several other places proposed by the Zionist project with the purpose of establishing a state for the Jews. Those include the East of the Suez Canal, and another country located in Uganda. However, Palestine was chosen to

establish a state for the Jews and achieve the Zionist project (Al-Natsheh, 1984; Al-Hourani, 2000).

1.8.3 The Balfour Declaration (1917)

Before the First World War ended and the victors shared the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour rushed, on November 2nd 1917, to write a letter to the British banker and one of the Jewish leaders in Britain, Baron Rothschild, that led to the establishment of the State of Israel and what ensued of wars and crises in the Middle East (Appendix I). As for the reasons that prompted Britain to issue this promise, there is more than one explanation, the most important of which is that Britain wanted to obtain the support of the Jewish community in the United States during the First World War because of its wide influence there in an attempt to push the United States to participate in the war on the side of Britain. Another explanation is the belief that the Old Testament guarantees Israel the right to Palestine.

The letter does not include the word "state", but rather talks about a homeland and stresses that nothing should be done that might jeopardize the civil and religious rights of the other groups living in Palestine.

The Balfour letter was the culmination of many years of contacts and negotiations between British politicians and the leaders of the Zionist movement in Britain. The issue of the fate of the Palestinian territories was under discussion in the ruling circles in Britain immediately after its entry into the First World War. The first meeting took place between Chaim Weizmann, the later leader of the Zionist movement, and Balfour in 1904, and it addressed the issue of establishing a homeland for the Jews in Palestine.

The letter, which later became known as the Balfour Declaration, stated the following:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2nd November 1917

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Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have the pleasure to inform you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, of the following statement of sympathy with the ambitions of Zionist Jews which has been submitted to and approved by the Government.

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to achieve this end, provided that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of other groups residing in Palestine, or the rights enjoyed by Jews in other countries, or anything that may affect their political status.

I would be grateful if you would take note of this statement to the Zionist Federation.

Sincerely yours,
Arthur Balfour

1.8.4   The British Mandate (1920-1948)

Shows the period of the British Mandate in Palestine (Appendix J), whereby Palestine came under its mandate as per the Balfour Declaration. The British Mandate is considered the golden period in which the settlement process and the immigration of Jews to Palestine were intensified. This was done under the supervision of a great power that supported it. At this stage, the settlement was subject to political and strategic considerations. Settlements were established in strategic areas and were in the form of closed communities called "ghettos" (Ghouri, 1972).

The Zionist organizations decided to accelerate the settlement movement to include the widest geographical area in the event of a partition of Palestine after reading the White Paper, issued in 1930, which stipulated the division of Palestine into two states, and specified the

number of Jewish immigrants who would come to Palestine over the next four years (Salim, 1982).

Palestine was subjected to a great conspiracy under the British occupation. During this period, the number of Jews increased from 55,000 in 1918 to 600,000 in 1948. Haganah gangs sought to expropriate Palestinian lands with the help of British colonialism. The Jewish Agency was established in 1929, which organized Jewish immigration from all over the world to Palestine. It established the institutions of the Jewish government economically, socially and educationally. It also established the Histadrut Labor Foundation and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Salim, 1982; Al-Budairi *et al.*, 1990).

1.8.5 The Nakba (1948)

After the Nakba of 1948, which led to the establishment of the State of Israel on 77% of the land of Palestine depending on the UN partition resolution 181 according to the (Appendix K), and after the uprooting of the Palestinians from about twenty cities and 420 villages, about 957,000 (66%) of Palestinians became homeless (Appendix F). The components of Palestinian society completely collapsed, which led to the emergence of a new phenomenon: Palestinian refugees (Jibara, 1998).

Palestinian refugees came from twenty Palestinian cities, mostly Acre, Ramle, Bisan, Beer seba', Haifa, Jaffa, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias and others, and from 420 villages including Ajour, Fallujah, Zakaria, Al-Dawaima, Al-Maghar, Tel Al-Safi, Al-Bureij, Bait Native and so on (Jarrar, 1995; Banat, 2002).

1.8.6 Al Naksa or the Setback of 1967

In the wake of the Nakba, Palestinians were uprooted and forcibly displaced from their land. The Israeli occupation has stripped and uprooted the Palestinian people and deprived them of almost all their basic human rights, and especially of their legitimate right to live in dignity on their land (Al-Hoot, 1986).

The West Bank came under Jordanian control, and the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control in the wake of the 1948 war. In the wake of the Naksa in 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai and the Golan Heights, which prompted the Arab regimes to think clearly about changing the course of their vision by abandoning the idea of "liberation" and expelling the Zionist occupation, and adopting the idea of "reconciliation," which reflects the reality of their inability and failure to resort to confrontation. Meanwhile, the occupation was working to strengthen itself and gradually increase its strength (Al-Rimawi, 2005).

After the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israeli occupation implemented systematic policies, including the confiscation of land, control of water resources, weakening and tightening the grip on the Palestinian economy and linking it to the Israeli economy, exploiting Palestinian labor in the Israeli labor market, and destroying political, economic and social institutions and infrastructure. This led to distortions in the structure of the Palestinian society and thus weakening any opportunity for the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity. The series of laws, regulations and military procedures that aimed to tighten the political and security grip on the Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip also had its weight (Hilal, 1974; Boyasir, 1987; Mansour, 1989).

1.8.7   Who Are The Palestinian Refugees?

A refugee is every Palestinian who was expelled from his natural place of residence in Palestine in 1948 or thereafter, or who was expelled from it for any reason, and Israel did not allow him to return to his homeland. The refugee shall retain this status until he or his descendants return to his original homeland (Abu Sitteh, 2001). This means that returning to the land of Palestine, even if that land has become a Palestinian state, does not lose him his refugee status legally, in conscience and in action as long as the refugee has not returned to his country of origin. Of course, resettlement in any Arab country, including the state of Palestine if it were established, does not cancel the refugee status.

This alsoapplies even if the person was residing in Palestine in 1948 (Israel), and became a holder of Israeli citizenship, but was prevented from returning to his original village, then he is still a refugee. Today, there are 250,000 internal refugees in Israel – about a quarter of the Palestinians in Israel – all of whom have been prevented from returning to their original villages, such as the example of the villages of Iqrit and Bir'em. The people of these two villages were expelled from their homeland in November 1948 and were promised to return within two weeks. They have not returned so far despite a ruling in their favor by the Israeli Supreme Court.

This definition of a refugee conforms to international law on the basis of which the famous United Nations Resolution No. 194 was issued, which judges the right of refugees to return, as it was stated in the explanatory memorandum of the decision that the return is to the homeland (home, house or field) from which he left.

The United Nations Relief Agency (UNRWA) used another definition, adding to the previous definition "the one who has lost his source of livelihood or needs aid", because the purpose of the agency was to provide relief to the refugees by feeding them, educating them and providing them with healthcare (Abu Sitteh, 2001). It is worthy to note that the number of refugees registered with the Agency is only 6.4 million out of 7.9 million refugees, which means that there are 1.5 million unregistered refugees.

Israel is trying to manipulate these definitions in order to reduce the number of refugees. For example, it sometimes claims that the refugees are only residents of the camps, i.e., about one million people, and this is a clear mistake. Or it claims that only those who were born before 1948 are refugees and estimates their number at only 50,000 while the real number is about 500,000.

There is no legal value for all these allegations because the definition of the United Nations in Resolution 194 is quite clear. If this decision is implemented, it is not for Israel to pick and choose who the people of Lod or Fallujah are, or the United Nations records of Palestinian property and so on.

Another frequently used expression is "displaced person", meaning a person who was resident until 1967 in Gaza or the West Bank – whether he was a citizen or a refugee – and left them for Jordan mostly because of the 1967 war (Abu Sitteh, 2001). This expression has no legal value and is an Israeli invention, wishing to claim sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, and this is what the entire international community, including America, rejects. Therefore, it claims the right to allow the return of whomever it wants from those who are 'displaced'. If the occupation is removed from the West Bank and Gaza, the refugee will remain a refugee and the citizen will remain a citizen, and they both have the right to move and live like any other person. Therefore, negotiating over the "displaced person" is an implicit recognition of the occupation or of Israel's sovereignty over those areas, so that it has the right to prevent or limit the number of "displaced persons" who are allowed to return, each to his home or camp.

The international community has affirmed the right of refugees to return under Resolution 194 more than a hundred times in the past 52 years, in a phenomenon unparalleled in the history of the United Nations. This decision goes beyond the decision intended to remove the effects of the 1967 aggression and does not contradict the Partition Resolution 181, which stipulates the right of every citizen to his home and land regardless of the sovereignty of the state in which he lives. Moreover, the right of return is guaranteed by Article 13 of the International Charter of Human Rights. In fact, the right of return stems from the sanctity of private property, which does not fall by occupation, sovereignty or the passage of time.

The right of return is an individual right under all of these legislations, and therefore it is not permissible in it by proxy or representation, and it cannot be waived in any agreement or treaty. In addition, the right of return is a collective right under the right to self-determination, which was affirmed by the United Nations in 1974 in the strongest comprehensive statement of Palestinian rights, which it called "inalienable rights." Therefore, it does not fall in the event of a peace treaty (Abu Sitteh, 2001). Of course, the Oslo Accord of Principles has no legal value to waive inalienable rights.

Table (1-1) shows a list of the villages from which Palestinians were uprooted in 1948, according to the judiciary, the number of refugees in 1948, and their number in 2000 (Abu Sitteh, 2001).

Table (1-1): The Palestinians who were uprooted from their homes... Where were their homes?

The judiciary	No. of displaced villages	No. of refugees in 1948	No. of refugees in 2000
Acre	30	47038	
Ramleh	64	97405	
Bisan	31	19602	
Beer Seba	88	90507	
Gaza	46	79947	
Haifa	59	121196	
Hebron	16	22991	
Jaffa	25	123227	
Jerusalem	39	97950	
Jenin	6	4005	
Nazareth	5	8746	
Safad	78	52248	
Tiberias	26	28872	
Toulkarem	18	11032	
Total	531	804766	

In other words, 85% of the residents of the lands on which Israel was established have become refugees.

The Zionist gangs used various methods and means to uproot the Palestinians from their land, which led to their forced displacement outside their original homes, where they sought refuge in other locations in the rest of the Palestinian lands, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in the neighboring Arab countries. Table (1-2) shows the most important means used by Israeli gangs to displace Palestinian citizens from their home.

Table (1-2): The means used by the Israeli gangs to displace Palestinian citizens from their homes

According to the Israeli files	No. of villages
Expulsion by Jewish forces	122
Direct jewish military attack	270
Fear of a Jewish attack on the villages	38
The effect of the fall of a nearby city	49
Psychological war	12
Optional Exit	6
Unknown	34
Total	531

In other words, 90% of the villages were displaced due to the Israeli military attacks on them (Abu Sitteh, 2001).

The number of Palestinians in 2021 was estimated at 14 million, some of whom live on the land of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and about 7 million people live in Israel, which constitutes 50% of the total. The number of Palestinians abroad reached about 7 million, of whom 6.3 million live in the Arab countries, and about 700,000 in the other countries, meaning that more than half of the Palestinian people are refugees (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2021).

The number of Palestinian refugees registered with the International Relief Agency (2020) is 6,388,887 refugees in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, who live in 58 camps, of whom 5,703,521 are registered refugees. There are registered persons (685,366) eligible to receive services under "other registered refugees".

1.8.8   Refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

The estimated population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip around the middle of 2020 was about 5.1 million people, where the population in the West Bank reached 3.05 million people and in the Gaza Strip 2.05 million people. The number of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip reached 2,065,500 refugees in 2020, or 40.5% of the population, who live in 27 refugee camps, including 19 camps in the West Bank and 8 camps in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020, 2021).

1.8.9   Refugees in the West Bank

The number of refugees in the West Bank reached 728,950 refugees living in 19 camps (Askar - Al Fara'a - Nour Shams - Tulkarm - Qalandia - Dheisheh - Aida - Beit Jibrin - Al Fawar - Al Arroub - Aqbat Jaber - Ain Al Sultan - Ain Beit Al Maa - Jenin - Balata - Al-Amari - Deir Ammar - Shuafat - Al-Jalazun (Appendix L) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020, 2021).

1.8.10 Refugees in the Gaza Strip

The number of refugees in the Gaza Strip reached 1,328,400 refugees, most of whom live in the eight camps of the sector (Jabalia, Al-Bureij, Al-Nuseirat, Al-Maghazi, Deir Al-Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah and Al-Shati) (Appendix M) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020, 2021).

1.8.11 Refugees in Jordan

Jordan is the largest host country for refugees, and the number of refugees living in Jordan is 2,463,130, some of whom live in the following camps (Al-Baqa'a - Al-Hussein - Al-Wihdat - Talbieh - Zarqa - Hittin - Irbid - Jerash - Al-Hosn - Sof) (Appendix G) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020, 2021).

1.8.12 Refugees in Syria

About 655,729 refugees live in Syria, and among the most important camps are (Yarmouk - Khan al-Sheikh - Khan Dnoun - Sabineh - Sayeda Zainab - Jaramana - Neirab - Homs - Hama - Darma) (Appendix N) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020, 2021).

1.8.13 Refugees in Lebanon

543,824 refugees live in Lebanon, including the camps (Mar Elias - Burj Al-Barajneh - Dbayeh - Shatila - Ain Al-Hilweh - Mieh o Mieh - Al-Bass - Rashidieh - Borj Al-Shamali - Nahr Al-Bared - Al-Badawi) (Appendix O) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020, 2021).

1.8.14 From UNRWA Records

Distribution of Palestinian refugees (Jordan 40%, Gaza Strip 21%, West Bank 17%, Syria 11%, Lebanon 11%) (Mansour, 2001).

1.8.15 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)

In response to the catastrophe of 1948, and as a result of the painful conditions experienced by the Palestinian people, several associations and centers were established, which focused

mainly on providing services and assistance at various levels to Palestinian refugees. Among these institutions was the International Relief Agency, which was involved in this field and provided services in kind, health, and education to Palestinian refugees at home and in the Diaspora, but these services were never able to cover the refugees' requirements and their increasing needs, in light of their deprivation of many of the necessities of life.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was formed in 1948 and took over relief work for the United Nations specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations. When it became clear that the Palestinian refugee issue would not be resolved quickly, the United Nations General Assembly/United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) was established.
A decision was taken to establish it in December 1949, and UNRWA began its operations in May 1950. Although it was considered a temporary agency, UNRWA's mandate was regularly renewed over the past 45 years, and UNRWA still provides basic services to refugees, and education is the largest service provided by the Agency and consumes 49% of its budget. While health services consume 21% of the budget (Mansour, 2001, Nar and Noor website). UNRWA's services are an international commitment towards refugees, and the continuation of the agency's work is linked to resolving the refugee issue, and improving living conditions does not negate the political rights of refugees.

1.8.16 The United Nations and Refugees

Since 1948, the United Nations General Assembly has issued more than fifty resolutions dealing with the issue of Palestinian refugees, the most important of which is Resolution 194 issued on 11/12/1948, which was repeatedly referred to in subsequent resolutions. The resolution states that "Refugees who wish to return to their countries and live in peace with their neighbors should be allowed to do so at the earliest possible date, and those who do not wish to return should be compensated for their property and for the damage and destruction they have sustained, in accordance with international law or in accordance with the principles of justice, and governments or authorities are obligated to do so" (Mansour, 2001, Nar and

Noor website). Resolution 194 is considered the basis for all United Nations resolutions on refugees and constitutes a strong card among the Arabs. It is worth noting that the United Nations' recognition of Israel as a state is conditional on its implementation of this resolution.

1.8.17 From the Declaration of Independence

On the land of heavenly messages to the Palestinian people on the land of Palestine, the Palestinian people were born, developed and created their human and national existence through an organic relationship that is indissoluble and unbroken between the people, the land and history. With epic steadfastness in place and time, the Palestinian people formulated their national identity, and elevated their steadfastness in defending it to the level of a miracle. The permanence of the people's friendship with the land is what gave the land its identity and what breathed into the people the spirit of the homeland.

The occupation of the Palestinian land by the Israeli forces, uprooting the majority of the Palestinians and displacing them from their homes by the force of organized terrorism, and subjecting the rest of them to occupation, persecution and operations to destroy the landmarks of their national lives, is a flagrant violation of the principles of international legitimacy, the Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions that recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to self-determination, independence and sovereignty over his homeland.

Based on the natural, historical and legal right of the Palestinian Arab people in their homeland Palestine and the sacrifices of their successive generations in defense of their homeland's freedom and independence, and based on United Nations resolutions since 1947, the Palestinian people's exercise of their right to self-determination, political independence and sovereignty over their land, the National Council declares:
The refugee issue is at the root of the Palestinian issue.
1. There is no peace without the return of the refugees.
2. The right of return is a sacred right.

3. Refugees at home and abroad are an indivisible unit.
4. Adhering to Resolution 194 as a basis for resolving the refugee issue.
5. Refugees are human beings with rights (the right to live in a homeland and with dignity).
6. Camps have always been the title of the Palestinian issue.
7. The camps bore the burden of the struggle.
8. The camps have the right to development.
9. The conditions of the camps are not worthy of us as citizens and human beings.
10. Hand in hand we build a nation with all its sons, for all its sons.
11. The United Nations recognized Israel on the basis of its acceptance of the refugees' right of return (Mansour, 2001, Nar and Noor website).

1.9 Study Design

1.9.1 Statement of the Problem

In spite of extensive theoretical previous studies on the political alienation worldwide in general and in the Palestinian society in particular, empirical studies of this important concept among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora is scarce. Palestinians remained deprived of exercising their right to elections until 1996 when the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, according to which the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994. The Oslo Accords stipulated that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would hold legislative, presidential and local elections. It is worthy to note that the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had reached nearly five million, and the number of Palestinian people in all places of their residence was about fifteen million. This meant that more than two-thirds of the Palestinian people could not participate in the election of a political leader to represent them (Jabali, 2009).

Subsequent to the Oslo Agreement and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the first presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 1996 where the Fateh movement won the elections and the Islamic movements boycotted the elections at the time. The

elections were scheduled to be held every four years, but the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 led to the inability of the Palestinians to hold elections until 2005 when the second presidential elections were held, which were won by the Fateh movement and which were also boycotted by the Islamic movements. The second legislative elections were later held in 2006 in which Hamas participated and won (Banat, 2010).

In 2021, the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree to hold parliamentary elections, but the Israeli Occupation constituted the biggest obstacle to holding the presidential elections, and consequently postponing the elections because the Israeli Occupation did not allow them to take place in East Jerusalem. As for the local elections, they were held in 2004 and 2005. Local elections were then held in 2012 and 2017. Palestinians were also preparing to hold local elections in 2021.

The main purpose of the current study is to investigate the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. Indicators and differences of political alienation between the participants were also assessed, to determine the demographic breakdown that influence this concept among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.

1.9.2   Significance Of The Study

The study is considered one of the leading studies that deal with the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. Palestinians in the Diaspora have been uprooted from their lands and homeland symbolize their daily sufferings on all levels: cultural, social, economic and political. They are still up till this present moment waiting for a political decision to put an end to their pain and suffering. In the human history there is not any crime which is as brutal as the crime of forcing Palestinians out of their lands in 1948 at the hands of the Zionist gangsters; this was later called the Palestinian Nakba (Setback) (Sayegh, 1983; Kana'na, 2000; Banat, 2002, 2010; Allan, 2007).

The study will be an important reference to those concerned in the area of political alienation especially in the findings it will reveal about this worldwide phenomenon. The Palestinian library is in need for precise empirical researches to this effect and to lay the scientific

grounds in order to enhance their question politically, socially and culturally. It is expected that the findings would add new scientific knowledge to its field in particular since it discusses a new and important topic in the Palestinian Diaspora.

1.9.3   Objectives Of The Study

The study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

1. Exploring the level of political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.
2. Addressing the indicators of political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.
3. Exploring the demography breakdown over political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora with the aim of identifying any statistically significant differences.

1.9.4   Questions Of The Study

The present study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What is the level of the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora?
2. What are the indicators of the political alienation as perceived by the Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora?
3. Are there any statistically significant differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to their gender, age, marital status, number of family members, educational level, religion commitment, relation to work force, political party affiliation, fraction affiliation, and region?

1.9.5   Variables Of The Study

The current study includes ten independent variables, represent the demography breakdown of the participants that are, gender, age, marital status, number of family members, educational level, religion commitment, relation to work force, political party affiliation,

fraction affiliation, and region. In addition to the dependent variable, which consists of an index of a 40-item scale to assess the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora, using a 5-point Likert scale (Strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree).

1.9.6   Hypotheses Of The Study

Taking into consideration, the set objectives, questions and variables of the study, the study addresses the following main hypothesis:

1. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to gender.
2. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to work force.
3. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to party affiliation.
4. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status.
5. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level.
6. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to political fraction.
7. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to region.
8. There is no statistically significant correlation at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ between age and the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.
9. There is no statistically significant correlation at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ between number of family members and the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.
10. There is no statistically significant correlation at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ between religion commitment and the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.

11. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to gender and region.

12. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to age and region.

13. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status and region.

14. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to number of family members and region.

15. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level and region.

16. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to religion commitment and region.

17. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to work force and region.

18. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to party affiliation and region.

19. There are no statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to political fraction and region.

1.10 Definition Of Terms

1.10.1 Intifada (Civil Uprising; Shaking Off):

It is a popular social rebellion movement against undesirable conditions in order to change them into a new and better situation by means of mobilizing popular behavior and exploiting activities against the occupier in order to regain the stolen rights. It referrs to the First Intifada which began in 1987 as well as to the second Al-Aqsa Intifada which started in 2000 (Abu Hin, 2001; Passia, 2002A).

Gaza Strip: It is a coastal strip of land along the Mediterranean Sea. It borders Egypt on the south-west and Israel on the south and east (The estimated population according to the 2007 consensus was 1,389,000) with an area of 360 square kilometers. The area is not recognized internationally as part of any sovereign country, but is claimed by the Palestinian National Authority as part of the Palestinian territories. Since the June 2007 battle of Gaza, actual control of the area is in the hands of the Hamas government. Egypt governed the Gaza Strip from 1948-1967, and today it rules the southern border between the Gaza strip and the Sinai desert, a border now famous for the breach in early 2008 and the smuggling of food through underground tunnels. Israel governed the Gaza Strip from 1967-2005. Pursuant to the Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Israel maintains military control of the Gaza Strip airspace, non-Egyptian land borders and territorial waters (Wikipedia, 2000).

1.10.2 Oslo Accords:

Officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or Declaration of Principles (DOP) was a milestone in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was the first direct, face-to-face agreement between Israel and political representatives of Palestinians. It was intended to be a framework for future relations between Israel and the anticipated Palestinian state, when all outstanding final status issues between the two states would be addressed and resolved in one agreement (Wikipedia, 2000).

The Accords were finalized in Oslo, Norway on 20 August 1993, and subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington D.C. on 13 September 1993, with Yasser Arafat signing for the Palestine Liberation Organization and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signing for the State of Israel. It was witnessed by Warren Christopher for the United States and Andrei Kozyrev for Russia, in the presence of US President Bill Clinton (Wikipedia, 2000).

The Oslo Accords were a framework for the future relations between the two parties. The Accords provided for the creation of a Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. The Accords also called for the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Permanent issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders were deliberately left to be decided upon a later stage. Interim self-government was to be granted by Israel in phases (Wikipedia, 2000).

Support for the Accords, the concessions made and the process were not free from criticism. The repeated public posturing of all sides has discredited the process, not to mention putting into question the possibility of achieving peace, at least in the short-term. Further strain was put on the process after Hamas won Palestinian elections in 2006. Although offering Israel a number of long-term ceasefires and accepting the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, Hamas has repeatedly refused to officially recognize Israel renounce legal resistance, or accept some agreements previously made by the Palestinian Authority, claiming it is being held to an unfair standard and points out the fact that Israel has not recognized a Palestinian state, renounced violence or lived up to all pledges it has made during previous negotiations. Hamas has always renounced the Oslo Accords (Appendix P) (Wikipedia, 2000).

1.10.3 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):

It is a political and paramilitary organization regarded by the Arab League since October 1974 as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Founded by a meeting of 422 Palestinian national figures in Jerusalem in May 1964 following an earlier decision by the Arab League, whose goal was the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. The original PLO Charter (issued on May 28th 1964) stated that Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate is an

integral regional unit and sought to prohibit... the existence and activity of Zionism. It also called for a right of return and self-determination for Palestinians. Palestinian statehood was not mentioned, although in 1974 the PLO called for an independent state in the territory of Mandate Palestine. In 1988, the PLO officially adopted a two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side contingent on specific terms such as making East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state and giving Palestinians right of return (Passia, 2002A).

1.10.4 Palestinian National Authority (PNA):

It is the administrative organization established to govern parts of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has about 3,750,000 Palestinian residents. The Palestinian National Authority was formed in 1994, pursuant to the Oslo Accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the government of Israel, as a 5-year interim body during which final status negotiations between the two parties were to take place but never did. According to the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was designated to have control over both security-related and civilian issues in Palestinian urban areas (referred to as Area A), and only civilian control over Palestinian rural areas (Area B). The remainder of the territories, including Israeli settlements, the Jordan Valley region, and bypass roads between Palestinian communities, were to remain under exclusive Israeli control (Area C). East Jerusalem was excluded from the Accords (Passia, 2002A).

1.10.5 A Refugee Is:

A   person who   has escaped from their own country for political,   religious, or economic reasons or because of a war (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018). According to the UN Refugees are persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection (UN, 1951).

1.10.6 Palestinian Refugee:

According to UNRWA, a Palestine refugee is "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict" (UNRWA, 1951). According to the Department of Refugee Affairs of the Palestine Liberation Organization the Palestinian Refugees are the Arab citizens who were forced to leave their homes in 1947, and everyone who was born to an Arab father until this date inside or outside Palestine has the right to return to his home (Salameh, 2006).

According to Article 5 of the Palestinian National Charter, which was not included in the powers abolished in 1996 according to the Oslo Accords, "Palestinian refugees and Palestinians in general are Arab citizens who were habitual residents of Palestine, and Palestine's boundaries are consistent with those of the Mandate established in 1906 until 1947, whether they were expelled or remained there. Anyone born to a Palestinian Arab father after that date inside or outside Palestine is a Palestinian" (Hafnawi, 1990).

1.10.7 Nakba (Catastrophe Or Disaster):

Nakba or Al-Nakba refers to the first wave of displaced and forcibly expelled Palestinians (approx. 800,000 people) from their homeland in 1948, and accompanying consequences, including their land occupation and confiscation. Today, 70 years after the Nakba, there are about 7.5 million Palestinian refugees; most of whom are still living in Refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in neighboring Arab countries (PCBS, 2017).

The Palestinian term for the events of 1948, when many Palestinians were displaced by the creation of the new state of Israel also describes the "uprooting of the Palestinians and the dismemberment and de-Arabization of historic Palestine"

(Masalha, 2012: 1). Moreover, this occurred when more than 900,000 Palestinian people – about half of prewar Palestine's Arab population – fled or were expelled from their homes during the 1948 Palestine war (Abu Sitteh, 1997; Banat, 2002; Masri, 2008).

1.10.8 Political Parties

Aldrich defined the political parties as collective entities that organize competitions for political offices (Aldrich, 1995). In a narrow definition, a political party can be thought of as just the group of candidates who run for office under a party label (Chhibber & Kollman, 2004). In a broader definition, political parties are the entire apparatus that supports the election of a group of candidates, including voters and volunteers who identify with a particular political party, the official party organizations that support the election of that party's candidates, and legislators in the government who are affiliated with the party (Anzia & Meeks, 2016). In many countries, the notion of a political party is defined in law, and governments may specify requirements for an organization to legally qualify as a political party (Avnon, 2007). According to Morse, a political party is a durable organization united by common principles which "has for its immediate end the advancement of the interests and the realization of the ideals... of the particular group or groups which it represents" (Morse, 1896). Political parties are distinguished from other political groups and clubs, such as political factions or interest groups, mostly by the fact that parties are focused on electing candidates, whereas interest groups are focused on advancing a policy agenda (Maltese *et al*. 2020). This is related to other features that sometimes distinguish parties from other political organizations, including a larger membership, greater stability over time, and a deeper connection to the electorate (Belloni & Beller, 1976).

1.10.9 Naksa (Setback):

The Arab popular name for what is known as the Six-Day War or the 1967 War, which took place on June 5th 1967 between Israel and some Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and ended with Israel's control of the entire State of Palestine, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights (Salameh, 2006).

1.10.10 The Right of Return:

This is the right whereby one or several persons and/or their descendants demand to return to the places where they used to live, but were forced to leave. It also refers to the right to repossess the property of which they were dispossessed or which they abandoned (Babadji, 1996).

The right of return is also reinforced in the UN General Assembly Resolution 194, wherein the issue of refugees is addressed in Article 11:

"Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible" (Hafnawi, 1996).

1.10.11 Camp:

The camp is a population gathering built on a limited area of land, which is placed at the disposal of the UNRWA in order to accommodate Palestinian refugees and assist them in meeting their basic needs. The UNRWA provides full supervision of the camp and provides health services, education, relief and social services for special hardship cases only (Banat, 2002, 2014).

1.10.12 Compensation:

This is to return something to its origin, to abolish the difference in the moral and physical state of the individual and the community between their living on their own homeland and uprooting and displacing them. This includes personal material benefit, such as movable and immovable property and businesses, and public material benefit, Such as organizations, services, public property, and sources of natural wealth. This also includes personal moral benefit, such as feeling safe, living in a family, and feeling happy, and public moral benefit, such as national identity, culture, history, and holy places (Abu Sitteh, 2001).

1.10.13 Consciousness:

Is the set of shared beliefs, ideas and moral attitudes which operate as a unifying force within society (Durkheim, 1893).

1.10.14 Palestinian Youth:

The term Palestinian youth, refers to both male and females between 15-19 years of age who reside in refugee camps at the West Bank regardless of their social or legal status, race, class or any other factor.

1.12.15 Exposure to Israeli Violence:

Any forms of Israeli violence that the youth families were exposed to in the camps, such as detention, home raids, injury, martyrdom, house demolition, job loss, ban from traveling, deportation and compulsory house arrest …etc. (Banat, 2010).

1.10.15 Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH):

It is a civilian observer mission stationed in the West Bank city of Hebron. It is an organization that was called for by the Israeli government and the Palestinian

authority in 1997 to provide support in the efforts to improve the situation in the city of Hebron. It was established following the killing of 29 Palestinians who were praying at the Abraham Mosque at the hand of one of the extreme settlers on February 25th 1994. The six member states of TIPH are: Norway, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, Denmark and Sweden. Every six months the Israeli government and the Palestinian authority decide if they want to renew the mandate of TIPH and, accordingly, sign an extension of the agreement (Banat, 2005).

1.10.16 The West Bank:

It is a territory, formerly part of Palestine, after 1949 administered by Jordan, and since 1967 largely occupied by Israel (the estimated population as per the 2007 consensus was 2,386,000) with an area of 5,607 square km, located west of the Jordan River, incorporating the northwest quadrant of the Dead Sea. Since the mid-1994, limited Palestinian self-rule has existed in portions of the West Bank under the Palestinian National Authority. Israelis who regard the area as properly Jewish territory often refer to it by the biblical names of Judaea and Samaria. The largest and most historically important cities are Hebron, Nablus, Bethlehem, and Jericho. East Jerusalem is regarded as part of the West Bank by Arabs; however, Israel has incorporated it into the larger Jerusalem economy and municipality (Wikipedia, 2000).

1.10.17 Political System

It is a set of rules and institutions that are coherent and interconnected among themselves, that show the system of government, the means of exercising power, its objectives and nature as well as the elements of the forces that control society, how they interact with each other, and the role that each of them plays (Abu Saif, 2009).

Easton defines the political system as "a set of interaction as abstracted from the totality of the social behavior, through which values are authoritatively allocated for

society". Easton argues that all political systems are closely connected with other social systems (Easton, 1965).

1.10.18 Democracy

Democracy comes from Ancient Greek: demos which means 'the people' and kratein which means 'to rule'. Hence, demokratia (democracy) indicates 'rule by the people'. As defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, democracy is "a. a system of government by the whole population, usually through elected representatives. b. a state so governed. c. any organization governed on democratic principles" (Harrison, Boyd, 2018).

1.10.19 Diaspora

Diaspora Palestinians is the term used to describe Palestinians who live outside Palestine. The total number of Palestinians worldwide is estimated between 9-11 million, at least half of whom live outside their country (Shiblak, 2005).

CHAPTER TWO: PREVIOUS STUDY

2   Previous Studies

2.1   Introduction

Several studies have addressed the topic of political alienation. The subject of alienation has had the attention of researchers and thinkers since ancient times. This is due to the potential negative effects that it has on human life. Many Arab and foreign studies addressed political alienation and political participation in different countries. The researcher refers to many of these studies in this section.

2.2   Political Alienation

In a very recent study for Zhang (2022), the study answered one general question using a country-scale case: what shapes the young generations' political disengagement in Singapore? Taking the generational differences and institutional influence perspectives, the study highlighted the time dimension to show the ebb and flow of political and (new) media landscape changes in a non-Western context in Singapore. By analyzing focus group discussions conducted among youth aged between 19 to 30 years old in 2011 compared to 2020, the author found that despite similarly claiming disinterest in politics, the 2011 youth group were more attentive to political news than the 2020 group. The changes in political institutions gave rise to this increased situational engagement. However, the gap between paying attention and taking action was still large in 2020, or even larger than in 2011, due to the increased complexity and competitiveness of politics that the 2011 youth group observed on social media. The persistence of political disinterest suggested its dispositional connections to psychological barriers that have been socially constructed over generations.

In another recent study by Abu Ali (2021) aimed to identify the impact of the social reality in the Palestinian camps on political participation after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority. The study adopted the camps of the West Bank as a model through the randomized sampling of 175 individuals from the Palestinian camp residents in the West Bank, using the descriptive approach and the questionnaire as a tool for data collection. The study concluded that the absence of adequate education and awareness by the Palestinian National Authority and its

official bodies made the political participation of Palestinian citizens in the camps considerably low. Additionally, the restriction of freedoms and the decline in the role of the political factions had a negative impact on political participation which was evident by the decrease in the participation rate. The impact of the deteriorating economic conditions in the camps on the political participation of camp residents was moderate. Study results showed that there were statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha \leq 0.05$ between the average responses of the study sample about the impact of the policies of the Palestinian National Authority represented in the official bodies in the Palestinian camps on political participation after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority according to the variables of gender, educational qualification and family income. No differences appeared with regards to age or the nature of work. The study recommended the necessity of reviving partisan political activities because of its positive impact on stimulating the camp residents' motivation towards political activities and political participation in light of the decline in the role of Palestinian factions in implementing educational programs, seminars and educational brochures. The author also recommended strengthening the values of justice in dealing with camp residents and combating biased behavior and nepotism, as this would have a significant positive impact on the political situation in general and on political participation in particular.

In another study by Borges (2021), which assumed corruption may lead individuals to believe that they were unable to influence the course of politics in Latin America, lowering their electoral participation and support for democracy. To investigate this assumption, the author tested whether corruption victimization impacts electoral alienation. The study assessed how personal experience with corruption affects the intention to vote with survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean. The findings showed that corruption victimization increased electoral alienation in all 18 Latin American countries under analysis. More specifically, the study's core linear probability model (LPM) indicated that the likelihood of someone casting a valid vote in the upcoming national elections fell by 2.8 percentage points when this person is a recent victim of corruption, nullifying the engagement effect of three years of formal education, all confounding variables held constant. Following a series of robustness tests, this finding corroborates the hypothesis that corruption victimization lowers citizens' perception of their own power to influence political change, leading to more abstention or invalid voting. At the same time, the effect of corruption

victimization extended to support for the entire political system as corruption victims are 2.1 percentage points less likely to support democracy as the best form of government, and 7.1 percentage points more likely to support a military coup when corruption is deemed severe. The findings advance existing knowledge on the effects of corruption on democracy and political legitimacy, and might help policy-makers in the design of anti-corruption policies and programs.

The study of Uberoi and Johnston (2021) considered characteristics associated with several indicators of political disengagement: selected political attitudes, levels of participation in political activities, electoral registration, voting and elected councilors, candidates and MPs. Investigated by age, young people were less likely to register to vote, vote and be elected, and to participate in selected political activities, but older people tended to have more negative attitudes about politics. The average age of councilors, candidates and MPs was over 50. By ethnicity, people from minority ethnic groups were less likely to be registered to vote, vote and be elected. People from white groups were more likely to have negative attitudes to politics and participate less in political activities. When it comes to social grade, unskilled workers and the long-term unemployed were more politically disengaged than people from other occupational backgrounds, as measured against all the indicators included in this paper. Not much is known about the socioeconomic backgrounds of councilors, candidates and MPs, although the number of MPs from a lower-skilled background has decreased in recent years. As for gender, women tended to have more negative attitudes to politics than men, and were less likely to participate in political activities. Men and women were equally likely to register to vote and – usually –vote, although women were less likely to vote at the 2019 General Election. Women are underrepresented in local government and Parliament. Research suggests that while some people are unhappy with the way democracy functions and would like to have more opportunities to participate, others share their unhappiness, but not their appetite, for more involvement.

The study of Alireza (2021) examined the relationship between social capital and political alienation using a questionnaire for collecting information. The research population involved citizens of Tehran city, from which, 384 individuals were selected as the sample population. By taking social trust, social participation and social cohesion into consideration, the study investigated political alienation by means of the Schwartz Value Scale and social capital through a questionnaire designed by the researcher. The findings indicated that the average level of social trust, especially at the institutional trust level, was lower among other variables of social capital. At the level of social trust, 99% of correlation was found between two variables of social trust and political alienation. Moreover, by applying the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the variables were shown to be correlated with a meaningful regression. The findings showed that social trust, among other variables of social capital, had the most significant correlation with citizens' political alienation.

In another study, Spaansen (2021) tested the theory of critical issues on a larger scale as it had only proven itself to be trustworthy on a national level. By applying the theory using the 2015 Refugee Crisis, the impact of a critical issue on the degree of political alienation was measured on an EU level. The central study research question stated: "How did the European Union's response to the 2015 Refugee crisis impact the degree of political alienation among EU citizens?". In order to measure political alienation, three indicators were used. Namely, the extent to which citizens feel their voice counts in the EU, the degree of distrust in politics, and the level of dissatisfaction with EU institutions. The findings showed that the EU created the European immigration policy to respond to the refugee crisis, which had a cosmopolitan nature. As predicted, some Member States were more likely to reject this policy rather than support it. The countries showing the most resistance were considered to be isolationist. To support Borre's theory, the degree of political alienation should have increased in more isolationist countries. However, in both cosmopolitan and isolationist countries, EU citizens showed more political support than political alienation in 2019 than in 2014. Therefore, the refugee crisis did not increase the share of politically alienated voters, and Borre's theory could not be fully supported on an EU level.

In De Bel-Air (2021) on youth unemployment and alienation in the Middle East, the structural reasons behind the persistence of youth unemployment in the Mashreq and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries were highlighted. Youth unemployment is a major focus of public policymaking in the region, especially since 2011. In a political demography approach, which uses labor and population statistics, the author questions, deconstructs and re-politicizes the issue of youth unemployment. The demonstration questions the prominence of graduates' unemployment. It also highlights the scale of inactivity, which compounds unemployment among youth, especially women. Youth unemployment incurs "waithood" and delayed adulthood, and underscores youth's political alienation from the social contract. The author concluded that the main obstacle to channeling young Arabs to sustainable employment was political by essence. It is structurally incompatible with the current clienteles, authoritarian systems ruling in the region. Policies currently enacted to alleviate youth unemployment address its political consequences (youth discontent), not its root causes.

In their article, Berg and Hofmann (2021) showed that for contemporary societies, digital democracy provides a key concept that denotes, in the authors understanding, the relationship between collective self-government and mediating digital infrastructures. New forms of digital engagement that go hand in hand with organizational reforms are re-intermediating established democratic settings in open-ended ways that defy linear narratives of demise or renewal. As a first approach, the authors traced the history of digital democracy against the background of its specific media constellations, describing continuities and discontinuities in the interplay of technological change and aspirations for democratization. Thereafter, the authors critically reviewed theoretical premises concerning the role of technology and how they vary in the way the concept of digital democracy is deployed. In four domains, the authors showed the contingent political conditions under which the relationship between forms of democratic self-determination and its mediating digital infrastructures evolve. One lesson to learn from these four domains is that democratic self-governance is a profoundly mediated project whose institutions and practices are constantly in flux.

The article of Malafaia, Ferreira and Menezes (2021) came to the terms with the multi-dimensionality of civic and political engagement which implied analyzing it in a comprehensive manner not limited to conventional modes of expression, nor to dichotomic perspectives or observable acts of participation. Studies in this field tend to overlook cognitive and emotional dimensions as types of engagement which, alongside with behavior, constitute citizenship. The data was analyzed from the Portuguese sample of the CATCH-EyoU Project's survey (1,007 young people aged between 14 and 30 years old). The main finding was the identification of four distinct profiles according to behavioral, emotional and cognitive forms of engagement: alienated, passive, disengaged and engaged. These profiles were then examined to assess whether and how they differed in terms of: 1) national and European identification, 2) relationships with alternative and traditional media, 3) democratic support, and 4) attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. The relationship between the different profiles and individual socio-demographic variables was also examined. The authors discussed how different dis/engagement profiles relate with socio-political dimensions and have different consequences both in terms of the political integration of young people and of the political challenges faced by democratic societies. The article's findings reinforced the need to account for participatory diversity, which necessarily implies broad typologies that include kinds of engagement which, although not necessarily and directly classified as political participation, might be of great importance in understanding it, as they are "pre-political" or "stand-by" kinds of engagement. Moreover, accounting for the youth engagement profiles contributes to gaining insight on the pathways of engagement through which young people are currently making (and meaning-making) European democratic citizenship, which in turn also sheds light on their political attitudes and democratic stances.

In another article by Modood and Thompson (2021), the relationship between religion and the state was examined, focusing on cases of establishment in which one religion is formally recognized. Arguing that religious establishment is wrong if it causes some citizens to feel alienated, the authors rejected the criticism that feelings of alienation were too subjective a foundation for a robust normative case about establishment. The authors based the argument on an account of collective identities, which may have an 'inside' but were also subject to a process of othering in which a dominant group imposes an identity on a subordinate group. The establishment of a religion may contribute to othering, and the other group may consequently be alienated from

the state. However, since establishment does not always cause alienation, it is necessary to seek evidence and engage in a dialogue in order to understand a group's own account of its experience of its situation. As the article has just reiterated, the overarching purpose in the article has been to argue that establishment may be one means by which a process of othering results in the alienation of a particular group. For this reason, the authors suggested that, when assessing the justifiability of specific cases of establishment, whether a group is alienated or not by that particular state–religion relation is one important factor that needs to be taken into account. This requires empirical research and dialogical engagement with the minorities in question, and not just deontological or 'reasonable person' or 'objective' ratiocination. In passing, the article also suggested that the argument is not specific to establishment but has the scope, suitably adapted, to extend to all state–religion arrangements, including strict separation. The authors did not attempt to outline the sort of relationship between the state and religion which, they thought would be desirable in light of our concerns about alienation. In closing, however, the authors suggested that one form that such a relationship might take would be plural or multiple establishments. If alienation is a condition in which a group is unable to identify with the state, and if one of the state's duties is to try to make such identification possible, the article showed that in some circumstances more than one religious community should receive a significant degree of formal recognition from the state. Defending this further argument is a task we must undertake elsewhere.

In another published thesis document for Gola (2021), the study's empirical findings indicated that corruption perceptions decreased two key components of system support and legitimacy: citizens' political trust and political efficiency. While the relationship between corruption, trust and political efficacy is well established in the literature, little attention was given thus far to contextual factors that could moderate this relationship. The thesis tested both the direct effects of corruption on trust and political efficacy and potentially their conditional nature in a new context: The Western Balkan. To test the thesis hypotheses, individual-level data from the Balkan Barometer, consisting of 6,020 observations, and OLS models have been used. The findings showed that, as expected, perceptions of corruption decreased levels of political trust and efficacy in the Western Balkans.

However, contrary to expectations stemming from previous research, citizens' satisfaction with the economy appeared to strengthen this relationship instead of weakening it.

The study of Kitanova (2020) showed that youth political disengagement continues to be a major issue facing contemporary democracies that needs to be better understood. There is existing literature on what determines youth participation in terms of socio-demographic factors, however, scholars have not given much consideration to the macro-level determinants. The author outlined an empirical analysis of what determines political participation among young people using the Eurobarometer 375 survey data from 28 European Union countries. The author argued that while socio-demographic factors are crucial for youth political participation, context matters in shaping levels of political participation among young people. The results from the logistic regression analyses indicated that democratic maturity influences patterns of political participation among young people in the EU. The results showed that youth engagement in different modes of political participation varies significantly across distinctive democracies, where individuals situated in established EU democracies are more likely to be politically active. The findings raised fresh concerns about existing levels of young people's engagement in politics in advanced and new democracies. The study also contributed to the comparative research on young people's participation in politics.

In another article by Jasim (2020), the author concluded that Iraqi society has suffered a lot, due to the continuation of many successive wars, bloody massacres and natural disasters, devastating floods and deadly epidemics, plague and smallpox, the invasions of greedy foreign armies, mass displacement of the population, injustices of tyrant rulers and the unjust dictatorial regimes, left behind by the horrors and the constant crushing of the souls and interests of human beings and their dignity, and the destruction of their hopes and aspirations, and preventing them from achieving their life and human goals, it is only natural that the behavior resulting from deprivation and frustration is generated by the most Iraqi individuals, perhaps this had led to understand the causes of Iraqi behavior and the sense of alienation. The alienation affected most of the Iraqis, is: a natural consequence of the security collapse, the loss of wealth and the absence of the basic

values of human and national building. The generations of the 1970s, left their mark on the generations that followed, in varying proportions, conflicting or opposed to the scarcity and wars that led to the collapse of educational and security institutions, intellectual structures, social structures and basic values of society, and led to the alienation of the Iraqis, reflected in the sense of social discontent, and in the form of personal alienation, which means the absence of social adaption , including: political loyalty, in the absence of social cohesion. Frustration, disappointment and deprivation, with the absence of the initial social cohesion of the individual in the primary family, and then the experiences and experiments of the individual in society, led to; 1- The nature of cruelty, violence, aggression and convulsions, at which point the process of engaging in terrorism may then not be difficult. 2-Loss of the importance of school and family in the prevention of crime, terrorism and drugs. 3-Poor maintenance of family ties and cohesion and the absence of community reform by state institutions. 4-The absence of proper religious awareness, and the growth of narrow sectarianism due to the occupation. 5-The absence of serious intellectual dialogue, the reform of intellectual structures with conscious minds and a policy away from violence. Protecting the human being from alienation requires sincere, painstaking and tireless efforts from the knowledge and understanding how to reform the social, intellectual, economic, institutional and demographic structures so that Iraqi society can rise up, this needs patience, prudence and long time. The author believe that the end of the Iraqis alienation will be by the negative effects of the wars, the economic blockade imposed on Iraq, and then the occupation of Iraq and the subsequent violence.

The study of Fox (2020) about Brexit (UK exit from the European Union) indicated that the direct role of political alienation in building support for such anti-establishment causes were barely examined. The study addressed this gap and used previous literature on political alienation to build a model to test the claim that Brexit was, at least in part, driven by political alienation in UK citizens. The analysis showed that while political alienation had a substantial effect in making some citizens more likely to support Brexit - specifically those who lacked trust in the integrity of the political elite and felt that the political system was unresponsive - its impact overall was limited. Moreover, claims that Brexit was driven by political alienation understate how alienated from politics most people who were opposed to it also feel.

In another study, Lytkina (2020) aimed to revise the Middleton Alienation Scale. The author revisited the well-established Middleton alienation scale from a cross-cultural perspective. Contrary to previous research, it is assumed that the scale consists of two dimensions: anomie and alienation. Confirmatory factor analysis, multi-group invariance, discriminant validity tests, and Bayesian structural equation modelling (BSEM) are employed on two separate datasets: World Values Survey (WVS) data (Russia and Kazakhstan) and data from the Euro-module (Slovenia, Germany, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Turkey, and South Korea). Full metric invariance is reached in Slovenia, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Turkey, and South Korea in the Euro-module dataset and in Russia and Kazakhstan in the WVS data when using the exact invariance approach, and scalar invariance is achieved for Russia and Kazakhstan when using BSEM. In most of the European countries, anomie relates distrust, whereas alienation is associated with dissatisfaction with life and unhappiness.

Abu Sulaib (2020) aimed to examine the issue of stateless 'Bidoon' in Kuwait. The study explored the historical background of the Bidoon issue in Kuwait. It found that the Bidoon issue was influenced by internal and external factors since the emergence of this problem in the 1950s in Kuwait. However, the main object of the study was to trace the relationship between statelessness and political alienation. Thus, it examined the case study of the Bidoon in Kuwait to determine whether they experienced political alienation. The study relied on a survey to answer this question. A questionnaire, which comprised the three main aspects of political alienation, powerlessness, normlessness and isolation, was distributed to a sample of 719 Bidoon individuals in Kuwaiti society. The study found that most of the research sample of Bidoon in Kuwait felt political alienation. Therefore, the study concluded that the feeling of political alienation among Bidoon had critical effects on Kuwaiti national security, including crimes and political violence.

Schraff study (2019) questioned if low-wage work led to political alienation. Even though low-wage sectors have grown in the advanced industrialized world, empirical evidence so far is sparse.

The author used household panel data to investigate the effect of low-wage work spells on political alienation. The author argued that repeated low-wage work spells lead to preference divergence between a low-income and the median-income earner, leading to withdrawal from democratic politics among low-wage earners. Using Swiss household panel data and fixed-effects regressions, we show that the accumulation of low-wage work spells decreases systemic trust. In a second step, the author demonstrated that an interaction of eroding systemic trust with low-wage work is associated with increased individual abstention probabilities. The findings highlighted the threat of a systematic under-representation of low-wage workers in the political sphere.

The Kaufman study (2019) about the rural political participation in the United States, clarified that a global concern had risen over support for authoritarian populism, in some cases specifically among rural populations. Rural influence, however, may be limited by relatively low political participation. The article examined participation in the United States, where past evidence showed rural Americans being less involved in politics than their urban counterparts. Analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1952 to 2012 showed historically less participation for rural residents relative to suburban and urban residents. Between 1988 and 2008, low political trust, a negative economic outlook, high external efficacy, and being more ideological and partisan were associated with increased political participation. The findings implied rural Americans with polarized views who felt deprived of political and economic power might participate more frequently in future political activities. Concurrently, similarly polarized circumstances in urban areas and low rural political efficacy may lead the rural-urban participation gap to persist.

Sørensen (2019) showed that the challenge of alienation is now again taken seriously in intellectual discussions. Years ago, Axel Honneth made the reflection on alienation a defining issue for social philosophy per se, and as the prime example of social philosophy, he brought forth Critical Theory. Within this horizon, recently two conceptions of alienation have been proposed by Rahel Jeaggi and Hartmut Rosa, and the present article took issue with both of these proposals, criticizing in particular their anti-essentialism. Hence, questioning the post-metaphysical agenda that Jaeggi has inherited from Honneth, which criticized her juxtaposition of the existentialist and the Marxist critique of alienation, her understanding of the good life as autonomy, and finally her acceptance of post-modern and liberal criticism of metaphysics and ontology. Turning to Rosa, the article

appreciated his societal approach to the critique of alienation, emphasizing the significance of capitalist modernity, but also, he accepts the post metaphysical agenda and his aesthetic idea of the good life, as resonance remains strongly individualistic. Both of these conceptions of alienation thus have ideological implications that threatens to turn upside down the original intentions and implications of Critical Theory in relation to social and political justice. To conclude, the criticism of capitalism, political economy and real-life politics is still relevant for understanding alienation, and therefore it is worth returning to the classics of the discussion.

Scholten (2019) raised the question "why do processes of policymaking on migration and (migration related) diversity so often seem 'out of control'?" The article proposed a new conceptual framework for understanding the role of complexity in the governance of migration and diversity. Complexity literature argued that complex problems like migration and diversity require complex approaches. However, migration literature showed that policy processes in these areas often fail to capture complexity, for instance through 'quick fixes' in migration regulation or on a strong belief in state-led 'immigrant integration.' The results in what will be conceptualized as 'alienation' from issue developments in migration and diversity, which comes in various forms: problem, institutional, political and social alienation. Alternatively, 'mainstreaming' is conceptualized as a governance approach that does try to capture rather than deny complexity. This requires, however, a rethinking of migration and diversity governance as a generic approach that does not treat migration and diversity as 'stand-alone' topics, that is oriented at the whole (diverse) population, that involves complex actor networks and a contingent and emergent process rather than a one-size-fits-all policy model. By helping actors to understand and respond to complexity, researchers can contribute to reflexivity in policy processes and help to promote mainstreaming and prevent alienation

The study of Santos Queirós (2019) discussed the political dimension of the human being, and the meaning of the good and the evil, for the twenty first century polices of communication. From the Aristotelian Man, that is not only a philosophical abstraction, but also a citizen; Aristotle's thought built a bridge between two dimensions of human beings, the philosophy of existence and political philosophy. To the utilitarian ethics of Jeremy Bentham and Stuart Mill, who assumed that "not only any action of a private individual, but all the Government measures" must improve the well-

being and reduce suffering. Far away, the primacy of duty (eudaimonia) from Aristotle, he based morality of action on benefits back to their subject and/or in the principle of less suffering caused to the "other". And crossing the nineteenth century when Feuerbach and Marx focused the debate about the concept of alienation based on the religion issue. The article focused on the philosophical debate, about the question of political alienation, in the twenty first century philosophical practices and ethical practices, discussing the key question of alienation and single thought. The article questioning about the hidden philosophe of single thought? Alienation on the discourse of social media, multimedia and cybernetic communication, why and how are diffused?

The study of Usry (2019) indicated that on average, veterans were more civically and politically engaged than civilians. Previous research on the effects of military service, however, did not account for differences in veterans' combat experiences. Using survey data from a representative sample of Vietnam veterans, the study presented evidence that veterans who were exposed to severe combat trauma and veterans who exhibited attitudes and fears associated with post-traumatic stress had significantly lower levels of political efficacy and trust. The negative consequences of combat exposure and post-traumatic stress were not mitigated when veterans had quality social support or when they sought professional counseling. The study findings informed political psychology and hold implications for claims regarding the empowering influence of service in the U.S. military, increased political engagement, in particular. Among Vietnam veterans, exposure to severe combat trauma and post-traumatic stress were both associated with reduced political efficacy and trust.

Kadi (2019) aimed at examining the political attitudes and participation of Moroccan youth, mainly through their engagement in two main political activities: voting in local and national elections and participating in decision-making institutions, such as the parliament and political parties. The author attempted to shed light on the current political situation of youth in Morocco with a particular focus on their participation in formal and informal politics and their new forms of engagement in politics as well as to shed light on what lies at the heart of young people's apparent disengagement from formal politics in Morocco: political apathy or a sense of political

alienation. The findings showed that young Moroccans have become increasingly alienated from parties and politicians, but are active in politics in a broader sense. The evidence uncovered through this study indicated that young people (both males and females) in Morocco showed interest in political affairs, dispelling the stereotype that their apparent disconnection from formal politics is as a consequence of their general apathy. Despite very negative perceptions of politics, respondents asserted that they were interested in political matters and a range of political issues. They were also interested in a new style of politics. While they may eschew much of what could be characterized as formal or conventional party politics, there is evidence of great support for a different type of politics that is more participative and direct. Moroccan youth have their own views and engage in democracy in a wide variety of ways. Indeed, it is young people themselves who are diversifying political engagement: from the streets to the Internet; from political parties to social movements, issue groups, and social networks. In Morocco, young people are now more likely than the country's population as a whole to participate in demonstrations and express their political views in online forums. Moreover, recent years have also confirmed that they are more likely than previous generations to get involved in protest politics. Young Moroccans are also still committed to the idea of elections and the democratic process; they strongly believe that the future of Morocco can improve with economic, political, and social changes. They believe it is their responsibility and burden to carry out these changes, as they consider that those charged with conducting politics on their behalf – the political parties and professional politicians – are self-serving, unrepresentative, and unresponsive to their demands as well as indifferent to the country's development. Thus, it can be said that there is a civic orientation amongst the young to the democratic process, and democratizing the country is generally seen to be an urgent need. Taken together, these findings serve to call into question the assumption that youth are politically apathetic, as their lack of participation is based ultimately on barriers they face. At the heart of declining youth, election turnout is a strong sense of political alienation rather than political apathy. As the political system in Morocco fails to provide the stimuli necessary to encourage young people and women to take a greater role in political life, it faces a crisis of democratic legitimacy.

In addition, the study of Valgarosson (2019) investigated what was driving the general decline of voter turnout in established democracies in the 21st century. The study developed a holistic framework that incorporated explanations on the aggregate and individual levels, as well as the broader literature on democratic developments hitherto largely ignored in studies of turnout decline. The study argued that there was an important, overarching debate within this literature that had yet to be tested longitudinal, cross-country analyses of changing political behavior: that between political apathy on one hand and political alienation on the other. In other words: are modern citizens voting less than earlier electorates because they are simply less interested in politics or because they are still interested but instead alienated from the specific type of formal politics dominant in today's democracies? To what extent are these dynamics particular to particular generations of citizens coming of age and what is the role of citizens' changing education levels? In order to provide answers to these questions, multilevel logistics regression models and age-period-cohort (APC) analyses have been conducted on an extensive new dataset, consisting of over 250,000 respondents from 121 national election studies conducted in eleven Western European countries in the period between 1956 and 2017 and merged specifically for the purposes of the study. Descriptive data for various measures of turnout has been presented, apathy and alienation in all of these countries before focusing in on the four "turnout decline countries" (TDC), where the available survey data reflects a gradual trend of turnout decline, and comparing dynamics in these countries with the rest of the countries in this study. The findings suggested that political apathy has in fact been declining across the region, while alienation has been rising substantially. However, the negative effect of apathy on turnout has become much stronger: apathetic citizens today are much less likely to vote than apathetic citizens in the past. This development accounts for most of turnout decline in the TDC and is significantly stronger there than in the other group of countries. Furthermore, the study found that this effect is largely (but not entirely) particular to younger generations of citizens, but there is also a growing education gap in turnout that these dynamics do not fully explain. These findings have important implications for studies of turnout decline and broader democratic developments, as well as for public policy in the fields of citizenship and participation – and for anyone interested in reengaging citizens with their democratic systems.

Valgarosson's study (2019) highlighted that voter turnout had been in a trend of gradual decline in most established democracies in recent decades and the reasons for this are by no means fully understood. While most studies agreed that the trend was largely driven by younger generations voting less than older cohorts, the individual-level mechanisms of their declining propensity to vote are still disputed. A major distinction in the literature on democratic developments is that between theories of political apathy and political alienation: whether citizens are less interested in politics or still interested but instead estranged from their political systems. An interesting test for these different explanations can be found in Scandinavia: While Norway and Sweden have intimate historical, political and cultural similarities, Norway has been experiencing gradual turnout decline, while there has been no clear overall trend in Sweden. The study used a combined dataset of over 50.000 respondents from 31 national election studies in these two countries from 1956–2013 to test the relative roles of apathy, alienation and generational dynamics in explaining these different trends in turnout. The findings indicated that apathy has been declining while alienation has been rising in both countries. However, in Norway, those who are more apathetic today are much less likely to vote than apathetic citizens were in the past. The youngest generations are also significantly more apathetic and less likely to vote in Norway than in Sweden. These dynamics appear to account for the larger trend of turnout decline in Norway.

Prokop's research (2019) showed that it is difficult to characterize the Russian society as completely active or passive due to the high voter turnout, but simultaneously, a low level of involvement in political life. The research focused on determining the extent of activity/passivity of the Russian society in the years 2000 – 2012. Findings of the analysis revealed a degree of participation of the Russian citizens in the electoral decision-making process and their involvement in political life. It was answered to the question: to what extent Russian legislation allows society to participate in the political life, by estimating a political activity index (Wap(ap)). Additionally, the political activity correlate index (Wap(k)) was checked, that enable to correct the obtained result on the basis of legal provisions according to the real dimension of the Russian political activity. The analysis of the legal legislation regulating the implementation of the abovementioned possibilities, the author stated that while considering the possibility of forming and acting in

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various types of political associations, one should take heed of a certain dualism: on the one hand, a lot of provisions promoting equality of all entities contain such that largely discourage society from political activity, i.e. regarding the relatively high number of members required to form parties and the requirement to create regional branches in more than half of the subjects of the Russian Federation. Therefore, a possibility can be treated as partially guaranteed with a score – "0.5" The possibility of participation in parliamentary and presidential elections is also guaranteed, but not completely. Federal Law introduces a range of privileges for entities that have obtained a certain level of support in previous elections, such as exemption from the obligation to make an advance payment during the registration of parties in elections and to collect signatures of support. Consequently, the implementation of a given possibility is neither fully ensured, merely with a score – "0.5" The last variable introduces the possibility of organizing and conducting a referendum and the right to legislative initiative. Russian legislation ensures citizens a possibility of participating in all kinds of referendums and the possibility of initiating a referendum. Meanwhile, the Basic Law does not provide an opportunity for citizens to start a legislative initiative that is why the score is "0.5".

Ebiotubo, Akakpo and Permanent (2019) indicated that the preponderance rate of suicide cases in Nigeria recently is fearful and worrisome. According to World Health Organization's (WHO) suicide ranking, with 15.1 suicides per 100,000 population in a year, Nigeria is now the 30th out of 193 nations that is most suicide-prone in the world. From the period of 2018 to the first quarter of 2019, more than 200 people committed suicide in Nigeria. The paper emphasized that the grave effects of suicide cases ranging from social stigma, guilt, hopelessness and apprehension are significantly immeasurable. Some of the etiological factors that are responsible for suicide perpetration are depression, mental disorder, chronic pain, alcohol, financial difficulties, loss of loved ones and so forth. The crux of the study was to examine whether, apart from the known risk factors for suicide as listed above, political alienation was also a substantial instigator of suicide in Nigeria. The study applied collection of secondary data method and descriptive approach of content analysis. The paper affirmed that the various risk factors for suicide as listed above were borne out of government relinquishment of the social contract and that the excess individualism as well as ceaseless competition for survival in life could poop out the underprivileged; inviting

suicide ideation. Therefore, this paper concluded that, there is a positive nexus between political alienation and the occurrence of suicide cases in Nigeria.

The article of Lazarev and Mironova (2018) on the economic consequences of political alienation: ethnic minority status and investment behavior in a post-conflict society, the authors investigated how minority status influence individual investment and savings does decisions in a post-conflict society. The authors argued that minority status was associated with lower trust in third-party institutions controlled by an ethnic out-group, and, as a result, leads to a preference for certain earnings over potentially risky investments. The hypothesis has been tested with multiple sources of evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, the authors experimentally elicit investment behavior among members of the same ethnic group on two sides of the boundary that makes some individual's majorities and others minorities. Second, they induced minority status in the lab. Analyses across the studies showed that both natural and induced minority statuses lead to lower levels of investment. The author provided ecological validity to the experimental results with the analysis of a large, representative household survey and an original survey of businessmen. The results have large implications for understanding of inter-ethnic relations and the sense of security in development.

Bakis and Rezqi (2018) attempted to give an opposite reading to what we are used to analyze when we constantly talk about the impact of politics in society. However, the article talked about the influence of the social phenomenon in politics by studying certain social phenomena, which contributed to consecrate political alienation phenomenon in the Algerian society. There was no need to prove the strong presence of political alienation phenomenon of the Algerian citizen while the Algerian authorities recognizes its political independence. However, the article tried to link political alienation to social alienation that the Algerian citizen suffers from, owing to social realities which he/she experienced during the colonial time and after independence. That period witnessed many crisis, conflicts and lost opportunities to build strong institutions capable of

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supporting the establishment of modern state. Needless to say that man is the result of his environment, perceptions and values he holds about things, and that interactions are only a result of the accumulation of experiences he has lived. So, it is not possible to jump on the social phenomenon to explain the political phenomenon because it can, at any time become a necessary point to address.

Kramer's thesis (2018) focused on Australian citizens who were not interested in politics during the period 1987- 2016 using data primarily from the Australian Election Study (AES) and the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). The thesis considered the political interest of Australian citizens with an emphasis on self-assessed political interest as well as actual turnout rates. The thesis, furthermore, investigated major predictors of political interest in Australia to see how interest has changed over time. The thesis then examined the demographics of political uninterested, the reasons for political uninterested, before focusing on the electoral and broader consequences of political apathy. The findings of the thesis suggested that there were at least 20% of Australians who were politically uninterested who lacked the motivation to garner rudimentary political knowledge. They did not understand how the system of government worked and could not take information shortcuts to vote according to ideology or atomized issues. Lower socio-demographic individuals are generally the most uninterested, yet they are also the section of society that require more from government in relation to benefits and programs. One of the major findings of the thesis was that uninterested individuals determined the outcome of the 1987, 1993 and 2010 elections in favor of Labor. Moreover, uninterested voters decide around eight House of Representative seats at each election. The thesis further established that uninterested voters are different political actors compared to interested voters in that they are less likely to discuss politics, garner political knowledge and consume politics in the media. They are also more likely to swing from one party to another at different elections and more likely to simply not care who governs. The broader polity is therefore affected by major political parties rationally focusing on uninterested swinging voters in order to attract their attention. The result is that ephemeral or fringe issues hijack political debate.

The study of Keleh and Tabrizi (2018) showed that religion and its role in various aspects of social and individual life has been the subject of many scholars in different areas of thought. The paper explored the effect of religiosity on forms and subjects of alienation (of self, of society, and of politics). The research method was survey, and an open-ended questionnaire was applied for data collection. The study sample population consisted of adult population in Tehran city which of whom 384 were selected. The research used Seeman and Keniston theories to articulate theatrical framework as well as research tools and measurement scales. Dean, Netler, Feuer, Schwartz and Srole scales also were utilized to measure the subjects and form of alienation. The religiosity of the respondents was also measured by the Glock & Stark religiosity scale. The research findings showed that there was no relationship between religiosity and social alienation variables, but an unreversed and meaningful relationship existed between religiosity and political alienation, self-alienation and its different forms. Among the dimensions of religiosity, the outcome dimension had a meaningful relationship with all alienation subjects and had the most correlation with self-alienation. The outcome dimension also had the greatest impact on and the most correlation with self-estrangement.

Jabiri (2018) built on the starting of the Arab revolutions in late 2010 and the connection between the law, state, political economy, gender norms and orientalist ideology that had formed the foundation of women's systematic exclusion from politics. The article offered a gendered political reading of the concept of alienation by unmasking the processes that created the ideological and material conditions of externalizing women's revolutionary acts, estranging their political involvement and exposing them to various forms of violence. The article suggested that gender normative ideology's characterization of women's image, roles and acts during and after revolutions corresponds to the most profound form of alienation. The article proposed that the externalization, subjugating of women and objectification of their revolutionary acts are modes of alienation are necessary conditions for the reconfiguration of power dynamics to restore authoritarian states' power. The sphere of politics, the article insinuated, not only relates to

political activism and conflict between revolutions and counter-revolutions, it is also a battlefield for the (re)production of gender normative knowledge.

The article of Harvey (2018) stated that the evidence of alienation with respect to work, daily life, politics and inclusion is widespread and has much to do with the increasing influence of right wing populism. Marx changed the basis for his thinking about alienation from a subjective humanist to an objective historical materialist basis. However, the relations between the two forms of alienation cannot easily be severed. The contemporary conditions producing subjective states of alienation need to be investigated, chief among these is the rise of personal indebtedness that forecloses upon future possibilities and restricts freedoms. Debt peonage and alienation are in our times a primary material basis for increasing subjective states of alienation.

Al-Kilani's study (2018) displayed the different nature of political participation from time to time, depending on the different environmental, social and political conditions in which the society lives, as well as its relationship to the degree and nature of social change and political culture. The success of the political participation process in achieving social upbringing depends on the extent of proper indoctrination of political culture; and considering that most of the developing countries have gone through a phase of colonialism and have been subjected to many social changes in their structure, this has affected their political culture. In order to establish correct political participation that achieves social development, the plans that must be drawn up shall be derived from the social, political and economic reality experienced by societies. It can be said that political participation plays a major role in the development of society in general and in political development in particular by building the individual's political personality to perform his role in participating in the service of his country and people. Given the great impact of political participation on social upbringing and its influence of it, researchers in the field of society and politics have long been interested in this topic, especially in developing countries, due to its social and cultural specificity.

Musab's study (2017) concluded that political participation is the basis for any democratic system and consists one of the absolute conditions for it. Rather, the future of democracy depends on it. For we cannot talk about democracy in isolation from political participation, which has become an

important role in developing mechanisms and rules for good governance, as well as for what is known as "sustainable development". Considering political participation as a political act, this political act or behavior is shaped and formed in the social context of individuals, such that this context may expand to include economic, political, social and cultural matters. The sociological approach stems from a basic perception whereby it is impossible to understand the political system and the political action of the society without linking it to the social, economic and cultural system of that society.

Ali's study (2017) sought to identify the Palestinian political elite and decision-making. The study used the systems analysis method. The study results reported that the decision-making process is an integrated and overlapping process, and that it is difficult to separate its components, due to the complexity of the issue on the one hand and its exposure to intense ambiguity on the other hand, as internal and external factors may overlap. Results also indicated that the economic factor played a major role in highlighting and recruiting the political elite along with political factors that lie in both the party and family aspects. The study recommended the need for serious work to prepare the Palestinian society and raise its awareness in the field of political participation, especially elections, so that the citizen chooses a program that can be implemented, not a person, party or clan.

In his article, Borja (2017) demonstrated that the electoral process can be considered as one basic component of a democracy, and for this reason, one way to evaluate the progress of a democratization project is by looking at the development of this civic practice in terms of both quantity (voter turnout) and quality (voters' preferences). From the case of electoral participation in the Philippines, the article poses the question: What is the relationship between political alienation and voter turnout in the context of the latter enjoying relatively high and sustained rates? Through a synthesis between the notions of political spectatorship, habitual voting and the learning approach towards analyzing voter behavior, the article argued that electoral participation was a

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disempowered mode of participation resulting from the interdependence of sustained spectatorship and habitual voting.

Eriksson's study (2017) indicated that attitudes towards wolf policy were likely to be driven by perceived differences in political power between urban and rural groups. Using Swedish survey data collected in 2014, and structural equation modeling, the study evaluated the effects of political alienation. Political alienation mediated the effect of having an urban or rural place of residence on attitudes towards wolf policy. Politically-alienated individuals also preferred more extreme policy options than other respondents, while being less likely to approve of the current wolf policy in Sweden. The findings suggest that political alienation drives attitude polarization in wolf related social conflicts. Awareness of these underlying power asymmetries could possibly increase both policy legitimacy and management efficiency. This highlights the importance of accounting for social context in relation to policy-making and conservation efforts related to wolves.

Dahl *et al*. (2017) concluded that political participation is one of the most studied aspects of the contemporary development of western democracies. A recent trend focuses the lack of political participation among younger generations. At the same time, the last decades have also witnessed a growth in the share of young European Union (EU) citizens who expressed alienation and distrust toward social and political institutions at the national as well as the European level. By studying young people across different countries of the EU, the study aimed to examine if youths' political passivity is better-explained by political apathy or alienation. The study analyses are based on a comparative survey data collected by the Catch-EyoU project comprising approximately 4,454 late adolescents assembled from eight member countries of the EU. Findings from logistic regressions predicting non-voting from apathy and alienation support the idea that political passivity is best understood as the result of political apathy. Moreover, it seems that the underlying separator of apathetic and alienated youths is cognitive awareness of political life.

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In his book, Schwartz (2017) questioned why people adopted attitudes of political alienation, attitudes of estrangement from, or lack of identification with, the political system. The author also investigated why some politically-alienated people react to their alienation by engaging in revolutionary behavior, while others similarly alienated become reformers or ritualists, and still others simply drop out of political activity. In *Political Alienation and Political Behavior*, the article attempted to answer these questions, challenging accepted theories of social status and economic difficulties and developing a completely new, three variable psychological theories to explain alienation. Based on observations of threat from value conflict, perceived personal inefficacy, and perceived systemic inefficacy, the theory includes a process model for predicting political behavior. The book is organized into a definition and discussion of the concept of political alienation, including reviews and critiques of relevant scholarly and popular literature; a theoretical explanation of the causes and consequences of alienation; presentation of data; research reports testing the author's explanation of political alienation; tests of a process model explaining the consequences of alienation; and a summary of the major findings of the research, indicating some of the directions that future research might profitably take. Fascinating reading for social scientists, this well-written book will be important to teachers and students concerned with U.S. politics and more generally with the relationship of economic, social, and psychological forces manifested in political behavior.

Widra's research (2017) confirmed what we already know happens to people when they are locked up. Their physical isolation leads to experiences of social isolation and their very real political disenfranchisement leads to a feeling of alienation from government. These psychological effects stay with people long after the physical and legal restrictions of their prison sentences end, affecting individuals, families and communities for years after release. Some new data shines a light on these long-term psychological effects of incarceration. A new survey about literacy behind bars also included some important questions about individual experiences of social and political isolation. The literacy findings have few surprises; like earlier studies indicate, incarcerated people score lower on various measures of literacy. In the U.S. Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies, participants were asked to respond on a five-point scale from "strongly

agree" to "strongly disagree" with the following three statements: 1. People like me don't have any say about what the government does. 2. There are only a few people you can trust completely. 3. If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you. The findings of these three questions about social and political isolation reinforced the conclusions of prior research, suggesting that criminal justice involvement at any level impacts political engagement and trust. Compared to the data collected from U.S. households, the survey of U.S. prisons indicates higher levels of mistrust, political disenfranchisement, and political alienation among incarcerated adults.

Prevost and Cherry (2017) explored political participation and democratic consolidation in South Africa 20 years after the end of apartheid. The authors did so through the lens of the residents of Kwazakhele, a black township in Nelson Mandela Bay in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. Two surveys were conducted in the month following the May 2014 elections provide the basis for analyzing the political attitudes and expectations of older residents and comparing them with those of younger residents of the 'born free' generation. The findings showed that while there was a high level of participation by older residents, there was a significant alienation of youth. At the same time, the consolidation of democracy was evidenced by the growth of political tolerance and political pluralism, shown by the presence and (limited) support for opposition parties. The findings included analysis of how the voting patterns in Kwazakhele contributed to the defeat of the ANC in the 2016 local elections in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality.

Farasin and Battaloglu (2017) studied polices and the strategic choices of the ruling elite of the Arab countries have alienated the Arab people. The paper analyzed the source of the Arab masses alienation by the state using the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) and the World Wide Governance Indicators along the following dimensions: lack of political participation; unstable democratic institutions; lack of political and social integration; socioeconomic deprivation; and poor governance. The analysis showed that the

source of alienation of the Arab masses before the Arab Spring and after the Arab Spring are the same, indicating that the grievances of the Arab masses have not been addressed.

Ahmed and Mahmoud (2017) aimed to identify the level of political alienation among university students, their nature of attitudes toward immigration, and the significance of differences depending on variables of gender, area of study and location of residence, and the nature of the relationship between political alienation and the attitude towards immigration. The study sample included 327 male and female students who were chosen at random from the Colleges of Arts and Sciences at University of Salah-Aladdin-Erbil. The study relied on two tools: the measure of political alienation, and the attitude towards migration. The tools were developed by the researchers. The data was processed using the Pearson's Correlation Coefficient and the t-test for one sample and two independent samples. The results showed that there was a high level of political alienation. There were no significant differences in the political alienation attributed to the variables of gender, area of study, and location of residence. It turned out that the university students' attitudes towards immigration were negative, and the results revealed an absence of significant differences in the attitude towards immigration depending on the variables of gender and area of study. While the results indicated a significant difference in the attitude of emigration is due to the variable of the location of housing, and for the benefit of students who live in the city center.

Tatar's findings (2016) in the political behavior literature was that citizens from Central and Eastern Europe participated less in politics than their western neighbors. While political institutions have democratized and consolidated in some of these countries (i.e., the new EU member states), overall civic and political activism of citizens from the former communist states knows an obvious setback. The article focused on Romania and traces the sources of political disengagement to the problems of post-communist transition in this country. The findings revealed that public expectations during the transition processes (i.e., demand side) have largely diverged

from the perceived democratic performance of political authorities (i.e. supply side). Thus, the paper identified widespread disappointments with the perceived outcomes of the political process as a key source of political alienation in post-communist Romania. Pervasive symptoms of political alienation in this country include feelings of political exclusion, helplessness and political ineffectiveness, distrust of politicians and political institutions, lack of interest in politics and the perception of politics as irrelevant to people's lives. All these further hinder citizen participation in the democratic process.

In their article, Dassonneville and Hooghe (2016) investigated the relation between partisanship, indifference towards political parties, and alienation from the party system, based on an analysis of the voter surveys of the European Election Studies (EES) project of 1989-2014. The findings indicated that dealignment was associated with indifference as well as with alienation but that the relation with alienation is much stronger, both on an aggregate as on an individual level. The article concluded therefore that dealignment could pose a challenge for the legitimacy of the party system as a whole.

In another study by Qarsh (2016) that aimed to shed some light on the reluctance of Palestinian youth to participate in the "partisan" organizational life through introductions, rationales and outcomes whereby the research indicated the justifications through the presentation of several groups. The first group clarified the climate, social, cultural and religious environment (objective conditions). The Palestinian and Arab social environment is greatly affected by the cultural and historical heritage, religious education and upbringing taught to young people from childhood, which are among the constants and social systems that influence the formation of the Arab personality, thought and behavior. While the second group concerned the parties themselves and their organizational structure. All parties and movements were established, worked, and operated under unfriendly conditions, and often in a hostile environment.

Heath (2016) presented an examination of class-based inequalities in turnout at British elections. These inequalities have substantially grown, and the class divide in participation has become

greater than the class divide in vote choice between the two main parties. To account for class inequalities in turnout three main hypotheses, to do with policy indifference, policy alienation and social alienation, were tested. The findings from the British context suggested that the social background of political representatives influences the ways in which voters participate in the political process, and that the decline in proportion of elected representatives from working-class backgrounds is strongly associated with the rise of working-class abstention.

Shah (2015) discussed the concept of alienation clarifying that alienation is a state in which a person feels one-self alone, estranged, worthless and meaningless. This may be the result of a sociopolitical setup or due to capitalist surroundings, but it is an accepted fact that a person who suffers from this has to bear a psychological agony. In our history of religions, it has been reported that the Prophet Adam (peace be upon him) complained of loneliness and asked God for a companion. Evidently, loneliness makes a man estranged from one's own surroundings. This estranged situation, for some thinkers, is purely psychological, for some it is an intellectual phenomenon, but for Karl Marx it is a material and social process which affects human beings. In modern time, psychologists have explored its variety of forms and their effects on persons and society. This research paper presents its meaning, history, types and its effects on individual as well as on society.

Uhlaner (2015) indicated that political participation refers to voluntary activities undertaken by the mass public to influence public policy, either directly or by affecting the selection of persons who make policies. Examples of these activities include voting in elections, helping a political campaign, donating money to a candidate or cause, contacting officials, petitioning, protesting, and working with other people on issues. Particular activities cluster into modes of participation. Substantial cross-national data have shown that wealthier and better-educated people participate at higher rates than the less advantaged, although this relationship is weaker in countries where strong parties or other political organizations provide alternative resources. Research associated

with the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) has documented that people transfer to political activity skills which they acquire in organizations. The CVM and other recent studies have also demonstrated that people participate more in response to recruitment or mobilization. (Both terms refer to efforts by one person to increase the activity of another.) The Political Action project has shown that people have expanded their 'political action repertory' to encompass both protest and conventional participation. The patterns of participation in authoritarian regimes and in economically less-developed countries raise other issues but substantially follow these broad outlines.

In another article for Borja (2015), the author indicated that politics usually takes the form of brawls ranging from the verbal and civilized, to the physical and savage, if not deadly encounters. These public engagements are political spectacles projecting narratives that are attractive to people who share the sentiments made public in these spectacles, and a following of spectators that, in sustaining their spectatorship, keeps the spectacle in its status. The article noted that spectators are attached and concerned with the narratives (i.e., from the causes and actors involved to the eventual results) behind and projected by such spectacles, and that this attachment in turn defines and sustains their spectatorship. Political alienation is a condition shared by both the apathetic and spectators. However, the case of spectators is more complex and merits closer analysis in order to attain an encompassing understanding of political alienation. The author argued and illustrated that political alienation must be understood as a sustainable process constituted and driven by sustained spectatorship (i.e., sustained relationship between spectators and a political spectacle) made possible by a habitus of disempowerment in everyday life.

In their study, Schäfer and Debus (2015) asked how do the positions of voters on European integration and EU policy alienation relate to electoral participation? The study was built on the recent literature on participation in elections in general, and in the European level in particular, and argued that positive positions on further steps in European integration boost the chances that

a citizen participates in the European parliamentary elections. In addition, by building on a simple spatial model, the study argued that the European policy offers parties make before the election have an impact on participation in the election to the European Parliament: the more alienated a citizen is from the European policy positions parties offer, the more likely she abstains from going to the polls. The analysis, which is based on the 2014 European Election Studies dataset, provides evidence for our argument, even after controlling for a battery of 'standard' factors that explain political participation

The study of Fox (2015), focusing on the case of Britain, explored the extent to which Millennials are a distinct political generation in terms of political participation, political apathy, and political alienation, and considers how their conceptualization as a distinct generation improves our understanding of their political characteristics. Furthermore, it tested the theory that their alienation from, rather than their apathy towards, formal politics can explain their distinct political behavior. Through critiquing and developing conceptualizations of the Millennials as a political generation, and of political apathy, alienation and participation, the study challenged the conventional wisdom. Millennials are a distinct generation in terms of their political participation, apathy and alienation – but they are distinct for their lack of participation, their unusually high levels of apathy towards formal politics, and their unusually low levels of alienation from it. Millennials have the potential to be the most politically apathetic, and least politically alienated, generation to have entered the British electorate since World War Two. In addition, the study also showed that while generational differences are significant and often substantial, they make only a limited contribution to explaining variation in political apathy, alienation and participation. The study argued, therefore, that future studies into and policy responses to the political behavior of young people must recognize their distinct levels of political apathy. At the same time, however, the focus on political generations should not be so intense as to obscure the role of more influential causes of differences in political participation.

The article of Christ (2015) about the concept of alienation in the early works of KARL MARX, viewed that the main analysis of alienated labor was developed by Karl Marx in his early work

Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts from 1844. Marx differentiates between four dimensions of alienated labor in capitalist modes of production: The alienation of individuals (workers) from the product, from economic activity, from their species-being, and the alienation of individuals from one another. Together with the description of four forms of alienation, Marx provides approaches for an anthropological definition of humans, who can be summarized in the conception of humans as 'representational species-beings'. According to Marx, the individual is a creature who acts in relationship to his own species and to human society. Under the conditions of private ownership and exchange, the individual alienates himself from his species-being and his fellows, whom he views solely as a means of achieving personal objectives. Following the analysis of alienated labor, Karl Marx provides in his early works initial indications of his ideas on a superseded alienation. In the case of human modes of production, where private ownership is positively superseded, Marx lists four different forms of affirmation, which are conceived of in the sense of recognition relationships and also relate to the anthropological definition of humans as 'representational species-beings'.

Malik (2014) showed an extensive effort to dig some relevant literature regarding alienation in unemployed adults by reviewing the previous literature. Unemployment is known as the great cause of different psychological problems and physical as well. Due to the prolonged period of unemployment a person lost control on himself and feels weak because of financial crunch and redundancy. It has been also observed by different researchers that an unemployed person lacks the self-identity, becomes isolated from the society and even himself also. Thus, the given literature provides enough evidence regarding the problem of alienation among the unemployed adults and its effect on their heath. An alienated person, especially if unemployed, experiences different psychological as well as physical disorders or diseases. The alienated individual lacks the willpower; his life becomes hopeless, gets disconsolate from his environment and becomes closer to the different social evils and consumptions. Due to the prolonged feeling of unemployment, a person could not make the well-adjusted in society because of financial barriers. It has been also evidenced by the above given literature that due to unemployment, a person loses their self-esteem, feels detached from himself and their society, they lose their self-identity, meaning of life and

purpose and always feel that they are worthless and weak, because of their financial insecurity and joblessness. Young people's increased social alienation is a consequence of unemployment, rather than a predisposition towards it, but that high social alienation at school leads to later job dissatisfaction. It has been also shown that unemployed individuals feel economic powerlessness which creates a feeling of inferiority. It has been also observed by different researchers that due to the continuous feeling of unemployment most of the adults gets involved into the drug addiction like alcohol consumption and other drugs

Janmaat, Mostafa and Hokins (2014) explored the effect of tracked education in upper secondary on voting behavior. They discussed two causal mechanisms that link tracked education to greater disparities of political participation: the curriculum and peer socialization. Data of waves 1, 2, 5 and 7 of the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) is used to assess the hypothesis that educational track has an independent effect on voting. Controlling for several pre- and post-track influences, the paper showed that students who have taken vocational courses in less prestigious schools indeed have lower reported voting levels at age 20 than those who have pursued an academic qualification (A levels) in prestigious schools. The authors proposed that the effect of tracked education on political participation is likely to vary across Europe and that this variation may well be explained by differences across Europe in the extent to which the academic and vocational tracks are integrated, both in terms of the curriculum and in their social intake.

In their study, Pedersen, Dassonneville and Hooghe (2014) displayed that voter turnout was not just dependent on individual characteristics of voters, but also on evaluations of the party system. It has been argued that both indifference and alienation can have a negative impact on the tendency to vote. While indifference means that the voter perceives little or no differences between the options that are available within the party system, alienation means that the voter has a negative evaluation of all political parties. The paper suggested that it is essential to take multiple parties into account when operationalizing indifference in a multiparty setting. The analysis showed that measures that move beyond looking at the top two parties are indeed superior in predicting voter turnout in multiparty systems, compared to cruder measurements. An analysis of CSES

(Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) data showed that alienation has a stronger impact on voter turnout than indifference. The paper concluded with some observation on how a negative evaluation of the party system can contribute to a trend of declining voter turnout

The study of Cale (2014) argued that models of political participation would be improved by the inclusion of political alienation variables, which have fallen into disuse in recent decades. Using data from the US Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey (2006), the study relied upon negative binomial regression with nested models to compare the explanatory power of social capital variables with models including political alienation and peer influence variables to assess the value of such concepts. Findings indicated that while the parent variables of political alienation (powerlessness, meaninglessness, and mistrust of political institutions) improve model accuracy and influence political participation, the latent variable remains ambiguously useful. Powerlessness and mistrust revealed significant effects, but mistrust failed to fit into the latent concept of political alienation, and meaninglessness did not produce significant results. Peer influence only significantly affected political participation when participants specifically discussed political matters with peers. Implications and concepts for future research follow.

Sanapour and Golafshan (2014) showed that the phenomenon of, is not only of the economic structure, but also have been a widespread subjective and objective orientation in human and economic structure is a part of it. Alienation of Iranian society as a society in transition is a sociological problem. In the past decades, especially in the sixties that rapid social changes undermined the traditional values and customs, modernism dealing with traditionalism without being able to create conceptions and cultural identity created two-fold condition which the result can be considered as social- political alienation. Given the importance of the youth in this study followed by a discussion of the relationship between alienation from the political system, political participation, the use of local media, the use of foreign media, economic - social, age and gender as independent variables. Social - Political alienation as the dependent variable we are. The results suggest that variable other than economic - social, there is a significant relationship between independent and dependent variables.

On the basis of 1996 and 2006 of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), Mierina (2014) explored the character of government-society relations in post-communist countries, and its dynamics. The use of comparative data and the application of Paige's (1971) political alienation model and Woolcock's and Narayan's (2000) model of government-society relations allows to shed new light on citizen's political attitudes by analyzing them in the context of the overall political environment in the country. The results revealed that while citizens in most established democracies bear allegiant attitudes, citizens of post-communist countries feel alienated. Distrust of each other and of the political authorities leads to dysfunctional government-society relations. Since the time of transitional reforms, people in post-communist countries have become more confident in their political capability, yet there is no general trend with regards to confidence in political authorities. Those at the margins of society often feel alienated, and dissident attitudes are on the rise, especially among youth.

The study of Wood (2014) attempted to help fill that void in the literature, through analyzing pre-election (N=2,322) and post-election (N=2,102) survey data from the 2008 American National Election Survey to find the causes of political alienation among the population as a whole and among men and women separately. Ordinary least squares regression analysis and difference-of-slopes tests were used in the analysis. Findings showed several causes of political alienation in the population, including a low degree of civic engagement and little or no affiliation with a major political party. Also, a low level of education was found to be a cause of political alienation among women, but not among men. On the basis of these findings, several methods are proposed for the reduction of political alienation in American society. The limitations of this study were also addressed, as well as its implications for theory and future political alienation research.

The study of Steinbrecher (2014) analyzed the impact of alienation and indifference on individual turnout in German federal elections between 1994 and 2009. Applying a comprehensive research design, the main findings were: 1) that alienation and indifference have become more important predictors of turnout in the elections of 2005 and 2009. 2) Both concepts can contribute to the explanation of electoral abstention in Germany even when controlling for traditional predictors of

turnout like the perceived duty to vote, strength of party identification, and interest in politics. In addition, 3) high levels of alienation clearly suppress the willingness to participate in elections among voters without party identification and among those who do not support the citizen duty.

Stoker and Evans (2014) concluded that more conceptual and empirical research is needed, while the article had demonstrated that political alienation is a complex and politically salient topic that justifies substantial investigation. In his discussion of political support for political systems – the other side of the coin to the discussion of political alienation and developed in the same time period – David Easton (1965) makes a well-known distinction between specific and diffuse support. The former is about support for the government of the day, its leaders and its policies. The latter refers to support for the basic political arrangements of democracy. Our return to the issue of political alienation however leaves us with some questions about the continuing value of Easton's distinction. It may prove to be more of a block on analysis than an aid. For Easton, political discontent can only come about in one of two forms which are the converse of his understanding of political support. Political discontent could be expressed against the government of the day and its behavior or it could lead to a rejection of the basic principles of the political system. Easton (1965; 1975) was aware of the 1960s literature on alienation but refused to incorporate it into his analysis. We think he was wrong. What 21st century citizens are saying in the empirical studies that we have undertaken is that their political discontent reflects their concerns about the government of the day and not the principles of democracy yet these concerns have diffused and system threatening aspects. Contemporary discontent has an additional dimension; alienation from the operation of the political system that stretches way beyond any judgement that a different government or leader would automatically make politics better. Political alienation matters because there are three pillars of political support in a liberal democracy not just two. Only one pillar is clearly supported by citizens – democracy and its inalienable political rights. The performance of the government of the day is often judged negatively and as the evidence presented in this article so clearly demonstrates; so too is the general operation of the political system. As the ancient Athenians would testify, an agora with only one fully functional pillar is prone to

toppling over. The beginning of the 21st century may well prove to be a crucible moment for liberal democracy.

The research of Hasani (2014) discussed the relationship between institutionalized participation and national security. The research highlighted that institutionalized participation on the one hand, leads to the development of democracy and legitimation of the states, and on the other hand, increases the level of national security. Moreover, people's confidence in the government increases the stability of the state, and enhances development and national security. From an Islamic point of view, the role of people is not limited only to legitimizing the governments, but they have a basic role in raising their efficiency. The research was conducted to achieve the following objectives: 1) Measuring the level of politico - social alienation, politico - Social participation, and participation in the national security. 2) Finding correlations among the variables of politico - social alienation, politico - social participation and the national security. 3) Studying the relationship of variables such as age, gender, religion, race, marriage, education and income with the level of politico - social participation. The finding of the research showed that socio - political participation is very effective in increasing or decreasing national security coefficient; and that politico - social alienation seriously threatens national security.

The study of Abu Ajwa (2013) attempted to identify the prevalence of political alienation among students of Al-Aqsa University in the governorates of Gaza, and to identify the relationship between Palestinian division and political alienation. The author also investigated whether there are statistically significant differences in political alienation according to gender, place of residence and party affiliation. The study was conducted on a sample of 440 male and female students from Al-Aqsa University, and concluded that there was a high degree of alienation among university students, such that discontent occupied the first place, then there was the lack of standards and feeling of helplessness. The study results showed that there were no statistically significant differences in political alienation among Al-Aqsa University students in Gaza governorates due to gender. There were, however, statistically significant differences in favor of the category of (1500-3000 shekels) when it comes to lack of standards and political isolation.

There were no statistically significant differences in political alienation among university students depending on the place of residence (village, city, camp), while there were significant differences in political alienation when it comes to the change of political affiliation (national, Islamic, leftist, independent) in favor of the leftist and the independent.

Lee (2013) used the cumulative ANES survey (1972-2004) to examine the effect of elite polarization on various measures of mass political engagement when alienation, mobilization and informational factors were included together in the estimation model. The paper also focused on the conditional effect of existing cognitive ability of an individual as it explored mass engagement question because citizens can respond differently to changed informational environment depending on their different levels of education. The findings of the study indicated that the effects of increasing elite polarization in the U.S. Congress on mass political engagement is rather ambiguous because the signs and the magnitudes of the effects are varying by measures of political engagement and levels of education. The ambiguity in findings might explained why previous research has provided conflicting empirical evidences regarding its effect on mass politics.

In his study, Steenvoorden (2013) discussed the political alienation and societal unease, and concluded that the discontent with politics is high, political participation is low and politicians meet cynicism about their intentions. But does political alienation stand alone or is it embedded in a broader sentiment of disaffection: societal unease? Amongst the general public across western societies, a negative view on the state of society is often discussed. The French call it 'malaise', the Germans 'Unbehagen' and the Dutch and Flemish 'maatschappelijk onbehagen', but they all but point to the same phenomenon, a discomfort with the direction society is heading. However, this societal unease has received little scientific attention. Over the last few decades, scholars have widely signaled discontent with various aspects of society. Political scientists are troubled by decreasing levels of political trust and engagement and the rise of populism and extreme right parties. Sociologists investigated the supposed loss of social capital, failing integration of immigrants and xenophobia and socioeconomic inequality. Criminologists focused on the perception of everincreasing levels of criminality. Nevertheless, empirical research on the

commonality between these varied attitudes remains limited and fragmented. The paper had three aims. First, it proposed a theoretical model of societal unease by integrating a broad range of interdisciplinary literature. Second, the commonalities among attitudes are studied, testing whether this model of societal unease holds empirically. The study employed confirmatory factor analysis in a case study of the Netherlands (with survey data from 2012) and prove that our theoretical model of societal unease exists empirically. Finally, the study used the scale of unease to understand its relationship with various types of disengagement with politics: political alienation, political cynicism and electoral abstention.

Adenrele (2012) communicates that almost three years ago, a group of Northern Nigerian militants that transformed from political brigandage declared a war on the country in the name of Islamic jihad. This has claimed thousands of lives and millions of naira worth of properties. However, a critical analysis of the mission of the group pointed to the theory of poverty and political alienation. The paper, therefore, examined the violent rampageous Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria from the perspectives of the current agitation for political power-shift and severe poverty in Northern Nigeria. The research tool for the study was an in-depth desk survey of media reports and literature data. The paper therefore recommended a total federal restructuring and massive poverty alleviation programs to curb Boko Haram violence and other ethno-religious crises in Nigeria.

Southwell (2012) focused on three dimensions of political alienation: internal efficacy, external efficacy, and political trust. Multivariate analysis of the demographic determinants of political efficacy and trust suggests that females, blacks, and Latinos were more likely to exhibit feelings of internal and external efficacy, but trust is significantly higher only among the well-educated and strong partisans. The research then examined the behavioral implications of these attitudes on voter turnout and candidate preference in the 2008 presidential election. Logit analysis of the 2008-2009 American National Election Study data suggested that internal efficacy increases turnout while external efficacy and trust are insignificant. With regard to candidate preference, those individuals

exhibiting internal and external efficacy were more likely to vote for Barack Obama, while trust was insignificant.

The Solhaug (2012) article addressed the following question: What characterizes the mechanisms of political alienation among non-Western immigrant students, and how might these mechanisms be related to student's acculturation attitudes? A theory of political alienation and acculturation is applied. Substantial quantitative data from Norwegian upper secondary school students reveals that non-Western immigrant students particularly see themselves as less politically involved than their Norwegian counterparts. Interviews were carried out with a selection of immigrant students from different background to explore the reasons for their political alienation. A number of mechanisms in political alienation were found and discussed. The interviews revealed a close link between political alienation, and the immigrant identity and their acculturation processes.

Udogu (2012) reviewed the book *Political Alienation in Libya* which assessed Citizens' Political Behavior, authored by Mabroka al-Werfalli. The book revolved around the issue of political alienation in the North African nation of Libya. It brought to the fore two major concerns that have engaged the philosophy and scholarship of some Africanists on the matter of the legitimacy of the state in postcolonial Africa. It is, indeed, the case that in much of contemporary African politics it is often difficult to separate the state from the leader. In this context, the ensuing question is this: to what extent did the character of Colonel Qaddafi himself advance political alienation in Libyan society? As in many African polities, the assumption is that Qaddafi was Libya, and that Libya was Qaddafi—just as Robert Mugabe is Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe is Mugabe; Paul Biya is Cameroon, and Cameroon is Biya; and so on. A second query that emerged was whether, to further the state's legitimacy, citizens should be politically devoted to the nation-state (as in nationalism) or to the individual leader. For instance, before his death during the recent rebellion, Colonel Qaddafi claimed that "my people love me"—not that the people loved Libya so much that they would defend it without him being in power. It is around the foregoing queries and discursive

conjectures that this book should be visualized. In chapter one, "Surveying Opinion in a Suppressive Milieu," al-Werfalli provides the empirical foundation on which the analyses and conclusion in this text are made. They include a survey of citizens' attitudes toward the state that was conducted in Al-Orouba, with a population of approximately 85,000, in the region of Benghazi (found on pages 3, 6-10; 195-205). The author further narrates the herculean task of conducting a "meaningful" survey in a repressive society, in which researchers are generally viewed with suspicion. Chapter two, "The Quest for Legitimacy," is used by al-Werfalli to historicize his analysis. The Libyan state lacked political legitimacy following "native" resistance to the occupation of the territory by the Ottoman Empire (p. 11). Readers learn that the reign of the monarchy did not change matters either, while the author alludes to the tactics adopted by the military junta after the 1969 coup d'état to advance the regime's support. The author points out that the stratagem applied by the administration was revolutionary legitimacy, which justified the acts undertaken by Colonel Qaddafi to rationalize his continuing in power indefinitely. The other mode with which to advance his political legitimacy was socioeconomic performance (dubbed eudaemonic), seen as a legitimation ploy on which most authoritarian regimes relied, especially when resources are considered plentiful. This method of operation is based upon the role of government in providing social and economic benefits to its citizens (pp. 12, 19). Meanwhile, other approaches adopted by Qaddafi to further his legitimacy, and not necessarily that of the state itself, included charismatic and foreign policy. He saw himself as the reincarnation, and heir in the Arab world, of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, especially as he championed the dogma of Arab nationalism (p. 26). He did so almost like the enigmatic Russian Rasputin by deluding himself as one endowed with supernatural, superhuman, and exceptional powers (pp. 22-23). Chapter three, "Aspects of Political Support," addresses the measure of support the regime had from the survey's outcomes. In particular, al-Werfalli studies the extent to which individuals attended meetings of the Basic Popular Congresses (BPCs), a political component of the regime. Whereas attendance was high in the late 1970s (65%), it dropped substantially in the early 1990s (to 27%), and it continued to dwindle (as shown on p. 53). This development suggested a deficiency of enthusiasm in the system and a lack of trust in the government to govern effectively (pp. 61-64, 67). Despite the foregoing situation in the BPCs, 53.5% of members of the Revolutionary Committees preferred to keep the system as it was, while 31.2% believed that some modifications.

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The Sha'ban study (2012) considered that political participation is one of the most important issues of interest to states, as this issue has a profound impact on laying the foundations of the state and in strengthening the building of its political, social and economic institutions. Young individuals in most countries worldwide receive remarkable attention as they are considered the future leaders. In the Palestinian case, young individuals are considered the future, whether in the democratic struggle or in the resistance of the occupation. The study clarified that the political participation of young individuals will lead to the strengthening of the presence of young leaders, who are capable of formulating the general policy of the state.

The study of Al-Barmil (2011) dealt with the trends of refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The study addressed two dimensions. The first dimension addressed the studies that dealt with the position of refugees on the Oslo Agreement whereas the second addressed the studies that dealt with the position of Palestinian refugees regarding the Right of Return and resettlement. The study concluded that a large number of Palestinian refugees rejected the idea of resettlement, and at the same time there was a difference in the views of refugees by geographical areas, whereby that disparity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank influenced the attitude of refugees towards the Right of Return, and therefore the statistical analysis here was the largest evidence of those percentages through which the opinions and attitudes of the refugees were revealed.

Knoblauch (2011) reintroduced the theory of political alienation as a model for analyzing and critiquing public sphere structures, arguing that commodified and professionalized media and organizational structures distance the general public from the production of public opinion and limit the public's capacity to use communication for democratic empowerment. These communication norms and practices act as a counter-force to more deliberative forms of communication and (re)create five conditions of alienation – commodified cation, social isolation, meaninglessness, normlessness, and powerlessness – that influence what individuals know, how they interact, and who ultimately has power in the political process. Integrating literature on public opinion, deliberative democracy, mediated communication, and collective action, this paper offers

an antinormative lens for critiquing currently existing practices and understanding how contemporary communication structures operate systemically.

In the PhD thesis of Mierina (2011), the author showed that often concerns raised about the political disenchantment and the lack of notable improvements in political attitudes among the citizens of post-communist countries (Howard, 2003, Mishler & Rose 2001, Lagerspetz, 2009). In most of these countries, people distrust both each other and the political authority, and such conflicting state-society relations can be considered 'dysfunctional' (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Building on the social capital theory, institutional and cultural theories and by using quantitative micro level analysis (structural equation modelling and an original technique of cohort analysis) the thesis offered an insight into the state-society relations in post-communist countries, as well as mechanisms behind the evolution or persistence of these attitudes. The statistical data from the ISSP indicated that post-communist countries, even after twenty years of democratization still form a distinct cluster characterized by low political trust and efficacy. By using a modified Paige's theoretical model, the findings showed that, as stated in Hypothesis 2, while citizens in most established democracies bear allegiant attitudes, citizens of post-communist countries feel alienated. The findings also allowed to conclude that the role of voluntary associations in facilitating development of social capital and civic attitudes might indeed be overstated, at least in the case of Latvia. Participation in voluntary associations does not increase interpersonal trust and political competence, and this result corresponds to Hypothesis 9. Apart from fighting corruption and restoring confidence in political authorities, raising the education level of the population might probably be one of the best available solutions to increase the political activity of citizens and overcome political helplessness.

The thesis of Snyder III (2011) presented an examination of factors that impact levels of voting activity among American citizens from 1972 through 2004. The subject of voter turnout has been

thoroughly examined by political scientists over the years, as have aspects of youth voting and the influence of education. Many of the same variables presented by scholars in recent years will be employed in this study. However, these earlier studies only looked at individual level variables in explaining voter turnout. The study contributed to a more complete understanding of voting through the analysis of individual, regional, and temporal variables using interactive logit models and hierarchical linear models. The application of multiple levels of information will help provide additional insights into the complexity of what drives voter turnout within the American electorate. Special emphasis will be placed on the role of education, political knowledge, and age in spurring voter turnout and how education and political knowledge may interact with other important individual and contextual level factors.

Another factor influencing political alienation is corruption. The study of Purnomo (2011) discussed political corruption. The paper stated that it is widely omnipresent in Indonesia. Some, who are in control in government and political institutions, abuse its power in order to maximize their self-interest in terms of wealth, power, influence, and social status. Tragically, rampant political corruption in Indonesia is becoming widespread from central to local level. The paper argued that the spread of political corruption relates to the political context in Indonesia. The significant reduction of state actions in pursuing public interest namely social justice, welfare society, and national prosperity significantly reduce public trust to the state. The absent state, then, facilitates the raise of political alienation among people. Political corruption, consequently, is conducted in order to protect self-interest of people in the era of absent state.

The study of Rawashdeh (2011) aimed to reveal the most important causes and factors that lead to political alienation among university youth, and to reveal the most important effects and manifestations resulting from this type of alienation. To achieve the objectives of the study, a sample of (393) male and female students was withdrawn from the humanities and sciences faculties for the academic year 2009/2010. And it found that there are statistically significant

differences attributable to college and family income in the factors and manifestations of political alienation and the proposed solutions. There are statistically significant differences due to gender in the manifestations of political alienation and the proposed solutions. The study recommended spreading a culture of challenge and developing party programs to encourage students for political participation as well as stimulating the political awareness of the young man to discuss political matters.

Al-Masry (2010) investigated the levels of political participation of working Palestinian women and their associated obstacles. The study sample was 200 working women in the Gaza Governorate. The study found that the percentage of women interested in political work reached 63.8%, followed by those who were political extremists (53.7%). As for those who practiced political activity, their percentage was 44.9%, and finally 34% were politically marginalized. The study also found that there were no statistically significant differences in the level of political participation of working Palestinian women according to the average monthly income, educational level or marital status, while there were statistically significant differences in favor of women who live in the city at the level of their interest in political work. There were also statistically significant differences in favor of women who live in rural areas and villages at the marginal level in political action. As for obstacles, the percentage of self-obstacles was 69.1%, followed by religious obstacles (64.3%), then political (61.3%), then social and cultural obstacles (58.8%), followed by economic obstacles (49.2%), and finally legal obstacles (39.8%).

In another study by Mabyed (2010), which addressed Palestinian refugees between alienation and political integration: a case study of the "Balata Camp". In her study, the author reviewed the historical roots of the Palestinian refugee issue, and the sequence of events to highlight the history of this problem, as well as to identify the waves of asylum and the categories into which the refugees are divided. The author also showed the geographical and demographic distribution of Palestinian refugees and their general characteristics, and the effects resulting from the process of displacement. The researcher used the descriptive analytical approach. The study outcomes surmised that there were no statistically significant differences at the level of significance (α =

0.05) from the point of view of Palestinian refugees in Balata camp between alienation and political integration due to age, gender or academic qualification. Conversely, from the point of view of Palestinian refugees in Balata camp, there were statistically significant differences at the significance level (α = 0.05) between alienation and political integration due to years of imprisonment, number of family members and political affiliation. This study provides some enlightenment that expatriation does not necessarily mean losing the homeland or emigrating from it, but there is also marginalization by the relevant official authorities and failure to take into account the factors of survival for the refugees and raising their level of awareness and unlocking their freedoms within the camp community.

Abu Zaher's study (2010) focused on the phenomenon of political and social alienation among the residents of Palestinian communities in order to know the impact of a number of social and political factors on the increase in political and social alienation among Palestinian refugees. The study was based on two main hypotheses: The first is that the more the residents of Palestinian communities get involved in the political process, the more they feel political alienation. The second hypothesis states that the less involved Palestinian communities are in community life, the more they feel social alienation. Given the lack of studies that examine political alienation among Palestinian refugees, the researcher relied on the analytical method to analyze some statistics and field studies linking them to the extent of the increase in political and social alienation in Palestinian societies. These studies were discussed in the various analyzes of the Palestinian refugee's sense of political alienation. The study concluded that the members of the sample were less involved in community life, which indicates the existence of social alienation among the residents of the communities. They had a tendency to political isolation, not engaging in political life, rejecting reality and the desire to change it. This indicates the existence of political alienation among the population of the communities.

In his paper "Still Citizen vs. State? Post-communist prospects for democracy in Europe", Lagerspetz (2009) analyzed political attitudes and behaviors on the basis of the ISSP 2004 data. He concluded that citizens of post-communist countries continue to distrust institutions, and

participation, both conventional and unconventional, is comparatively very low. State is considered "somebody else's business, not mine".

Gniewosz, Noack and Buhl (2009) examined how parental political attitudes, parenting styles, and classroom characteristics predict adolescents' political alienation, as feelings about the individual's ability to affect the political system's performance at the individual level. Participants were 463 families that included mothers, fathers, and their adolescent children in 6th, 8th, and 10th grades. Teachers reported on the classroom context. Multilevel analyses indicated several findings: parental and adolescent political attitudes supported a parent–adolescent transmission process, adolescents' perceptions of parental attitudes mediated the transmission process, authoritarian parenting style positively predicted adolescent political alienation, and classrooms comprised of teachers with clear educational goals were negatively related to adolescent political alienation. Results are discussed in terms of learning political alienation within family by parent–child transmission. Associations among adolescent political alienation, parenting style, and classroom climate are considered as interaction characteristics with authorities shaping adolescents' political attitudes.

The PhD thesis by Robertson (2009), about youth political participation in Poland and Romania, the researcher indicated that although perceived changes in political participation patterns amongst young people in recent years have attracted much academic research in established democracies this remains an understudied area in the newer post-communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. In established democracies, researchers have shown that although many young people are increasingly shunning traditional forms of political involvement, such as voting and political party membership, instead they are turning to more direct methods such as volunteering and protest. Despite evidence that young people in newer democracies may also have low levels of electoral participation and party membership, there is little understanding of whether this is due to communist legacies of forced participation, economic and social hardship or indeed reflects trends in established democracies. As active political participation plays a vital role in the improvement of the quality of democracy, this represents an important gap in our knowledge. The thesis aimed

to start to address this by analyzing the logics behind youth political participation in two contrasting newer democracies, Poland and Romania. To do this, the study employed a multi-method comparative approach which combines qualitative findings of fieldwork and quantitative data on electoral turnout. The thesis assessed electoral participation, party membership and involvement in informal forms of participation such as volunteering and protest. It found that many young people in post-communist democracies choose to opt out of traditional forms of political participation because, as in established democracies, they feel alienated from formal political agents. However, this exit from formal methods of participation is not generally coupled with active participation in informal forms of involvement. The thesis concluded that despite sharing some important characteristics with young people in established democracies, legacies of communism and the rapid nature of post-communist political and socioeconomic transformation continue to negatively influence youth political participation in Poland and Romania.

Southwell's research (2008) centered on the link between alienation and voter turnout, by considering the various dimensions of alienation - powerlessness, meaninglessness, and cynicism - and how they might interact to influence the decision on whether to vote. Logit analysis of a pooled American National Election Study data set, 1964-2000, suggests that feelings of powerlessness and meaningless-ness depress turnout, as expected. However, increased cynicism can serve to boost turnout among those who display only a moderate amount of powerlessness or meaningless, therefore underscoring an important interactive effect of cynicism on voter turnout. During the past three decades, American have become less attached to the two major political parties, more cynical about elected officials and political institutions, and less confident in their own abilities to influence the political system. The research examined the link between this increase in alienated attitudes and the parallel decline in voter turnout during this same time period. The approach was that such attitudinal factors contribute as much to the explanation of the voting decision as do the standard demographic and contextual explanations of voter turnout.

Bansal (2008) discussed the Kashmir region which is occupied by Gilgit–Baltistan in Pakistan. The author indicated that the Occupied Kashmir has witnessed a series of political disturbances and violence over the past years. Though many analysts have viewed the often-violent assertions by otherwise peaceful residents of this remote and mountainous region as occasional eruptions of the Shia–Sunni sectarian divide, a careful examination will indicate the deeper roots of alienation of the population in this long-neglected region. Almost total absence of democratic rights, lack of participation in the government and economic exploitation of the region coupled with ethnic, cultural and linguistic marginalization appear to be the main factors that have led to this alienation.

Saito (2008) states that in many democratic societies, including Japan, political alienation such as political cynicism or inefficacy is widespread among the general public. Some researchers argue that along with various other factors embedded in political systems, the mass media, particularly television, plays a crucial role in promoting or intensifying political alienation. Focusing on the influence of the media, this study examines whether television news induces political cynicism and inefficacy in Japan. Previous research has indicated that public and commercial broadcasts may have different impacts on the political attitude of the audience. Thus, the study predicted that the relationship between television news exposure and political alienation would be stronger among those who exclusively watch commercial news programs. The results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses indicate that among non-Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) news viewers, those who view television news more frequently are more likely to feel politically inefficacious, and that those who rely exclusively on television for political information are more likely to be politically cynical. However, negative influences associated with television reliance or television news viewing are not observed among the NHK news viewers, although positive influences are also not observed. Thus, according to the results, the "video malaise" effect would be limited to certain viewers. The article discussed the implications of the findings and also suggested that more exclusive psychological explanations be examined for the video malaise effect.

Radkiewicz (2007) attempted to ascertain whether it is possible that a permanent experience of helplessness, senselessness and alienation from socio-political reality leads to an individual having ethnocentric attitudes. The supposition that there is a causal relation between the two phenomena would imply that people who feel lost and disoriented tend to have a strong sense of national identity. The empirical data used in the analyses was taken from a survey conducted among a nationwide representative sample of adult Poles (N=1522). The set of hierarchical regression analyses showed that the relations which were observed could be explained as being the effect of the joint operation of two separate mechanisms. Firstly, this is influenced partly by the fact that growing ethnocentrism and increasing anomie and alienation are common among elderly and poorly-educated people. The second mechanism consist of finding that people who experience feelings of socio-political senselessness and helplessness have a tendency to look for compensation in authoritarian-paranoid worldviews. It would seem that authoritarian-paranoid beliefs can be seen as being a mediator between social anomie and political alienation, on the one hand, and ethnocentric attitudes on the other.

Tsfati (2007) examined the notion that minority perceptions of the strong influence of biased media coverage may indirectly lead to increased minority alienation. This idea was tested in the context of the perceived media stigmatization of Arab citizens in Israel. Using structural equation modeling (N=251), it is demonstrated that, over and above the effects of ideological, social, and demographic variables, hostile media perceptions and the perceived influence of media coverage affected Arabs' perceived image and consequently their social alienation. Interestingly, the amount of exposure to mainstream Israeli media did not play a significant part in this process. However, exposure to Arab media significantly affected perceptions of hostile coverage.

Foljanty-Jost and Schmidt (2006) argued that local trends might have an impact on national politics through the repolarization of citizens. However, preconditions are, ceteris paribus, the restoration of political trust through participation and institutional changes that support citizen involvement

in politics. The paper concluded that in Japan, the relationship between citizens and their government is undergoing a profound change. Conventional political participation has been eroding for more than a decade, and citizens have lost their trust in politicians and administration, have become skeptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned with the democratic process. Japan's political system is losing its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, who are the foundation of the democratic system. Dissatisfaction with the present political system has grown most rapidly among the better educated, the more affluent, and young urban citizens, but among women as well. New forms of citizen participation have simultaneously gained momentum at the local level, including community-based involvement in decision-making, participation in NGOs and volunteer activities. Citizen networks, which form a new kind of local party, can be regarded as distinctly different from the established political parties, indicating that citizens are ready to develop their own political alternatives. Not only the number, but also the composition of those citizens who become involved in local politics, is evolving: especially women and younger urban citizens are increasingly involved in these movements. These new forms of citizens' involvement in local affairs are not an isolated social phenomenon, but are integrated into the broader context of a paradigm shift in local politics that started with institutional reforms of decentralization, but has already moved to new political innovations involving cooperation between politicians, administration, and citizens. The decentralization reform has improved the preconditions for local governments to meet citizens' needs, while simultaneously providing citizens with the means to actively participate in local politics. This combination could be the foundation on which the restoration of political trust could be built. Citizen participation in governance is essential for enhancing public confidence and belief in governing institutions, state policies formulated to meet people's needs, and providing feedback on such policies. The ongoing process could therefore strengthen and further develop citizens' political involvement as long as institutional reforms and political improvements regarding politicians and civil servants' qualifications and professionalization continue, and independent financial local sources are guaranteed. The future will show whether the revitalization of local politics and participation in local affairs can restore participation in elections as a core political behavior.

Adams, Dow and Merrill (2006) presented a unified model of turnout and vote choice that incorporates two distinct motivations for citizens to abstain from voting: alienation from the candidates, and indifference between the candidates. Empirically, the finding was alienation and indifference each motivated significant amounts of voter abstention in the 1980–1988 U.S. presidential elections. Using model-based computer simulations to manipulate factors affecting turnout—the finding showed that distinguishing between alienation and indifference illuminates three controversies in elections research. First, also the paper found that abstention because of either alienation or indifference benefited Republican candidates, but only very modestly. Second, presidential elections involving attractive candidates motivate higher turnout, but only to the extent that abstention stems from alienation rather than from indifference. Third, paradoxically, citizens' individual-level tendencies to abstain because of alienation are strongly affected by their evaluations of the candidates' policies, whereas aggregate turnout rates do not depend significantly on the candidates' policy platforms.

Gaudi (2004) studied the factors contributing to the political alienation of the students at Shiraz University. To explain the concept of alienation, Geyer's theoretical framework in the social psychology was used. The statistical universe of the research consisted of 6822 persons, of which 400 were taken randomly, using Couckran formula. The findings showed that the variables self-confidence, political content, the family's self-guided educational method and sense of gratitude had the greatest effect of the students' political alienation. The multi-variable analysis showed that among the above-mentioned variables, self-confidence and political content were the most significant variables, followed by two other variables; that is, the father's education and his degree. The findings indicated that political alienation is a multi-faceted phenomenon developed during the process of socialization, and which is affected by certain psychological and sociological (subjective and objective) factors.

The study of Banat and Salameh (2003) identified the degree of prevalence of the phenomenon of political alienation among residents of Al-Arroub camp and its relationship to some variables. The authors used the descriptive analytical method. In their study, the authors reached a set of results,

including the prevalence of the phenomenon of political alienation among residents of Al-Arroub camp to a considerably high degree whereby 67% of them felt a state of political alienation. The study showed that there were no statistically significant differences in the degree of political alienation among Al-Arroub camp residents, according to gender. There were, however, statistically significant differences in favor of individuals who were not politically affiliated with any of the existing parties in the Palestinian arena, where the degree of political alienation among them was high, compared to those affiliated with political parties. Finally, the study reported that there were no differences in the degree of political alienation among residents of Al-Arroub camp according to age, number of years of education, monthly income, number of family members, and the degree of religiosity. Undoubtedly, the loss of a homeland and displacement are important factors in a person's life, so what if other factors are added to this equation such as the economic situation and the refugee's failure to provide what he needs to be able to survive. Not to mention other factors, though secondary, such as education and awareness. These issues negatively affect the psyche of refugees, and prevent them from distinguishing between exile and alienation.

Howard (2003) made a gloomy observation that the new democratic institutions are neither rooted in, nor actively supported by the population. At the same time, the paper concluded that the democracy in post-communist countries is neither thriving nor on the verge of collapse, it is somehow 'muddling through'

In his study, Judeh (2001) investigated the nature of the trend towards the Oslo Accord among a sample of Palestinian university youth, identified its basic components, and disclosed the potential relationship between the trend towards the Oslo Accords and both character appreciation and the political trend. The study sample consisted of 546 male and female students, of whom 257 were male and 288 were female students, studying in the universities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The study results revealed that the attitudes towards the Oslo Accords were negative, and that there was a negative correlation between the attitude towards the Oslo Accords and the degrees of character appreciation. The study also showed that there was no significant correlation between the trend towards the Oslo Agreement and political affiliation, and that the general trend towards the Oslo Accords and the course of the settlement process was a negative one.

Thijssen and Dierickx (2001) stated that after a critical evaluation of the existing research concerning the relation between political alienation and extreme-right voting behavior, the authors found that there is a great need for clarification of the premises which underlie the attempts to operationalize both variables and to establish a causal link between both. With respect to the operationalization, the authors concluded that the multidimensionality of the notion "political alienation" is often overlooked or treated without due caution. Recent research shows, for example, that attitudes regarding political authorities do evolve more rapidly than attitudes regarding the democratic regime (Inglehart, 1999: 255). Also, some authors fail to make a distinction between the attitude of alienation and its conative or behavioral consequences, in spite of the fact that this insight was already widespread in the sixties and seventies (Finifter, 1972). As far as the causal direction is concerned, the authors questioned a prevailing consensus. Almost all researchers use alienation to predict extreme-right voting behaviour. This is less than obvious because reversing the relationship would be more in accordance with Hume's temporal condition of causality. The authors showed that both a bivariate and a multivariate (longitudinal) analysis of Flemish panel data support the hypothesis that Vlaams Blok-voters gradually develop feeling of political powerlessness. This finding casts some doubt on the effectiveness of the policy of isolation (cf. 'cordon sanitaire') which the Belgian political establishment pursue with respect to the Vlaams Blok.

Henry (2000) showed that Western alienation is a term used in Canadian politics to describe the four western provinces' sense of alienation from the Federal government and central Canada. To date, claims that it is a political phenomenon unique to Western Canada and distinct from more general forms of political alienation have not been adequately validated. Using the 1997 Federal Election Study data, the current study measures levels of 'western' alienation across Canada and takes a closer look at what drives political protest among those demonstrating high levels of this form of alienation. The results of the study show that high levels of 'western' alienation appear in other regions of the country and also vary significantly within the four western provinces. Logistic regression models focusing on respondents with high levels of regional alienation explore the impact of political efficacy and its correlates on predicting protest voting behavior. The results

suggest that western alienation may be more appropriately labelled Periphery Region Alienation and that this form of regional alienation will remain an issue in Canada until there are significant institutional changes designed to redress the imbalance of power inherent in Canada's political system.

Zepa (1999) concluded that with regards to the Baltic countries, the paper argued that there are very weak vertical bonds which could promote the relationship between the masses and the political elite, and one can observe distinct political alienation. The state is perceived as something distant and abstract beyond the will and control of individuals (Zepa, 1999: 32).

Mariani (1998) stated that the split within the Michigan Militia leadership highlights a disagreement between competing factions about the role militia groups should play in the political system. Norm Olson, the deposed commander of the group, rejects political participation entirely and focuses on the militia's paramilitary role. The leadership that replaced him under Lynn VanHuizen and Tom Wayne actively engages the political system, using tactics resembling those of modern interest groups. Despite continued challenges to VanHuizen and Wayne's leadership, the Michigan Militia has maintained this focus. Ada Finifter's classic conception of the multiple dimensions of political alienation is utilized as a framework from which to understand these different views of political participation. Strategies that restrict or stigmatize traditional forms of political participation by militia groups may, in certain cases, increase the likelihood of violence and should be carefully considered in light of this risk.

The research article of Holtz-Bacha (1990) showed that the concept of `video malaise' was first used in America in the 1970s to describe the dual phenomenon of a loss of trust in political

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institutions and individuals' increasing reliance on television as a means of obtaining political information. Could it be that the particular features of political programming caused political malaise? Using West German survey data, the research presented here tests the validity of the video malaise thesis. No connection was found between political malaise and the contents of political programming which leads to the conclusion that the video malaise thesis is unwarranted. Instead, political alienation and low participation are related to the use made of entertainment content in both television and the press.

The study of Citrin (1977) presented a conceptualization of political alienation as an evaluative orientation toward the political system at the regime level. It then reviews the conceptual status of the most widely used measures of alienation, and concludes that the distinctions among them reflect differences in the attitude object and in the format of the survey questions which make them up. Moreover, the study reviewed trends in attitudes toward American political institutions between 1964 and 1974, demonstrating that the decline in confidence in national leaders was only rarely accompanied by a repudiation of systemic values and processes. These findings are based upon national opinion surveys. The main body of the article reported on evidence about the relationship between political alienation and political action, drawn from surveys in the San Francisco Bay Area conducted by Berkeley's Survey Research Center in 1972 and 1973. A new Political Alienation Index is used as the attitude measure, and a model is developed to account for alienation's causal influence on participation in unconventional political protest. By the use of multiple regression analysis involving multiplicative terms, it is shown that political alienation interacts with the individual's cognitive and political skills, age, attitudes toward the protest act, and structural opportunities for action to promote protest behavior. Thus, the political relevance of rising disaffection from the ongoing order can only be assessed when other characteristics of the alienated and their political context have been established.

The purpose of Cutler and Bengtson's study (1974) was to discern the plausibility of these hypotheses by analyzing data on political alienation via the technique of cohort analysis. An analysis of three nationwide political attitude surveys revealed that, of the three possible explanations, the historical or period effect best explains changes in political alienation across the

years 1952 to 1968. Much less marked is a trend attributable to generational effects. No maturation or aging effects were evident.

In other study by Fendrich and Axelson (1971), the authors explored whether being married and having children reduces the political alienation among young black veterans. Political alienation was measured by a twenty-eight-item multidimensional Likert scale. Black interviewers were used to gather the data from seventy-nine single and 112 married black veterans in a southern metropolitan area. Age, socioeconomic status, length of time since discharge, number of weeks worked during the year, employment status, and status inconsistency could be expected to be highly associated with both marital status and political alienation. It was decided to examine and, if necessary, to control for these intervening variables. Only age was found to be significantly related to both marital status and political alienation. Therefore, covariance analysis was used to measure the independent effects of marital status on political alienation. The data confirmed the general hypothesis that single men would be more alienated than married men. When age was controlled, however, married veterans with children were found to be as politically alienated as single veterans. A tentative explanation is offered.

The study of Olsen (1969) addressed two categories of political alienation. Survey data indicates that incapability occurs most commonly among persons occupying various disadvantaged social statuses, while discontentment is most prevalent among those comprising the old middle class. Neither category of alienation is markedly correlated with any form of political participation, but they do differ sharply in their relationships to party preference and voting. Persons with high incapability and low discontentment vote overwhelmingly Democratic, whereas those with high discontentment and low incapability largely vote Republican.

2.3   Palestinian Refugees

Study of Banat and Dayyeh (2019) investigated the impact of the Nakba on the Palestinian Personality. The study approached the literature as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, addressing both theoretical and applied research. The findings revealed that the physical and spiritual sacrifices of the Palestinian people made to preserve their national personality indicated the strong connection between their national personality and the disputed land between the Palestinians and their Israeli occupiers. Based on the traumatic experiences of the Nakba, Palestinians had adopted new types of socialization—all of which aimed at preserving the Palestinian political, social, and cultural identities. These efforts aimed at inculcating revolutionary values and sentiments, which would help preserve their national identity and liberate Palestine in the future generations.

The paper of Kortam (2019) addressed the collective action in the Palestinian social movements in Lebanese camps since its inception in July 2019 and throughout its stages, and the challenges it faced with the political class and the saboteurs. For the first time in the history of refugee camps in Lebanon, a movement has persisted this long and aims to break the oppression paradigm and seek to break free from dependence on the injustice of the Lebanese sectarian system by demanding civil rights in order to live in dignity. Palestinian refugees have succeeded in overcoming the predominant political equation by closing the camps on themselves rather than being isolated inside them and by boycotting all components of the Lebanese state after having reached a high degree of alienation due to the accumulation of grievances over the years. The structure and framework of the movement appear to have been developed to a great extent. There is horizontal and vertical coordination that allows for the protest movement to continue, despite some of the security, political and material challenges it faced but managed to overcome and may still face again in the future. In order to avoid such challenges, it seems necessary to invest in "awareness activists," that is, activists who engage in the protest without being direct beneficiaries of it and constitute an external support that works in favor of the protesters' goals and can take over from them if they are subjected to pressure. In order to maintain sustainability, the movement must also form ties with other Lebanese rights movements, to demand rights collectively and

develop mechanisms to achieve social justice, while preserving the Palestinian specificities. Building bridges and alliances can indeed help in avoiding the prospect of the camps and the refugees' demands being isolated or trapped in minefields or security tensions that could destroy these Palestinian movements. Such an approach should be comprehensive in order to build alliances, rally support, and expand solidarity through churches, mosques, sports clubs, embassies, municipalities, human rights organizations, etc. It must also insist on the implementation of the Lebanese Constitution and the relevant international and Arab laws, treaties and agreements ratified by Lebanon. Finally, it is essential that collective action is coordinated in a spatial and temporal manner to avoid depleting the resources and energies of this social mobilization in the long run.

In another study by Dayyeh and Banat (2019), the authors aimed to study the refugee camps issue as an emergent presence to the social structure of the Palestinian society. The study approached the literature as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, which addressed both theoretical and applied research. The findings revealed that the Palestinian camps do not accurately reflect the structure of the Palestinian society, as they are an emergent presence to the social structure of the Palestinian society. These camps depict the exposure of the Palestinian Diaspora concentrations during the Nakba of 1948 and after the 1967 war. It reflects the social, economic, and cultural conditions of the period resulting from the uprooting of more than one million Palestinians from their cities, villages, and Bedouin sites of origin.

The study of Amro (2019) pointed out the reasons for asylum, and shed some light on the conditions of refugees in the Al-Arroub and Al-Fawwar camps. The author further studied the origins of both camps and the development of urbanization in them which led to overcrowding in both camps, in addition to learning about the health, economic and educational conditions in the two camps, and showing the forms of struggle and steadfastness in them. The study concluded that the British Mandate authorities deliberately opened the door to Zionist immigration to Palestine, whereby the Zionist movement worked in its conquest of Palestine to destabilize the demographic structure in Palestine in favor of the Zionists. The Nakba of 1948 had several consequences,

including the dispersal of the Palestinian people. Some of them fell under the Zionist occupation whereas some were forced to emigrate and leave their homes. One of the consequences of the Nakba was the establishment of the Zionist state on 77% of the area of Palestine, while 56% was allocated to it as per the partition resolution. The process of displacement that was practiced against Palestinian civilians also left traces that are still present today. It created fragmented and geographically dispersed Palestinian communities, and made clear changes in the lifestyle of the refugees. It destabilized social ties and left multiple psychological and human impacts, leaving the Palestinian refugee feeling alienated, lonely and oppressed while he is far from his homeland.

Al-Jaab's study (2016) provides an in-depth analysis of the trends of refugees on the issues of the 'final solution', by which the study sought to identify the opinions and attitudes of the refugees, who comprise one of the most important five final solution issues on the one hand, and who, on the other hand, represent the largest number of the Palestinian population in the homeland and the Diaspora. Due to the large size of the study sample, the trends of Palestinian refugees towards permanent solution issues in the Rafah governorate were studied as a model, and not as a single case, especially in light of the successive changes on the Palestinian issue. The importance of the study lies in the fact that it is a field study that relies on the descriptive approach to analyze the data. The questionnaire, the study tool, was applied to a random sample of refugees in the Rafah governorate, in all its camps. The study attempted to answer the main question related to its title and content: What are the trends of the refugees in Rafah governorate towards issues of permanent solution? The study came to several conclusions, the most important of which were that two thirds of the sample (about 36%) described the Palestinian situation as weak, and that about 41% of respondents believe that the Palestinian society is going in the wrong direction. A total of 32.3% of respondents believe that the borders of the Palestinian state are those of 1948, while 14% believe that the borders are those of June 4th 1967. Moreover, 44.6% of respondents rejected the idea of any Israeli presence along the Jordan River, and 13.6% of them believed that a two-state solution is the closest solution to peaceful coexistence.

Banat and Dayyeh (2018) examined the collective memory reproduction of the Nakba (the Catastrophe) among Palestinian refugee youth. The collective memory reproduction of the Nakba was evaluated using an index containing 27 items developed by the researchers, which was

administered to three-hundred-and-seventy-four participants in refugee camps in the West Bank. The findings revealed that Palestinian refugee youth preserved a strong collective memory of the Nakba. The statistics revealed that gender, parents' educational level, exposure to violence perpetrated by the Israelis, and grade point average (GPA), were significant predictors of collective memory reproduction of the Nakba. Traumatic experiences are not being erased, as older refugees may die, but the youth will never forget. As these refugees continue to be deprived of the right to return to the territory where their ancestors had lived until they were violently expelled from the area, the collective memory reproduction of the Nakba grows stronger. The implications of the findings for practice are discussed in the study report.

A study conducted by Andersen (2016) on refugees who were displaced from Syria to Lebanon in the aftermath of the Syrian civil war showed that Lebanon has received approximately 1.5 million refugees from Syria since the outbreak of the war in Syria 2011. Around 53.000 are Syrian Palestinians refugees. Since the beginning of the crisis, the government in Lebanon has followed a "No Camp Policy", refusing to establish refugee camps. Instead, the refugees are seeking shelter in informal gatherings in primitive tent camps, for instance, in the Bekaa Valley on private rented soil or in the poorest areas including rented rooms in existing Palestinian refugees camps, which have existed in Lebanon after the refugee waves following the establishing of Israel in 1948. Based on field study in Lebanon Spring 2016, the paper focused on the consequences of the refugee crisis for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. 455.000 Palestinians are registered by UNWRA, the UN agency established to take care of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. Approximately 250.000 are living in the Palestinian camps while the rest are living outside Lebanon. Lebanon refuses to integrate or nationalize the Palestinians who have very restricted access to labor market and receive no help the crises have for their living conditions, and how they interpret their situation facing more pressure on their living conditions and still lesser perspective for a return to Palestine.

The study of Valentine (2012) stated the increasingly Arab-Israeli peace talks envision a large role for Arab host countries to absorb Palestinian refugees. This paper undertakes a cross-country case study of the three largest host countries: Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Through examining the history, current living situations of refugees, and political concerns refugees pose for each country, the viability and willingness of each country have been examined to integrate Palestinian communities. Each community has vastly different political implications: In Jordan, integration poses concerns for economic well-being and national identity. In Syria, absorption threatens the ruling elite and politicians are wary it may be seen as a concession to Israel and the West. Finally, Palestinian integration in Lebanon poses a threat to the demographic makeup of the country and the political system based on demographic composition. There is no over-arching solution that can account for the unique characteristics of these communities and countries. Each must be examined independently, keeping in mind the rights of all parties involved. The study concluded that as evidenced by this cross-national case study, the history, current living conditions, and political implications of Palestinian refugees vary vastly from country to country. There is not a blanket solution to the refugee crisis and negotiators and politicians must look at each population individually. Additionally, it is essential that the refugees themselves gain a role in peace talks, something that has been lacking since the crisis began in 1947. Compromises must be made at every level for a sustainable solution: Israel must agree to the repatriation of some refugees, particularly cases of family reunification; Palestinians must recognize and accept that a literal interpretation of the right of return is impractical and be willing to resettle in Gaza and the West Bank; Arab and Western countries must assist in resettling at-risk populations; and the international community must commit to aiding all parties in reaching a compromise. While it is possible for Jordan and Syria to integrate more refugees, there must be alternative solutions for at-risk populations and refugees with severely limited rights, such as those in Lebanon. Additionally, there must be an established system to allow those wishing to return to Palestine to do so. The refugee question has been a fringe debate for far too long. Too often, it is politicized and the over 4.7 million people who are impacted everyday by the inability to reach a solution are forgotten or treated as second-class citizens. Instead of being seen as individuals, they are referred to as a crisis population. A viable compromise may seem impossible after decades of animosity, but the human

element of the crisis underscores the need for peace and for negotiations to make it possible for individuals to live with dignity and exercise human rights.

De Bel-Air (2012) highlighted the situation of the refugees from Palestine are one of the oldest refugee populations in the world. UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which anchors Palestinian refugees' claims for their right of return to Palestine, is now 63 years old. Yet, in Jordan and Lebanon, the refugees' main host countries, the Palestinian presence grew in importance in domestic politics through the 2000s. In Lebanon there were the political debates surrounding the granting of some civil rights to Palestinian refugees, which culminated mid-2010. In Jordan, controversies over political naturalization stir up violent political debates. The essay explored the reasons behind the fact that, in Jordan and Lebanon, granting civil rights to refugees raises a lot of concern. It also examines how the civil rights issue cannot be separated from that of the protection of the Palestinian "cause", the right of return. More generally, the report investigates the various perceived challenges and the outreach of Palestinian refugees' settlement (tawtin) in each of the two countries, before and after the late 1980s-early 1990s. Return and resettlement were taken as the two extremes of a similar demographic policy, and therefore, proved to be powerful political tools for regimes and political actors, at the local, regional and international levels. The theoretical framework of political demography and the "political economy" of Palestinian refugee trends and policies in Jordan and Lebanon also allowed for the Palestinian issue to be resituated in the history and the socio-political context of each country; thus, revealing their specific challenges. The essay shows that the granting of civil rights to Palestinians is hampered by its politically-destabilizing significance in host countries, where civil rights are constructed as citizenship-bound privileges. Therefore, debates on Palestinian refugees flag up deepening rifts within Jordanian and Lebanese citizenries, and diverging views on political "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991). In Jordan, such a rift has been deepened by the recent emergence of nationalist movements and by the tensions which emerged in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Representations of national populations as closed, de jure and ethnic-based increasingly oppose views of nationhood as open, de facto and assimilationist.

Itani (2010) spoke about the British mandate that was approved on Palestine on July 24th 1922, and how Britain opened the door to immigration for the Zionists to Palestine, which prompted the

Zionist gangs to commit massacres, ethnic cleansing and the displacement of the Palestinian people from their land. This resulted in the emergence of the refugee problem. The author presented a comprehensive picture of the suffering of refugees in the various areas of asylum and Diaspora, and indicated that the Palestinian refugee issue is at the core of the Palestinian issue, as the refugees suffer the bitterness of living while awaiting the realization of their dream and their right to return to their land, cities and villages.

The study of Ramadan (2009) clarified that the symbolic landscape of Rashidieh camp, Lebanon, plays an important role in the Palestinian refugee cultural and political system there. Palestinian political factions produce and display wall paintings, posters and graffiti, which promote Palestinian nationalism by prompting people to recall popular discourses of their homeland. A close reading of this landscape reveals the political divisions between different factions, which share a commitment to Palestinian nationalism but diverge in their articulation of that nationalism and how to achieve the liberation of the homeland. The landscape is both an arena through which Palestinian factions attempt to communicate with people and produce and reproduce a sense of Palestinian identity and solidarity with the Palestinian nationalist movement, and an arena through which Palestinian factions compete with each other for support from the Palestinian populace. These efforts function as one of a range of power practices performed by the dominant political factions in the camp, but ordinary people's divergent and critical readings of the landscape's messages can shed light on the workings and failures of these processes.

In his study, Salameh (2008) addressed many issues related to Palestinian refugees in light of the sixtieth anniversary of the Nakba, at a time when events related to asylum and displacement in 1948 were unfolding. The Zionist forces carried out military operations against dozens of Palestinian villages and cities, within the various military plans, with the aim of expanding the area of land that will be controlled. The study reported the continuation of the occupation in implementing its policies by building settlements on more Palestinian land for its benefit until the construction of the apartheid wall, which caused the deportation of more Palestinian families from their lands, in addition to the continuation of the policy of displacement of villages against the Palestinians. Furthermore, the study addressed the conditions suffered by the refugees in the

Diaspora, as well as the attempts of the occupation to obliterate the Palestinian identity, and to remove the camps, which are the essence of the Palestinian cause.

Al-Masry's study (2008) discussed the reality of Palestine between 1948 and 1999, and dealt with the developments of the Palestinian cause in these years pointing out the status of the Palestinian refugee issue in the negotiations that took place between the Palestinians and the Zionists. The study showed that the refugee cause is being marginalized, and the reality of the presence of Palestinian refugees in Palestinian towns and villages is highlighted. The study also outlined the decision of Resolution 194 as relating to the right of refugees to return, recovering their property, and their right to compensation, as well as the decision to establish the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Refugees (UNRWA).

Hassawi's study (2008) specialized in international rules related to refugees that deal with the development of asylum, the emergence of international regulations related to asylum, asylum in public international law, the content of the right of asylum, the definition of a refugee, international protection of refugees, the principles relating to refugee protection, the relationship between the issue of asylum and human rights and the role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The author concluded by stating that the definition of a refugee enshrined in the 1451 Convention does not apply to the Palestinian refugee, as the former is based on a subjective factor represented by fear of persecution for reasons listed in the said treaty, whereas the Palestinian refugee was forced to seek refuge in the host countries for reasons related to the grave violations committed against him, most notably the expulsion and massacres that prompted him to leave, which led to the transformation of most of the Palestinian people into refugees. The author further addressed international legitimacy and the rights of Palestinian refugees, and outlined the historical events that accompanied the mass deportation of the Palestinian people. The study concluded by calling on the international community collectively to assume its responsibility in restoring the rule of law and applying legal principles, given the urgent need to end the tragedy of the Palestinians, especially since the Charter of the United Nations imposes on the international

community to save generations and peoples from dangers, and imposes on states to abide by legal principles, and apply treaties acceded to in good faith.

The study of Abu Liyah (2007) communicated the social and economic conditions of Palestinian refugees in the northern camps of the West Bank and the prospects for development. The results showed that the degree of refugees' assessment of the social, economic and service conditions in the northern camps of the West Bank was moderate. There were no statistically significant differences at the significance level ($\alpha = 0.05$) in the economic and service conditions in the northern camps of the West Bank as relating to the number of family members in all fields. Also, there were no significant differences according to the educational level or monthly income in all fields with the exception for the field of economic conditions, where it was found that there were statistically significant differences in favor of the group whose average income was between 5001-6000 NIS.

Takkenberg (2003) aimed to identify the status of Palestinian refugees in international law, focusing on the situation of Palestinians in the Arab world and in Western countries alike. The study used the descriptive analytical approach, and contained a comprehensive and useful analysis of the multiple fields of international law including refugees, the law on stateless persons, humanitarian law, and human rights law, and explored their relevance to the provision of International protection for Palestinian refugees and the search for a just, lasting and comprehensive solution.

A study by Meanwhile, Jarra study (1997) presented the refugee problem through two viewpoints: the legal viewpoint, in terms of the refugees rights and property; and the economic viewpoint, in terms of the role of the host country economic capabilities in accepting the refugees as well as its absorptive capacities, in addition to knowing the living conditions in Palestinian refugee camps. The study presented potential solutions to the situation of Palestinian refugees. The first solution was to keep the camps while improving the living conditions inside them as a step for integration.

As for the second solution, it comprises of achieving integration through major factors: economic, social and political. The third solution was the voluntary return of refugees, such that the study presented a set of factors that would help in the return, and other factors that would hinder the process of the return of Palestinian refugees.

The study of Kan''na (1992) displayed the events of 1948 – 1967 and the resultant displacement of the large numbers of Palestinians, as they became refugees and were not allowed to return to their villages from which they were displaced. The author discussed the Zionist policy of killing, displacement and carrying out massacres, such as the Deir Yassin massacre. It is worthy to note that the displacement of Palestinians was planned for a long time, as it is one of the Zionist plans and ideologies to achieve the goal of a national home for the Jews under the title "A land without a people, for a people without a land".

2.4   Comments on Previous Studies

The researcher reviewed previous studies related to the issue of alienation in general, and the political alienation in particular. It is noticeable that alienation has taken the attention of researchers since ancient times. They tried to focus on it, to study its dimensions and its impact on the societies and their growth. In order to identify the most important recent developments in the subject of political alienation, most recent studies in the past twenty years have been reviewed.

It is clear for us from a review of the previous literature that several studies approached the political alienation as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, which addressed both theoretical and applied research; researches from different backgrounds exerted outstanding effort in dealing with this phenomenon from different aspects; this subject had an outstanding rank in the world in general and in the Palestinian society in particular. These studies in general aimed at identifying this

phenomenon in terms of definition, historical framework, tools and effect. Very limited studies dealt with the topic from a field perspective through the refugees in general and Palestinian refugees in particular.

Through previous studies, it was found that most of the previous studies focused on the theoretical aspect only, and a few of the previous studies adopted the research aspect. It was also noted that most of the previous studies that adopted the research aspect, although few of them, adopted the quantitative method only and did not focus on the qualitative aspect.

Most societies suffer from the phenomenon of political alienation in various forms. Political alienation was not limited to poor or developing societies or those suffering from political turmoil, but also included advanced societies, as we noticed in UK, where the vote on its exit from the European Union attracted the attention of researchers to study whether there was political alienation that led to this result in the voting. Fox (2020) conducted a study to find out wither it was a relation between the voting result and the political alienation or not, the analyses showed that while political alienation did have a substantial effect in making some citizens more likely to support Brexit—specifically those who lacked trust in the integrity of the political elite and felt that the political system was unresponsive—its impact overall was limited. Moreover, claims that Brexit was driven by political alienation understate how alienated from politics most people who were opposed to it also feel.

Some studies dealt with the reasons for the prevalence of political alienation in societies. The studies have argued that there is a close link between the economic situation and the prevalence of the phenomenon of alienation in societies. The few studies that examined this subject found that alienation in general and political alienation in particular increases in societies that suffering from economic crises. In the same related context, previous studies have shown that social factors are linked to the economic factor in increasing the phenomenon of alienation. Studies have shown the close link between poverty and unemployment and the prevalence of the phenomenon of alienation. It has been shown that societies that suffer from poverty and unemployment are more alienated than societies in which economic and social conditions prevail. This was reinforced by

this study that people who suffer from poverty, unemployment and poor economic conditions are more alienated than people who work.

Looking at previous literature, there are a few studies that dealt with societies that suffer from dictatorial political regimes or suffer from political crises. As mentioned by Udogu (2012); it is, indeed, the case that in much of contemporary African politics it is often difficult to separate the state from the leader. Moreover, studies have shown countries that suffer from political crises are facing more political alienation than others. The current study confirms this phenomenon. The study finds that the Palestinian refugees in Syria have suffered from the prevalence of the phenomenon of political alienation more than other areas, as a result of the political conflict in Syria.

The Arab studies that dealt with political alienation are very few and limited, due to the sensitivity of such an approach in Arab societies which restricts freedom of expression. The studies did not investigate the phenomenon in its various aspects. Also, the studies related to political alienation that dealt with the Palestinian society are very few and limited in terms of the target groups, or the different geographical areas in which the Palestinian society is located. Moreover, the studies that dealt with the political alienation among Palestinian refugees are very few.

Nevertheless, these studies had benefited the present dissertation in shedding light on the phenomenon of political alienation with its different dimensions; they encouraged the researcher to go ahead with studying this topic from the Refugees point of view, the current study will be a continuation to the previous studies and would carry out their recommendations.

To sum up, the concept of political alienation has been used to refer to social entities based on common interests, goals, and history. It also focuses on nationalism, culture and it's a certain notion in conflicted societies (Banat, 2014b). According to MacMillan (2009), history provides much of the fuel for nationalism and is used and misused to form national identities. The remembrance of events or periods important to the people of the nation is a crucial part in the invention and reproduction of national identity.

In spite of the studies on political among of Palestinian refugees in Diaspora, empirical studies of this important concept among youth and women are scarce. Palestinian experience under occupation was and still is the most tragic one after seventy-four years of the Nakba, which is a key date in the history of Palestinians. The Palestinians in the Diaspora are subjected to multiple pressures from the Israeli occupation in order to increase their alienation and push them to forget the Palestinian cause, in addition to the narrowness, siege and inability to express their opinion in other countries of the Diaspora.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

3   Methodology And Design

3.1   Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology of the study, its population, the tools of data collection and the methods of verifying its validity and reliability, the procedures of the study and statistical analysis.

3.2   Methodology And Design

The study is a descriptive research study used a triangulation approach of quantitative and qualitative designs, and a questionnaire, which is appropriate to the exploratory nature of the research, and will provide more meaningful in-depth data.

3.3   Population And Sampling

The target population consists of Palestinian refugees in the diaspora during 2022, that includes 15,378,205 Palestinians, as indicated in table 3.1 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2022).

Table (3-1). Distribution of the study population and sample by region.

Region	Country	Population	Sample
Palestine	West Bank	3,010,000	1878
	Gaza Strip	2,140,654	1336
	Green Line (1948)	1,900,000	1185
Neighbor Countries	Jordan	4,400,000	2746
	Syria	631,111	393
	Lebanon	524,340	327
	Saudi Arabia	500,000	312

	Emirates	300,000	187
	Qatar	251,000	157
	Egypt	85,000	53
	Kuwait	80,000	50
	Libya	70,000	44
	Yamane	27,000	17
	Iraq	13,000	8
	Tunisia	1,400	1
Arab Countries	Algeria	10,000	7
	Chile	500,000	312
	Brazil	60,000	37
	Mexico	13,000	8
	Colombia	12,000	7
	Argentina	1,100	1
	Venezuela	80,000	50
	Honduras	54,000	34
South America	Guatemala	1,700	1
	Salvador	100,000	62
	Denmark	35,000	22
	Germany	80,000	50
	Britain	50,000	31
	Spain	13,000	8

	Greece	8,000	5
	Holland	9,000	6
	France	5,000	3
	Norway	6,000	4
	Austria	3,000	2
	Italy	10,000	6
	Belgium	4,000	3
	Poland	800	1
Europe	Sweden	70,000	44
North America	USA	252,000	157
	Canada	47,000	29
	Malaysia	4,000	3
	Pakistan	500	1
Asia	Indonesia	600	1
Australia	Australia	15,000	9
Total		**15,378,205**	**9598**

The overall sample composed of nine thousands five hundred and ninety-eight Palestinian refugees in the diaspora (5822 males and 3776 females) 15 years of age or above stratifiedly selected, due to region. The participants were from, Palestine, neighbor countries, Arab countries, South America, Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia. The sample size was calculated using the sampling web of http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm, sample size calculator, with a margin error of 0.01, as indicated in appendix Q.

The demographic breakdown of the participants was as follows, gender, age, marital status, number of family members, educational level, religion commitment, relation to work force, political party affiliation, fraction affiliation, and region.

In total, nine thousands five hundred and ninty-eight were conducted. Respondents were between 15 and 87 years of age (M 33.38, SD 13.64); and the vast majority (82.9%) were married. Males represented 60.7% of the participants, while the remaining 39.3% were females. Half (49.4%) of the respondents had a secondary degree, and almost 48.3% had highly religious committed. The majority (57.4%) were working, and had on average of 5.56 family members, with a range of 1 to 15 (SD 2.45). Party affiliation represented 55.8% of the participants, while the remaining 44.2% do not have any party affiliation; and the majority (58.4%) were independent, (22.6%) were from Fateh, (13.6%) from Islamic trends (Hamas, Islamic Jihad), (3.7%) from left Trends (People's, Democracy, FDA, People's Party), and (1.8%) from other political fractions, as indicated in tables 3.2-3.11.

Table (3-2). Sample distribution by gender.

Gender	N	Percent %
Male	5822	60.7
Female	3776	39.3
Total	9598	100

Table (3-3). Sample distribution by marital status.

Marital status	N	Percent %
Single	1266	13.2
Married	7959	82.9
Other (Divorced, Widow)	373	3.9
Total	9598	100

Table (3-4). Sample distribution by educational level.

Educational level	N	Percent %
Basic	1279	13.3
Secondary	4746	49.4
Bachelor or above	3573	37.2
Total	9598	100

Table (3-5). Sample distribution by religion commitment.

Religion commitment	N	Percent %
Low	1009	10.5
Moderate	3950	41.2
High	4639	48.3
Total	9598	100

Table (3-6). Sample distribution by relation to work force.

Relation to work force	N	Percent %
Working	5510	57.4
Not working	4088	42.6
Total	9598	100

Table (3-7). Sample distribution by party affiliation.

Party affiliation	N	Percent %
Affiliated	4244	44.2
Not affiliated	5354	55.8
Total	9598	100

Table (3-8). Sample distribution by political fraction.

Political fraction	N	Percent %
Fateh	2169	22.6
Islamic Trends (Hamas, Islamic Jihad)	1306	13.6
Independent	5601	58.4
Left Trends (Popular, Democracy, FIDA, People's Party)	354	3.7
Other	168	1.8
Total	9598	100

Table (3-9). Sample distribution by region.

Region	N	Percent %
West Bank	1878	19.6
Gaza Strip	1336	13.9
Green Line (1948)	1185	12.3
Jordan	2746	28.6
Syria	393	4.1
Lebanon	327	3.4
Arab countries	836	8.7

South America	512	5.3
Europe	185	1.9
North America	186	1.9
Other (Asia and Australia)	14	0.1
Total	9598	100

Table (3-10). Sample distribution by age.

Variable	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Age	9598	15	87	33.38	13.64

Table (3-11). Sample distribution by family members.

Variable	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Family members	9598	1	15	5.56	2.45

3.4 Instrumentation

Political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora was evaluated using an index of a 40-item scale, introduced by the researcher. A 5-point Likert scale (Strongly agree, agree, neither, disagree and strongly disagree) was used to assess the political alienation among the sampled population through an online survey that was launched on May 19, 2021, and the data were collected for a period of twelve months. The sampling survey instrument sought socio-economic background information about the participants, which included gender, age, marital status, number of family members, educational level, religion commitment, relation to work force, political party affiliation, fraction affiliation, and region, as indicated in appendix R, S.

3.4.1 Instrument Validity

Validation of the instrument proceeded in three distinct phases. The initial phase involved a group of referees and expert arbitrators (N=15), who provided some comments on the tool, as indicated in Appendix T. The second phase involved a small focus group session (N=20); while the third phase involved the implementation of a pilot study (N=50) to validate the survey using exploratory factor analysis. Factor loading for all items exceeded 0.75 (0.76 to 0.93), which means that those items are suitable in measuring every item of political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora, as indicated in table no. 3.12.

Table (3-12). Factor analysis of political alienation scale among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.

No.	Items	Extraction
1.	I am not inclined to participate in the upcoming Legislative Council elections	0.78
2.	I do not participate in political discussions	0.81
3.	I do not believe in the importance of political pluralism in our Palestinian society	0.81
4.	I don't like the idea of being a political leader	0.88
5.	I am not a member of any of the political parties in our Palestinian society	0.85
6.	I do not follow political news on radio and television	0.80
7.	I do not have a clear vision of how political life should be like in our Palestinian society	0.88
8.	I do not trust the performance of the Palestinian Authority in politics	0.86

9.	The Palestinian political decision must be affected by external influences and factors	0.76
10.	I do not see any point in political action in our Palestinian society	0.89
11.	I am not interested in seminars that deal with political matters	0.89
12.	Democracy cannot be practiced properly in our Palestinian society	0.89
13.	Politicians are not interested in the views & attitudes of a person like me, and what I think	0.80
14.	I think that we are politically pushed to a field where we have no choice	0.92
15.	Whoever is politically not with me is against me	0.86
16.	A good politician is good whether his name is Muhammad or Hanna	0.90
17.	Political actions in our Palestinian society are a waste of time	0.87
18.	I do not see any importance to my political views as a Palestinian refugee	0.93
19.	The Palestinian political system is not entrusted with our rights as Palestinian refugees	0.91
20.	I do not know the political parties neither their objectives	0.93
21.	A person like me has no influence on the Palestinian political system	0.90
22.	I am not sure of my position on political issues	0.88
23.	I would like to participate in the Palestinian political life if things weren't so complicated	0.93
24.	Staying away from politics can relax your mind and conscience.	0.88
25.	I do not feel comfortable with the margin of political freedom in our Palestinian society	0.84

26.	The fear from political action in our Palestinian society is realistic and not exaggerated	0.79
27.	It is clear that there are intellectual and political differences between Palestinians, but the economic differences are much more important	0.87
28.	Every person has the right to express his political ideas even if most people have different views	0.83
29.	Democracy in Palestinian society doesn't manifest itself in the presence of political opposition	0.89
30.	It is difficult to be a member of a group with multiple political ideas	0.78
31.	I feel the distance between me and the politicians in our Palestinian society	0.91
32.	Citizens should not be allowed to demonstrate or express their political opinion if this breaches public order and security	0.91
33.	No one is good at everything, I personally have no sense for politics	0.92
34.	Certain issues in politics get me lost	0.93
35.	Generally speaking, Legislative Council members quickly lose touch with people	0.89
36.	What matters for political entities is the number of votes and not the ideas of the electorate	0.91
37.	There is no way to influence what the government does other than elections	0.92
38.	Politics is so complicated in our Palestinian society that a person like me cannot understand what is really happening	0.93
39.	No matter the outcome, political violence cannot be justified	0.91
40.	I am pessimistic about the future of political life in our Palestinian society	0.91

3.4.2 Instrument Reliability

The reliability was tested using Cronbach's Alpha and Guttman Split-Half Coefficients to ascertain reliability and consistency of the survey. Cronbach's Alpha and Guttman Split-Half for the survey instrument was 0.95 and 0.94, respectively, indicating excellent reliability and consistency, as indicated in table 3.13.

Table (3-13). Reliability of political alienation scale among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.

Model	No. of items	Alpha
Cronbach's Alpha	40	0.95
Guttman Split-Half	40	0.94

3.5   Statistical Analysis

Data were analyzed using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS). The questionnaire items were rated on a 1–5 Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree), the highest score indicated a high level of political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. Descriptive statistics gauged political alienation scores among the sampled population. The following statistical techniques were measured, Standardized Regression, T.test, One-way analysis of variance, Tukey test, Two-way analysis of variance, Three-way analysis of variance, Cronbach's Alpha, Split-Half Coefficient and Factor Analysis. To understand the findings of the study, the mean score key will be useful, as indicated in table no. 3.14.

Table (3-14). Mean score key for the findings of the study.

No.	Mean score	Key of political alienation	Standard
1.	1 – 2.33	Low	
2.	2.34 – 3.67	Moderate	Range Method
3.	3.68 - 5	High	

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

4 Findings

4.1 Introduction

The study aimed at identifying the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. The findings of the study questions and hypotheses are as follows.

4.2 Degree Of Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora.

What are the degree of political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora?

Numbers, mean score, standard deviation, and percentage were used to identify the above question. Table (4.1) presents the results.

Table (4-1). Number, mean score, standard deviation, and percentage of political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.

Variable	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation	Percent %
Political alienation total score	9598	3.20	0.54	64.0

*Mean out of 5 points.

The mean score of the political alienation scale as experienced by the sample of nine thousands five hundred and eighty-nine Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora was moderate (M 3.20 SD 0.54), as indicated in table 4.1. The total score showed that (64%) of the Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora preserved a moderate level of political alienation.

4.3 Indicators Of Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora.

What are the indicators of political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora?

Numbers, mean score, standard deviation, and percentage were used to identify the above question. Table (4.2) presents the findings.

Table (4-2). Mean scores, standard deviation, and percentage for the indicators of political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora ranked in a descending order.

Indicators of political alienation	Mean*	Std. Deviation	Percent %
A good politician is good whether his name is Muhammad or Hanna	3.70	1.27	74.0
Every person has the right to express his political ideas even if most people have different views	3.68	1.23	73.6
I do not feel comfortable with the margin of political freedom in our Palestinian society	3.64	1.23	72.8
What matters for political entities is the number of votes and not the ideas of the electorate	3.56	1.25	71.2
No matter the outcome, political violence cannot be justified	3.55	1.29	71.0
The fear from political action in our Palestinian society is realistic and not exaggerated	3.51	1.15	70.2
I am pessimistic about the future of political life in our Palestinian society	3.47	1.33	69.4
I do not trust the performance of the Palestinian Authority in politics	3.46	1.30	69.2
Politicians are not interested in the views & attitudes of a person like me, and what I think	3.46	1.25	69.2
The Palestinian political decision must be affected by external influences and factors	3.45	1.20	69.0
I feel the distance between me and the politicians in our Palestinian society	3.43	1.23	68.6
Generally speaking, Legislative Council members quickly lose touch with people	3.42	1.22	68.4

It is clear that there are intellectual and political differences between Palestinians, but the economic differences are much more important	3.42	1.22
		68.4
I am not inclined to participate in the upcoming Legislative Council elections	3.42	1.37
		68.4
The Palestinian political system is not entrusted with our rights as Palestinian refugees	3.39	1.30
		67.8
Democracy cannot be practiced properly in our Palestinian society	3.34	1.24
		66.8
I think that we are politically pushed to a field where we have no choice	3.33	1.22
		66.6
I do not participate in political discussions	3.27	1.24	65.4
No one is good at everything, I personally have no sense for politics	3.27	1.25
		65.4
It is difficult to be a member of a group with multiple political ideas	3.26	1.23
		65.2
I am not a member of any of the political parties in our Palestinian society	3.25	1.35
		65.0
Staying away from politics can relax your mind and conscience.	3.22	1.30
		64.4
There is no way to influence what the government does other than elections	3.22	1.26
		64.4
Certain issues in politics get me lost	3.22	1.19	64.4
I don't like the idea of being a political leader	3.20	1.30	64.0
Democracy in Palestinian society doesn't manifest itself in the presence of political opposition	3.18	1.23
		63.6
Politics is so complicated in our Palestinian society that a person like me cannot understand what is really happening	3.17	1.26
		63.4

A person like me has no influence on the Palestinian political system	3.17	1.30	63.4
I do not have a clear vision of how political life should be like in our Palestinian society	3.14	1.23	62.8
Political actions in our Palestinian society are a waste of time	3.12	1.24	62.4
I am not interested in seminars that deal with political matters	3.11	1.22	62.2
I do not believe in the importance of political pluralism in our Palestinian society	3.10	1.26	62.0
I do not see any point in political action in our Palestinian society	3.10	1.26	62.0
I do not know the political parties neither their objectives	3.06	1.28	61.2
I would like to participate in the Palestinian political life if things weren't so complicated	3.03	1.28	60.6
I am not sure of my position on political issues	3.02	1.26	60.4
Citizens should not be allowed to demonstrate or express their political opinion if this breaches public order and security	3.02	1.32	60.4
I do not see any importance to my political views as a Palestinian refugee	3.01	1.32	60.2
I do not follow political news on radio and television	2.91	1.22	58.2
Whoever is politically not with me is against me	2.80	1.33	56.0
Total	3.20	0.54	64.0

*Mean out of 5 points.

Findings revealed the indicators of the political alienation as perceived by the Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora ranked in descending order as follows, A good politician is good whether his name

is Muhammad or Hanna (M 3.70, SD 1.27), every person has the right to express his political ideas even if most people have different views (M 3.68, SD 1.23), I do not feel comfortable with the margin of political freedom in our Palestinian society (M 3.64, SD 1.23), what matters for political entities is the number of votes and not the ideas of the electorate (M 3.56, SD 1.25), and no matter the outcome, political violence cannot be justified (M 3.55, SD 1.29).

Furthermore, the Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora indicated that they not sure of their position on political issues (M 3.02, SD 1.26), citizens should not be allowed to demonstrate or express their political opinion if this breaches public order and security (M 3.02, SD 1.32), I do not see any importance to my political views as a Palestinian refugee (M 3.01, SD 1.32), I do not follow political news on radio and television (M 2.91, SD 1.32), and whoever is politically not with me is against me (M 2.80, SD 1.33), as indicated in table no. 4.2.

4.4 Differences In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora.

4.4.1 There are no statistically significant differences at $α≤0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to gender.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table (4.3) presents the results.

Table (4-3). T-test for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to gender.

Gender	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation	DF	T-value	Sig.
Male	5822	3.16	0.54			
Female	3776	3.27	0.54	9596	-9.391	0.000
Total	9598	3.20	0.54			

*Mean out of 5 points.

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at $α≤0.05$ in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to gender. The differences were in favor of the females (M 3.27, SD 0.54) compared to (M 3.16, SD 0.54) for the males, T.test value was (-9.391, P=0.000), as indicated in table (4.3). The hypothesis is rejected.

4.4.2 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Relation To Work Force.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table (4.4) presents the results.

Table (4-4). T-test for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to work force.

Relation to work force	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation	DF	T-value	Sig.
Working	5510	3.17	0.57			
Not working	4088	3.25	0.50	9596	-7.235	0.000
Total	9598	3.20	0.54			

*Mean out of 5 points.

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to work force. The differences favored the non-working participants (M 3.25, SD 0.50) compared to (M 3.17, SD 0.57) for the working, T.test value was (-7.235, P=0.000), as indicated in table (4.4). The hypothesis is rejected.

4.4.3 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Party Affiliation.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table (4.5) presents the results.

Table (4-5). T-test for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to party affiliation.

Party affiliation	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation	DF	T-value	Sig.
Affiliated	4244	3.16	0.57			
Not affiliated	5354	3.24	0.52	9596	-7.397	0.000
Total	9598	3.20	0.54			

*Mean out of 5 points.

Findings indicated that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to party affiliation. The differences favored the non-affiliated participants (M 3.24, SD 0.52) compared to (M 3.16, SD 0.57) for the affiliated, T.test value was (-7.397, P=0.000), as indicated in table (4.5). The hypothesis is rejected.

4.4.4 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Marital Status.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.6-4.8) present the results.

Table (4-6). One-way Anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Between groups	2	13.835	6.918		
Within groups	9595	2883.259	0.300	23.021	0.000
Total	9597	2897.095	-----		

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status. The differences favored the single participants (M 3.29, SD 0.49), F-value was (23.021, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.6-4.8). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-7). Tukey test for the source of differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status.

Marital status	Single	Married	Other (Widow, Divorced)
Single		0.10022*	0.17586*
Married			0.07564*
Other (Widow, Divorced)			

Table (4-8). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status.

Marital status	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Single	1266	3.29	0.49
Married	7959	3.19	0.55
Other (Widow, Divorced)	373	3.12	0.62
Total	9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.5 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Educational Level.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.9-4.11) present the results.

Table (4-9). One-way Anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Between groups	2	7.780	3.890		
Within groups	9595	2889.315	0.301	12.918	0.000
Total	9597	2897.095	-----		

Findings showed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level. The differences favored the less-educated participants (M 3.22, SD 0.54), F-value was (12.918, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.9-4.11). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-10). Tukey test for the source of differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level.

Educational level	Basic	Secondary	Bachelor or above
Basic		0.00090	0.08338*
Secondary			0.08428*
Bachelor or above			

Table (4-11). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level.

Educational level	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Basic	1279	3.13	0.61
Secondary	4746	3.21	0.53
Bachelor or above	3573	3.22	0.54
Total	9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.6 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Political Fraction.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.12-4.14) present the results.

Table (4-12). One-way anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to political fraction.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Between groups	4	55.437	13.859		
Within groups	9593	2841.657	0.296	46.787	0.000
Total	9597	2897.095	-----		

Findings showed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to political fraction. The differences favored the independent participants (M 3.52, SD 0.53), F-value was (46.787, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.12-4.14). The hypothesis is rejected.

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Table (4-13). Tukey test for the source of differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to political fraction.

Political fraction	Fateh	Islamic trends	Independent	Left trends	Other
Fateh		-0.13343*	-0.43752*	-0.04896	-0.15109*
Islamic Trends			-0.30409*	0.08447	-0.01766
Independent				0.38856*	0.28643*
Left Trends					-0.10213*
Other					

Table (4-14). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to political fraction.

Political fraction	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Fateh	2169	3.09	0.62
Islamic Trends	1306	3.22	0.50
Independent	5601	3.52	0.53
Left Trends	354	3.14	0.49
Other	168	3.24	0.52
Total	9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.7 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Region.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.15-4.17) present the results.

Table (4-15). One-way anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Between groups	10	76.112	7.611		
Within groups	9587	2820.983	0.294	25.866	0.000
Total	9597	2897.095	-----		

Findings showed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to region. The differences favored the Palestinian refugees in Syria (M 3.37, SD 0.49), F-value was (25.866, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.15-4.17). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-16). Tukey test for the source of differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to region.

Political fraction	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Green Line (1948)	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	Arab Countries	South America	Europe	North America	Other
West Bank		0.09241*	0.00227	-0.12202*	-0.21434*	-0.14867*	-0.12686*	0.05172	0.04700	0.04414	-0.03654
Gaza Strip			-0.09015*	-0.21443*	-0.30675*	-0.24109*	-0.21928*	-0.04070	-0.04541	-0.04827	-0.12896
Green Line (1948)				-0.12429*	-0.21661*	-0.15094*	-0.12913*	0.04945	0.04473	0.04187	-0.03881
Jordan					-0.09232	-0.02665	-0.00484	0.17374*	0.16902*	0.16616*	0.08548
Syria						0.06567	0.08747	0.26605*	0.26134*	0.25848*	0.17779
Lebanon							0.02181	0.20039*	0.19567*	0.19281*	0.11213
Arab Countries								0.17858*	0.17386*	0.17100*	0.09032
South America									-0.00472	-0.00758	-0.08826
Europe										-0.00286	-0.08354
North America											-0.08068
Other (Asia and Australia)											

Table (4-17). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to region.

Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
West Bank	1878	3.16	0.65
Gaza Strip	1336	3.07	0.50
Green Line (1948)	1185	3.16	0.64
Jordan	2746	3.28	0.44
Syria	393	3.37	0.49
Lebanon	327	3.31	0.37
Arab Countries	836	3.29	0.43
South America	512	3.11	0.60
Europe	185	3.11	0.61
North America	186	3.12	0.61
Other (Asia and Australia)	14	3.20	0.63
Total	9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.8 There Is No Statistically Significant Correlation At A≤0.05 Between Age, Number Of Family Members, Religion Commitment And The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora.

Standardized regression was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.18) presents the results.

Table (4-18). Standardized regression between age, number of family members, religion commitment and the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.

Variables	N	Beta-value	Sig.
Age	9598	0.040	0.000
Number of family members	9598	0.054	0.000
Religion commitment	9598	-0.075	0.000

R Square= 0.009

Findings showed that there is statistically significant positive correlation at α≤0.05 between age, number of family members and the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. However, a statistically significant inverse correlation at α≤0.05 was found between religious commitment and the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. Beta value was (0.040, P=0.000, 0.054, P=0.0000, -0.075, P=0.000), respectively, as indicated in table (4.18). The hypotheses are rejected.

4.4.9 **There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Gender And Region.**

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.19-4.20) present the results.

Table (4-19). Two-way Anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to gender and region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Gender	1	2.230	2.230	7.688	0.006
Region	10	72.694	7.269	25.065	0.000
Gender*Region	10	11.944	1.194	4.118	0.000
Error	9576	2777.211	0.290	-----	-----
Total	9598	101637.785	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	9597	2897.095	-----	-----	-----

Findings indicated that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to gender and region. The differences favored the female Palestinian refugees in Syria (M 3.46, SD 0.43), F-value was (4.118, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.19-4.20). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-20). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to gender and region.

Gender	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Male	West Bank	1193	3.08	0.63
	Gaza Strip	585	2.97	0.48
	Green Line (1948)	759	3.09	0.63
	Jordan	1804	3.27	0.42
	Syria	236	3.32	0.52
	Lebanon	157	3.30	0.39
	Arab Countries	455	3.27	0.43
	South America	360	3.09	0.61
	Europe	130	3.08	0.61
	North America	131	3.08	0.61
	Other (Asia and Australia)	12	3.18	0.67
Female	West Bank	685	3.29	0.65
	Gaza Strip	751	3.14	0.51
	Green Line (1948)	426	3.29	0.65
	Jordan	942	3.31	0.47
	Syria	157	3.46	0.43
	Lebanon	170	3.32	0.36
	Arab Countries	381	3.30	0.43
	South America	152	3.16	0.60
	Europe	55	3.20	0.60
	North America	55	3.20	0.60
	Other (Asia and Australia)	2	3.31	0.44
Total		9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.10 **There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Age And Region.**

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.21-4.22) present the results.

Table (4-21). Two-way anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to age and region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Age	3	3.600	1.200	4.135	0.006
Region	10	38.720	3.872	13.341	0.000
Age*Region	30	46.128	1.538	5.298	0.000
Error	9554	2772.820	0.290	-----	-----
Total	9598	101637.785	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	9597	2897.095	-----	-----	-----

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to age and region. The differences favored the Palestinian refugees 65 years of age or above in Asia and Australia (M 3.97, SD 0.00), F-value was (5.298, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.21-4.22). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-22). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to age and region.

Age	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
	West Bank	799	3.19	0.65
	Gaza Strip	789	3.15	0.51
	Green Line (1948)	496	3.19	0.65

	Jordan	1454	3.23	0.44
	Syria	200	3.43	0.49
	Lebanon	120	3.29	0.40
	Arab Countries	375	3.23	0.45
	South America	155	3.15	0.58
	Europe	51	3.12	0.63
	North America	51	3.12	0.63
30-	Other (Asia and Australia)	1	3.82	0.00
	West Bank	564	3.17	0.68
	Gaza Strip	450	2.92	0.47
	Green Line (1948)	350	3.17	0.68
	Jordan	860	3.30	0.42
	Syria	83	3.19	0.49
	Lebanon	146	3.31	0.33
	Arab Countries	343	3.30	0.40
	South America	130	3.10	0.65
30-44	Europe	52	3.09	0.63
	North America	52	3.09	0.63
	Other (Asia and Australia)	2	2.37	0.88
	West Bank	477	3.11	0.59
	Gaza Strip	89	3.07	0.44
	Green Line (1948)	316	3.11	0.59
	Jordan	373	3.42	0.46
	Syria	62	3.40	0.48
	Lebanon	48	3.40	0.39
	Arab Countries	96	3.45	0.44
	South America	218	3.08	0.59
45-64	Europe	78	3.12	0.59
	North America	79	3.13	0.59

	Other (Asia and Australia)	10	3.22	0.48
	West Bank	38	2.98	0.77
	Gaza Strip	8	3.18	0.46
	Green Line (1948)	23	2.99	0.78
	Jordan	59	3.54	0.14
	Syria	48	3.44	0.44
	Lebanon	13	3.05	0.29
	Arab Countries	22	3.31	0.39
	South America	9	3.18	0.71
65+	Europe	4	3.08	0.75
	North America	4	3.08	0.75
	Other (Asia and Australia)	1	3.97	0.00
Total		9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.11 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Marital Status And Region.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.23-4.24) present the results.

Table (4-23). Two-way anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status and region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Marital status	2	0.484	0.242	0.837	0.433
Region	10	9.349	0.935	3.230	0.000
Marital status*Region	15	37.680	2.512	8.680	0.000
Error	9570	2769.732	0.289	-----	-----
Total	9598	101637.785	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	9597	2897.095	-----	-----	-----

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status and region. The differences favored the divorced and widow Palestinian refugees in Syria (M 3.51, SD 0.27), F-value was (8.680, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.23-4.24). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-24). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to marital status and region.

Marital status	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
	West Bank	310	3.38	0.56
	Gaza Strip	220	3.26	0.56
	Green Line (1948)	186	3.38	0.56
	Jordan	320	3.22	0.34
	Syria	24	2.80	0.44
	Lebanon	54	3.31	0.36
	Arab Countries	152	3.26	0.35
	South America	-----	-----	-----

Single	Europe	-----	-----	-----
	North America	-----	-----	-----
	Other (Asia and Australia)	-----	-----	-----
Married	West Bank	1495	3.12	0.65
	Gaza Strip	1037	3.03	0.49
	Green Line (1948)	951	3.12	0.64
	Jordan	2353	3.29	0.45
	Syria	353	3.41	0.48
	Lebanon	261	3.32	0.38
	Arab Countries	662	3.30	0.45
	South America	484	3.11	0.58
	Europe	174	3.11	0.60
	North America	175	3.11	0.60
	Other (Asia and Australia)	14	3.20	0.63
Other (Divorced, Widow)	West Bank	73	3.06	0.80
	Gaza Strip	79	3.00	0.44
	Green Line (1948)	48	3.06	0.81
	Jordan	73	3.26	0.39
	Syria	16	3.51	0.27
	Lebanon	12	3.10	0.05
	Arab Countries	22	3.20	0.26
	South America	28	3.00	0.89
	Europe	11	3.16	0.81
	North America	11	3.16	0.81
	Other (Asia and Australia)	-----	-----	-----
Total		9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.12 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Number Of Family Members And Region.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.25-4.26) present the results.

Table (4-25). Two-way anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to number of family members region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Marital status	2	10.958	5.479	18.532	0.000
Region	10	35.993	3.599	12.174	0.000
Marital status*Region	13	15.432	1.187	4.015	0.000
Error	8306	2455.713	0.296	-----	-----
Total	8332	87566.144	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	8331	2578.461	-----	-----	-----

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to number of family members and region. The differences favored the Palestinian refugees in family 10 members or above in Syria (M 3.63, SD 0.19), F-value was (4.015, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.25-4.26). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-26). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to number of family members and region.

Number of family members	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
5-	West Bank	595	3.16	0.72
	Gaza Strip	345	2.98	0.46
	Green Line (1948)	357	3.16	0.72
	Jordan	824	3.32	0.50
	Syria	168	3.44	0.44
	Lebanon	108	3.40	0.36
	Arab Countries	350	3.35	0.45
	South America	22	3.54	0.51
	Europe	-----	-----	-----
	North America	-----	-----	-----
	Other (Asia and Australia)	-----	-----	-----
5-9	West Bank	933	3.08	0.61
	Gaza Strip	678	3.05	0.49
	Green Line (1948)	622	3.08	0.61
	Jordan	1357	3.28	0.41
	Syria	189	3.38	0.51
	Lebanon	153	3.24	0.33
	Arab Countries	304	3.24	0.40
	South America	490	3.09	0.60
	Europe	185	3.11	0.61
	North America	186	3.12	0.61
	Other (Asia and Australia)	14	3.20	0.63
	West Bank	40	3.40	0.58
	Gaza Strip	93	3.08	0.51
	Green Line (1948)	20	3.40	0.58
	Jordan	245	3.25	0.49

		12	3.63	0.19
	Syria	12	3.63	0.19
	Lebanon	12	3.41	0.69
	Arab Countries	30	3.14	0.73
	South America	-----	-----	-----
	Europe	-----	-----	-----
10+	North America	-----	-----	-----
	Other (Asia and Australia)	-----	-----	-----
Total		9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.13 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Educational Level And Region.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.27-4.28) present the results.

Table (4-27). Two-way anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level and region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Marital status	2	1.057	0.529	1.866	0.155
Region	10	96.522	9.652	34.080	0.000
Marital status*Region	20	89.868	4.493	15.865	0.000
Error	9565	2709.024	0.283	-----	-----
Total	9598	101637.785	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	9597	2897.095	-----	-----	-----

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level and region. The differences favored the less-educated (Basic) Palestinian refugees in Asia and Australia (M 3.97, SD 0.00), F-value was (15.865, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.27-4.28). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-28). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to educational level and region.

Educational level	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Basic	West Bank	172	2.72	0.69
	Gaza Strip	110	2.95	0.52
	Green Line (1948)	110	2.73	0.68
	Jordan	430	3.29	0.47
	Syria	145	3.47	0.54
	Lebanon	74	3.42	0.37
	Arab Countries	145	3.34	0.43
	South America	52	2.75	0.56
	Europe	20	2.70	0.60
	North America	20	2.70	0.60
	Other (Asia and Australia)	1	3.97	0.00
	West Bank	728	3.18	0.67
	Gaza Strip	654	2.95	0.45
	Green Line (1948)	459	3.18	0.67
	Jordan	1792	3.30	0.42
	Syria	198	3.38	0.43
	Lebanon	132	3.25	0.35
	Arab Countries	446	3.29	0.43
	South America	188	3.14	0.60

Secondary	Europe	71	3.16	0.63
	North America	71	3.16	0.63
	Other (Asia and Australia)	7	3.24	0.73
Bachelor or above	West Bank	978	3.22	0.59
	Gaza Strip	572	3.22	0.52
	Green Line (1948)	616	3.22	0.59
	Jordan	524	3.21	0.46
	Syria	50	3.09	0.46
	Lebanon	121	3.31	0.38
	Arab Countries	245	3.24	0.43
	South America	272	3.15	0.59
	Europe	94	3.17	0.57
	North America	95	3.17	0.56
	Other (Asia and Australia)	6	3.02	0.48
Total		9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.14 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Religion Commitment And Region.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.29-4.30) present the results.

Table (4-29). Two-way anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to religion commitment and region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Marital status	2	4.038	2.019	6.954	0.001
Region	10	42.039	4.204	14.481	0.000
Marital status*Region	20	32.142	1.607	5.536	0.000
Error	9565	2776.720	0.290	-----	-----
Total	9598	101637.785	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	9597	2897.095	-----	-----	-----

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to religion commitment and region. The differences favored the highly religion commited Palestinian refugees in Syria (M 3.45, SD 0.41), F-value was (5.536, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.29-4.30). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-30). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to religion commitment and region.

Religion Commitment	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
	West Bank	200	3.15	0.56
	Gaza Strip	197	2.94	0.54
	Green Line (1948)	127	3.14	0.55
	Jordan	192	3.13	0.41
	Syria	57	3.32	0.49
	Lebanon	49	3.04	0.32
	Arab Countries	91	3.10	0.38

Low	South America	57	3.02	0.39
	Europe	19	2.97	0.37
	North America	19	2.97	0.37
	Other (Asia and Australia)	1	2.37	0.00
Moderate	West Bank	836	3.23	0.58
	Gaza Strip	483	3.13	0.54
	Green Line (1948)	527	3.23	0.58
	Jordan	1010	3.22	0.43
	Syria	159	3.31	0.56
	Lebanon	157	3.33	0.33
	Arab Countries	359	3.29	0.39
	South America	240	3.15	0.53
	Europe	86	3.11	0.55
	North America	87	3.12	0.55
	Other (Asia and Australia)	6	3.11	0.76
High	West Bank	842	3.09	0.72
	Gaza Strip	656	3.06	0.45
	Green Line (1948)	531	3.09	0.72
	Jordan	1544	3.34	0.44
	Syria	177	3.45	0.41
	Lebanon	121	3.38	0.40
	Arab Countries	386	3.33	0.47
	South America	215	3.09	0.72
	Europe	80	3.15	0.71
	North America	80	3.15	0.71
	Other (Asia and Australia)	7	3.39	0.47
Total		9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.15 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Relation To Work Force And Region.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.31-4.32) present the results.

Table (4-31). Two-way Anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to work force and region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Marital status	1	1.365	1.365	4.715	0.030
Region	10	65.654	6.565	22.686	0.000
Marital status*Region	10	35.869	3.587	12.394	0.000
Error	9576	2771.276	0.289	-----	-----
Total	9598	101637.785	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	9597	2897.095	-----	-----	-----

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to work force and region. The differences favored the non-working Palestinian refugees in Syria (M 3.47, SD 0.45), F-value was (12.394, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.31-4.32). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-32). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to work force and region.

Relation to work force	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Working	West Bank	1312	3.10	0.67
	Gaza Strip	456	2.96	0.47
	Green Line (1948)	832	3.10	0.66
	Jordan	1466	3.32	0.44
	Syria	159	3.23	0.52
	Lebanon	163	3.29	0.39
	Arab Countries	447	3.31	0.44
	South America	381	3.08	0.63
	Europe	140	3.07	0.61
	North America	141	3.08	0.61
	Other (Asia and Australia)	13	3.19	0.66
Not working	West Bank	566	3.31	0.58
	Gaza Strip	880	3.13	0.51
	Green Line (1948)	353	3.30	0.58
	Jordan	1280	3.24	0.44
	Syria	234	3.47	0.45
	Lebanon	164	3.33	0.36
	Arab Countries	389	3.26	0.42
	South America	131	3.20	0.53
	Europe	45	3.24	0.60
	North America	45	3.24	0.60
	Other (Asia and Australia)	1	3.27	0.00
Total		9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.16 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Party Affiliation And Region.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.33-4.34) present the results.

Table (4-33). Two-way Anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to party affiliation and region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Marital status	1	4.172	4.172	14.506	0.000
Region	10	77.151	7.715	26.826	0.000
Marital status*Region	10	61.400	6.140	21.349	0.000
Error	9576	2754.047	0.288	-----	-----
Total	9598	101637.785	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	9597	2897.095	-----	-----	-----

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to party affiliation and region. The differences favored the non-party affiliated Palestinian refugees in Syria (M 3.45, SD 0.47), F-value was (21.349, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.31-4.32). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-34). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to party affiliation and region.

Party affiliation	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Affiliated	West Bank	1019	3.09	0.64
	Gaza Strip	726	3.03	0.51
	Green Line (1948)	640	3.08	0.64
	Jordan	937	3.39	0.38
	Syria	114	3.19	0.49
	Lebanon	72	3.42	0.43
	Arab Countries	262	3.36	0.40
	South America	269	2.97	0.64
	Europe	98	2.97	0.62
	North America	99	2.98	0.62
	Other (Asia and Australia)	8	3.15	0.73
Not affiliated	West Bank	859	3.25	0.65
	Gaza Strip	610	3.11	0.49
	Green Line (1948)	545	3.25	0.64
	Jordan	1809	3.23	0.46
	Syria	279	3.45	0.47
	Lebanon	255	3.28	0.35
	Arab Countries	574	3.25	0.44
	South America	243	3.26	0.52
	Europe	87	3.27	0.56
	North America	87	3.27	0.56
	Other (Asia and Australia)	6	3.26	0.53
Total		9598	3.20	0.54

*Mean out of 5 points.

4.4.17 There Are No Statistically Significant Differences At A≤0.05 In The Political Alienation Among Palestinian Refugees In The Diaspora According To Fraction Affiliation And Region.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. Tables (4.35-4.36) present the results.

Table (4-35). Two-way Anova for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to relation to fraction affiliation and region.

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Marital status	4	8.129	2.032	7.204	0.000
Region	10	16.686	1.669	5.914	0.000
Marital status*Region	37	95.703	2.587	9.168	0.000
Error	9546	2693.156	0.282	-----	-----
Total	9598	101637.785	-----	-----	-----
Corrected Total	9597	2897.095	-----	-----	-----

Findings revealed that there are statistically significant differences at α≤0.05 in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to fraction affiliation and region. The differences favored the other fraction affiliation Palestinian refugees in the West Bank (M 3.80, SD 0.26), F-value was (9.168, P=0.000), as indicated in tables (4.31-4.32). The hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4-36). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora according to fraction affiliation and region.

Fraction affiliation	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Fateh	West Bank	645	3.04	0.66
	Gaza Strip	492	3.03	0.49
	Green Line (1948)	402	3.03	0.66
	Jordan	222	3.52	0.40
	Syria	30	3.14	0.60
	Lebanon	24	3.49	0.42
	Arab Countries	66	3.45	0.36
	South America	169	2.90	0.67
	Europe	56	2.92	0.64
	North America	57	2.94	0.64
	Other (Asia and Australia)	6	3.07	0.81
Islamic Trends	West Bank	206	3.09	0.60
	Gaza Strip	142	3.08	0.50
	Green Line (1948)	134	3.10	0.60
	Jordan	472	3.35	0.35
	Syria	61	3.21	0.47
	Lebanon	30	3.48	0.33
	Arab Countries	134	3.37	0.36
	South America	66	3.07	0.63
	Europe	30	2.98	0.63
	North America	30	2.98	0.63
	Other (Asia and Australia)	1	3.00	0.00
	West Bank	892	3.24	0.649
	Gaza Strip	642	3.11	0.49

Independent	Green Line (1948)	566	3.24	0.64
	Jordan	1907	3.23	0.45
	Syria	287	3.46	0.47
	Lebanon	267	3.29	0.35
	Arab Countries	604	3.26	0.44
	South America	252	3.24	0.52
	Europe	89	3.27	0.56
	North America	89	3.27	0.56
	Other (Asia and Australia)	6	3.26	0.53
Left Trends	West Bank	86	3.10	0.50
	Gaza Strip	45	2.76	0.48
	Green Line (1948)	53	3.10	0.50
	Jordan	105	3.35	0.40
	Syria	15	2.96	0.23
	Lebanon	-----	-----	-----
	Arab Countries	14	3.23	0.49
	South America	20	3.14	0.45
	Europe	8	3.14	0.46
	North America	8	3.14	0.46
	Other (Asia and Australia)	-----	-----	-----
	West Bank	49	3.80	0.26
	Gaza Strip	15	3.41	0.76
	Green Line (1948)	30	3.79	0.26
	Jordan	40	3.38	0.55
	Syria	-----	-----	-----
	Lebanon	6	2.60	0.00
	Arab Countries	18	3.03	0.57
	South America	5	3.63	0.19
	Europe	2	3.60	0.24

| Other | North America | 2 | 3.60 | 0.24 |
| | Other (Asia and Australia) | 1 | 3.77 | 0.00 |

*Mean out of 5 points.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5   Discussion

5.1   Introduction

The current dissertation aims to investigate the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the findings of the study, and the hypotheses, and provide the needed recommendations in terms of these findings taking into consideration the subject of the study.

The study findings revealed that Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora experienced a moderate level of political alienation. The Palestinian experience under the on-going Israeli occupation was and still is the most tragic one in terms of victims and violence; it has left behind acts of killing, injury, handicaps, physical and psychological torture due to house demolition, confiscation of lands and water, arrests, raids, pursuits and other forms of violence. Palestinians have always faced the most brutal occupier that history ever knew. It is certain that Palestinians did not chose this battle; they wished that they were like the rest of the peoples of the world paying attention to the development of their independent state and fulfilling their political, economic and social aspirations. However, they were forced to live with the Israeli occupier who brought destruction and hatred to this region of the world more than a century ago (Ateek, 2002; Soibelman, 2004).

In the human history, few crimes have been as brutal and perpetrated at the scale as that of the Zionists driving Palestinians out of their land in 1948 – a population-wide crime that would later become known as the Palestinian Nakba (Jibara, 1998; Allan, 2007; Banat *et al*., 2018; Dayyeh *et al*., 2019).

On 15 May 1948, the Zionist Movement declared the formation of the State of Israel on 78% of the Palestinian lands. They have uprooted Palestinians from twenty cities and about four hundred villages; about seven hundred thousand Palestinians i.e., 66% of the residents of Palestine became homeless. This was the complete deterioration of the Palestinian society with all its components and bases, and led to the emergence of a new phenomenon in the Palestinian society which is the Palestinian Refugees Camps which spread in the Diaspora, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and neighboring countries: Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and

the rest of the world. These camps which bear witness to the catastrophe, homelessness and uprooting of Palestinians from their lands and homeland symbolize their daily sufferings on all levels: cultural, social, economic and political.

According to Sanbar (2001), the contemporary history of the Palestinian people turns to a key date: 1948. That year, a country and its people disappeared from the map of the world. In 1948, the Palestinian people suffered from a traumatic experience that cannot be erased from their collective memory (Abu Sitteh, 1997, 2001; Banat *et al*., 2018).

The disaster of the Nakba, this cataclysmic event, has imprinted itself as the main issue affecting the Palestinian personality and collective memory. It is the starting point for many experiences that can be grouped under the title of "the consequences of the Nakba". In addition to the destruction of an entire society, the Nakba represents an unbridgeable gap in the place, time, consciousness and personality of the Palestinians (Banat, 2010; Dayyeh *et al*., 2018, 2019).

Furthermore, since the Israeli Occupation of Palestine in 1948, which controlled Palestine with the exception of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - whereby the West Bank was under Jordanian rule and the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian rule - the Palestinian people have been unable to exercise their right to elections of all kinds, whether it be presidential, parliamentary or local, and to consequently choose their leadership to represent them at all levels.

Historically, the first elections were held in 1923 when Palestine was under the rule of the British Mandate, which tried to control the Palestinian people by holding legislative elections comprising twenty-three members, in which thirteen members were elected and ten members were appointed by the British ruler, who was known as the "High Commissioner", but the Palestinian people boycotted these elections leading to their failure at the time (Abrash, 1998; Jabali, 2009; Casati, 2016).

This situation continued in Palestine until 1976, when elections were held in the West Bank on April 12th 1976 by order of the Israeli military authorities and under an amended version

of the Jordanian Municipal Elections Law of 1955. The voter turnout was 72.3% in favor of Palestine's Liberation Organization (PLO) supporters. Elections were held in 24 municipal councils. Through these municipal elections, the Israeli Occupation tried to find an alternative leadership to the PLO by producing heads of local bodies subject to the Israeli Occupation authorities. However, the results of the elections disappointed the hopes of the Israeli Occupation, as representatives of the PLO won the elections, which subsequently led to Israel expelling part of them, attempting to assassinate the other part, and dismissing those who remained from their positions as elected heads of local bodies (Banat, 2010; Casati, 2016).

The Palestinian people remained deprived of exercising their right to elections until 1996 when the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, according to which the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994. The Oslo Accords stipulated that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would hold legislative, presidential and local elections. It is worthy to note that the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had reached nearly five million, and the number of Palestinian people in all places of their residence was about fifteen million. This meant that more than two-thirds of the Palestinian people could not participate in the election of a political leader to represent them (Jabali, 2009).

Subsequent to the Oslo Agreement and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the first presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 1996 where the Fateh movement won the elections and the Islamic movements boycotted the elections at the time. The elections were scheduled to be held every four years, but the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 led to the inability of the Palestinians to hold elections until 2005 when the second presidential elections were held, which were won by the Fateh movement and which were also boycotted by the Islamic movements. The second legislative elections were later held in 2006 in which Hamas participated and won (Banat, 2010).

Since 2006 until now, no presidential or parliamentary elections were held due to the obstacles imposed on the Palestinian people by the occupation, in addition to the Palestinian division that also contributed to the postponement of the aforementioned elections.

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In 2021, the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree to hold parliamentary elections, but the Israeli Occupation constituted the biggest obstacle to holding the presidential elections, and consequently postponing the elections because the Israeli Occupation did not allow them to take place in East Jerusalem. As for the local elections, they were held in 2004 and 2005. Local elections were then held in 2012 and 2017. Palestinians were also preparing to hold local elections in 2021. In this regards, Khalidi (2009) indicated that since even before the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, the Palestinian political system has been undergoing an intense crisis. This is a crisis of objectives and methods, a crisis of confidence and legitimacy, indeed a crisis which may prove to be existential in nature for the Palestinian people. The profound split between the two leading Palestinian political movements, Fateh and Hamas (and increasingly within the former), has seriously exacerbated this crisis. In this regard, a Palestinian refugee in the Diaspora said "I do not have a clear vision of how political life should be like in our Palestinian society, I do not see any point in political action in our Palestinian society, and political actions in our Palestinian society are a waste of time".

Another major contributing factor has been the striking absence of realism and clarity as to their objectives on the part of all the Palestinian factions. This crisis takes place against the somber background of a tightening stranglehold of Israel's 74-year-old occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and of the interference and pressures of external powers that have been fishing in Palestinian waters (Khalidi, 2009). All of these indicators negatively affected the Palestinian refugees' political participation and increased their political alienation. Regarding this issue, a Palestinian refugee in the Diaspora said "I think that we are politically pushed to a field where we have no choice, and a person like me has no influence on the Palestinian political system".

The study findings showed that, Palestinian refugee females in the Diaspora scored a higher level of political alienation than males. This can be linked to the conservative customs and traditions in Palestinian society, in which male patriarchal dominance and their social socialization is based on gender inequality. Patriarchal ideology is deeply rooted in Palestinian society, where the notions of father and brother are most important. According to

these notions, male dominance supports the structure that keeps men in positions of power, authority and control (Barakat, 1993). The Palestinian culture seeks to direct males towards an affirmation of masculine qualities like manhood, chivalry, bravery, gallantry, daring and stamina.

The Palestinian culture also stresses directing females towards feminism, decency, decorum, virginity, love of children, home economics and stability (Banat, 2010; Banat *et al*., 2021). This, therefore, contributes to ensuring a higher level of political alienation. Nonetheless, Palestinian females have also been subjected to quota issue in the Palestinian Parliament that do not exceed 15% of the seats. This has decreased her political participation and increased her political alienation.

In this regards, Osmond and Thorne (1993) indicated that the devalued and subordinated position of women in society and families is a central theme of feminist theory; where feminists agree that male dominance within families is part of a wider system of male power, is neither natural nor inevitable, and occurs at women's cost. It follows that women would likely experience more political alienation than men in a patriarchal ideology that is deeply rooted in the Palestinian society, where the notions of father and brother are prevalent (Banat, 2015).

Moreover, as any Arab society, the Palestinian family socialization process is characterized for being patriarchal in relation to the process of differentiation between males and females in the directions they receive according to gender. Separation between the two genders starts at a very early age in the individual's life. Boys are raised in the men's world while the girls are raised in the women's. This distinction spreads to several educational, moral, aesthetic, intellectual, philosophical and even practical atmospheres. It is clear that guidance of the males is geared towards confirmation of manhood, bravery, chivalry, courage, eloquence and stamina while the girls are geared towards feminism, decency, chastity, love of children, home economics and stability, and increases their political alienation (Muhawi & Kana'na, 2001; Lachkar, 2002; Banat, 2010). In this regard, a Palestinian female refugee in the Diaspora said "I would like to participate in the Palestinian political life if things weren't so

complicated, and I do not feel comfortable with the margin of political freedom in our Palestinian society".

The findings of the study indicated that, non-working Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora experienced a higher level of political alienation than the working participants. Sociologically, Karl Marx (1844) had pointed out in his social theory about the significance of the economic aspect in the social structure and its role in controlling all aspects of the society (Banat, 2012). Economic gives independence and social status. Thus, this is regardless of the harsh living conditions in the Palestinian society as a result of the high rate of unemployment and poverty under the on-going Israeli occupation. In terms of this issue, a Palestinian refugee in the Diaspora said "It is clear that there are intellectual and political differences between Palestinians, but the economic differences are much more important, however, every person has the right to express his political ideas even if most people have different views".

According to Fapohunda and Todaro (1988), changes in income generating capacity of spouses precipitate changes in reproductive decision-making prerogatives. Thus, anything that can have direct influence on income generating capacity of couples can be considered to be a good correlate of domestic decision-making. Meanwhile, Brotherson (2000) clarified that participants with greater control of financial resources tend to have more contributions to internal decision-making such as financial security and quality of life.

The findings of the study indicated that non-affiliated Palestinian refugees experienced a higher level of political alienation than affiliated participants. According to Banat (2014), sense of community is based upon the interaction and contact between community members. The society consists of several communities which interact with one another in a systematic manner and share stable and organized social relations. They share joint interests and goals governed by a group of values, customs, traditions and norms which organize their behavior and relationships to guarantee the survival and sustainability of the society. Every group is characterized by the interest of its members in certain behavioral norms based on their own values so as to distinguish them from members of other societal groups; each group exerts

pressure on its members to hold fast to these norms in order to preserve and sustain their group entity (Othman, 1999).

Social participation takes place within a community context, where people engage in social activities in many formal and informal social networks. Forms of participation are determined by issues arising within a community, a place, and include its culture, norms, values, institutions (Cicognani *et al.,* 2008). This confirms that being involved with institutions operating in the Palestinian society is a good indicator of political participation. Party affiliation touches the provision of humanitarian services to marginalized groups in the Palestinian society through many formal and informal social networks, which consequently reflect the noblest human feelings, and qualify them to communicate with others, feel with them, understand their needs, and help solve the problems they face, which positively enhances their feelings of sense of community and social responsibility and decrease their political alienation (Verba *et al.,* 1995; Youniss *et al.,* 2002; Cicognani *et al.,* 2008; Banat, 2014; Banat *et al.,* 2022).

Considering the degree of involvement in social activities, results of descriptive studies conducted in several nations in the last 20 years have provided a fairly consistent picture of increasing apathy toward traditional politics among youth, but also showed evidence of interest in a range of no mainstream forms of civil involvement, including voluntary activity (Verba *et al.,* 1995; Youniss *et al.,* 2002) as cited in Cicognani *et al.* (2008). Additionally, the study of Cornolti *et al.* (2005) concluded that the most popular ways of being politically active are participation to public meetings dealing with political and social issues. Regarding this issue, "I am not a member of any of the political parties in our Palestinian society, however, a good politician is good whether his name is Muhammad or Hanna".

The findings of the study revealed that single Palestinian refugees scored a higher level of political alienation than married participants, and that the number of family members was positively associated with the political alienation level among the sampled population. These results are considered natural, since marriage is a social system in all human societies and since it is a means to fulfill instinctive, psychological and social satisfactions; it is the first

step to build a family by which the individual crosses from an individual life to a new life full of cooperation, partnership compliance by rights and obligations together with his wife in their new life. It is a bilateral relationship where the most profound manifestations of interaction and human contact are exhibited (Banat, 2015).

Marriage is a complex process, it can affect not only the physical and mental health of both spouses but also their children's development, life satisfaction, job satisfaction, income level, well-being, educational success, social skills, community and political participation (Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; Holt-Lunstad *et al.,* 2008; Cummings & Davies, 2010). Consequently, with increased number of children, spouses have more family responsibilities and deal with different problems including economic issues under the difficult living conditions prevalent in the Palestinian occupied society and new challenges, which would agitate the stability of the family and decrease their political participation and increase their political alienation. In terms of this issue, a single Palestinian refugee in the Diaspora said "I don't like the idea of being a political leader, I am not interested in seminars that deal with political matters, and democracy cannot be practiced properly in our Palestinian society".

Furthermore, findings revealed that less-educated Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora scored a higher level of political alienation than well-educated participants. In fact, 1948 is a key date that is unerasable from the collective memory of Palestinians, the year when a country and its people disappeared from both maps and dictionaries (Sanbar, 2001: 4). Additionally, education is highly valued among Palestinian refugee women as it provides them with full awareness of the Nakba, which retained in their collective memory. Those refugee women consider education as an important mechanism by which they seek to develop their potentials, interact with others to advocate their just cause and defend it on international arena. Undoubtedly, education is a significant stage in the formation and development of one's personality; it represents a critical turning point in the women's life, which fulfills their life aspirations, meets their abilities, preferences, and interests (Banat & Remawi, 2014).

There is no doubt that education constitutes a turning point and an important stage in the formation and development of one's personality, not to mention the pivotal role that higher

education plays in the betterment of developing societies, which results in a societal return that far exceeds economic accounts. Higher education plays a pivotal role in shaping the most advanced types of human capital. Higher education institutions are the ones that establish the societal wealth of advanced knowledge and capabilities, that is, the highest levels of human capital, which are the mainstay of progress in the current century (Firjani, 1998: 3; Banat & Rimawi, 2014). This consequently contributes to increasing one's sense of social responsibility, political participation, and decrease their political alienation.

In this context, Khan *et al*. (2011) indicated that education provides people with guidance in decision making, their rights and their orientation to living in a prosperous way; and education is sometimes associated with the process of empowering individuals particularly in disadvantaged situations; as education enhances their chances to participate in economic activities and therefore in return, the economic contribution allows them, to participate in the family decision-making. Additionally, Acharya (2008, 2010) acknowledged that education is an important tool in individuals' empowerment, which can help them gain a better understanding of their rights and responsibilities, and give them more confident about their opportunities, community participation, and decision-making, which decrease their political alienation. In regards to this issue, a well-educated Palestinian refugee in the Diaspora said "The fear from political action in our Palestinian society is realistic and not exaggerated, and no matter the outcome, political violence cannot be justified".

Furthermore, findings revealed that independent Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora scored a higher level of political alienation. The researcher explains this result by the existence of a large gap between the political elite and the popular base, this elite controlling the helm of the decision, unable to provide any solutions to the Palestinian issue, and refusing to acknowledge its inability to lead the masses, which led to the further widening of the gap between the political elite and the popular base.

In fact, the political elite only has to adapt to historical developments, by re-representing popular demands at the official level, and rebuilding trust between the base that has been separated from the political elite by virtue of oppression and repression, and the need to give

it its historical opportunity to lead itself, and to play a historical role on the level of the Palestinian issue. Taking into consideration that the political system is a mirror of the political environment in which any society lives, and it differs with the changes and events experienced by that society. There is no doubt that the Palestinian political system is not far from this framework. It is difficult to say that the Palestinian society has adopted a single political ideology despite the presence of common elements within this ideology in the past and present. It is worthy to note that the Palestinian ideology was initially very similar to the Arab ideology taking into consideration the dilemmas faced by the Palestinian and Arab societies such as the national struggle against colonialism, and the call for Arab unity. At the same time, the regime did not support the freedom of opinion expression and political participation, which increased their political alienation (Muheisen, 2006). In this regard, a Palestinian refugee in the West Bank said "I do not believe in the importance of political pluralism in our Palestinian society, and I am pessimistic about the future of political life in our Palestinian society".

Regarding this issue, an independent Palestinian refugee in Lebanon Diaspora said, "I do not trust the performance of the Palestinian political elite, politicians are not interested in the views and attitudes of a person like me, and what I think, I feel the distance between me and the politicians in our Palestinian society, since what matters for political entities is the number of votes and not the ideas of the electorate, and legislative Council members quickly lose touch with people".

The study findings indicated that Palestinian refugees in the Syria Diaspora scored a higher level of political alienation. Ten years after demonstrations started in Syria, over half of the Palestine refugees in the country have been displaced at least once because of the brutal conflict that ensued, including 120,000 who have sought safety in neighboring countries.

Since the start of the conflict in 2011, UNRWA has stepped up its operations to ensure the needs of Palestine refugees in the country are met. The Agency is the main provider of humanitarian assistance and basic services to 438,000 Palestine refugees who remain in the country – 91% of whom live in absolute poverty - and who have been among those worst

affected by the conflict. "As a Palestine refugee, you are already born with a tag that says "displaced", said UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini. "If you are a Palestinian refugee in Syria, then you are at least doubly displaced and most likely living in extreme hardship". The Palestinian refugees in Syria are suffering from a multiple complex predicament. Multiple layers of conflict, displacement, hardship and most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic (UNRWA, 2021).

UNRWA is a lifeline to nearly 420,000 of the most vulnerable Palestinian refugees in Syria. Cash assistance and food aid by the Agency are often the only fixed support they get. In neighbouring Jordan and Lebanon, a total of 45,500 Palestinian refugees from Syria receive health, education, social services and cash assistance from UNRWA to help cover their basic needs. Since the start of the conflict, many UNRWA installations inside Syria, such as schools and health centres, have become inaccessible or sustained severe damage. Forty per cent of UNRWA classrooms have been lost and almost 25 per cent of the Agency's health centres are currently unusable due to the conflict. UNRWA in Syria has also lost 19 staff members during the 10-year conflict. "The daunting images of destruction in Yarmouk camp remain with me, even a few months after I visited Syria," said Mr. Lazzarini. "Children in pink and blue school uniforms stepping out of the rubble to get on a school bus was a surreal sight" (UNRWA, 2021).

Additionally, after the Nakba 1948, Palestinians settled in neighboring Arab countries, including Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The regime of these countries did not support the freedom of opinion expression, expression and political participation. Palestinian refugees were deprived of many rights, including the right to political participation, the right to own property, and the right to work...etc., which increased their political alienation.

With regards to this issue, Saleh (2012) indicated that the laws and decisions regulating the presence of Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon were harsh and greatly detracted from their human rights, and that their daily suffering was on an ascending line from the first days of asylum, including the right to residency and housing. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are divided into three categories according to their legal status: registered refugees, unregistered

refugees, numbering about 35,000, and refugees without identity papers, numbering three thousand.

In addition to their right to work, the laws and decisions related to Palestinian refugees were characterized by many deprivations and prohibitions, until the prohibited professions reached 72 professions, and Palestinians were not allowed to engage in self-employment, until in the summer of 2005, the list of prohibited professions was partially reduced. That is in addition to depriving refugees of the right to own property under a law approved by the Lebanese Parliament in March 2001, under the pretext of rejecting settlement, and preventing building materials from the Tire camps and the negative effects resulting from this prohibition, especially in light of the deprivation of the Palestinian right to own property (Saleh, 2012). In terms of this issue, a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon said "I do not follow political news on radio and television, and there is no way to influence what the government does other than elections".

Moreover, findings showed that the elderly Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora reported more political alienation than youth participants. In fact, we are talking here about the generation of the Nakba who experienced interpersonal trauma at higher frequencies as compared to other generations in the Palestinian family (Dayyeh *et al.*, 2018).

According to Morina *et al.* (2010), civilian war survivors seeking treatment reported multiple war-related traumatic events and high levels of psychiatric morbidity. Moreover, individuals assessed during follow-ups reported no change in post-traumatic stress symptoms or psychological well-being. This is the first generation of the Palestinian Nakba whereby geography persisted in their memory. It is the generation who rejected the dictations of history. The authenticity of the place is steadfast in their memory and narration; thus, it ended their dreams and delusions that the hegemony of history is capable of being restricted within the place in this memory. This memory was able to exceed the parameters of geography and pass on to generations who were impregnable barriers against those new settlers.

Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora are still waiting, till this present moment, for a political decision to put an end to their pain and suffering. It follows that elderly Palestinian refugees

in the Diaspora experienced more political alienation than youth participants (Sayegh, 1983; Kana'na, 2000; Banat, 2002; Allan, 2007; Banat, 2012; Banat *et al*., 2018; Dayyeh *et al*., 2018; Dayyeh & Banat, 2019). Regarding this issue, a senior Palestinian refugee in the Diaspora said: "Politics is so complicated in our Palestinian society that a person like me cannot understand what is really happening, and I do not see any importance to my political views as a Palestinian refugee".

On the other hand, Hughey *et al.* (1999) indicated that community participation enhances sense of community. Community participation offers young people the opportunity to cultivate social ties with persons other than the family and peers within different social settings, and through this, helps them to gain a sense of connectedness and belonging as well as to strengthen their social identity and identification processes.

During adolescence, young people express a strong need to belong to a group. This need helps them acquire a distance from their parents and find their own identity. Moreover, young people develop a strong sense of belonging by creating links with their friends. This emotional experience reinforces their identification with the group. Certainly, when the child feels accepted and esteemed by his/her peers, he/she confirms his/her identity, and trust to others increases. He/she looks for the occasions or situations where he/she is in a group, because he/she feels confidence and knows that he/she will be recognized, which increase their political participation and decrease their political alienation (Abdelkader & Bouslama, 2014).

In fact, youth played a pioneering role in being the leaders and impetus for liberation revolutions worldwide. With more focus, we find that Palestinian people starting with the family, school and the larger society respectively raise the child on an authentic culture of belonging to their country and its just cause; this culture grows with the child without any barriers or hesitations. Another feature of Palestinian social construct is the highlighting of duties more than of rights; the Palestinian family and the educational system raises the members in such a manner as to qualify them for making sacrifices and offering more services than obtaining rights and gains. If we go deep into the behavior of the original

Palestinian personality which represents the outcome of this type of education, it becomes clear to us the extent of its interest in its duties towards others and its keenness on preserving its social reputation and bonds to those who care about those duties (Banat, 2010; Dayyeh *et al.,* 2018). All of these are considered fundamental dimensions of sense of community that raise the level of political participation and decrease the political alienation (Banat, 2014).

Finally, political alienation substantially decreases among religious Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora. This result could be linked to the fact that commitment to religion in the Palestinian family occupies a large space in its social, intellectual and emotional life. It is normal that the religious creed is respected by all members of Palestinian society. This is due to the concentrated efforts which the parents exert in bringing up their members (Banat, 2010; Banat *et al.,* 2021b).

In fact, religion as a mediator can influence mental procedures and the evaluation of daily events. Thus, some researchers believe that confronting stress and social situations are facilitated via religious beliefs as a source of comfort (Mahoney *et al*., 2001; Yeganeh & Shaikh mahmoodi, 2013). Additionally, religious orientation improves mental health and provides a suitable condition for answering basic questions of humans such as identity and choosing a certain life style in order to attain perfection contributing to adjustment and psychological well-being. In short, religious commitment increases the level of self - confidence, adjustment and self-esteem, which are basic factors of mental health, psychological well-being, and life satisfaction that consequently decrease their political alienation (Allport, 1950, 1963).

In this regards, Yahya (1991) indicated that the Islamic society is based on a positive recognition of the sacred; religion is inconvertibly of the highest value in almost all Muslim populations. This often creates difficulties in adjusting to the secular ends-means criteria. Innovation includes inventions as a source of popular cultural beliefs.

Moreover, the contemporary Muslim world has many aspects of secular characteristics in social, political and economic life. General patterns of change that indicate such phenomena are evident. For example, expanding urban areas and factory labor; the increase in

communication, education, and literacy; and the advent of national states backed by a rationalist feeling that spread from the educated elite to the masses. Until recently those masses had remained largely outside the political society. Furthermore, there is a growing equality of women and the loosening of paternal authority as well as an application of Western, secular legal codes and an increased use of science and technology in agriculture, industry and healthcare (Yahya, 1991: 14), which consequently decreases the political alienation level among the sampled population.

Furthermore, Hamas changed its position to accept participation in the Palestinian political system. By participating in the second legislative elections in 2006, Hamas achieved a landslide victory over the Fateh movement, which had ruled the regime for more than 35 years. Thus, Hamas was able to form the Palestinian government unilaterally, according to its own political program that is different from that of the organization, which does not recognize Oslo as a ceiling for the legislative elections, which made Israel and the United States, along with the majority of the international community, impose a financial and political siege on the Palestinian government. One of the repercussions of this was the existence of a two-headed authority, the presidency and the government, with different programs and positions, and conflict over powers. With this, the Palestinian political system entered a suffocating political crisis, which seriously threatened to cross red lines and cause internal Palestinian fighting.

The rise of Hamas as a religious party to the top of the Palestinian political system after the second legislative elections was not of little importance, both in terms of the relations and future of Hamas, and in terms of the nature of the Palestinian political system, and the conditions of the Palestinian national liberation movement Fateh in general. The entry of Hamas into the political system was the culmination of a long and complex historical process. While the movement preferred to work outside the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization and compete with it on the Palestinian representation front, it refused to recognize the authority, and followed a strategy to embarrass it that combined military confrontation with the occupation in particular through specific martyrdom operations and political confrontation with its leadership.

The results of the last legislative elections in 2006 showed the desire of the Palestinians to change those in charge of the Palestinian National Authority, and restore the bond between the Palestine Liberation Organization abroad, which was still controlled by the Fateh movement, and the Palestinian Authority, which was divided between the Palestinian presidency led by Fateh and the Palestinian government led by Hamas. It emerged after the legislative elections in 2006, and for the first time there was a presence of two leaderships in the Palestinian arena: the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the leadership of the Palestinian National Authority, which weakened both of them. Noting that the overlap in the powers between the Palestinian presidency and the government – which existed before – was between the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat on the one hand, and his Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, who submitted his resignation due to his inability to continue his work due to the interference of the presidency in his powers. The same applies to his successor, Ahmad Qurei', who threatened to resign several times before Arafat's death. Arafat was forced to separate the Palestinian government from the presidency, due to American and Israeli pressures, under the pretext of distributing powers and carrying out reforms in the Palestinian National Authority (Panorama, 2005). All of the above issues were strong indicators that increased the political participation for the religious parties (Hamas, Islamic Jihad), and decrease their political alienation. In terms of this issue, a religious Palestinian refugee in the Diaspora said "I do not trust the performance of the Palestinian Authority in politics, the Palestinian political decision must be affected by external influences and factors, and the Palestinian political system is not entrusted with our rights as Palestinian refugees".

5.2   Conclusion

Political participation and the freedom of opinion expression is a measure of subjective sense of community that brings a considerable positive impact towards individuals and the society. The present study sheds some light on political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora after 74 years of the Nakba.

The study confirmed the value of political participation in the Palestinian occupied society. Approximately, more than half of the participants scored a moderate level on political alienation scale. Age, gender, marital status, number of family members, educational level, religion commitment, relation to work force, political party affiliation, fraction affiliation, and region were significant predictors for the political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora.

On 15 May 15th 1948, the Zionist Movement declared the formation of the State of Israel on 78% of the Palestinian lands. They have uprooted Palestinians from twenty cities and about four hundred villages; about seven hundred thousand Palestinians i.e., 66% of the residents of Palestine became homeless; this was the complete deterioration of the Palestinian society with all its components and bases. The Palestinian experience under the on-going Israeli occupation was and still is the most tragic one in terms of victims and violence; it has left behind acts of killing, injury, handicaps, physical and psychological torture due to house demolition, confiscation of lands and water, arrests, raids, pursuits and other forms of violence. Palestinians have faced the most brutal occupier that history has ever known. Since the Israeli Occupation of Palestine in 1948, which controlled Palestine with the exception of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - whereby the West Bank was under Jordanian rule and the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian rule - the Palestinian people have been unable to exercise their right to elections of all kinds, whether it be presidential, parliamentary or local, and to consequently choose their leadership to represent them at all levels.

Historically, the first elections were held in 1923 when Palestine was under the rule of the British Mandate, which tried to control the Palestinian people by holding legislative elections comprising twenty-three members, in which thirteen members were elected and ten members were appointed by the British ruler, who was known as the "High Commissioner", but the Palestinian people boycotted these elections leading to their failure at the time (Abrash, 1998; Jabali, 2009; Casati, 2016).

This situation continued in Palestine until 1976, when elections were held in the West Bank on April 12th 1976 by order of the Israeli military authorities and under an amended version

of the Jordanian Municipal Elections Law of 1955. The voter turnout was 72.3% in favor of Palestine's Liberation Organization (PLO) supporters. Elections were held in 24 municipal councils. Through these municipal elections, the Israeli Occupation tried to find an alternative leadership to the PLO by producing heads of local bodies subject to the Israeli Occupation authorities. However, the results of the elections disappointed the hopes of the Israeli Occupation, as representatives of the PLO won the elections, which subsequently led to Israel expelling part of them, attempting to assassinate the other part, and dismissing those who remained from their positions as elected heads of local bodies (Banat, 2010; Casati, 2016).

The Palestinian people remained deprived of exercising their right to elections until 1996 when the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, according to which the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994. The Oslo Accords stipulated that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would hold legislative, presidential and local elections. It is worthy to note that the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had reached nearly five million, and the number of Palestinian people in all places of their residence was about fifteen million. This meant that more than two-thirds of the Palestinian people could not participate in the election of a political leader to represent them.

Additionally, the regime of Arab countries does not support the freedom of opinion expression, and political participation. Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora were deprived of many rights, including the right to political participation.

Subsequent to the Oslo Agreement and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the first presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 1996 where the Fateh movement won the elections and the Islamic movements boycotted the elections at the time. The elections were scheduled to be held every four years, but the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 led to the inability of the Palestinians to hold elections until 2005 when the second presidential elections were held, which were won by the Fateh movement and which were also boycotted by the Islamic movements. The second legislative elections were later held in 2006 in which Hamas participated and won (Banat, 2010).

In 2021, the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree to hold parliamentary elections, but the Israeli Occupation constituted the biggest obstacle to holding the presidential elections, and consequently postponing the elections because the Israeli Occupation did not allow them to take place in East Jerusalem. As for the local elections, they were held in 2004 and 2005. Local elections were then held in 2012 and 2017. Palestinians were also preparing to hold local elections in 2021.

After 74 of the Nakba, Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora are still, till this present moment, waiting for a political decision to put an end to their pain and suffering. The Palestinian political system has witnessed many turning points, starting with the Palestinian catastrophe or Nakba in 1948 and passing through the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization and reaching the Oslo Agreement. The Oslo Accord was a major turning point in the Palestinian political system such that this agreement has left an impact on the Palestinian political system, and among the Palestinian forces since the inception of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which signed this agreement with the Israeli party to be a fundamental turning point in the formation of the Palestinian political system through the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, and the holding of the first presidential and legislative elections in 1996. Despite this transformation, there was a sharp Palestinian division among the Palestinian factions, both supporters and opponents of the Oslo Accord. The Fateh Movement and the Palestinian People's Party were with the Oslo Accord, claiming that the agreement would constitute a turning point for the transfer of the PLO into the Palestinian territories. Conversely, other factions opposed the agreement including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front and the Democratic Front, for political Islam to occupy the position of the opposition rejecting the Oslo Accord. Then, it became a strong competitor of the central trend in the Palestinian arena, occupying the center stage in the Palestinian political system recently, after the second legislative elections that took place in January 2006.

In fact, with more focus, we find that Palestinians, starting with family, school and the larger society respectively, raise the child on an authentic culture of belonging to their country and its just cause, sense of community, and political participation; this culture grows with the

child without any barriers or hesitations. Taking into consideration that Party affiliation touches the provision of humanitarian services to marginalized groups in the Palestinian society through many formal and informal social networks. However, the Palestinian disunity since 2007, the postponing of holding elections at their scheduled time under the on-going Israeli occupation, and the large gap between the political elite and the popular base in the Palestinian society, this elite controlling the helm of the decision, unable to provide any solutions to the Palestinian issue, and refusing to acknowledge its inability to lead the masses, were major factors that increased political alienation among Palestinians in the Diaspora.

5.3   Recommendation

Based on the findings and conclusions of this study, the following recommendations are made:

1. Give the concept of political socialization the utmost importance in the Palestinian curriculum and in the different media outlets.
2. It is necessary to activate the political participation of Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora, by taking charge of the refugees themselves or choosing their representative in any future solutions to their just cause.
3. Activating all official and popular institutions to support the Palestinian refugee cause, which is the basis of the Palestinian cause.
4. Since there is a large proportion of politically-independent individuals, the study recommends the emergence of a new party linked to the Palestinian refugee issues, which will have a prominent role in the conflict solution, especially political participation, the right of return, and the right to self-determination.
5. Holding the Palestinian elections as soon as possible with the participation of all Palestinian factions and all Palestinians in the Diaspora.
6. Empowering women in the Palestinian political life through awareness programs and amending the mechanisms of the Palestinian political system.
7. Further studies are necessary to expand our understanding of political alienation in the Palestinian occupied society.

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
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
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
APPENDIXS

Appendix (A). Palestine: West Bank and Gaza Strip.

(Passia, 2002)

Appendix (B) Oslo agreement Map

Appendix (C). Palestine: West Bank Separation Wall.

West Bank Wall - Map 2006

Appendix (D). Palestinian Loss of Land, 1946-2000.

Palestinian Loss of Land 1946 to 2000

(Passia, 2002)

Appendix (E). Vision For Peace Conceptual Map: Trump's Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plan 2020.

(Cramer, 2020)

Appendix (F). Palestinian Refugees: Displaced from Urban and Rural Areas.

(Palestine in Arabic - Maps, 2000)

Appendix (G). Palestinian Refugee Camps.

Palestinian Refugees - Area of UNRWA Operations

(UNRWA, 2017)

Appendix (H) Palestine Before 1948

PALESTINE 1946:
Districts and District Centers during the Mandate period

Copyright © PalestineRemembered.com

LEBANON

N

0 10 20 30 40 50
Kilometers

Safad

Acre

SYRIA

Haifa

Tiberias

Nazareth

Baysan

Jinin

Tulkarm

Nablus

TRANSJORDAN

Jaffa

Ramallah

al-Ramla

Jerusalem

Gaza

Hebron

Beersheba

EGYPT

Foreign Office,

November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country"

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Appendix (J). Palestine under the British Mandate, 1923-1948.

Palestine under the British Mandate 1923-1948

The Palestine Mandate granted to Great Britain at the 1920 San Remo Conference as the region of a Jewish National Home

Approximate area in which the Jews hoped to set up a National Home

Area separated from Palestine by Great Britain in 1921, given to Emir Abdullah and named Transjordan

Area ceded by Great Britain to the French Mandate of Syria in 1923

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)

Appendix (K). Palestine UN Partition Plan, 1947.

(Passia, 2002)

Appendix (L). Palestinian Refugees Camps in West Bank

348

Appendix (M). Palestinian Refugees Camps in Gaza Strip

349

Appendix (N). Palestinian Refugees Camps in Syria

Appendix (O). Palestinian Refugees Camps in Lebanon

Appendix (P). The Oslo Accords between Palestinians and Israelis.

(Passia, 2002)

Appendix (Q). Sample size calculator.

Appendix (R). Questionnaire in English.

<div align="center">بســــم الله الرحمــن الرحيــم</div>

Granada University

Institute of Migration Studies

PhD Program of Migration Studies

Dear Refugee,

The researcher is conducting a study on "**Political alienation among Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora",** in order to complete the requirements for obtaining a PhD in Immigration Studies. You have chosen randomly to be part of the study sample, so I ask you to cooperate with us by filling out this questionnaire in accordance with your point of view. Note that the study data is for scientific research purposes only, and it will be kept confidential, and you are not required to write your name or anything that indicates you. Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Thank you for your time.

Prepared by Bashir Ahmad

Supervised by Prof. Francisco Entrena Duran

Section one: General information.

Please choose the suitable answer:

1. Gender   1.Male   2.Female
2. Age ……… Years.
3. Marital status 1.Single   2. Married   3. Other
4. No. of family members ………………
5. Educational   1.Basic   2.Secondaroy 3.Diploma   4.Bachelor or above
6. Religion commitment   1.High   2.Moderate   3.Low
7. Relation to work force 1. Working   2. Not working
8. Party affiliation   1. Affiliated   2. Not affiliated
9. Political fraction   1. Fateh   2. Islamic Trends (Hamas, Islamic Jihad)

    3. Independent   4. Left Trends (Popular, Democracy, FDA, People's Party) 5. Other (specify).....................

10. Region   1. West Bank   2.Gaza Strip   3. Green Line (1948) 4. Jordan 5. Syria   6. Lebanon   7. Arab countries   8. South America   9. Europe 10. North America   11. Asia   12. Australia

Section Two: Political Alienation Questionnaire items.

Please answer the following questions according to the following scale (1= strongly agree, 2= Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5= strongly disagree).

No	Item	SA	A	N	DA	SA
1.	I am not inclined to participate in the upcoming Legislative Council elections	1	2	3	4	5
2.	I do not participate in political discussions	1	2	3	4	5
3.	I do not believe in the importance of political pluralism in our Palestinian society	1	2	3	4	5
4.	I don't like the idea of being a political leader	1	2	3	4	5
5.	I am not a member of any of the political parties in our Palestinian society	1	2	3	4	5
6.	I do not follow political news on radio and television	1	2	3	4	5
7.	I do not have a clear vision of how political life should be like in our Palestinian society	1	2	3	4	5
8.	I do not trust the performance of the Palestinian Authority in politics	1	2	3	4	5
9.	The Palestinian political decision must be affected by external influences and factors	1	2	3	4	5
10.	I do not see any point in political action in our Palestinian society	1	2	3	4	5
11.	I am not interested in seminars that deal with political matters	1	2	3	4	5
12.	Democracy cannot be practiced properly in our Palestinian society	1	2	3	4	5
13.	Politicians are not interested in the views & attitudes of a person like me, and what I think	1	2	3	4	5
14.	I think that we are politically pushed to a field where we have no choice	1	2	3	4	5

15.	Whoever is politically not with me is against me	1	2	3	4	5
16.	A good politician is good whether his name is Muhammad or Hanna	1	2	3	4	5
17.	Political actions in our Palestinian society are a waste of time	1	2	3	4	5
18.	I do not see any importance to my political views as a Palestinian refugee	1	2	3	4	5
19.	The Palestinian political system is not entrusted with our rights as Palestinian refugees	1	2	3	4	5
20.	I do not know the political parties neither their objectives	1	2	3	4	5
21.	A person like me has no influence on the Palestinian political system	1	2	3	4	5
22.	I am not sure of my position on political issues	1	2	3	4	5
23.	I would like to participate in the Palestinian political life if things weren't so complicated	1	2	3	4	5
24.	Staying away from politics can relax your mind and conscience.	1	2	3	4	5
25.	I do not feel comfortable with the margin of political freedom in our Palestinian society	1	2	3	4	5
26.	The fear from political action in our Palestinian society is realistic and not exaggerated	1	2	3	4	5
27.	It is clear that there are intellectual and political differences between Palestinians, but the economic differences are much more important	1	2	3	4	5
28.	Every person has the right to express his political ideas even if most people have different views	1	2	3	4	5
29.	Democracy in Palestinian society doesn't manifest itself in the presence of political opposition	1	2	3	4	5
30.	It is difficult to be a member of a group with multiple political ideas	1	2	3	4	5
31.	I feel the distance between me and the politicians in our Palestinian society	1	2	3	4	5

32.	Citizens should not be allowed to demonstrate or express their political opinion if this breaches public order and security	1	2	3	4	5
33.	No one is good at everything, I personally have no sense for politics	1	2	3	4	5
34.	Certain issues in politics get me lost	1	2	3	4	5
35.	Generally speaking, Legislative Council members quickly lose touch with people	1	2	3	4	5
36.	What matters for political entities is the number of votes and not the ideas of the electorate	1	2	3	4	5
37.	There is no way to influence what the government does other than elections	1	2	3	4	5
38.	Politics is so complicated in our Palestinian society that a person like me cannot understand what is really happening	1	2	3	4	5
39.	No matter the outcome, political violence cannot be justified	1	2	3	4	5
40.	I am pessimistic about the future of political life in our Palestinian society	1	2	3	4	5

Thank you for your kind Cooperation

Researcher: Bashir Ahmad

Appendix (S). Questionnaire in Arabic.

بســــم الله الرحمــن الرحيـــم

جـامعـة غرنـاطـة

معهـد دراسـات الهجرة

برنامج الدكتوراه في دراسات الهجرة

أخي اللاجئ / أختي اللاجئة

تحية طيبة وبعد،،،

يقوم الباحث بإجراء دراسة حول "الاغتراب السياسي لدى اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشتات"، وذلك استكمالاً لمتطلبات الحصول على درجة الدكتوراه في دراسات اللاجئين والهجرة، وقد وقع عليك الاختيار عشوائياً لتكون ضمن عينة الدراسة، لذا أرجو منك التعاون معنا بتعبئة هذه الاستبانة بما يتوافق مع وجهة نظرك، علماً بأن بيانات الدراسة هي لأغراض البحث العلمي فقط، وسيتم الحفاظ على سريتها، ولا يطلب منك كتابة اسمك أو ما يشير إليك، شاكرين لك حسن تعاونك.

إعداد: أ. بشير أحمد   إشراف: د. فرانسيسكو انترينا دوران

القسم الأول: معلومات عامة.

الرجاء وضع دائرة حول رمز الإجابة التي تنطبق عليك.

1. الجنس   1.ذكر   2.أنثى

2. العمر .... سنة

3. الحالة الاجتماعية   1.أعزب   2.متزوج   3.غير ذلك

4. عدد أفراد الأسرة ....

5. المؤهل العلمي	1.أساسي فما دون	2. ثانوي	3.دبلوم	4.بكالوريوس فأعلى

5. المؤهل العلمي   1.أساسي فما دون   2. ثانوي   3.دبلوم   4.بكالوريوس فأعلى

6. درجة التدين   1.متدين   2.متدين إلى حد ما   3.غير متدين

7. العلاقة بقوة العمل   1.أعمل   2.لا أعمل

8. الانتماء الحزبي   1.منتمي   2.غير منتمي

9. الانتماء السياسي   1. فتح   2. اتجاهات اسلامية (حماس، الجهاد الاسلامي)

3. مستقل   4. اتجاهات يسارية (الشعبية، الديمقراطية، فدا، حزب الشعب)

5. غير ذلك (حدد) ....

10. التجمع   1.الضفة الغربية   2.غزة   3.الخط الأخضر (1948)

4.الأردن   5. سوريا   6. لبنان   7.الدول العربية   8.أمريكا الجنوبية   9.أوروبا

10. أمريكا الشمالية   11. أسيا   12. استراليا

القسم الثاني: الاغتراب السياسي.

يرجى قراءة الفقرات الآتية بعناية، والإجابة عنها بوضع دائرة حول رمز الإجابة التي تراها/ترينها مناسبة.

لا أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق	بين بين	أوافق	أوافق بشدة	الفقرات	الرقم
5	4	3	2	1	لا أميل إلى أن أشارك في انتخابات المجلس التشريعي القادمة	1.
5	4	3	2	1	لا أشارك في المناقشات السياسية	2.
5	4	3	2	1	لا أؤمن بأهمية التعددية السياسية في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني	3.
5	4	3	2	1	لا تستهويني فكرة أن أكون قائداً سياسياً	4.
5	4	3	2	1	لست عضواً في أي من الأحزاب السياسية في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني	5.
5	4	3	2	1	لا أتابع الأخبار السياسية في الراديو والتلفزيون	6.
5	4	3	2	1	ليس لدي تصور واضح عما ينبغي أن يكون عليه حال العمل السياسي في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني	7.
5	4	3	2	1	لا أثق بأداء السلطة الفلسطينية في العمل السياسي	8.
5	4	3	2	1	لا بد أن يتأثر القرار السياسي الفلسطيني بمؤثرات وعوامل خارجية	9.
5	4	3	2	1	لا أرى هناك أي جدوى للعمل السياسي في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني	10.
5	4	3	2	1	لا أهتم بالندوات التي تعنى بالأمور السياسية	11.
5	4	3	2	1	لا يمكن ممارسة الديمقراطية بالشكل الصحيح في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني	12.
5	4	3	2	1	لا يهتم السياسيون بتفكير إنسان مثلي، أي بماذا أفكر	13.

5	4	3	2	1	أرى أننا مدفوعون سياسياً إلى مجال لا خيار لنا فيه	.14
5	4	3	2	1	من ليس معي سياسياً فهو ضدي	.15
5	4	3	2	1	السياسي الجيد، جيد سواء كان اسمه محمد أو حنا	.16
5	4	3	2	1	العمل السياسي في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني مضيعة للوقت	.17
5	4	3	2	1	لا أرى أية أهمية لرأيي السياسي كلاجئ فلسطيني	.18
5	4	3	2	1	النظام السياسي الفلسطيني غير مؤتمن على حقوقنا كلاجئين فلسطينيين	.19
5	4	3	2	1	لا أعرف الأحزاب السياسية وغايات تشكيلها	.20
5	4	3	2	1	لا يوجد لإنسان مثلي أي تأثير في النظام السياسي الفلسطيني	.21
5	4	3	2	1	لست واثقاً من موقفي في المواضيع السياسية	.22
5	4	3	2	1	كنت أود المشاركة في العمل السياسي الفلسطيني لو لم تكن الأمور معقدة بهذا الشكل	.23
5	4	3	2	1	إذا ابتعدت عن العمل السياسي ترتاح ويرتاح ضميرك	.24
5	4	3	2	1	لا أشعر بالارتياح من هامش الحرية السياسية في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني	.25
5	4	3	2	1	إن تخوف البعض من العمل السياسي في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني أمر واقعي وغير مبالغ فيه	.26
5	4	3	2	1	من الواضح أن هناك فروقات فكرية وسياسية بين الفلسطينيين لكن الفروقات الاقتصادية أهم بكثير	.27
5	4	3	2	1	لكل شخص الحق في أن يعبر عن أفكاره السياسية حتى لو كان لمعظم الناس أفكار أخرى	.28

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5	4	3	2	1	لا تتجلى الديمقراطية في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني بوجود المعارضة السياسية	.29
5	4	3	2	1	من الأمور الصعبة أن تكون عضواً في جماعة متعددة الأفكار السياسية	.30
5	4	3	2	1	أشعر ببعد المسافة بيني وبين السياسيين في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني	.31
5	4	3	2	1	يجب ألا يسمح للمواطنين بالتظاهر أو التعبير عن رأيهم السياسي إذا كان هذا يخل بالنظام والأمن العام	.32
5	4	3	2	1	لا يوجد من هو جيد بكل شيء، أنا شخصياً لا توجد لدي حاسة للسياسة	.33
5	4	3	2	1	تحصل لي أشياء معينة في الأمور السياسية تسبب لي الضياع	.34
5	4	3	2	1	بصورة عامة بفقد أعضاء المجلس التشريعي الصلة مع الشعب بسرعة	.35
5	4	3	2	1	ما يهم التنظيمات السياسية هو عدد الأصوات وليس أفكار الناخبين	.36
5	4	3	2	1	لا توجد طريقة للتأثير على ما تقوم به الحكومة غير الانتخابات	.37
5	4	3	2	1	إن السياسة معقدة في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني، بحيث أن إنسان مثلي لا يستطيع فهم ما يحدث	.38
5	4	3	2	1	لا يمكن تبرير العنف السياسي بغض النظر عن النتيجة	.39
5	4	3	2	1	أنا متشائم من مستقبل العمل السياسي في مجتمعنا الفلسطيني	.40

شاكراً لكم حسن تعاونكم.

الباحث: أ. بشير أحمد.

Appendix (T). Group of Referees and Expert Arbitrators.

No.	Professor's name	University	Country
1.	Francisco Entrena Durán	University of Granada	Spain
2.	Sobhi Albadawi	Macquarie University	Australia
3.	Hasan Yahya	Michigan State University and Jackson Community College	USA
4.	Abdel Aziz Mousa Thabet	York University	Canada
5.	Tiziana Chiappelli	University of Florence	Italy
6.	Hassan Karaki	Lebanese University	Lebanon
7.	Mohamad Toufic Houri	Beirut Arab University	Lebanon
8.	Mohamed Shishtawy	Benha University	Egypt
9.	Abdelmajid Naceur	Tunis University	Tunis
10.	Ayat Nashwan	Yarmouk University	Amman
11.	Kamel Lahmar	Mohamed Lamine Debaghine Setif 2 University	Algeria
12.	Sharif Kana'na	Birzeit University	Palestine
13.	Bassam Yousef Banat	Al-Quds University	Palestine
14.	Mahmoud Hammad	Al-Quds University	Palestine
15.	Rabee Owais	Al-Quds University	Palestine
16.	Hasan Barmil	Al-Quds Open University	Palestine
17.	Mohammed Namourah	Al-Quds Open University	Palestine
18.	Khaled Katalo	Al-Quds Open University	Palestine

Appendix (U). Facilitating Mission Letter for Data Collection.

UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA
DEPARTAMENTO DE SOCIOLOGÍA
Francisco ENTRENA DURÁN
Catedrático de Universidad
18071 – Granada
E-mail: fentrena@ugr.es

Granada (Spain), August 1, 2021

To Whom It May Concern

This is to certify that Mr. Bashir Ahmad is PhD candidate in the program Immigration Studies, University of Granada, Spain. He is Conducting Survey titled: "The Political Alienation Among the Palestinian refugees in The Diaspora" as part of fulfillment of the requirements to obtain a Doctorate degree in Immigration Studies.

I highly appreciated your assistance in facilitating his mission in this important subject, which will have a significant impact on the Palestinian Society and scholarly research in General.

Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.

Signed. Prof. Dr. Francisco Entrena-Durán
Director of Bashir Ahmad's PHD Thesis

FIGURES

Figure (2). Distribution of the participants by gender.

**Figure (3)**. Distribution of the participants by marital status.

**Figure (4)**. Distribution of the participants by educational Level.

**Figure (5)**. Distribution of the participants by religion commitment.

**Figure (6).** Distribution of the participants by relation to work.

**Figure (7**). Distribution of the participants by parity affiliation.

**Figure (8)**. Distribution of the participants by Political fraction.

Figure (9). Distribution of the participants by region

Figure (**10**). Indicators of the political alienation by mean

No matter the outcome, political violence cannot be justified		
What matters for political entities is the number of votes and not the ideas of the electorate		
I do not feel comfortable with the margin of political freedom in our Palestinian society		
Every person has the right to express his political ideas even if most people have different views		
A good politician is good whether his name is Muhammad or Hanna		

3.45   3.5   3.55   3.6   3.65   3.7