Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

PhD Thesis
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Contents

List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CMA	Critical Metaphor Analysis
CMT	Cognitive Metaphor Theory or Conceptual Metaphor Theory
DA	Discourse Analysis
DMT	Deliberate Metaphor Theory
ECR	The European Conservatives and Reformists Group
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
GUE/NGL	*Gauche Unitaire Européenne* / Nordic Green Left
IT	Interaction Theory
KWIC	Key Word in Context
MEP	Minister of the European Parliament
MIP	Metaphor Identification Procedure
MIPVU	Metaphor Identification Procedure *Vrije Universiteit*
NAFTA	The North American Free Trade Agreement
NTL	Neural theory of Language
PDA	Political Discourse Analysis
PSOE	*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*
RT	Relevance Theory
S&D	The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SMO	Social Movement Organisation
TI	*Teoría de Interacción*
TMC	*Teoría de la Metáfora Cognitiva o Teoría de la Metáfora Conceptual*
TMD	*Teoría de la Metáfora Deliberada*
TR	*Teoría de Relevancia*
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party

Introduction

Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1. Introduction

This thesis originated in a master's dissertation I completed in 2015 as part of an MA in English literature and linguistics at the University of Granada (Keating, 2015). My undergraduate studies at University College Cork, Ireland, had been in English literature and Latin, and I had spent the years after my undergraduate degree working in English language education and, afterwards, in the world of literary publishing.

At this time, 2014-15, the so-called Islamic State was emerging out of the chaos of the Syrian civil war, their atrocities and territorial gains making the evening news. Like most people, I was horrified and hypnotised by this grim spectacle; the image of "Jihadi John" holding a knife to the necks of his orange-jumpsuit clad victims seemed like something out of a film. Although I could not explain how, I felt their use of symbolism was a powerful part of how they communicated, to both their supporters and their detractors: Newspapers argued about whether they should even call them the Islamic State or whether this meant falling into one of their symbolic traps. I suspected that metaphor was involved somehow, and I began research for the MA.

The corpus of the MA dissertation consisted of the first few issues of the so-called Islamic State's English-language magazine, *Dabiq*. I argued that they used metaphor in the magazine to communicate their polarising worldview, their ideology, to both supporters and opponents. This argument was also my focus when I embarked upon the PhD thesis. However, both the argument and the subject matter changed a great deal as the PhD thesis progressed.

World events were moving on: the so-called Islamic State were losing their earlier territorial gains and their ability to carry out attacks, or claim credit for attacks, was diminishing. At the same time, a new threat to Western liberal democracy was emerging: the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the USA and the success of the Brexit referendum seemed to indicate that the old spectre of populism had risen once again, disrupting the post-Cold War international order.

There is something instinctively similar about terrorism and populism. Perhaps it is something in the way they polarise society, or perhaps something in the way their ideas are

communicated through discourse. Such an insight, I think, motivated Encarnación Hidalgo-Tenorio to approach Belén Soria and myself to see if we would contribute a chapter to a book on populism she was putting together with some colleagues (Hidalgo-Tenorio et al., 2019). Of course, we jumped at the chance; we began research into the topic, and I started putting together a corpus of populist speeches from the European parliament.

This research revealed several important challenges to my PhD research, theoretical, practical and personal. Firstly, while populism has been approached from many different perspectives, I became convinced of the argument that it is best seen as a discursive frame which pits a homogenised pure people against a corrupt elite (Aslanidis, 2016).

The terrorism scholar Haroro Ingram described Islamic State propaganda as depicting a Manichean struggle between a virtuous ingroup and a corrupt outgroup (Ingram, 2018). This led me to a number of interesting questions: Could terrorism also be approached as a discursive frame? Perhaps terrorism and populism could both be seen as particular forms of a more general polarising frame? Or perhaps these common aspects between populism and the propaganda of the so-called Islamic State arise because the Islamic State are/were both populists and terrorists.

These are intriguing questions but it was clear that such a comparison between terrorism and populism would require a thesis of its own. While I was certain, and I am still certain, that a pragmatic study of metaphor can reveal much about how terrorism is expressed, either as single phenomenon or in concert with populism, it was clear to me that to study both phenomena in one thesis would take me away from a pragmatic analysis of metaphor. In short, I had to limit the scope of the thesis. While I might have continued with my work on terrorism, it did not seem possible to do so without considering the populist aspects of their discourse. Therefore, it made sense, practically and theoretically, to limit my research to populism and focus all my energy on the interesting question of how populists use metaphorical utterances.

There were also personal considerations I had to take into account. The propaganda of the so-called Islamic State is murderous in its intent and graphic in its detail. While this did not seem to affect me much during the MA, I began to find that the material was affecting my mental health. Populism is by no means a pleasant political phenomenon, but at least I would not have to expose myself to such extreme material. If I had not changed my thesis to focus on populism, I am not sure I would have completed it.

Therefore, while the title of this thesis is the use of novel or active metaphorical utterances in polarising discourse, I focus on one variety of polarising discourse, populism. This provides a narrow scope in which I can say something meaningful about how metaphorical utterances are used in this type of discourse, but I believe the original framework outlined in this thesis can be used for the analysis of other kinds of polarising discourse, such as terrorist discourse.

By *active metaphorical utterances* I am drawing on Black's terminology of *active metaphors* (Black 1954-5). They can be defined here as utterances (a sentence or clause complex in use) which depend on non-conventional (non-lexicalised) meaning derived via a process of metaphorical mapping between domains. Non-conventional metaphorical utterances have been talked about in a variety of ways, many of which involve assumptions I wish to avoid, for example *poetic metaphors* (Lakoff & Turner, 1989), *original metaphors* (Goatly, 1997, 2007), *deliberate metaphors* (Steen, 2017), and, more widely, *novel metaphors*. Romero and Soria (1997-8) use *novel metaphorical utterances* which avoids the assumptions that all unconventional metaphors are poetic, original, or deliberate. However, while I follow their theory and have used this term in the title of the thesis, I have come to prefer Black's coinage of active metaphors in order to clearly differentiate these kinds of utterances from the *novel metaphorical concepts* that are built online in the process of interpreting these utterances. An utterance is metaphorical, according to Romero and Soria, when the metaphorical mechanism for its interpretation is activated. Therefore, there are no literal metaphorical utterances. Although there may be *conventional metaphorical concepts*, and literally interpreted utterances motivated by them, the term *literal metaphor* is, for them (Romero & Soria, 2005a), a contradiction in terms. I will use *conventional metaphorical utterances* when I need to refer to such literally interpreted utterances, with the understanding that these are not metaphorical on the level of language use. In this thesis, novel metaphorical utterances, active metaphorical utterances, and *non-conventional metaphorical utterances* are the same linguistic phenomenon and the only type of metaphorical utterance which is interpreted metaphorically.

An original contribution of this thesis lies in its application of a pragmatic theory of metaphor to political discourse. While many authors have tried to take pragmatic concerns into account when dealing with metaphor in political discourse, they have often been working with a purely cognitive theory of conventional metaphor on top of which pragmatic analysis is attempted. This thesis is unique in its application of a fully pragmatic theory of metaphorical utterances to political discourse.

In this introductory chapter, I give an overview of some important preliminary concepts and theories, including polarising discourse (1.2), pragmatics (1.3), and relevance theory (1.4). I also give an overview of my theoretical approach to metaphor in political discourse (1.5), my general and specific research objectives (1.6), an overview of the corpus methodology (1.7), and an overview of each chapter (1.8).

1.2. Polarising Discourse

Political polarisation is a phenomenon which can be examined from many different angles. DiMaggio et al. (1996, p. 693) define it as both a state, "the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed in relation to some theoretical maximum", and as a process, "the increase of such opposition over time". Some political scientists have distinguished between the polarisation of elites and the polarisation of the masses (Layman et al., 2006). However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is more useful to consider the differences between ideological political polarisation, "the extent to which different political parties offer different ideologically distant policy platforms" (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 8) and affective political polarisation, "the extent to which supporters of different political parties dislike the other political party (and possibly its supporters)" (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 8).

Populism, as understood in this thesis, is a discursive frame which communicates a Manichean struggle between a homogenised, pure people and a corrupt elite (Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Hawkins & Silva, 2019). A populist speaker, of any ideological persuasion, can position ingroup and outgroup entities according to these polarised opposites, and therefore contribute to a discourse of affective political polarisation, i.e., it increases animosity between supporters of political parties / ideological positions. In that sense, populist discourse is polarising.

However, if we take populism to be a discursive frame, then it is not, in itself, a form of ideological political polarisation. Populist frames can be communicated by figures as diverse as Donald Trump on the radical right of American politics, and Pablo Iglesias on the far left of Spanish politics. In this sense, populism is open to almost any ideological position. Populism has the frame but not the content, the shape but not the colour, the body but not the animating spirit of polarising discourse.

The argument of this thesis is that novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances are used by populist speakers to flesh out the populist frame, to

give it its ideological teeth and claws. In this thesis, ideology is analysed as the inevitable and irreconcilable contestation of political concepts:

> We can only access the political world through decontesting the contested conceptual arrangements that enable us to make sense of that world, and we do so—deliberately or unconsciously—by imposing specific meanings onto the indeterminate range of meanings that our conceptual clusters can hold. (Freeden, 2006, p. 19)

By adopting a pragmatic interaction theory of metaphor (henceforth, pragmatic IT) (Romero & Soria, 1997-8, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming), I can explain how metaphorical utterances are used to communicate provisional meanings via the construction of ad hoc metaphorical concepts. Thus, active metaphorical utterances can be used by populists to communicate conceptions of political concepts, that is, to communicate their ideological positions and contribute to both affective political polarisation and ideological political polarisation.

1.3. Pragmatics

While there are many theoretical positions that I will take up and defend in detail in this thesis, there are certain theoretical points of departure which I would like to establish here, points which might be contested in some debates, but are widely accepted in pragmatics.

The answer to the question "what is pragmatics?" is a deceptively simple one. Some will go back to the Morris' distinction (1938, p. 6) in which syntax is viewed as the relation of signs to each other, semantics as the relation of sign to the signified, and pragmatics as the relations of signs to their users. In other words, pragmatics looks at language in use, or language in context.

This is useful to an extent. Yet such clear distinctions, especially between semantics and pragmatics, do not hold under scrutiny. This kind of semiotic model of communication assumes that language essentially works as a code. This model, which has seen many different variations since Aristotle, is most influentially articulated in Shannon and Weaver (1949) and summarised by Sperber and Wilson (1986/95, p. 4):

> Communication is achieved by encoding a message, which cannot travel, into a signal, which can, and by decoding this signal at the receiving end. Noise along the channel can destroy or distort the signal. Otherwise, as long as the devices are in order and the codes are identical at both ends, successful communication is guaranteed. (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 4):

Essentially, the speaker has a thought which she encodes into language and sends to a hearer, and the hearer decodes the language and retrieves the thought. This code model of linguistic communication, though not without its uses, is misleading in many ways, especially in its underestimation of the pragmatic dimension of human communication.

The birth of modern pragmatics really starts with the work of Paul Grice. His contribution to the theory of meaning is nicely summarised by Kent Bach who points out that, according to Grice, "communication is a kind of game of coordination" in which

> the speaker intends the hearer to figure out what he means partly on the basis that he is intended to do so, and the hearer, in figuring out what a speaker means, presumes that the speaker intends him to do so. (Bach, 2010, p. 137)

Grice made several observations which have seeded pragmatics as we know it today. The first involves the nature of meaning in human communication, which he called *non-natural meaning*, or *meaning$_{NN}$* (Grice, 1957/89). Grice realised that while language might involve some level of coding and decoding, human communication, whether by language or other means, requires that the intention of the speaker be inferred by the hearer. To be more precise, communication is successful when the speaker's intention is fulfilled by means of the hearer recognising that intention:

> "A meant$_{NN}$ something by *x*" is (roughly) equivalent to "A intended the utterance of *x* to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention". (Grice, 1957/89, p. 385)

This insight into human communication is the starting point of contemporary pragmatics, and although this exact formulation has been modified by different theories, it is an insight which is generally accepted. As Sperber and Wilson note: "Grice's greatest originality was

not to suggest that human communication involves the recognition of intentions. It was to suggest that this characterisation is sufficient" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 27).

The most important notion to be drawn from this view of communication, and more particularly of verbal communication, is the notion of *speaker's meaning*. Although there are differences among pragmatists about how exactly the pragmatic principles can be formulated, they all have come to agree that the linguistic meaning of a sentence falls short of the meaning intentionally communicated by the speaker. The linguistic meaning of a sentence underdetermines the speaker's meaning, that is, there is a gap between the meaning encoded by an expression and the meaning communicated by the speaker's use of that expression on a particular occasion.

Grice's notion of speaker's meaning involves a central distinction that is widely accepted today: *what is said* vs *implicature*. What is said is defined as the proposition meant that is "closely related to the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered" (1967/89, p. 25). An implicature is a proposition meant that is implicitly communicated. None of these types of propositions are obtained simply by decoding. Inference is needed to get the meaning intended, both in the case of what is said and in the case of implicatures. The meaning encoded by a sentence does not fully determine the truth-conditional content communicated by the speaker at the explicit level. Reference assignment, disambiguation, completion, and pragmatic adjustments of lexical meanings are among the different types of pragmatic processes that have been acknowledged as part of the process of deriving the proposition intentionally communicated at the explicit level. For example, to get the proposition intended in an utterance of (1)

(1)   he is ready

reference assignment and completion are needed to get a full proposition communicated at the explicit level (e.g., BILL IS READY TO GO TO SCHOOL).[1] But the proposition intentionally communicated at the explicit level, what is said, does not always exhaust speaker's meaning. The speaker of (1) may, in a certain context (e.g., Bill's mother talking to her

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[1] This sentence does not by virtue of its encoded meaning express a proposition since the linguistic meaning of the pronoun "he", an overtly context-sensitive expression, needs the context to determine its propositional contribution. In addition, we cannot fix what state of affairs should obtain for this sentence to be true unless we recover important information about what Bill is ready for. An incomplete proposition is not a proposition (see Romero & Soria, 2019, for a detailed explanation).

husband), be used to convey an implicature[2] (e.g., You should leave and get Bill to school now). To give a famous example by Grice:

> A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: "dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc." (Grice, 1967/89, p. 33)

Clearly, the professor does not mean to inform the addressee of Mr X's English fluency and attendance at lectures alone, though this is what is said. Rather, he means to comment indirectly on the student's inadequacy for the job.

In order to restrict the many possible implicatures which might be inferred from what is said, Grice claimed that humans follow certain expectations when attempting to communicate, *the cooperative principle*, which guides, and restricts, interpretation:

> The cooperative principle
>
> Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice, 1967/89, p. 26)

This cooperative principle is complemented by four categories of maxims: quantity, quality, relation and manner (Grice, 1967/89, p. 26).

Grice surmised that implicatures are communicated when there is an apparent non-observance of the cooperative principle by blatantly flouting or exploiting a maxim. A blatant non-observance of a maxim is an indication for the hearer to infer some other proposition(s) on the assumption that the speaker is rational and has no reason to opt out of the cooperative principle. In the case of the professor's letter, Grice claims that the professor is blatantly flouting the first maxim of quantity ("Make your contribution as informative as is required") (Grice, 1967/89, p. 26). Assuming that the professor knows about the student's work but is blatantly refusing to write it down, the addressee infers that the professor intends to communicate a conversational implicature in order to maintain the cooperative principle, an implicature that the addressee is capable of calculating i.e., that the student is not a good philosopher. Grice formulated this as follows:

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[2] Here I use "implicatures" having the more specific concept of *conversational implicatures* in mind.

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, PROVIDED THAT (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the cooperative principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that , q is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE TERMS) consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice, 1967/89, pp. 30-31)

This is only the briefest and simplest of overviews of Grice's work, but serves to introduce key terms which are relevant to any discussion involving pragmatics: what is said (the proposition meant which is closely related to the conventional meanings of the words uttered), implicature (the intended proposition[s] implicitly communicated) and speaker's meaning (all the propositions intentionally communicated by the speaker). Both what is said and what is implicated are part of speaker's meaning. This, however, poses an internal problem in Grice's account of non-literal utterances because when the conventional meanings of the words do not coincide with the meanings intended at the explicit level, the starting point for the derivation of implicatures cannot be a literal what is said since it is not meant. Thus, in these cases, he has to change "saying" to "making as if to say" and this entails an important internal problem in his theory of meaning and more particularly of non-literal meaning. Indeed, most pragmatists today have criticised the view of metaphor as implicature and defend that non-literal meanings are communicated directly (Bach, 2010) or that non-literal meanings are part of the proposition explicitly expressed (e.g., Carston, 2010a; Romero & Soria, 2007) rather than being considered as cases of implicature. This is the position I am going to follow here. I follow Romero and Soria (2007) in their defence of *what is metaphorically said*.

1.4. Relevance Theory

1.4.1. Main Tenets

Although Gricean pragmatics has developed in several directions (Levinson, 2000; Horn, 1984), I will focus on how his ideas have been developed within relevance theory

(henceforth, RT) (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; Wilson & Sperber, 2012b; Carston, 2002, 2010a). However, while I find RT to be the most convincing theory of communication available, and I agree with their current position that in some non-literal uses of language pragmatic adjustments take place at the explicit level (Carston, 2002), I would like to emphasise from the beginning that I do not agree with all of RT's explanations, particularly their characterisation of the type of pragmatic process involved in the interpretation of metaphor.

Although Grice established the importance of inference in human communication, his theories tend to hit a number of issues which have been treated more adequately in some of the more recent developments in the study of inferential communication, and I am going to follow RT in some of these. Firstly, there is the problem of *common knowledge* (Lewis, 1969) or *mutual knowledge* (Schiffer, 1972): for Gricean speaker's meaning to be reached, speaker and hearer would need to share knowledge of certain background facts, and second order facts about their sharing of those facts, and third order facts about the sharing of the second order facts and so on, *ad infinitum*. This kind of infinite regress makes Grice's model psychologically implausible according to Sperber & Wilson (1986/95, p. 18) who formulate a more psychologically realistic notion, the notion of *mutual cognitive environment* (1986/95, p. 41). Secondly, a matter particularly important for theories of metaphor, Grice's conception of metaphor as implicature seems to have drastically underestimated the role of context and inference on the proposition explicitly expressed (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 183). Although relevance theorists originally claimed that metaphor interpretation involved only implicature derivation, in current RT they claim that metaphorical meaning also affects the proposition explicitly expressed (what they call *explicatures*). In this vein, I will also defend, following Romero and Soria, that in cases of active metaphor, what the speaker says is metaphorically said. Thirdly, I find that the relevance theoretic notion of metarepresentation is essential to account for irony and denial, aspects of language use which have proven important to this thesis. I will now try to briefly explain the main tenets of RT with the intention of showing how they develop Grice's ideas into a cognitive-pragmatic theory of communication.

In order to solve the problem of infinite regress involved with common knowledge, Sperber and Wilson use the concept of *manifestness*.

> An assumption is manifest to an individual at a given time iff he is capable at that time of mentally representing it and accepting its representation as true or probably true (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 241)

This solves the common knowledge problem because, unlike knowledge or belief, manifestness does not require an assumption to be explicitly represented. In the literature, an analogy is often drawn between manifestness and field of vision (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 51). When you look out of a window, looking out at the people on the street below, you might not notice the gathering rain clouds on the horizon though they are visible in your environment. If a colleague at your side were to point to the clouds, they would become more manifest to you. Similarly, there are assumptions which are manifest to you but which you might not explicitly represent unless prompted to do so. (2) is an assumption which is manifest to you, but which you are unlikely to have previously represented:

(2)   Noam Chomsky never had breakfast with Julius Caesar (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 40)

An infinite regress of represented belief or knowledge is psychologically implausible, but this is not so for an infinite regress of manifest assumptions because manifestness does not require assumptions to be explicitly represented. Since "manifest" is weaker than "known", "a notion of mutual manifestness can be developed which does not suffer from the same psychological implausibility as 'mutual knowledge' or 'mutual assumptions'" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 41-42). The set of manifest assumptions of an individual is called the *cognitive environment* of that individual and when these set of assumptions are mutually manifest and it is manifest to individuals that they share it with each other, the cognitive environment is called *mutual cognitive environment*.

Using their idea of manifestness, RT also gives us two types of intention which are necessary for communication to succeed:

> The informative intention
> An intention to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I. (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 58)

> The communicative intention
>
> An intention to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the communicator has this informative intention.
>
> (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 61)

Both intentions are necessary in order for human communication to take place. Without the informative intention, there are no assumptions to communicate. Without the communicative intention, we cannot explain how the assumptions are inferred by the hearer. While there are undoubtedly other human behaviours which involve the transfer of information, these are not communicative as we understand it here. As Grice stated, meaning in verbal communication depends on the recognition of speaker's intentions (see Gricean definition of *meaning*NN above). RT also defend that human communication is intentional and define it as ostensive-inferential:

> The communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends by means of this stimulus to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I.
>
> (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 63)

As relevance theorists say, verbal communication is ostensive, i.e., the intention to make these assumptions manifest is overt, *mutually manifest* to speaker and hearer. Utterances are ostensive stimuli and thus, covert forms of communication, where a hearer does not know he is being communicated with, is a contradiction in terms. It is not communication but some other form of information transfer.

The second issue with Grice's work was his potential underestimation of the role of inference in communication at the level of the basic proposition expressed. The extent to which meaning is inferred from wide context at this level is an issue which is still up for debate and is frequently a contentious point between pragmatics and semantics. Here, I am only outlining the contextualist viewpoint of RT; I am well-aware that minimalists such as Borg (2004, 2012) would disagree.

Grice described, somewhat vaguely, a theoretical notion of what is said as the literal proposition explicitly conveyed by the speaker in uttering a sentence. What someone has said is "closely related to the conventional meanings of the words (the sentence) he has uttered" (Grice, 1967/89, p. 25). It had long been noted that even propositions at the explicit

level could be context sensitive, at least when it came to reference assignment (for example, to determine the semantic value of "I") and disambiguation, but it has been argued (Borg, 2012) that the contextual influence to get the proposition explicitly expressed is limited to rules that automatically pair properties of the context with semantic properties of the expression, without resorting to the speaker's intention. Such limited context sensitivity can be explained in terms of code-like rules, (for example, the semantic value of "I" can be obtained automatically in context) and thus the determination of the proposition explicitly expressed is not dependent on a wide context (Borg, 2012). In RT, however, it has been argued that propositions are far more context sensitive (Carston, 2002; 2010a). A good example of this is with concept loosening such as:

(3)   Holland is flat (Sperber & Wilson, 2012b, p. 19)

Holland is not literally flat; there are small hills, bumps etc. Here, the logical properties of FLAT must be loosened in an ad hoc way according to the context, resulting in the ad hoc concept FLAT* which can be applied to landscapes. Yet we would not say that the flatness of Holland communicated here is implicated; it is part of the explicit propositional content of the utterance, or what is said. In order to highlight the contextual influence on the proposition explicitly expressed, RT coined the term *explicature.* In RT, an explicature is the encoded content of an utterance, developed via pragmatic processes such as enrichment, reference assignment, and disambiguation (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 182). In later RT, especially through the work of Carston (2002; 2010a), it was recognised that even free pragmatic processes, such as ad hoc concept construction, can affect explicatures. An explicature is based on the pragmatic development of encoded meaning.

The third important difference between Grice's cooperative principle and the principle of relevance is that the former is a kind of game of coordination involving strategic interaction, while the latter is an ordinary cognitive process[3]. Whereas Grice's cooperative principle was born out of a logical necessity, RT develops it into a concept of *relevance* which is rooted in evolutionary psychology. It is a property of stimuli which serve as inputs to cognitive processes and is often described as a kind of cognitive cost-benefit analysis; the human brain has evolved to measure the potential positive cognitive

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[3] For a more detailed explanation of the differences see Bach, 2010, p. 130.

effects of stimuli against the cognitive effort required to process them. This idea is formulated in two principles of relevance:

Cognitive principle of relevance

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 260)

Communicative principle of relevance

Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 260)

It is important to clarify the use of "overt communication" here. This does not mean that there is an alternative covert type of communication that speakers might adopt; "communication should be distinguished from covert forms of information transmission" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 30). The act of uttering is itself an overt act that, by its very nature, conveys a presumption of optimal relevance. Without a presumption of relevance there would be no need for a hearer to process the stimuli and nothing to guide the process of interpretation.

This process of interpretation is described as follows:

Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic

(a) Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance (and in particular in resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, in going beyond linguistic meaning, in supplying contextual assumptions, computing implicatures, etc.).

(b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

(Sperber & Wilson, 2012b, p. 7)

Part (a) involves three comprehension sub-tasks:

(a) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicatures by developing the linguistically encoded logical form.

(b) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions

(implicated premises).

(c) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (implicated conclusions).

(Sperber & Wilson, 2012b, p. 7)

These are not meant to be taken as sequential steps, nor consciously reasoned. RT assume that the processes involved in the comprehension heuristic are subconscious, online processes, which mutually adjust one another until the expectation of optimal relevance is satisfied.

1.4.2. Metarepresentation

One aspect of RT which I need to discuss further for this thesis is their conception of metarepresentation. One advantage to using RT as a model of communication is that they attempt to place Gricean pragmatics within a wider psychological literature. For example, there has been a wealth of psychological studies done on *theory of mind* or *mindreading* concerned with our ability to form thoughts about attributed thoughts (that is, the thoughts of others).

RT defines *metarepresentation* as "a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded in it" (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 230). The higher-order representation is usually an utterance or thought, and three forms of lower-order representation have been investigated: public representations (utterances), mental representations (thoughts), and abstract representations (sentences/propositions) (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 232). Early RT followed Fodor (1983) in supposing that there is one general mindreading ability which is applied in communication among other cognitive activities. However, later RT endorses a distinct module of the mind for communication, a distinctly communicative mechanism of metarepresentation (Sperber & Wilson, 2002/12, p. 262). In any case, the Gricean logical calculation of speaker's meaning can be understood in light of this psychological ability as "starting from a metarepresentation of an attributed utterance and ending with a metarepresentation of an attributed thought" (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 231).

One way in which metarepresentation can further our understanding of ostensive-inferential communication is by illuminating the different ways that individuals interpret utterances. While every utterance carries a presumption of optimal relevance, the way that

relevance is adjusted during the comprehension process might depend on certain strategies the hearer can have, depending on their disposition towards the speaker and her[4] utterance:

> Naive optimism: A naïve optimist assumes that the speaker is competent enough to avoid misunderstanding and benevolent enough not to lead him astray. The only metarepresentation required is to attribute speaker's meaning to the speaker once an interpretation satisfies relevance. (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 239)

> Cautious optimism: A cautious optimist assumes that the speaker is benevolent but doubts their competence. There is possibly another level of metarepresentation here because the hearer can ask himself "on what interpretation the speaker might have thought her utterance would be relevant enough". (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 239)

> Sophisticated understanding: This strategy can be used when the hearer questions the speaker's benevolence. He can ask himself "under what interpretation she might have thought he would think her utterance was relevant". (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 240)

Notice that in all cases, the goal of the hearer is to calculate the speaker's meaning via their communicated intention. Even if the speaker has some sort of covert intention, such as to lie or to manipulate, and even if the hearer knows or believes this fact, the communicated content of the utterance, speaker's meaning, is the same. The difference lies in how the hearer calculates speaker's meaning given background assumptions about the utterance which should render the utterance irrelevant and not worth the processing effort, i.e., an utterance which communicates information the hearer already knows, or information which he suspects to be false (and therefore, not really information). This is important to keep in mind in polarising discourse, in which ingroup and outgroup audiences will hold different dispositions towards the speaker.

So far, I have discussed levels of metarepresentation involved in inferring speaker's meaning. But metarepresentation can also form part of speaker's meaning, i.e., the set of assumptions (I) which are the content of the utterance as described in RT's informative intention.

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[4] Here, I am following a convention in the pragmatic literature where the speaker is referred to using female pronouns and the hearer with male pronouns.

RT uses metarepresentation as part of speaker's meaning to convincingly explain different phenomena in language use. I will focus on two of these phenomena here due to their pertinence to this thesis, irony and denial.

Grice explained irony as a departure from literal meaning, a flouting of the first maxim of quality, i.e., "Do not say what you believe to be false" (Grice, 1967/89, p. 34). Grice's emphasis on the primacy of a literal encoded what is said must be questioned in light of the contextual effects which seem to affect propositional meaning (Carston, 2002, 2010a). RT explains irony as "echoic". Echoic utterances achieve relevance by conveying the speaker's attitude to content (such as an utterance or thought) which has been attributed to another: The speaker's attitude might be that she "agrees or disagrees with the original, is puzzled, angry, amused, intrigued, sceptical etc., or any combination of these" (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 249). In the case of irony, the attitude is one of "tacit dissociation" (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 250).

RT claims that denial is also echoic, that it involves the rejection of attributed thoughts, utterances, and abstractions (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 251). The speaker does not tacitly dissociate themselves from the attributed content but rejects it, a rejection usually conveyed by negative sentences. This is useful to explain aspects of metaphor such as "no man is an island" in which a metaphorical thought seems to be attributed and explicitly rejected. However, I am wary of Wilson's distinction between denial as a speech act, and negation as "properly semantic" (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 251). Horn points out that "not every negation is a speaker denial, nor is every speaker denial a linguistic negation" (Horn, 1989, p. 203). Laura Hidalgo-Downing discusses the pragmatic and cognitive functions of negation in discourse, which include the rechannelling of information in discourse and the blocking of information in discourse (Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, p. 149). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis it is enough to accept the assumption that the prototypical function of negation as denial, to view negation as "a natural foregrounding device typically used in discourse to deny a previous proposition that is explicitly mentioned or implicit in previous discourse"(Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, p. 197), with the important addendum that negation can not only modify previous information but also introduce new information in order to deny it (Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, p. 198). In other words, we should keep in mind that "negation is not just a static semantic notion" (Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, p. 198).

One final point in respect to RT's approach to metarepresentation is the relationship between the original utterance or thought and the metarepresented utterance or thought. They argue that all types of metarepresentation are "representation by resemblance" rather

than by strict identity: "In many cases, indirect quotation involves paraphrase, elaboration, or exaggeration rather than strict identity of content" (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 243). They suggest that resemblances may be of any type, "perceptual, linguistic, logical, mathematical, conceptual, sociolinguistic, stylistic, typographical" (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 244) but mainly they distinguish between two categories of resemblance: metalinguistic and interpretive. The former increases the salience of formal or linguistic resemblances, the latter increases the semantic or logical resemblances (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 244). More specifically, to say that a representation has an interpretive resemblance to another is to say that "two representations resemble each other (in a context) to the extent that they share logical and contextual implications" (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 244). While echoic utterances can be metalinguistic or interpretive, RT claims that, in general, echoic verbal irony is based on interpretive resemblance (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 250).

In this thesis, RT is adopted as the model of communication. To my mind, it is a powerful tool which has enormous explanatory power for a wide variety of phenomena in communication, including the attribution of thoughts and their rejection. However, I do not agree with their deflationary account of metaphor (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 97). In this thesis, I adopt an interaction theory of metaphor which argues that metaphorical utterances can be best explained by an online process of mapping between domains. RT seems to disagree with this, explicitly denying the possibility of a specialised mechanism of metaphor interpretation (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12). While this issue is an important one, and one I will address, I do not think it is necessary to exhaustively defend the integration of interaction theories of metaphor and RT in this thesis. Other interaction theorists have adopted RT and argued these points elsewhere (Forceville, 1996, 2020; Romero & Soria, 2014).

1.5. A Pragmatic Approach to Metaphorical Utterances in Political Discourse

This thesis adopts a pragmatic interaction theory of metaphor, Romero and Soria's theory of novel metaphorical utterances (Romero & Soria, 1997-8, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming) which, in this thesis, I call pragmatic interaction theory (henceforth, pragmatic IT). Interaction theories have developed from the work of Max Black (Black, 1954-5, 1977, 1979) which was concerned with active metaphorical expressions, i.e., expressions which we process metaphorically. Seeing metaphor as both a cognitive and linguistic phenomenon, Black claimed that such

active metaphors could be analysed as projections from one idea, or system of ideas, upon another. While Black's ideas have been developed in many directions, its most influential offspring is cognitive metaphor theory (CMT) (Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003; Lakoff & Turner, 1989), probably the most dominant approach to metaphor in studies of discourse today.

CMT is unlike other interaction theories in two important ways: firstly, CMT views metaphor as primarily a cognitive phenomenon and only derivatively a linguistic phenomenon. For that reason, the active metaphorical use of expressions that Black was concerned with are dismissed as uninteresting to them: "The generalizations governing poetic metaphorical expressions are not in language, but in thought" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 203). Rather, CMT is concerned with the *conventional conceptual metaphors* which they suggest are systematic in the human conceptual system. Any expression, be it literally or metaphorically interpretated, is only interesting in so far as it is the "surface manifestation of conceptual metaphor" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 224). For example, expressions that might be interpreted literally on the level of language use, such as "our relationship isn't going anywhere", "we're at a crossroads", and "we're spinning our wheels", are the surface linguistic expressions of a conventional conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff, 1993, p. 206). They are literal metaphorical expressions because they have become conventional enough to be processed literally at the level of language use, but they are metaphorical at the conceptual level. While CMT does acknowledge the existence of *novel metaphorical concepts*, which presumably cannot be interpreted literally (an utterance motivated by a novel metaphorical concept cannot be conventional), it has tended to focus on conventional metaphorical concepts and more-or-less ignores any utterance level phenomena which might be resultant of novel metaphorical concepts, concepts that contribute to the proposition expressed intended by the speaker.

Secondly, CMT views metaphorical concepts as primarily static mappings which are stored in long-term memory (Lakoff, 1993, p. 210). While it seems that mappings can be extended in contexts to create more imaginative or novel metaphorical expressions in their theory, there are few explanations of how this works in discourse because CMT does not have a theory of communication. On a linguistic level, CMT focuses on decontextualised metaphorical expressions, not metaphorical utterances, and so there is little pragmatic analysis of meaning in their theory. In short, CMT is a valuable framework for the analysis of the cognitive aspects of metaphor in long-term memory, but has little to

offer us on the cognitive aspects of metaphorical concept construction in working memory, or the contextual effects which might influence metaphorical meaning in discourse.

These limits to CMT have proven problematic when it has been applied to the study of ideologies or political discourse. CMT's dismissal of metaphor on an utterance level has meant that there are no clear identification criteria to distinguish literally interpreted metaphorical uses of language from the active metaphorically interpreted utterances which Black was concerned with, and no clear explanation of how metaphorical meaning is communicated as part of speaker's meaning. Researchers have been pushed to bridge this gap between metaphorical concept and metaphorical utterance themselves, through a variety of means. Charteris-Black (2004; 2005), for example, posits a pragmatic function of metaphor as implied evaluation, Musolff (2004; 2016) suggests a framework of *metaphor scenarios*, and Steen (2017) has moved to support an interaction theory (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) for the interpretation of some types of non-conventional metaphorical utterances. Some frameworks have had success in applying CMT to political discourse (Cameron, 2008; Charteris-Black, 2004, 2005, 2019; Musolff, 2004, 2016; Goatly, 2007). However, their pragmatic analysis is limited and distinct from the metaphorical mapping itself. The focus of their work remains the static, conventional conceptual metaphors which are said to be part of the cognitive system in long-term memory. In the case of Steen's deliberate metaphor theory (DMT) (Steen, 2017), he has embraced an interaction theory (Gentner 1983; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) for the interpretation for *deliberate metaphors*. However, Gentner's form of interaction theory also lacks an explanation of the pragmatic aspects of metaphor mapping. Nevertheless, the fact that proponents of DMT have started to focus on some kinds of active metaphorical utterances in political discourse is a welcome development (Heyvaert et al., 2020; Perrez & Reuchamps, 2014; Perrez et al., 2019; Reijnierse et al., 2018).

The main reason why studies of metaphor in political discourse mostly focus on conventional conceptual metaphors and the literal metaphorical utterances which are motivated by them, rather than novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances, is because the former are seen as potentially powerful ideological tools. CMT claims that the conventional metaphorical system is mostly drawn on unconsciously: "an extensive, and mostly unconscious, system of metaphor that we use automatically and unreflectively to understand complexities and abstractions" (Lakoff, 1992, p. 2). This is coupled with a socio-cognitive view of ideology (van Dijk, 1998) as something similar to Gramsci's *hegemony*; something ubiquitous but unconscious, propagated and ingested

unreflectively through discourse. The argument, most clearly made explicit in Goatly (2007), but tacitly assumed in much analysis of metaphor in political discourse, is that conventional metaphorical concepts and utterances are more ideological because they are activated unconsciously, whereas novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances require more conscious reflection and are therefore less ideological:

> When we meet original [novel] metaphor we have to do a great deal more mental work than when we process a conventional metaphor [. . .] it is precisely because they are conventionalised that they may achieve the power to subconsciously affect our thinking without our being aware of it. (Goatly, 2007, p. 22)

While I do think the study of conventional metaphors used by a speech community leads to interesting insights into ideology at sociological level, I do not think CMT is an adequate tool for the study of the communication of political ideology in discourse. Without a pragmatic theory of communication, such as Grice's or Sperber and Wilson's, there is no way to analyse how a particular speaker uses a given utterance (literally or metaphorically interpreted) to communicate ideological content. If attempts to integrate CMT and RT are to be successful (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008), CMT can no longer dismiss metaphor as only derivatively linguistic: a metaphorical explicature reached via metaphorical mapping would have to be dynamic, context sensitive, and explain the role of relevance in the calculation of the derived meanings intended by the speaker.

A dynamic, context-sensitive metaphorical mapping is described by Romero and Soria's pragmatic IT. Like Black's IT, it is focused on active metaphors, the utterances we interpret metaphorically. Just as RT takes Gricean logic and develops it into a plausible cognitive-pragmatic theory of communication, pragmatic IT takes Black's IT and develops it into a cognitive-pragmatic theory of metaphor identification and interpretation. Metaphor interpretation is described as the construction of ad hoc metaphorical concepts via a mapping function between domains. The mapping function, guided by relevance and coherence, results in a context-sensitive, metaphorical what is said (or a metaphorical explicature). This is an online, dynamic process in working memory to construct ad hoc concepts that form a part of the intended metaphorical proposition expressed, what is metaphorically said.

A main goal of this thesis is to show how pragmatic IT reveals the ideological potential of novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances. While novel

metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances have been dismissed under CMT as only minimally ideological, because they are more reflective or take more processing effort, pragmatic IT describes active metaphorical utterance interpretation as a sub-personal (i.e., unconscious) and sub-propositional process involved in the derivation of the provisional meanings of the words which are metaphorically used. On that argument alone, it resists the idea that novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances are less ideological. However, the argument for using pragmatic IT to analyse political discourse is stronger than that. By describing how a metaphorical what is said is constructed and achieves speaker's meaning, it allows us to examine how ideological content can be intentionally communicated by individual speakers and inferred by individual hearers. In short, metaphor is not only an unconscious reflection of hegemonic ideology but can be analysed as part of the intentional communication of political ideologies in discourse.

When dealing with abstract political concepts such as populism and ideology, there will be inevitable disagreement on how to conceptualise them. This is also true for academic terms such as "discourse" and "frame". Over the course of this thesis, when I have needed to take a decision on these issues, I have been guided by three criteria; (1) which conceptualization of the concept can best serve my research objectives; (2) what is the dominant approach or approaches taken by experts in that field; and (3) theoretical consistency. For example, while I started out assuming that populism was an ideology (Mudde, 2004), I came to adopt the position that populism is best approached as a discursive frame (Aslanidis, 2016). While this complicated my research considerably, it is the most suitable position for this thesis because (1) it allows me to analyse populism as a graded phenomenon of discourse rather than assuming a speaker is populist by virtue of their reputation, (2) the current academic consensus in political science seems to be converging in that direction (Aslanidis, 2016; Freeden, 2017), and (3) by separating populism from ideology on a theoretical level, it facilitates a comparison between left-wing and right-wing populist uses of metaphor. Similarly, rather than adopting a socio-cognitive model of ideology (van Dijk, 1998) which is common in discourse analysis, I adopt a more specific framework focused on political ideologies in particular, Freeden's morphological framework (Freeden, 1996, 1998, 2006, 2013, 2017). This is because (1) it suggests highly specific ways that political ideologies are communicated, i.e., via the contestation of certain political concepts, (2) it is arguably the dominant theory of ideology in political science, and (3) it facilitates a clearer distinction between the concepts of ideology and discourse,

avoiding the blurring between them which can be a problem with some research (van Dijk, 1998, p. 196).

1.6. Research Objectives

Now that the general outline of the context of research has been made clear, I can set out my research objectives. This research is a mixed-method study in which quantitative data is analysed in order to inform and enrich a stage of qualitative analysis. As such, in forming my research objectives, I have followed the recommendations on designing mixed-research objectives given in Tashakkori and Creswell (2007).

General objectives:

1. To apply a pragmatic theory of metaphor (pragmatic IT) to political discourse
2. To investigate the use of active metaphorical utterances by potential populists
3. To investigate the use of active metaphorical utterances to communicate ideology

These general objectives provoked more specific objectives:

1. To design and compile corpora which would facilitate the investigation of metaphorically used language by populists in the EU Parliament, 2014-2019, and during the presidential election campaign in the USA, 2016
2. To develop a corpus methodology which would provide qualitative data that could inform pragmatic qualitative analysis
3. To develop a theoretical framework which would facilitate the analysis of ideological content as part of speaker's meaning
4. To evaluate the discourse of potential populists against their non-populist peers, in order to verify to what extent they can be considered populist
5. To manually annotate a corpus using pragmatic IT's identification criteria for active metaphorical utterances
6. To quantitatively compare populist and non-populist uses of active metaphorical utterances in my corpora

7. To qualitatively compare populist and non-populist uses of active metaphorical utterances for ideological purposes

8. To discuss possible interpretations of the quantitative data in light of the qualitative findings, and thereby generate hypotheses for future research

As I have discussed, novel metaphorical concepts and non-conventional metaphorical utterances are often dismissed as uninteresting and only minimally ideological. My findings will demonstrate through qualitative analysis that such claims are without warrant.

1.7. Methodology

During the course of my research, I developed my own method of applying pragmatic IT to corpora. Relatively late in my research, I discovered the field of corpus pragmatics which gave me confidence in my methods. Here I briefly outline the stages of quantitative and qualitative analysis in this thesis and how it can be contextualised within the field of corpus-pragmatics.

In recent decades, corpus linguistics has come to influence almost every sphere of linguistic research. So much so, that David Crystal talks of a "corpus revolution" (Crystal, 1995/2018, p. 448). In the age of personal computers and the advent of the internet, any scholar can compile their own specialised corpus and move away from artificial or intuitive examples of language use (Romero-Trillo, 2013, p. 2).

Given that a main objective of this thesis is to apply a pragmatic theory of metaphor to political discourse, the compilation of corpora to analyse naturally occurring examples of metaphorical utterances was vital. However, pragmatic analysis and corpus linguistics can sometimes seem to be strange bedfellows; "two paths of scientific thought, parallel but often mutually exclusive and excluding" (Romero-Trillo, 2008, p. 2).

I have found reassurance in the fact that many of the decisions I have made have been justified in the corpus pragmatics literature. For example, a central issue in using corpora for pragmatic analysis is corpus size. Unlike other areas of linguistics which often strive for larger and larger datasets, corpus pragmatics is often better served by smaller corpora:

[...] given that pragmatic phenomena are extremely context-sensitive and occasionally completely resistant to automatic retrieval, we should accept that

larger corpora are simply not suitable for some of our purposes, despite the volume of potential data they contain. The middle ground lies in the design and exploitation of small corpora for pragmatic research. (Vaughan & Clancy, 2013, p. 70)

In the design of my corpora, I have striven for the representativeness of larger corpora while retaining access to the contextual elements which make pragmatic analysis possible. Rühlemann and Aijmer (2015) discuss two types of reading involved in corpus pragmatics, vertical and horizontal. Vertical reading is they type of reading more typically associated with corpus linguistics, particularly the KWIC (key word in context) format; "researchers go through the texts focusing on the node word and the minimal co-texts surrounding the node word" (Rühlemann & Aijmer, 2015, p. 7). Pragmatic analysis is usually characterised by horizontal reading, where "large and often whole texts are received and interpreted in the same temporal order in which they were produced and received" (Rühlemann & Aijmer, 2015, p. 3).

The key to designing corpora for pragmatic purposes lies in making careful decisions on how to balance these types of reading. In this thesis, I focus on two corpora: Plenary debates of the European Parliament, 2014-2019 (henceforth, the EUP corpus), and speeches from the US presidential election campaigns, 2016 (henceforth, the US corpus). Table 1.1 gives the data of these corpora.

Table 1.1 Corpora analysed in this thesis	
Corpus	**Word count**
EUP corpus	37,579, 903
US corpus	175,626

The EUP corpus might be better described as a text archive rather than a corpus per se[5]. Nevertheless, it is a large collection by any standards; full horizontal reading or manual coding of the corpus would be impractical for a single researcher. My approach at this level might be considered an iterative combination of horizontal and vertical reading. The first step was to carry out limited horizontal reading: key speeches of each parliamentary session were read as a form of background research (speeches by members of the EU Commission, visiting national heads-of-state, etc.). Then, speeches of the politician under analysis

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[5] I am thinking of the distinction made by Stefan Th. Gries between a text archive, a database of texts compiled for any reason, and a corpus, which is compiled for the purpose of linguistic analysis. However, he admits that these distinctions are often blurred (Gries, 2009, p. 7).

(henceforth, subject) were searched for, and then read horizontally for background research. These subject speeches were then extracted to a separate subject-specific sub-corpus. With the background research carried out from the horizontal reading of the key speeches and subject speeches completed, references to the subject by interlocutors were also searched for and analysed in their immediate context (vertical reading), and the relevant portions of their speeches were also tagged and extracted into the subject sub-corpora. The end result is a sub-corpus for every politician under analysis, extracted via vertical reading but informed by horizontal reading of the relevant contextual information from the higher-level corpus. Table 1.2 gives information on these EU sub-corpora:

Table 1.2. Sub-corpora extracted from the EUP corpus		
Name	**N. of speeches**	**N. of words**
Farage sub-corpus	63	35,497
Fox sub-corpus	41	10,773
Iglesias sub-corpus	20	5,455
García sub-corpus	20	5,761
Sub-corpora total	144	57,486

These were analysed using horizontal reading and manually tagged for two independent types of data: First, each speech in the sub-corpora was given a populism score using the holistic-grading method (Hawkins & Silva, 2019), and then they were manually tagged for active metaphorical utterances using Romero and Soria's identification criteria (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 12). This means that there are two sets of numerical data in this thesis: populism scores (qualitative data) and rates of active metaphorical utterance use (quantitative data). I would like to emphasise again that this numerical data is not meant to prove or disprove my hypothesis. Rates of populism and metaphor use cannot have an independent/dependent variable relationship because metaphor might be used for any number of political objectives. Rather, this data is meant to inform, guide and generate questions for the subsequent qualitative analysis of metaphorical utterances.

The tagged metaphorical utterances from each sub-corpus were extracted as their own dataset and analysed qualitatively, which can be considered a mix of vertical and horizontal reading at the level of utterances. The goal behind this methodology is to gather "a representative volume of data, sieved through pragmatics theories" (Romero-Trillo, 2013, p. 1).

1.8. Overview of this Thesis

The structure of this thesis can be broken down into three sections: Theoretical Framework, Corpus and Methodology, and Analysis.

In chapter 2, I briefly discuss the historical development of the term "ideology" in order to highlight some developments and distinctions which still affect how the term is used today (2.2.1). Then I discuss some of the broad trends in contemporary approaches, highlighting the trend away from Marxist approaches to ideology (2.2.2). I narrow my focus on one contemporary theory, Freeden's morphological approach to ideology (Freeden, 1996, 1998, 2006, 2013, 2017), describing some of its key concepts (2.2.3). I then turn to discourse, discussing some of the many ways it has been described in the literature (2.3.1), and outline the way I will use it in this thesis (2.3.2). In section 2.4, I look at various uses of frames across disciplines, starting with the work of Erving Goffman (2.4.1), the approach taken in discourse analysis (2.4.2), and sociology (2.4.3). Finally, in light of the theories discussed, I summarise the use of ideology, discourse and frames in this thesis (2.5).

In chapter 3, I discuss the central polarising phenomenon analysed in this thesis, populism. First, I examine some of the historical conceptions of populism (3.2.1), and the contemporary arguments for and against approaching populism as a strategy (3.2.2), as an ideology (3.2.3), as discourse (3.2.4), or approaches which combine these conceptions (3.2.5). I outline the ideational-discursive approach to populism taken in this thesis (3.2.6), and some of the methodological issues this implies (3.2.7). I then look at the ideologies which are most often associated with populist discourse, liberalism (3.3.1), conservatism (3.3.2), socialism (3.3.3) and nationalism (3.3.4).

In chapter 4, I discuss theories of metaphorical mapping (4.2), starting with a discussion of Max Black (4.2.1), followed by cognitive metaphor theory (CMT) (4.2.2) and then Romero and Soria's pragmatic interaction theory (4.2.3). I discuss categorisation theories (4.3), starting with the work of Glucksberg (4.3.1), then relevance theory (4.3.2) and discuss some problems for categorisation theories (4.3.3). I quickly summarise how different theories which agree on a metaphorical speaker's meaning differ in their views regarding at which level of speaker's meaning metaphorical meaning is communicated (4.4). Finally, I discuss sceptical accounts of metaphor (4.5), and some arguments against their position.

In chapter 5, I discuss early and early-modern approaches to metaphor in political discourse (5.2), followed by a discussion of the "cognitive turn" initiated by Lakoff and

Johnson (1980/2003) and some theoretical problems in its application to political discourse (5.3). I analyse how problems have surfaced in frameworks based on CMT and in their analysis of political discourse (5.4.1), specifically Goatly (2007) (5.4.2), Charteris-Black (2004, 2005, 2019), (5.4.3), Musolff (2004, 2016) (5.4.4), the discourse dynamics theory of metaphor (Cameron & Deignan, 2006; Cameron et al., 2009) (5.4.5), and deliberate metaphor theory (Steen, 2017) (5.4.6).

Chapter 6 marks the beginning of the Corpus and Methodology section. I discuss Biber and Conrad (2009)'s model for analysing aspects of genre and register (6.2) and apply it to the specific sub-genres of parliamentary speeches (6.3) and presidential campaign speeches (6.4) which are the object of study in this thesis, in order to describe their situational characteristics.

In chapter 7, I discuss some methods for identifying metaphor in corpora and why they are unsuitable for use in this thesis (7.2), and outline Romero and Soria's identification criteria which I use in this thesis. I then discuss my own corpora (7.3.1), the tools I used to overcome the problems they posed (7.3.2), how I graded for populist discourse (7.3.3), my method for analysing metaphor, qualitatively and quantitatively (7.3.4), and how I decided which statistical tests would be most applicable to the data (7.3.5). In this section, I also give a detailed analysis of a metaphorical utterance using pragmatic IT and the theoretical framework developed in this thesis.

In chapter 8, I apply my method to the sub-corpora extracted from the EUP corpus, the contributions by four MEPs in the plenary debates of the 8th European Parliament (2014-2019). First, I present the numerical data related to measuring rates of populism and active metaphor use (8.2.1) and discuss its implications for further qualitative analysis (8.2.2). Then I qualitatively analyse each subject sub-corpus using pragmatic IT; Nigel Farage (8.3.1), Pablo Iglesias (8.3.2), Asley Fox (8.3.3), and Iratxe Garcia (8.3.4). Finally, I make some concluding remarks on the main findings (8.4).

In chapter 9, I apply pragmatic IT to the corpus of US presidential elections, 2016. First, I present the numerical data for rates of populism and active metaphor use (9.2.1) and discuss its implications for further qualitative analysis (9.2.2). Next, I qualitatively analyse each subject corpus using pragmatic IT; Donald Trump (9.3.1), Bernie Sanders (9.3.2), and Hillary Clinton (9.3.3). Finally, I make some concluding remarks on the main findings (9.4).

In chapter 10, I reflect on how I have achieved my specific research objectives (10.2), my general objectives (10.3), and, in my concluding remarks (10.4), I highlight all of the quantitative and qualitative conclusions which only a pragmatic analysis of metaphor could uncover.

Section I: Theoretical Framework

Chapter 2
Ideology, Discourse, Frames

2.1. Introduction

The aim of chapters two and three is to clarify terms which, due to their political or theoretical natures, have fostered a number of diverse definitions and uses: *populism* is a term which is often used with a normative bias and defies simple definitions. The old cliché, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", might be aptly modified to "one man's populist is another man's democrat".

One of the main objectives of this thesis is to show that active metaphorical utterances (and novel metaphorical concepts) are often used for ideological purposes in political discourse. More specifically, I claim that in some politicians' use of language, the metaphorical contents intentionally communicated often become part of populist frames (frames presenting a Manichean struggle between a homogenised, virtuous people and a corrupt elite) and are used to communicate different ideologies. To defend this claim, the aim of this thesis is to develop a framework which allows us to identify and analyse active metaphorical utterances in corpora of political discourse and to explore how active metaphorical utterances contribute to populist frames. Before I can fully articulate this corpus pragmatic approach to the analysis of active metaphor in populism, there are some academic terms which I will need to clarify: "ideology", "discourse" and "frame" are terms which have a wide range of uses across various academic fields. Chapter two is concerned with defending particular uses of these terms in this thesis so that I may present my argument in more detail and outline the challenges which can be expected in establishing a framework for active metaphorical utterances in polarising discourse.

First, I briefly discuss the historical development of the term "ideology" in order to highlight some developments and distinctions which still affect how the term is used today (2.2.1). Then I discuss some of the broad trends in contemporary approaches, highlighting the trend away from Marxist approaches to ideology (2.2.2). I then narrow my focus on one contemporary theory, Freeden's morphological approach to ideology, describing some of its key concepts (2.2.3). I then turn to discourse, discussing some of the many ways it has been described in the literature (1.3.1), and outline the way I will use it in this thesis (2.3.2). In section 1.4, I look at various uses of frames across disciplines, starting with the seminal

work by Erving Goffman (1974/86), (2.4.1), the approach taken in discourse analysis (2.4.2), and in sociology (2.4.3). Finally, in light of the theories discussed, I summarise the use of ideology, discourse and frames in this thesis (2.5).

2.2. Ideology

2.2.1. A Historical Overview

"Ideology", as a term, is attributed to the French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), though his use of it is far removed from its present day uses. De Tracy's ideology was "a science of ideas", with the explicit aim of developing "a theory of the moral and political sciences" (De Tracy, *Memoire sur la faculte de penser*. Quoted and translated in Kennedy 1979, p. 355). Napoléon Bonaparte found de Tracy and his fellow ideologues politically threatening and his "association of 'ideology' with abstract metaphysics and utopian, political liberalism became a widespread pejorative usage after 1848" (Kennedy, 1979, p. 364).

According to Kennedy (1979), the Marxist conception of ideology was conceived largely in reaction to de Tracy's particular views on class and economics, particularly in reaction to de Tracy's ideological (ideological in the sense of his science of ideas) defence of private property and the division of labour (Kennedy, 1979, p. 368). For Marx, de Tracy's so-called science of ideology was "neither simply science of ideas nor liberal political theory, but a system of thought which seeks to justify the existing mode of production and the social relationships which spring from it" (Kennedy, 1979, p. 368). The Marxist conception of ideology was born: a false consciousness, a distorting lie promoted by capitalist elites.

A series of thinkers developed the Marxist conception in important ways, shaping contemporary usages. The sociologist Karl Mannheim saw ideology as "a feature of any social environment" (Freeden, 2003, p. 13) and was the first to recognise "the pluralist potential of ideologies" (Freeden, 2003, p. 13), rather than the distorting effect of capitalism that Marx and Engels condemned. Though he maintained the Marxist view of ideology as a calculated and deliberate falsehood, his concept of *Weltanschauung* [worldview] is both broader than his concept of ideology and drops the pejorative notion of domination: "A total conception of ideology indicated the broad origins of ideology in group and even mass attitudes and views" (Freeden, 2003, p. 14). Freeden summarises the impact of Mannheim

as follows: "The question was no longer merely what ideology *did,* but what kind of thinking ideology *was*" [emphasis in original] (Freeden, 2003, p. 17).

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937)'s major contribution to the concept of ideology was his concept of hegemony. Like Mannheim's *weltanscauung*, hegemony is broader than the Marxist idea of ideology but is intricately related to it. Instead of being a top-down imposition of distorted ideas for the purpose of domination, hegemony is the practice of creating consent through civil and cultural life. "Gramsci was therefore inclined to sharpen the distinction between ideology as a more conscious creation for its producers, and a more unconscious one for its consumers" (Freeden, 2003, p. 20).

Finally, Louis Althusser (1918-1990) "departed from Marx in acknowledging that ideology was a 'new reality' rather than the obscuring of reality" (Freeden, 2003, p. 25). Like Mannheim, Althusser recognised that ideologies have "fundamental features, irrespective of the historical forms specific ideologies adopt" (Freeden 2003, p. 27). Similar to Gramsci's hegemony, "ideology was plural only in its location in diverse social spheres [. . .] not in its functions" (Freeden, 2003, p. 26). For Althusser, ideology was still a distortion, but an inevitable one (Freeden, 2003, p. 27). Crucially, Althusser located ideology in public and private institutions, in the social actions people perform every day, and claims that, as thinking subjects, we are both generators of, and dominated by, ideology.

2.2.2. Contemporary Approaches

The pejorative senses of ideology are often present in our contemporary everyday conception of ideology: the idea that ideologies are distortions, that they deceive, that they are what the other falsely believes (van Dijk, 1998, p. 2). Yet, although they might reject some of these elements, scholars working in Marxist or post-Marxist traditions often, explicitly or implicitly, maintain a pejorative conception of ideology. These traditions come through Gramsci, Althusser, and Michel Foucault[6] and generally approach ideology as intimately connected to the abuse of power. In Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), for example, "the strong focus on processes of domination in which meaning plays a role [. . .] is the reason why ideology research is predominantly a critical enterprise, even if we do not follow Engels" (Verschueren, 2012, p. 10). Van Dijk, who moves away from Marxist

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[6] For an indication of Foucault's conception of ideology, see Deleuze (1977).

conceptions of ideology in favour of his socio-cognitive model (van Dijk, 1998), nevertheless maintains links to it via Foucauldian conceptions of power/knowledge and discourses. For example, he distinguishes ideologies which serve the function to legitimate domination (racism, classism, sexism, neoliberalism) from those that that serve a function of resistance against domination (anti-racism, feminism, socialism, pacifism, and environmentalism) (van Dijk, 2013, p. 175).

According to Maynard and Mildenberger (2016)'s survey of ideology across disciplines, Marxist and post-Marxist conceptions are becoming more unpopular across the social and political sciences in favour of "a non-pejorative usage, in which it more neutrally denotes some sort of systematised political thinking" (Maynard & Mildenberger 2016, p. 2).

Across disciplines and approaches, there are two aspects to the contemporary academic conception of ideology which are largely agreed upon: that an ideology refers to a system of ideas, and that this system is, in some way, coherent (Maynard & Mildenberger, 2016, p. 3).

2.2.3. Freeden's Morphological Approach

One of the more established conceptions of ideology in political science is that of Freeden's morphological approach (Freeden 1996, 1998, 2006, 2013, 2017). Inspired by Wittgenstein's family resemblance view of categorisation (Wittgenstein, 1953), prototype theory (Rosch et al., 1976), as well as linguistic research into semantic fields (Fillmore, 1976), Freeden proposes a morphological approach to ideology.

Before we discuss Freeden's approach in detail, we must briefly discuss an important topic in contemporary political theory, one which is central to Freeden's conception of ideology—*essentially contested concepts*. Walter Bryce Gallie (1912-1998) claimed that there are concepts which "relate to a number of organised or semi-organised human activities" where "there is no one clearly definable general use" (Gallie, 1955, p. 168). Different groups will have their own use of the concept, and "each party continues to defend its case with what it claims to be convincing arguments, evidence and other forms of justification" (Gallie, 1955, p. 68). Unlike cases of conceptual confusion, where multiple parties might be discussing different phenomena under a single linguistic sign, arguments which may be resolved through more refined analysis or more precise terminology,

essentially contested concepts are "mutually contesting, mutually contested" (Gallie, 1955, p. 169). The idea is succinctly summarised in Collier et al. (2006):

> The strong normative valence associated with some concepts, often combined with other considerations, motivates users to strongly prefer a particular meaning. They may energetically defend their own usage whereas others will contend that an alternative usage is correct—hence the idea of a contested concept. Examples of such concepts are democracy, justice, rule of law, citizenship, war, genocide, abortion, rape, and hate crime. (Collier et al., 2006, p. 212)

Gallie's theory of essentially contested concepts has been, itself, severely contested (Collier et al., 2006); his criteria have been criticised as too narrow and as promoting conceptual relativism. These debates are outside the scope of this thesis. However, Gallie's thoughts on essentially contested concepts are especially important in relation to Freeden's morphological approach to ideology.

For Freeden, ideologies are "combinations of political concepts" (2013, p. 116). Because they are political, these concepts are often essentially contested concepts. Ideologies are attempts to decontest these concepts. They advocate certain uses of political concepts and certain relationships between political concepts, and thereby "construct the political and navigate through it" (Freeden, 2013, p. 115):

> They display verbal and ideational practices of decontestation [. . .] through which specific meanings, selected from among the spectrum of inevitably contested and contestable conceptions that a concept can and does hold, are conferred on political discourse. (Freeden, 2013, p. 119)

Although Freeden's exact distinction between concept and conception is not precisely explained, he seems to view the concept as the broader category, contested because any or all of its features are contestable, and conceptions as the decontested interpretation selected from among the many possible conceptions of the concept. That is to say, a concept is contested in the sense that it is contestable, and a conception is contested in the sense that it is one decontested meaning among rival decontested meanings. This seems clear in passages such as:

In concrete terms, an ideology will link together a particular conception of human nature, a particular conception of social structure, of justice, of liberty, of authority, etc. '*This* is what liberty means, and *that* is what justice means', it asserts [emphasis in original]. (Freeden, 1996, p. 76)

This attempt at decontestation is unlikely to result in a stabilisation of the concept: the "drive to finality is ultimately unsustainable: it is constrained by the inevitable variability of essentially contested concepts, a variability which is, in turn, constrained by the drive to finality" (Freeden, 2013, p. 119). This dynamic precludes an approach to ideology as "totalizing, doctrinaire, and dogmatic" (Freeden, 2013, p. 126), but sees it as "mutating, or shifting, from rupture to rupture" (Freeden, 2013, p. 119).

Freeden analyses ideologies as having a structure with two axes: on the first axis, he makes a three-tier distinction between micro-conceptual components, concepts, and macro-conceptual concatenations. On the middle level of concepts, clusters of concepts form "the specific anatomy of an ideology" (Freeden, 2013, p. 126). Within these clusters lies the second axis of core, adjacent and periphery concepts, where ideologies can vary across time and space (Freeden, 2013, p. 126).

Core concepts are those which demonstrate "long-term durability" (Freeden, 2013, p. 126), and hold the ideology together: "Thus, liberalism always appears to contain the concept of liberty" (Freeden, 2013, p. 126). However, ideologies are not defined by single or even multiple core concepts. The relationship between core concepts, the weighting they are given, "accounts for a constant mutation within the ideational boundaries of a core that will—loosely or more tightly—anchor the ideology and secure its components" (Freeden, 2013, p. 127), and this structural relationship between core concepts is affected by adjacent and peripheral concepts.

Adjacent concepts are "second-ranking in the pervasiveness and breath of the meanings they impart to the ideology" (Freeden, 2013, p. 127). These are the temporary concepts which bring core concepts into "a more determinate and decontested semantic field" (Freeden, 2013, p. 127). Thus, in liberalism, well-being, democracy, and property have "pulled liberal ideology in different directions, generating versions" (Freeden, 2013, p. 128).

Peripheral concepts are peripheral in two senses. Firstly, they are concepts which are more marginal and ephemeral: "Empire or elitism have come and gone, or have been

much reduced, in liberal ideologies, while localism and ethnicity have joined the outer circle of liberal concepts" (Freeden, 2013, p. 128). The second sense of peripheral here relates to the "interface between the conceptual arrangement of an ideology and the social practices, events, and contingencies that occur in its environment" (Freeden, 2013, p. 128).

In summary, Freeden (2013) outlines seven important features of the morphological approach:

1. Ideology is an "ubiquitous and permanent form of political thinking" and is, in and of itself, an amoral phenomenon. (Freeden, 2013, p. 116)

2. Ideologies emerge at all levels of human societies. (Freeden, 2013, p. 116)

3. Ideologies are combinations of political concepts which can be identified through an analysis of political language. (Freeden, 2013, p. 116)

4. Besides some generalisations about what ideologies are and do, the morphological approach focuses on microstructures of different ideologies, the patterns and variations in combinations of political concepts. (Freeden, 2013, p. 116)

5. Ideologies are "discursive competitions over the control of public political language", control which facilitates political decision making. The morphological approach seeks to understand the aspects of ideological argumentation and presentation involved in this. (Freeden, 2013, p. 117)

6. The study of ideologies involves the analysis of political language, "textual, oral, and symbolic, and with visual forms of human expression". (Freeden, 2013, p. 117)

7. Ideologies are not distortions of something true or more real, but "actual modes of political thinking", that is to say that ideologies are the forms that political thinking takes. (Freeden, 2013, p. 117)

An interesting distinction within the Freedian model is that between *thin-centred ideologies* and *thick-centred ideologies*, a distinction which has become quite important within the debate on the genus of populism (Mudde, 2004). A thin-centred ideology is one "whose conceptual patterns and arrangements [are] insufficient to contain the comprehensive solutions for the full spectrum of socio-political problems that the grand ideological families have customarily sought to provide" (Freeden, 2017, p. 2). They are characterised by a restricted or "narrow core" and focus on single issues, or append

themselves to other ideologies "to thicken out" (Freeden, 2017, p. 2). Freeden's own examples include feminism, green ideology (Freeden, 1996, p. 488-548) and nationalism (Freeden, 1998), to which Cas Mudde argued populism should be added (Mudde, 2004). Freeden (2017), however, disagrees (see discussion in this thesis, section 3.2.3).

This discussion of ideology points a way forward, particularly in how we might separate ideologies and thin-centred ideologies from a term with which it is often associated, and even conflated—discourse.

2.3. Discourse

2.3.1. Discourse Analysis

In their introduction to the first edition of *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (Tannen et al., 2001/15), Schiffrin et al. (2001/15) acknowledge that there is no single definition of the term "discourse". However, they discern three broad uses:

> (1) anything beyond the sentence, (2) language use, and (3) a broader range of social practice that includes non-linguistic and non-specific instances of language use. (Schiffrin et al., 2001/15, p. 1).

Schiffrin et al. do not clearly define these categories but it seems that the first group are those linguistic approaches which use discourse to refer to units of spoken or written language larger than the sentence/utterance, what we might also call "texts", though as we shall see, there are important differences between text and discourse which must be examined. Broadly speaking, it seems that Schiffrin et al. are referring to theories such as systemic functional linguistics and other text grammar approaches, and also some approaches based on semantic and pragmatic linguistics, though Schiffrin et al. do not clarify this. The second category, language in use, could also comfortably apply to pragmatic linguistic approaches to discourse, which, perhaps, points to the vagueness of Schiffrin et al.'s distinction. It is clear, however, that they apply it to sociolinguistic approaches such as Fasold (1990), in which a functional, cognitive and social dimension is pursued. Finally, the third category seems to refer to post-structuralist uses, following the work of Foucault, which add the dimensions of history, knowledge and power as producers

and products of discourse. Discourse analysis such as Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), and van Dijk (2015) would be good examples of scholars who take this approach.[7]

Schiffrin et al.'s three distinctions are useful as very broad understandings of the different ways discourse is used by scholars as long as we understand that these uses often reveal a difference in emphasis or perspective rather than a difference in kind, and idiosyncratic variations are rife, not only between and within fields but within the work of particular authors. Van Dijk, for example, uses an "extended meaning", in which discourse is a "communicative event", "an everyday conversation with friends during dinner, a dialogue between doctor and patient, or writing/reading a news report in the newspaper" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 194). This sounds like Schiffrin et al.'s second category. But he also uses a "restricted meaning" of "a talk or text", "a spoken or written verbal product" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 194) which sounds like the first category. Nevertheless, through his work in critical discourse analysis (CDA) he seeks "Rather than merely describe discourse structures, [. . .] to explain them in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social structure" (van Dijk, 2015, p. 467). It is this last, most abstract use of discourse, that is often "collapsed with that of ideology" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 196) a practice which van Dijk warns against. We might think of Schiffrin et al.'s categories as Russian dolls, with the third category as the largest of the three. Each one can be examined in isolation or in relation to the other two.

However, these categories are not the only distinctions that can be made. Van Dijk delineates more abstract uses of discourse either as types of "conversation, story or news reports in general" or as "specific set of (abstract) discourses or genres [. . .] as in political discourse, medical discourse, and academic discourse" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 196) and the even more abstract concept of discourse as "all possible discourse genres and all domains of communication" of a "period, community, or culture" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 196).

Other ways of describing discourse can be found in Gee (2004), Chilton (2004) and Cameron (2001) which capture different aspects of the forgoing descriptions, depending on their theoretical backgrounds and research goals.

These differences between perspectives on discourse is not a minor detail, however. It tends to be the dividing line between academic subfields and is important to clarify the matter in order to place this thesis in its proper context.

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[7] Wodak and Meyer (2001/09) divide discourse along a similar tripartite description where the first category is related to text-grammar, the second to written and oral texts in context, the third to Foucauldian ideas of power/knowledge and discourses.

We might say that the viewpoint of discourse taken by most political science research and much linguistic research falls loosely under the first two of Schiffrin et al.'s categories. Most researchers working in discourse analysis (DA) and CDA incorporate the third category, though it must be said that there are many scholars who work across these fields and the boundaries are fuzzy. It is worth focusing on critical discourse analysis briefly, in order to distinguish my work from it. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) characterise CDA in the following way:

1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. Power relations are discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. The link between text and society is mediated.
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.
8. Discourse is a form of social action. (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997. Quoted in van Dijk, 2015, p. 467)

In a thesis which deals with the use of metaphor for ideological purposes through polarising discourse, my work is generally in line with some of these tenets, particularly number four. However, one way in which this thesis distinguishes discourse from ideology is by adopting Freeden's morphological view of ideology. This is quite different to the post-Marxist views of ideology adopted by most critical discourse analysts.

Secondly, there is an explicit and deliberate normative dimension, reflected in tenet one above and in van Dijk's analysis that "CDA is discourse study with an attitude" (van Dijk, 2015, p. 466). To a large extent, the normative dimension is also present in another subfield of DA, political discourse analysis (PDA), largely because of the overlap in scholars working on PDA and CDA. Van Dijk, for example, conflates the two: "critical-political discourse analysis deals especially with the reproduction of political power, power abuse, or domination through political discourse" (van Dijk, 1997, p. 11), an approach which has been taken up by others in the field (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 17). Furthermore, all of these authors claim that "PDA can have a lot to offer political science" (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 18). I do not disagree with this, but the normative

dimension of CDA/PDA may well be an obstacle to that end, particularly in the study of populism: "The normative implications of populism have plagued the literature and crippled its evolution into a respected theory" (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 94).

I accept that, as scholars, we should be aware of the biases, political positions and other aspects of our subjective perspectives which may affect our research. However, I do not share CDA's aim of addressing social problems. I gratefully draw on DA and CDA's rich resources, but I do so selectively, hoping that my work is compatible with work within those fields, even if I do not share all of their research aims or their conception of ideology. To quote Goffman,

> I can only suggest that he who would combat false consciousness and awaken people to their true interests has much to do, because the sleep is very deep. And I do not intend here to provide a lullaby but merely to sneak in and watch the way the people snore.
> (Goffman, 1974/86, p. 14).

2.3.2. A Pragmatic Approach to Discourse

So far, I have enriched the question, not just "what is discourse?" but also 'how should we approach discourse?" However, I have not reached a satisfactory answer. I have highlighted my differences to scholars who extend their uses of discourse to Schiffrin et al.'s third category, based mostly on their conception of ideology, while not denying an ideological dimension to discourse. This leaves my work on discourse somewhere in the first two categories. This is as far as these distinctions will take us.

To refine my uses further we will have to examine the differences between text and discourse. A comprehensive analysis of these differences is undertaken in Martínez-Cabeza (2010). He provides a list of the different definitions of text and discourse and says: "On the whole, these definitions display little consistency if not contradictions" (Martínez-Cabeza, 2010, p. 23).

He describes text and discourse as different perspectives on the same phenomenon, units of communication that are not merely above the sentence, or clause complex, but beyond it (Martínez-Cabeza, 2010, pp. 1-2). He argues that texts are units of meaning, not of form (Martínez-Cabeza, 2010, p. 33) and are realised through sentences, not constituted by them (Martínez-Cabeza, 2010, p. 1). How does discourse differ? Taking the extreme

end points of the scale; text is abstract, discourse is concrete; text is product, discourse is process; text is formal, discourse is functional; text is propositional, discourse is non-propositional; text is de-contextualised, and discourse is contextualised (Martínez-Cabeza, 2010, p. 23). These oppositions represent the extreme points of a cline and many positions can be taken between them. To arrive at the position taken in this thesis, we must resolve certain problems of incompatibility. If a text is de-contextualised, complete propositions are not obtained, and thus "propositional" and "de-contextualised" are not compatible attributes for a text. It cannot be taken to have both among its properties.

A possible way to distinguish them is to recognise that meaning at the textual level is based primarily on formal features and that it tends to be constant while meaning at the discourse level is context-dependent and becomes concrete by pragmatic adjustment. However, if this is so, we can only talk about the linguistic meaning of a text as a meaning that is gappy and non-propositional. The propositional meaning of a text is not simply the linguistic meaning of words (or combinations of words if that is really possible without context) and the propositions and the relations between them are only obtained through the context-dependent process of interpretation of the use of textual linguistic material. By means of pragmatic derivation, we obtain both the propositional content communicated by the speaker through her use of every sentence and the propositional relations between them. These context-dependent derivations may have lexical or compositional linguistic demands as well as contextual demands, as Romero and Soria (2019) claim, but, in any case, the linguistic meaning of a sentence is not fully propositional and the linguistic meaning of a text isn't either.

As a work of pragmatic linguistics, this thesis approaches the meaning of a text as the product of communication from a pragmatic, discursive perspective. It recognises the importance of textual formal features (e.g., cohesive ties such as indexicals) and how they rely on context to get the intended semantic value (e.g., anaphoric pronouns demand pragmatic resolution to achieve saturation and to be able to contribute to the intended referential propositional content). This thesis does not take propositional meaning as a purely textual attribute, outside the domain of a pragmatic linguistics, given the work by many pragmatists today (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; Carston, 2002; Romero & Soria, 2019). The coherent meaning intended by the speaker only results from the interpretation of the sentences the text is realised through, together with the inferences needed to establish the relations among propositions.

In this thesis, I use both restricted uses and more extended uses of "discourse". Thus, drawing on Martínez-Cabeza (2010), I will talk of "texts" meaning texts as the product of communication beyond the use of language at sentence level. From a discursive perspective, a text may appear in different modes and forms, whether linguistic (spoken and/or written), visual or multimodal and may take different conventional formats which may be described using layman's terms of "speech" or "tweet" or "conversation". Drawing on van Dijk (1998), I use discourse referring to discourse as a genre or genres and the patterns of communication involved in them: "Political discourse" would therefore describe the patterns, tradition, expectations and distinguishing features which can influence the production and reception of political discourse-as-text.

My discussion here is not meant to arrive at clear-cut definitions—it is an acknowledgment of the many, often ambiguous uses of "discourse", and an attempt to specify how I am thinking of discourse in this thesis, to clarify which conceptualisations of discourse I am drawing on when I use these terms and which I am not.

2.4. Frames

2.4.1. Goffman

Most of the different uses of "frames" and "framing" which are relevant to this thesis trace their conceptual lineage back to Goffman (1974/86). For Goffman, framing is the way that we answer the question "What is it that's going on here?" (Goffman, 1974/86, p. 8) when faced with a "strip" of social reality (Goffman, 1974/86, p. 10): "definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization, which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them" (Goffman, 1974/86, p. 10-11). They are "schemata of interpretation" that we use to "locate, perceive, identify, and label" experiences (Goffman, 1974/86, p. 21).

An important dimension of Goffmanian frames is the idea of *footing*, a somewhat vague concept, by which he seems to mean the alignments negotiated between participants in a social situation and their alignments to the social situation itself: "a change in footing implies a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance" (Goffman, 1981, p. 128).

Goffman's insights into framing have generated several different strands of frame analysis in different fields. Though it is somewhat outside of the scope of this thesis to compare them fully, I will discuss the most relevant strands of research and outline my use of the term in this thesis.

2.4.2. Frames in Discourse Analysis

Tannen and Wallet (1987) was an early and influential development of Goffman's insights into an empirical framework. First of all, it confirmed Goffman's intuition that linguistic analysis might be the most conducive method of testing his sociological idea of framing (Goffman, 1981, p. 157). Second of all, it separated the concept of anthropological/sociological *interactive frames* from cognitive *knowledge schemas* and proffered a description of how they interact: "a mismatch of knowledge schemas can trigger frame switches" (Tannen & Wallet, 1987, p. 205).

Tannen and Wallet's knowledge schemas are explicitly associated with Charles Fillmore's *semantic frames* (Fillmore, 1976), a theory which grew out of his work on syntactic frames, and so is quite different from the Goffmanian concept of interactional frames, even if both concepts can be said to refer to "structures of expectation" (Tannen, 1977).

A classic illustration of knowledge schemas / semantic frames is shown by comparing the following two sentences:

(4)   I spent two hours on land this afternoon
(5)   I spent two hours on the ground this afternoon (Fillmore, 1976, p. 27)

"The process of understanding the sentence with 'on land' requires having a frame for sea voyages [. . .] [t]o understand the sentence with 'on the ground' is to know about air travel" (Fillmore, 1976, p. 27). These are lexical and grammatical frames which are the result of "the contexts within which we have experienced the objects, properties, or feelings that provide the perceptual or experiential base of our knowledge of the meaning of a word" (Fillmore, 1976, p. 24). Though Fillmore does acknowledge the connection between interactional frames and "cognitive or conceptual frames" (Fillmore, 1976, p. 25), it is the latter, as constituted in language, that concerns frame semantics:

The concept of frame does not depend on language, but as applied to language processing the notion figures in the following way. Particular words or speech formulas, or particular grammatical choices, are associated in memory with particular frames, in such a way that exposure to the linguistic form in an appropriate context activates in the perceiver's mind the particular frame—activation of the frame, by turn, enhancing access to the other linguistic material that is associated with the same frame. (Fillmore, 1976, p. 25)

This is not the Goffmanian conception of frame, so the distinction made in Tannen and Wallet is an important one; the interactive concept of frame refers to "a sense of what activity is being engaged in, how speakers mean what they say" (Tannen & Wallet, 1987, p. 207). The concept of frame expressed by knowledge schemas refers to "participant's expectations about people, objects, events, and settings in the world, as distinguished from alignments being negotiated in a particular interaction" (Tannen & Wallet, p. 207).

Work within discourse analysis has revealed how intertextuality, (Hodges, 2015) and contextualisation cues (Gumperz, 1982) play a role in the interaction of knowledge schemas and interaction frames. Key terms in this tradition include *keying*, in which an "activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else" (Goffman, 1974/86, p. 44). Keying results in a *lamination*, or *layer*, (Goffman, 1974/86, p. 82) and different processes have been identified with this layering: *blending* (Gordon, 2008, 2009), *reframing* (Matsumoto, 2011a, 2011b; Tannen, 2006), *shifting* (Goodwin, 1996), and *embedding* (Gordon, 2002, 2009).

It would be negligent of me to overlook the work of cognitive linguist George Lakoff, which is also concerned with framing and metaphor, particularly in how it is used in political discourse (Lakoff, 2008b). Lakoff's approach to frames is, in some ways, quite particular. Although he claims to have developed his ideas via Fillmore's frame semantics, his use of the term is often suggestive of Goffmanian interaction frames. For example, "Words are defined relative to frames and conceptual metaphors" (Lakoff, 2008b, p. 15) suggests semantic frames, but elsewhere, Lakoff explicitly references Goffman, albeit with a cognitive twist:

The neural circuitry needed to create frame structures is relatively simple, and so frames tend to structure a huge amount of our thought. Each frame has roles (like a

cast of characters), relations between the roles, and scenarios carried out by those playing the roles. The sociologist Erving Goffman discovered that all institutions are structured by frames.

 (Lakoff, 2008b, p. 22)

The conflation of interactional frames and semantic frames (knowledge schemas) can, perhaps, be justified by Lakoff's cognitive focus; both might be situated in the same neural architecture. More concerning is the way in which Lakoff conflates frames and metaphors, without drawing clear distinctions between the two. When discussing George W. Bush's "war on terror", Lakoff describes it as both a metaphor (2008b, p. 130) and a frame (2008b, p. 131). We might assume that he considers conceptual metaphors to be a subtype of his conceptual frames. If that is the case, then he can no longer conflate interactional frames and semantic frames, since semantic frames are presumably part of the metaphorical mapping between source domain and target domain and interactional frames are presumably the product of the metaphorical process (as in the war metaphor/frame). Whatever the case, this ambiguity in Lakoff makes his conception of frames unsuitable for this thesis.

In an attempt to resolve some of the ambiguities in the "scattered conceptualization" of framing, Entman (1993) takes the concept of framing as describing "the power of a communicating text" (p. 51). Frame analysis "illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information" (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The essential elements of framing for Entman are the selection and salience of aspects of reality in order to define problems:

> To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described [emphasis in original].
> (Entman, 1993, p. 52)

This conception of frames is a Goffmanian frame, though it is more focused on the dynamics of power relationships: "it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text" (Entman, 1993, p. 55). Entman's politically focused conception of framing as a way to diagnosis social problems is closer to what is required

in this thesis. In order to explore this idea further, I will now turn to the dominant conception of frames in sociology.

2.4.3. Collective Action Frames

In the social sciences, Snow and Benford's work on frames (Benford, 1993; Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988, 1992) has been highly influential, particularly on research into social movements.

In social movement studies, actors within social movements are seen as "signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613) rather than "carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or ideologies" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613).

These signifying agents take part in the process of framing which is

active in the sense that something is being done, [. . .] processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process [. . .], entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists, [. . .] and is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them.
 (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614)

Much of this seems to chime with Freedian ideas of decontestation and variability in ideologies. How might they be related? Benford and Snow (2000) stress that whereas ideologies are normally taken as "fairly broad, coherent and relatively durable [. . .] collective action frames function as innovative amplifications and extensions of, or antidotes to, existing ideologies or components of them" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). Though Freeden's morphological approach does not conform fully with Benford and Snow (2000)'s description of ideology, Freeden does stress a stable, durable, core for thick-centred ideologies and so Benford and Snow's distinction between ideology and frame is applicable.

Collective action frames are used "to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). Benford and Snow (2000) draw on Tannen and Wallet (1987) to explain how

collective action frames interact with cognitive schemas: "frames and schemas are not different concepts for the same phenomena but are highly interactive" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Thus, collective action frames are compatible with frames in discourse analysis but differ from Lakoff's conflated conception of frames.

Benford and Snow (2000, p. 615) describe collective action frames using two sets of features: *core framing tasks* and *framing processes and dynamics*.

Core framing tasks are divided into the following sub-tasks:

1. Diagnostic framing: In this task "adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation [. . .] [and] make attributions regarding who or what is to blame." (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615)

2. Prognostic framing: This task seeks to "articulate an alternative set of arrangements." (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615)

3. Motivational framing: This task seeks to "urge others to act in concert to affect change." (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615)

It should be noted that these are not always independent tasks: "the identification of specific problems and causes tends to constrain the range of possible 'reasonable' solutions and strategies advocated" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616).

Within these core framing tasks, collective action frames can demonstrate wide variability: in pre-identification and locus of attribution, in flexibility/rigidity, in inclusivity/exclusivity, in scope and influence, and in resonance (Snow & Benford, 2000, pp. 618-620).

The second set of features, framing processes and dynamics, concerns the development, generation and elaboration of frames, as well as their diffusion across "movements, cultures, and time" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 622). These are "discursive, strategic, and contested" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623):

1. Discursive processes: The processes of "talk and conversations [. . .] written communications of movement members" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623). Discursive processes are divided into two sub-processes:

a) Frame articulation: This sub-process involves "the connection and articulation of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion [. . .] not so much the originality of its ideational elements [. . .] but the manner in which they are spliced together and articulated, such that a new angle of vision, vantage point, and/or interpretation is provided" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623).

b) Frame amplification: This sub-process involves "accenting and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as being more salient than others [. . .] punctuated issues, beliefs, and events may function much like synecdoches, bringing into sharp relief and symbolizing the larger frame or movement of which it is a part" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623).

Benford and Snow are keen to emphasise the importance of these processes: "the key to understanding the evolution of frames resides in the articulation and amplification processes rather than in the topics or issues comprising the frames" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624).

2. Strategic processes: These are "framing processes that are deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624)

Strategic processes are subdivided into the following sub-processes:

a) Frame bridging: This sub-process involves "the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624).

b) Frame amplification: This sub-process involves "the idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). Note that Benford and Snow also include "frame amplification" in discursive processes. They do not clarify this, but there doesn't seem to be an issue in taking it as two perspectives on the same process, i.e., discursive-frame-amplification and strategic-frame-amplification.

c) Frame extension: This sub-process "entails depicting an SMO's [social movement organisation's] interests and frame(s) as extending beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to potential adherents" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 625).

d) Frame transformation: This sub-process involves "changing old understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 625).

3. Contested processes: These are processes in response to certain challenges to the overall framing process, challenges which are intrinsic to "the politics of signification" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 625).

These take three forms;

a) Counterframing: This sub-process seeks to "rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 626).

b) Frame disputes/frame resonance disputes: This sub-process involves "intramovement disagreements regarding diagnoses and prognoses" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 626; Benford, 1993) and, in the case of resonance disputes, "how reality should be presented" (Benford, 1993, p. 691).

c) Dialectic between frames and events: This sub-process involves "dialectic tension between collective action frames and collective action events" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 627). Essentially, the reciprocal influence of discourse and events (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 627).

4. Diffusion processes:

Benford and Snow (2000) claim that diffusion processes are particularly relevant to the analysis of social movements when "only one party in the process—either the

transmitter or the adopter—takes an active role in the process, or when the conditions of similarity or compatibility between transmitters and potential adopters are not given but are problematic and in need of construction" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 627).

Diffusion processes are divided into two sub-processes:

a) Strategic selection: This sub-process involves "intentional cross-cultural borrowing [. . .] adapting the borrowed item to the new host context or culture" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 627).

b) Strategic fitting: This sub-process involves "intentional cross-cultural promotion [. . .] fitting the objects or practices of diffusion to the host culture" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 627). In other words, as I understand it, in (a) an "item" is borrowed and made fit the context of the frame to facilitate diffusion. In (b) a frame is made fit the context in which it is to be diffused.

While this thesis is not committed to adopting Benford and Snow's framework in its entirety, my concerns are linguistic rather than sociological, their analysis of collective action frames manages to make the insightful but rather vague intuitions of Goffmanian interaction frames more concrete, with a particular focus on how these frames operate in political life. The terminology and theoretical tools they provide might clarify some aspects of how active metaphors contribute to populist frames, and how these frames fit into the wider social movement.

2.5. Summary

I have discussed the early evolution of the term "ideology", from its use to denote a scientific system to examine ideas, through to the conception of Marx and Engels that ideology is a distortion of reality imposed by capitalism. I have discussed some important post-Marxist developments, and the tendency of contemporary scholars to move away from Marxist and post-Marxist conceptions to a non-normative view of ideologies as forms of political thinking without which human social and political life would be unimaginable. I have emphasised an important aspect of many political concepts, their essential

contestability, and have described one of the most widely accepted contemporary approaches to ideology, the morphological approach, which views ideologies as forms of political thinking, combinations of political concepts in various configurations, driven by a need to decontest the inherent variability of political concepts.

Of particular interest to this thesis is how Freeden's morphological approach rejects the normative conception of ideology in Marxist and post-Marxist accounts, while retaining the insights of Gramsci and Althusser into the ubiquity and socially constructed nature of ideologies. Furthermore, he shares Althusser's conception of ideology as an inevitable product of human social and political life.

Freeden's focus on discourse as the locus in which ideology can be analysed is obviously conducive to the aims of his thesis. Freeden's model straddles some of the same academic fields as my own, i.e., it can be brought into dialogue with the literature of discourse analysis, political science, and metaphor studies.

Regarding discourse, I have summarised some of the very broad ways that this term is used and have tried to refine some of these uses. In this thesis, I approach discourse from pragmatic linguistic perspective. It is the product of interpretation at the textual level, but textual meaning is, of course, affected by utterance and sub-utterance level phenomena as well as issues of coherence. Thus, I presume that my analysis will fit into Schiffrin et al. (2001/15)'s second category. Within this scope, the term still retains a high degree of ambiguity. Therefore, it will be useful to use van Dijk's distinction between these restricted and extended uses of discourse as a communicative event and discourse as a genre or set of genres. Thus, I might speak of the discourse of a particular politician, having in mind a speech or speeches in particular contexts. Yet, I might also speak of the discourse of the parliament itself, either as it presents itself in a particular sitting of parliament or the discursive patterns it displays as a parliament in general. I might speak of the discourse in the narrow senses of "parliamentary discourse" or "populist discourse", or the wider set of genres involved in "political discourse" and "polarising discourse".

There are some uses of discourse I explicitly do not follow; the post-modern view which van Dijk warns against, which conflates ideology and discourse, seems to be an example of conceptual confusion. Strangely, van Dijk's own socio-cognitive conception of ideology (2006) sounds very much like Benford and Snow's collective action frames. My position is not opposed to the Foucauldian approach to discourse taken by CDA scholars (broadly speaking, Schiffrin et al.'s third approach). However, I do not follow this approach either. It is a perspective which can incorporate my own but is not necessary, or suitable,

for this thesis. That is to say, their Russian doll might incorporate my own, but it is impossible for mine to incorporate theirs.

Regarding frames, I have described how Goffman (1986)'s conception of frames has grown into a number of different traditions in different fields. Clearly, Benford and Snow (2000)'s collective action frames should prove the most useful in the context of this thesis. Besides the obvious point that it is focused on social movements, and therefore, explicitly focused on the political, it is also highly theoretically developed in terms of having an analytical framework of precise framing processes. This will allow me to more precisely pinpoint how active metaphors contribute to these processes. Besides this, collective action frames are theoretically compatible with contemporary research in political science, sociology, discourse analysis, and even cognitive linguistics if we disregard the problem that Lakoff seems to conflate knowledge schemas and interaction frames.

Furthermore, Benford and Snow's conception of frames seems to work well with Freeden's morphological approach to ideology. To begin with, both emphasise the active ideological agency of those involved in political discourse. Both give prominence to discourse as the locus of ideological and framing processes. People are not passive recipients or carriers of political thinking, parrots of political talk, but active signifying agents. If ideology entails the decontestation of political concepts, collective action frames can be conceived of as the tasks, processes and dynamics by which signifying agents carry out such decontestation. By seeing ideology and frames in this way, active metaphorical utterances would seem to be a particularly useful linguistic tool for political agents; the active ad hoc construction of metaphorical concepts would allow them to tailor their frames from utterance-to-utterance, communicating their decontestations of political concepts, and, therefore, doing ideological work with active metaphorical utterances.

Chapter 3
Populism

3.1. Introduction

In chapter two, I refined my use of some of the theoretical apparatus that are central to the discussion of political phenomena, particularly to the discussion of the political use of language: Ideology, discourse, and frames. In this chapter, I will discuss the central polarising phenomenon analysed in this thesis, populism, using these tools. First, I will examine some of the historical conceptions of populism (3.2.1), and then the contemporary arguments for, and against, approaching populism as a strategy (3.2.2), as an ideology (3.2.3), as discourse (3.2.4), or approaches which combine these conceptions (3.2.5). I will outline the ideational-discursive approach to populism taken in this thesis (3.2.6), and some of the methodological issues this implies (3.2.7). I then look at the ideologies which are most often associated with populist discourse: liberalism (3.3.1), conservatism (3.3.2), socialism (3.3.3), and nationalism (3.3.4).

3.2. Populism

3.2.1. Historical Overview

The term "populism" has been a catch-all term from the very beginning. It first emerged in the academic literature as a way to describe two very different political movements in the nineteenth century: Firstly, the People's Party in the United States, an organisation of farmers and other voters in the rural South and Mid-West of the USA who opposed the demonetisation of silver and felt left behind by an urban political elite (Allcock, 1971, p. 372). Secondly, "populist" was also used as a translation of the Russian *narodnichestvo*, an intellectual movement in the 1860s and 1870s which believed that educating the peasants would transform them into a revolutionary class (Moffitt, 2016, p. 16).

It wasn't until the 1950s that the term came to denote a political phenomenon rather than distinct historical movements, (Shils, 1955, 1956; Lipset, 1960). Shils (1956) defended an early view of populism as an ideology, one in which the people are sovereign above their rulers, with a direct connection to their government. Lipset was more concerned with populism's relationship to xenophobia and anti-Semitism and looked for the empirical connections between populist instances via their social base.

In the 1960s, researchers began to use the term to describe the class-conscious political movements they were seeing in Latin America (Di Tella, 1965; Smith, 1969). Fairly soon, the academic community recognised the nebulousness of the phenomenon and tried to reach a consensus on a definition at a conference held at the London School of Economics in 1967. They were unsuccessful: "There can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is clear what it is" (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969, p. 1).

It was the first time, however, that many different views of populism, as an ideology, as a movement, as a form of organisation, were brought together. Wiles famously observed: "To each his own definition of populism, according to the academic axe he grinds" (Wiles, 1969, p. 166).

The discussion has moved on since then but there is still little consensus. As analysed in Bonikowski and Gidron (2016), the contemporary approaches to populism can be distinguished into three broad groups: populism as ideology, populism as discourse, and populism as a political strategy. It should be noted from the outset, however, that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that they frequently cross-pollinate (for example, in the work of Team Populism[8]; Hawkins et al., 2019).

3.2.2. Populism as a Strategy

The approach to populism as a strategy is perhaps the least relevant to this thesis. To briefly summarise, it is an approach largely taken by scholars concerned with studying the populist movements in Latin America (for example, Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Roberts, 2006). Weyland defines populism as "a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers" (Weyland, 2001, p. 4).

Thus, the focus of the strategy approach is on how populist movements are mobilised and especially on the politicians who manage to mobilise them. While a focus on populist strategy is not relevant to this thesis, the strategic aspects of populism are theoretically maintained by analysing populism through Benford and Snow's framework of collective action frames (Benford & Snow, 2000), a framework focused on the functions of frames in social movements.

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[8] Team Populism is a research group which "brings together renowned scholars from Europe and the Americas to study the causes and consequences of populism [. . .] by studying multiple levels of analysis, and we draw on different methodological tools, including experiments, surveys, and comparative analysis" (https://populism.byu.edu/).

3.2.3. Populism as an Ideology

In the last decade or so, an approach to populism as an ideology has been especially productive in the literature. Canovan (2002) is an early contemporary ideological approach, but it is Mudde (2004) which took populism to be a Freedian thin-centred ideology, establishing the contemporary ideological approach. Mudde defines populism as: "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).

The ideological approach is typically based on close-reading of manifestos and speeches to determine if a political actor is populist or not (Akkerman et al., 2014; Arter, 2010; Kriesi, 2014; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Pankowski, 2010; Pappas, 2019) and are often qualitative case-studies or small-scale quantitative studies.

Mudde's thin-centred ideology approach has advantages in that it satisfies the intuition that populism is about ideas while avoiding the theoretical complications and conceptual stretching involved in approaching it as a full ideology, i.e., few would argue that populism involves the systematic structuring of ideas and internal coherence observed in fascism or communism. Instead, when viewed as a thin-centred ideology, populism "can be easily combined with very different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism" (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). Mudde's definition also has the advantage of having a minimum number of necessary conditions which makes it easier to operationalise and apply to populist actors across geographical and temporal contexts.

Despite these advantages, there are problems with the ideological approach, both in practice and in theory. Bonikowski and Gidron accuse the ideological approach of treating "the phenomenon as having more coherence and stability than is warranted" (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 10). Some of the strongest criticisms of the ideological approach are outlined in Aslanidis (2016):

First, the very notion of thinness is conceptually spurious; second, this position entails significant methodological inconsistencies in the framework of its

proponents; and third, its essentialist connotations erect insurmountable obstacles with regard to classification and measurement. (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 89)

I do agree with Aslanidis's criticism that the criteria for identifying thin-centred ideologies are unclear and that "the list [of thin ideologies] can have no end" (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 91). Freeden is doubtful that the concept of thin ideologies can be applied to populism, and his arguments against it are revealing as to his conception of thin-ideologies: "[a thin-centred ideology] although curtailed, is nonetheless well-articulated and the product of long processes of measured and reflective political thinking" and is "structured so as to rely systematically on other ideological positions to fill it in" (Freeden, 2017, p. 3). Furthermore, he suggests that they "nest within broader ideological families" (Freeden, 2017, p. 3), and that "populisms are hardly threatened by other populisms" (Freeden, 2017, p. 3). This suggests that, though their cores may be restricted, thin-centred ideologies attempt to decontest their conceptual cores, just as thick-centred ones do. Finally, Freeden suggests that thin-centred ideologies demonstrate "a positive self-aware, drive whose transformative alternatives are not predicated on resurrecting primordial social intuitions but on future-oriented change" (Freeden, 2017, p. 3) and "have the potential to become full if they incorporate existing elements of other ideologies" (Freeden, 2017, p. 3). Summarising Freeden's points, we can draw up a list of features for thin-centred ideologies:

1. Thin-centred ideologies are a product of measured and reflective political thinking.
2. Thin-centred ideologies are systematically reliant on other ideologies.
3. Thin-centred ideologies nest within broader ideological families.
4. Thin-centred ideologies attempt to decontest the political concepts at their core.
5. Thin-centred ideologies are positive, self-aware, and focused on future-oriented change.
6. Thin-centred ideologies have the potential to become full.

These are based on Freeden's discussion on populism and are perhaps not all necessary nor sufficient criteria. As well as this, it is not clear what Freeden means by "positive" in (5), nor how to define "measured and reflective political thinking" in (1). It

seems clear that it is difficult to defend populism as a thin-centred ideology, especially given the requirement that they have the potential to become full.

I also agree with Aslanidis (2016) that the essentialist connotations of ideological approaches are a problem. The ideological approach demands that we establish whether an actor is populist or not, but this is often impossible to establish empirically. Donald Trump, for example, is usually taken to be the quintessential contemporary populist. Yet, there is evidence that Trump "struggles to express populist ideas unless he's reading remarks prepared by his scriptwriters" (Smith et al., 2019). Kirk Hawkins concludes that "Trump's populism is not entirely his own" (quoted in Smith et al., 2019). Steve Bannon, Trump's advisor and the person largely credited with the success of Trump's 2016 presidential campaign, has described Trump's difficulties with populism:

> He hated [Stephen] Miller and I going after elites because he said, 'What you're saying is, we're not elites. We are elites. I'm the elites. My audience is an elite audience.' And I said that's not actually technically correct. He wasn't having it. (Quoted in Smith et al., 2019)

Trump's difficulties with the concept even included its lexical entry: "I am a popularist" he is reported to have insisted (quoted in Smith et al., 2019).

Can Donald Trump be a populist if he does not sincerely subscribe to the idea or even understand it? The ideological approach would seem to demand an answer, but any evidence, short of some kind of direct psychological examination of Trump himself, would be inconclusive.

Finally, Aslanidis also sees a normative aspect to the essentialism of the ideological approach: "portraying populism as ideology swells the scope and purported impact of the phenomenon and forces analysts to take sides in favour of or against it" (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 94).

3.2.4. Populism as Discourse

Both Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) and Aslanidis (2016) argue against the ideological approach and endorse a discursive approach to populism as a collective action frame. Approaching populism as discourse allows for a graded approach to the phenomenon. We can analyse the degree of populism shown by speakers through discourse, rather than

categorising them as populist or not. This does not preclude the possibility of a normative dimension, but it does avoid the essentialist demands of the ideological approach, through which normative biases can be obfuscated.

Of course, the theoretical intricacies of a discursive approach largely depend on how one defines discourse. One of the earliest and most influential discursive approaches can be found in the work of Ernest Laclau and his colleagues (1977, 1980, 2000, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), whose post-structuralist, post-Marxist understanding of discourse and ideology leads him to see populist discourse as a constitutive, and even desirable, aspect of political life: "If populism consists in postulating a radical alternative within a communitarian space, a choice in the crossroads on which the future of a given society hinges, does not populism become synonymous with politics? The answer can only be affirmative" (Laclau, 2005c, p. 47). Laclau has been criticised for such conceptual slippage, particularly the conflation of populism, politics, and hegemony (Arditi, 2010; Howarth, 2008; Stavrakakis, 2004; Žižek, 2006a, 2006b). Yet Laclau was the first to see populism as a matter of degree, or as Moffitt puts it: "the true theoretical innovation [of Laclau's approach] is that it sees populism as something that is *done* [emphasis in original]" (Moffitt, 2016, p. 23).

Laclau claimed that "a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual contents as identifiable as populistic, but because it shows a particular logic of articulation of those contents—whatever those contents are" (Laclau, 2005c, p. 33). Developing this idea, Laclau claimed that the logic of populism pits a "people" against a "power bloc", (2005c, p. 69) but that these are *empty signifiers*—signifiers which must be saturated with meaning in context (2005c, p. 40).

Aslanidis (2016) and Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) are inspired equally by Laclau's discursive approach and Mudde's thin-centred ideological approach, to offer minimal discursive approaches. Essentially, they try to isolate populism from ideology, from a Freedian ideological analysis on one side, and from post-structuralist views of discourse on the other: "I simply refer to language, textual data, written or spoken–in other words, the standard material of text analysis" (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 98).

Drawing on Goffmanian ideas of frames, via collective action frames (Benford & Snow, 2000), Aslanidis describes populism as "an anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign People" and "the systematic dissemination of a frame that diagnoses reality as problematic because 'corrupt elites' have unjustly usurped the sovereign authority of the 'noble People'" (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 99). The solution which populism offers is the

righteous political mobilisation of the noble people in order to regain power (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 99).

Similarly, Bonikowski and Gidron argue that "if populism is a mode of discourse, then the starting point of analysis should be distinct speech acts"[9] (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 9).

3.2.5. Mixed Approaches

It is important to emphasise that the approaches outlined here are not mutually exclusive and that many, if not most, researchers combine their features in different ways. Researchers working with Mudde's ideological definition often end up performing some form of discourse or corpus analysis in order to establish the presence of ideological content. Pauwels (2011) is a good example of this. He operationalises Mudde (2004)'s ideological definition in order to perform counts of keywords in a corpus of populist texts. Similarly, many of the researchers working within the Team Populism research group take Mudde's ideological definition as a departure point for studying populist discourse. It is this amalgamation of approaches which leads Team Populism to call their approach the ideational approach:

> [I]t is true that [we] use the notions of 'discourse', '(thin-centred) ideology' and 'worldview' somewhat interchangeably, all these terms share an understanding of populism as a specific set of ideas (Carlin et al., 2019, p. 420).

Stephen Moffitt uses a stylistic approach (Moffitt, 2016) and distinguishes it from discursive approaches because, rejecting both the post-structuralist view of discourse and the minimalist textual view espoused by Aslanidis (2016), he emphasises the importance of utterance level and paralinguistic effects in the communication of populist ideas. Essentially, this too is a discursive approach but one more sensitive to paralinguistic factors. Jan Werner Müller (Müller, 2017), in some ways looking back to Laclau's approach, refers to the logic of populism and Laclau's empty signifiers—his approach is very similar to the discursive approach of Aslanidis.

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[9] It seems that by "speech acts" they mean utterances, rather than referring specifically to speech act theory.

3.2.6. Populism in this Thesis

The approach of this thesis is largely informed by the discursive approaches outlined here, but with some important differences, theoretically and methodologically. I agree with Aslanidis that the thin-centred ideological approach is unsound (its essentialist claims are ultimately unfalsifiable) but that its methodological benefits (a definition that is easily made operational and applicable to disparate case studies) can be retained via a minimal discursive definition. I also agree with his insistence that we should be cautious of the normative biases which can undermine the academic study of populism (and politics, in general). I agree with Aslanidis when he insists on a clear distinction between discourse and ideology (Aslanidis, 2016): the conflation of the two, whether in the post-structuralist sense, or under the superordinate ideational approach, can foster conceptual slippage and stretch the concept of populism until it is almost meaningless. However, I agree with Moffitt that to take too minimalist an approach to discourse can blind us to important aspects of the phenomenon (Moffitt, 2016). There is a balance to be struck between restricting the study of populist discourse to textual features and widening the scope to include the endless variables of context. This is the contribution that pragmatics can bring to the table and an original approach that this thesis develops in combination with corpus linguistics. The result is a corpus-pragmatic approach to the analysis of active metaphor in populist discourse.

In this thesis I argue that the content communicated by the speaker through active metaphorical utterances contributes to the construction of populist frames for ideological purposes. However, before we analyse how active metaphorical utterances interact with populist frames, we must define the populist frame and establish its presence in a corpus.

I follow the minimalist discursive definitions of Aslanidis (2016) and Bonokowski and Gidron (2016) which conceptualise populism as a frame, but I operationalise it in the manner of Hawkins et al. (2019). Although Team Populism conceptualise populism as a set of ideas, and do not clearly distinguish ideology from discourse, they explicitly refer to populism as an *ideational frame* (Carlin et al., 2019, p. 420).

Therefore, largely following the work of Hawkins et al. (2019), Aslanidis (2016), and Bonikowski and Gidron (2016), I analyse populism as a discursive frame consisting of three features:

(a) a Manichean and moral cosmology; (b) the proclamation of 'the people' as a homogenous and virtuous community; and (c) the depiction of 'the elite' as a corrupt and self-serving entity. (Carlin et al., 2019, p. 420).

It is not necessary for populists to explicitly utter "people" or "elites", but they must evoke them and when they do, they must do so in the context of a Manichean struggle: The virtuous people against the corrupt elite. Most importantly, the people are a homogenous entity.

This last point may seem obvious and the least controversial observation about populism, but it is worth defining this further. It is quite common, almost a cliché in American politics, to talk about the people as a morally pure, group:

> I chose to run for the presidency at this moment in history because I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we solve them together - unless we perfect our union by understanding that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look the same and we may not have come from the same place, but we all want to move in the same direction - towards a better future for our children and our grandchildren. This belief comes from my unyielding faith in the decency and generosity of the American people. But it also comes from my own story. (Obama, 2008, 187.2)

In this speech by the then US president, Barack Obama, the American people are homogenous in their decency and generosity. However, it is clear that with this he is not evoking a populist frame. To begin with, there is no Manichean struggle with a corrupt elite. But, besides that, his collective use of a moral American people is qualified by an explicit recognition and positive evaluation of the pluralism within the collective: "we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes". If we contrast that with Donald Trump's inaugural address, we can see the difference clearly:

> Today's ceremony, however, has very special meaning. Because today we are not merely transferring power from one Administration to another, or from one party to another – but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C. and giving it back to you, the American People. For too long, a small group in our nation's Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost.

Washington flourished – but the people did not share in its wealth. Politicians prospered – but the jobs left, and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country." (Trump, 2017)

Here, Trump not only places the homogenous people in opposition to a corrupt elite, but excludes the political class as part of the people. This is what Jan Werner Müller refers to when he says "populists are always anti-pluralist: populists claim that they, and only they, represent the people" (Müller, 2017, p. 20) and that [paraphrasing the French philosopher Claude Lefort] "the supposedly real people first has to be 'extracted' from the sum total of actual citizens" (Müller, 2017, p. 20). The people of the populist frame must be based on this moral exclusion of the other, rather than the unity in diversity seen in Obama's speech.

By adopting the three-part disaggregated definition of Team Populism, my research can be better contextualised within the literature, both in how it benefits from contemporary research and how it can contribute to it.

3.2.7. Methodological Issues

Now that I have a minimal discursive definition, I must establish a method of applying it. There has been a surge in qualitative studies which, whether they define populism as an ideology or discourse, base their analysis on small-scale or large-scale corpus analysis.

Bonikowski and Gidron (2016, p. 8) describe how different approaches differ in their objects of study: pure ideological approaches often focus on close readings of partisan materials—such as manifestos—which is labour intensive research and often limited in scope (Akkerman et al., 2014; Arter, 2010; Kriesi, 2014; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Pankowski, 2010), though it should be said that more far-reaching qualitative comparisons have been attempted (Pappas, 2019).

Discursive approaches and ideological/discursive approaches often focus on micro-level mechanisms, which Bonikowski and Gidron claim should be "distinct speech acts" (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 9). Pauwels (2011) on the other hand, counts instances of populist keywords and establishes the presence of ideological material that way. A vital issue for this thesis must be to decide which unit of language use is most suitable for identifying the presence of a populist frame, given my theoretical framework.

From a pragmatic perspective, quantitative studies such as Pauwels (2011) cast the net too wide. Though every approach to populism takes the people as a central component, counting instances of the term "people" would retrieve far too many false positives to be a useful indication of the presence of populist discourse: "people" can be used in many different ways which are not populist, even in a populist text. Even the complete absence of this key term in a text does not preclude the presence of a populist frame because, if I am right, the populist concept of PURE PEOPLE might often be communicated indirectly through metaphor.

Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) espouse analysis at the level of "speech acts", by which I take them to mean utterances (a sentence or clause complex in use). This is certainly a better fit for a pragmatic discursive approach and is the one Belén Soria and I followed in previous work (Keating & Soria, 2019). However, this too can potentially result in false positives. It is not enough that an utterance expresses concepts of a homogenous virtuous people, or a corrupt self-serving elite, or even a Manichean struggle between good and evil to be considered, in itself, populist: "fully populist expression – spoken, written, or revealed via surveys – requires all three of these components" (Carlin et al., 2019, p. 420).

However, if we were only to accept utterances which showed evidence of all elements of the frame, we would likely cast our net too narrow: just because an utterance is not in and of itself populist, it does not mean that it does not contribute to the communication of a populist frame: "populism is [not] an either-or affair, especially considering texts, individuals, or groups in the aggregate" (Carlin et al., 2019, p. 420).

Therefore, I follow Hawkins and Silva (2019) and apply holistic grading at the level of the political speech to establish the presence of the populist frame. To be brief, holistic grading is a method developed in educational science to evaluate whole texts. Graders are given a grading rubric and anchor or model texts on which they judge the assessed texts (Team Populism, 2019). Hawkins and Silva (2019) use this method to holistically evaluate speeches for populist content: a maximum grade of 2 is assigned to texts which feature the three components of his definition without contradictory content. A minimum grade of 0 is given to texts which do not feature any of the three components or do so to a minimal degree with contradictory content present.

My unit of analysis to establish the presence of the populist frame is the political speech. After establishing the degree to which individual speeches evoke a populist frame, I can analyse active metaphorical utterances within them and evaluate the contribution they

make to the populist frame. Thus, I retain the benefits of a precise and operationalised definition of populism while avoiding an overly narrow focus at an utterance level.

3.3. Populism and Other Isms

Whether one takes populism to be a thin-centred ideology or a discursive frame, there remains the problem of how populism interacts with other political phenomena with which it is often confused: liberalism, fascism, and nationalism being the most common. In this section, I will discuss some of these "isms" using the theoretical frameworks I have discussed and suggest some ways we might untangle populism from them.

3.3.1. Liberalism

Freeden calls liberalism the "the dominant ideology of the developed world and one of the most misunderstood" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 329). It is better thought of as a family of ideologies, in which variations decontest some of the most important political concepts of the modern era, making the language of liberalism "one of the most frequently employed devices in contemporary political life" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 329).

While outlining a definitive list of political concepts at the core or periphery of an ideological family would seem impossible, Freeden does suggest some commonalities in conceptual structure of liberalism's most dominant forms. The core concepts generally include liberty, development, individualism, rationality, the general interest, sociability and rule-limited government (Freeden, 1996, p. 230). While we cannot define a liberal ideology based purely on how these concepts are contested, such an analysis might suggest how populism, as a discursive frame, plays a role in communicating different liberal or illiberal positions.

A good place to start is in what is sometimes called classical liberalism, the kind found in the writings of the nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill. Freeden reads Mill's phrase "the free development of individuality" (Mill, *On Liberty*. Quoted in Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 333) as illustrating three of the core concepts and how they interact in decontestation. Here the individual is free, not only in the negative sense of the absence of restrictions, but in the positive sense of an individual entity capable of choice. This individual has the capabilities and freedom to develop his abilities, the progress from a lower state to a higher one. The concepts of liberty, development, progress and individualism are decontested together, a relationship of "mutual dependence and

definition [. . .] each core concept then attracts additional defining components obtained, among others, from proximity with the other core concepts" (Freeden, 1996, p. 145).

Perhaps more than any other ideology, liberalism conforms to Gramscian ideas of hegemony. Both left- and right-wing politicians draw on its core concepts to justify political action. Consider how the concept of the state has been decontested in liberal varieties: In America, decontestations of liberty, individuality, and rule-restricted government have been used to restrict social action by government. In Britain, it led to the establishment of the welfare state (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 335). Certainly, after the second world war, very specific forms of liberalism became "the desperate last protective force against the evils of pathological forms of ideology and state power" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 336).

In the modern era, especially after the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy was said to have led us to the end of history, the end of ideologies (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992)[10]. The ideal of the individual, free to develop, free to choose, and to be able to do so free from state oppression, had become universalised, enshrined in domestic and international law. Yet, this too interacts with peripheral concepts in different ways. In neoliberalism, the free market becomes the vessel of universal human development, and the welfare state is an intrusion on that freedom. To others, the neoliberal promise of personal development begins to sound hollow when that person is decontested as a corporation, and the claims of universalism can begin to sound colonialist.

On another front, in what is often referred to as "the culture wars", we see how other liberal core concepts are decontested; "the desire of liberals to supplement their existing respect for the singularity of individuals with the uniqueness and integrity of cultural groups has led to zero-sum clashes between liberal values" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 338). The anti-abortionist sees themselves as protecting the rights of the individual through their concept of the unborn child, the pro-abortionist sees themselves as protecting the rights of the individual through a woman's right to choose. Those who endorse distinguishing women from men in certain ways feel that they are protecting the integrity of dominant cultural groups, while others see themselves as protecting minority groups from persecution. Immigration debates can also be seen as rival decontestations at the core of liberalism; the universal rights of the individual are measured against the perceived risk to the integrity of culturally significant groups related to ethnicity and nationality.

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[10] Fukuyama's work has often been misconstrued, simplified, and attacked. I do not wish to do so here. I simply refer to his argument that liberal democracy has had a monopoly on ideological thinking in the post-Cold War era, and that this has been, on balance, a positive thing.

Liberalism alone cannot offer answers to such decontestations at its core without interacting with other peripheral concepts or other ideologies; nationalism, conservatism, and socialism in particular, bring their own decontestations to the core concepts of liberalism. Even racism appropriates liberal language, though we should not mistake it for a liberal ideology: "many are keen to appropriate liberal language for their own purposes" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 341).

Scholars have struggled to articulate exactly how and why contemporary liberalism, the dominant ideology of the age, seems to be coming under increasing pressure, evinced by the slow slide into the so-called illiberal democracies like that in Viktor Orbán's Hungary or seismic events like the election of Donald Trump in the USA. One suggestion is that liberalism's very universalisation has robbed it of its appeal in more particular contexts: "as contemporary liberalism has related the ideology's longstanding universal aspirations to new institutions of global governance, of universal culture and absolute rights and freedoms, it has found it harder to remember that there is also an appeal in particularistic dimensions" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 344).

Some scholars of populism have suggested that populism is the opposite of liberalism (Pappas, 2019). Given the difficulties in conceptualizing populism as an ideology, I do not think that this is the case. The relationship seems more complicated than that; populism appeals to liberalism just as it undermines it. It is an illiberal tool of decontestation, a discursive frame uniquely aimed at the core liberal concepts; the freedom of a people against the abuses of an elite, the direct governance of the people to further the general interest, the restriction of government by virtue of their homogenised will. In other words, it offers an easy solution to the contemporary clashes within liberalism "where even an already illiberal majoritarianism is converted into something worse: a total, singular and monolithic viewpoint that sweeps all others away" (Baritono & Freeden, 2018).

3.3.2. Conservatism

Like contemporary liberalism, conservatism is an ideology that tries to dispel any appearance of being an ideology. In contrast to the mass consumed, rarefied utopias of other ideologies, conservatism is seen as experiential, practical, taking the world as it is (Freeden, 1996, pp. 317-318). When we approach ideology as the decontestation of political concepts, this is clearly not the case; conservatism is also a family of ideologies,

though quite a peculiar one. It is peculiar in that it seems capable of flexibility, if not outright contradiction, to an astonishing degree:

> How can one term encompass [. . .] both reverence for the state and contempt for it, both a conception of community and an atomistic libertarianism, both a faith in high politics and a diminution of the political sphere, both a notion of citizenship based on responsibility and duty and one based on contractual markets and an economic clientele? (Freeden, 1996, p. 346)

At the core of conservatism is a concern with change. This is often dismissed as a fear of change, but Noël O'Sullivan sees in it the positive appeal of conservatism: "a defence of limited politics against a belief in the desirability of radical political and social change" (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 295). Yet even this positive appeal is based on an opposition to progressive ideologies. Freeden brings more nuance to this idea: conservatism does not necessarily seek to forestall change or to eliminate it, but rather to render it safe (Freeden, 1996, p. 332).

Nevertheless, we are still left with the challenge of trying to articulate what political concepts are decontested by conservative ideologies and how. Freeden suggests only two substantive concepts at the core of conservatism. The first is a resistance to change unless it is an organic or natural change. The second is the subordination of change to the belief that human law and behaviour has extra-human origins; that political life cannot be subject to human whims (Freeden, 1996, p. 344).

These two core concepts give rise to "a grammar of response", the way in which conservatism reacts to ideological challengers and determines the other concepts which are decontested at a variety's core and periphery. This is a "swivel mirror-image technique", the creation of contingent conservative values, stable yet impermanent, in reaction to progressive ideologies and which secure the first two core concepts (Freeden, 1996, p. 345). The decontestation of these concepts is characterised by a flexibility which "permits a firmness of conservatism's fundamental structure when confronted with very different concrete historical and spatial circumstances" (Freeden, 1996, p. 345).

O'Sullivan (2013) explores some conservative varieties, dividing them into four schools; reactionary conservatism, radical conservatism, moderate conservatism and the New Right (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 294). At the centre of the reactionary school is a belief that "no society can survive unless its political institutions are underpinned by a consensus

on fundamental religious and moral values" (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 294). It is inspired by its utopian vison of a harmonious, hierarchal society (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 295). When this vison is frustrated by political reality, the tendency is to attribute the failure to machinations of conspirators or to demonise an outgroup. Usually because of its failures to engage with democratic modernity, reactionaries are marginalised to the fringes of political life (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 295).

Radical conservatism, on the other hand, embraces modernity by mobilising popular support behind a leader who rejects the liberal concept of parliamentary democracy and promotes direct mass involvement in politics (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 297). Rejecting the liberal concepts of rule-bound government, representation, and the protection of individuals and groups from state power, radical conservatism sees the leader's role as the mobilisation of the masses via conflict with a political foe, thereby resolving the divisive pluralism of modern democracy. O'Sullivan only distinguishes this variety of conservatism from fascism by virtue of the latter's focus on race.

Moderate conservatism endorses a limited state, the rule of law and checks on executive power. It is the variety of conservatism which most obviously overlaps with liberalism, but which rejects the liberal decontestation of rationality, the abstractions and theoretical rationalisations for political change, in favour of a supposedly pragmatic, experiential knowledge of the limits of permittable change. The conservative concept of limits on change has been decontested by different moderate conservatives in different ways: Edmund Burke sought to establish limits based on divine will and David Hume by an assumption that all men in politics should be mistrusted as "knaves" (O'Sullivan, 2013, pp. 298-299).

As moderate conservatism engaged with liberalism, it attempted to mitigate the liberal challenge to the natural, organic order by embracing some of the decontestations at the liberal core. The reaction against these accommodations to liberal thought would eventually lead to the rise of the New Right in the 1970s. The New right was characterised by a fear that constitutional systems were being undermined by corporate ones, fears of a bloated interventionist state, rising inflation, welfare dependence, and family breakdown. Moreover, it feared the emergence of a new underclass estranged from the social order and the loss of a distinct conservative cultural identity (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 301-302). O'Sullivan identifies three forms of the New Right which attempt to deal with the breakdown of the post-war consensus in different ways: The first focuses on national identity, the second on a defence of the free market, and the third by reviving an ideal of a

Hobbesian civil association, a political solidarity dependent on civilised mutual recognition rather than a unified moral community and where the role of state is simply to facilitate this association (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 304).

Apart from these four schools, O'Sullivan also identifies varieties of conservatism particular to the USA (O'Sullivan, 2013, pp. 305-306) which are characterised by two extremes; at one extreme lies a radical libertarianism in favour of a minimal state and which rejects modern mass society in favour of Nietzschean ideals of the superman; at the other extreme, lies the New Conservatism which attempted to apply European conservatism to American political life. Between these rather impractical extremes, a number of varieties developed. The economic policies of Milton Friedman, the rational choice theory of James Buchanan, and a post-Cold War neoconservatism which trumpeted democracy abroad and worried about welfare dependency at home. Another variety, paleoconservatism, opposing neoconservatism's global preoccupations, successfully wedded nationalist and protectionist forms of conservatism to Christian opposition to abortion and homosexuality (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 306). Paleoconservatism is often associated with populism, as is the Tea Party, a protest movement which united a number of different conservative and libertarian ideologues. There are a number of reasons for this, one of which is the nationalist focus of these conservative ideologies. Nationalism and right-wing populism would seem to be especially intertwined.

What seems clear is that the discursive frame of populism could prove very useful to some of the varieties discussed here: the Manichean struggle might prove especially useful to a reactionary conservativism preoccupied with returning society to a golden age of harmonious hierarchy; radical conservatism shares populism's focus on a charismatic leader who embodies the unified will of the people. On Freeden's more abstract level, populist discourse can be used as conservatism's "grammar of response": populism's claim to restore the proper order of a virtuous people over corrupt elites might also serve to protect the concept of an organic, natural hierarchy at the conservatism's core.

3.3.3. Socialism

While some ideologies can become confused because of the similarity of structure at their cores, or some varieties of an ideology can become confused by virtue of the similarity of the decontestations, quite another problem is when one historical manifestation comes to represent a whole ideological family. Perhaps like no other, this is the contemporary

difficulty with the label "socialist". While we can talk of socialism as a family of ideologies, and quite reasonably substitute the term communism (small "s", small "c"), such an interchange is not the same as identifying a Socialist as a Communist (capital "S", capital "C"). Yet all of these are connected by history, if not always by clear ideological kinship, and so when we discuss one, we inevitably discuss the others. Obviously, such a nuanced topic can only be discussed broadly in the context of this thesis. Here, I will discuss some of the political concepts at the core of socialism as a broad umbrella term for the ideological family, and then turn to the two most relevant manifestations relevant to contemporary politics: Communism and Social Democracy.

Freeden sees five political concepts as forming the core of most varieties of socialism: (1) the constitutive nature of the human relationships, (2) human welfare as an objective, (3) human nature as active, (4) equality, and (5) history as the arena beneficial change (Freeden, 1996, pp. 425-426).

The first concept emphasises the importance of human social ties and social groups, though the weight given to these ties and the basis of these ties can be decontested in different varieties. Unlike most forms of conservatism, where society is seen as the natural hierarchal regulation of individuals, or liberalism, where society facilitates individual progression, in socialism society is the means by which individual progression is achieved.

The second concept, human welfare, is tied to this concept of social life. While welfare is most commonly associated with the satisfaction of material needs, socialism aspires to the fulfilment of society's full potential, and therefore, the full potential of the individual within it. Early socialists such as Charles Fourier and Robert Owen emphasised this conception of welfare, not only as an escape from poverty but as a movement towards the happiness and dignity of everyone in society (Freeden, 1996, p. 428). In its extreme forms, of course, this kind of decontestation could easily slip into the utopianism for which socialism is often criticised.

The third concept sees human nature as active, or productive. Activity, not only economic activity but in its broader sense too, is seen as a natural state of human beings, not something they need to be coerced into doing under capitalist systems (Freeden, 1996, p. 429). While conservatism and neoliberalism often view individual activity as contingent on capitalism, socialism sees capitalism as contingent on the individual's natural inclination towards activity.

The fourth concept is deceptively simple and often mischaracterised. Equality in socialism is both the natural state of man, before being corrupted by material history, and

the objective to return to that state (Freeden, 1996, p. 430). However, equality does not necessarily mean a numerical equality in terms of material wealth. While the eradication of poverty is key to most socialisms by virtue of their decontestations of human welfare, and the redistribution of wealth a means to achieve it, equality goes beyond material wealth to the eventual dissolution of unnatural and hierarchal systems of human status (Freeden, 1996, p. 431).

The fifth concept, history as the arena beneficial change, is a diachronic perspective on the other core concepts (Freeden, 1996, p. 426). Many socialists, not least of all Marx, have viewed history through a Hegelian lens of historical progress: the almost inevitable march of history towards reason and its communist destiny. Choice plays a role, but choice is circumscribed by the socio-cultural patterns of productive forces and economic structures. This view of history has repercussions on how all the other core concepts are decontested; the promise that the socialist ideal society could be delivered in the future excuses past and present generations of failure to achieve it in the present, and allows them to make more pragmatic decontestations "by pointing to the oppressing forces which previous and penultimate historical stages generated" (Freeden, 1996, p. 435). However, the Hegelian-Marx view of historical materialism was not the only socialist decontestation of this concept; evolutionary science also came to influence socialist conceptions of history. In evolutionary socialist ideology, the socialist society need not be a far-off, post-evolutionary end-state but can be pre-empted, a continuous and progressive socialisation of society.

The revolutions which established Communist states in the twentieth century have a complicated relationship with socialism as an ideology. While the Marxist decontestations of the core dominate, in many cases further ideological decontestation and political pragmatism introduced changes which Marx would not have endorsed. So even Marxism, as a distinct socialist ideology, is an umbrella term. "Such was the oppressive character of the Communists party-states that there was, moreover, hardly a serious danger of conflating Communism [. . .] and the communist, classless, and stateless society of the future envisaged by Marx" (Brown, 2013, p. 372).

 Brown (2013, pp. 372-377) identifies six defining features of this capital-"C"-Communist ideology: (1) a firm belief in the necessity of the monopoly of power, (2) democratic centralism, (3) commitment to state ownership of the means of production, (4) centrally planned economies were more just and more efficient than a market economy, (5) the sense of belonging to an international communist movement and (6) the aspiration to

build the communist stateless, classless society of the future. As Brown points out, the first four are policies concerned with maintaining power with the Communist Party (Brown, 2013, p. 375), doctrines for the operation of imperfect socialist societies in anticipation of the Marxist communist ideal, which is based upon the Marxist-Hegelian view of history. The last two are more clearly based on Marxist decontestations within the socialist core.

As Communist varieties of socialism were dying out during the cold-war, social democracy, Socialism with a capital "S", was decontesting the concepts at the socialist core. This evolutionary socialism did not endorse communism as the ideal end-state of history but endorsed a gradual socialization of the liberal democratic state. This meant the extension of the democratic principles of freedom and equality into the organisation of economic and social life, in opposition to the inequalities of *laissez-faire* capitalism (Jackson, 2013, p. 348).

Jackson (2013, pp. 351-352) outlines some of the ideological features of social democratic ideology: (1) a commitment to parliamentary democracy, (2) a commitment to constructing cross-class coalitions, (3) an egalitarian society could be realised through legislation and government policy, and (4) the necessity of reformations to the capitalist system in order to achieve liberal ideals (liberty, equality and community). "Ideologically, social democracy married the classical democratic ideals of liberals and republicans to new insights into the social interdependence of individuals and the capacity of collective action to protect individuals from the consequences of unhindered market forces" (Jackson, 2013, p. 352).

With so many varieties of socialism, the populist frame could be utilised for a variety of ideological purposes. The Marxist idea of class-struggle is perhaps the most clearly aligned variety; the working class can be depicted as the virtuous people, the bourgeoisie as the corrupt elite, the struggle to return power to the people becomes the struggle to return to the natural state of equality or towards the ideal communist future.

Social democracy might also benefit from this frame: the virtuous people are no longer defined by class but by their victimization at the hands of an abusive capitalist elite. The Manichean struggle is no longer one between capitalism and communism, but the struggle to defend liberal-democratic ideals from the extremes of capitalism. It is in these subtle differences in the decontestations of political concepts that discourse does its ideological work.

3.3.4. Nationalism

The relationship between nationalism and populism is not an easy one to disentangle. Freeden's views on nationalism (Freeden, 1998) and populism (Freeden, 2017) are interesting, because whereas he rejects the view of populism as a thin-centred ideology, he suggests that nationalism can be either a distinct thin-centred ideology or it can arise as a component of a broader ideology (Freeden, 1998, p. 751)

Unlike the full ideologies discussed in this chapter, nationalism "discards the general validity of its assertions as a universal organizing principle of political ideals" (Freeden, 1998, p. 758). It does not try to answer the big questions of political life but focus on quite a restricted set of political issues. Freeden suggests the following core concepts for nationalism: (1) prioritisation of a group, the nation, as the key framework for human beings and society, (2) a positive valorisation is assigned to one's own nation, sanctioning claims over the conduct of its members, (3) the desire to give politico-institutional expression to the first two concepts, (4) space and time as crucial determinants of social identity, and (5) the importance of emotion and sentiment in the sense of group membership.

The parallels between populism and nationalism become clear in light of this analysis. Both are concerned with defining, homogenising, and positively evaluating the social grouping of people. Both are concerned with the establishment of politico-institutional expression for that group, and both draw on emotional and sentimental attachment to the group. However, whereas the grounds of group membership are more or less fixed in terms of nationalism, the empty signifier of the pure people in the populist frame is a more flexible construct. As I have suggested, the populist pure people can be used to signify the working class in a Marxist ideology or the moralistic defenders of a natural order in a conservative ideology. It is this referential flexibility of populism, the "empty signifiers" in Laclau's terminology, which makes populism so conductive to carrying out different ideological objectives.

3.4. Summary

The essentialist dimension of the strategic and ideological approaches demands that we decide if an actor is populist or not. Combined with the normative implications which often attach themselves to the concept of populism, the result is that the academic endeavour of

studying the phenomenon can be undermined: "scholars of populism tend to write as if they are loyal opponents or supporters of a political cause, rather than objective observers" (Aslanidis 2016, p. 64).

Bonikowski and Gidron state that "it is more useful to think of populism [. . .] as a frame through which other kinds of political claims, from those on the far left to those on the far right, can be expressed" (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 10) and I agree.

Using the three-part disaggregated definition of Team Populism (Hawkins et al., 2019), I have a minimal discursive definition and the holistic grading method of establishing the presence of populism in political speeches.

Analysing populism as a collective-action frame, I have a framework in place for assessing how framing processes work in populist discourse and populist movements, which will help me analyse the possible influence of active metaphors on these processes.

Arriving at a minimal discursive definition for populism, I am in a position to explore how it is used to communicate different ideological content. Taking ideology as the decontestation of political concepts, I have suggested some ways that the empty signifiers of populist discourse can be used by very different ideological families. Next, I will begin my discussion of metaphor, with the aim of establishing how active metaphorical utterances can be used for ideological purposes via the populist frame.

Chapter 4
Theories of Metaphor

4.1. Introduction

Metaphor, as an object of study, is like some rocky, windswept island, inconveniently located in disputed waters. Some people don't understand the fuss and dismiss it as unimportant. For others, perhaps those who suspect it is rich in natural resources, it becomes an object of fascination, ambition, and, inevitably, territorial dispute.

Many areas of academic study claim to be metaphor's proper dominion: literature, philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and linguistics are some of the most prominent. Cognitive linguistics, semantic linguistics, pragmatic linguistics and philosophy of language have all made important contributions to the study of metaphor in the field of linguistics.

The problem for a study such as this one is where to draw the line, even within the field of linguistics. Given that this is a study of metaphorical language in political discourse, I will focus on theories which have a pragmatic dimension or have been used to analyse political discourse. Furthermore, given that some of these theories are complex, highly developed, and wide-ranging, I will only be able to focus on those aspects which relate to the metaphorical use of language. It is inevitable that, given this narrow scope, some aspects of the theories discussed will not be given the weight that they would otherwise deserve. Such are the practicalities of interdisciplinary diplomacy.

First, I discuss theories of metaphorical mapping (4.2), starting with a discussion of Max Black (4.2.1), followed by cognitive metaphor theory (CMT) (4.2.2), and then Romero and Soria's pragmatic interaction theory (4.2.3). I discuss categorisation theories (4.3), starting with the work of Glucksberg (4.3.1), then relevance theory (4.3.2) and discuss some problems for categorisation theories (4.3.3). Next, I discuss arguments regarding at which level of speaker's meaning metaphorical meaning is communicated (4.4). Finally, I discuss sceptical accounts of metaphor (4.4).

4.2. Theories of Metaphorical Mapping

4. 2.1. Max Black and Interaction Theory

"To draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him" (Black, 1954-5, p. 273). In his seminal article on metaphor, Max Black set out to defend metaphor as a serious form of thought, rather than a decorative embellishment opposed to the literal and the logical. Along with two other important works on the subject 'More about metaphor' (1977) and 'How metaphors work: A reply to Donald Davidson' (1979), Black set out a startlingly original approach to metaphorical language and thought which is still being developed in contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics:

> In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is resultant of their interaction. (Black, 1954-5, p. 285)

Black claimed that metaphor has a cognitive value. This was in contrast to the prevailing positions, which Black called "the substitution view", in which metaphorical language was seen to communicate a meaning that might have been expressed literally - "understanding a metaphor is like deciphering a code or unravelling a riddle" (Black 1954-5, p. 280). A variation of the substitution view is "the comparison view", where metaphor consists of "the *presentation* of the underlying analogy or similarity" [italics in original] (Black, 1954-5, p. 283). Black illustrates the difference using the following metaphor:

(1)   Richard is a lion (Black, 1954-5, p. 283)

According to the substitution view, the metaphorical words of the sentence (*the focus*[11]), "a lion", can be replaced by its literal equivalent (1b) with no loss of cognitive value:

(1b)   Richard is brave (Black 1954-5, p. 283)

According to the comparison view, the focus can be replaced by literal simile (1c) with no loss of cognitive value:

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[11] The focus of a metaphor is also often called "the vehicle".

(1c)   Richard is like a lion (in being brave) (Black, 1954-5, p. 283)

Black claims that these views cannot account for all cases of metaphor. Though they might seem close to the mark in their analysis of (1), which Black would call "a trivial metaphor", they cannot explain "the *distinctive* capacities and achievements [emphasis in original]" (Black, 1954-5, p. 284) of strong, active metaphors such as (2):

(2)   Man is a wolf (Black, 1954-5, p. 286)

It is not so easy to formulate the substitution view's literal equivalent of (2), (Man is ferocious/violent/ carnivorous / wild etc.) nor a comparison view's literal simile (Man is like a wolf [in ferocity/ violence/ eating habits / wildness etc.]).

Black claims that there is a contrast between the focus of the metaphor, "a wolf", and *the frame* (the words used literally), "Man is". This contrast triggers the interaction between the two thoughts, man and wolf, giving "wolf" its metaphorical meaning in (2).

Black makes five explicit claims about metaphor and how it functions (Black, 1979, p. 441-443):

1. Metaphorical statements[12] have two distinct subjects, *the primary subject*, or the subject we are talking about (man in [2]), and *the secondary subject*, or the subject we use to talk about the primary subject, (wolf in [2]).[13]

2. The primary and secondary subjects are systems, or *implicative complexes[14]* rather than "an individual thing" (Black, 1979, p. 441). Black himself emphasises this as one of his most original contributions to the study of metaphor (Black, 1979, p. 442). He explains that the secondary subject, partly depending on the context of the utterance, determines a set of beliefs, opinions, attitudes and emotions shared by members of a speech community

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[12] In contemporary linguistic terminology, Black would probably have used "metaphorical utterances", as he makes it clear that he refers to "specific and relatively complete acts of expression and communication" (Black, 1979, p. 437).

[13] In Black (1954-5) primary subject was the principal subject and the secondary subject was the subsidiary subject. In contemporary discussions, these are called the target domain and source domain, respectively, after Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003) brought their own cognitive-linguistic development of Black's ideas into metaphor research.

[14] Black also uses the alternative term, *implication complex.*

related to that subject. Black does not develop this idea of an implicative complex's context dependency further. However, it is clear that he is beginning to articulate not only the cognitive dimension of metaphor, but also the pragmatic. For example, he adds that a speaker can introduce a novel and non-platitudinous *implicative complex* (Black, 1979, p. 442) which in contemporary pragmatic and cognitive theories we would call an ad hoc concept.

3. A metaphorical statement projects the secondary subject upon the primary subject, or filters the primary subject through the secondary subject, by applying statements to the primary subject which are isomorphic to the secondary subject's implicative complex. "Isomorphism" here is taken from mathematics and is "an identity of structure" (Black, 1979, p. 445). This isomorphism means that "every metaphorical statement may be said to implicate a likeness-statement and a comparison-statement, each weaker than the original metaphorical statement" (Black, 1979, p. 445). Metaphor might be grounded in similarity, but is not reducible to it (Black, 1979, p. 445).

4. Via the isomorphic projection of statements from the secondary subject's implicative complex onto the primary subject, the speaker selects, emphasises, suppresses and organises features of the primary subject.

5. The "projection" and "filter" metaphors for metaphor are misleading in that they do not describe how the two subjects interact. "The nature of the intended application helps to determine the character of the system to be applied" (Black, 1954-5, p. 291). He describes the interaction process as follows (Black, 1979, p. 442): "(a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary subject's properties; and (b) invites him to construct a parallel implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject." Black viewed the production of metaphor as a verbal action that demands uptake, "a creative response from a competent speaker" (Black, 1979, p. 442).

4.2.2. Developments of Black: Cognitive Metaphor Theory

Black's interaction theory has inspired much work in metaphor since the publication of 'Metaphor' (Black, 1954-5). Although not an explicit, self-declared development of Black's IT, cognitive metaphor theory (CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003; Lakoff, 1993; Gibbs, 1994) is similar enough that it warrants inclusion in the broad family of Blackian approaches. It is also the most well-known developments of Black's ideas, one which has provoked an abundance of research, not least of all in the analysis of political discourse.

This is not to say that CMT is a reiteration of Black. Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003) took Black's defence of the cognitive value of metaphor and developed a cognitive linguistic framework to explore it in ways which Black would not have envisioned. Black developed IT to account for active metaphors in language use, uses of language which we interpret metaphorically, and was largely unconcerned with applying metaphorical mapping to what he considered "trivial" metaphors, and even less concerned with "dead" metaphors. On a linguistic level, CMT theorists focus most of their efforts on these trivial and dead metaphors, metaphors which are so common in a language and culture that they are often used and processed literally in day-to-day communication. Thus, according to CMT, in

(3)   Our relationship *isn't going anywhere* (Lakoff, 1993, p. 206)

the italicised part of the statement is a metaphorical expression even though it would not easily be recognised as metaphorical by most people. CMT claims that this is metaphorical because it is based on a conceptual metaphor, that is a metaphor of thought rather than language. The conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY maps entities from the source domain, JOURNEY, to entities in the target domain, LOVE, so that we understand the target domain in terms of the source domain. Table 4.1 reproduces Lakoff's description of some of the ontological correspondence of entities between LOVE and JOURNEY (Lakoff, 1993, p. 207).

Table 4.1. The LOVE AS A JOURNEY mapping
The lovers correspond to travellers.
The love relationship corresponds to the vehicle.
The lover's common goals correspond to their common destinations on the journey.
Difficulties in the relationship correspond to impediments to travel.

This conceptual metaphor is part of the conceptual system which underlies language use, and is conventional in our culture. It motivates literal expressions such as (3) and other common metaphorical expressions such as: "Our relationship has hit a dead-end street", "we're at a crossroads", "we're spinning our wheels", "our relationship is off the track", "the marriage is on the rocks", etc. (Lakoff, 1993, p. 206). Other conventional metaphorical concepts prevalent in English speaking cultures (and beyond) include THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, ARGUMENT IS WAR, and many more. These are conceptual metaphors which structure the way we think and are constitutive of how we experience the world. As pointed out in Romero and Soria (2005a, pp. 8-9), in CMT there is terminological shift which has become influential and can be a cause for confusion: in CMT "metaphor" is chiefly used to denote metaphorical concepts rather than metaphorical linguistic expressions or utterances. In CMT, they are "metaphors we live by" meaning metaphorical concepts we live by and so live metaphors, though their expression at the linguistic level would have been considered trivial, dead, and even non-metaphorical in Black's IT.

However, not all linguistic expressions motivated by a conventional conceptual metaphor are like (3). Nor are all metaphorical concepts as conventional as LOVE IS A JOURNEY. Romero and Soria (2005a, p. 3) concisely outline the distinctions which are made or implied by CMT. The following discussion is based on their analysis.

There are three types of metaphorical concepts. We have already seen that conventional metaphorical concepts (or conventional metaphors), such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, are mappings between conceptual domains which are systematically part of our conceptual system and motivate a large range of expressions such as (3). In contrast, marginal metaphorical concepts (or marginal metaphors) are not systematic in our conceptual system and motivate few or perhaps even just a single metaphorical expression. An example of this would be the metaphorical concept MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON which motivates the expression "*the foot* of the mountain" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 55). Finally, new metaphorical concepts, novel metaphors, are new mappings between domains.

They represent new ways of thinking and have the potential to alter the conceptual system. An example of a new metaphorical concept is THEORIES ARE PATRIARCHS, which motivates the expression "Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children most of whom fight incessantly" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 53).

There are two main grounds on which to differentiate metaphorical expressions in CMT. One distinction parallels the distinction between metaphorical concepts: Dead metaphorical expressions are metaphorical expressions which are motivated by marginal metaphorical concepts. For example, the marginal metaphorical concept A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON motivates the dead metaphorical expression "the foot of the mountain", but the metaphorical concept does not systematically motivate other expressions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 55). Live metaphorical expressions are motivated by conventional metaphorical concepts which systematically motivate many expressions: LOVE IS A JOURNEY motivates (3) and many more. Finally, novel metaphorical expressions are motivated by new or novel metaphorical concepts: THEORIES ARE PATRIARCHS motivates "Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children most of whom fight incessantly" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 53).

Complicating this one-to-one relationship is the distinction between literal and non-literal metaphorical expressions. There is an obvious difference between (3) "our relationship isn't going anywhere" and (4), though both are based on the conventional metaphorical concept LOVE IS A JOURNEY:

(4)   Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra and then suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night, the ice weasels come. (Matt Groening. Quoted in Romero & Soria, 2016, p. 147)

There are some problems in CMT when dealing with examples such as (4). For now, it is enough to point out that (3) would not be recognised as anything but literal by a layman speaker, whereas (4) could not be taken as anything but non-literal, as love is, quite obviously, not something that can race across the tundra.

Combining the first and second distinctions, Romero and Soria (2005a) outline the taxonomy of metaphorical concepts and expressions in CMT. I reproduce an altered version of their schema in table 4.2, adding the examples they use from Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003).

Type of concept	Example concept	Expression distinction 1	Expression distinction 2	Expression distinction 3 [1 + 2]	Example metaphorical expression
Marginal metaphorical concepts	A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON	Dead	Literal	Literal dead	(5) We are going to the foot of the mountain
Conventional metaphorical concepts	THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS	Live		Literal live	(6) The foundations of my theory are sure
			Imaginative	Imaginative live (type A)	(7) His theory has thousands of little rooms
				Imaginative live (type B)	(8) These facts are the bricks of his theory
New / novel metaphorical concepts	THEORIES ARE PATRIARCHS	Novel		Imaginative novel	(9) Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children, most of whom fight incessantly

Table 4.2. Schema of metaphorical categories in CMT

(5) is a literal dead metaphor. It is literal by virtue of the fact that it is a conventional expression and dead by virtue of its marginal conceptual basis. (6) is a literal metaphor because it is a conventional linguistic expression based on the commonly used parts of a conventional metaphorical concept. (7) is an imaginative live metaphor because it is an unconventional expression of the unused parts of the conventional metaphorical concept: rooms are not usually part of the mapped entities in the conventional metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. (8) is a second type of imaginative live metaphor (type B). Like a literal live metaphor, it is based on the used parts of a conventional metaphorical concept, but unlike a literal live metaphor, it is an unconventional extension of the used parts: in (8) the use of "bricks" is an unconventional extension of the outer shell, but the outer shell is a commonly used part of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. Finally, (9) is novel in that it is based on a new metaphorical concept, and therefore imaginative, as it is not a conventional expression of a used part of a conventional metaphorical concept.

For the purposes of this thesis, we must focus on how CMT approaches imaginative live metaphors such as (7) and (8), and imaginative novel metaphors such as (9). The vast majority of CMT research, however, has been focused on the literal live metaphors such as

(6). This is largely because the research goals of CMT are quite different from mine: they are interested in discovering and describing metaphor's role in our conceptual system, the conventional metaphorical concepts which are constitutive of human cognition. My interest is in novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical uses of language, and how they are used in political communication. For such a pragmatic approach, CMT is quite limited.

To understand how CMT explains imaginative/novel metaphor, we must first understand that they reject traditional ideas of literal meaning (Lakoff, 1993, pp. 204-205), especially truth-conditional ideas of literalness. This in itself is not unusual in contemporary linguistic theories. The problem is in how CMT redefines the literal/figurative distinction: "those concepts that are not comprehended via conceptual metaphor might be called 'literal'" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 205). Distinguishing literalness in this way, on the conceptual level rather than the linguistic level, CMT does not recognise a principled distinction between literal and non-literal uses of metaphorical language. Imaginatively used metaphorical expressions such as (7), (8) and (9) are interpreted in the same way as literally used metaphorical expressions (5) and (6).

This brings us to the major distinction between mapping in IT and CMT: In CMT, "each mapping is a fixed pattern of conceptual correspondence across conceptual domains" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 210). Lakoff emphasises that they are "static" and "should not be thought of as processes" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 210). An imaginary or novel metaphorical expression (the terms are often used interchangeably in CMT) can draw on this cognitive system of conventional metaphorical concepts and "builds on it, but only rarely occurs independently of it" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 228). This is not the sense that we get from Black when he focused his interaction theory on the mapping between implicative complexes in active metaphors (Black, 1979, p. 442). In IT, mapping can be a dynamic active cognitive process involved in the online interpretation of language.

There are really three ways in which CMT analyses imaginative/novel metaphorical expressions. The first, and primary way, is to explain imaginary/novel metaphors by tracing their meaning back to a combination of conventional metaphorical concepts in the fixed, conventional metaphorical system. For example, given the expression

(10)   My job is a jail

Lakoff analyses it as being based on the confluence of three conventional metaphorical concepts; GENERIC IS SPECIFIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCE IS PHYSICAL FORCE, and the Event Structure Metaphor (Lakoff, 1993, p. 236).

Under this analysis, the GENERIC-SPECIFIC metaphorical concept preserves the image-schema of the knowledge schema that a jail restricts a prisoner's physical movement, "factoring out the specific details of the prisoner and the jail" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 236), giving a more general abstract schema: "X imposes extreme physical constraints on Y's movements" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 236). A sub-metaphor of the event structure metaphor, ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS, is combined with another generic-level PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCE IS PHYSICAL FORCE metaphor to map the schema mentioned above onto "X imposes extreme psychological constraints on Y's actions" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 236).

The first problem with this is that the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor, "an extremely common mechanism for comprehending the general in terms of the specific" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 235), blurs the boundary between metaphor and heuristic. Turner (1991) considers it a general mechanism of analogic reasoning. To consider it a conceptual metaphor would seem to stretch the concept of metaphor to breaking point. Can we say that there is a fixed mapping of entities between the source domain SPECIFIC and the target domain GENERIC, in the same way we talk about cross-domain mapping in the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor?

Furthermore, such abstract metaphors have very little explanatory power in how (10) is interpreted, particularly in different communicative contexts. Consider the following variations on (10), contextualised metaphorical utterances rather than decontextualised expressions:

(10a) [Mary congratulates her friend Peter, who has just received a promotion at work. Mary says:] I'm jealous. My job is a jail

(10b)   [In a discussion about workplace friendships, Mary has described working from home. Mary says:] My job is a jail

(10c) [Mary has just described her windowless office. Mary says:] My job is a jail

In (10a) the physical restraint of being in jail is mapped onto the professional constraint of not being able to advance in one's career. In (10b) physical constraint might not be mapped at all. Rather, it is the isolation from wider society which is mapped. In (10c), it is physical

environment of a type of windowless cell which is mapped to the physical description of the office.

Perhaps, CMT could argue that in these cases different generic-level conventional metaphors are used to interpret these utterances. Even so, CMT cannot explain why a hearer interprets one variation using one set of conventional metaphors and another using a different set of conventional metaphors, because it offers no theory of communication, no account of how a hearer reaches speaker's meaning. It is difficult to see what Lakoff's explanation can offer an analysis of the different uses of "my job is a jail" in discourse, beyond the very general heuristic of the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor.

A second approach to novel metaphor in CMT is restricted to image metaphors, metaphors which map "one conventional mental image onto another" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 229), defined as (a) conventional and (b) non-conceptual (Lakoff, 1993, p. 229). Lakoff (1993, p. 229) gives this example from the poem 'Free Union' by André Breton:

(11)   My wife . . . whose waist is an hourglass

Lakoff analyses this as a "one shot" metaphor, i.e., conventional images are mapped, rather than a set of concepts. The mental image of the conventional hourglass image is mapped onto the mental image of the conventional image of the woman's body. Thus, the middle of the hourglass is mapped onto the waist of the woman. It is not just these visual properties that are mapped, however. In

(12)   My horse with a mane made of short rainbows

Lakoff discusses how "image mapping allows us to map our evaluation of the source domain onto to the target" (1993, p. 230).

There are some problems with this analysis: first of all, a majority of readers cannot have or have had a conventional mental image of Breton's wife, only a conventional image of the concept WOMAN or WIFE. If we accept that the image is a conventional image of WOMAN or WIFE, Lakoff needs to explain why a hearer would arbitrarily separate this conventional image from the rest of their knowledge of the concept. Without an explanation of how metaphorical concepts are modified in context, this would seem impossible.

In (12) if, as Lakoff claims, the "source-domain" (Lakoff presumably means source-image here) "short rainbows" maps both an image and an evaluation, then non-

visual information is being mapped. The knowledge that rainbows are usually positively evaluated is not part of the visual aspects of the concept RAINBOW but part of its associated encyclopaedic knowledge. Lakoff's examples contradict his own definition of image metaphors which are defined by their mapping of images which are (a) conventional and (b) non-conceptual (Lakoff, 1993, p. 229).

Even without these internal contradictions, the theoretical concept of image metaphor is unfit for the analysis of novel metaphors. For example, (11) is taken from a surrealist poem, 'Free Union' in which highly unconventional imagery is intentionally used. Other metaphors in the poem include:

(13)   My wife [. . .] [w]hose waist is the waist of an otter caught in the teeth of a tiger
        (André Breton. Translated by David Antin, in Polizzotti, 2003, p. 89)

If (13) is an image metaphor, it is an unconventional one. There is no image "waist of otter caught in the teeth of a tiger" which is conventional in our conceptual system. It is therefore outside the scope of the image metaphor approach.

Later research in CMT has tended to embrace two other cognitive-linguistic theories with which they can analyse novel metaphors: the first is conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). This posits that rather than mapping between two conceptual domains, multiple conceptual domains (or input spaces) can be mapped to a blended space in which the structure of multiple domains can be partially combined. This theory is particularly useful to CMT because it is a cognitive theory which deals with online meaning construction i.e., a dynamic form of mapping rather than static concepts in the conceptual system (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008, p. 1829). However, it is not clear how CMT's later use of conceptual blending theory can be made coherent with Lakoff's earlier claims of metaphor as static, fixed mappings. Perhaps because of this, conceptual blending theory has not been completely accepted by CMT theorists. Gibbs criticised it for failing to predict behaviour which might be falsified (Gibbs, 2000, 2001). It has also been criticised for introducing needless complexity in some processes (Harder, 2003) and requiring a psychologically implausible number of mental spaces to explain the interpretation of some utterances (Ritchie, 2004). Furthermore, it has been claimed that some of the theoretical claims of the theory spring from its own metaphorical conception of cognition and may not directly describe neural structures in the brain, as claimed (Ritchie, 2004). For the purposes of this thesis, while conceptual blending might be a valid theory to explain the cognitive processes

involved in the construction of metaphorical concepts, it does not seem to have the pragmatic dimension necessary to explain how context affects the construction of ad hoc metaphorical concepts in the communication of speaker's meaning.

Another cognitive theory which intersects with later CMT is the neural theory of language (NTL) (Dodge & Lakoff, 2006; Lakoff, 2008a) in which reasoning is the activation of certain neuronal groups in the brain. As Tendahl and Gibbs note, NTL is quite a departure from earlier CMT: "Many aspects of metaphorical thought are now understood as 'metaphorical enactments' that occur in real-time as dynamic brain functions" (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008, p. 1829). Yet, in 2008, Lakoff (2008a, p. 25) still claims that "novel metaphorical language makes use of the existing system of conventional metaphors" and even that "in most cases, new conceptual metaphors that are easy to learn and make sense of are using conceptual mappings that pre-exist, frame-based knowledge that pre-exists and adding connections in the form of circuitry that binds, links, maps, extends and forms gestalts" (Lakoff, 2008a, p. 27). So, even in later CMT, both novel metaphorical expressions and new metaphorical concepts are explained via fixed mappings in the conceptual system. Though the later version of CMT seems to somewhat accept metaphorical mapping as an online process, there is still little to no distinction drawn between literal and non-literal uses of metaphorical language. Metaphor is only derivatively a linguistic phenomenon.

This position is often defended on the basis of psychological experiments which tested hearer's reaction times to metaphorical and literal language, and which showed an equivalency in reaction time (Gerrig, 1989; Gibbs, 1994). CMT theorists conclude that the cognitive processes for interpreting literal and metaphorical utterances must be the same.

This conclusion must be understood in the context of the Gricean approach to metaphor which describes metaphor as a two-stage process: an obviously false or trivially true literal proposition is interpreted as flouting the maxim of quality and the hearer derives implicatures to interpret the speaker's metaphorical meaning. If a hearer must undergo a two-stage process to interpret metaphorical language use, but a one-stage process to interpret literal language, then it is assumed that it should take a hearer longer to interpret the metaphorical utterances. By measuring reaction times, and finding them to be mostly equivalent, CMT researchers could disprove the two-stage thesis. There are many problems with this research, both methodologically and in the conclusions reached that literal and metaphorical utterances are interpreted via the same mechanism (Giora, 1999; Romero & Soria, 2013a) (See this thesis, section 4.4., for further discussion).

In summary, CMT has developed lists of fixed conventional metaphorical concepts which they see as generating metaphorical meaning, whether that metaphorical meaning results in a literal or metaphorical use of language is seen as largely irrelevant. Thus, the theory is strangely unbalanced. CMT sees metaphorical conventional concepts everywhere but is blinkered to metaphorically used language: "Paradoxically, Lakoff couples this hyperliteral model of metaphor understanding to a hypermetaphoric construal of literal language" (McGlone, 2001, p. 106).

Standard CMT rejects the necessity of identification criteria and a pragmatic analysis for metaphorical uses of language, and though they are strong supporters of conventional metaphorical meaning as a result of cross-domain mapping, they have traditionally overlooked cross-domain mapping as an active process in metaphor interpretation. Their later acceptance of blending theory and NTL seems to accept metaphor as an online cognitive process in working memory. Yet, their focus is still very much on how metaphorical expressions are based on fixed mappings in the conceptual system, rather than how novel metaphorical concepts, via metaphorical language use, can add "connections in the form of circuitry that binds, links, maps, extends and forms gestalts" (Lakoff, 2008a, p. 27). Surely, these latter added connections are just as important as studying fixed conceptual mappings, and their study requires that metaphorical uses of language be distinguished from literal.

4.2.3. Developments of Black: Pragmatic Interaction Theory

Contemporary developments of IT do not deny the insights and importance of work carried out in CMT. However, there is a recognition that CMT is limited and differs from Black's original insights in some important ways. Some of these differences are a matter of focus: CMT focuses on metaphor at the cognitive level, IT tends to focus on metaphor at the level of language use while still embracing Black's defence of the cognitive value of metaphor. More importantly are the ways in which they differ theoretically: CMT does not distinguish between literal and metaphorical interpretation in language processing. There are no criteria for the identification of metaphorical uses of language, and they are inconsistent on the existence of an active processes in metaphor processing.

IT has long addressed these issues (Black, 1954-5, 1977; Forceville, 1991, 1996, 1999, 2008, 2020; Gentner, 1981, 1983; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Gentner & Wolf, 2000;

Indurkhya, 1986; Kittay, 1987; Romero & Soria, 1997-8, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming).

Romero and Soria, in particular, have developed a pragmatic approach to metaphor which combines key insights of CMT, Black's IT and other developments in pragmatics and philosophy of language. The first important way in which they depart from CMT is by emphasising the metaphorical utterance as their unit of analysis. This is because utterances are "the only interpretable units" (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 9). CMT analyses metaphorical concepts and metaphorical expressions, both of which are decontextualised and, therefore, unsuitable for the analysis of the interpretation of metaphors in language use.

By taking the utterance as their unit of analysis, the need to distinguish non-literal from literal metaphorical uses of language becomes paramount. To illustrate what might be considered literal in CMT, Lakoff (1993, p 205) uses Searle's famous expression

(14)   The cat is on the mat (Searle, 1978, p. 208)

Lakoff analyses this sentence or expression as literal because it is not "comprehended via conceptual metaphor" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 205). Taking it as an utterance, however, Romero and Soria show how it can indeed be metaphorical:

(15)   [Sarah asks Marian where her one-year-old son is, and she answers:] My cat is on the mat (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 12)

Cleary, in this context, Sarah would have to take Marian's answer as metaphorical or as completely irrelevant to her question. CMT does not have the apparatus to describe such communicative situations because they blur the distinction between literal and metaphorical. In CMT metaphorical concepts are systematically expressed, and these expressions are literal metaphors.

Romero and Soria (2005a) reinstate the distinction literal/non-literal by emphasising the difference between conventional and non-conventional meanings. The metaphorical use of language is a type of non-literality. Conventional meanings are the "community's store of established knowledge" (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 10), a "code-like predictability of usage, forms, and meanings" (Toolan, 1996, p. 9. Quoted in Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 10), and knowledge of these meanings are built through linguistic and

extralinguistic experience. Conventional meanings contribute to the mutual cognitive environments which people draw on in order to communicate successfully (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95). Literal utterances are those in which a conventional meaning of each lexical item is operative until the interpretative process has concluded (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 14).

Metaphor is one of the ways that language can break the stability of these conventional meanings (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 10). To explain how, Romero and Soria draw distinctions between conceptions, concepts and domains. Concepts are "the constituents of thoughts and they are stable" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 187). Conceptions of concepts are "the lexical meanings of the words that express them [concepts] and must be understood as a complex idealisation of the understanding of the words when used" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 187). Finally, domains are "representations of a part of a conception associated with a concept" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 188).

The information which constitutes a conception can be stored at a certain conceptual address in three ways: logical, encyclopaedic and lexical (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, pp. 86-93). Logical content is a set of inferential rules associated with the concept. For example, in the case of the concept CAT, there is a conception which contains the inference rule whose output is ANIMAL OF A CERTAIN KIND (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 188). An encyclopaedic entry includes beliefs and experiences associated with the concept, whether this be idiosyncratic or commonly held: this might be anything from scientific knowledge of cats to personal experiences of cats to the appearance of cats (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 188). The lexical entry is the phonetic structure and grammatical properties of the word "cat" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 188).

In a literal utterance, words are used to communicate the conventional conception or conceptions of concepts. In active metaphorical utterances, however, some of the words are used to communicate non-conventional conceptions of concepts (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 191).

The use of "cat" in (15), starts from the conventional meanings or conceptions of the concept CAT and restructures the conception of INFANT. This is a provisional metaphorical restructuring of the conception of the concept; it is unlikely to result in a permanent restructuring of the concept INFANT in the conceptual system, neither Sarah's own conceptual system, nor the conventional concepts which she shares with her speech community. Yet, this provisional metaphorical restructuring is vital for communication to be successful in (15). "When a temporary conceptualization involves the construction of

an ad hoc category, an ad hoc concept is constructed for this category and we speak of ad hoc concept construction" (Romero & Soria, 2021a). Romero and Soria defend metaphor as a process of ad hoc concept construction.

How does Sarah identify (15) is an active metaphorical utterance? Romero and Soria (1997-8, 2005a) suggest two identification criteria: contextual abnormality, and conceptual contrast. A contextual abnormality is perceived when "an expression is used in an unusual linguistic or extralinguistic context" (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 12). In (15), Sarah recognises that "cat" cannot refer to a feline animal in this context and must have a non-conventional meaning. Conceptual contrast is perceived "when we identify one concept as a source domain and another concept as a target domain" (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 12). In (15), Sarah recognises that the concept CAT is being used to describe INFANT and adjusts her conceptions of both accordingly. She must "establish the metaphorical relation between the conceptions of the concepts" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 193).

Consider another example used often used by Romero and Soria, a metaphorical utterance which is unequivocally novel or active. Romero and Soria (2021a, forthcoming) analyse an extended metaphorical utterance from the film *About a Boy* (Weitz & Weitz, 2002). I also quote the contextual information included in Romero and Soria (forthcoming).

(16)   [The scene takes place just at the beginning of the film and shows the protagonist, Will, being alone at home and watching the TV program *Who Wants to be a Millionaire*? When the host asks, "Who wrote the sentence 'No man is an island'? John Donne? John Milton? John F. Kennedy? Jon Bon Jovi?", Will answers: "Jon Bon Jovi; too easy" and adds:]

And, if I may say so, a complete load of bollocks.
In my opinion, all men are islands.
And what's more, now's the time to be one.
This is an island age.
A hundred years ago, you had to depend on other people.
No one had TV or CDs or DVDs or videos.
... or home espresso makers.
Actually, they didn't have anything cool.
Whereas now, you see...

> ... you can make yourself a little island paradise.
>
> With the right supplies and the right attitude ...
>
> ... you can be sun-drenched, tropical, a magnet ...
>
> ... for young Swedish tourists.
>
> And I like to think that perhaps I am that kind of island.
>
> I like to think I'm pretty cool.
>
> I like to think I'm Ibiza.
>
> (*About a Boy*. Quoted in Romero & Soria, forthcoming)

This is an interesting example for a number of reasons, not least because it is a form of recursive ad hoc concept construction (Romero & Soria, 2021a). That is to say, while John Donne's "no man is an island" takes the stable concept of ISLAND as source domain, this is not the case with Will's extended metaphor in which "the source domain is already an ad hoc concept represented by a combination of words such as the complex noun phrase 'an island which is sun-drenched, tropical and a magnet for young Swedish tourists'; or the anaphoric phrase, 'that kind of island', pointing to the previous one" (Romero & Soria, 2021a). Furthermore, while Donne's utterance has a conventional conceptualisation of MAN for the target domain, meaning humanity in general[15], this is not the case in Will's utterances where the target domain is a specific kind of male, a man like Will (Romero & Soria, 2021a). They analyse the ad hoc source domain and ad hoc target domain used as input into the metaphorical process as shown in table 4.3 (Romero & Soria, forthcoming):

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[15] For this reason, I later represent the concept as HUMAN rather than MAN

Table 4.3. Representation of the source domain and target domain involved in the interpretation of (16)	
Source domain (D$_s$): IBIZA-TYPE OF ISLAND	**Target domain (D$_t$):** WILL-TYPE OF MAN
D$_s$ = <V$_s$, S$_s$ >	**D$_t$ = <V$_t$, S$_t$>**
V$_s$ = {'Ibiza', 'island', 'beach', 'sun-drenched', 'beach', 'tourist', 'separated', 'mainland', 'Spain', 'Balearic islands', 'fun', 'sexual freedom', etc}	**V$_t$** = {'man', 'young', 'male', 'TV', 'home espresso maker', 'independent', 'unmarried', 'fellow beings', 'sex without marriage', etc}
S$_s$ = [1$_s$] Ibiza is a Spanish island, a Spanish body of land isolated from Spain's mainland by water, [2$_s$] Ibiza is a sun-drenched island with fantastic conditions to enjoy life, [3$_s$] Ibiza has beautiful beaches, [4$_s$] Ibiza often receives young tourists in search of fun, [5$_s$] In the sixties, foreigners arrived in Spanish islands such as Ibiza and changed the local lifestyle. [6$_s$] In the sixties, Ibiza was a very attractive place for many young female tourists (Swedish, Danish, German…) with a look and behaviour very different from local women (they were generally called "las suecas" and became the symbol of sexual freedom in Spain). [7$_s$] Ibiza is a body of land isolated from Spain's mainland but part of an island chain, the Balearic Islands, etc.	**S$_t$ =** [1$_t$] Will-type-of-man is an individual human being independent from his fellow beings, [2$_t$] Will lives alone in a fantastic house, [3$_t$] Will has very good supplies at home (TV, DVDs, CDs, home espresso maker), [4$_t$] Will is free to make decisions on his own, [5$_t$] Will's attitude makes him enjoy a very independent lifestyle, etc.

Source domain terms like "island", "sun-drenched", and "tropical" etc. are used here in a non-conventional way (contextual abnormality) to describe an ad hoc category of human male to which Will belongs (conceptual contrast). The identification criteria indicate that an utterance is metaphorical and that a metaphorical interpretation is needed; a pragmatic process of mapping (M), from a source domain (D$_s$), to a target domain (D$_t$) is triggered. This is an online process involved in the act of interpretation, rather than a conventional mapping which is fixed in the conceptual system. The domains are representations of parts of the conventional conceptions of D$_s$ and D$_t$. They consist of a set of terms, or vocabulary (V) and a set of structural constraints (S). M consists of (i) a partial

admissible function F^{16} from source domain terms (V_s), to target domain terms (V_t) or potential target domain terms and (ii) the subset of source domain structural constraints (S_s) which are coherently transformable to the structural constraints of the target domain (S_t) (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 195). In the example, this entails (i) a partial function, F, between terms formed by pairs such as (Island → man), (separated → independent), (mainland → fellow beings) etc., and (ii) a subset of sentences from the source domain (S) which can be transformed coherently using F to information associated only with the target domain. S is coherent and transformable by F if the union is true under at least one model (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 195). In the example, S is formed by [1_s] - [7_s], sentences that include properties that are not literally applied to WILL-TYPE OF MAN. Source domain terms get the meaning of the target domain terms to which they are applied in F, meaning that is established in the metaphorically restructured target domain. In (16) some terms such as "islands", "tropical", "sun-drenched" etc. acquire a provisional metaphorical meaning, derived from a restructured non-conventional conception of WILL-TYPE OF MAN. It is a provisional meaning which intervenes at the level of constituents, i.e., a sub-personal, sub-propositional process (Romero & Soria 2005a, p. 16). What is said with (16) is, therefore, metaphorically said. Table 4.4 shows the restructured target domain $D_t^{'}$, or D_t^{M},[17] which provides the metaphorical context needed for the interpretation of the utterance (Romero and Soria, forthcoming):

Table 4.4. Representation of the metaphorically restructured target domain involved in the interpretation of (16)
Restructured target domain ($D_t^{'}$ or WILL-TYPE OF MAN^{M}): WILL-TYPE OF MAN AS IBIZA-TYPE OF ISLAND
[1_t'] Will-type-of-man is an individual human being independent from his fellow beings, [2_t'] Will lives alone in a fantastic house, [3_t'] Will has very good supplies at home (TV, DVDs, CDs, home espresso maker), [4_t'] Will-type-of-man is free to make decisions on his own, [5_t'] Will's attitude makes him enjoy a very independent lifestyle, [6_t'] Will-type-of-man often receives occasional visitors in search of fun, (new coming from [4s]) [7_t'] Will-type-of-man is a very attractive man for occasional female beautiful visitors with the right attitude (sexual freedom typical of "las suecas" in Spain) to enjoy his good conditions with him but with no intention to get permanent local rights. (new coming from [6_s])

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[16] F is admissible in that it preserves the types of arguments and values of the function according to their lexical entries.

[17] Both notations, $D_t^{'}$ and D_t^{M}, have been used for the restructured target domain by Romero and Soria in different papers. I have decided to use D_t^{M} for my own examples in this thesis, because I feel it facilitates reading.

The mapping M for (16) generates a metaphorically restructured conception, WILL-TYPE OF MAN AS IBIZA-TYPE OF ISLAND, characterised by the structural constraints of table 4.4. With [1_t'] to [5_t'] nothing new is added to the target domain from the source domain but some information is reinforced and highlighted by the relational similarities that are revealed by their alignment with the characteristics activated (by the utterance) in the source domain. For example, [1_t] is strengthened via alignment with [1_s], resulting in [1_t']. In addition, when the description of the target domain from the source domain adds information which is not present in the first one but is consistent with it and relevant to the intended metaphorical meaning, novel properties emerge in the target domain as in the case of [6_t'] and [7_t']. Romero and Soria make it clear that the online mapping from source domain to target domain also allows for some target domain constraints to be weakened in the restructured target domain, although they do not include an example in their analysis of (16). As an example of this, we can suppose that a Will-type of man might be considered immature. In fact, the main theme of the film is Will's growth into a more mature kind of man who has meaningful relationships. We already have a constraint in IBIZA-TYPE OF ISLAND, constraint [4_s], which could be coherently mapped to strengthen a constraint of immaturity. However, the constraint of immaturity is not relevant to Will's intended meaning in (16) and so it is not selected as part of the restructured target domain. In pragmatic IT, the strengthening, weakening and creation of constraints is part of reaching the intended propositional meaning of the speaker, guided by relevance and coherence. This allows us to explain the different metaphorical effects of utterances in discourse.

Imagine if an interlocutor were to say to Will, the protagonist of *About a Boy*:

(17)   While it is true that men can be islands, and some men are Ibizas, other men are romantic Greek islands, full of history and culture

Conventional conceptual metaphors, such as the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 172), cannot explain the nuances of metaphorical meaning in such an interaction as that of (17)[18]. Using pragmatic IT we can argue that we have three different metaphorical concepts in the interlocutor's utterance (HUMANS AS ISLANDS, WILL-TYPE OF MAN AS IBIZA-TYPE ISLAND, and OTHER-TYPE OF MAN AS GREEK-TYPE OF ISLAND). The first

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[18] Rash (2006, p. 115-117) makes a similar point regarding the lack of explanatory or descriptive power of THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor.

metaphorical concept takes well-established concepts as its input; conventional conceptualisations of HUMANS and ISLANDS. However, the second two take ad hoc target domains and ad hoc source domains as their inputs. Moreover, while the interlocutor draws on the metaphorical context of Will's utterance, his metaphorical conception of WILL-TYPE OF MAN AS IBIZA-TYPE ISLAND is not the same as the metaphorical conception involved in Will's utterance of (16). In (17), the interlocutor wants to compare an immature man with a mature one; the coherent constraint that a Will-Type of man is immature is strengthened rather than weakened in the search for relevance. In order to explain the subtleties of metaphorical utterances in political discourse, we need to be able to explain these differences between metaphorical ad hoc concept construction, recursive metaphorical ad hoc construction, and the way that constraints can be weakened, strengthened and introduced in discourse. This is a different kind of ad hoc concept construction than that supported by categorisation theories (Glucksberg, 2001) and later relevance theory (Wilson & Sperber, 2012b; Wilson, 2003; Carston, 2002). While they support a form of ad hoc concept construction via loosening or a combination of narrowing and loosening, Romero and Soria defend analogical transfer (mapping) as a process of ad hoc concept construction (Romero & Soria, 2014).

Because this is a sub-propositional process, Romero and Soria (2005a, p. 17) explicitly argue against a two-stage metaphorical interpretation in which an initial literal proposition is rejected as false, which has been the traditional view in pragmatics (Grice, 1989f; Searle, 1979/93).[19] Though reaction time experiments might have disproved the two-stage process, Romero and Soria (2013a) show that they do not preclude a sub-propositional interpretative process particular to metaphor.

In summary, Romero and Soria's pragmatic approach recognises the insights of Black's IT and CMT into metaphorical meaning, while developing the theoretical tools necessary for a pragmatic analysis of the metaphorical use of language. They draw a distinction between literal and metaphorical utterances which does not rely on the truth or falsity of a proposition, but on contemporary pragmatic research into how propositional

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[19] Nevertheless, in his 'Retrospective epilogue' (Grice, 1989e), Grice already suspected that something can be said non-formally. Romero and Soria (2013c, p. 557) explain that in the cases that Grice (1989e, p. 361) called cases of dictiveness without formality (examples such as the utterance of the sentence "He is an evangelist" in a context in which he is not an evangelist), the speaker meant what in fact his words said. His words would be dictive but their content would be nonformal and not part of the conventional meaning of the words used. In particular, with this utterance, the speaker says that he is a sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-grubber. In cases like this, what is non-conventionally signified can also be said.

meaning is dependent on context in utterance interpretation. This distinction allows them to develop identification criteria for the metaphorical use of language, as well as elaborating on how Black's understanding of metaphor as cross-domain mapping operates as both a pragmatic and cognitive process in communication. This pragmatic interaction theory (pragmatic IT) will allow me to analyse the powerful effects of novel or active metaphorical utterances in political discourse: how such metaphor can communicate the conceptions of concepts held by individuals, and how speakers might provisionally modify audiences' conceptions of concepts (ad hoc metaphorical concepts). Since the modification and communication of conceptions of concepts is also key to the Freeden's theory of ideology, the two frameworks would seem to be particularly suited to each other for an analysis of how metaphor can be used ideologically.

As I discuss other theories of metaphor in this chapter, I will compare them against Romero and Soria's IT in order to illustrate why this theory is the most suitable to my research aims.

4.3. Categorisation Theories

4.3.1. Glucksberg's Categorisation Theory

I have described the developments of Black's IT as it developed into CMT and pragmatic IT, two theories which, although they do not fight incessantly, do not always see eye-to-eye. Now I turn to the other major family of theories of metaphor, categorisation theories, of which the work of Glucksberg (2001) is the patriarch.

Glucksberg approaches metaphor using two theoretical components: The first sees the act of using metaphor as a class inclusion statement. In

(18)   My lawyer is a shark

the metaphorical vehicle "shark" has a dual-reference role (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 38). Firstly, it refers to the lexicalised meaning of a vicious predator and secondly, a metaphorical superordinate category to which both a lawyer and a shark can belong (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 41). (18) states that the concept LAWYER belongs to this superordinate category. The recategorization of LAWYER is possible because "when two objects can be sensibly grouped into a single category, then they can resemble each other precisely with respect to the salient characteristics of that category" (Glucksberg, 2001, p.

41). Table 4.5 reproduces Glucksberg's list of the two concepts referenced by "shark" in (18):

Table 4.5. Concepts referenced by "shark "in utterance (18)	
Metaphorical Shark	**Literal Shark**
Vicious Predatory Aggressive Tenacious	Vicious Predatory Aggressive Tenacious Can swim Has fins Has sharp teeth Has leathery skin Has gills

By uttering (18), I can say that my lawyer is vicious, predatory, aggressive, and tenacious because SHARK as a metaphorical superordinate category functions as an attributive category; it provides properties to be attributed to the topic. These functional categories are "partly retrieved from memory and partly constructed as needed" (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 44). For Glucksberg, metaphor interpretation involves, at least in part, an online process in working memory.

Glucksberg claims that the metaphorical topic (in this case LAWYER) is a local context which affects the construction of SHARK (superordinate category). Thus, when we change the topic, we change the local context which constructs the subordinate category: "even with conventional metaphors, context guides and constrains concept construction, that is, interpretation" (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 44). The metaphorical process is also pragmatic.

The view of metaphor as categorisation lets Glucksberg explain some of the issues particular to the metaphorical use of language. For example, the fact that similes of the form X is like Y, can be expressed as class inclusion statements, X is Y, with little change in meaning, but literal similes cannot:

(19a)   My lawyer is like a shark

(19b)   My lawyer is a shark

(20a)   Copper is like tin

(20b)   Copper is tin

(19a) and (19b) are acceptable variations of each other as categorical statements. (20a) is a true proposition but (20b) is a false proposition. Glucksberg claims that this is because literal comparisons compare two concepts at the same level of abstraction, and "typically belong to the same category" (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 38) while metaphors and similes, being implicit class inclusion statements, involve "two entities [which] are at different levels in a taxonomic hierarchy" (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 42). He observes that while literal comparisons can be reversed ("tin is like copper" and "copper is like tin"), class inclusion statements cannot ("a tree is a plant" but not "a plant is a tree") (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 44). This leads Glucksberg to posit identification criteria or metaphor cues which indicate to a hearer that a metaphorical interpretation is necessary (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 46):

1. The dual-reference of the metaphor vehicle or "the recognition that the assertion can be paraphrased as a simile".
2. Provision of salient properties of the superordinate category, exemplified by the vehicle, which are to be attributed to the topic.

To summarise the theory so far: when interpreting an utterance of (18), a hearer recognises that the vehicle "shark" has dual reference (SHARK [literal] and SHARK [metaphorical]) and that SHARK (metaphorical) is a higher-level category than LAWYER. The topic LAWYER gives the context in which the concept SHARK (metaphorical) is constructed, providing the salient properties of viciousness, predation, aggression, and tenacity. These properties are attributed to LAWYER.

The mechanism that makes this possible is outlined in the second component of the theory: the interactive property attribution model (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 51). In addition to the dual function of the vehicle, Glucksberg claims that the topic functions as a local context for the construction of the metaphorical category (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 53): "For any given metaphor topic, only certain sorts of property attributions would be context appropriate, that is, interesting and/or relevant" (p. 53). Here his use of the term relevance is different than in relevance theory. He means relevance in terms of "dimensions of attribution" or "the dimensions of within-category variation" (p. 53).

LAWYER for example can provide a limited number of dimensions for attribution: skill, experience, temperament, ambition, reputation, and cost, among others (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 54). In (18), presumably the dimensions of attribution are skill and/or ambition.

SHARK provides properties which are matched to these dimensions. Other metaphor topics have more dimensions of attribution and so are less constraining on the construction of the metaphorical ad hoc category (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 54). There are thus two factors which influence the attribution of properties to a topic: the superordinate category exemplified by the vehicle, and the constraining influence of the topic "metaphor topics and vehicles are used interactively to generate interpretations" (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 55).

Most criticisms of Glucksberg's theory are also applicable to relevance theory (RT), and these will be discussed further after I have described the approach of RT. Nevertheless, there is one Glucksberg-specific question to which I have not found satisfactory answers to: Glucksberg's metaphor cues seem to run into a problem. The recognition of dual reference of the metaphorical vehicle is a criterion for metaphorical interpretation. The vehicle of the metaphor has a dual-referential function (SHARK [literal] and SHARK [metaphorical] in "My lawyer is a shark") as opposed to the single referential functions in a literal comparison (COPPER in "tin is like copper") and literal categorisation (PLANT in "a tree is a plant"). The difference between class-inclusion statements and literal comparisons was that literal comparisons compare concepts at the same level of a taxonomic hierarchy, whereas class inclusion statements categorise a concept within a category at a different level. The important question for a theory of metaphor as *implicit* class-inclusion assertions (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 44) is how the hearer recognises that the vehicle has a dual referential function and thereby recognises that the topic and vehicle refer to concepts at a different level. Glucksberg says that the "default level of referring expressions is usually at the basic level of categorization" (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 5). If this is so, the most accessible concept derivable from "shark" is SHARK [literal], the basic level, not SHARK [metaphorical], the superordinate category. SHARK is at the same basic level as LAWYER and so a hearer should interpret it in the same way as "tin is copper" or "a wasp is a bee"—false literal propositions which do not provoke a metaphorical interpretation. Glucksberg does suggest that categorisation statements are often cross-category, and it is true that this is one major difference between "my lawyer is a shark" and "tin is copper". However, if Glucksberg's theory cannot explain same-category metaphors then it is not in a position to explain all predicative metaphors of the A IS B form, never mind the non-predicative metaphors and extended metaphors we would expect to find in political discourse. Perhaps Glucksberg would turn to relevance as the mechanism by which hearers recognise the dual function of the metaphor vehicle. As we shall see, however, relevance theory's form of categorisation

theory is quite different to Glucksberg's. They do not see metaphor interpretation as involving any process which distinguishes it from non-metaphorical language.

4.3.2. Relevance Theory

Relevance theory (RT) (Carston, 2002, 2010a, 2010b, 2018; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95; Wilson, 2003; Wilson & Carson, 2008; Wilson & Sperber, 2012b) is a cognitive-pragmatic theory of communication, so their focus is not on metaphorical concepts, nor metaphorical language, but they do try to account for it within the wider theory. For this reason, I will first have to briefly outline some of the main tenets of RT before discussing their views on metaphor.

RT is a radical development of Grice's ideas for whom an essential feature of most human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and recognition of intentions (Grice, 1957/89, 1967/89, 1969/89, 1981/89, 1982/89, 1987/89). In developing this claim, Grice laid the foundations for an inferential model of communication, an alternative to the classical code model.

Relevant theorists, develop this inferential model of communication from a cognitive and experimental perspective. 'Relevance' is a technical term for a property of inputs to cognitive processes, processes which have been shaped by evolution to find the most cognitive benefits for the least cognitive effort (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 261). To put it simply, it is a kind of cost/benefit analysis. In processing an utterance, a hearer automatically searches for positive cognitive effects weighed against the effort involved in deriving them, and when he gets enough, he stops. Every utterance communicates a presumption of optimal relevance:

a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it.

b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.

Any hearer will have expectations of relevance when interpreting the utterance. This is coupled with a development of Gricean ideas of reflexive intentions and conversational implicature: speaker's meaning is inferred by a hearer based on the manifest intentions of the speaker, by conveying partially pragmatically derived communicated

assumptions (intended propositions which result from logical extensions or modulations of the explicit meaning of sentence elements or explicature) and a wholly pragmatically derived array of weakly and/or strongly communicated assumptions (implicit intended propositions or implicatures). As an example, consider the following non-metaphorical utterance:

(21)   Peter: For Billy's birthday party, it would be nice to have some kind of show.

Mary: Archie is a magician. Let's ask him. (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 104)

Peter decodes Mary's sentence but must pragmatically adjust the semantic meaning of the words to derive speaker's meaning. He recognises that Mary's utterance is a communicative act and therefore expects it to be optimally relevant to him (that he will be able to derive cognitive benefits from it without the exertion of undue processing power). Furthermore, he can expect it to be relevant in a particular way, by addressing his suggestion that they have a show for Billy's birthday party (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 112).

Guided by his search for relevance, Peter carries out several pragmatic tasks, not necessarily in sequential order. He assigns reference to ARCHIE$_x$ and the anaphoric reference for the pronoun "him". "Magician" has different lexicalised senses; MAGICIAN$_1$, "someone with supernatural powers who performs magic"; and MAGICIAN$_2$, "someone who does magic tricks to amuse an audience" (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 105). Peter disambiguates the meaning of "magician" to derive one of its lexicalised senses, MAGICIAN$_2$. He derives an implicit premise (implicature), that a MAGICIAN$_2$ puts on magic shows that children enjoy. He derives an implicated conclusion (implicature), that Archie could put on a magic show for Billy's birthday. He confirms his interpretation of the explicit content (explicature) of Mary's utterance, that Archie is a MAGICIAN$_2$. He reaches his first overall interpretation of (21) and accepts it as Mary's meaning: Archie is a MAGICAN$_2$ who could put on a magic show for Billy's birthday party that the children would enjoy (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 112).

Considering a metaphorical utterance such as (22),

(22)   Peter: I've had this bad back for a while now, but nobody has been able to help.

Mary: My chiropractor is a magician. You should go and see her. (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 112)

the heuristic Peter uses is assumed to be the same as with literal utterance (21), an inferential process of deriving explicatures and implicatures from the decoded linguistic meaning, guided by relevance. However, instead of disambiguating "magician" to derive its lexicalised meaning MAGICIAN$_2$, Peter derives an ad hoc concept MAGICIAN*. This ad hoc concept is derived from the lexicalised MAGICIAN$_1$ "someone with supernatural powers who performs magic" (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 104), which is loosened to a meaning which can be approximately paraphrased as someone who "can achieve extraordinary things". Using this ad hoc concept MAGICIAN*, Peter reaches a relevant interpretation of (22): that "Mary's chiropractor is a MAGICIAN*, who would be able to help Peter better than others by achieving extraordinary things" (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 113).

Loosening is one way that a concept can be adjusted in context. Narrowing is another. An example of loosening is

(23)   Holland is flat (Wilson & Sperber, 2002/12, p. 54)

Holland could not be uniformly flat, and so the concept FLAT has been loosened to the ad hoc concept FLAT*. In

(24)   I have a temperature (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 105)

the speaker has an abnormally high or low temperature for a human being. The concept TEMPERATURE has been narrowed to TEMPERATURE*.

In RT, metaphor can involve loosening or a combination of narrowing and loosening. For example, in a metaphorical utterance of

(25)   [Mary says:] Caroline is a princess (adapted from Wilson & Carston, 2008, p. 2)

where Caroline is Mary's spoilt sister, the concept PRINCESS is loosened in its logical entry (Caroline is not a daughter of a King and Queen) but narrowed in its encyclopaedic entry (a sub-set of princesses who are spoilt, selfish, etc.).

Because relevance theorists view metaphor as involving these kinds of concept adjustment, they see no qualitative differences between metaphorical utterances such as (25) and other forms of loosening and narrowing. They see metaphor as part of continuum

of loose and narrow uses of concepts. If there is a perceived difference, it is because "the effort required for ad hoc concept construction calls for matching effects, and given the freedom left to the interpreter in the construction process, these effects are unlikely to consist in just a few strongly implicated strong implications" (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 122). In other words, metaphor interpretation involves the loosening or loosening and narrowing of concepts to derive an explicature and the derivation of an array of weak implicatures. They therefore claim that "there is no mechanism specific to metaphors [. . .] metaphors are not a 'natural kind', and 'metaphor' is not a theoretically important notion in the study of verbal communication" (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 97). They call this their "deflationary account" of metaphor.

4.3.3. Problems with Categorisation Theories

The title "deflationary account" is metaphorical. It is also polarising: It emphasises the RT account as reasonable and down-to-earth while emphasising that other theories of metaphor are inflated, perhaps in the way that we might say that a person with excessive self-esteem has an inflated opinion of themselves. Sperber and Wilson explicitly align themselves with Glucksberg and in opposition to CMT (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 97) and so, at least in tone, the deflationary account seems to be a reaction against the claims of CMT regarding the ubiquity and importance of metaphorical thought.

Yet, though they might differ in the cognitive mechanisms involved, both RT and CMT end up making the same radical claim that the metaphorical use of language is neither qualitatively different from most literal language use, nor a theoretically useful concept for understanding how metaphor works in communication.

Let's turn back, momentarily, to the patriarchs: Black's IT and Glucksberg's categorisation view. Glucksberg categorises himself and Black as having similar views (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 29). He even states that "Metaphors work via an interaction between the metaphor vehicle and the metaphor topic" (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 52). The view of metaphorical utterances as implicit class-inclusion statements does not, nor is it supposed to, fully explain how metaphor works in communication: "our account of metaphors as categorisations that create new, relevant, and useful characterisations of their topics does not, however, solve the problem of how people come to understand metaphors" (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 51). This is why Glucksberg develops the interactive property attribution model, in which the topic which provides dimensions for attribution, while a

metaphor vehicle provides properties to be attributed to the topic. "Providing attributes to the topic" in Glucksberg and "mapping entailments to a primary subject" in Black, though perhaps not the same process, seem to be close enough for Glucksberg to consider his theory as similar to Black's, and he explicitly refers to his model as an interaction view (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 55). How do they differ?

The distinction between them becomes clear when we consider the emergent property issue. This is an aspect of metaphor that all theories must contend with: How properties which do not seem to be part of target domain/topic concepts nor source domain/vehicle concepts seemingly emerge when they are used in metaphor. In other words, properties emerge in metaphor that are "neither standardly associated with the individual constituents of the utterance in isolation nor derivable by standard rules of semantic composition" (Wilson & Carston, 2008, p. 1). For example, in the utterance of (26)

(26)   [Two members of a university department, Mary and Robert, have every different views on how to cope with the recent announcement that their department's funding is to be severely cut. Mary is reluctant to discuss her ideas with Robert, commenting:] Robert is a bulldozer (Romero & Soria, 2014, p. 492)

the speaker communicates the properties that the referent is forceful, stubborn, persistent, insensitive to others etc., yet "our encyclopaedic knowledge of bulldozers [. . .] is unlikely to include the information that they may be forceful, stubborn, persistent, and insensitive to the feelings and viewpoints of others" (Romero and Soria, 2014, p. 494).

Under Glucksberg's categorisation model, the word bulldozer serves a dual-referential function, to the basic level BULLDOZER (literal), a machine for clearing rubble, rocks, and so on, and BULLDOZER (metaphorical) a superordinate category of things which are stubborn, persistent, forceful and insensitive, a category which, by virtue of the utterance, attributes those properties to Robert. The category BULLDOZER (metaphorical) is constructed with these properties because they correspond to a dimension or dimensions for attribution of the topic, ROBERT, presumably temperament.

The problem pointed out by Romero and Soria (2014) is that out of the properties of attribution which construct the category BULLDOZER, only one can be literally (or at least, with a common lexicalised meaning) be applied to bulldozers and human temperament: forceful. Yet forceful in terms of human temperament is not the same property as forceful

in terms of physical force. Human forcefulness is not the same property as bulldozer forcefulness. There are no literal properties of dimension in ROBERT to correspond to properties of attribution in BULLDOZER (literal), and so Glucksberg's BULLDOZER* (metaphorical) cannot explain (26), unless his interactive property attribution model tacitly presupposes a stage of analogical transfer. The emergent property problem brings these issues into relief, but Glucksberg has the same problem with metaphors such as (18). Ferociousness might be a property which can be applied to both sharks and lawyers but literally attributing the property of shark-ferocity to a lawyer would suggest a murderous lawyer rather than an overly ambitious or ruthless one.

One possible solution for categorisation views is that emergent properties are connotated by the basic level reference of the metaphor vehicle, BULLDOZER (literal) in (26). Sperber and Wilson dismiss this solution:

(27)   [Woman to uncouth suitor:] Keep your paws off me!

They write:

> From an inferential point of view, the idea that the literal meaning of 'paw' is discarded while its connotations remain is even more puzzling than the smile of the Cheshire cat: the cat's smile lingers at an empty location, whereas the connotations of the literal meaning of "paw" are supposed to adorn the figurative meaning that has replaced it. (Sperber & Wilson, 2008/12, p. 120)

According to RT, in (26) the logical entry of the concept BULLDOZER is loosened or loosened and narrowed to allow it to be applied to ROBERT, giving us the metaphorical explicature:

(26b)   ROBERT$_X$ is a BULLDOZER* (forceful, insensitive, etc.)

In order to bridge the gap between (26) and (26b), to explain how these properties emerge from BULLDOZER, relevance theorists suggest that the properties themselves are also metaphorically adjusted, "the comprehension process involves a metaphor inside a metaphor", (Wilson & Carston, 2008, p. 15). In that case, the explicature would look like (26c)

(26c)   ROBERT_x is a BULLDOZER* (forceful*, insensitive*, etc.)

This entails that it is the encyclopaedic properties of encyclopaedic properties that are attributed literally to the topic. One problem with this is that it suggests infinite regression (Romero & Soria, 2014, p. 498). If the encyclopaedic properties of the encyclopaedic properties of BULLDOZER cannot be applied literally to the topic, we would need to loosen those properties, and so on, and the cognitive effort would soon outweigh the cognitive benefits.

Another problem with this solution is that, at least for cross-category metaphors, the gap between lexicalised concept and metaphorical meaning remains: no amount of loosening to the properties of BULLDOZER can give us the literal property of stubborn that can apply to Robert (Romero & Soria, 2014, p. 499). We need analogical transfer to bridge that gap. Recanati (2007, p. 163) agrees: "the imaginary mixing of features from both the source and the target is the most characteristic feature of metaphor. That property is, indeed, irreducible to loosening."

Relevance theorists endorse their version of the categorisation view because they see it as part of a wider inferential model of human communication. To be more precise, RT views the inferential processes involved in human communication as utilising a particular type of non-demonstrative inference. Sperber and Wilson's position on inference has been criticised as overly reductionist (Cummings, 1998) and that it suffers from some of the same weaknesses as scientific positivism: "the idea that nothing counts as a contribution to 'cognitive science' unless it is presented in terms of 'mental representations' (and these described 'computationally')" (Putnam, 1988, p. 55-56).

Recanati (2002) observes that the relevance theoretic conception of inference is quite restrictive (Recanati, 2002, p. 121) in that inference is assumed to be sub-personal, or unconscious, and yet "the transition must be from a conceptual representation to a conceptual representation [and] must be truth-preserving" (Recanati, 2002, p. 121). Recanati doubts that what he calls primary pragmatic processes (pragmatic processes involved in determining what is said) can be truth-preserving, or that the inferential transitions that they involve need to be from conceptual representation to conceptual representation. Furthermore, he states that primary pragmatic processes "are not *themselves* inferential (in the sense intended by Sperber and Wilson), even if they can be *embedded in* a broader inferential process [emphasis in original]" (Recanati, 2002, p. 123). He points

out that the embedding of non-inferential processes within inferential processes is already admitted in relevance theory, in their idea of how decoding and inference work together (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 737). Perhaps Sperber and Wilson's insistence on a purely inferential model of metaphor needs to be revised in their quite atypical and overly restrictive view of inference. While they are unlikely to view analogy as inferential in itself, the embedding of sub-personal analogical processes in a wider inferential model would make their model no-less inferential. After all, in standard RT, the decoding of linguistic signs does not make human communication less inferential. There have been debates within mainstream RT which indicate that their deflationary continuity view of metaphor does not satisfy them as an explanation for all types of metaphor (Carston, 2018, Carston 2010a, 2010b; Rubio-Fernández et al., 2015) and there have been arguments for incorporating analogy into categorisation views (Wearing, 2014).

There is a long history of scholars attempting to explain analogy as forms of deductive or inductive reasoning, at least going back to John Stuart Mill. There is a strong argument that analogy is a form of inference in itself, "based on comparisons between the causal or higher-order relationships in which the items in an analogy operate" (Shelley, 2003, p. 6). Many structuralist theories of analogy (Gentner, 1981, 1983; Polya, 1945; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) endorse an inferential view of analogy as structural mapping. Applied to metaphor, it is only IT theorists and CMT theorists who accept analogy as an inferential process, and only IT theorists who attempt to explain the function of sub-propositional analogical processes in how novel metaphors are interpreted in communication. So far, it is the only explanation of how emergent properties arise and how cross-category metaphors are inferred which does not "kick the can down the road" so-to-speak, i.e., by positing improbably recursive loosened properties of loosened properties, or superordinate categories which spontaneously generate insensitivity from bulldozers.

This is by no means meant to deny the contributions which Glucksberg and relevance theorists have made to the study of communication, and to an understanding of metaphorical language use. One of the merits of these approaches is the way in which they focus on the ad hoc restructuring of concepts so that properties are applied to a target domain. Romero and Soria accept that loosening and narrowing of concepts can contribute to metaphor interpretation since, for them, one of the characteristics of novel metaphor is that the source is often modulated online in order to analogically map the properties of the ad hoc concept that results from this modulation to the target concept. Glucksberg's property attribution model might be compatible with IT mapping if a form of analogical

transfer is accepted. Furthermore, besides providing a wider pragmatic and cognitive account of communication in which to contextualise a mapping approach to metaphor, RT's conception of relevance is useful for evaluating how features from a source domain are contextually selected and mapped to a target domain.

4.4. Metaphorical Meaning at Different Levels of Speaker's Meaning

The previous discussion primarily focused on the different mechanisms (mapping or class-inclusion) by which theories explain how metaphorical effects are obtained. While all of the theories discussed so far would seem to agree that metaphorical meaning is part of speaker's meaning, there are different views regarding at what level of speaker's meaning they are obtained.

The Gricean approach was to see metaphor as implicature (Grice, 1989f; Searle, 1979/93). According to Grice, speaker's meaning is intended. With a single utterance (e.g. [A utters:] it is raining), the speaker may intentionally convey propositions at the explicit level (it is raining) and at the implicit level (we should take an umbrella). The intentionally communicated proposition explicitly expressed is called "what is said" and the intended proposition implicitly communicated is called "implicature". For Grice, the speaker's intended meaning does not coincide with the meaning of an expression and he formulates the cooperative principle (specified in several maxims) to explain how it is possible to go from the linguistic meaning to the speaker's meaning. With the literal meaning of a metaphorical utterance, the speaker would flout the conversational maxim of quality (do not say what you believe to be false). In the metaphorical use of language, the meaning of the sentence uttered, if taken literally, is obviously false (e.g., Richard is a lion) or trivially true (e.g., no man is an island) and thus, it cannot be what the speaker intends to communicate. The hearer would therefore reject this literal proposition and derive the necessary implicature(s) to arrive at the speaker's intended meaning.

This view has been quite generally accepted in the philosophy of language by minimalists (e.g., Borg, 2004) but it has also been widely criticised by contextualists (e.g., Romero & Soria 2013a, 2019) and psycholinguists (Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Keysar & Glucksberg, 1992; Gibbs, 1994). This latter group point to reaction time experiments where little difference has been observed between the interpretation of literal and figurative utterances. While Romero and Soria (2013a) agree that this makes the Gricean view of metaphor as implicature untenable, they do not agree with the conclusion that literal and

figurative utterances are interpreted by the same mechanism. As psycholinguists point out, the not-quite identical reaction times which have been also observed are better explained by different processes that operate concurrently (Romero & Soria, 2013a, p. 8). The online derivation of metaphorical sub-propositional meaning can take more interpretative time but does not always need to. Furthermore, being sub-propositional, the derivation process takes place without the obtention of the false or trivially true literal proposition which is not intended by the speaker and this would allow the equivalency of processing times in some cases. For Romero and Soria, the metaphorical proposition is obtained directly, at the level of what is said. They defend that, in metaphor interpretation, metaphorical meaning is metaphorically said rather than implicated. There is an asymmetry between conventional and non-conventional meaning, but the derived metaphorical provisional meaning is part of the proposition said.

In early RT, it was argued that the metaphorical use of language achieved relevance through an array of weakly communicated implicatures, that is, a set of assumptions which, as a set, the hearer could assume to be communicated, but would have limited evidence that specific individual implications within the set had been meant by the speaker (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 236).

However, after Carston's work on the context sensitivity of explicatures (Carston, 2002) and her observations that an account of metaphorical interpretation without including explicature was theoretically problematic, current RT now embraces a categorisation approach to metaphor, though not quite Glucksberg's model.

Romero and Soria defend a view of metaphor as "what is metaphorically said" against views of metaphor as implicature and theories which are sceptical of metaphorical meaning (Lepore & Stone, 2010, 2015). It is these latter sceptical views to which I now turn, and Romero and Soria's arguments against them.

4.5. Sceptical Accounts of Metaphorical Meaning: Non-Propositional Effects

Despite their differences, a central idea on which IT, CMT and RT theorists can generally agree is that metaphorical meaning is a sub-propositional component of communication, i.e., that the vehicle in a metaphorical utterance can have metaphorical meaning, that metaphorical effects are obtained at the level of what is said (or explicature). There are accounts of metaphor, however, which reject theories of metaphorical meaning. This line of thought goes back to Donald Davidson's 'What metaphors mean' (1978). Although he

agrees with Black that metaphor "is a legitimate device [. . .] in science, philosophy, and the law" (Davidson, 1978, p. 33), that it allows us to see one thing as another, he disagrees with how metaphor accomplishes this. For Davidson, a metaphorical utterance does not hold any metaphorical meaning, only its literal. Metaphor is a matter of non-propositional effects, not of meaning, and depends "entirely on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they compromise" (Davidson, 1978, p. 33).

"A metaphor makes us attend to some likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, between two or more things" (Davidson, 1978, p. 33). Under Davidson's sceptical account, interpreting a metaphor such as (2), we realise that it is literally false and we are invited to attend the similarities between man and wolf, but any metaphorical effects are caused or provoked rather than communicated. Metaphorical meaning is a result of attending to some likeness rather than a component of a metaphorical expression or utterance. This sceptical stance towards metaphorical propositional effects was countered in Black (1979). Black argues against Davidson's own metaphor of metaphor being "the dreamwork" of language, and in doing so illustrates that we can indeed, say something metaphorically.

From a contemporary pragmatic perspective, the main flaw in Davidson's argument is that it presupposes the primacy of literal meaning and the context insensitivity of propositions. The work of contextualists have persuasively argued for propositional context sensitivity (Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004, 2007; Romero & Soria, 2007, 2016, 2019), and if context can affect propositions, then there is reason to believe that metaphors also affect propositions (via analogical mapping, categorisation, broadening/loosening etc., depending on the theory).

A contemporary theory which takes up and develops Davidson's sceptical account is that of Lepore and Stone (2010, 2015). Their argument revolves around three main points: (i) that analogy is characteristic of metaphor, (ii) a rejection of a metaphorical speaker's meaning, and (iii) a rejection of metaphorical propositional meaning. On the first point, they have something in common with interaction theorists, in that analogical thinking is key to metaphor. However, for Lepore and Stone, this analogical thinking takes place after propositional meaning and speaker meaning have been derived; metaphor is the result, rather than the cause of understanding.

Lepore and Stone argue that non-sceptic accounts which endorse the claims rejected in (ii) and (iii) have misconstrued speaker's meaning. Gricean speaker's meaning (Grice, 1957/89) is derived by the recognition of intentions. But the similarities of metaphor, sceptics claim, are not perceived by the recognition of intentions but by appreciating a

likeness in a causal way. These effects are caused rather than meant, and so they cannot form part of Gricean speaker meaning. Since, in their view, the only propositional content made available by the metaphorical use of language is the literal proposition and this is either obviously false or trivially true, nothing is added to the conversational common ground and metaphor cannot be explained using Lewis's speaker's meaning either. Thus, the analogical reasoning involved in metaphor is incompatible with pragmatic theories of speaker's meaning.

Both Recanati (2004) and Romero and Soria (2007, 2016) have argued against sceptical accounts by pointing out there are figurative utterances for which a non-figurative propositional meaning is unobtainable. Recanati uses an example of metonymy,

(28)   [A waitress utters]: The ham-sandwich left without paying (Recanati, 2004, p. 33)

and claims that an accessibility shift causes the hearer to go from the concept of HAM SANDWICH to HAM SANDWICH ORDERER before obtaining the propositional meaning, and therefore "he or she does *not* entertain the absurd literal proposition" (2004, p. 33, emphasis in original).

Romero and Soria (2007, p. 3) discuss an example of metaphor,

(29)   the sky is crying

and claim that given the semantic mismatch due to type constraints (Romero & Soria, 2019; Asher, 2011), skies cannot cry, lacking the necessary emotions and tear-ducts to derive any kind of literal proposition, even an absurd one. This argument holds against both sceptical theories, which deny metaphorical speaker's meaning, and Gricean approaches, which view metaphor as implicature.

4.6. Summary

In this survey of the major theories of metaphor in the literature, I have focused on the most divisive issues of contemporary debate: firstly, issues regarding the cognitive and pragmatic mechanisms at work in metaphor production and interpretation.

Hard definitive evidence on either side of this theoretical debate is simply unavailable. A decision of choosing one theory over another is a matter of research

objectives and, though we as researchers may not always like to admit it, personal preference.

Unfortunately, this situation is obscured by often hyperbolic claims: CMT researchers have, at times, simply rejected the necessity of analysing metaphorical uses of language. They make strong claims for the explanatory power of cognitive metaphor, driven by psychological experimental data. Yet, as Steen (2017) and Romero and Soria (2013a) have pointed out, their psychological experimental research does not warrant such strong conclusions.

Seemingly in reaction to CMT, and driven by a uniquely restrictive theory of inference, the deflationary account of RT makes its own inflated claim: that there is no cognitive or pragmatic process particular to metaphorical language. Both of these claims, despite their contemporary influence, are historically atypical in their depreciation of metaphorical utterances as an object of study.

Despite these strong unproven claims, and sometimes dogmatic debate, the two theories have much to offer the study of metaphor. Their insights can be more properly appreciated by going back to the patriarch of contemporary metaphor studies, back to Black. Black was reacting against a dominant view of metaphor which saw it as a matter of rhetoric, of decoration, of language with no cognitive value. His great insight, building on Richards (1936), was to recognise how a certain type of metaphor, non-trivial metaphors, involved a cognitive mapping between two subjects—the cognitive value of metaphor. His other great insight, one which he himself considered to be the most insightful of his theory, was that the subjects were not "things" but "systems of ideas" which could be adjusted in the context of communication—the pragmatic phenomenon of metaphorical language use. For Black, metaphor was not primarily a matter of cognition and only derivatively linguistic—it was both a cognitive and linguistic phenomenon worthy of serious analysis.

The theories which most convincingly develop Black's insights are contemporary interaction theories. In particular, Romero and Soria's model, pragmatic IT, is the most suitable for the study of active metaphor in polarising discourse; it is focused on metaphorical uses of language and avoids making inflated claims about other types of metaphorical thought and language; it has developed criteria and procedures for analysing non-conventional metaphorical utterances; it is firmly grounded in contemporary insights of cognitive linguistics, pragmatic linguistics, and philosophy of language; and it is the only theory which provides a convincing solution to the emergent property problem. This

theory has not been widely applied to discourse before, certainly there have been no large-scale applications to political language. The next stage of this study will explain my methodology for applying pragmatic IT to political discourse.

Chapter 5
Metaphor and Political Discourse

When Bill Bradley first campaigned for the Senate six years ago, [. . .] People said his manner was so awkward that it was embarrassing [. . .] If he was not a natural speaker, he reasoned, he could do the next best thing - observe gifted speakers [. . .] In time, he concluded, "what you strive for is a metaphor that works".
(Winerip, 1984)

5.1. Introduction

In the story of Senator Bill Bailey above, we can see one of the contradictions in contemporary approaches to metaphor in political discourse. After the "cognitive turn" of the 1980s, metaphor is most often seen as a matter of unconscious thought. The metaphorical use of language is dismissed as uninteresting:

[conceptual metaphors are] conceptual in nature and deep, in the sense that they are used largely without being noticed, [. . .] they have enormous social consequences, [. . .] they shape the very understanding of our everyday world [. . .] It is important to contrast such deep conceptual metaphors [. . .] with superficial metaphors, which are of only marginal interest. (Lakoff, 1995, p. 210)

This dismissal of the metaphorical use of language is often coupled with a conception of ideology as something latent or hidden, which is uncovered by the metaphor analyst:

[conventional metaphorical expressions] constitute verbal evidence for an underlying system of ideas – or ideology – whose assumptions may be ignored if we are unaware of them. (Charteris-Black, 2004, pp. 29-30)

In much of the literature which uses Cognitive or Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003) to analyse political discourse, the focus is on conventional metaphorical concepts and the literal (conventional)

metaphorical expressions based on them. Novel metaphorical concepts and non-literal (non-conventional) metaphorical uses of language (active metaphorical utterances) are ignored or explicitly dismissed as, at best, minimally ideological (Goatly, 2007, p. 29). This conclusion is based on the assumption that mostly unconscious conventional metaphorical concepts reflect the unconscious ideologies of the speaker and can more easily affect the unconscious ideologies of the hearer: "it is precisely because they are conventionalised that they may achieve the power to subconsciously affect our thinking without our being aware of it" (Goatly, 2007, p. 22).

How, then, do we deal with politicians like Senator Bill Bradley who intentionally seek out metaphorical uses of language to win hearts, minds, and elections? Can we really dismiss it as uninteresting as Lakoff suggests? Is the political use of novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical language only minimally ideological?

In order to address these questions, I will look at how metaphor in political discourse has been analysed in the literature. Once again, I am faced with a daunting body of work spread over many academic fields. For this reason, I will only focus on the most representative works of particular arguments on the role of metaphor in political discourse. I begin with a discussion of early and early-modern approaches to metaphor in political discourse (5.2). I then the discuss the cognitive turn, describing the applications of traditional CMT to political discourse, some of its strengths and also its weaknesses (5.3). Next, I discuss how scholars have attempted to adapt CMT to more adequately apply it to political discourse, and some who have turned away from CMT to embrace other models (5.4). Finally, I summarise these points and reiterate the need for a fully pragmatic model of metaphorical utterances in political discourse (5.5).

5.2. Early and Early-Modern Approaches to Metaphor in Political Discourse

Metaphor has always been a part of politics, and so always a part of the study of politics. Plato would have banished poets from his ideal society. Aristotle analyses Pericles' metaphor of the young men vanishing in war (1996, 1411a). Both Cicero and Quintilian address the subject in their respective works on oratory.

Reading classical authors was a major part of education in Europe (and beyond) until the middle of the twentieth century, and the study of rhetoric was an important part of this tradition, particularly so for young upper-class, would-be statesmen. It is both within, and against, this tradition that contemporary scholarship on metaphor finds its roots.

Richards (1936) and Black (1954-55, 1977, 1979), among others, were working against the established view that metaphor was a mere rhetorical ornament. Yet, there is an interesting distinction to be made here between classical theories and a classical tradition as it came to be understood and taught in the first half of the twentieth century. For classical authors, rhetoric was not mere rhetoric:

> The technique founded on knowledge of the factors that help to effect persuasion puts formidable power in the hands of anyone who masters perfectly – the power to manipulate words apart from things, and to manipulate men by manipulating words. [. . .] Before becoming futile, rhetoric was dangerous. This is why Plato condemned it. (Ricoeur, 1975/2003, p. 10)

Aristotelian rhetoric, according to Ricoeur, was an attempt to harness this dangerous power, what he calls *l'usage sauvage de la parole* (Ricoeur, 1975/2003, p. 10). Cicero might have seen metaphor as a form of rhetorical ornament, but rhetoric was vital to public life. *De oratane* and *Orator* were not meant to be books of tips and tricks for smooth talkers, but philosophical treatises on how to sway the opinions and emotions of others, *docere, delectare, et movere*. The idea of rhetorical tropes being something superficial to logical and serious thought has more to do with the educational traditions handed down to the modern era via neohumanist philologists and twentieth century ideas in philosophy, particularly Anglo-American analytic philosophy: "Rhetoric died when the penchant for classifying figures of speech completely supplanted the philosophical sensibility that animated the vast empire of rhetoric" (Ricoeur, 1975/2003, p. 9).

Then there were really two problems with the standard view of metaphor in the early twentieth century, the first entailed by the second. The first problem, a denial of the cognitive value of metaphor, was brilliantly countered by Black (1954-5). The second problem is a wider problem with which studies of metaphor in political discourse still struggle: a denial of the cognitive and pragmatic dimensions of rhetoric.

After the pioneering work of Richards (1936) and Black (1954-5) began to overturn the idea of metaphor as a superficial ornament to logic and truth, political scientists and political philosophers immediately began to look at metaphor in political discourse in a new light. Burke (1939-40) is an early example, an analysis of Hitler's rhetoric, including metaphor, to communicate his violent political vision. Miller (1979) outlined two general

scholarly views of metaphor in political discourse, as it stood in 1979: an empiricist verificationist view and a counter-empiricist constitutivist view (Miller, 1979, p. 156).

The verificationist view held that metaphors "when developed as clear and explicit models, can play a vital role in the search for political knowledge" (Miller, 1979, p. 158) and that "metaphorical insights are treated as hypotheses until such time as they are verified by the observation of political reality itself" (Miller, 1979, p. 15). This heuristic value of metaphor for scientific discovery and explication was limited and "could be dispensed with in the systematic statement of scientific explanations" (Hempel, 1965, p. 44).

The constitutivist view, Miller explains, is based on the observation that "for the mass of people at least, the bewildering political universe would be altogether unintelligible if it were not ordered and given meaning by language" (Miller, 1979, p. 160). Political reality is mediated and constructed through language, through "the creation of shared meanings, perceptions, and reassurances" (Miller, 1979, p. 160). In the constitutivist view, we find the roots of CMT: "Thought is metaphorical and metaphor pervades language" (Edelman, 1971, p. 67).

Miller (1979) claims that both viewpoints have much to offer the study of politics but rejects the extremes of both positions. He rejects the extreme empiricism of verificationsts because they fail to recognise "that metaphor is essential to political knowledge" and he rejects extreme constitutivism for its linguistic relativity "it gives up the possibility that political inquiry can move beyond metaphorical perspectives" (Miller, 1979, p. 162).

Miller's own approach, which he calls "manifestationist", insists on the cognitive value of metaphor while rejecting linguistic relativism: "political reality has an intelligible structure that is not simply the creation of metaphorical language and thought [. . .] metaphor is necessary to disclose the meaning of political things, since these things are not given directly to observation" (Miller, 1979, p. 162).

What is most interesting about Miller (1979) from a contemporary perspective is that it shows that scholars were discussing the same problems which are debated in the study of metaphor in political discourse today: the relationship between metaphorical language and metaphorical thought in a form of discourse in which "the great metaphors of political theory are deliberate contrivances [. . .] however, words and meanings are very often taken over from another sphere without the speaker's or hearer's awareness that a transference has taken place" (Miller, 1979, p. 157).

Although we have made many advances in metaphor studies, on some questions it seems we have not advanced very far. For example, Chilton (1996) says:

> Since the time of Aristotle discussion of metaphor has oscillated between the cognitive perspective and the oratorical perspective. Sometimes the two perspectives have been merged. Is metaphor a means of knowledge? ... Or is it to do with persuasion and affect? (Chilton, 1996, p. 65)

This dichotomy between metaphor as cognition and metaphor as rhetoric is misleading, reinforced by a tradition in cognitive linguistics which has sometimes failed to engage with the rich history of metaphor studies which preceded it.[20] Despite claiming to overturn over two millennia of erroneous philosophy, it insists on this dichotomy between cognitive value and rhetorical ornament, a dichotomy which Aristotle is unlikely to have entertained. As will become clear in this chapter, when cognitive theories insist on this primacy of metaphorical thought, they quickly encounter problems with the metaphorical use of language in political discourse.

5.3. The Cognitive Turn

Shortly after Miller published his overview of research into metaphor in politics, Lakoff and Johnson published their seminal work *Metaphors we live by* (1980/2003). In it we can see a development of what Miller would have considered the constitutivist view: that metaphor structures many or most of our concepts and is only derivatively a linguistic phenomenon. The work has certainly been ground-breaking in its influence on studies of political discourse even if its claims to have revolutionised philosophical thought on metaphor are severely overstated ("For 2,500 years, nobody challenged Aristotle, even though he was wrong," George Lakoff. Quoted in Matt Bai, 2005).

Given George Lakoff's political activism, it is not surprising that the study of metaphors in politics was explicit in CMT from the beginning. For instance, when Lakoff and Johnson discuss U.S. President Carter's ENERGY CRISIS IS WAR metaphor, they write:

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[20] This was pointed out from the beginning of the CMT project. See, for example, Max Black's review (1981) of Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003): "I am sorry to report that [Lakoff and Johnson's] ambition is not matched by their performance: their exposition is endemically slipshod, the copious literature on metaphor is almost completely ignored, and the absence of an index is deplorable" (Black, 1981, p. 210).

"Most of our metaphors have evolved in our culture over a long period, but many are imposed upon us by people in power" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, pp. 159-160).

This is an interesting quote for a number of reasons. That politicians and others in power might "impose" metaphors upon us, suggests that they intentionally use metaphors for political purposes. This intentionality presumably does not mean an awareness of metaphor *per se* as a cognitive process. Lakoff and Johnson seem to be suggesting that it is a tool that is available to speakers looking to persuade and manipulate, an awareness of metaphor as a product, rather than a self-conscious reflection on its mechanism. Even so, it reveals an interesting contradiction in Lakoff and Johnson's work: theoretically, it is focused on the fixed mappings which they claim are part of our (semi)permanent conceptual system. Linguistically, the theory is focused on the everyday conventional expressions whose meanings are based on metaphorical concepts; linguistic expressions which we use and process literally. Yet, when applying his theory to politics, Lakoff often analyses what seems to be novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances. There is the suggestion that these are used intentionally, strategically, and possibly even ideologically.

For example, Lakoff and Chilton discuss an extended metaphorical utterance used by Bill Clinton in a speech given to NATO in 1994, "the aim of which was to establish the role of this essentially Cold War organization in the rapidly changing continent of Europe" (Chilton & Lakoff, 1995, p. 49). President Clinton said:

(1)   Today the race is being played out from the Balkans to Central Asia. In one lane are the heirs of the enlightenment, who seek to consolidate freedom's gains by building free economies, open democracies and tolerant civic cultures. Pitted against them are the grim pretenders to tyranny's dark throne—the militant nationalists and demagogues who fan suspicions that are ancient and parade the pain of renewal to obscure the promise of reform. (Bill Clinton. Quoted in Chilton & Lakoff, 1995, p. 49).

Chilton and Lakoff suggest that this is a "new" race metaphor which draws on a conceptual metaphor which is something like POLITICAL RIVALRY IS A RACE (Chilton and Lakoff do not give an A IS B form). By "new" it is not clear whether they mean a novel metaphorical concept or a non-conventional metaphorical utterance based on a conventional concept. I will presume the latter but the former, by definition, would also

result in a non-conventional metaphorical utterance. In either case, we have no tools to differentiate this metaphorical use of language from the conventional metaphorical expressions studied by CMT. Furthermore, though the theory of CMT would seem to insist that Clinton draws on the metaphorical concept as part of a subconscious metaphorical system, Chilton and Lakoff go on to say that "perhaps, most frightening, President Clinton may actually be taking this metaphor seriously" (Chilton & Lakoff, 1995, p. 50). It is not clear why this seriousness should be surprising, if he is drawing on the metaphorical concept subconsciously.

The gap between Lakoff's theoretical stance as a linguist and his application of it in political analysis is not a small matter: it points out grievous flaws inherent in the practical application of the theory. John G. Gunnell (2007), after criticising Lakoff's "tenuous" connections between cognitive science and politics (p. 706), describes four levels of discourse involved in cognitive approaches to political discourse (pp. 722-723): the first is the hard data of experiments in neuroscience. The second is the literature which extrapolates philosophical implications from the empirical data. The third is the discourse of social scientists who draw on the first two levels and "often mix them with other, often incommensurable, elements of philosophy" (Gunnell, 2007, p. 722) and the fourth level is "the language, and ideology, of social and political life" (Gunnell, 2007, p. 722). Gunnell highlights the dangers of applying ideas in cognitive science to politics under the banner of interdisciplinary cooperation:

> There are significant and complex problems involving the relationship among these conceptual and linguistic realms, and it is, for example, misleading to assume that claims in natural science, and especially those associated with philosophically controversial arguments in cognitive theory, constitute some kind of neutral epistemological bedrock. (Gunnell, 2007, pp. 722-723)

The assumptions of CMT when applied to political language are that

a) linguistic expressions provide evidence for fixed metaphorically structured concepts in our conceptual system

b) metaphorical concepts are mostly subconsciously used and interpreted

c) therefore, we can analyse subconscious political ideology by looking at metaphorical political concepts in political discourse

Although it is common in CMT to take (a) as an established fact, "it infers the conceptual structures that it attempts to demonstrate evidence for rather than seeking independent evidence for these conceptual structures" (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 781) and is, in its strong Lakoffian form, a circular argument (Black, 1981; McGlone, 2007). Even if we take (a) as given, it is by no means clear that (b) is true. We have no means of distinguishing metaphorically interpreted language from literally interpreted language in CMT, no way of distinguishing the seemingly more deliberate use of metaphor in non-literal language from the unconscious uses of metaphorical concepts in literal language. This becomes a major obstacle for the analysis of political discourse, where an assumption of (b) does not even seem to be consistent in Lakoff's own application of the theory. Finally, even if we accept (b), we cannot claim (c). It is impossible to know if Bill Clinton really took the metaphor in (1) seriously, and doubtful that such extended uses of metaphorical language in a polished, carefully constructed political speech can purely stem from unconscious ideology. In other words, we cannot assume a direct relationship between linguistic expressions and hidden ideology, not even for a politician. To claim that we can uncover Clinton's subconscious ideological thinking by analysing the metaphor in (1) or its effect on the hearer's subconscious ideology, is really a form of fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977): to overestimate how the observed behaviour of others reflects their personal disposition, and underestimate the situational factors involved.

Though some applications of CMT to political language mostly focus on ideology at a macro, societal level, on which they are more convincing, much of Lakoff's work on political language readily jumps from (a) to (b) to (c) to explain the ideology behind a speaker's utterance or actions, with little evidence to back up his assumptions. But even at the macro-level, his conclusions regarding political ideology are suspect. For example, in *Moral Politics* (Lakoff, 2002) and *Whose Freedom?* (Lakoff, 2006), Lakoff analysed Republican Americans as following a STRICT FATHER metaphor for the role of the state and democrats as following a NURTURING PARENT metaphor. These metaphors are meant to explain ideological variations among Americans, from their religious beliefs to positions on abortion. As Stephen Pinker observed in his highly critical review:

> Lakoff's cartoonish depiction of progressives as saintly sophisticates and conservatives as evil morons fails on both intellectual and tactical grounds [. . .] Lakoff provides no evidence from linguistics or from surveys to show that this

ludicrous ogre is the prototype of fatherhood in any common American conception of the family. (Pinker, 2006)

Pinker observes that Lakoff's psychological analysis of conservative Americans, though presented as science, is not backed up by evidence and is thinly concealed political partisanship. Pinker does not hold back: "There is much to admire in Lakoff's work in linguistics, but [. . .] his thinking about politics [,] is a train wreck" (Pinker, 2006). This criticism cannot be dismissed as just another heated academic exchange. Lakoff's political work grows directly out of his linguistic theories. Pinker adds to several accusations which have long been levelled at Lakoff's work, both linguistic and political: the circularity of his arguments (Black, 1981; McGlone, 2007), a failure to cite sources and discuss previous literature (Black, 1981; Holland, 1982), a presentation of controversial cognitive science as scientific consensus (Gunnell, 2007), a simplification of philosophical traditions and a misrepresentation of opposing viewpoints (Chomsky, 1973), and, more worryingly, using a veil of science to sell political propaganda and partisanship (Pinker, 2006; Emanuel & Reed, 2006).

The problem for this thesis is that while CMT might prove useful for investigating political ideologies at a macro-level of society, via the lexicalised concepts used by a speech community, it cannot tell us about the political ideologies held by an individual based solely on an analysis of these conventionalised concepts, nor how the speaker communicates ideology in context. Even for Lakoff, CMT is ill-equipped for the analysis of metaphor in political discourse. There is a limit to CMTs explanatory power for explaining the use of metaphor in political discourse and Lakoff, especially in his later work, passes these limits. What he lacks is a pragmatic theory which can bring the political power of metaphorically used language back into the frame.

5.4. Pragmatics, Metaphorical Language, and Political Discourse

5.4.1. Applying CMT to Discourse

Despite the controversial nature of Lakoff's claims in the fields of philosophy, cognitive science, and linguistics, since the publication of *Metaphors we live by* (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003) there has been an explosion of work which uses CMT to analyse different domains of discourse, not least of all political discourse. There are inevitable problems when a theory that denies a literal/metaphorical distinction has become so widely used in

the study of metaphorical language in use. In this section I will broadly outline the ways that contemporary scholars have approached metaphor in political discourse, often working against CMT as much as they work with it. CMT has been in development for forty years. Though the assumptions of Lakoff's strong CMT are difficult to defend in political discourse analysis, there are many ways in which weaker positions of CMT have been used to great effect to further our understanding of metaphor in this domain.

5.4.2. Goatly

Goatly has done extensive work on metaphor and ideology (Goatly, 2007) and exemplifies both the benefits and pitfalls of applying CMT to political discourse. First of all, as is quite common, Goatly uses the terms discourse and ideology in the critical discourse analysis tradition. Therefore, discourse here does not just refer to linguistic or textual practices in context but to wider social practices. Ideology is "the basis of social representations shared by member of a group" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 8). Therefore, ideology is often subconscious, something "latent and hidden", intimately entwined with Gramscian ideas of hegemony "as unnoticeable and ubiquitous as the air we breathe" (Goatly, 2007, p. 1). It is something infused in society to be revealed by the analyst as sociologist. However, ideology is also cognitive, "in your head as well as in discourse" (Goatly, 2007, p. 2), and is therefore something to be revealed and solved by the analyst as psychologist. Like Lakoff, Goatly is at his best when he focuses on sociology, but on considerably shaky ground when he attempts psychology.

For example, when investigating the metaphors used in racist discourse, he writes: "colour labels have developed into an analogical if not metaphorical system" (Goatly, 2007, p. 46). He furnishes us with many examples for this being the case, including EVIL IS DARK/BLACK, for which he gives examples like "black mark", "blackguard", and "black sheep" (Goatly, 2007, p. 46). However, he goes further: "The prejudice created by these associations between evil, crime and people of African race continues" (Goatly, 2007, p. 46), and as an example, he points to the rates of false conviction for black men accused of raping white women. The implication is that the metaphorical association of the colour BLACK with EVIL is, in itself, racist and that it "creates" prejudice. There can be no doubt that black is associated with evil in English speaking cultures, and no doubt that this association has been used in racist discourse. However, we cannot assume that this association is, in itself, racist even though it is used in racist discourse. Nor can we assume

that these associations "cause" prejudice. Goatly's own example of the word "blackguard" illustrates this: Etymologically speaking, it does not have anything to do with race (Online Etymology Dictionary, n.d.). Moreover, the association with the colour black in the word "blackguard" is not readily apparent in many speech communities as the word has undergone a pronunciation shift. In Hiberno-English, for example, it is pronounced, and often written, "blaggard", rendering the association with black highly opaque. Even if the association were apparent, the conclusion that its use causes prejudice or reveals the covert ideology of an individual or speech community does not follow and is a clear example of the (a)-(c) logic of CMT political analysis which I outlined earlier.

Similarly, Goatly analyses an example of the metaphor DEVELOPMENT/SUCCESS IS MOVING FORWARD in an advertisement for Opel Vectra cars (Goatly, 2007, p 57):

> WHEN YOU'VE MASTERED THE ART OF CONTROL PEOPLE WILL KNOW
>
> Remember all those moments when you wanted to say something, do something, but didn't? Times when you held back, because you were happier to let others take the lead. And yet you know deep down that you wouldn't be who you are today, if it weren't for the decisions you'd made. Decisions that let you discover the power of individuality and the reward of independence. So why should your mode of travel be so different from your mode of thought? Why, indeed should you follow the pack when you could be leading it?
>
> When we designed the Opel Vectra, we set out to create a car that would sit at the very head of its class. A car that gives you the power to go where you want, when you want. And be capable of taking you the distance in comfort, safety and, yes, we dare say it, style. You know what it is to be an individual, to move while others are stationary, to take control of a situation and direct it in the way you want. When you drive the new Vectra you'll be reminded of all those moments when you pushed on with what you truly believed in. And when you move others will follow, as they come to realise you have mastered the art of control.
>
> OPEL
>
> (Quoted in Goatly, 2007, p 57)

The text of the add uses language from the domain of MOVEMENT to describe SUCCESS and does this in an extended way. We would surely be naive to accept that this

extended metaphor has been unconsciously drawn on and reveals only a latent ideology: ads for firms such as Opel are meticulously constructed by marketing teams and tested for their effectiveness on audiences. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the metaphorical association between SUCCESS and MOVING FORWARD is not intended to be appreciated by the audience—it is part of the ad's appeal and explicit narrative: It explicitly asks the audience to make an analogical link between their successful way of thinking and their car ("So why should your mode of travel be so different from your mode of thought?"). CMT tells us that the target audience are meant to subconsciously draw on the fixed conceptual metaphor DEVELOPMENT/SUCCESS IS MOVING FORWARD. This could be interpreted as any kind of movement, on foot, by train, by horse, as success. To take this as the endpoint of interpretation by the audience renders the ad almost unintelligible. It tells us very little about the intentions of the speaker, the interpretation of the audience, or even the cognitive processes that make the use of metaphor here successful.

Using pragmatic IT we could say that the target audience are intended to actively interpret several metaphorical utterances (conventional metaphorical utterances and active metaphorical utterances) to derive at least one ad hoc metaphorical concept which is something like SUCCESS IN YOUR CAREER/LIFE AS MOVEMENT IN AN OPEL CAR. This ad hoc metaphorical concept is constructed in online working memory, emerges out of discourse, provides the metaphorical context by which the whole extended utterance is interpreted, and is guided by the hearer's search for relevance. This analysis can better explain the communicated ideological content of the speaker and the provisional metaphorical meanings which make the extended metaphor succeed.

Goatly's analysis does bear fruit when it explores the sociological rather than the psychological connections between conventional metaphors and ideology. The problem is when CMT is used to assess psychological aspects of ideology, either applied to the specific group or individual. To do so, is to see people as mindless parrots who do not mean what they say and do not understand what they hear, rather than the sophisticated political animals that they are (Chilton, 2004, p. 4).

Goatly's model for metaphor analysis makes this connection between CMT and subconscious ideology explicit:

When we meet original [novel] metaphor we have to do a great deal more mental work than when we process a conventional metaphor [. . .] it is precisely because

they are conventionalised that they may achieve the power to subconsciously affect our thinking without our being aware of it. (Goatly, 2007, p. 22)

Despite requiring more mental work, Goatly dismisses novel metaphors as having no effect on ideology because it is "more noticeable and debatable" (Goatly, 2007, p. 29). This is highly dependent on his conception of ideology. It is an assumption about the relationship between metaphor and ideology that might work for a macro level analysis of ideology in a language community, but quickly becomes insufficient when discussing discourse at the level of individuals and the utterance. Though, as a society, we might use GAME metaphors to construct our concept of POLITICS and JOURNEY metaphors to construct our concept of LIFE, this does not tell us much about how a politician uses a particular utterance to persuade her audience to vote, or how a marketing team uses metaphor to persuade their audience to buy an Opel car.

To study the ideological use of metaphors by individuals, we need a pragmatic theory of linguistic expressions which are used and interpreted metaphorically. Critical discourse analysis based on CMT is often blinded to this shortcoming because of a theoretical assumption that both metaphorical thought and ideology is latent or hidden.

5.4.3. Charteris-Black's Critical Metaphor Analysis

There are a few theories which have attempted to address the lack of pragmatic analysis within CMT. Charteris-Black points out:

One of the limitations of metaphor analysis when the cognitive approach is isolated from the pragmatic one is that the only explanation of metaphor motivation is with reference to an underlying experiential basis. This assumes that metaphor use is an unconscious reflex, whereas a pragmatic view argues that speakers use metaphor to persuade by combining the cognitive and linguistic resources at their disposal. (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 11)

An important difference between Charteris-Black's critical metaphor analysis (CMA) and other approaches coming from CMT is that he does not completely adopt the unconscious conceptions of ideology and metaphor. For Charteris-Black, ideology "appeals through *consciously* formed sets of beliefs, attitudes and values" [emphasis in

original] (Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 13). This is a necessary theoretical move for an analysis of how individual professional politicians use metaphor in speeches. On a speech by Tony Blair, Charteris-Black writes:

> This is a well-studied speech in which the techniques of persuasion have been analysed and rehearsed. I do not think that this is the rhetoric of a spontaneous and charismatic leader, but an artefact produced by a leader who has been systematically and expertly advised as to how persuasion is realised in political speeches. (Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 212)

Political speeches are meticulously crafted; Metaphors are not mostly drawn on subconsciously but are often deliberately chosen. However, Charteris Black does emphasise their subliminal power on evaluation: "it exploits the subliminal resources of language by arousing hidden associations that govern our systems of evaluation"(Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 2).

Given this stance on ideology and how metaphor is deliberately used to persuade, we might question Charteris-Black's decision to rely on CMT as a theoretical tool to explain metaphorical mapping. In fact, Charteris-Black's own definition of metaphor is in many ways incompatible with CMT. It has more in common with IT approaches:

> [Metaphor is] a linguistic representation that results from the shift in the use of a word or phrase from the context or domain in which it is expected to occur to another context or domain where it is not expected to occur, thereby causing semantic tension. (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21)

As he himself points out, according to this definition, metaphor is primarily a linguistic phenomenon (Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 14). However, despite emphasising the linguistic aspects of metaphor, in practice Charteris-Black's CMA is focused on conventional metaphorical concepts and their conventional linguistic expressions: "The primary focus of this work will, therefore, be on the conventional metaphors, but where relevant I will also consider novel, or creative, metaphors" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 18).

Charteris-Black attempts to address these different aspects of metaphor, cognitive and pragmatic, concept and utterance, by isolating different roles for metaphor:

metaphor has a number of different roles in language: a semantic role in creating new meanings for words, a cognitive role in developing our understanding on the basis of analogy and a pragmatic role that aims to provide evaluations. (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 24).

The pragmatic function is restricted to an evaluative one. Practically speaking, he is still working from the CMT model of conventional static mappings.

We can see this in his discussion of variations on the expression "blood [is] being shed" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 26-27). He analyses such expressions as implying an innocent victim and a guilty agent because they are based on both a conceptual metonymy BLOOD FOR LIFE and a conventional metaphor HARMING IS SEPARATING. Charteris-Black traces the conventional metaphorical meaning of this expression as originating in the Bible (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 27). He says, "selection of the phrase 'blood is shed' implies a covert persuasive evaluation that communicates the ideologies of the producers of these texts" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 27). This is a classic CMT approach to metaphor and ideology: First there is circular reasoning where the language gives evidence that a conventional metaphor exists, and the existence of the conventional metaphor is used as evidence that the language is metaphorical. Next, there is the assumption that metaphorical (and metonymical) concepts are unconsciously drawn on or interpreted (BLOOD FOR LIFE, HARMING IS SEPARATING). Finally, there is the fundamental attribution error: that by analysing unconscious metaphor we gain access to covert ideology. Charteris-Black's argument is more sophisticated because he allows for a pragmatic evaluative function to explain the connection between cognitive content and ideological use. In uttering some expression like "blood is shed", the speaker is using a conventionalised metaphorical meaning to covertly evaluate an experience. By making overt what the speaker makes covert, we gain insight into their ideology.

There are two contradictions in this approach: the first involves the nature of metaphorical meaning. If "Jewish blood is being shed" holds a conventional meaning which can be paraphrased as "Jewish innocent victims are killed by guilty agents", then there is no cognitive-metaphorical reason why the evaluation is more covert than the literal alternative "innocent Jewish people are being murdered". In fact, if these evaluative aspects are part of the metaphorically derived meaning, and that meaning is conventional, then the evaluative aspects of "shed blood" should be more overt than the literal alternative. There

may be syntactic or pragmatic effects which make one more covertly evaluative than the other, but it is not due to a conventional metaphorical mapping. To take a non-metaphorical example, we would not claim that to refer to a person with the insult "fool" is more covertly evaluative than to refer to a person as "person". It is the opposite: the negative evaluation of "fool" is overt by virtue of its conventional meaning. There is no reason to believe that an evaluation as part of a conventional meaning should be more covert just because that conventional meanings has been metaphorically constructed.

If, as Charteris-Black suggests, the evaluative aspects are "implied", and we take "implied" to mean a form of implicature, then what is the metaphorically constructed meaning of "shed" and "blood" in such expressions to distinguish it from "murder"? In CMT metaphorical mapping results in meaning affecting what is said, not a form of implicature.[21] If covert evaluations are implicatures, they cannot form part of what is said and so CMT's model of metaphorical mapping cannot explain how such evaluations are derived.

Without resolving these issues, the premise that conventional metaphorical utterances reveal ideology through their evaluative function is untenable. Charteris-Black's attempts to explain metaphorical language and ideology in this way are self-contradictory: In order to justify the special quality of metaphor to "reflect inner-subjectivity [. . .] through the rhetorical act of persuasion" he claims that in a metaphorical utterance "the speaker invites the hearer to participate in an interpretative act" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 12). He is therefore arguing for a mechanism of online metaphorical utterance interpretation. At best, this is outside the scope of CMT. He goes on to explain that the metaphorical utterance will be successful "if the hearer is able to overcome the tension between what is said and what is meant" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 12). This is a version of the proposal of metaphor interpretation in two propositional stages which directly contradicts CMT's tenets on the nature of metaphorical meaning (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 3) as well as their psychological experiments (Gibbs, 1994).

Although I generally agree with Charteris-Back that definitions of metaphor need to include "a linguistic [I take him to mean 'semantic' here], a pragmatic and a cognitive"

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[21] I presume that CMT views metaphor as affecting what is said due to their stance that metaphorical thought is just as, if not more, ubiquitous and fundamental as literal thought (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 3). It would be difficult, even impossible, to defend a position of metaphor as either implicature or as non-propositional, given such a stance. In fact, they explicitly reject the Gricean approach to metaphor as implicature. However, I do not believe they have made their position in relation to these pragmatic distinctions explicit.

dimension (2004, p. 20), Charteris-Black's implementation of these dimensions is overly stratified and contradictory. It is stratified in that he does not allow for pragmatic effects on metaphorical meaning but regulates it to an evaluative function. It is contradictory in that this stratification bifurcates his theory into using two different theories of metaphorical processes and meaning: the CMT model which assumes that metaphor is a constituent part of our conventional conceptual system, and therefore is part of what is literally said. The other, a pragmatic view of metaphor where literal meaning is rejected to get the implicature, the metaphorical meaning. This latter view was espoused by Grice and Searle but is rejected by CMT, pragmatic IT, and categorisation theories of metaphor. By limiting metaphor's pragmatic role to implied evaluation, there is no possibility for a pragmatically derived metaphorical what is said. This means that Charteris-Black relies on CMT to explain how a metaphorical literal meaning is communicated through a static, fixed mapping affecting what is said. But such mapping alone cannot explain how speaker meaning is reached in metaphorical utterance interpretation.

5.4.4. Musolff's Scenarios

Another interesting framework which adapts CMT to analyse political discourse via corpora is that of Musolff (2004, 2012, 2016). Although he seems to share a CDA conception of ideology as mostly unconscious, he observes that "even common conceptual source domains can be used for different argumentative and ideological purposes" (Musolff , 2004, p. 5) and that this argumentative dimension requires "a revision of the theoretical model linking cognitive and linguistic aspects of metaphor" (Musolff , 2004, p. 6). He emphasises that, at least for political discourse, in which meanings are contested[22], ideological differences in metaphor use must be discerned at a linguistic level and in a socio-pragmatic context (Musolff , 2004, p. 9).

Firstly, Musolff uses a distinction introduced by Kövecses (2002) into CMT: that conceptual metaphors should be analysed on three levels of abstraction—an individual level, supra-individual level and a sub-individual level. The first is the level at which speakers use and create metaphors in "actual communicative situations' (Kövecses, 2002, p. 242). Supra-individual is the level at which we can analyse conventional metaphorical concepts at the level of language communities (Musolff , 2004, p. 40) and the sub-

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[22] It is not clear if Musolff is thinking of Gallie (1955)'s essentially contested concepts here.

individual level is the level at which we can analyse the experiential grounding of metaphors: embodied cognition and so on (Musolff , 2004, pp. 243-244).

This allows Musolff to search his corpus for metaphorical concepts at an individual level and group them, based on semantic similarity, into domains (Musolff, 2004, p. 9). Mappings between domains (supra-personal) are then analysed by positing two types of mapping: central mappings are cognitively necessary sub-mappings of cross-domain mappings. For example, in the EUROPEAN UNION IS A FAMILY mapping, NATION STATE IS A PERSON is a central mapping (Musolff , 2004, p. 18). The other type of sub-mapping is called a "scenario":

> we can think of a scenario as a set of standard assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about the 'prototypical' content aspects (participants, roles, 'dramatic' story-lines) and social/ethical evaluations concerning elements of conceptual domains. (Musolff , 2004, p. 17)

For example, in the EUROPEAN UNION IS A FAMILY metaphor, one scenario is that particular states or groups of states have the role of parents that engender, bear and raise a child or several children (Musolff , 2004, p. 18).

Key to Musolff's framework is the view of metaphor as argumentation: cognitive metaphors do not just map entailments but presuppositions and so metaphors can function as warrants in political arguments (Musolff, 2004, p. 32). This function of metaphor is dependent on the political context (Musolff , 2004, p. 33). Moreover, Musolff suggests that the argumentative function of conventional metaphor more easily reveals itself at the level of a "spiced up" utterance rather than at the level of supra-personal abstraction (Musolff , 2004, p. 34):

Supra-personal metaphorical concept: X is the father of European unity

Spiced-up utterance: The father of European Unity must always be treated with
unconditional respect.

Though the presupposition of unconditional respect is present at both levels of analysis, it is made more explicit at the level of utterance.

Musolff's unit of analysis at the personal level, the scenario, thus becomes the site of a metaphor's function in political discourse and the method by which Musolff attempts to bridge the gap between metaphorical concepts and their expression in language use. Drawing on semantic interaction theories of metaphor such as Kittay (1987), Stern (2000) and Leezenberg (2001) as well as psychological theories such as Glucksberg (2001), he further defines the concept of scenarios as "prominent sub-sets of presuppositions within a specific thematic dimension or perspective" (Musolff, 2004, p. 81) and therefore by measuring the distribution of scenarios in a corpus, has "a justification for drawing conclusions [. . .] specific scenarios in the corpus to the cognitive function of source concepts (Musolff , 2004, p. 81).

Musolff's model is a welcome development for the analysis of discourse using CMT, especially political discourse, and goes a long way to addressing the shortcomings observed in the previously discussed models. He recognises that the study of metaphor in political discourse requires a theoretical model for the study of metaphorical language in use, and this model should take pragmatic considerations into account.

However, the problem with this framework for my research purposes is that it still does not adequately address the role of metaphorically used language in political discourse. It is not always clear why utterances should be grouped under one scenario and not another. For example, when analysing TRAIN JOURNEY scenarios for the EU, Musolff distinguishes two scenarios:

X IS OFF TRAIN/OFF TRACK/ OBSTACLE IN PATH OF TRAIN, RELUCTANT PASSENGER

and

X IS ON TRAIN/ ON TRACK, LOCOMOTIVE, DRIVING THE TRAIN, SETTING THE POINTS

(Musolff, 2004, p. 55)

These two categories seem to cover quite an arbitrary and diverse set of utterances including instances where X is the train itself and instances where X is a passenger on the train. Yet under the category of BICYCLE scenarios, Musolff lists four separate scenarios:

> X, Y ARE PARTNERS ON TANDEM
>
> X IS (SUCCESSFUL) CYCLIST
>
> X IS (SLOW) BICYCLE
>
> EUROPEAN PROGRESS IS BICYCLE: MOVE (FORWARD) OR FALL
>
> (Musolff, 2004, p. 58)

It is not clear on what basis we can categorise utterances into separate scenarios.

Another problem with the abstraction away from the utterance to scenarios is that metaphorical concepts seem to be defined only by source domain. This is another issue in CMT related to abstracting metaphorical concepts from utterances. A conceptual metaphor A IS B requires both a source domain and a target domain. Change either and you are changing the metaphorical mapping. In the scenarios above the target domain is represented by X, which in these cases indicate different European countries. Although, in many cases, there may be little or no difference between utterances which draw on GERMANY IS A RELUCTANT PASSENGER and BRITAIN IS A RELUCTANT PASSENGER, this would need to be confirmed at the level of utterance and, even if it is confirmed, would only apply to the particular utterances under analysis. For example, one can easily imagine utterances which depict Britain as a reluctant passenger in relation to the destination of the train journey and Germany as a reluctant passenger in relation to the ticket price. These would make important differences to the presuppositions involved: for the British utterance, a presupposition that the passenger does not want to reach the destination, in the German utterance that the passenger is tight with money. These two utterances should give us two different scenarios with very different metaphorical effects in context. Admittedly, Musolff is attempting to develop a framework for corpus analysis of metaphor and fears that "if an exclusively pragmatic account of metaphor were true, we would have to give up any hope of finding metaphors in a corpus based on linguistic criteria" (Musolff, 2004, p. 72). Yet here, like Charteris-Black, Musolff has in mind the traditional two-stage theories of metaphor of Grice and Searle. Elsewhere, he has explicitly called for a pragmatic/cognitive theory of metaphor informed by relevance theory (Musolff, 2012, p. 302).

5.4.5. Discourse Dynamics Theory of Metaphor

Lynne Cameron, with various co-writers, also endorses modifications to CMT in order to analyse metaphor in discourse: "non-literal expressions with a relatively fixed form and

highly specific semantics and pragmatics are very frequent in our data but are not well accounted for by current cognitive metaphor theory" (Cameron & Deignan, 2006, p. 671).

Rather than seeing metaphor as primarily a matter of cognition, and only derivatively linguistic, Cameron and Deignan see "the relationship between language and thought is instead a two-way interaction within a single complex system [. . .] metaphor emerges from the dynamics of language and thinking [. . .] and is at the same time conceptual and linguistic" (Cameron & Deignan, 2006, p. 674). Like Charteris-Black they also emphasise the affective role of metaphor (Cameron & Deignan, 2006, p. 674).

At the core of this theory is what they call the metaphoreme, a unit of analysis which is intended to capture how the metaphorical use of a word or phrase emerges from the dynamic system of thought and language, stabilising semantic, syntactic and pragmatic features via discourse. As an example, Cameron and Deignan (2006) discuss <walk away from> as it is used metaphorically in the reconciliation talk between and IRA bomber (Pat) and the daughter of one of his victims. They then compare his use of the metaphoreme with instances found in the British National Corpus (BNC).

Their findings are certainly interesting for the study of how conventional metaphors are expressed in discourse and convincingly demonstrate that CMT cannot ignore the linguistic and pragmatic aspects of conventional metaphor in use. However, the theory does not seem equipped to deal with the study of metaphor in politics. For instance, they show that Pat uses the <walk away from> metaphoreme in mostly the same way as it is found in the BNC, with only minor differences. If that is true, then it is not clear what Pat's use of the metaphoreme reveals about his ideology or even psychology. If it is undifferentiated from the general use of the metaphorical concept in the language community, it is not much more informative about Pat's language use than if he had used "cat" to refer to a domesticated, feline animal. In order to comment in some meaningful way about Pat's use of metaphor to communicate ideology, it must be differentiated from the conventional uses of the wider speech community. We need to analyse his novel use of metaphorical concepts and expressions in context. I therefore disagree when Cameron and Deignan use their method in the following type of analysis of Pat's use of terms "movements" and "struggle":

(2)   Pat: It was the republican movement, it was the republican struggle (Cameron & Deignan, 2006, p. 681)

Cameron and Deignan say: "We can note in the first two lines metaphorical ways in which the IRA describe their group and their actions [. . .] both have become conventionalized within that particular socio-cultural group of *republicans"* (Cameron & Deignan, 2006, p. 681).

The Merriam-Webster dictionary online gives the following definition for one of the lexicalised meanings of "movement": "an organised effort to promote or attain an end" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.-a). For "struggle", it gives the following lexicalised senses: "1. contest/strife 2. a violent effort or exertion: an act of strongly motivated striving" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.-c). Therefore, there is nothing distinctively republican or ideological about Pat's use of these conventional metaphors "movement" and "struggle", at least nothing distinctively ideological contributed by metaphorical mapping.

5.4.6. Deliberate Metaphor Theory

One of the ambiguities in cognitive approaches to metaphor analysis in political discourse is the extent to which metaphors are used consciously. CMT, of course, declares that most metaphoric thought is unconscious. This has been theoretically convenient for those scholars who analyse conventional metaphor use to reveal latent, unconscious forms of ideology in society. However, in practice, we have seen that this type of analysis is limited and prone to error when we want to investigate how individuals or sub-groups use metaphorical language in discourse. Gerard Steen has worked on this problem for a number of years and calls his approach the deliberate metaphor theory (DMT) (Steen 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017).

Its main tenet is that "some metaphors in language use require on-line cross-domain mapping between referents while others do not, and that this difference resides in the deliberate production, reception or exchange of metaphors as metaphors" (Steen, 2017, p. 10) and is "a response to the general neglect of intentions in cognitive linguistics and the discourse studies of metaphor that have been inspired by it" (Steen, 2017, p. 6). This has seemed to cause quite a stir among CMT theorists who accuse Steen of taking metaphor studies "back to a Stone Age time where metaphor was ornamental, deviant, and only employed by special people with highly conscious communicative aims" (Gibbs & Chen, 2017, p. 124). This argument is frequently used in CMT scholarship, and as I have discussed in this chapter, based on a reductive reading of classical authors and a neglect of the literature on metaphor written between Aristotle and 1980.

Nevertheless, Gibbs and Chen have a point when they say that the idea of deliberateness is "in the eye of the beholder" (Gibbs & Chen, 2017, p. 121). When applied to political discourse, this aspect of Steen's framework has proven difficult to apply: "the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate at the communicative level is potentially more dependent on the researchers' reconstruction of the speaker's intentions" (Perrez & Reuchamps, 2014, p. 21).

There are two different arguments here that are easily conflated. We might assume that CMT, as a cognitive theory, is talking about metaphor as a subconscious cognitive structure, i.e., that the conventional mapping between domains is subconscious. If this is the case, then Romero and Soria's pragmatic IT is generally in agreement, though it views metaphor as a dynamic process: the online mapping process involves a sub-propositional and sub-personal (unconscious)[23] pragmatic process of transfer. Under both theories, the mapping between domains is cognitively activated/processed but not always consciously activated/processed. The mapping of properties is not consciously inferential.

This is different to debates about metaphor as a product that is intentionally used, i.e., the awareness of the speaker/hearer that they are using/interpreting metaphorical language (Gibbs, 2011a, 2011b; Steen, 2008, 2017). The theoretical necessity of deliberate metaphor grew out of the perceived paradox that most metaphorical language under the CMT model (conventional literal-metaphorical expressions) are processed by categorisation rather than the mapping endorsed by CMT (Steen, 2008, p. 214). Steen's deliberate metaphor theory (DMT) (Steen, 2008, 2017) endorses a form of online metaphor mapping, similar to pragmatic IT, a dynamic mapping process involved in the interpretation of non-conventional metaphorical utterances (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008). DMT argues that such a mapping process is triggered by a metaphor's deliberate use. In contrast, pragmatic IT argues that the mapping process depends on the hearer identifying a contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast (Romero & Soria, 1997-8, p. 379, 2005a, p. 2). This identification triggers an online mapping mechanism, and this sub-personal pragmatic process is part of the hearer's working out what is communicated by the speaker via an utterance, i.e., metaphorical meaning is inferred by the hearer via the speaker's manifest intention to communicate it.

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[23] For details on the distinction between personal (conscious) and sub-personal (unconscious) inferences, see Recanati (2004, pp. 40-44).

Relevance theory (RT) outlines the two intentions which are required for successful ostensive-inferential communication: an informative intention and a communicative intention (Sperber & Wilson, 1995/86, p. 58-60). DMT also draws on RT as a framework for communication (Steen, 2017, p. 4). As Steen (2017, p. 6) rightly points out, under such a model of communication all metaphorical meaning, conventional or otherwise, is intentional. One definition of deliberate metaphor provided by Steen (2017, p. 6) is that it is "intentionally used as a metaphor in communication". Deliberateness in DMT would therefore seem to require the communication of a metarepresentation of the metaphorical thought as an intended metaphor. This causes some problems in its application to discourse: Perrez and Reuchamps decline to include an instance of non-conventional metaphor as deliberate because they say it is an act of "spontaneous association rather than an explicit attempt of the speaker to have the addressee reconsider the target domain from the perspective of the source domain" (2014, p. 22). While such a distinction is interesting in its own right, it cannot be the factor which triggers an online metaphorical mapping. Addressees must also be able to process non-conventional metaphorical utterances which are not explicitly deliberate in that way, such as spontaneous associations. Furthermore, because the informative intention is made mutually manifest to the hearer by means of the communicative intention (Sperber & Wilson, 1995/86, p. 60), the assumptions which it makes manifest should be recoverable by the hearer and by pragmatic analysis. This is not the case with the intention to use metaphor as metaphor which might not be mutually manifest (as in the case of the spontaneous association discussed by Perrez and Reuchamps). It does not seem viable to demand an explicit intention to use metaphor, beyond what is required by the informative intention and communicative intention, to explain the communication of metaphorical meaning. Nevertheless, despite this issue, there seems to be many common concerns in DMT and pragmatic IT which might be fruitfully explored in the future.

To conclude, pragmatic IT does not view the mapping of active metaphorical utterances as necessarily more conscious than the mapping of conventional metaphorical utterances. Deliberateness in metaphorical language use is undoubtedly an interesting topic, but in pragmatic IT, it is not necessary for online metaphor mapping.

The issue of deliberateness, though not as inconsequential as Gibbs and Chen (2017) make out, is something of a red herring. The question should not be whether a metaphor is used deliberately or consciously but if a metaphorical meaning is part of the communicated meaning of the speaker or not and the processes involved in reaching the

speaker's meaning of metaphorical utterances. Thus, while I share Steen's frustrations with the limits of CMT and its application to discourse, I do not agree with his framework, which utilises the ambiguous concept of deliberateness in place of a pragmatic theory of online metaphor interpretation.

5.5. Summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to discuss some of the main problems in contemporary approaches to metaphor analysis in political discourse. Often, when reading the literature on metaphor, and metaphor in politics, one gets a sense that metaphor studies was changed drastically, and for the better, with the advent of the cognitive turn in the 1980s. However, this oversimplifies and mispresents classical theories of metaphor and rhetoric, and often ignores a rich early-modern tradition which defended both cognitive and linguistic values of metaphorical meaning via metaphorical mapping (Richards, 1936; Black, 1954-5, 1977, 1979). The discussion of metaphor in politics was also in good health before the 1980s, as described in Miller (1979).

Studies which use CMT to "uncover" ideology have a tendency to overreach. Though the theory has had considerable successes in describing the metaphorical basis of political concepts at the macro level of society, it is a severely limited and even contradictory theory at the levels of the sub-group, the individual and the utterance. Often it results in a form of fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977), attributing hidden ideologies to groups and individuals based on controversial and unfalsifiable interpretations of their linguistic behaviour. Related to this is the dismissal by CMT of the importance of novel metaphorical concepts and metaphorical utterances.

Some scholars have attempted to deal with these problems by welding pragmatic theoretical structures to CMT's cognitive base (Charteris-Black, 2004, 2005, 2019; Musolff, 2004, 2012, 2016; Cameron & Deignan, 2006). Much progress has been made, but these theories often run into serious contradictions, either on a theoretical level or in their assumptions regarding metaphor and ideology. Other scholars have adopted deliberateness as a theoretical distinction between literally interpreted metaphors and metaphorically interpreted metaphors (Perrez & Reuchamps, 2014; Steen 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017), but this also runs into contradictions.

One way that we can avoid the trap of fundamental attribution error in political metaphor analysis is by adopting a pragmatic perspective. By focusing on what is

communicated by the speaker in the context of an utterance, we can avoid drawing a one-to-one relationship between the linguistic evidence and a hidden, latent, subconscious inner life of ideology. Rather, we observe ideology indirectly through the manifest intentions of speakers and the potential interpretations of hearers. We can analyse participants in a communicative-event as active contributors to ideological discourse, political thinkers who intentionally communicate and interpret the decontestation of political concepts, rather than the passive transmitters of society's collective subconscious. I am inclined to agree with Lori Bougher who says

> the failure to adopt a methodological framework that adequately acknowledges metaphor's varied functions has further delayed research on civic applications of metaphor [. . .] citizens are not passive recipients who simply accept the metaphors presented to them by politicians and the media. (Bougher, 2012, p. 149)

Despite the attempts of scholars to find a pragmatic dimension to complement the cognitive in the analysis of metaphor in politics, researchers have been missing a vital component; a pragmatic model of metaphorical mapping. Romero and Soria's pragmatic IT provides that component and with it, I will present a model of how novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances can be analysed in political discourse.

Section II: Corpora and Corpus Methodology

Chapter 6
The Contextual Configuration of Corpora

6.1. Introduction

Many writers have emphasised the important role of genre can have in metaphor interpretation (Forceville, 1996, 1999, 2020; Steen, 1994; Zwaan, 1993). Forceville (2020) calls genre a "fundamental element in the cognitive environment" (p. 118) and that genres "steer the viewer's [presumably, also hearer's] search for relevance in clear directions" (p. 146). In this chapter, I discuss Biber and Conrad (2009)'s model for analysing aspects of genre and register (6.2) and apply it to the specific sub-genres of parliamentary speeches and presidential campaign speeches which are the objects of study in this thesis, the EUP corpus (6.3) and the US corpus (6.4).

6.2. Genre and Register

6.2.1. Biber and Conrad's Characterisation of Register

"Genre", "register" and "style" are terms which have been used by many writers, across disciplines, with considerable terminological confusion. A good overview of this, and an attempt to disentangle the terms, is Lee (2001). In this thesis, I am largely following Biber and Conrad (2009). I chose this model as it provides us the tools necessary for outlining the contextual configuration of my corpora, without the theoretical baggage of other similar models (i.e., systemic functional grammar).

Both Lee (2001) and Biber and Conrad (2009) agree that register and style are "in essence two different ways of looking at the same object" (Lee, 2001, p. 46). For Lee, register is the "lexico-grammatical and discoursal-semantic patterns associated with situations (i.e., linguistic patterns) and genre [is] used when we are talking about memberships of culturally recognisable categories" (Lee, 2001, p. 46). Biber and Conrad (2009) also observe this distinction between the two, but tease apart some of the more practical differences between them:

> The genre perspective is similar to the register perspective in that it includes
> description of the purposes and situational context of a text variety, but its linguistic

analysis contrasts with the register perspective by focusing on the conventional structures used to construct a complete text within the variety, for example, the conventional way in which a letter begins and ends. (Biber & Conrad, 2009, p. 2)

For Biber and Conrad, both genre and register analysis must begin with an outline of the "situational context of use" which includes communicative purpose, audience, mode among other elements. Internal textual analysis is then carried out on linguistic level features for register, "the words and structures that commonly occur" (Biber & Conrad, 2009, p. 6), and on structural and discourse level features for genre. Elements from the situational context and textual analysis are then analysed together to find functional links between them. As a model, it is useful to us for the sake of systematically analysing the situational context of a corpus and how this may affect the use of metaphor within it. I will analyse (in sections 5.3, 5.4) the situational context of my corpora following Biber and Conrad (2009, p. 40), the attributes of which are reproduced in table 6.1.

Table 6.1. Situational characteristics (reproduced from Biber and Conrad 2009, p. 40)	
Participants	Addressor(s) Addressees Are there on-lookers?
Relations among participants	Interactiveness Social roles Personal relationship Shared knowledge
Channel	Mode Specific medium
Production circumstances	Real time/ planned
Setting	Is time and place shared by participants? Place of communication Time period
Communicative purposes	General purposes Specific purposes Factuality Expression of stance
Topic	General topical "domain" Specific topic Social status of person being referred to

As Both Lee (2001) and Biber and Conrad (2009) point out, the emphasis on discourse level, structural features which are the focus of analysing genre, means that whereas register can be analysed through text excerpts, genre can only be analysed through complete texts. There is flexibility, however, on what exactly constitutes a complete text. Biber and Conrad (2009, p. 17) point out that within the complete text, it is possible to have

sub-sections with their own genre features, and thus can be considered complete texts, at least for the purposes in analysing genre.

6.2.2. Levels of genre

Another important point is how we categorise texts according to genre (registers are largely characterised by the internal linguistic features, whereas genre is dictated by external, often cultural, categorisation). Genres are not clearly defined so labels can be given, altered and mixed. This is most commonly seen in film and television, where common genre hybrids include "romantic-comedy", "dramatic comedies", and even, "teen supernatural romance". It is also clear that genres can be retroactively applied, such as "silent films" which would only have been recognised as such once technological advances made sound in films a possibility and "talkies" began to take over.

The fuzziness of genre labels has been a problem for some scholars on the subject, particularly those who compile corpora, as pointed out in Lee (2001). Lee finds an answer to this problem in Steen (1999) who proposes applying prototype theory (Rosch, 1973a, 1973b, 1978; Rosch et al., 1976) to the issue of genre. Essentially, prototype theory claims that categories are often vaguely defined and allow membership via partial membership attributes.

Taking his cue from Steen, Lee (2001, p. 48) outlines how different levels of categorisation may work in genre (table 6.2).

Table 6.2. A prototype approach to genre (reproduced from Lee, 2001, p. 48)			
Superordinate	Mammal	Literature ["Super-genre"]	Advertising ["Super-genre"]
Basic-level	Dog/Cat	Novel, poem, drama [Genre]	Advertisement [Genre]
Subordinate	Cocker spaniel/ Siamese	Western, Romance, Adventure [Sub-genre]	Print ad, Radio ad, TV ad, T-shirt ad [Sub-genre]

Basic-level categories are those which are in the middle of a hierarchy of terms. They are characterised as having the maximal clustering of humanly-relevant properties (attributes), and so members are more distinguishable than superordinate and subordinate members (Lee, 2001, p. 48).

In the example above, dogs and cats are at the basic level because it is the level at which mammals are maximally distinct, whereas it not quite so easy for the average person

to distinguish between a mammal and a fish (in the case of a whale), nor between a Yorkshire Terrier and a West Highland White Terrier.

Using Steen (1999)'s prototype model of genre, my corpora can be analysed as shown in table 6.3:

Table 6.3. Levels of genre in the corpora analysed in this thesis		
Superordinate	Super-genre	Formal public speech
Basic	Genre	Political speech
Subordinate	Sub-genre	Parliamentary speech, campaign speech, etc.

The superordinate category, the super-genre, is the formal public speech. By formal public speech, I mean where a speaker plans and prepares to speak in front of a live audience. It is important to distinguish this type of speech from impromptu or informal public speech because the linguistic characteristics of an unprepared speech might be quite different. The basic category is a political speech, which for the purposes of this thesis I will define as a formal public speech given by a professional politician. It is true that non-politicians can engage in formal political speech events, in a question-and-answer type television debate for example, but this type of political speech is not the focus of my thesis. Political speeches can be easily distinguished from other types of formal public speeches such as university lectures, wedding speeches, and so on, largely by virtue of their institutional setting and purpose. Finally, the sub-genres can be different types of political speeches such as campaign speeches, parliamentary speeches, ribbon-cutting speeches. These are not as maximally distinct as the basic, genre level and permit more fuzziness and overlap; a ribbon-cutting speech might also form part of a politician's election campaign, and so on.

My corpora differ at this sub-genre level: My US corpus consists of political campaign speeches given by various politicians during the presential primary and presidential election campaigns leading to the 2016 presidential election. The presidential primaries are the elections by which the two main political parties in the USA, Republicans and Democrats, choose their nominee for the presential election. As such, there might be some slight differences in situational characteristics, mostly relating to addressees, but these differences do not warrant analysing the speeches in separate categories. A candidate in a presidential primary is still trying to persuade people to make them president.

The EU Parliament corpus consists of political parliamentary speeches, specifically the plenary debates, of the 8th European Parliament, 2014-2019. In theory, these speeches should be quite different to presidential campaign speeches, though campaigning might influence some particular speeches.

Because my corpora can be best distinguished at this sub-genre level, and because this is the level at which a detailed analysis would seem most beneficial, I will analyse my corpora as sub-genres of political speeches and apply the model of analysis elaborated in Biber and Conrad (2009) to analyse the contextual configuration of the corpora in this thesis.[24]

6.3. The EU Corpus: Situational Characteristics

6.3.1. Participants

The topic of participant roles is a complex issue, one which is far too complex to develop here (see Levinson, 1988 for an overview). Here, I use the "addressor", "addressee" and "onlooker" roles as they are used in Biber and Conrad (2009, p. 41). However, the criteria for identification of participant roles are quite vague, and this should be an area of concern for all pragmatic theories[25].

6.3.1.1. Addressors

The addressors of the EU Parliament corpus are Nigel Farage, Ashley Fox, Pablo Iglesias and Iratxe Garcia, Ministers of the European Parliament (MEPs) during the 2014-2019

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[24] Style is a third perspective, along with genre and register. It is enough simply to say that Lee (2001) and Biber and Conrad (2009) view style as the personal choices made by a writer:

> The style perspective is similar to the register perspective in its linguistic focus [. . .] The key difference from the register perspective is that the use of these features is not functionally motivated by the situational context; rather, style features reflect aesthetic preferences, associated with particular authors or historical periods.
> (Biber & Conrad, 2009, p. 2)

[25] An abandoned section of this thesis was concerned with participation roles, their identification, and their effect on speaker's meaning. It was abandoned because it seems the issue would have needed a thesis of its own. Good work on this topic has been carried out by Allen (1986), Bell (1984), Clark (1986), Clark and Carlson (1982), Clark and Schaefer (1992), Dynel (2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2014, 2016), and Levinson (1988) among others, but the topic is fraught with contradictions and complications, particularly for dyadic models of communication like relevance theory. I agree with Clark and Schaefer (1992) when they say: "What is remarkable is how many essential aspects of language use it affects and, therefore, how many theories are incomplete, or wrong, without it" (p. 248).

parliament. I will give a brief summary of the relevant biographical material for each candidate.

6.3.1.1.1 Nigel Farage[26]

Nigel Farage (b. 1964, London, England) served in the European Parliament from 1999 to 2020. In Britain, he joined the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) at its founding in 1993, became its leader from 2006 to 2009, and again from 2010 to 2016. In 2019 he founded a new political party, the Brexit Party.

Under Farage, UKIP brought nationalism and Euroscepticism into mainstream British politics. UKIP won 17 percent support in the 2009 European elections and more than 27 percent of the popular vote in the 2014 European elections. In domestic elections during this period, UKIP were not quite as successful but were beginning to pick up votes from dissatisfied voters leaving the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. In local elections in 2012, UKIP won 14 percent of the vote, and improved on that result in local elections in 2013. The domestic gains of UKIP began to worry the Conservatives to such an extent that Prime Minister David Cameron promised that Britain would hold a referendum on the UK's membership of the EU. Farage himself was unsuccessful in domestic elections, finishing third for a seat representing Buckingham in 2009 and also failed to win a seat in the 2015 general election. Nevertheless, he remained the leader of UKIP and for the majority of the 8th European Parliament (2014-2019) he served as chair or co-chair of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD), an alliance of Eurosceptic MEPs.

After the Brexit referendum of June 23, 2016, Farage announced he would resign as UKIP leader saying that his "political ambition has been achieved"(Mason et al., 2016). However, in April 2019, being deeply unhappy with Prime Minister Theresa May's negotiation of the UK's withdrawal from the EU, and increasingly fearing a "soft-Brexit" or a second referendum, Farage launched the Brexit Party. This caused some conflict with his previous colleagues in UKIP, a party that Farage then criticised as a far-right organisation. The Brexit Party won the day, winning 29 seats in the European elections. UKIP won no seats, and the Conservatives only four, a result which heralded the resignation of PM Theresa May. Boris Johnson succeeded Theresa May as PM, and after

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[26] Unless otherwise indicated, information provided here is based on the entry for Farage in the Encyclopedia Britannica online (Kellner, n.d.) and Farage's entry on the European Parliament's website (Europarl, n.d.-c).

negotiating a Withdrawal Agreement acceptable to Parliament, called a snap election. Farage, fearing that the popularity of the Brexit Party would split the Leave vote, announced that Brexit Party candidates would stand down in 300 constituencies where they were challenging a conservative seat. Johnson won a landslide victory and Brexit was all but assured. Farage announced that he would travel to the USA to support Donald Trump's 2020 re-election campaign and on January 29, 2020, Farage made his final address to the European Parliament in which extolled the virtues of populism.

6.3.1.1.2. Ashley Fox[27]

Ashley Fox (b. 1969, Sutton Coldfield, England) was first elected to the European Parliament in 2009 and again in 2014 as a Conservative MEP. He served as Chief Whip of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) from 2010-2014 and remained a member of the group thereafter. In November 2014, he was elected Leader of the Conservative MEPs. In 2019, he failed to retain his seat in the EU parliament.

In the European Parliament he was a member of the Industry, Research & Energy Committee and the Economic & Monetary Affairs Committee. Fox took a special interest in abolishing the "Strasbourg Circus" – the alternating plenary meetings of the EU parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Domestically, Fox also served as Councillor on Bristol City Council.

6.3.1.1.3. Pablo Iglesias[28]

Pablo Iglesias (b. 1978, Madrid, Spain) came into politics via academia. Among other academic qualifications, Iglesias holds a doctorate in political science from Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) where he also taught from 2008 to 2013. There, he met Íñigo Errejón, a student activist and PhD student. Both Iglesias and Errejón became interested in the Spanish *Indignados* movement, particularly the 2011 occupation of plazas in Spanish cities known as 15-M. Out of this, they began to think of ways to politically

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[27] Information provided here is based on information found on Ashley Fox's website (www.ashleyfoxmep.co.uk) and his entry on the European Parliament's website (Europarl, n.d.-a).
[28] Unless otherwise indicated, information provided here is based on information found in Chazel and Fernández-Vásquez (2019) and Iglesias's entry on the European Parliament website (Europarl, n.d.-d).

organise such social movements and, with others, they subsequently founded the political party *Podemos* in 2014 (Chazel & Fernández-Vásquez, 2019).

Podemos immediately found success in the 2014 European elections where they won almost eight percent of the vote in Spain, enough to win five seats in the European Parliament, including one for Iglesias himself (Gálvez & Kadner, 2014). Almost immediately Iglesias courted controversy when he altered the words of an oath to the Spanish constitution which he had to swear as an MEP-elect: "Prometo acatar la Constitución hasta que los ciudadanos de mi país la cambien para recuperar la soberanía y los derechos sociales" [I promise to take up the Constitution until the citizens of my country change it to regain sovereignty and social rights] (quoted in Manetto, 2014).

Iglesias spent a short but active time in the EU parliament. He was a member of the Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and on several committees including the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Human Rights, Delegation for relations with Mercosur. He was nominated as a candidate for President of the European Parliament but he was unsuccessful (Europarl, n.d.-d). In October 2015, Iglesias left the European Parliament in order to stand in the Spanish general election, and was elected to the Spanish parliament. After the November 2019 elections, he entered government as Second Deputy Prime Minister in a coalition government with Pedro Sánchez's PSOE. He resigned from this office in 2021 to contest regional elections in Madrid, but retired from politics when his party performed poorly.

6.3.1.1.4. Iratxe Garcia[29]

Iratxe Garcia (b. 1974, Baracaldo, Spain) is a member of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). She was elected to the Spanish Congress of Deputies in 2000 and first elected to the European Parliament in 2004, and re-elected in 2009, 2014 and 2019. In September 2014 she was appointed leader of PSOE's MEPs within the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group.

During the 8th European Parliament, Garcia was involved in committees such as the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, the Conference of Committee Chairs, the Delegation for

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[29] Information provided here is based on information found in García's entry on the European Parliament website (Europarl, n.d.-b) and (La Vanguardia, 2014)

relations with the Arab Peninsula, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Regional Development, and the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality. As of July 2019, she is Chair of the S&D group.

6.3.1.2. Addressees/Onlookers

The participation roles of addressee and onlooker (or "overhearer" in some systems) are particularly tricky. There are many criteria for identifying the addressee but, in some cases, these can be insufficient and even contradictory. They include address by vocatives/pronouns, eye contact, relevance and more (see Levinson, 1988 for an overview). Going back to Goffman (1981), onlookers /overhearers are normally defined as a participant who is not ratified to the communicative event, though what ratification entails differs from author to author and can be quite a vague concept. This causes problems because there can be cases where both speaker and addressee are fully cognizant that there is another participant onlooking/overhearing, and with utterances designed and interpreted accordingly. This has forced some writers on the subject to talk about "tacit ratification" (Dynel, 2010a) and "partial communicative intentions" (Clark & Carlson,1982, p. 348), ideas which don't sit easily with Gricean pragmatics.

Nevertheless, in mass media events such as televised political speeches, it seems to be standard, in general, to treat the audience at home as onlookers and the attending participants as ratified participants, either as addressee or as a ratified third party (Biber & Conrad, 2009, p. 42). There is an important qualification to keep in mind here: participant roles should be defined utterance by utterance rather than at event level. For example, in the first presidential debate between Joe Biden and Donald Trump in September 2020, the candidates sometimes addressed each other, sometimes addressed the debate moderator. They were each speaker, addressee and onlooker at different moments of the debate. In general, we can consider the audience at home as onlookers. However, at one point in the debate Joe Biden also looked into the camera and addressed the American people, using the second-person pronoun plural, in which case they are addressees.

In the European Parliament, MEPs are, in theory, addressing each other. There will often be opening words by a high-ranking representative of a EU institution, a head of state, or a committee report to Parliament given by a rapporteur. MEPs will then debate, taking turns to address the plenary speaker, the president of the parliament, other MEPs as a group

or specific MEPs, or perhaps all of the above. The audience, at home, are onlookers—they receive the debates via mainstream media, or via online media (YouTube, Twitter, etc,).

6.3.2. Relations Among Participants

In a context such as EU parliamentary debates, relations between participants can become quite complicated. To begin with, although "audience" is always quite an artificial homogenization of different audiences, this is even more striking in a communicative context where audiences come from 28 different countries and may speak 24 different official languages. When a German MEP is producing an utterance with her domestic audience in mind, there may be important differences then if she is addressing any and all European citizens. The German MEP will share a mutual cognitive environment (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 41-42)[30] with her German audience which differs from the mutual cognitive environment she shares with fellow MEPs, which in turn might differ from the mutual cognitive environment shared by a more international audience, and so on. Since relevance is relevance to an individual (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 142), these differences in audiences might have an effect on how an utterance is designed and interpreted. To a German audience, the German MEP might choose to speak in German, perhaps even throwing in some dialectal varieties. To an international audience, they might choose to speak in quite a standard, international English. In some cases, multilingual MEPs change languages within their turn which seems to indicate a certain relevance to a certain audience.

Moreover, the ways in which different audiences at home consume media can have an impact on how MEPs design their utterances. This is particularly true for Nigel Farage. He had a certain infamy with the EU Parliament for leaving plenary debates after he had made his own contribution. In the words of one MEP, Esther de Lange, "He made his speech, probably put it on YouTube, and left the room. That is what he always does" (Strasbourg, 16/01/2019).

For Farage, who does not wait for replies to his own contributions, and for Farage's audience, consuming selected and edited snippets of the debate on YouTube, the

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[30] A mutual cognitive environment is the set of manifest assumptions which is shared by a group of individuals and in which it is manifest to those individuals that they share it with each other: "When a cognitive environment we share with other people is mutual, we have evidence about what is mutually manifest to all of us" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 45). See section 1.4 in this thesis for further discussion.

communicative event is not really a political debate at all; they do not listen to their interlocutors.

This is in itself part of the polarisation process. Through the direct relationship politicians can form over the internet, political lecturing and haranguing can masquerade as political debate. Such exposure to negative views of political outgroup entities reinforces biased views and increases social distance between groups (Iyengar et al. 2012).

It is worth reiterating here that, while different audiences might have different dispositions towards the speaker, they are all guided to an interpretation of speaker's meaning by the search for relevance (see section 1.4.2 for discussion).

6.3.3. Channel

I have briefly mentioned the effect that the specific media of dissemination can have on the production of utterances in the debate, their reception by audiences and the effects this can have on relations between participants.

In terms of reception, though utterances are spoken in plenary debates they can often be disseminated to audiences in written form i.e., reported in print and online news articles. In terms of this thesis, my corpus was extracted from official transcripts of the debates provided on the European Parliament's website[31]. While the website also provides video, I found that not all of these functioned. Furthermore, with a corpus so large, it would not have been feasible to watch all of the debates. Instead, I looked at videos only for those speeches for which the transcriptions indicated some relevant visual detail.

6.3.4. Production Circumstances

There is another issue related to this which is the mode by which debates are produced and disseminated. While the plenary debates are technically spoken, there is obviously an element of written production involved since politicians do not usually come to a debate and speak impromptu. This fact is often acknowledged in introductions to work on metaphor in politics (Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 212). Given the fact that politicians carefully construct their speeches, sometimes employing teams of speechwriters, we should assume that the metaphorical utterances they use are carefully crafted.

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[31] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary

One complicating factor in the EUP corpus is the blue-card questions, in which ministers answer questions posed by other MEPs. These fall into a somewhat grey area, because they seem, by their nature, impromptu. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that questions are somewhat foreseen and answers, in part, prepared. Sometimes answers consist of reiterations of points made in the main speech. Furthermore, these blue-card questions and answers form a very small part of the overall corpus.

6.3.5. Setting

The complexities of my corpus are typical of contemporary communication in that setting and participation can interact in interesting ways. The plenary debates are seemingly synchronous events—MEPs address each other and others who are physically present in the parliament. Yet even at this level, synchronicity is somewhat deceptive. Nigel Farage would often leave the debate before other MEPs replied to his contribution. Moreover, in parliamentary debates the world over politicians are often caught on their phones, sleeping or doing other activities, ostensively or otherwise, when the contribution of a speaker does not interest them. To what extent can we call a participant an addressee when, like Jacob-Reese-Mog in the British parliament, they have put up their feet to take a rest and have made a point of opting out of the conversation? (Rawlinson, 2019)

This deceptive synchronicity is even more pronounced if, like Farage, a politician's audience watches speeches on an internet site like YouTube. With such a participation dynamic, communication can be completely asynchronous (Yus, 2011): viewers might watch Farage berating the EU Parliament in the most recent debate, and then be recommended a whole slew of videos from previous debates which reinforce the first. After viewing the older video, the viewer can then engage in asynchronous communication with fellow audience members in the comments section, turns in a conversation which feel synchronous but can be separated by years.

This is not only a problem with YouTube but with mainstream media sources. As news has moved online, news stories can be shared and reshared and stay in circulation months and years after their original context has become obscured. Old news is mistakenly taken as contemporary news in a contemporary context of interpretation. These asynchronous aspects of online communication have forced newspapers like the Guardian to prominently highlight the age of articles to help prevent the spread of misinformation.

As for the physical setting of the plenary debates, this is sometimes, but not often relevant to utterances in the corpus. A peculiarity of the European Parliament is that it moves from Brussels to Strasbourg several times a year, as stipulated by treaty. This is source of criticism by many MEPs, who view it as a waste of taxpayers' money and symbolic both of European bureaucratic waste and the irrationality of the EU as a political project. So, when Farage utters (1),

(1)   [Strasbourg, 14/09/2016. Farage says:] If you were to think of this building as a temple, Mr. Verhofstadt is the high priest, a fanatic.

he refers to the physical parliament building in Strasbourg, not the institution of parliament itself, because it is symbolic of what he opposes.

6.3.6. Communicative Purposes

The general purpose of political debate is usually seen as persuasion and the reconciliation of differences through communication (Chilton, 2004, p. 4). Although this might be the case in general, politicians might have a variety of other motivations when they speak in parliament: explication, narration, and even obstruction (in the case of a filibuster).

In general, the purposes behind speeches in the EUP corpus appear quite diverse; some may wish to persuade colleagues to vote a certain way, others may wish to insult a political enemy, to make a point to domestic audiences, or some combination of all of these and more. Specific purposes at an utterance level can be even more diverse. An MEP can perform a variety of speech acts in her turn and to a variety of audiences.

I think it is important to stress that communicative purposes are not the same as communicative intentions in the Gricean or relevance theoretic sense. Communicative intentions are the intentions which must be made manifest for communication to be successful. According to RT, one of the speaker's intention is to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the communicator has this informative intention (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, p. 61). In that sense, communicative intentions are overt, and can be recovered through pragmatic linguistic analysis. Even non-explicit intended effects such as making a directive without using the imperative form or issuing an implicature might be recoverable pragmatically, for example. There are, however, communicative purposes which might not be recoverable. For example, the intention to deceive or to

manipulate, or any other kind of "covert" intention, are often not recoverable beyond conjecture. This is one reason why I do not follow the type of metaphor analysis found in traditional CMT and discourse analysis traditions such Charteris-Black (2004), which try to recover these covert intentions and subconscious ideology through linguistic analysis. Of course, language and thought cannot be separated so easily, but I take the position that the limits of pragmatic linguistic analysis is "what are the intended effects (explicitly or implicitly) communicated?" rather than "what is the covert ideology of speakers?" A pragmatic linguistic analysis attempts to account for the content intentionally communicated by the speaker with her utterances (speaker's meaning). Furthermore, when the speaker uses language metaphorically, the content is metaphorically elaborated on the spot and this contextual elaboration demands a pragmatic explanation.

6.3.7. Topic

The topics of debate in the EU Parliament can vary considerably, from farming and fishing quotas to the war in Syria to human rights. For pragmatic linguistic analysis, this can sometimes be a problem; the question of how much background research is necessary can resemble the question "how long is a piece of string?" Because the corpus is more or less contemporary, 2014-2019, and because I generally keep up-to-date with current affairs, I could rely on my own background knowledge for general purposes and I conducted research online using reputable news sources for anything I felt less than sure of. For a less-contemporaneous corpus, more in-depth systematic research might have been necessary. In any case, dealing with a corpus of such varied topics, a large-scale systematic background research would require a large amount of time and resources.

On an individual candidate level, topics can also vary greatly, even within the same debate. Farage, for example, will often use the main debate topic to attack the EU, its institutions or specific MEPs. Iglesias, though perhaps less often, does the same against various representatives of capitalist interests. Garcia and Fox, on the other hand, stick more to the debate topics being discussed.

The social status of those involved will often vary depending on who the MEP is addressing. Although a minimum of social deference and professional politeness is expected, these lines are sometimes crossed.

6.4. The US Corpus: Situational Characteristics

6.4.1. Participants

While the 2016 saw a large number of candidates running for president, I focus my qualitative analysis on Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders. In this section, I give some of the relevant biographical information of each.

6.4.1.1. Addressors

6.4.1.1.1. Donald Trump[32]

Donald J. Trump (b. 1946, New York, USA) was the 45th president of the United States, elected in 2016, serving one term until January 2021.

Before entering politics, Trump was well-known as a businessman and media personality. His professional career began in the late 1960s when he joined his father, Fred Trump, in the development and management of real estate. In 1974, Donald became president of his father's conglomeration of enterprises, which he renamed the Trump Organization. In the 1980s, Donald Trump expanded the organisation's interests, developing iconic real estate in Manhattan, including the Grand Hyatt hotel which would become Trump Tower, as well as several projects in Atlantic City. In the 1990s, several of these businesses began to run into financial difficulties, some going bankrupt, and Trump found it increasingly difficult to get credit from large banks.

As the American economy improved in the late 1990s, Trump's financial fortunes began to improve, and he moved further into the entertainment industry. In 2004, he launched a reality television series, *The Apprentice*, in which he starred, and which made Trump into a household name across the world.

Trump had flirted with running for president since the 1980s, but it was not until the 2012 presidential election, when he became a high-profile political pundit on Fox news, that he began to demonstrate political influence. Trump was instrumental in fostering the birther conspiracy, a belief among some conservative voters that President Barack Obama was not a legitimate US citizen.

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[32] Unless otherwise indicated, information provided here is based on information found in Duignan (n.d.).

In June 2015, Trump announced his candidacy in the US presential election of 2016. His campaign was constantly mired in controversies over perceived racism and misogyny. Most commentators thought the campaign was aimed at furthering his celebrity rather than a realisation of any sincerely held political ambition. However, Trump would see off 16 challengers during the Republican primaries to win the party's nomination.

The presidential campaign was also mired in controversy; coming to a head when a recording emerged of Trump using crude language to talk about women. Trump successfully diverted attention towards his democratic opponent Hillary Clinton, accusing her of criminality and hypocrisy relating to a number of issues. Trump's speeches at political rallies became notorious for the vitriol against Clinton, where Trump would lead chants of "Lock her up"—the kind of threat against political opponents which was unheard of in American democracy up until that point. Trump courted controversy for refusing to condemn white supremacists who had endorsed him and for accusing the media as being "enemies of the American people" (Davis, 2018). Trump's brash speaking style was enhanced by his online presence on Twitter, a medium which Trump used to bypass media and communicate directly with his followers.

Despite trailing Clinton in the polls leading up to the election, and losing the popular vote, Trump won the presidency through America's electoral college system. In his inaugural speech he showed no sign of reigning in his controversial style of politics, promising a political revolution of "America First" that would "make America great again".

6.4.1.1.2. Hillary Clinton[33]

Hillary Rodham Clinton (b. 1947, Chicago, USA) is a lawyer, politician and senior member of the Democratic party. She has a long history of service in the US government, as first lady to President Bill Clinton (1993-2001), as a US senator (2001-2009) and as secretary of state (2009-2013) under President Barack Obama. She was the Democratic nominee in the presidential election, 2016.

After graduating from Yale law school in 1973, Clinton started a promising career in law, first with the Children's Defense Fund and then working for the House Judiciary Committee pursuing the impeachment of President Richard Nixon. She then moved to

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[33] Information provided here is based on information found in Caroli (n.d.).

Arkansas where she taught at the University there, and joined a prominent law firm, becoming a partner. As her husband, Bill, pursued a career in politics and served as governor of Arkansas, Hillary became one of America's most influential lawyers and served on the boards of several corporations.

During her husband's presidential campaign and eventual two-term presidency, Clinton played an unprecedented active role as first lady, leading the administration's policies on healthcare. This, along with her impressive professional career, made her the object of scorn and suspicion in conservative America, something that undoubtedly persists to this day.

However, Clinton also provoked, and still provokes, suspicion among the general American public for her financial history and connections with corporate America. An early example of this is the Whitewater scandal, in which her and her husband's financial investments in Arkansas came under scrutiny, and which rocked the first Clinton administration.

Hillary also played a central role in the scandal that defined her husband's second term—his affairs with Monica Lewinski and his subsequent impeachment by the US House of Representatives and trial in the Senate. Clinton's defence of her husband would become an important line of attack for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election.

As a senator, Clinton voted in favour of President Bush's Iraq war in 2003, a decision she later regretted, and this would also be used against her in 2016. However, it is two issues from her time as Secretary of State which most affected her 2016 presidential bid. The first revolved around a series of attacks on a US installations in Benghazi, Libya, in 2012. These attacks, carried out by Islamic terrorists, resulted in the death of four Americans and the wounding of ten others. The Obama administration, and particularly Clinton as secretary of state, was accused by Republicans of failing to provide adequate security for the installation and for misleading the American public in the attack's aftermath (BBC, 2013).

The second issue revolved around her use of a private internet server for official government business. Trump used this scandal in the 2016 race to imply that Clinton was giving preferential access to political donors. Though the issue was investigated by the FBI, no evidence of criminality was found. However, the issue would become a turning point in the 2016 election when FBI director James Comey announced he would reopen investigations into the private server eleven days before election day.

6.4.1.1.3. Bernie Sanders[34]

Bernard 'Bernie' Sanders (b. 1941, New York, USA) is an American politician who has run in two presential races, 2016 and 2020. In 2016, he lost the Democratic nomination to Hillary Rodham Clinton and in 2020 he lost the nomination to Joe Biden. However, his strong support among young Democrats on the left of the party has made him an agent of change in left-wing American politics and an influential voice in public life.

Sanders became involved in civil rights protests during his time studying political science at the University of Chicago. The anti-Vietnam war movement inspired him seek elected office, and despite some early failures, he was elected mayor of Burlington, Vermont, in 1981.

Running as an independent, Sanders was elected to the US House of Representatives in 1990. There, he founded the Congressional Progressive Caucus and was a staunch opponent of President George W. Bush's war in Iraq and tax-cuts for the wealthy. He won re-election seven times.

In 2006, Sanders was elected to the US Senate where he campaigned for tax reform. He was also a supporter of legislation in favour of measures to combat climate change and improve veteran's affairs.

In 2015, Sanders announced he would run for president in the 2016 election. Initially dismissed as too socialist for American voters, Sanders surprised pundits with a campaign that roused and inspired young Democratic voters. The primary campaign saw a quite intense rivalry between Sanders and Clinton, with Clinton eventually gaining the party's nomination. Sanders would eventually endorse Clinton, but the primary campaign had left many of Sander's supporters indifferent or even bitter towards Clinton.

6.4.1.2. Addressees/Onlookers

Since the US corpus consists of campaign speeches, the role of addressee and onlooker is somewhat more complicated than in the EU parliament corpus. There are at least two target audiences, the audience who witness the speech live and the much larger audience(s) who watch the speech online or on television, hear it on the radio or read about in a newspaper. In many ways the first audience is a prop used to communicate with the latter. In a sense,

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[34] Information provided here is based on information found in McNamee (n.d.).

because the two target audiences coincide in that they are all supporters or potential supporters, the first is acting as surrogate for the second.

A more complicating factor is Trump's explicit reference to outgroup audiences such as the media, the opposition candidates and their supporters. In general, I find it useful to separate Trump's and other politicians' audiences into ingroup and outgroup audiences; though in some ways it simplifies things, it allows more succinct analysis of populism's polarising discourse. When more fine-tuned analysis is necessary, these broad categories of ingroup and outgroup audiences can be broken down further.

6.4.2. Relations Among Participants

The degree to which candidates interact with different audiences, and audiences with each other, varies from candidate to candidate. The presence of ingroup/outgroup audiences is frequently made explicit in Trump's speeches. For example, although Trump makes the participation of the media as a hostile audience explicit, Clinton observes the more traditional dynamic of seeming to only address the crowd in front of her. Trump also interacted directly with protesters who came to his rallies, suggesting that his supporters throw them out. Relations among participants also vary on an utterance-by-utterance basis. For example, when Trump led audiences in a chant of "lock her up!", he was threatening his political opponent. When he was addressing a meeting of military veterans, his tone was more measured.

Like Farage's use of YouTube, Trump's use of social media, especially Twitter, has a role to play in how participants relate to each other. For example, while the "drain the swamp" metaphor theme was introduced relatively late in the 2016 campaign, it became one of Trump's most famous slogans. This is not reflected in my corpus, where it occurs only rarely. However, if Trump's account of its origin in his campaign is true, we can see how the relationship between participants played an important role:

> Funny how that term caught on, isn't it? . . . I tell everyone, I hated it. Somebody said "Drain the swamp," and I said, "Oh, that is so hokey. That is so terrible." . . . I said, all right, I'll try it. . . . So, like a month ago, I said, "Drain the swamp," and the place went crazy. And I said, "Whoa, what's this?" Then I said it again. And then I start saying it like I meant it, right? And then I said it—I started loving it, and the

place loved it. Drain the swamp. It's true. It's true. Drain the swamp. (Donald Trump. Quoted in Widmer, 2017)

Trump, reluctant at first to use the slogan, used the in-person audience at his speech to test its reception. Given the enthusiastic reaction of the in-person audience, Trump and his followers on Twitter began to use it as a hash-tagged slogan online. In a preliminary study I have carried out of Trump's tweets during the campaign[35], roughly one third of the active metaphors used were based on the drain-the-swamp theme.

6.4.3. Channel

As with the EUP corpus, although the speeches are spoken with potentially relevant paralinguistic features, they reach audiences through a variety of media, both mainstream media and online alternative media. As already mentioned, the latter is especially important for Trump. Unlike any presidential candidate, or president, before him, Trump used social media such as Twitter to directly communicate with his audiences.

The US corpus, which I took and expanded from the Team Populism website[36], consists of transcripts of speeches which Team Populism scholars collected from mainstream media sources during the campaign or shortly after (Hawkins, 2016). While parliamentary speeches, or presidential speeches, are often conserved carefully for research and for posterity, this is not the case with campaign speeches. Candidates give many, many speeches over the course of the campaign, and not all of them are deemed equally newsworthy. The quality of transcription can vary considerably. I have tried to find video of speeches to confirm particularly important passages of speeches, but this has not always been possible. Furthermore, transcriptions in Team Populism's US corpus were often missing important metadata, such as the location of the speech. Where possible, I have tried to confirm such details, but again, this has not always been possible. It is an unfortunate limitation and would be remedied were scholars to systematically collect campaign speeches concurrently with the events. It is not always easy or possible to reliably recover such information years later.

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[35] This preliminary study is another abandoned section of this thesis which, nevertheless, might inform future research.
[36] https://populism.byu.edu

6.4.4. Production Circumstances

As political speeches, we must assume that campaign speeches are highly prepared and crafted, not only by the candidate themselves but by a team of writers and campaign advisors. An interesting caveat to this is Donald Trump. He is famous, or infamous, for ignoring his teleprompter and having an impromptu style. Interestingly, using the Team Populism holistic method, scholars have found that the speeches in which Trump goes impromptu are less populist (Smith et al., 2019). This implies that Trump's populism "is not his own" (Smith et al., 2019). The populist elements of Trump's rhetoric are usually attributed to the influence of his one-time advisor Steve Bannon. However, in my coding of the speeches, I have found populist elements present in Trump's speeches before Bannon joined the campaign.

6.4.5. Setting

As I have already discussed, Team Populism's US corpus is missing some important metadata which is not always recoverable. This means that the setting of a speech is not always clear or is very general. However, I do not think this has been a problem for my analysis. In most cases, the general setting is enough. Major campaign speeches are usually given in arenas or airport hangers, anywhere that can accommodate large audiences, and therefore have similar contextual components—the candidate on stage, addressing mostly ingroup audiences, who are observing in-person and remotely. In some circumstances, the location of speech will inspire intertextual or cultural references. For example, a speech given in Gettysburg will probably reference Lincoln's famous "Gettysburg Address", but these references are usually superficial and easily noted.

6.4.6. Communicative Purposes

Perhaps even more so than other sub-genres of political speeches, campaign speeches seek to persuade. However, other purposes can also be involved: when a candidate loses a vote they are expected to make a concession speech which will often seek mitigate the ingroup audiences' disappointment and motivate them for the next campaign. Sometimes a candidate will be on the offence, attacking an opponent, at other times on the defence, responding to an attack reported via the media.

6.4.7. Topic

There is no one topic in campaign speeches apart from the election itself. Though general themes will almost always be present. For example, foreign policy and health care are particularly important topics in contemporary America. In 2016, immigration was a prominent topic, probably because of Trump's provocative promise to build a wall between the USA and Mexico and to deport illegal immigrants. Hillary Clinton's historic candidacy as the first woman nominated by one of the two main parties meant that the topic of minority rights was also quite prominent.

6.5. Summary

In this chapter, I have used Biber and Conrad (2009)'s model of genre analysis to interrogate the situational context of my two corpora. While the variables of context are almost endless, this analysis allows me to systematically research the most relevant contextual information. Although the next stage of Biber and Conrad (2009)'s model is to carry out textual analysis and explain register/genre features based on aspects of the situational context, my aim here is not to define genres but to retrieve and analyse active metaphorical utterances from corpora. The analysis of situational context carried out here will inform the pragmatic qualitative and quantitative analysis of the corpora.

One issue which is worth emphasising is that the EUP corpora consists of parliamentary speeches and the US corpora consists of campaign speeches. This makes the possibility of direct comparison between them limited. However, this is not a problem for my research objectives. The quantitative data derived from each is meant to inform the qualitative analysis of each corpora separately. My research objectives are not served by statistical extrapolation of the quantitative data to wider speech communities: Populists might use metaphor differently given different contextual configurations. However, corpora can also be used to inform theoretical questions, and here limited comparison between the corpora can be useful. I now turn to methods for extracting metaphorical utterances from corpora.

Chapter 7
Corpora and Methodology

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter I discuss some methods for identifying metaphor in corpora and why they are unsuitable for use in this thesis (7.2). I then discuss by my own corpora (7.3.1), the tools I used to overcome the problems they posed (7.3.2), how I graded for populist discourse (7.3.3), my method for analysing metaphor, qualitatively and quantitatively (7.3.4), and I take note of some considerations and challenges regarding statistical analysis (7.3.5). It is an analysis which fits the new field that Romero-Trillo has named "corpus pragmatics". Work in this field has attempted

> to bridge the gap between two ways of looking at language: corpus linguistics as a method of analysis primarily informed by mathematics and statistics with the aid of an excellent and meticulous methodology; and pragmatics, on the other hand, which was perceived to have an indefinite methodology when it accounted for the interpretation of the pervasive distance between sentence and intended meaning in communication. (Romero-Trillo, 2013, p. 1)

This bridging between corpus linguistics and pragmatics involves some methodological adjustment in both directions; the corpus-analysis must become more pragmatic and the pragmatic analysis more corpus-driven. While each researcher and research topic will demand different adjustments, a common dimension of corpus-pragmatic work is that it relies on both quantitative and qualitative methods.

In this thesis, the quantitative data extracted from the corpus does not serve to prove or disprove a hypothesis, as it does in much corpus-linguistics. Rather, it serves a hypothesis-generating purpose, a method for generating data which can guide and inform qualitative analysis (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007). On the other hand, unlike traditional pragmatic linguistics, this thesis attempts to base its conclusions on the analysis of "a representative volume of data, sieved through pragmatics theories" (Romero-Trillo, 2013, p. 1). The originality of this thesis lies in the application of a pragmatic theory of metaphor interpretation to political discourse, and this entails bridging the gaps between pragmatic

theory and corpus methodology, between quantitative and qualitative analysis, between metaphor as thought and its use in political discourse.

7.2. Corpus Methodologies for Metaphor Analysis

7.2.1. Charteris-Black's Identification Criteria

In chapter 5, I outlined some theoretical problems in Charteris-Black's model for analysing metaphor in discourse; the contradictions in using CMT's model of mapping while adopting a stratified definition of metaphor based on semantic tension; and the problems in viewing the pragmatic function of metaphor as covert evaluation (section 5.4.3). The contradictions in his theoretical model are reflected in his corpus methodology. The stratified functions of metaphor outlined by Charteris-Black involve metaphor having different definitional/identification criteria for each function.

The linguistic criteria are (1) reification, i.e., using a word or phrase to refer to an abstract concept which, in other contexts, refers a concrete concept; (2) personification, i.e., using a word or phrase to refer to an inanimate concept which, in other contexts, refers an animate concept; (3) depersonification i.e., using a word or phrase to refer to an animate concept which, in other contexts, refers an inanimate concept (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21).

The pragmatic criteria are that the metaphor be an incongruous linguistic representation that has "the underlying purpose of influencing opinions and judgments by persuasion", and this intention to persuade is often covert (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21).

The cognitive criteria are that "a metaphor is caused by (and may cause) a shift in the *conceptual system*" [emphasis in original] (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21). This conceptual shift is "the psychological association between [. . .] the attributes of the referent of a linguistic expression in its original source context and those of the referent in its novel target context" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21).

Charteris-Black does not give clear examples of how each of these work. In practice, he summarises them into one general criterion "the presence of incongruity or semantic tension" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 35). The pragmatic criteria, based on uncovering a covert intention to persuade, is actually more psychological than pragmatic. Ironically, since all of the linguistic and cognitive criteria involve reference assignment and their context sensitivity is emphasised, they could be deemed more pragmatic than the pragmatic criteria. In fact, when summarising his approach to metaphor identification

Charteris-Black writes "any word can be a metaphor if its context makes it such and if the speaker intends it as such" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 35), a stance which would seem to demand rigorous pragmatic criteria.

This trifurcation of Charteris-Black's theory and definitional/identification criteria forces him to compartmentalise different approaches with their own units of measurement. Building on his three sets of criteria, he outlines his units of analysis as follows. A *metaphor*, a linguistic structure, is characterised by semantic tension (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21). A *conventional metaphor* is a metaphor that has become linguistically conventional and, therefore, has lost a sense of semantic tension (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21). A *novel metaphor* "has not previously been taken up and used in a language community" and has heightened semantic tension (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21). A *conceptual metaphor* is a cognitive "statement" that resolves the semantic tension of a set of *metaphors* and *a conceptual key* a cognitive "statement" that resolves a set of conceptual metaphors (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 21).

There are many problems here: If semantic tension is the tension between literal what is said and metaphorical what is meant, which is how Charteris-Black explicitly defines it, this would be a problem for aspects of his model which are drawn from CMT, since CMT rejects this idea of semantic tension out of hand and CMT's model of conventional metaphorical concepts cannot be used to explain it. If by semantic tension Charteris-Black means some form of contextual abnormality similar to that of pragmatic IT, as Charteris-Black sems to implicitly use it, then he cannot use CMT's model of conceptual metaphor to explain such abnormality or resolve it. Linguistically, CMT focuses on conventional metaphorical expressions, literal metaphors, and thus there is little or no contextual abnormality to resolve. Novel metaphors might show strong contextual abnormality, but because these are novel they are unlikely to be part of sets, and so cannot be explained by conventional metaphors as Charteris-Black describes them.

Moreover, these categories are quite arbitrary. Almost any metaphor beyond basic embodied metaphors could be considered both a conceptual metaphor and a conceptual key. For example, Charteris-Black gives an example of a conceptual metaphor looking at an utterance of George Bush Senior:

(1)   Yes, the United States bears a major share of *leadership* in this effort. Among the
        nations of the world, only the United States of America has had both the moral

standing, and the means to back it up. [emphasis in original] (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 15)

Charteris-Black sees the presence of the conceptual metaphor AMERICA IS A MORAL LEADER.

I do not see semantic tension here. It is true that there might be a metonymic relationship between AMERICA and AMERICAN PEOPLE, but there is no clear evidence of semantic tension being resolved by cross-domain mapping. Moreover, we could analyse the utterance (1b) in several different ways using conceptual metaphors:

(1b)   Yes, the United States (i) *bears* a major (ii) *share* of *leadership* in this (iii) *effort*. Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has had both the (iv) *moral standing*, and the means to back it up. [italics are my own]

I could take the numbered italicised expressions as evidence for the following conceptual metaphors:

    i. TAKING RESPONSIBILITY IS BEARING A BURDEN

    ii. LEADERSHIP IS A SHARABLE SUBSTANCE

    iii. GEOPOLITICAL POLICIES ARE PHYSICAL EFFORTS

    iv. GOOD MORAL REPUTATION IS STANDING UP

My point is not to argue for or against the presence of these metaphors in (1b). I am merely pointing out the arbitrariness of using linguistic expressions as evidence for conceptual metaphors based on quite vague criteria.

Conceptual keys are equally arbitrary. Charteris-Black groups the conceptual metaphor he finds in (1a) with other conceptual metaphors AMERICA IS A FRIEND, AMERICA IS AN ENEMY and groups them under the conceptual key A NATION IS A PERSON. But why stop there? We could analyse an expression like "mother nature" and "mother earth" to give us the conceptual metaphor NATURE IS A MOTHER or EARTH IS A MOTHER and group them with the NATION IS A PERSON conceptual key to arrive at a higher-level conceptual key GEOGRAPHICAL SPACES ARE PEOPLE. We could probably find more expressions and create another level without much effort.

This arbitrariness is a problem when we are working with a cognitive framework because we are making specific claims about the existence of structures in our conceptual

system. Charteris-Black seems to admit this when he says that conceptual metaphors and conceptual keys are useful to the extent that "they are valuable notions for describing and classifying figurative language" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 16). This an ambiguity which does his work a huge disservice. One cannot claim that AMERICA IS A MORAL LEADER is both a cognitive structure in the mind which allows one to objectively analyse the ideology of others, and at the same time an arbitrary tool of the analyst for description and classification.

Moreover, the arbitrariness of these units of analysis is a fatal flaw for quantitative corpus analysis. What does it mean to say that I have found 200 instances of the AMERICA IS A PERSON conceptual metaphor in a text? If the category is arbitrary and utterances could be categorised at a higher or lower level of abstraction, it is likely that my category is concealing more than it reveals.

Charteris-Black's corpus analysis is dependent on these units of analysis which are deeply flawed in their conception. He performs two stages of metaphor identification, one stage of metaphor interpretation, and a final stage of metaphor explanation. In the first stage of metaphor identification, he conducts a close reading of sample texts to identify metaphor candidates. These metaphor candidates are examined in relation to his linguistic, pragmatic and cognitive criteria which Charteris-Black summarises as "the presence of incongruity or semantic tension–either at linguistic, pragmatic, or cognitive levels–resulting in a shift in domain use–even if this shift happened some time before and has since become conventionalised" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 35).

In the second stage of identification, he identifies words that are commonly used with a metaphorical meaning in the sample texts and measures the quantity of these words in the larger corpus. Each occurrence of these keywords is then examined with its cotext to determine whether it is metaphoric or literal (presumably according to the linguistic, pragmatic and cognitive criteria).

Because his identification criteria are stratified into linguistic, cognitive and pragmatic levels, none of which seems to be sufficient on their own, Charteris-Black has to adopt other criteria in an ad hoc way. For example, when looking at the example of George Bush Jr's use of "crusade" to describe the War on Terror, he uses diachronic criteria to classify its metaphorical use: Any sense that is used or interpreted as referring to religious struggle is deemed literal, and the conventional metaphorical sense is "a reforming enterprise undertaken with zeal and enthusiasm" (*Longman New Universal Dictionary*. Quoted in Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 36). In the second stage of metaphor identification, he

analyses uses of the word "crusade" extracted from a corpus using KWIC tools and compares them against these two lexicalised senses, the lexicalised literal sense and the lexicalised metaphorical sense. The former are rejected and the latter are accepted. Therefore he counts expressions[37] (in bold) in utterances (or partial utterances) such as "[. . .] of the most effective voices in the **crusade against slavery**. In 1837, twelve [. . .]" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 36). Since both Charteris-Black's literal and metaphoric senses of "crusade" are dictionary senses, i.e., conventional, he seems to have precluded the possibility of crusade being used as with novel metaphorical sense in his corpus. On the other hand, Charteris-Black's method seems to discount highly conventional metaphorical expressions:

> Keywords are therefore words that have a tendency to be used as conventional metaphors rather than words that will always be used as metaphors. This is because if they were used as metaphors in every instance this would erode the semantic tension that is a required criterion for the classification as metaphor in the first place. (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 37)

This indicates that there is a level of conventionalisation at which Charteris-Black no longer considers an expression metaphorical. In CMT, conventional metaphorical concepts account for many of the most conventionalised meanings of words, i.e., "my spirits *rose*" and "my income *rose* last year" are motivated by the concepts HAPPY IS UP and MORE IS UP, respectively (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, pp. 15-16). It is not clear if Charteris-Black counts such instances. His method is neither suitable for retrieving the most conventional metaphorical utterances from a corpus nor its novel metaphorical utterances but is focused on the grey area in between.

After the two stages of identification, Charteris-Black conducts a stage of metaphor interpretation: "establishing a relationship between metaphors and the cognitive and pragmatic factors that determine them" (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 37) i.e., categorising linguistic conventional metaphors into conceptual metaphors and conceptual keys. In the case of "crusade" as used metaphorically by Bush, Charteris-Black categorises it as

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[37] While Charteris-Black endorses a pragmatic approach to metaphor analysis, the results returned by KWIC analysis are limited in the context provided. In the examples of "crusade against", only partial sentences are given (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 6) which makes it debatable whether he is counting metaphorical utterances or the more decontextualised metaphorical expressions.

motivated and interpreted by the conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS RELIGION. Since conceptual metaphors are meant to be determined by sets of linguistic metaphors, not single expressions, Charteris-Black cites as evidence the phrase "axis of evil", which Bush used to refer to those countries he deemed opposed to America.

According to David Frum, the White House speech writer who originally coined the phrase "axis of hatred", which was changed to "axis of evil" in Bush's final version, the motivation behind it was not initially an analogy between POLITICS and RELIGION but an analogy between post-9-11 geopolitics and post-Pearl Harbour geopolitics:

> "On December 8, 1941, Roosevelt had exactly the same problem we had. The United States had been attacked by Japan, but the greater threat came from Nazi Germany," Frum argues. In effect, al-Qaida is Japan and no prizes for guessing who plays Hitler this time around. (Borger, 2003)

While "evil' can indeed come from the domain of RELIGION, it is not the only domain that it might come from. While the theological connotations were certainly appreciated at the time of Bush's speech, and a mapping from the domain of religion might explain the shift from Frum's "axis of hatred" to Bush's "axis of evil", the misplaced certainty with which CMT theorists assign terms to one domain or another has long been a criticism of CMT (see Black 1981 for an early criticism of this). In this case, Charteris-Black assumes that "evil" is drawn from RELIGION in order to use it as evidence for the metaphorical concept, but we can also argue that is drawn from the domain of WAR or from both domains or from neither (with "evil" being used in a general loose use).

I have already outlined the theoretical problems in using conceptual metaphors to explain incongruity, either as involving the rejection of a literal meaning or as contextual abnormality. Here the problems are readily apparent in analysis: "crusade against" and "axis of evil" are both used as evidence for POLITICS IS RELIGION despite one being a conventional metaphorical expression ("crusade against") and the other being a more novel expression ("axis of evil"). The conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS RELIGION is used to explain how the semantic tension is resolved for both, but there is no semantic tension in the former without adopting ad hoc diachronic criteria, and the latter cannot be explained without arbitrarily assigning it to a set of expressions which are explained by the conceptual metaphor (a circular argument).

Finally, Charteris-Black engages in a stage of metaphorical explanation: identifying the social agency involved in the production of metaphors and their social role in persuasion (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 39). An example of this involves contrasting metaphorical concepts such as POLITICS IS RELIGION, CONFLICT IS POLITICS and CONFLICT IS RELIGION all of which are said to have motivated a particular ideological conception of TERRORISM after 9/11 (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 40). At this stage of analysis, Charteris-Black is working at an abstract level far removed from the linguistic expressions he started from. Despite the quite arbitrary path he has used to get to these metaphorical concepts, Charteris-Black is not using them as ways to categorise and describe metaphorical utterances, for which an arbitrary assignment of expressions and sets of expressions to themes might be acceptable, but as a way to attribute covert ideological beliefs to political actors. These are strong claims which carry a heavy burden of proof. Moreover, it is not a pragmatic linguistic exercise to uncover covert intentions but a psychological one. The only intentions which can be in any way recovered in pragmatic linguistic analysis are relatively overt, i.e., the reflexive intentions (Grice, 1957/89) or mutually manifest intentions (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95) which form part of speaker's meaning.

In summary, while Charteris-Black has done important work in reorientating metaphor studies towards the linguistic properties of metaphor and he is a pioneer in the use of corpora for the analysis of metaphor in discourse, his method for defining and identifying metaphor undermine his quantitative analysis and the contradictions in his theoretical model undermine his qualitative analysis. When Charteris-Black analyses a 50,000-word corpus of Churchill's speeches for ideological metaphorical content and finds 373 metaphors (Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 38), what can this really tell us when the method of counting neglects or even precludes both the counting of non-conventional metaphorical uses of language and some highly conventional uses of lexicalised metaphors? When Charteris-Black tells us that of these 373 metaphors, 144 use a source-domain PERSONIFICATION (I take this to mean the source domain HUMAN) and 7 use the source domain FAMILY, what does this mean when family members are invariably human too? When metaphorical concepts can be defined and applied arbitrarily, the claim that they represent real psychological structures must be challenged. Even more so when those metaphorical concepts are used to uncover the covert intentions and ideologies of others.

7.2.2. Steen et al.'s Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP and MIPVU)

The Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) was developed by a number of researchers, known collectively as the Pragglejaz Group (Pragglejaz group, 2007). It was further developed into the Metaphor Identification Procedure *Vrije Universiteit* (MIPVU) by a group of researchers from Vrije University (Steen et al., 2010). As they are quite similar, I will refer to them both collectively as MIP, unless I need to contrast the two specifically.

The aim of these scholars was to develop a general procedure for the identification of metaphorically used words in natural discourse which would be useful across theories and disciplines (Steen et al., 2010, p. 4). The unit of analysis is the lexical unit (MIP), or "metaphor related words" (MIPVU) which are "words in discourse that can be taken to be lexical expressions of underlying cross-domain mappings" (Steen et al., 2010, p. 38). The basic steps can be summarised as follows (Steen et al., 2010, p. 5):

1. Read the "entire text/discourse" to establish general understanding.
2. Determine the lexical units.
3. a) Establish the contextual meaning of each lexical unit.

   b) Establish which is the most basic meaning of the lexical unit.
4. Decide if the contextual meaning contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood with it.
5. If so, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical.

Steen et al. (2010, p. 9) emphasise that one advantage of the MIP is that it does not require an analyst to identify conceptual structures and so it avoids some of the pitfalls of matching metaphorical language to metaphorical concepts. They also stress that it does not presuppose a model of metaphorical mapping, and so can be applied by analysts working with different theories of metaphor (Steen et al., 2010, p. 9).

The "basic meaning" established in step 3b is a meaning which is more concrete, related to bodily action, more precise, or historically older (Steen et al., 2010, p. 6). Dictionaries are used to establish both the basic meaning of the word and whether the contextual meaning is basic, conventionally metaphorical or novel. For example, with the words "defend" and "attack", their basic meaning is the sense meaning physical engagement because it is related to bodily action. Other dictionary senses of defend and attack, such as those related to some form of argumentation, are conventional metaphorical

senses. Contextual meanings which are not covered by the dictionary senses are potentially novel metaphors.

There are many important insights in the MIP which I will retain in my own corpus method. For example, the method of using dictionaries to distinguish conventional metaphorical uses of from novel or active metaphorical uses of language. However, there are number of problems with the MIP which meant it could not be adopted wholesale into this thesis.

One major issue is the focus on basic meanings. Although the MIP is supposed to be a process for identifying metaphorical language, not metaphorical concepts, its concept of basic meanings is highly reliant on ideas about metaphorical thought coming from the CMT tradition. The idea that in metaphorical language something concrete is used to talk about something more abstract is an old one which predates CMT. However, CMT took it up as a defining feature of metaphorical thought which is how it used in the MIP. In other traditions, it has been acknowledged as an important function of metaphorical language, particularly as used in scientific models (Black, 1962, p. 230), but there are examples of metaphorical uses of language where the metaphorical focus need not be more concrete than the frame. Is "man" more abstract than "wolf" in the metaphor "man is a wolf"? Most people will have a great deal of concrete experience of interactions with people but very few will have such experiences with wolves. The same can be said of "My lawyer is a shark", "my job is a jail", "Juliet is the sun" and many other novel or active examples of metaphor.

The other criterion for basic meaning, embodiment, is also heavily indebted to CMT and is intimately related to the first criterion of concreteness. In CMT, almost every metaphorical concept has its origin in an embodied basic concept. Yet, the theory of embodiment in the wider field of cognitive science is certainly not uniform (Wilson, 2002) nor is the role of metaphor in how embodiment affects social behaviour clear. Meier et al . (2012, p. 706) points out that while Lakoff and Johnson see metaphorical thought as the cause of observed embodiment effects, others see metaphors as a manifestation (Anderson, 2010; Williams et al., 2009) or as a reinforcement of embodiment effects (Landau et al., 2010). The relationship between metaphorical concepts and embodiment is not quite as clear as it is presented in CMT.

Because of the centrality of basic meanings to the procedure, and because basic meanings are so heavily reliant on CMTs model of metaphorical thought, the MIP and MIPVU are not widely applicable to different theories and fields, and not suitable for use

in a pragmatic study of novel metaphorical utterances in particular. In this study we do not need to compare lexicalised metaphorical senses of words against a more basic concrete or embodied sense. In order to find novel metaphorical utterances, we must compare the intended metaphorical meaning of metaphorically used words in metaphorical utterances against the conventional, lexicalised senses of those words, whether those conventional senses are basic or potential expressions of conventional metaphorical concepts .

7.2.3. Cameron

Another quite influential procedure for analysing metaphorical language in corpora is that used by Lynne Cameron (Cameron, 2003). Cameron (2003) takes a discourse perspective on metaphor and bases metaphor identification on an incongruity between "the discourse context" and the context of a linguistic item (Cameron, 2003, p. 4).

Cameron (2003) makes an interesting distinction between linguistic metaphor, process metaphor and conceptual metaphor. The first is a linguistic structure with "the potential for incongruity between two domains to be interpreted from surface lexical content" (Cameron, 2003, p. 25). In this "broad category", she includes some similes where dissimilar domains are linked ("the atmosphere is like a shield") and hyperbole (Cameron, 2003, p. 25). The second is a linguistic expression that does "actually activate two domains in the mind of a discourse participant [. . .] and a construction of a meaning for the expression" (Cameron, 2003, p. 12). Finally, a conceptual metaphor is the same conceptual metaphor we are familiar with from CMT.

Cameron (2003)'s focus is on linguistic metaphors. She distinguishes these from process metaphors because she wants to "remove speaker intention and hearer interpretation from criteria for metaphoricity" (Cameron, 2003, p. 12).

Her criteria for linguistic metaphor identification are as follows:

1. A word/phrase that is incongruously used in the discourse context (Cameron, 2003, p. 59)
2. This incongruity can be resolved by a transfer of meaning from Vehicle to Topic (Cameron, 2003, p. 60).

By incongruence in 1, Cameron means the incongruence between "the content of the discourse context and the content of the item" (Cameron, 2003, p. 4). By transfer of

meaning in 2, she means it loosely to mean interaction or conceptual blending (Cameron, 2003, p. 60).

These criteria for linguistic metaphor do not withstand scrutiny because establishing a discourse context in (1) and the transfer of meaning in (2) would seem to require a search for speaker's meaning, a pragmatic dimension which the theoretical construct of linguistic metaphor was meant to exclude. Before discussing this point further, we need to pin down Cameron (2003)'s conception of incongruity.

Charteris-Black's model mostly focuses on incongruity at a linguistic level and is based on a rejection of a literal what is said. The MIP procedure focuses on incongruity as a cognitive level phenomenon of deviation from a more basic meaning. Cameron (2003)'s concept of incongruity is based on the difference between "the content of the discourse context and the content of the item" (Cameron, 2003, p. 4). It is not altogether clear what this means, but it seems to be closer to Charteris-Black's incongruity than to the MIP/MIPVU's. This is somewhat contradictory, however, because Cameron seems to accept CMT's findings that metaphorical and literal utterances are processed in the same way. To confuse things further, in discussion of her second criteria, on the resolution of incongruity, Cameron (2003, p. 4) seems to be following Kittay (1987).

Kittay (1987)'s ideas on incongruity and its resolution are often misinterpreted and rejected as endorsing the older pragmatic view of a two-stage process (Romero & Soria, 2013a). In fact, as Romero and Soria point out, Kittay (1987)'s concept of incongruity does not imply a rejection of literal meaning before metaphorical processing but depends on processing sub-propositional constituents literally (Romero & Soria, 2013a, p. 32). Cameron, however, does not seem to endorse a view of metaphorical meaning as implicature, as Kittay (1987) does, and on which Kittay's view of incongruity is based (Romero & Soria 2013a, p. 47). It is possible to have a concept of incongruity where literal meaning is processed sub-propositionally, but which does not rely on a model of metaphor as implicature. Romero and Soria have developed such a model in pragmatic IT. The problem with Cameron (2003) is that her conception of incongruity is quite vague, so it is difficult to understand how she is following Kittay (1987).

Cameron (2003) suggests two types of incongruity: semantic incongruity and pragmatic incongruity (Cameron 2003, pp. 59-60). Cameron gives an example of semantic incongruity in (2):

(2)   [During a dancing lesson, a teacher says to children:] You are spokes in a wheel (Cameron, 2003, p. 60)

Cameron says that "spokes in a wheel" shows semantic incongruity. This could be sub-propositional incongruity, where the literal meaning of "spokes in a wheel" shows a semantic mismatch with the referents of "you" before the proposition is processed.

However, when Cameron speaks of pragmatic incongruity she gives the following example:

(3)   [During a dancing lesson, a teacher says to children:] you deserve a medal (Cameron, 2003, p. 60)

Cameron says that "deserve a medal" is metaphorical because "the discourse context would disallow a non-figurative meaning" (Cameron, 2004, p. 60), i.e., both the teachers and students know that there are no medals on offer.

There is no semantic incongruity in (3). Every word in "deserve a medal" carries a conventional, lexicalised meaning and the composition rules are in place. There is no semantic mismatch between the sentence constituents. Cameron seems to suggest that it is the literal proposition that causes the pragmatic incongruity. The statement that the pupil(s) deserve a literal medal is literally false because there are no medals to be had. I disagree with this analysis. If falsehood of the literal proposition is used to characterise pragmatic incongruity, her theory inherits the problems of the two-propositional stages view of metaphor interpretation that I have already discussed (see this thesis, section 4.4). Furthermore, if this type of incongruity is taken as a necessary and sufficient identification condition of a linguistic metaphor, then many other types of utterances such as fictional or metonymic ones should also count as linguistic metaphors. This is quite an undesirable conclusion. For example, in a context where children are fictionalising that they are running a race at the Olympic games and their parents are watching them, when the one who wins the race tells her mother "I won a medal", both speaker and hearer know that there are no medals on offer and yet, we would not say that we need metaphorical transfer to resolve an incongruence. Similarly, if in Beijing 2008, a fan of Rafa Nadal utters: "I met the gold medal today", both speaker and hearer know that there was no medal to meet and again the "incongruity" does not indicate metaphoricity. The hearer will resort to the intentions of

the speaker to recover relevant information so that he understands the propositional content intended: the speaker met the [winner of the tennis] gold medal [at the Beijing Olympic games] today. The sentence meaning is semantically underdetermined and demands pragmatic enrichment, some linguistically unarticulated constituents (represented in square brackets) are inferentially recovered from the context, but no metaphorical transfer is needed to get at the intended meaning, no cross-domain mapping is necessary to derive the speaker's meaning. In many cases such as these examples of fiction or metonymy, the literally false proposition (if it is available) does not indicate metaphor recognition and, in other cases such as negative metaphors (e.g., no man is an island), the literal proposition is often obviously true. Thus, falsehood of the literal proposition is neither a sufficient nor a necessary identification condition of metaphor.[38] Furthermore, if Cameron is suggesting that we must reject the false literal proposition that the children deserve a medal before metaphorical processing, she is endorsing the two-stage interpretation of metaphor which is rejected by most theories of metaphor.

These issues around incongruence as propositional falsity undermine her corpus work because her unit of analysis is a linguistic metaphor. This is distinguished from a process metaphor and conceptual metaphor because it does not presume any cognitive process. The purpose of this is to "remove speaker intention and hearer interpretation from criteria for metaphoricity" (Cameron, 2003, p 23). However, it is doubtful that her criteria accomplish this. In criteria 1, how are we meant to establish the incongruous use of a word or phrase in discourse context without inferring speaker's meaning? In criteria 2, how would we know that the pragmatic process demanded is transfer rather than world context-shift or the recovery of missing constituents without resorting to wide context?

As an illustration of the difference between linguistic metaphor and process metaphor, Cameron gives the following example of a child who wrote of a football match:

(4)   the tenshun [sic] was as great as Indianapolis (Cameron, 2003, p. 23)

Cameron writes:

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[38] What is more, in certain cases, a literal proposition cannot even be obtained, an expression may be semantically ill-formed and thus we cannot mentally represent its content as true or false (for a detailed discussion, see Romero & Soria, 2019).

I later learnt that Indianapolis refers to the Indianapolis 500, the annual international car race. So although the linguistic form suggested a metaphorical simile [. . .], I was unable to interpret it as a process metaphor.

(Cameron, 2003, p. 23)

Presumably Cameron understood Indianapolis as referring to the city and not the race, as intended by the child. The problem Cameron had in processing (4) was really a problem of reference assignment. Reference assignment is a primary pragmatic process, sub-propositional, and is dependent on speaker intentions. Therefore, incongruence cannot be established without speaker intentions and Cameron's distinction between linguistic metaphors on the one hand, and process metaphors and conceptual metaphors on the other, begins to fall apart.

As for the second criteria, the resolution of incongruence via transfer, this must also be dependent on speaker intention. In (4), if we take Indianapolis to refer to the city, the potential metaphorical transfer is not between the city and a football match, but between the size of the city and the intensity of the child's tension at the football match—"great" undergoes a metaphorical shift of meaning because "great" in the context of a city is not the same as "great" in the context of a feeling. If "Indianapolis" refers to the race, the potential metaphorical transfer is between the intensity of tension the child felt at the race and the intensity of tension the child felt at a football game. According to pragmatic IT, this would be a literal comparison.

All of these issues mean that Cameron (2003)'s method for metaphor analysis in corpora are unsuitable for the aims of this thesis because, in pragmatic IT, metaphor identification cannot be achieved without considering speaker's intentions.

7.2.4. Romero and Soria: Identification and Interpretation of Active Metaphor

If the identification of metaphor must draw on the speaker's intentions, corpus discourse analysis of metaphor can benefit from a more informed theory of pragmatics. In an attempt to provide an analysis of metaphorical utterances, I will follow the identification criteria of Romero and Soria's pragmatic IT. According to Soria (1992) and Romero and Soria in all their subsequent works on metaphor, metaphorical utterances are identified by a complex identification criterion. Only if a contextual abnormality leads to the identification of a domain as source to describe what the speaker is talking about (the target), can we identify

an utterance as metaphorical. The contextual abnormality, is described by Romero and Soria (2016, p. 157) as "the use of an expression in an unusual linguistic or extra-linguistic context." They add that a contextual abnormality may appear in two different modes:

a) As an oddity between the terms uttered […].

b) As an oddity between the occurrence of an expression in the actual unusual context and the implicit context associated to a normal use of this expression.

Abnormality of mode (b) is due to the incompatibility of the context of the utterance and the context conventionally associated to the expressions uttered.

(Romero & Soria, 2016, p. 157)

Contextual abnormality is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for metaphor since it can also appear in metonymical utterances such as "The ham sandwich is waiting for his check" when, in a restaurant, a waitress says this in answer to a waiter asking what he had to do next. As we have seen before, the pragmatic resolution in metonymy does not involve the recognition of a source to analogically describe the target and only if this were the case, would the utterance be considered metaphorical. Metaphorical identification is achieved only if both contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast appear. This identification blocks the literal interpretation and triggers the metaphorical mechanism: the mapping from source to target domain to get the conceptual adjustment involved in the interpretation of metaphorical utterances.

The evidence given by the speaker with her metaphorical utterance includes among other things the semantic information conventionally associated to sub-sentential expressions from which it is possible to construct the restructured target domain to get the provisional meanings that will be a part of the metaphorical intended proposition. Obviously, neither the identification nor the interpretation of a metaphorical utterance is possible without resorting to the speaker's intentions.

The **identification of active metaphors,** following Romero and Soria, will proceed as follows:

1. Read the entire text/discourse to establish general understanding so that the topic the speaker is talking about (the target domain) can be determined.

2. Determine the lexical units showing contextual abnormality, the speaker's unusual use of terms. Terms that do not normally belong in the target domain.

3. Determine if the terms abnormally used (either of in mode a or b) belong to a domain with properties or dimensions which can be analogically correlated with properties or dimensions of the target domain.

4. If so, the utterance will be identified as an active metaphor.

When the metaphor is identified as metaphorical, we must explain what correlations between the domains are productive in the derivation of speaker's meaning, what aspects are mapped from source to target coherently and relevantly in the way intended by the speaker. This will be done with Romero and Soria's representation of the mapping, as illustrated in section 4. 2. 3.

To explain the interpretation of active metaphors:

1. Determine possible coherent correlations from source to target.

2. Taking into account what the speaker is talking about, determine which of the source domain properties or dimensions can be transformed so that they can be coherently and relevantly projected upon the target domain.

3. Give the restructured target domain resulting from the mapping. This is the new context of interpretation from which to determine the provisional meaning (Romero, 1990-1 and Romero & Soria in all subsequent works) of the terms used abnormally.

An important difference between metaphor analysis using CMT and that following Romero and Soria's framework is that the former stop at the identification of metaphor (A IS B). By contrast, following Romero and Soria, I attempt to give an explanation of the interpretation of metaphor by providing the mapping needed to get to the metaphorical provisional meanings of abnormally used terms that contribute to speaker's meaning in the interpretation of metaphorical utterances.

In metaphor studies, the A IS B formula is standard for presenting metaphorical concepts. For the purposes of this thesis, I remain agnostic as to the existence or not of conventional conceptual metaphors as discussed by CMT, i.e., that a particular A IS B

structure is activated in long-term memory as revealed by conventional metaphorical expressions.

As pointed out elsewhere (Cameron, 2003, p. 71) the A IS B format is a legacy from when linguists and philosophers discussed metaphorical utterances such as "Juliet is the sun" or "Man is a wolf"–active metaphorical utterances which were unambiguously non-literal and where both the source and the target were represented by nominal expressions. Abstractions based on statements communicated by these utterances were called metaphor themes by Black, a way to describe patterns observed in language use in a decontextualised way, but not a claim about structures in the conceptual system (Black, 1977, p. 438). When CMT is used for discourse analysis it is not always clear when an author is using the A IS B form to make a claim about a cognitively real metaphorical concept, or as a way to catalogue the concepts associated to linguistic expressions they find into thematic groups (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 16). It is important to distinguish these. The first is a claim about the reality of human cognition, which would need to be proven via further empirical experiment. The latter is an abstraction to aid description and discussion.

In this thesis, I will use the convention of lower-case "man-as-wolf theme" when talking about abstract thematic groupings of metaphorical uses of language, and small capitals, MAN AS WOLF, when I discuss the conceptualizations involved in the online metaphorical mappings of active metaphorical utterances. MAN IS WOLF would be the static conceptual metaphor in long-term memory, as discussed in CMT.

7.3. Corpus Pragmatics: Method and Challenges

7.3.1. General Information about the Corpora

In this thesis I analyse two different corpora: the European Parliament plenary debates during the period 2014-2019 and the American presidential elections, 2016. Though my overall method for analysing the corpora was the same, each corpus posed its own challenges which had to be overcome.

Table 7.1, outlines the essential information of the US corpus, showing the number of speeches and overall word count of each candidate, as well as the total number of speeches and total word count.

Table 7.1. Team Populism's corpus of speeches from the US presidential elections, 2016.		
Candidate	**N. of Speeches**	**N. of Words**
Trump	22	76,388
Clinton	21	62,733
Sanders	5	11,705
Rubio	4	7,206
Cruz	3	6,552
Carson	1	4,052
Kasich	2	6,990
Total	58	175,626

Table 7.2, outlines the essential information of the EUP corpus, showing the number of speeches and overall word count of each MEP's sub-corpus (subject sub-corpus), as well as the total number of speeches and total word count for each subject sub-corpus.

Table 7.2. The EUP corpus and sub-corpora		
Corpus	**N. of Speeches**	**N. of Words**
The EUP corpus	-	37,579,903
Farage sub-corpus	63	35,497
Fox sub-corpus	41	10,773
Iglesias sub-corpus	20	5,455
García sub-corpus	20	5,761
Sub corpora TOTAL	144	57,486

7.3.2. Tools of Analysis

At its highest level, the EUP corpus consisted of every spoken contribution during every plenary debate of the 8th European Parliament, 2014-2019. Considering that the EU then consisted of 28 countries, represented by 751 MEPs speaking 24 different languages, this is a considerable corpus in size and complexity. Table 7.3. shows the different level of the corpora after data was extracted.

Table 7.3. Levels of the EUP corpus		
Level	**Unit of analysis**	**Example corpus**
Macro	Parliamentary debate	EUP
Meso	Speech	Farage sub-corpus
Micro	Metaphorical utterance	Farage's metaphorical utterances

In another study, the analyst might be justified in extracting the relevant candidate speeches and constructing the smaller level corpora for specific speakers without reference to the larger. However, given the pragmatic nature of this thesis and the dialogic nature of parliamentary debates, it was necessary to retain relevant contextual information which might be relevant to the four subject sub-corpora. Therefore, I need a corpus tool which would be able to efficiently find and extract relevant information from the larger macro-level corpus of parliamentary debates and retain access to it in the meso-level sub-corpora of speeches. Furthermore, because my unit of analysis in metaphor analysis is the utterance, I needed a tool to extract the utterances from the subject sub-corpora of speeches into micro-level corpora of utterances, while retaining access to the meso- and macro- level corpora.

My second corpus, the US corpus, was not quite so complicated. I used a ready-made corpus of speeches given by Republican and Democrat candidates during the 2016 presidential elections, collected by Team Populism (Hawkins, 2016) and made available to researchers on their website (https://populism.byu.edu). Because these were relatively isolated speeches, a macro level corpus was not needed nor possible to compile, though the macro-level of analysis was still retained by doing background research into topics and references which were relevant to the speeches. Table 7.4. illustrates the relationship between levels of the US corpus:

Table 7.4. Levels of the US corpus		
Level	**Unit of analysis**	**Example corpus**
Meso	Speech	Trump corpus
Micro	Metaphorical utterance	Trump's metaphorical utterances

There are quite a few commercial corpus tools for qualitative analysis which would have been suitable for my thesis. A good example is *Atlas.ti*, a sophisticated piece of software which allows researchers to analyse corpora of text, audio, image and video. It includes powerful tools for inductive text analysis, including wordlists, advanced text search and more. It also allows the construction of complex coding annotation schemes and collaboration with other researchers through the cloud. The biggest problem with *Atlas.ti* is that the price for the thesis as a whole makes it unfeasible.

SketchEngine is another quite popular corpus tool with similar features to *Atlas.ti*. Through the Elexis program, EU institutions can sign up for free. However, it seems that

the program is only usable from computers on campus. This would have been unworkable for a number of reasons, not least of all the COVID-19 pandemic which made accessing campus impossible at a vital stage of my research.

UAM Corpus Tool is freely downloadable software which I used during my Master thesis. It has powerful annotation and analysis tools which make it popular with many scholars at the University of Granada, and I strongly considered using it for this thesis. While I knew that *UAM Corpus Tool* could be used, for free, to accomplish what I needed, I knew from my master's dissertation that the tagging process could be slow, and I suspected that I would have problems working with different levels of the corpora. Furthermore, online collaboration using *UAM Corpus Tool* would have been complicated and possibly prone to error.

Ultimately the choice of tool came down to weighing the advantages of using these tools against the effort and expense needed to use them. Besides price, the other factors which I considered were ease of use, ease of collaboration, efficiency, and, most importantly, their suitability to my research goals. By ease of use, I mean how difficult it would be to learn the tools of the program. By ease of collaboration, I mean how the tool would adapt to the collaborative workflow between me as student, and my supervisor who has many other demands and responsibilities besides my thesis. This aspect became even more important to consider after the COVID-19 pandemic meant that all collaboration would have to take place online. By efficiency, I mean how fast it would be to construct and analyse a corpus at the different levels outlined in tables 7.3. and 7.4.

Taking these things into consideration, I decided that *Atlas.ti*, *SketchEngine* and *UAM Corpus Tool* were not the tools I needed. Most importantly, while all of these programs offer powerful ways to analyse text - concordances, wordlists, parsing and so on - these features would not be necessary for my research goals. My research goals would be better served by a simpler tool which could quickly extract tagged data, retain the relationships between different sub-corpora, and facilitate online collaboration.

My solution was to use Microsoft's *Word* and *Excel* programs in conjunction to construct a makeshift corpus tool. There were several advantages to this; though not free, they are commonly available programs which both me and my supervisor already had access to and had experience in using. These programs had most of the features I needed; advanced search, tagging via the comment function, and the ability to collaborate online via the cloud or simply through the track changes function. There were other advanced features which also made it ideal: the built-in translator would be useful for dealing with

the multilingual EUP corpus, and I knew that Excel could be used for quantitative and statistical analysis if needed.

However, there were some challenges to using the Microsoft programs as corpus analysis tools. The comment function is useful for tagging sections of text but there is no obvious automatic way to extract those tagged sections of text for further analysis. Though it would have been possible to manually copy and paste every tagged section of text into a separate file, this would have been immensely time-consuming, given the size of the corpus.

My solution was to write a small program for *Word* known as a "macro", a snippet of code which can be used to automate processes in Microsoft programs. This was written in the *Virtual Basic for Applications* programming language. The macro opens each document in a chosen directory, scans them for commented text, copies the highlighted text as well as its associated comment or "tag" and some document metadata. It then pastes this data into a table in a separate *Word* file. Besides creating separate cells in the table for text and tag, the macro also creates cells for the person who made the comment (the coder), and the document file name and page number from which the comment was taken. Table 7.5. shows the code of the macro. Instructions and explanations of the code are in italics and indicated by an initial single quotation. Sections of code which need to be replaced by the analyst are given in bold.

Table 7.5. code for "TagExtraction"

```
Sub TagExtraction()

'This section of code creates a box in which the user enters the location of the folder. The
    'macro will look for comments in all doc and docx files within the folder.
Dim flpath As String, fl As String
flpath = InputBox("Please enter the path to the folder you want to run the macro on.")
If flpath = "" Then Exit Sub
If Right(flpath, 1) <> Application.PathSeparator Then flpath = flpath &
    Application.PathSeparator
fl = Dir(flpath & "*.doc*")
Application.ScreenUpdating = False
Do Until fl = ""
 MyMacro flpath, fl
 fl = Dir
Loop
End Sub


 'This code finds and copies your data
Sub MyMacro(flpath As String, fl As String)
Dim doc As Document
Set doc = Documents.Open(flpath & fl)
```

```
Dim oDoc As Document
 Dim oNewDoc As Document
 Dim oTable As Table
 Dim nCount As Long
 Dim n As Long
 Dim Title As String

 Title = "Extract All Comments to New Document"
 Set oDoc = ActiveDocument
 nCount = ActiveDocument.Comments.Count

 If nCount = 0 Then
 MsgBox "The active document contains no comments.", vbOKOnly, Title
 GoTo ExitHere
 Else

 End If
 Application.ScreenUpdating = False

 'This code tells Word what file you want to paste your data into.
 Documents.Open ("/File location/File name.docx")
 Set oNewDoc = ActiveDocument
 Dim MyRange As Range
 Dim nTbl As Long
 Let nTbl = ActiveDocument.Tables.Count
 Set MyRange = oNewDoc.Paragraphs.Last.Range


 'This code creates a table for your data

 With oNewDoc
 .Content.InsertParagraphAfter

 Set oTable = .Tables.Add _
 (Range:=MyRange, _
 NumRows:=nCount, _
 NumColumns:=5)

 With MyRange
 .Collapse Direction:=wdCollapseEnd
 .InsertParagraph
 .Collapse Direction:=wdCollapseEnd
 End With
 End With


 'This code formats your table
 With oTable
 .Range.Style = wdStyleNormal
 .AllowAutoFit = False
 .PreferredWidthType = wdPreferredWidthPercent
 .PreferredWidth = 100
 .Columns.PreferredWidthType = wdPreferredWidthPercent
 End With
```

```
'This code inserts the data you have extracted into the table
For n = 1 To nCount
With oTable.Rows(n)
'Page number
.Cells(1).Range.Text = _
oDoc.Comments(n).Scope.Information(wdActiveEndPageNumber)
'The text marked by the comment
.Cells(2).Range.Text = oDoc.Comments(n).Scope
'The comment itself
.Cells(3).Range.Text = oDoc.Comments(n).Range.Text
'The comment author
.Cells(4).Range.Text = oDoc.Comments(n).Author
'The comment date in format dd-MMM-yyyy
.Cells(5).Range.Text = oDoc.FullName
End With
Next n

Application.ScreenUpdating = True
Application.ScreenRefresh



If oNewDoc.Saved = False Then oNewDoc.Save
oDoc.Close

ExitHere:
Set oDoc = Nothing
Set oNewDoc = Nothing
Set oTable = Nothing
End Sub
```

In the end, the code did exactly what I needed a corpus tool to do: It allowed me to extract large amounts of tagged data from one level of the corpus to another, while retaining links between levels (via the document and page cells of the table).

I can now explain exactly how Microsoft *Word* and *Excel* were used to extract and analyse my data, using the EUP corpus as my example. First, I had to search the macro level corpus (over 37.5 million words) for spoken contributions of the four subject MEPs. In the case of Nigel Farage, this meant using *Word*'s search feature to look for "Nigel" and "Farage". When Farage's contributions were found, the whole contribution was highlighted and given a tag with the comment "FARAGE". However, I also wanted to find references to Farage in the contributions of other participants in the debate; questions they had asked him, attacks or praise aimed towards him, or any references to him that might be contextually relevant to his contribution. In order to cast as wide a net as possible, a number of terms were looked for using search; truncated forms "Nig" and "Farag" in case of

reference in an inflected language; "UKIP" in order to catch any references to him as its leader; "Brexit" and "Brexiteers" in case of reference in relation to that topic. When references were found, the contribution of Farage's interlocutor was highlighted and tagged with the comment "INT" followed by the name and group affiliation of the interlocutor. In cases where the interlocutor contribution was very long, I highlighted only the paragraph or paragraphs relevant to the reference to Farage. *Word*'s translate function was very useful here for assessing the relevance of contributions in languages other than English and Spanish. Once all the documents in the macro-level corpus were processed, my custom macro was used to automatically extract the tagged content into a separate file: this file then became my Farage sub-corpus[39]. Table 7.6. shows an example of what the extracted information looked like in the sub-corpus:

Table 7.6. Example of data extracted from macro-level corpus to meso-level corpus				
6	[. . .] It has been throughout a total failure of leadership. But perhaps more significantly, she hasn't learned or heeded the historical lesson that if you appease bullies, they always come back for more. She has behaved like a leader of a nation defeated in war, and that is why this Withdrawal Agreement looked more like a surrender document and it was smashed to pieces in the House of Commons last night. She of course believed that she'd get some concessions from you today, but it's perfectly clear from what you've said that there are no concessions to come. She is still our Prime Minister, and that of itself is quite remarkable. If she had any sense of honour, she'd be gone by lunchtime today. [. . .]	FARAGE	John Keating	/Users/jk/Desktop/Documents/Europarlcorpus/Plenary PDFs/2019sessions/CRE-8-2019-01-16_EN.doc

From left to right, the cells show the page number of the macro-level document, the tagged speech, the associated tag, the name of the coder, and the name of the macro-level document.

An interlocutor contribution followed the same structure (table 7.7.):

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[39] Of course, interlocutor contributions were discounted from sub-corpora for the sake of quantitative analysis, when necessary.

Table 7.7. Example of extracted interlocutor data				
7 2	To Mr Farage, wherever he is, I would say, with all due respect, please be very careful in using the word 'war', because there was indeed a war and, thank God, the British won it. Everybody learned their lesson, but perhaps not Mr Farage.	INT Esteban González Pons (PPE)	John Keating	/Users/jk/Desk top/Document s/Europarlcorp us/PlenaryPDF s/2019sessions /CRE-8-2019-01-16_EN.doc

Any contribution, by subject or interlocutor, could then be easily found in the macro-level corpus by simply opening the document and going to the page number (or using the search function).

I carried out two separate qualitative analytic tasks on the meso-level corpora. The first was to measure the degree of populism in each speech by each subject. The populism scores produced during this analysis were simply recorded in a separate *Excel* sheet for further analysis.

The second task at this level was to tag the sub-corpus for possible active metaphorical utterances using Romero and Soria's identification criteria. In the excerpt from Farage's contribution above, I tagged five possible active metaphorical utterances; "she hasn't learned or heeded the historical lesson", "if you appease bullies, they always come back for more", "She has behaved like a leader of a nation defeated in war", "that is why this Withdrawal Agreement looked more like a surrender document", and "it was smashed to pieces in the House of Commons last night". These were all tagged as F MET, with "F" indicating Farage and "MET" indicating its status as an active metaphorical utterance candidate. Tagging at this level did not mean that an utterance was accepted as an active metaphorical utterance in final analysis. Those decisions were made at the next micro level of the corpus. If potential active metaphors were found in interlocutor contributions these were tagged with INT MET. Though they are not the focus of the thesis, these interlocutor metaphors might have had some effect on the subject's use of metaphor and so it was important to tag them.

With all the contributions of the Farage sub-corpus processed, my custom macro was used again to automatically extract the tagged utterances into a new *Word* file. This time, rather than analysing the extracted data in *Word*, I transferred the table into an *Excel* file. This was a simple matter of copying and pasting the extracted table into *Excel*. Figure 7.1. gives an example of how this micro, utterance-level corpus was structured.

Figure 7.1: Extracted data from meso-level corpus to micro-level corpus

The left-most cell gives the page number in the sub-corpus document from which the utterance was taken, the next cell contains the utterance itself, the third cell gives the tag from the sub-corpus (in this case "F MET"). The two next cells are added as part of metaphor analysis. If an utterance is accepted as actively metaphorical it is tagged "ACT" in the fourth cell. If it is not accepted, it is tagged "REJ" for "rejected". In the fifth cell, notes are made about reasons why an utterance was accepted or rejected, and any other notes of interest. Finally, the sixth and seventh cells give the coder's name and source document file name respectively. As with the extraction of data from the macro-corpus to the meso-corpus, data can be easily traced back from the micro-level to the meso level via the document name and page number. Furthermore, with each level inked in such a way, an utterance in the micro-level corpus can be quickly traced back to its discursive context at the macro-level.

7.3.3. Grading Populism

The choice to use Team Populism's corpus of speeches during the 2016 presidential elections had many advantages but also disadvantages for this thesis. One benefit is that I did not have to compile the corpus myself which saved time. Another advantage is that such a corpus would have been difficult, if not impossible, to compile myself because the degree to which presidential campaign speeches are reported on by the media varies depending on the perceived importance of the candidate and the speech. It is a challenge to collect these speeches even as they are happening, never mind trying to do so years afterwards, as the relevance of the speeches to contemporary politics fades, and the online links to transcriptions die or disappear behind paywalls. Perhaps it is because of this that Team Populism's corpus does not have every speech given by every candidate during the party primaries and presidential campaigns. There were a total of six candidates competing for the Democratic nomination which was quickly whittled down to two: Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton. However, there were a record-breaking seventeen candidates competing for the Republican nomination, ultimately won by Donald Trump. Systematically collecting every speech would have been a herculean task.

One of the main reasons that I chose to use the corpus was because it had been graded for populism using the holistic grading method (Hawkins & Silva, 2019, p. 28). I felt that one deficiency in the study I had carried out with Belén Soria (Keating & Soria, 2019) was that we had more or less taken it as a given that some politicians were populist

based on their designation as such by other scholars and by the media. Yet if we are taking populism to be a form of discourse, a matter of degree, we should be able to measure and compare the degree of populist discourse used by different actors. The method devised by Team Populism is one of the few methods available to do so and seems to be the most widely used (cf. Aslanidis, 2018). By using Team populism's corpus, I could compare my own grading of the corpus with the scores given by Team Populism's coders, and therefore come to a more objective conclusion on who was populist and to what degree.

Holistic grading is a qualitative method used to evaluate texts. It relies on trained coders giving an overall impressionistic score in comparison to example anchor texts and in conjunction with a coding rubric. In the case of Team Populism, a codebook is provided on the website (Team Populism, 2019) which is used for training coders, and with which I trained myself. Briefly, a target text is assigned a score between 0 and 2, depending on how the text compares to anchor texts in relation to the coding rubric. A score of zero is assigned to non-populist speeches, 1 to speeches which are populist but with mitigating elements and 2 to speeches which are clearly populist (Team Populism, 2019, p. 2).

Coders were permitted to assign decimal scores with the understanding that a score of 0.5 or higher would be rounded up to 1, and a score of 1.5 or higher would be rounded up to 2 (Team Populism, 2019, p. 1).

Team Populism break down the populist ideational frame into three disaggregated elements which are assessed in grading:

1. A Manichean/moral cosmology
2. The proclamation of "the people" as a homogenous and virtuous community
3. The depiction of "the elite" as a corrupt and self-serving entity

(Carlin et al., 2019, p. 420)

All three elements must be present for the discourse to be considered populist. Therefore, it may not be possible to consider any given single utterance as populist, even as it contributes to the overall populist framing of the set of utterances as a unitary whole. In practice, this means that I had two different units of analysis; each political speech as a whole, which was graded for populism; secondly, within the speech, active metaphorical utterances which potentially contribute to this populist frame.

For the stage of populism analysis, I graded the US corpus before the EUP corpus. This is because I could compare my scores to the Team Populist coder's scores of the US

corpus, check inter-coder reliability, and then proceed to analyse the EUP sub-corpora with some level of confidence. Of course, it would have been best to have more than one coder grade the EU sub-corpora, but I did not have the resources for this. Furthermore, Team Populism explicitly state that, once a coder has been trained, work by a single coder is acceptable (Hawkins & Silva, 2019, p. 32). In order to further ensure reliability, I carried out intracoder reliability tests on both the EU and US sub-corpora.

The use of Team Populism's holistic grading method contextualises my work in the work of political scientists who specialise in analysing populist discourse. Metaphor is not the only aspect of language that might affect populist discourse. By grounding my work in theirs, I hope it will allow scholars beyond metaphor studies to build on my work.

7.3.4. Metaphor Analysis

The second stage at the meso-level was to read each text and tag possible active metaphors. This was carried out according to Romero and Soria (1997-8, 2005a)'s identification criteria of contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast. At this stage, tagging of metaphors is based on a rigorous but intuitive application of the identification criteria and an "if-in-doubt-leave-it-in" approach is necessary.

Once this data had been extracted to a micro-level corpus, utterances were analysed in more detail and decisions were made on whether they would be accepted as active metaphorical utterances or not. This stage is similar to other methods such as (Steen et al., 2010) in which dictionaries are used as repositories of the most common lexicalised uses of metaphor. Steen et al. (2010) recommend using advanced learner dictionaries which are based on large corpora. For my purposes, I chose two online corpus-based dictionaries: Cambridge English Dictionary Online[40] and Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online[41]. For Spanish, for which there doesn't seem to be the same range of resources, I used the latest version of the *Diccionario de la lengua española* of the *Real Academia Española*, available online.[42]

However, while the methods of Steen et al. (2010) are focused on finding conventional metaphorical utterances by comparing contextual senses (conventional or non-conventional) of the metaphor vehicle (the metaphorically used word or words) against

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[40] Cambridge English Dictionary Online (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/).
[41] Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online (https://www.ldoceonline.com).
[42] *Diccionario de la lengua española* (https://www.rae.es).

the "basic" senses of those words, my method is focused on comparing the unconventional contextual senses of vehicle words against the conventional lexicalised senses. Therefore, in the second round, metaphors were tagged as active if the metaphorical vehicle could not be explained by the lexicalised senses in either of the two dictionaries. If they could be explained by a sense in the dictionary, they were rejected. Thus, an utterance such as

(5)   [Location unknown, 11/07/2016. Trump says:] This epidemic of violence destroys
        lives, destroys communities, and destroys opportunity for young Americans.

was rejected because the sense of "a sudden increase in the number of times that something bad happens" (Pearson, n.d.-b) explains the use of "epidemic" in this utterance. An utterance such as

(6)   [Arizona, 29/10/2016. Trump says:] When we win on November 8th, we are going
        to Washington, D.C. and we are going to drain the swamp.

was accepted as active because the sense "land that is always very wet or covered with a layer of water" (Pearson, n.d.-d) does not explain the meaning of "swamp" in this context.

It is generally accepted that the distinctions between non-conventional and conventional metaphorical uses of language are fuzzy: unconventional becomes conventional, active becomes lexicalised, with indistinct stages in-between (Cameron, 2003, p. 62; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Goatly, 1997; Nair et al., 1988; Romero & Soria, 1998). The method I have outlined is designed to sort and categorise language which is inherently resistant to such categorisation. Complications arise when otherwise lexicalised metaphors are used in ways which seem to reactivate the metaphoricity of the language. A frequent example is extended metaphor:

(7)   [Arizona, 29/10/2016. Trump says:] Government corruption spreads outward, like
        a cancer, infecting the whole operation of our government.

In this case, the metaphorical meaning of "cancer" can be explained by the dictionary, "a harmful activity that spreads quickly" (Cambridge University Press, n.d.-a). However, the extension of the conventional metaphor to include other terms from the source domain

(spread, infected) as well as the coherence of the government as the body being infected, and the use of the simile form (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008, p. 120) would likely increase the salience of the contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast of the utterance and activate the metaphorical mechanism. In these cases, the utterance was tagged active.

However, other cases of extended metaphor could not be tagged as active because there is evidence that the extended form itself is highly conventional (more than likely an idiom) or that all the source domain terms used have conventional senses for that topic. A good example of this is

(8)   [North Carolina, 22/06/2016. Clinton says:] Twice now in the past 30 years, a Republican president has caused an economic mess and a Democratic president has had to come in and clean it up.

"Mess" can have the sense of "a situation that is full of problems" (Cambridge University Press, n.d.-d) and the phrasal verb "clean up for/after sb" can have the sense "to remove dirt or problems that someone has made" (Cambridge University Press, n.d.-c.). This candidate active metaphor was therefore rejected.

Another factor which can activate a lexicalised metaphor is what Goatly (1997) and Cameron (2008) call *literalisation*. This occurs when different senses of the vehicle, literal and metaphorical, are evoked at the same time. An example is

(9)   [South Carolina, 27/02/2016. Clinton says:] Instead of building walls, we need to be tearing down barriers. We need to show by everything we do that we really are in this together.

In addition to other factors such as wordplay and a contrast between different mappings, the vehicle alludes to both Trump's plan to build a physical wall and the conventional metaphorical meaning of a wall as a disunity among people. The effect of this kind of literalisation is to draw attention to the conceptual contrast between a wall as a physical barrier and as a disunity between people.

Not all instances where a metaphor vehicle communicates multiple senses can be counted as literalisation. In the utterance

(10)   [Pennsylvania, 22/10/2016. Clinton says:] Love trumps hate.

Clinton is using a lexicalised metaphor based on poker, where one card trumps or beats another. Here, however, it seems she is playing off her opponent's surname and a lexicalised sense of beat without reactivating the conceptual contrast of the lexicalised metaphorical meaning. Instances such as this were rejected.

It is clear that much more work needs to be done on the factors which affect the reactivation of conventional metaphors. This is only possible if we recognise metaphorically used language as distinct from conventional expressions based on metaphorical concepts.

An important point to note here is that a constellation of active metaphorical utterances may contribute to the same dynamic online metaphorical mapping. Take, for example, utterance (11):

(11)   [Strasbourg, 20/01/2016. Farage is addressing Mark Rutte, the prime minister of the Netherlands, who is about to begin a 6-month period as president of the European Council and has just addressed the European Parliament. Farage says:] This EU faces an existential crisis. Indeed, there is an outbreak of a contagious disease. It is not a new one; the Greeks first came across it a couple of thousand years ago. The virus in its new form began in Denmark in the early 1990s but was put down with a heavy German hand. There have been a couple of outbreaks in Ireland, but substantial European money again cured the outbreak. But the red alert in 2005, when the contagion swept across the Netherlands and France, frankly has never gone away, and I think now we have simultaneous outbreaks of the disease. In Denmark it now looks to be wholly irreversible and, in my own country, despite decades of our political establishment denying its existence, a recent opinion poll showed that sufferers may now be actually in a majority. What surprised me about your speech, as the Dutch Prime Minister, is that you did not mention the fact that 427 000 of your own citizens have outed themselves in public, declared themselves to be carriers, called a referendum for 6 April and encouraged the rest of the country to join in. I suppose it must be embarrassing for you. The diagnosis, by the way, will not be popular in this House: the disease is called democracy. People want to have a say on their future.

This is an example of an extended metaphor. It is also an ironic utterance; an attribution of a thought or thoughts to the EU parliament and an expression of the speaker's tacit attitude of dissociation from that content (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 250). By my analysis, there are seven active metaphorical utterances here. Each metaphorical utterance triggers a metaphorical sub-mapping. Because this is an extended metaphor, each utterance seems to explore a new element of an overarching conceptual metaphor. This is online mapping, a dynamic process. The metaphorical concept is not something fixed which is accessed from long-term memory but is something dynamic, constructed, guided by coherence and relevance through several active metaphorical utterances:

i. there is an outbreak of a contagious disease (A POLITICAL POSITION AS OUTBREAK OF CONTAGIOUS DISEASE)

ii. It is not a new one; the Greeks first came across it a couple of thousand years ago (DEMOCRACY AS DISEASE WHICH GREEKS FIRST CAME ACROSS A COUPLE OF THOUSAND YEARS AGO).

iii. The virus in its new form began in Denmark in the early 1990s (DANISH REFERENDUM 1992 AS NEW FORM OF VIRUS)

iv. There have been a couple of outbreaks in Ireland, (2 IRISH REFERENDA ON LISBON TREATY AS OUTBREAKS)

v. but substantial European money again cured the outbreak. (EU MONEY AS CURE FOR OUTBREAKS IN IRELAND)

vi. But the red alert in 2005, when the contagion swept across the Netherlands and France, frankly has never gone away and I think now we have simultaneous outbreaks of the disease (2005 VOTES ON EU TREATY AS BEGINNING OF CONTEMPORARY OUTBREAK)

vii. In Denmark it now looks to be wholly irreversible and, in my own country, despite decades of our political establishment denying its existence, a recent opinion poll showed that sufferers may now be actually in a majority. (ANTI-EU VOTERS AS SUFFERERS OF DISEASE)

viii. What surprised me about your speech, as the Dutch Prime Minister, is that you did not mention the fact that 427 000 of your own citizens have outed themselves in public, declared themselves to be carriers, called a referendum for 6 April and encouraged the rest of the country to join in. I

suppose it must be embarrassing for you. (ANTI-EU DUTCH VOTERS AS PROUD CARRIERS OF DISEASE)

ix.   The diagnosis, by the way, will not be popular in this House: the disease is called democracy. (IDENTIFICATION OF THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY AS AN UNPOPULAR DIAGNOSIS OF A DISEASE)

The metaphorical conception behind each utterance can be analysed on its own or we can analyse one ad hoc metaphorical concept providing the context by which each utterance is interpreted: MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY AS OUTBREAKS OF A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE. This decision depends on the aims of the researcher. These are static approximations of dynamic mental processes we cannot fully represent. However, it is vital that we stay as close to the linguistic evidence as we can; Farage is not claiming that all politics is a disease, he is ironically describing Eurosceptic politics as a disease. If we go too far down the road of abstraction, our analysis loses its explanatory power of what the linguistic evidence tells us Farage was trying to communicate. This is a major difference between cognitive approaches and pragmatic IT: We are not trying to recover covert thought processes. We are asking "what is intentionally communicated and how?" That these questions involve a cognitive aspect is undeniable, but pragmatic analysis must draw a line between the cognitive aspects of communication and the covert intentions of the communicator.

The distinction between metaphorical utterances and the metaphorical mapping that must be constructed to interpret them becomes vital when we consider the requirements of qualitative research and quantitative research. What does it mean to say there are seven metaphorical mappings in (11) when another analyst can just as equally count one? A quantitative count of metaphorical utterances is less arbitrary, though it does depend heavily on one's conception of what a metaphorical utterance is. That is why my unit of analysis for quantitative purposes is the metaphorical utterance, and not the metaphorical concept or conceptualisation which might underlie it.

However, in qualitative analysis the difference between analysing (11) as several mappings or one mapping containing sub-mappings no longer has such an impact on results. The analyst can choose whichever point of view which allows them to better explain the linguistic evidence of what was communicated and how. In my qualitative analysis, I therefore look at the ad hoc metaphorical mappings which might explain the metaphorical utterances, but without the commitment of CMT that these are fixed in long-

term memory (Romero & Soria 2021a). What follows is an example of this qualitative analysis of the metaphorical mapping involved in processing the utterances in (11).

Firstly, in (11), there is a semantic mismatch since we do not normally use the vocabulary of the domain DISEASE to talk about democracy. There is also a conceptual contrast when we identify the concept OUTBREAKS OF A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE as the target domain (D_t) and the complex concept MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY as the source domain (D_s) from which to describe the target domain. This contrast activates the interpretation of metaphor which involves the projection of properties from D_s upon D_t to conceptualise OUTBREAKS OF A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE as MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY. This conceptualization is represented by a mapping, M, from the source domain, OUTBREAKS OF A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE, to the target domain, MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY.

Following Romero and Soria, I represent a domain by a set of terms forming its vocabulary, V, and by a set of sentences or structural constraints, S, which specify how the terms in their vocabulary give access to the information associated with the concept.

Table 7.8. Representation of the source domain and target domain involved in the interpretation of (11)	
Source domain (D$_s$): OUTBREAKS OF A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE	**Target domain (D$_t$):** MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY
D$_s$ = <V$_s$, S$_s$ >	**D$_t$ = <V$_t$, S$_t$>**
Vs = {'disease', 'contagious', 'outbreak', 'endanger', 'people', 'patient', 'virus', 'sweep across (grow exponentially)', 'mutate', 'new variants', 'cure', 'carriers', diagnosis', 'vaccinations', 'medication', 'containment', 'infected', 'alarm', 'quarantine', 'social stigma', zoonosis', etc}	**V$_t$** = {'Euroscepticism', 'democracy', 'popular', 'movement', 'support', 'EU', 'authority', 'people' 'to have a say', 'public', 'ancient', 'Greece', 'established', 'referenda', 'opinion poll', 'this House (EU parliament)', etc}
S$_s$ = [1$_s$] An outbreak of a contagious disease endangers people's lives and the functioning of society, [2$_s$] A virus is a contagious disease, [3$_s$] People have always come across viruses, [4$_s$] Viruses mutate into new variants, [5$_s$] An outbreak of a variant can sweep across an area, [6$_s$] The spread of a virus entails the finding of many outbreaks, [7$_s$] Authorities can use vaccinations, medicines, and other measures in order to cure or contain an outbreak, [8$_s$] An outbreak of a contagious disease can cause alarm, [9$_s$] Infected people/carriers should be isolated from others (quarantined) [10$_s$] Infected people may face social stigma, [11$_s$] Hearing a diagnosis of a contagious disease can be unpleasant, [12$_s$] Viruses can be passed from animals to humans (zoonosis), etc.	**S$_t$ =** [1$_t$] A movement of Euroscepticism opposes EU membership, [2$_t$] Democracy is a form of government in which people have the authority to have a say on public matters, [3$_t$] Democracy was discovered/created by the Ancient Greeks over two thousand years ago, [4$_t$] Eurosceptic democracy began in Denmark in the 1990s, [5$_t$] Support for Eurosceptic democracy is evinced by a number of referenda results and demands for referenda in Europe (Denmark 1992, France and the Netherlands 2005, Ireland 2008, Denmark 2016, UK 2016), [6$_t$] The EU authorities used money and heavy-handedness to reverse referenda results (Denmark 1993, and Ireland 2009), [7$_t$] Dutch Eurosceptics proudly succeeded in their request of a referendum against an EU agreement with the Ukraine, [8$_t$] The EU parliament dislike the rising Euroscepticism, etc.

The interpretation of (11) consists in elaborating a partial admissible function *F* from the terms in the vocabulary of the source domain to the terms that belong or that will belong to the target domain. In the example, this entails a partial function, *F*, between terms formed by pairs such as (outbreak → movement), (contagious disease → Euroscepticism), (contagiousness → popularity), (endanger → negatively affect), (virus → Eurosceptic democracy), (come across → discover), (mutate into new forms → take new forms), (sweeping across → growing exponentially in). The mapping also consists of a subset of

sentences from the source domain, *S*, which can be transformed coherently using *F* to information associated only with the target domain. In the example, *S* is formed by [1$_s$] - [11$_s$], sentences that include properties that are not literally applied to democracy. These sentences are transformable by *F* because each of its terms belongs to the arguments of this function or it belongs directly to the vocabulary of the target domain. Source domain terms get the meaning of the target domain terms to which they are applied in *F*, meaning that is established in the metaphorically restructured target domain. When transforming the sentences of *S*, we find other sentences only in terms of the target domain, as we can see in table 7.9 which represents the restructured target domain.

Table 7.9. Representation of the metaphorically restructured target domain involved in the interpretation of (11)
Restructured target domain (D$_t^M$ or MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY^M):   MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY AS OUTBREAKS OF A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
[1$_t^M$] A movement of Euroscepticism opposes EU membership,   [2$_t^M$] Movements of Eurosceptic democracy negatively affect EU citizens' lives and the functioning of the European Union, (new, introduced by [1$_s$]),   [3$_t^M$] Democracy is a form of government in which people have the authority to have a say on public matters,   [4$_t^M$] Euroscepticism is a popular form of democracy, (new, introduced by [2$_s$]),   [5$_t^M$] The Ancient Greeks discovered democracy over two thousand years ago, ([3$_t$] strengthened by [4$_s$]),   [6$_t^M$] Eurosceptic democracy is a new form of the type of democracy discovered by the Greeks, (new, introduced by [5$_s$]),   [7$_t^M$] Support for Eurosceptic democracy is growing exponentially in EU states, (new, introduced by [6$_s$])   [8$_t^M$] The exponential growth in support for Euroscepticism is evinced by a number of referenda results and demands for referenda in Europe, including referenda in Denmark in 1992, France and the Netherlands in 2005, Ireland in 2008, Denmark 2016 and the UK 2016, ([6$_t$] strengthened by [7$_s$]),   [9$_t^M$] The EU authorities used money or heavy-handedness to reverse referenda results in order to eliminate or contain movements of Eurosceptic democracy, (new, introduced by [8$_s$]; [7$_t$] is also strengthened)   [10$_t^M$] The results in France and the Netherlands in 2005 was a red alarm for the EU, (new, introduced by [9$_s$]),   [11$_t^M$] Supporters of Euroscepticism should be (socially and politically) isolated from others, (new, introduced by [9$_s$]),   [12$_t^M$] Supporters of Euroscepticism face social stigma, (new, introduced by [11$_s$]),   [13$_t^M$] Hearing about Eurosceptic democracy can be unpleasant for the EU but it is necessary for them to hear (new, introduced by [12$_s$])

The mapping M for (11) generates a metaphorically restructured conception of MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY: MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY^M or MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY AS OUTBREAKS OF A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE, characterised by the structural constraints of Table 7.9. With [1$_t^M$], [3$_t^M$], [5$_t^M$], and [8$_t^M$]

nothing new is added to the target domain from the source domain but some information is reinforced and highlighted by the relational similarities that are revealed by their alignment with the characteristics activated (by the utterance) in the source domain. In addition, when the description of the target domain from the source domain adds information which is not present in the first one but is consistent with it and relevant the intended metaphorical meaning, novel properties emerge in the target domain as in the case of $[2_t^M]$, $[4_t^M]$, $[6_t^M]$, $[7_t{}^M]$, $[9_t^M]$, $[10_t^M]$, $[11_t^M]$, $[12_t^M]$, and $[13_t^M]$. As $[12_s]$ is not relevant to what the speaker intends to communicate, it has no effect on the restructured target domain. Of course, its potential effect could be exploited in another utterance if relevant. The mapping is an online dynamic process.

How is this metaphorical concept used in (11) for the communication of ideological content and a populist frame? The first thing to note is that the source domain is a complex ad hoc concept. The contagiousness of the outbreak is vital for an understanding of what Farage is intending to communicate. To analyse the source domain via the more general concept DISEASE would not be able explain the interpretation of speaker's meaning of utterance (11) because CONTAGIOUS DISEASE is quite a different concept than other illnesses such as GENETIC DISEASE which is not contagious. Furthermore, we might say CONTAGIOUS DISEASE is narrowed further to exclude those contagious diseases or viruses which are not contagious or dangerous enough to pose a serious threat to society. This is a narrow conception of DISEASE which we use when we talk about epidemics and pandemics or any situation where contagious viruses pose a serious threat to public health.

The target domain is also an ad hoc concept. Farage is conceptualizing EUROSCEPTICISM as more than a political movement. It is democracy itself, the same democracy which was first created/discovered by the ancient Greeks. Note that this is an idealised conception of Greek democracy but a common one; it is not the conception that a historian might have which would contain the information that democracy in ancient Greece was restricted to certain classes of men. Here, ancient Greek democracy is seen as the original, pure democracy where decisions are made by a simple majority. The conflation of populist political movement and majoritarian democracy is a typical feature of populism, particularly with an emphasis on referenda as revealing the homogenous will of the people (Canovan, 1999, p. 2). The populist conception of DEMOCRACY is not representative democracy where minority voices are represented, but a direct democracy where the majority rules absolutely. Furthermore, this ad hoc concept also involves a narrow conception of EUROSCEPTICISM. While moderate Eurosceptics might agree that the

EU is in need of reform or might disagree with the political integration of EU states, they need not be opposed to the existence of the European Union itself. Farage's conception of Euroscepticism as a pure direct democracy in opposition to the EU is already polarising and ideological in eliding these more subtle positions.

This metaphor is a case of recursive ad hoc concept construction. The partial mapping process involves the mapping of terms and constraints from the ad hoc source domain to the ad hoc target domain. The process is guided by the hearer's search for relevance to derive speaker's meaning, and the potential coherence of constraints in the restructured target domain once they are aligned. For example, while constraint $[1_t]$ already expresses the Eurosceptic opposition to the EU, this is strengthened by its alignment with $[1_s]$ that the outbreak of a contagious virus is dangerous to people's lives and health. However, $[1_s]$ also introduces a new constraint, $[2_t^M]$; Eurosceptics are not just opposed to the EU but are an existential threat to it. Before the shock result of the Brexit referendum of 2016, few people considered Euroscepticism to be a serious threat to the EU. In the mapping of $[1_s]$, Farage introduces this sense of threat. "Endanger" in the context of the source domain has two senses: a mortal threat to people's lives and a more general threat to the functioning of society. In the context of the restructured target domain, this becomes a threat to people's status as EU citizens (they will no longer be EU citizens) and a threat to the functioning of the EU. Farage is communicating this as part of an ironic utterance so this view of Euroscepticism as a threat is attributed to the EU, rather than being endorsed by Farage. As Farage is a prominent Eurosceptic, his audiences would know that he himself would positively evaluate the Eurosceptic threat.

In $[4_t^M]$ a new constraint has been introduced by $[2_s]$; contagiousness in the context of a disease is mapped onto the popularity of Euroscepticism. "Popularity" in the restructured target domain is something which passes swiftly from person to person, a popularity which is difficult to contain or control. In $[8_t^M]$ the exponential spread of a highly contagious disease is mapped onto the exponential rise in support for Euroscepticism, which Farage says is "irreversible". Contagious viruses, once they meet a certain threshold of transmission, affect a population exponentially. Farage depicts a perceived rise of support for Eurosceptic policies as an exponential rise, a contagiousness of support intrinsic to the movement itself and inevitable if it is not cured or contained by external agents. There is no such inevitable exponential dimension in the target-domain before mapping. While support for these movements might rise and fall, this can be due to a wide range of

factors, many of which have nothing or little to do with the movements themselves (e.g., the immigration crisis in Europe was co-opted by Farage to promote his Brexit movement).

In [5$_t^M$], [3$_t$] is strengthened by [3$_s$]. In [3$_t$] I have expressed the constraint as the Greeks having "discovered/created" democracy because there is an ambiguity in how we think or talk about democracy as a natural, inevitable product of human evolution (see Francis Fukuyama, 1992) or as something contingent on historical and cultural circumstances, just one form that the social contract (Hobbes, 1651/2017) can take. Constraint [5$_t^M$] resolves this ambiguity via analogy, and in doing so, decontests the concept of DEMOCRACY, an ideological act. Just as viruses occur naturally and have been witnessed by countless generations throughout history, so too has democracy. Interestingly, it is in ambiguities such as this that pragmatic IT leaves room for CMT's analysis of conventional metaphorical concepts. It might be that there is a conventional metaphorical concept which structures DEMOCRACY as a natural phenomenon and which is activated in long term memory in the interpretation of (11). However, such a metaphor alone could not explain the communicated metaphorical content of (11).

[6$_t^M$] is a new constraint introduced by [4$_s$]. The mutation of viruses into new variants is mapped onto the development of ancient Greek democracy into Eurosceptic democracy. As I have already discussed, the ad hoc target domain itself already conflates a conception of DEMOCRACY with a conception of EUROSCEPTICISM. The mapping of [4$_s$] defines the relationship between these conceptions; Euroscepticism is a new form, a natural development, of the original democracy discovered by the Greeks.

Crucial to this populist decontestation of DEMOCRACY is the role afforded to referenda as giving voice to the homogenised will of the pure people (Canovan, 1999, p. 2). With constraint [8$_t^M$], Farage can use examples of referenda which have gone in favour of Eurosceptic positions as evidence for its exponential spread among EU citizens. The votes which Farage cites were, in reality, evidence for no such thing. In Ireland, there is widespread support for the European Union. While it is true that the Irish people initially voted against the Lisbon treaty in 2008, the result might be taken to reflect other concerns of the Irish people at the time, such as concerns about immigration and abortion. By depicting each vote as an outbreak of a contagious virus, Farage weakens these potential constraints of the target domain by attributing the success of the referenda to support for Euroscepticism.

In [9$_t^M$], [7$_s$] strengthens [6$_t$] but also introduces a new constraint. Farage refers to the "heavy German hand" in overturning results of a referendum in Denmark. Farage is

referring to a second referendum in Denmark in 1993, in which the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, unlike the referendum in 1992, in which ratification was rejected. It is not clear to me why Farage attributes the reversal in result to a "heavy German hand", unless German here is meant to stand for EU leadership in general. The 1993 referendum only went in favour of ratification after certain concessions were made by other EU states in the Edinburgh Agreement. In (11) Farage also talks about the role of European money in overturning a referendum result in Ireland. Here he is referring to the second Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which is often held up as an example of the EU's supposedly anti-democratic behaviour. However, in the 2009 Irish referendum, concessions from Europe were also key to the shift in support for the treaty, especially the guarantee that Irish abortion laws would not be affected (McDonald, 2009). By mapping the measures taken by authorities to contain and eradicate a virus to the measures that the European Union supposedly took in repeat referenda, Farage not only strengthens assumptions about the actions taken by the EU, but he also introduces the motivation behind those actions. The EU, viewing Eurosceptic democracy as a virus, have used heavy-handedness and money in an attempt to contain and eradicate Euroscepticism.

In $[10_t^M]$, $[8_s]$ introduces a new constraint, that the growing support for Eurosceptic positions is a cause for alarm. This is expressed in utterance of (11) by the lexicalised conventional metaphorical utterance "a red alert". This is another point where CMT might be useful in analysis, as it would seem to suggest a conventional metaphorical utterance motivated by the POLITICS IS WAR conventional metaphorical concept. It is interesting to note that this possible presence of a conventional conceptual metaphor as part of the novel metaphorical utterance does not seem to result in a mixed metaphor. Under an analysis using pragmatic IT, "red alert" is processed literally, the same as any other literally used terms in (11), while the metaphorically used words such as "virus" are processed via an online dynamic metaphor mapping. For CMT, however, there is no difference in how the conventional use of "red alert" and unconventional use of "virus" are processed, and so one might expect some kind of mixed metaphor effect. What is even more interesting is that the sense of alarm is introduced by the novel metaphorical concept MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY^M and is expressed by Farage using the conventional metaphorical expression. This means that the novel metaphorical concept has motivated the use of the conventional metaphorical expression, which is the opposite of the standard CMT position in which conventional metaphorical concepts motivate novel metaphorical utterances.

In [11$_t^M$], [9$_s$] introduces a constraint where the necessity of infected carriers of a disease to be quarantined is mapped to the social and political isolation of Eurosceptics. Farage is being ironic in (11) so we understand that he himself does not endorse the social or political isolation of Eurosceptics but that he is attributing this thought to the EU parliament. Carriers of contagious diseases often face social stigma. This is introduced in [12$_t^M$] to depict Eurosceptics as facing social stigma. In recent years, there has been a narrative within right-wing movements that the left demonise any views which they do not agree with. Farage himself, rightly or wrongly, was associated with racism during the Brexit campaign.

Finally, in [13$_t^M$], [9$_s$] strengthens [8$_t$] and introduces a new constraint; the diagnosis of a disease is usually unpleasant for somebody to hear but is necessary for them to hear. In the restructured target domain, this is mapped onto the EU parliament receiving the unpleasant news that Euroscepticism is on the rise in Europe.

The constraints I have outlined in the mapping involved in (11) are used as part of an ironic utterance. I follow relevance theory's echoic account of irony, in which a speaker attributes some thought or utterance to someone or something and tacitly dissociates herself from it (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 250). In (11), I claim that Farage attributes a thought which contains the metaphorical concept MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY AS OUTBREAKS OF A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE. There are several ways in which he tacitly disassociates himself from this thought. Firstly, the choice of source domain itself indicates dissociation. Farage was one of the most well-known Eurosceptics in parliament, if not the world, and this assumption is mutually manifest to speaker and audience. A sincere use of such a negatively evaluated source domain to describe Euroscepticism would not seem to result in a relevant interpretation. This kind of evaluation in identifying speaker's meaning in metaphor interpretation has long been noted by Charles Forceville in his work on multimodal metaphor in advertising (Forceville, 1996); advertisers are expected to say something good about the product they are selling. Similarly, Farage is expected to speak in favour of Euroscepticism. Moreover, the evaluation of democracy as positive is ubiquitous in most contemporary societies. Farage's audience would not take his description of it as a negatively evaluated disease at face value.

A key component of the irony in (11) is when Farage speaks about 427,000 Dutch citizens having "outed themselves in public" by calling for a referendum. Here Farage is referring to the number of official requests made by citizens of the Netherlands for a referendum on a treaty between the EU and the Ukraine in 2016. Longman gives a

lexicalised sense of "to out somebody" as "to let the public know a fact about someone that they would prefer to keep secret" (Pearson, n.d.-c). Farage is contrasting the attitude of the EU towards Eurosceptics, the negative evaluation of them as carriers of a disease, with their actual attitude which he depicts as being openly and proudly Eurosceptic. In the restructured target domain this constraint would be incoherent; carriers of diseases are not normally open and proud of that fact. Farage's explicit emphasis on this fact is used to juxtapose the two views of Eurosceptics, and to highlight his own dissociation from the metaphorical thought.

Benford and Snow (2000)'s core framing tasks are revealing on how metaphor and irony can be used in the communication of populist frames; their core framing tasks were (i) diagnostic framing, "a shared understanding of some problem"; (ii) prognostic framing, "an alternative set of arrangements"; and (iii) motivational framing, "urge others to act" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). In (11) there are really two frames being constructed; a frame which is metarepresented as the EU's point of view; and the populist frame. The metaphorical thought involved in (11) expresses the EU's frame; (i) Eurosceptic democracy is a contagious disease which existentially threatens the EU; (ii) Euroscepticism can be eradicated; and (iii) Eurosceptics can be isolated and stigmatised. The ironic attribution of the metaphorical thought constructs the populist frame; (i) EU elites arrogantly consider Eurosceptic democracy to be a disease, wish to eradicate it, and stigmatise its followers; (ii) Eurosceptics can be open and proud; and (iii) Eurosceptics can demand referenda.

Benford and Snow (2000)'s framework also outlined discursive processes: (a) frame articulation, "the connection and articulation of events [. . .] a new angle of vison [. . .] is provided", (b) frame amplification: "accenting and highlighting some issues [. . .] issues, beliefs, and events may function much like synecdoches" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623). Active metaphor would seem to be particularly useful for these discursive framing tasks and are readily seen in (11); (a) referenda results, rising support for Euroscepticism, repeat referenda, the association of Euroscepticism with stigmatised beliefs – all of these are brought together in the restructured source domain into a cohesive whole, and certain relationships between them are highlighted or created (e.g., the association of Euroscepticism with stigmatised beliefs like racism becomes a tactic used by EU elites to eradicate Euroscepticism); (b) the referenda results are emphasised as evidence of an exponentially growing support and repeat referenda are emphasised as symbols of the EU's anti-democratic nature. Finally, the utterance of (11) can be considered an act of counterframing, an attempt to "rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths,

versions of reality, or interpretive framework" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 626). Of course, there is no evidence that any EU parliamentarian ever described Euroscepticism as a disease, much less the parliament thinking it as a whole. The power of irony and metaphor in politics may be that quite complex frames can be attributed to entities, and then countered, even if the entities themselves have never entertained the frame in question.

As an ideological act of decontestation, (11) would seem most concerned with the concept of DEMOCRACY. As I have already discussed, the target domain already features a populist decontestation of DEMOCRACY as majoritarianism. The metaphorical concept in (11) brings related decontestations into play; the attempts of the EU to overturn referenda results they don't like, and to isolate and stigmatise Eurosceptics, are presented as attacks on certain conceptions of core liberal concepts such as LIBERTY, INDIVIDUALISM and RULE-LIMITED GOVERNMENT. In the case of Farage these concepts are decontested via a nationalist conservative-ideology; national self-determination is the only legitimate form of democratic expression and referenda are the means for national groups to regain their socio-political representation.

The combination of irony and active metaphor in (11) allows Farage to position entities according to a populist frame. The EU elites are arrogantly anti-democratic in their view of Eurosceptic democratic movements as a contagious disease. By metarepresenting this antagonistic view of the elite towards the people, Farage manages to characterise the pure people as proud followers of Euroscepticism, despite the social stigma attached to that political position by the elite. Any entity which fears or hates democracy, as it is narrowly decontested by Farage, is a threat to the fabric of society. By using irony to disassociate himself from such a view, Farage can present himself as speaking for the real democrats, the pure people who fight against the EU elite. It is a Manichean struggle between people and elites which derives its moral absolutes based on a populist decontestation of DEMOCRACY and an ironic attribution of a metaphorical thought to an elite entity. Of course, in reality, it is unlikely that any EU parliamentarians saw or described Euroscepticism or democracy itself as a disease. The powerful combination of irony and metaphor in politics allows a speaker to attribute complex thoughts or utterances to opponents which they might never have thought or uttered.

7.3.5. Notes on Statistical Analysis

One of the goals of corpus pragmatics is to utilise the statistical tools of corpus linguistics in order to give weight to the arguments of pragmatic analysis. To this end, I carry out several statistical tests on the data retrieved in this thesis. However, one has to be careful in how statistical tests are applied and the conclusions which are drawn from their results. In this thesis, they are meant to inform and support qualitative analysis, rather than prove or disprove a hypothesis. Here I outline some key concerns and challenges regarding statistical analysis of the corpora under study.

To begin with, it is vital to consider the types of data which are retrieved via the holistic-grading method for populism and pragmatic criteria of metaphor identification. Holistic grading is a qualitative method which generates ordinal data (Wright, 2007, p. 253). The metaphor identification procedure followed in this thesis generates ratio, scale, or continuous data. The calculations which can be carried out on these two types of data differ. For example, while it is acceptable to calculate a mean average for ratio data, this is controversial for ordinal data, for which a median average is often deemed more acceptable (Laerd Statistics, n.d.). However, some scholars maintain that, under certain circumstances, using the mean average for ordinal data is acceptable (Campbell & Swinscow, 1976/2009, p. 22). In the analysis of my data, this ambiguity regarding the applicability of mean averages to ordinal data has proven challenging, especially in deriving the overall rates of populism reported in the results. It is one reason why I do not perform any form of t-test when comparing populists. Besides the fact that t-tests are designed for the comparison between two groups, and I compare several, they are generally considered unsuitable for establishing statistically significant differences between ordinal values.

Similarly, it is important to note that the sample sizes and distributions of the sub-corpora are not equal. While certain measures can be used to mitigate these factors, such as the normalisation of metaphor use, some statistical tests are more sensitive to these factors than others. Such concerns led me to adopt the Kruskal-Wallis H Test to establish statistical difference in both rates of populism and active metaphor use between speakers. While some might consider a one-way ANOVA test more suitable for continuous data such as rates of metaphor use, this test is more sensitive to unequal sample sizes and skewed distributions (Laerd Statistics, 2017, p. 9).

The Kruskal-Wallis H tests were carried out using IBM's industry standard SPSS software, following the detailed guide given in Laerd Statistics (2015). As for intracoder

and intercoder reliability tests, these were carried out using Deen Freelon's ReCal(OIR) tool (Freelon, 2013) on his website (http://dfreelon.org/). An advantage of using this tool, besides its ease of use, is that it differentiates between ordinal and ratio/continuous data.

7.4. Summary

In this chapter I have discussed some different ways of identifying and counting metaphor in corpora. Charteris-Black's method involves distinct functions, definitions and identification criteria based on three dimensions of metaphor: cognitive, linguistic and pragmatic. While his focus on the linguistic and pragmatic dimensions of metaphor were welcome in a field dominated by CMT, the trifurcation of his theory causes problems and contradictions, particularly in his adoption of CMT as a model of mapping while accepting semantic tension between what is said and speaker's meaning as an identification criterion. These issues affect the theoretical viability of his units of analysis, which are applied too arbitrarily to be used as evidence of covert political ideologies.

The MIP and MIPVU methods described in Steen et al. (2010) have inspired my own method to the extent that I reference dictionaries to establish the conventionality of the intended meaning of metaphorically used words. However, despite their claims that the MIP method can be used for in conjunction with different theories, the MIP method is not suitable for work using pragmatic IT: the MIP compares the intended sense of a metaphorically used word against a "basic" sense, which is theoretically grounded in CMT's conception of embodied cognition. They are focused on comparing these basic senses of metaphor vehicles against the intended meaning of the metaphor vehicle in context, while I am focused on comparing all lexicalised senses against the intended meaning of the metaphor vehicles in context.

Finally, Cameron (2003)'s method has also inspired my method on some issues but ultimately her criteria lack the pragmatic dimension which this thesis requires. She attempts to separate speaker's intention from the identification of metaphor, but this leads her into contradiction; the distinction between linguistic metaphor and process metaphor does not hold. Furthermore, her conception of incongruence as a criterion for metaphor identification seem to contradict her adoption of CMT as a model for metaphor mapping.

Ultimately, these methods are unsuitable for this thesis because they are not focused on active metaphorical utterances or they do not adequately consider the role of pragmatics in metaphor identification.

I have outlined the corpus tool that I devised using Microsoft Office programs; I wrote a macro to automate extraction of manually tagged content from large corpora so that smaller sub-corpora, more suited to corpus-pragmatics, could be analysed. This required careful consideration of the contextual factors which needed to be retained and made accessible at each level of analysis, in order to attain a "a representative volume of data, sieved through pragmatics theories" (Romero-Trillo, 2013, p. 1).

I outlined how I used Team Populism's holistic-grading method to evaluate the degree of populist discourse in different sub-corpora.

I also outlined how the task of metaphor identification, using pragmatic IT's identification criteria of contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast, were applied to the corpus, along with some challenging examples. I gave an example of how the theoretical framework of this thesis can be applied to metaphorically used language, describing its contribution to the communication of populist frames and ideological content. Finally, I outlined some of the considerations which went into choosing suitable statistical tests. Next, I will show the results of this method, quantitative and qualitative, and demonstrate the benefits of applying a pragmatic theory of metaphor identification and analysis to corpora of political discourse.

Section III: Analysis

Chapter 8
Populism and Active Metaphorical Utterances in the European Parliament[43]

8.1. Introduction

While Europe is no stranger to populism, the European Union, and particularly its Parliament has long been a bastion of centrist politics, diplomacy and consensus building. In recent times, however, it has had to reckon with rising populist movements on both the right and the left of the political spectrum; the Brexit movement in the UK, *Podemos* and *Vox* in Spain, *Rassemblement National* in France, *Partij voor de Vrijheid* in the Netherlands, Viktor Orbán's illiberal democracy in Hungary, and the *Movimento 5 Stelle* in Italy. In the 2014 European parliamentary elections, populist parties increased their number of seats (Grabbe & Groot, 2014) and increased this again in the elections of 2019 (Balnaves et al., 2020).

In this chapter, I grade the rate of populist discourse and rate of active metaphorical utterances of two well-known populist MEPs in the EU Parliament; Nigel Farage from the British right-wing parties UKIP and the Brexit Party; and Pablo Iglesias from the Spanish left-wing party *Podemos*. For comparison, I also analyse the rate of populist discourse and active metaphor use of two presumably non-populist MEPs; Ashley Fox from the centre-right British Conservative and Unionist Party, and Iratxe García, from the centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers Party (*PSOE*) (8.2). I then qualitatively examine the active metaphorical utterances of each MEP, using pragmatic IT as developed in the works of Soria (1992) and Romero and Soria (1997-8, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming) (8.3).

The corpus of EU parliamentary speeches was downloaded from the website of the European Parliament (www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary)[44]. This macro-corpus consisted of all plenary debates of the 8th European Parliament, 2014-2019. From this macro-corpus, the spoken contributions of each of the four subject-MEPs (Nigel Farage, Pablo Iglesias,

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[43] An early version of this chapter was published as Keating and Soria (2019).
[44] There does not seem to be one central location to download multiple speeches at the same time. In order to retrieve the full text of the debates, one has to use the calendar and click on each date. Once brought to the page for that date's session, the full plenary debate can be found, in different file formats, at the bottom of the webpage.

Ashley Fox and Iratxe García) were tagged and extracted into four separate sub-corpora. Contributions consisted of spoken utterances only–written contributions were excluded (MEPs can submit written explanations for having voted a certain way. Often, these seem to be templates used by all members of the party). These spoken contributions were often speeches given in the context of plenary debates but could also be blue-card questions, where the subject-MEP asked another MEP a question based on the latter's contribution to the debate. Spoken contributions also include blue-card answers, when the subject-MEP answered blue-card question posed to them. In these exchanges, and indeed any exchange where the subject-MEP was addressed or referenced by another MEP, contributions from the subjects' interlocutors were tagged as interlocutor exchanges in the macro-corpus and imported into the subject sub-corpus to ensure that the dialogic context of the debates was taken into account. After the subject-corpora were compiled, subjects' contributions were manually analysed for rates of populism using the holistic-grading method (Hawkins & Silva, 2019), and then manually analysed using metaphor identification criteria and tagged for active metaphor. The word-count of each corpus is shown in table 8.1.

Table 8.1. EUP corpora word counts[45]	
Corpus	**Word count**
EUP corpus	37,579,903
Farage sub-corpus	35,497
Fox sub-corpus	10,773
García sub-corpus	5,761
Iglesias sub-corpus	5,455

8.2. Measuring Populism and Active Metaphor Use

8.2.1. Rates of Populist Discourse and Rates of Use of Active Metaphor

For the purpose of populism grading, separate contributions given by candidates on the same day were counted as one speech. This is because if the subject-MEP made more than one contribution on the same day, it was due to asking or answering a blue-card question related to their own speech or the speech of another. The populist holistic grading method works best with longer speeches, the ideal being between 1,000 and 3,000 words (Hawkins, 2009, p. 1051), although it has been applied to texts as short as *Twitter* tweets (Cassell, 2020). By conflating same-day contributions under one score, I avoided having to assign

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[45] These word counts include interlocutor contributions and metadata. For the calculation of rate of active metaphor use, interlocutor data and metadata was removed.

scores to very short contributions (questions and answers) which might have distorted the overall results. Furthermore, because the subject MEP was usually answering a question on their own speech, it can be reasonably assumed that the smaller contributions would have the same topic and overall communicative purpose as their main speech. Table 8.2 shows the populist scores per subject-MEP per speech, followed by the rounded score. It then shows the number of active metaphors found per speech and the number of words per speech.

Table 8.2. Data retrieved from the EUP sub-corpora					
Name	**Date**	**Pop Score**	**Rounded**	**Mets**	**Words**
Farage	2/7/14	0.8	1	4	991
Farage	15/7/14	0.8	1	1	936
Farage	16/9/14	0.0	0	2	403
Farage	21/10/14	0.2	0	1	543
Farage	22/10/14	0.4	0	0	428
Farage	16/12/14	0.1	0	1	789
Farage	17/12/14	0.1	0	0	162
Farage	12/1/15	0.3	0	0	393
Farage	13/1/15	0.3	0	2	447
Farage	11/2/15	0.8	1	2	544
Farage	11/3/15	0.4	0	1	501
Farage	29/4/15	0.5	1	0	663
Farage	20/5/15	0.3	0	0	337
Farage	8/7/15	0.5	1	1	660
Farage	9/9/15	0.2	0	0	334
Farage	17/9/15	0.0	0	0	154
Farage	7/10/15	0.8	1	1	530
Farage	27/10/15	0.8	1	1	596
Farage	2/12/15	0.4	0	2	662
Farage	16/12/15	0.4	0	2	591
Farage	18/1/16	0.4	0	0	536
Farage	19/1/16	0.8	1	0	599
Farage	20/1/16	1.0	1	10	453
Farage	3/2/16	1.0	1	5	668
Farage	24/2/16	1.0	1	3	732
Farage	9/3/16	0.4	0	0	493
Farage	13/4/16	1.2	1	1	615
Farage	8/6/16	1.3	1	4	700
Farage	28/6/16	1.0	1	1	928
Farage	14/9/16	0.5	1	6	674

Farage	26/10/16	1.3	1	5	967
Farage	14/12/16	1.0	1	3	621
Farage	1/2/17	0.4	0	0	676
Farage	13/2/17	0.2	0	0	125
Farage	14/2/17	1.0	1	1	340
Farage	5/4/17	1.4	1	12	1032
Farage	26/4/17	1.4	1	3	410
Farage	17/5/17	0.9	1	5	381
Farage	14/6/17	0.1	0	2	426
Farage	13/9/17	0.8	1	0	313
Farage	3/10/17	1.2	1	0	661
Farage	14/11/17	0.4	0	0	548
Farage	29/11/17	0.1	0	1	492
Farage	13/12/17	1.0	1	1	493
Farage	17/1/18	0.8	1	1	510
Farage	28/2/18	0.8	1	2	354
Farage	12/3/18	0.8	1	0	172
Farage	13/3/18	0.9	1	0	339
Farage	18/4/18	0.8	1	1	270
Farage	3/5/18	0.4	0	2	715
Farage	29/5/18	1.0	1	0	391
Farage	3/7/18	1.3	1	1	780
Farage	11/9/18	0.8	1	5	386
Farage	12/9/18	0.4	0	0	590
Farage	2/10/18	0.9	1	8	548
Farage	24/10/18	0.9	1	1	577
Farage	13/11/18	1.0	1	2	429
Farage	29/11/18	1.0	1	0	455
Farage	16/1/19	1.2	1	3	509
Farage	30/1/19	0.6	1	0	547
Farage	13/3/19	0.8	1	1	492
Farage	27/3/19	1.0	1	4	566
Farage	16/4/19	0.6	1	6	764
				121	33941
Fox	16/7/14	0.0	0	0	91
Fox	16/9/14	0.0	0	1	365
Fox	12/11/14	0.2	0	0	59
Fox	16/12/14	0.3	0	0	400
Fox	25/2/15	0.0	0	0	174
Fox	11/3/15	0.0	0	0	315
Fox	9/6/15	0.0	0	0	362
Fox	24/6/15	0.0	0	0	39

Fox	7/7/15	0.0	0	0	190
Fox	8/7/15	0.5	1	0	209
Fox	9/7/15	0.0	0	0	103
Fox	16/9/15	0.0	0	0	159
Fox	17/9/15	0.4	0	1	125
Fox	27/10/15	0.0	0	0	278
Fox	28/10/15	0.0	0	0	101
Fox	11/11/15	0.0	0	0	200
Fox	24/11/15	0.3	0	0	830
Fox	2/2/16	0.1	0	0	277
Fox	24/2/16	0.1	0	0	610
Fox	25/5/16	0.0	0	0	355
Fox	7/6/16	0.0	0	0	232
Fox	23/6/16	0.0	0	0	171
Fox	4/7/16	0.0	0	0	316
Fox	6/7/16	0.0	0	0	458
Fox	25/10/16	0.0	0	0	179
Fox	21/11/16	0.0	0	0	306
Fox	23/11/16	0.0	0	0	237
Fox	18/1/17	0.0	0	0	79
Fox	14/2/17	0.4	0	0	210
Fox	5/4/17	0.0	0	0	322
Fox	17/5/17	0.0	0	0	180
Fox	13/6/17	0.0	0	0	249
Fox	5/7/17	0.0	0	1	263
Fox	6/7/17	0.0	0	0	92
Fox	13/3/18	0.0	0	0	126
Fox	14/3/18	0.0	0	0	191
Fox	29/5/18	0.0	0	0	86
Fox	31/5/18	0.0	0	0	87
Fox	30/1/19	0.0	0	0	524
Fox	11/2/19	0.0	0	1	602
Fox	4/4/19	0.4	0	0	174
				4	10326
García	15/7/14	0.0	0	0	425
García	16/9/14	0.0	0	0	165
García	21/10/14	0.0	0	0	178
García	22/10/14	0.1	0	0	239
García	12/11/14	0.4	0	0	163
García	25/11/14	0.0	0	0	656
García	26/11/14	0.2	0	1	193
García	17/12/14	0.1	0	0	208

García	13/1/15	0.0	0	1	361
García	14/1/15	0.0	0	0	393
García	10/2/15	0.0	0	0	792
García	28/4/15	0.0	0	0	420
García	29/4/15	0.0	0	0	141
García	19/5/15	0.0	0	0	174
García	27/5/15	0.0	0	0	247
García	9/6/15	0.0	0	3	155
García	8/7/15	0.0	0	2	260
García	9/9/15	0.0	0	1	173
García	7/10/15	0.0	0	1	89
García	27/10/15	0.0	0	0	161
				9	5593
Iglesias	1/7/14	1.5	2	15	1116
Iglesias	2/7/14	0.0	0	0	36
Iglesias	16/7/14	0.5	1	0	248
Iglesias	15/9/14	0.5	1	1	208
Iglesias	16/9/14	0.4	0	1	181
Iglesias	17/9/14	0.4	0	0	343
Iglesias	22/10/14	0.0	0	1	183
Iglesias	12/11/14	0.4	0	2	159
Iglesias	27/11/14	0.5	1	0	152
Iglesias	16/12/14	0.0	0	0	26
Iglesias	17/12/14	0.3	0	1	170
Iglesias	14/1/15	0.3	0	0	303
Iglesias	11/2/15	0.4	0	0	223
Iglesias	12/3/15	0.2	0	3	167
Iglesias	27/4/15	0.4	0	0	111
Iglesias	19/5/15	0.4	0	0	273
Iglesias	9/6/15	0.5	1	2	159
Iglesias	8/7/15	1.5	2	1	232
Iglesias	6/10/15	0.2	0	1	294
Iglesias	27/10/15	1.5	2	3	633
				31	5217

I have not been able to compare my results against other coders' results and carry out an intercoder reliability check. However, the coding for these EUP sub-corpora was carried out after the coding of the US sub-corpora, which successfully passed intercoder and intracoder reliability tests. Team Populism affirm that coding may be carried out by a single coder when necessary (Hawkins & Silva, 2019, p. 32). Moreover, I carried out an intracoder reliability test on approximately 25% of the EUP sub-corpora, roughly 3, 600

words per speaker, with speeches chosen randomly. A Krippendorff's alpha (ordinal) value of α = 0.77 was obtained for the raw populist scores, and a score of α = 0.75 for the rounded data. While a value of α ≥ .800 is the accepted threshold of reliability, Krippendorff emphasises that this threshold depends on "the costs of drawing invalid conclusions" and that tentative conclusions are still valid between α ≤ .800 and α ≥ .667 (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 429). Therefore, my coding of rates of populism is approaching a high level of reliability and are adequate for making tentative conclusions.

A Kruskal-Wallis H test was run to determine if there were differences in populism scores between four groups of speeches (grouped by speaker) showing different rates of populism: Farage's speeches (n = 63), Fox's speeches (n = 41), Iglesias's speeches (n = 20) and García's speeches (n = 20). Distributions of populist scores were not similar for all speakers, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. The distributions of populist scores were statistically significantly different between speakers, $\chi^2(3)$ = 85.431, p = .000. Note, a p value of .000 indicates that p < .0005 (Laerd Statistics, 2015, p. 14). This indicates that the differences in populism scores among speakers is highly significant.

A Kruskal-Wallis H test is an "omnibus test", i.e., it tells us that there is a statistically significant difference among the speakers but does not specify where that statistical significance lies. Therefore, pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in populism scores between the Farage and Fox (p = .000), Farage and García (p = .000), but not Farage and Iglesias (p = .455). Similarly, significant difference was found between Iglesias and Fox (.000), and between Iglesias and García (p = .001). Finally, no significant difference was found between Fox and Garcia (p = 1). In other words, significant differences were found between so-called populists and non-populists, but no significant difference was found between populists, or between non-populists. Fig 8.1 illustrates these findings:

Fig 8.1 Pairwise comparison of populism

Pairwise Comparisons of speech by speaker

Each node shows the
sample average rank of
speech by speaker.

As for metaphor, table 8.3 shows the number of metaphorical utterances tagged in each sub-corpus, the rate of active metaphor use according to the corpus size, and a rate of active metaphor use normalised per 1000 words.

Table 8.3. Rates of active metaphor use in the EUP sub-corpora			
Name	**Metaphors**	**Corpus N.**[46]	**Rate/1k words**
Farage	121	33,941	3.57
Fox	4	10,326	0.39
García	9	5,593	1.61
Iglesias	31	5,217	5.94

An intracoder reliability test was also carried out on metaphor identification, using the same samples tested for intracoder reliability of populism. A Krippendorff's alpha (ratio) value of $\alpha = 0.83$ was obtained, indicating high reliability.

A Kruskal-Wallis H test was run to determine if there were differences in rates of active metaphor use (normalised to 1000 words) between the four groups of speeches. Distributions of active metaphor use were not similar for all speakers, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. The distributions of active metaphor use were statistically

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[46] These numbers represent the corpora after being stripped of interlocutor contributions and metadata.

significantly different between speakers, $\chi^2(3) = 29.958$, p < .001. This indicates that the differences in active metaphor use among speakers is highly significant.

Post-hoc analysis using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons revealed statistically significant differences between Farage and Fox (p = .000), but not between Farage and Iglesias (p =1.000), nor between Farage and García (p = .223). Significant differences were found between Iglesias and Fox (p = .001) but not between Iglesias and García (p = .519). Finally, no significant difference was found between Fox and García (p = .412). These results are illustrated in fig 8.2:

Fig 8.2 Pairwise comparison of metaphor

Pairwise Comparisons of speech by speaker

Fox
47.37

Adj. Sig.
── < 0.05
── >= 0.05

Farage
86.38

Garcia
66.15

Iglesias
86.65

Each node shows the
sample average rank of
speech by speaker.

8.2.2. Discussion of Data

Team Populism provide a framework for interpreting the holistic-grading scores: not populist (0-0.49); somewhat populist (0.5-0.99); populist (1-1.49); very populist (1.5-2) (Lewis et al., 2019).

In order to categorise these speaker's according to Team Populism's framework, we need to generate an overall average score for each speaker. Here, we run into some interesting ambiguities in regard to the applicability of mean averages to ordinal values (see section 7.3.5). In table 8.4, I display both the mean and median averages for each

speaker, generated via the raw data for each speech and via the rounded data for each speech.

Table 8.4. Average rates of populism per speaker				
Name	**Mean (raw)**	**Median (raw)**	**Mean (rounded)**	**Median(rounded)**
Farage	0.696825397	0.8	0.650793651	1
Fox	0.065853659	0	0.024390244	0
García	0.04	0	0	0
Iglesias	0.495	0.4	0.5	0

As can be seen, in most cases there is little or no difference in these results as they would be interpreted according to Team Populism's interpretative framework. However, when it comes to Iglesias, there is indeed a difference. A raw median value of 0.4 would result in a "not populist" interpretation, as would the rounded median score of 0. On the other hand, the mean raw value of 0.495 and the mean rounded score of 0.5, would point to a "somewhat populist" interpretation. While the median values are generally seen as more accurate for ordinal data, I think this is clearly not the case here. The median rounded score of 0 would indicate the absence of populist discourse in Iglesias's speeches, an interpretation which is easily contradicted by further qualitative analysis of the speeches. Given that Team Populism are clear that individual coder's scores are rounded, for the sake of consistency with their method I think it is best to use the mean rounded score of 0.5. In terms of the other subjects, there is no meaningful difference in interpretation, and in terms of Iglesias it allows us to acknowledge the populist content of his speeches while noting the borderline result between "not populist" and "somewhat populist".

The mean average of rounded populist scores (to two decimal places) for each candidate and the corresponding interpretation are given in table 8.5.

Table 8.5. Interpretation of populist scores		
Name	**Mean of rounded scores**	**Interpretation**
Farage	0.65	somewhat populist
Fox	0.02	not populist
García	0.00	not populist
Iglesias	0.50	somewhat populist

My data indicates that two well-known European populists, Nigel Farage and Pablo Iglesias, are only moderately populist. This is itself is an interesting result: it suggests that populism in contemporary Europe, even at its most populist, is only moderately populist in comparison to populism elsewhere.

However, the study is unavoidably limited in its scope: Politicians do not just do politics in parliament, but on television, on radio and online. We can only say that Iglesias and Farage showed a moderate level of populist discourse in the European parliament, 2014-2019.

The comparison studies provide the necessary contrast to place this moderate-populism in context. Both García and Fox show negligible rates of populist discourse. As the main representatives of major centre-left and centre-right domestic parties (García representing the Spanish socialist *PSOE*, Fox representing the British Conservative Party), their low scores suggest that populist discourse, even moderately populist discourse, is not part of mainstream political discourse in the European Parliament. Though this is impossible to say for certain without a wider study incorporating more MEPs, it suggests why a moderate populist might be considered more populist by fellow MEPs and the media. In such a context, a moderate level of populism was sufficient for these politicians to achieve their goals or, alternatively, that their use of populism was limited by the norms of EU Parliamentary discourse.

As for active metaphor use, the numbers are also revealing. Both Farage and Iglesias show a higher rate of active metaphorical use than the non-populists[47]. In this study, moderate populists generally engage in more active metaphorical framing than their non-populist counterparts. Of course, this does not suggest that there is always a correlation between populism and active metaphor use, nor causation. Indeed, my findings for the US corpora (chapter 9) show that this is not the case. Metaphorical framing can be used for different ideological and discursive purposes and populism can be communicated via other means. Nevertheless, this data leads to some interesting questions for further qualitative analysis: Why do populists in the EU parliament use more active metaphors than their non-populist counterparts? Do they use metaphor differently? If so, how?

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[47] Although the differences between García and the populist speakers in terms of active metaphor use was not proven statistically, I take it as a tentative conclusion based on the normalised frequencies.

8.3. Qualitative Analysis

8.3.1. Farage

In general, Farage's use of the populist frame takes four forms:

    i.   Framing which positions British people against an EU elite.

    ii.   Framing which positions various EU peoples against an EU elite.

    iii.   Framing which positions EU peoples against their pro-EU domestic elite.

    iv.   Framing which positions the British people against a British political elite.

Clearly, these variations of the populist frame are mutually reinforcing. However, Farage's focus is mostly on frame (i): When Farage opposes the sovereign people of Hungary against an anti-democratic EU, or he talks of British politicians betraying Brexit, he is making a wider point in regard to the corruption of the European Union and the struggle of the British people against them. For all these frame variations, he uses active metaphorical utterances to communicate the populist frame. First, I will examine how active metaphorical utterances, grouped under a similar thematic category, politics-as-religion, can be used to communicate these four variations. By doing so, I will show how a pragmatic theory of online metaphor interpretation can explain the different metaphorical effects of thematically similar metaphorical utterances. In other methods, the metaphorical effects of these utterances would often be explained and categorised according to a conventional metaphorical concept, POLITICS IS RELIGION, and so the differences between these utterances would be lost. We need a pragmatic theory of metaphor interpretation in order to analyse the metaphorical effects of metaphorical utterances.

8.3.1.1. The Politics-as-Religion Theme

Consider the utterance of (1):

(1)   [Strasbourg, 14/09/2016. Farage says:] If you were to think of this building as a temple, Mr Verhofstadt is the high priest, a fanatic. In fact, there is only one real nationalist in the room and it is you, Mr Verhofstadt, because you want flags, anthems and armies. You are an EU nationalist, and I frankly think that this appointment amounts to pretty much a declaration of war on any sensible

negotiating process. If you stick to the dogma of saying that for reciprocal tariff-free access to the single market we must maintain the free movement of people, then you will inevitably drive us towards no deal – no deal on trading under WTO rules for the United Kingdom, which is actually not too bad because it is very much better and cheaper than the current deal we have got.

This a good example of an extended active metaphor. Farage explicitly asks his audience to consider the European Parliament building in Strasbourg as a temple. It is not conventional to describe a parliament building as a temple (contextual abnormality) and it is clear that a source concept TEMPLE is being used to describe a target concept STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING (conceptual contrast). According to pragmatic IT, a metaphorical mechanism for the interpretation of active metaphorical utterances will be triggered in a competent hearer, mapping structural constraints (S) and terms (V) from the source concept TEMPLE to the target domain STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING. This is a process of online ad hoc concept construction, not a permanent or semi-permanent structure in long-term memory. The metaphorical mechanism results in a provisional metaphorical concept STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING AS TEMPLE. Succeeding utterances can be dependent on this metaphorical context for the interpretation of speaker's meaning. Thus in (1) I find two potential active metaphorical utterances interpreted via STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING, using pragmatic IT's identification criteria and the corpus methodology outlined in chapter 6:

(1a)   If you were to think of this building as a temple

(1b)   Mr Verhofstadt is the high priest

We could consider (1a) and (1b) to be separate metaphorical mappings. However, to borrow a metaphor from Max Black (1954-5, p. 290), this is rather like emphasising the overtones of a musical chord. There might be benefits to this kind of analysis, but we lose perspective of the proper relationships, the harmonics, between the utterances in discourse. For this reason, in qualitative analysis I consider (1b) to be a sub-metaphor of the metaphorical mapping STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING AS TEMPLE which is initiated by metaphorical utterance (1a). I analyse a metaphorical concept which is supported and firmly rooted in the linguistic evidence, while recognizing that there is not always a one-to-one relationship between metaphorical concept and metaphorical utterance.

Looking at (1) again there are other terms which might be interpreted as coming from the source domain.

(1c)　　[Mr Verhofstadt is] a fanatic

(1d)　　If you stick to the dogma of saying that…

Taken as independent, individual, context-free metaphorical expressions, we would have to conclude that (1c) and (1d) are conventional. Both "fanatic" and "dogma" have loose conventional senses which can be applied to the domain of POLITICS and so do not give any evidence of active metaphoricity when taken as decontextualised expressions. It is only in the context of the metaphorical mapping triggered by (1a) that they can be considered active and that we can explain their use in (1). To be more precise, "fanatic" and "dogma" are narrowed concepts, FANATIC* and DOGMA*, which concern religious fanaticism and religious dogmatism, rather than the lexicalised concept which might conventionally refer to political fanaticism and political dogmatism. By narrowing these concepts in the context of (1a), and then using them to describe political fanaticism and political dogmatism, Farage highlights the contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast which are dormant and conventionalised in the lexicalised concepts. In other words, I suggest utterances (1c) and (1d) have been reactivated[48]. This is a feature of extended metaphorical utterances which needs further investigation. Table 8.5 gives a representation of the active metaphor STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING AS TEMPLE.

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[48] However, as they do not satisfy the identification criteria they have not been counted as separate metaphorical utterances for quantitative purposes. Therefore, my data is likely a conservative measurement of the use of active metaphorical utterances.

D_s: TEMPLE	**Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:**	**D_t:** STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING
	[1_s] A temple is a building used for (irrational) religious purposes [2_s] A temple is run by (fanatical) priests [3_s] Priests are directed by a (fanatical) high priest [4_s] A temple is dedicated to a pagan deity, deities, or pagan religious system [5_s] A temple is a site where followers of the religion come to take part in (irrational) rituals [6_s] A religion has certain dogma which believers must unquestioningly accept	

Table 8.6. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (1)[49]

Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M):
STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING AS TEMPLE

[1_t^M] The EU parliament is used for irrational purposes (new, introduced by [1_s])
[2_t^M] The moving of parliament to Strasbourg is irrational (strengthened by [1_s])
[3_t^M] The EU parliament is irrationally dedicated to European political integration (new, introduced by [4_s])
[4_t^M] The EU parliament is run by MEPs who are irrationally dedicated to EU integration (new, introduced by [2_s])
[5_t^M] MEPs are directed by Guy Verhofstadt who is irrationally dedicated to EU integration (new, introduced by [3_s])
[6_t^M] The EU parliament is where MEPs take part in irrational rituals (new, coming from [5_s])
[7_t^M] EU elites dictate Brexit negotiation policies which European MEPs unquestioningly accept (new, introduced by [6_s])

I have posited an ad hoc metaphorical concept STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING AS TEMPLE. Both STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING and TEMPLE have metonymic relationships to their domains of social activity, i.e., EU POLITICS and RELIGION respectively. In the target domain, we would have constraints concerning the physical buildings but also some related cultural and political practices. This metonymic relationship facilitates further alignment between target domain and source domain.

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[49] This is a simplified form of the metaphor tables exemplified in chapters 4 and 7. In chapters 8 and 9, I only include the source domain constraints involved in the mapping, and the restructured target domain. Target domain constraints and the sets of vocabulary can be inferred from the restructured target domain. The purpose of simplifying these tables is to facilitate reading and comprehension of the argument and to avoid overwhelming the reader with technical details.

By introducing his metaphor by mapping, the physical structures rather than just the institutions themselves, Farage can highlight aspects of irrationality in his conceptions of the source and target concepts. Thus, in $[1_t^M]$, a new constraint is introduced by $[1_s]$; The irrationality of religious activity at a temple becomes the irrationality of politics in the EU parliament. Although there is nothing inherently irrational about the lexicalised concept of RELIGION, this is an attribute of Farage's conceptualisation of RELIGION in (1). The word "temple" is generally used for non-Abrahamic religions[50]; Farage could have used "church", "synagogue" or "mosque" and metaphorical mapping would have been quite different. "Temple" is generally used for othered religions; ancient religions, pagan religions, exotic religions. His use of "high-priest", "fanatic" and "dogma" all highlight these othered and irrational aspects of his conceptualisation of RELIGION here. Similarly, by referencing the parliament building in Strasbourg, Farage strengthens the constraint that he and other MEPs often criticise the movement of parliament between Brussels and Strasbourg as irrational ($[2_t^M]$). Indeed, the Strasbourg parliament is often singled out by Eurosceptics as a symbol of EU waste and irrational bureaucracy. Coherence and relevance are inferential requirements for metaphorical mappings (Romero & Soria, 2014). The irrational beliefs and rituals of othered religions map neatly onto the supposedly irrational politics, people, and traditions of the European Parliament as a whole ($[3_t^M]$, $[4_t^M]$, $[5_t^M]$, $[6_t^M]$, $[7_t^M]$).

There is nothing inevitable about a populist interpretation of (1a), if taken in isolation. STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT AS A TEMPLE might be interpreted as saying that the European parliament is sacred, where devoted politicians serve the higher purpose of democracy. In uttering (1b)-(1d), Farage is both working from the metaphorical context established in (1a) and adding to that metaphorical context, negating some potential interpretations and making his own intended meaning more explicit. Each metaphorical utterance inherits the metaphorical context of the utterance which precedes it and contributes to that context. Utterances are dialogical events:

> The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical
> moment in a social specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands
> of living dialogical threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the

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[50] "Temple" can be used in Judaism and Mormonism in reference or in comparison to the ancient Temple of Jerusalem. Even though these are Abrahamic religions, they have often been othered by mainstream (Nicene) Christians as practicing human sacrifice in their temples.

given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. After all, the utterance arises out of this dialogue as a continuation and as a rejoinder to it—it does not approach the object from the sidelines. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 276-7)

My representation of STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT BUILDING AS TEMPLE in table 8.5 is, by necessity, an artificially static representation of a process that is quite dynamic: a cognitive structure that emerges out of discourse, rather than a cognitive structure that underlies it.

As an act of ideological decontestation, this metaphorical utterance clearly depicts the EU as attacking most, if not all, of the core concepts of liberalism: LIBERTY, DEVELOPMENT, INDIVIDUALISM, RATIONALITY, THE GENERAL INTEREST, SOCIABILITY and RULE-LIMITED GOVERNMENT (Freeden, 1996, p. 230). The dogmatic policy of European integration does not permit individual states and individual voters to develop in their own way, to choose their own destiny. The religion does not operate by rationality but by irrational devotion. The general interest is subordinated to that EU integration. Sociability and rule-limited government is replaced by a dogmatic religious hierarchy. In this way, the metaphor depicts the EU as attacking the ideological foundations of contemporary liberal society.

Moreover, the metaphor does ideological work by performing conservative and nationalistic decontestations of these liberal concepts: the EU frustrates the development of the nation-state and thus the individual, the primary identity by which an individual achieves liberty and development in nationalist ideology. Supra-national political institutions are precluded from being democratic because they cannot represent the individual. The otherness and irrationality of the pagan religion in the source concept evokes a certain conservative-nationalist, xenophobic conception of LIBERTY which has become particularly prevalent in far-right European ideology: the freedom of a Christian nation to exist and guard itself from being weakened by non-Christian (non-white) socio-religious identities.

In CMT this entire passage would presumably be taken as evidence for fixed conventional mappings in our conceptual system; perhaps POLITICS IS RELIGION, perhaps IDEAS ARE BUILDINGS, perhaps a confluence of these and more. Though this might be so, such abstract metaphorical concepts are not fully explanatory of how a hearer can interpret (1). Furthermore, as we abstract away from the language, the analyst's choice of how to

express the fixed metaphorical concept becomes more arbitrary, the ontological claim of such fixed structures existing in the brain becomes more dubious and more difficult to defend on the basis of the language observed. For this reason, in pragmatic IT, I stay as close to the metaphorical utterance as possible. A more static conceptual metaphor of RELIGION IS POLITICS cannot explain how we interpret the subtleties of active metaphorical utterances. After all, Farage did not say "if you were to think of this parliament as a religion…".

Another example of how Farage used the politics-as-religion metaphor theme can be seen in (2). The European Parliament had just been addressed by the Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orbán. Orbán, increasingly turning to far-right politics and anti-EU tactics in Hungary, had refused to accept the EU's migrant quota system championed by Angela Merkel.

(2)   [Brussels, 26/04/2017. Farage says:] You spoke today and you behaved today as the leader of a nation, but is it not becoming obvious that, as a member of the European Union, you are actually not a nation? Just as we are seeing in France at the moment, with huge interference in the French presidential election, even with the unelected Commission now coming out and backing this godlike creature called Macron. No, you are not the leader of a nation, and these people will go on interfering in the lives of Hungarian people, and you will never be forgiven. You are a sinner in their eyes, not just because you want to close down George Soros' propaganda machine that masquerades as a university – nothing to do with that. It is because you will not pay the price for Ms Merkel's supreme folly and sign up to migrant quotas, and they will never, ever forgive you for it. Surely, since you yourself have said in the past that we need to get rid of a utopia called supranational Europe, it must become clear to you [. . .] Institutions like this are led by fanatics. They are turning this into a state, and the nation state cannot coexist alongside.

The potentially active metaphorical utterances I find here are:

(2a)   the unelected Commission [is] now coming out and backing this godlike creature called Macron

(2b)   You are a sinner in their eyes

(2c)   they will never, ever forgive you for it

(2d)   Institutions like this are led by fanatics

Here a similar metaphorical mapping to that in (1) is constructed, but it is not exactly the same. For starters we have the depiction of the "godlike creature" Macron. I will ignore this for now but will come back to it. The main focus of this section of the speech is (2b), describing Orbán metaphorically as a sinner, the metaphorical context in which the utterance as a whole can be interpreted.

(2b) triggers the metaphorical process: "sinner" is not conventionally used to refer to politicians (contextual abnormality) and it is clearly being used to describe the politician Victor Orbán (conceptual contrast). The mapping from source concept SINNER to target concept VICTOR ORBÁN is triggered. However, Farage is metarepresenting this metaphorical description of Orbán. Metaphor combines with irony to convey the meaning intended by the populist speaker. The metaphorical conceptualisation involved in this utterance (VICTOR ORBÁN AS SINNER) contributes to Farage's populist opposition (ii), by attributing to the elites the conceptualisation of the democratically elected representatives of the noble people as sinners. Victor Orbán, the rightful representative of noble Hungarian people, is seen as a sinner for disagreeing with the EU's refugee policy, but just "in their [the elite's] eyes". With this expression, Farage is making it clear that this is a metaphorical thought he does not endorse, it is ironic. Following the echoic account by Wilson and Sperber (2012a, pp. 128-129), we can identify Farage's utterance as ironic since his primary intention is not to assert that Victor Orbán is not the democratically elected Hungarian leader. Rather, he is conveying his negative attitude or reaction to the alleged fact that European authorities are "interfering in the lives of Hungarian people" and, by doing this, Victor Orbán is being unjustly treated as a sinner.

SINNER is a particularly Christian concept and indicates a Christian conception of religion. Though ambiguous, EU elites are clearly those who can judge and forgive sin. The utterances "you will never be forgiven" and "they will never, ever, forgive you for it" were not counted as metaphorical utterances in quantitative analysis, as they do not satisfy the identification criteria. However, the object of "forgive" and "forgiven" is the metaphorical sin. I would argue that this is a narrow conceptualization of FORGIVE supposed to be interpreted as the institutional forgiveness imparted by an official of an organised religion. This is strengthened by the utterance "Institutions like this are led by fanatics". As in (1), "fanatics" is imbued with a religious significance it might not have had outside the metaphorical context: EU elites are fanatical in the quasi-religious belief in a supra-national

Europe. They condemn Orbán as a sinner for committing the sin of rejecting their migrant quotas.

Going back to utterance (2a), the strict requirements of analysis once again meet the fuzzy boundaries of discourse: since (2a) precedes the triggering of the metaphorical mechanism in (2b), it makes sense to treat it as a separate metaphorical concept MACRON AS GODLIKE CREATURE. However, I would also argue that this, being an active metaphor which draws on the domain of RELIGION and would have to have some contextual influence on the mapping of VICTOR ORBÁN AS A SINNER. Both metaphorical concepts are used ironically to metarepresent the views of European elites and express Farage's tacit dissociation from these views. The contrast between how EU elites view the ingroup entity, Macron, and the outgroup entity, Orbán, is part of this tacit dissociation. Contrasting these two metaphors, a highly ad hoc depiction of EU elites emerges. A priestly class who are fanatical in their belief in a supranational EU; who assume the authority to judge and forgive sinners; who are somehow Christian yet can worship a Godlike creature. Taking these "living dialogical threads" of the utterance into account, table 8.7 represents the metaphorical concept EMMANUEL MACRON AS GODLIKE CREATURE and table 8.8 represents VICTOR ORBÁN AS SINNER:

Table 8.7. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (2a)		
D_s: GODLIKE CREATURE	**Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:**	**D_t:** EMMANUEL MACRON
	[1_s] A creature who has the divine moral and mental attributes of a god such as wisdom, moral purity etc. [2_s] Godlike creatures are worshipped by believers [3_s] Godlike creatures favour their believers over others	
Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M): EMMANUEL MACRON AS GODLIKE CREATURE		
[1_t^M] Macron is wise and morally pure (new, introduced by [1_s]) [2_t^M] Macron is loved by the European commission (new, introduced by [2_s]) [3_t^M] Macron is pro-EU (strengthened by [3_s])		

Table 8.8. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (2b)		
D$_s$: SINNER	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** VICTOR ORBÁN
	[1$_s$] A sinner is someone who breaks a Christian moral law [2$_s$] A sinner is subject to judgment and punishment by the church and by God [3$_s$] A sinner can be forgiven by the church and by God if he asks for forgiveness and accepts the church's and God's authority	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): VICTOR ORBÁN AS SINNER		
[1$_t^M$] Orbán is someone who broke the European Union deal on migrant quotas (strengthened by [1$_s$]) [2$_t^M$] Orbán is subject to judgment and punishment by EU institutions (new, introduced by [2$_s$]) [3$_t^M$] Orbán can be forgiven by EU authorities even if he asks for forgiveness and accepts the European Union's supranational state (new, introduced by [3$_s$] but explicitly negated in the utterance of 2)		

In (2a), the metaphor strengthens the constraint that Macron is pro-EU, while introducing constraints of wisdom and moral purity ([1$_t^M$]) and the support he receives from the EU commission ([3$_t^M$]).

In (2b), the conceptualization of the target concept VICTOR ORBÁN is a complex conceptualization of him as a democratically chosen leader heroically confronting a corrupt European Union which is "interfering in the lives of Hungarian people". The fact that the target domain constraints which express these qualities are neither coherent nor relevant, and are therefore dropped from the restructured target domain, is important. The contrast between Orbán as democratic leader in the target concept, and the downplaying of those aspects in the restructured target domain is precisely the point: Farage is pointing out how unfair and undemocratic it is to view Orbán in such a way. Ideologically, like (1), it presents the EU as attacking the core concepts of liberalism and performs a nationalist decontestation in which the very idea of supranational democracy is a contradiction.

Constraint [1$_t^M$] expresses the reason that Orbán is considered a sinner by EU elites by strengthening the constraint that he was refusing EU migrant quotas and [2$_t^M$] expresses the consequences of judgment and punishment. More interestingly, constraint [3$_t^M$] is strengthened in the restructured target domain only to be negated in the utterance of (2). This kind of strengthening and negation of constraints has been observed in active

metaphor before, as contributing to the argument structure of an utterance (Romero & Soria, forthcoming). Here, it may also contribute to tacit dissociation involved in irony; the EU elites view Orbán as a sinner, but this view is undermined because they do not offer forgiveness.

All of this is cognitive content which we can partially recover through a pragmatic analysis of metaphorical utterances. A static conventional metaphorical concept like POLITICIAN IS A SINNER or POLITICS IS RELIGION cannot explain how we reach speaker's meaning of (2a) and (2b) without explaining how such mapping of lexicalised concepts are adjusted in utterances. If there is fixed metaphorical concept MAN IS GOD, it does not explain how an utterance of (2a) is interpreted. An utterance of "that godlike creature Brad Pitt" would result in a very different mapping of godlike attributes than (2a).

Another active metaphor using the politics-as-religion theme can be seen in (3) when Farage addresses the guest speaker Leo Varadkar, the *Taoiseach* [prime minister] of the Republic of Ireland:

(3)   [Strasbourg, 17/01/2018. Farage says:] You, of course, worked here as a young man; you're a devotee. In fact, we should call you, I think, a European Unionist – whatever the cost to Ireland may be.

Though "devotee" is general enough not to trigger contextual abnormality here, those who are familiar with Farage's frequent metaphors of European elites as fanatic followers of a religion might interpret it in that context. Nevertheless, I do not count it as metaphorical in my data.

An ad hoc metaphorical concept is clearly present in noun phrase "European Unionist" – there is a contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast in this adjective-noun combination. "Unionist" in an Irish context conventionally refers to Northern-Irish Unionists who politically identify themselves as British and wish Northern-Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. This contextual abnormality is heightened by the fact that he is describing the leader of the Irish Republic, in many ways the antithesis of Northern Irish Unionism. The conceptual contrast is indicated by describing Varadkar as a devotee to Europe: pro-Europeans are to Europe as Northern-Irish Unionists are to Britain. We can analyse the metaphor as PRO-EU IRISH AS ULSTER UNIONIST and the mapping is presented in table 8.9:

Table 8.9. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (3)		
D$_s$: ULSTER UNIONISTS	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** PRO-EU IRISH PEOPLE
	[1$_s$] Ulster Unionists identify as British by nationality [2$_s$] Ulster Unionists want Northern-Ireland to be a devolved state within the United Kingdom [3$_s$] Ulster Unionism conflicts with Irish nationalism [4$_s$] Ulster Unionists follow the Protestant religion	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): PRO-EU IRISH PEOPLE AS ULSTER UNIONISTS		
[1$_t^M$] Pro-EU Irish people identify as European by nationality (strengthened by [1$_s$]) [2$_t^M$] Pro-EU Irish people want Ireland to be a devolved state within the European Union (new, introduced by [2s]) [3$_t^M$] Irish pro-Europeanism conflicts with Irish nationalism (new, introduced by [3$_s$]) [4$_t^M$] Pro-EU Irish people believe in EU political integration (new, introduced by [4$_s$])		

[1$_t^M$] describes the pro-European Irish person as identifying their nationality as European rather than Irish. [2$_t^M$] aligns the relationship between Northern-Ireland and the United Kingdom, a relationship between devolved state and national state, to that of the Republic of Ireland and the European Union, a relationship between a national state and a supranational organisation. Furthermore, there is a sense of betrayal communicated, underlined by Farage's "whatever the cost to Ireland might be". A pro-European Irish person cannot really believe in a sovereign Irish republic ([3$_t^M$]). By attributing this ad hoc metaphorical concept to Varadkar, he is then a type of traitor, an Irish elite subservient to a foreign government and devoted to their foreign "religion" of political integration ([4$_t^M$]). Again, it is an ideological decontestation of liberal concepts of democracy itself, that it can only function, and should only function, at the level of the nation-state. Moreover, as in (1), there are possibly some nationalist-xenophobic aspects to this utterance: Varadkar's father was Indian and the implicit accusation that Varadkar is not really Irish is likely to have xenophobic resonance with some audiences.

The metaphorical mappings I have discussed in this section are examples of how Farage uses the politics-as-religion metaphor theme to construct three of the four variations of the populist frame:

(i)   STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT AS TEMPLE presents European elite as part of a fanatical pagan cult, and their negotiation policies concerning Brexit as irrational dogma (for Farage, Brexit represents the unified will of the British people).

(ii)   MACRON AS GODLIKE CREATURE and ORBÁN AS SINNER are metaphors which ironically metarepresent the views of a more Christian fanatical European elite. Macron, the pro-European, is viewed as a God. Orbán, a democratically elected leader of a unified European people, is viewed as a sinner for rejecting EU policy.

(iii)   PRO-EUROPEAN IRISH AS ULSTER UNIONIST uses a highly ad hoc source domain to describe the leader of the Irish Republic as devoted to a foreign power, and therefore, as a traitor to the Irish people.

In this section, I have discussed active metaphorical utterances which are dependent on these online metaphorical mappings for their interpretation. Besides the examples discussed in detail here, my corpus also includes active metaphorical utterances such as:

(4)   [Strasbourg, 14/02/2017. Farage says:] Mr President, I feel like I am attending a meeting of a religious sect here this morning. It is as if the global revolution of 2016 – Brexit, Trump, the Italian rejection of the referendum – has completely bypassed you.

(5)   [Brussels, 28/02/2018. Farage says:] And it is the same story in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán quite rightly refuses to accept your ludicrous migrant quota programme and he is now cast as the devil.

(6)   [Strasbourg, 26/10/2016. Farage says:] The only obstacle appears to be the high priests of Euro-federalism in this room today.

It can be claimed that all of these are based on a fixed metaphorical mapping which is conventional to our conceptual system, POLITICS IS RELIGION. However, this conventional metaphor alone cannot explain how such non-conventional metaphorical utterances are understood in context. There is no pre-existing conventional metaphorical concept

EUROPEAN UNIONIST, nor does it fit neatly into a mapping between RELIGION and POLITICS but is rather a mapping between one culture-specific socio-political identity and another. Finally, POLITICS IS A RELIGION alone cannot explain the variation on that theme which Farage uses to construct different versions of the populist frame.

All of these metaphors share an ideological function of decontesting liberal concepts, particularly a nationalist decontestation of the relationship between the individual, the nation-state, and the supranational EU. Active metaphorical utterances are used by Farage to communicate different populist framings of political life, adapted to the context of the utterance. Through these frames, these active metaphorical utterances, and the novel metaphorical concepts which emerge in discourse, can perform the ideological act of decontestation. In other words, novel metaphorical concepts become the new context of interpretation of the speaker's active metaphorical utterance, and this new conceptualisation may be essential to the decontestation of some political concept in support of an ideological position in the way intended by the speaker.

8.3.1.2. The Brexit-as-War Theme

Variations on the politics-as-religion theme were used to communicate the populist frames (i) – (iii), but what about frame variation (iv), British people versus the British elite? In my corpus, British elite entities are often depicted as weak, ineffective or even treacherous through war metaphors. Utterance (7) gives one such example. Farage is discussing the division, indecision and delays in the British parliament's approach to negotiations with the EU:

(7)   [Strasbourg, 26/10/2016. Farage says:] Frankly, the whole thing is a disgrace. It is even worse that it is supported by quislings in the British Parliament – people like Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband, who are desperate to keep Britain inside this awful single market. Well, I am sorry but it simply isn't going to happen.

The metaphorical utterance is:

(7a)   It is even worse that it is supported by quislings in the British Parliament – people like Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband

"Quisling" originates as a reference to Vidkun Quisling, a Norwegian military officer and politician who collaborated with the Nazis during WWII. In contemporary

English, that comparison has become somewhat obscured and it has acquired the meaning "a person who helps an enemy that has taken control of his or her country" (Cambridge University Press, n.d.-e).

Nick Clegg is a British politician who led the Liberal Democrat party into a coalition government with the Conservative party and served as that government's Deputy Prime Minister under David Cameron, 2010-2015. Ed Miliband was leader of the British Labour Party and Leader of the Opposition from 2010-2015. Post Brexit-referendum, Both Clegg and Miliband reluctantly supported a soft-Brexit i.e., keeping Britain within the European single-market in exchange for following EU rules on issues like state aid. To hardcore Brexiteers such as Farage and the more right-wing elements of the Conservative party, the concessions this would require were unacceptable and they favoured a hard-Brexit—leaving the single market with or without a trade deal in place.

Although the British public had not voted explicitly for a soft or hard Brexit, the Brexiteers began to depict anything less than a hard-Brexit as a betrayal of the British people. Farage's utterance (7a) uses QUISLING as a source domain to describe the target domain—politicians in favour of a soft-Brexit, of which Clegg and Miliband are examples.

Table 8.10. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (7)		
D$_s$: QUISLINGS	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** PRO-SOFT BREXIT POLITICIANS
	[1$_s$] Someone who helps a foreign occupying power take control of their country [2$_s$] Someone who works against the interests of their own people	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): PRO-SOFT BREXIT POLITICIANS AS QUISLINGS		
[1$_t^M$] Pro-soft Brexit politicians are working with EU powers to control Britain (new, introduced by [1s]) [2$_t^M$] Pro-soft Brexit politicians are working against the interests of the British people (new, introduced by [2$_s$])		

In the target domain, arguments that the British Brexit referendum did not imply a mandate to leave the single market are suppressed. [1$_s$] introduces constraint [1$_t^M$], that pro-soft-Brexit politicians are working with the EU to undermine British sovereignty. By

working with the EU to usurp British sovereignty, they are working against the interests of the British people and their homogenised will of a hard-Brexit [2_t^M].

Theresa May and her negotiations towards a Withdrawal agreement are also described via the Brexit-as-war metaphor theme:

(8)   [Strasbourg, 16/01/2019. Farage says:] It has been throughout a total failure of leadership. But perhaps more significantly, she hasn't learned or heeded the historical lesson that if you appease bullies, they always come back for more. She has behaved like a leader of a nation defeated in war, and that is why this Withdrawal Agreement looked more like a surrender document and it was smashed to pieces in the House of Commons last night.

The active metaphorical utterances are:

(8a)   She has behaved like a leader of a nation defeated in war
(8b)   this Withdrawal Agreement looked more like a surrender document

Table 8.11. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (8)		
D_s: A LEADER OF A NATION DEFEATED IN WAR	**Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:**	**D_t:** THERESA MAY
	[1_s] A leader who must negotiate surrender with a victorious enemy [2_s] A leader who accepts defeat [3_s] A leader who has no negotiating power because they have lost the war [4_s] A leader who signs a formal document of surrender, accepting the enemy's terms	
Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M): THERESA MAY AS A LEADER OF A NATION DEFEATED IN WAR		
[1_t^M] Theresa May is negotiating badly with a victorious EU (new, introduced by [1_s]) [2_t^M] Theresa May has accepted defeat in negotiations with the EU (new, introduced by [2_s]) [3_t^M] Theresa May has no negotiating power because she has lost against the EU (new, coming from [3_s]) [4_t^M] Theresa May has formally agreed to a withdrawal document, accepting the EU's terms (new, coming from [4_s])		

Constraints [1_s] and [2_s] introduce [1_t^M] and [2_t^M], respectively, claiming that she is negotiating badly with the EU and that she has accepted defeat. In [3_t^M] Farage strengthens the constraint that Theresa May's disadvantage in negotiations is due to her failure and weakens any target domain constraints that Theresa May's weak negotiating position was due to a confluence of international and domestic political factors: it is arguable that Britain would have been in a weaker position than the EU no matter who was Prime Minister, based on geopolitical and economic influence. He weakens the constraint that her weak negotiating position was based on the fragile minority government she was holding together, and the in-fighting within her own party. [4_s] depicts the signing of May's withdrawal agreement as a formal acceptance of the EU's terms. Farage doesn't accept this defeat as he makes very clear in his speech: "We will be even more defiant if we have to fight a second referendum, and we will win it by a bigger majority" (Strasbourg, 16/01/2019).

A similar metaphorical mapping to that in (8) is used in (9):

(9)   [Strasbourg, 27/03/2019. Farage says:] I thought what happened at the summit last week was a national humiliation, an impasse, because we have in Ms May a Prime Minister who hasn't got the courage, who hasn't got the vision, to carry out her many repeated promises: to take us out of the European Union this Friday, 29 March. It is not happening, and we are witnessing a slow-motion betrayal – perhaps the greatest betrayal of any democratic vote in the history of our nation – and the reason, of course, is this Withdrawal Treaty. And I'll go back to the First World War: we won the war, but we had the Treaty of Versailles, and this Treaty is the modern-day equivalent. We have a reparations bill of GBP 39 billion we have to pay for nothing in return. We have the annexation of a part of our national territory in the shape of Northern Ireland. This Treaty is a bad piece. It is unacceptable, it is not Brexit, and it will not pass.

I will ignore the metaphor "slow motion betrayal" as it is the war metaphorical context involved in (9a)–(9c) that is important to this discussion:

(9a)   this Treaty is the modern-day equivalent [of the treaty of Versailles]
(9b)   We have a reparations bill of GBP 39 billion we have to pay for nothing in return

(9c)   We have the annexation of a part of our national territory in the shape of Northern Ireland

The ad hoc metaphorical concept behind these utterances seems clear: WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT (2018) AS TREATY OF VERSAILLES. What Farage means exactly by clauses leading up to (9a) is a little difficult to determine. Presumably "we won the war" is literal and refers to the Fist World War. However, it is not clear why he uses "but" to introduce the clause regarding the Treaty of Versailles. "But" carries a conventional implicature that the treaty of Versailles contrasts with the statement that the British won the war, rather than being consistent with it. This only seems to make sense if we take the metaphorical concept into account and analyse "we won the war" as metaphorical, referring to winning the Brexit referendum. It is ambiguous because the metaphorical context of (9a)–(9c) doesn't become clear until (9a). This points to another grey area between active metaphorical use of language and conventional language (whether literal or metaphorical) in discourse – not all potentially metaphorical language succeeds in communicating its metaphorical meaning. This is not surprising: misunderstandings, ambiguities and repairs are, of course, common in discourse, especially in spoken discourse. However, it does have implications for the quantitative study of metaphor. In this case, I have not counted "we won the war" as a metaphorical utterance.

Regardless of this ambiguity, (9a) is clearly a metaphorical utterance, identifiable by contextual abnormality (the treaty of Versailles in a contemporary context) and conceptual contrast (describing the Brexit withdrawal agreement, 2018).

Table 8.12. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (9)		
D$_s$: TREATY OF VERSAILLES	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT (2018)
	[1$_s$] The Allied Powers required the German government to admit defeat after WWI [2$_s$] The treaty was seen as a humiliation for the German people [3$_s$] The Allied Powers required Germany to pay reparations as a humiliating punishment [4$_s$] The Allied Powers required Germany to relinquish territory	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT (2018) AS TREATY OF VERSAILLES		
[1$_t^M$] The withdrawal agreement is an admission of defeat by Theresa May (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [2$_t^M$] The withdrawal agreement is a humiliation for the British people (new, introduced by [2$_s$]) [3$_t^M$] The withdrawal agreement requires Britain to pay a sum of money as a humiliating punishment for leaving the EU (new, introduced by [3$_s$]) [4$_t^M$] The withdrawal agreement requires Britain to relinquish their territory of Northern Ireland (new, introduced by [4$_s$])		

The metaphor aligns key aspects of the withdrawal agreement to the treaty of Versailles. Constraints [1$_s$] and [2$_s$] introduce new constraints ([1$_t^M$] and [2$_t^M$]) which present May's withdrawal agreement as a humiliating defeat for the UK. The agreement to pay Britain's outstanding debts at the time of departure from the EU is described as a punishment meant to humiliate the UK for leaving ([3$_t^M$] introduced by [3$_s$]). Finally, the "Irish backstop" is an enormously complex agreement under which Britain would ensure that a hard border would not be established between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. For the EU and the Republic of Ireland, this was a way to ensure that Britain could be held to the commitments it had made under the Good Friday agreement and maintain a hard-won peace between Unionists and Republicans in Northern Ireland. For British conservatives, there was a fear that the backstop could be used to lock Britain into regulatory alignment with the EU indefinitely. Farage obscures these complexities by presenting it as a relinquishment of national territory ([4$_t^M$] introduced by [4$_s$]).

This Brexit-as-war metaphor theme was used by Farage to characterise European elites as an occupying or victorious foreign enemy humiliating the British people. Domestic

politicians who are either pro-EU or pro-soft-Brexit are depicted as traitors or surrendering leaders. Utterances (8) and (9) are therefore communicating populist frame variations (i) and (iv) at the same time. Ideologically, like his use of the politics-as-religion theme, Farage uses these utterances to promote the conservative-nationalist decontestation of the relationships between the INDIVIDUAL, the STATE and DEMOCRACY.

Other metaphorical utterances which can be grouped under this use of the theme include:

(10)   [Strasbourg, 15/07/2014. Farage says:] You said at the end of your speech that this is not the time for a revolution. I put it to you that there has already been a revolution. There has effectively been a coup d'état on nation state democracies without people realising, without people realising what was being done to them.

(11)   [Strasbourg, 13/04/2016. Farage says:] So, what we are seeing is the big battalions of vested self-interest doing their best to completely ignore the will of the Dutch people.

(12)   [Strasbourg, 16/09/2014. Farage says:] This EU empire, ever seeking to expand, stated its territorial claim on the Ukraine some years ago.

(13)   [Strasbourg, 4/09/2016. Farage says:] You are an EU nationalist, and I frankly think that this appointment amounts to pretty much a declaration of war on any sensible negotiating process.

There are a number of utterances which might be included in the politics-as-war theme but could form their own theme: the European-Union-as-USSR theme.

Utterances (14)–(16) illustrate this theme:

(14)   [Strasbourg, 08/07/2015. Farage says:] I feel that the continent is now divided from north to south: there is a new Berlin Wall and it is called 'the euro'. The old enmities have been resumed.

(15)   [Strasbourg, 27/10/2015. Farage says:] This is the modern-day implementation of the Brezhnev doctrine.

(16)   [Strasbourg, 11/09/2018. Farage says:] I am sure that for Hungarians of a certain age today will have brought back many dark memories. You're here with a show trial where a bunch of political non-entities get up and point the finger and scream, enjoying themselves with their afternoon hate, and the chief prosecutor, the commissar that comes from the unelected government, has the audacity to lecture you on democracy.

Utterance (14) achieves a very different purpose than those we have looked at so far. Rather than positioning political institutions or politicians according to a populist frame, it describes the Euro currency. EURO CURRENCY AS BERLIN WALL describes a division between northern and southern European countries: The southern countries are presumably East Berlin, disadvantaged and less prosperous, and the northern countries are the more prosperous West Berlin. The euro is the obstacle that keeps them separate.

Utterance (15) describes the relationship between the EU and its member states as that between the USSR and its member states. The Brezhnev doctrine was adopted by the USSR from the 1960s-1980s and stated, "When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries" (Leonid Brezhnev. Quoted in Ouimet, 2003, p. 67). Farage describes the EU as an anti-democratic authoritarian super-state that crushes opposition to its continued expansion and integrationist policies.

Utterance (16) explicitly aligns the European Parliament's meeting with Victor Orbán as a soviet show-trial, MEPs as enthusiastic communist party members and the president of the EU commission as a commissar. The metaphor positions EU politicians as unelected, hypocritical and fanatical elites in a Manichean struggle against a democratically elected representative of a European people.

These metaphorical utterances seem to communicate populist frame variation (ii) EU peoples versus the anti-democratic European Union, while the other utterances in the politics-as-war theme communicated frame variations (i) and (iv). These are important differences that are uncovered by a pragmatic analysis of the differences between metaphorical utterances and would be lost if we analysed them via the conventional conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS WAR. Moreover, the possibility of subcategorising metaphor themes highlights the arbitrary nature of organising utterances by metaphor

theme and the problems in taking such themes as evidence for the existence of a static conventional conceptual metaphors in long-term memory.

8.3.1.3. Other Themes

I have discussed how Farage uses metaphor to describe European entities in terms of fanatical religious followers, an invading, victorious enemy and metaphorically compared to the USSR. Domestic elites have been described as traitors, weakly surrendering or actively working with a foreign power. The metaphorical utterances he uses to do this provoke different metaphorical mappings, but that these utterances and mappings can be grouped together into metaphor themes for the sake of analysis. Nevertheless, utterances of the same theme show important differences. Unlike CMT's conceptual metaphors, positing a metaphor theme does not assume the existence of a static pre-existing mapping in long-term memory.

While it is useful to organise and discuss metaphors by theme, in order to highlight the variation in context of metaphorical utterances and the construction of different populist frames, there are many active metaphors in the corpus which are difficult to group by theme. They are no less useful for constructing the populist frame. In the Farage corpus, the two frame variations which are most common are (i) utterances which oppose the British people and the EU elite, and (ii) utterances which oppose EU peoples against the EU elite, though as we have seen already, utterances can communicate multiple variations of the populist frames at once.

Unsurprisingly, many of the metaphors in the Farage corpus which contribute to frame variation (i) of the populist frame deal with the Brexit referendum. In (17) Farage is speaking in the context of Britain's triggering of article 50 of the European Treaty, i.e., when Britain officially notified the European Union that it would be leaving. The triggering of article 50 was a contentious political and legal issue in the UK, which meant that nine months had passed between the Brexit referendum and the triggering of article 50.

(17)   [Strasbourg, 05/04/2017. Farage says] Mr President, it may have taken nine months – a pretty full gestation – but be in no doubt that last Wednesday was a great historic day when the United Kingdom announced that we were going to become an independent, self-governing, democratic nation once again, an act that has been cheered by hundreds of millions of people all over the world.

The ad hoc metaphorical concept here is PROCESS OF TRIGGERING ARTICLE 50 AS PREGNANCY and is outlined in table 8.13.

Table 8.13. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (17)		
D$_s$: PREGNANCY	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** PROCESS OF TRIGGERING ARTICLE 50
	[1$_s$] There is typically a period of nine months between the conception and birth of a child [2$_s$] Pregnancy is a natural and a necessary process [3$_s$] Pregnancy is physically, emotionally and mentally demanding [4$_s$] Giving birth is painful [5$_s$] The birth of a child is a joyful occasion [6$_s$] The parents should be congratulated [7$_s$] The child will grow up to be strong and independent	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): PROCESS OF TRIGGERING ARTICLE 50 AS PREGNANCY		
[1$_t^M$] There was a period of nine months between the Brexit referendum and the triggering of Article 50 (strengthened by [1$_s$]) [2$_t^M$] The process leading to Article 50 was a natural and a necessary process of the referendum (new, introduced by [2$_s$]) [3$_t^M$] Process leading article 50 was physically, emotionally and mentally demanding (strengthened by [3$_s$]) [4$_t^M$] Triggering Article 50 was a painful occasion (strengthened by [4$_s$]) [5$_t^M$] Triggering Article 50 was a joyful occasion (strengthening by [5$_s$]) [6$_t^M$] Farage and others who are responsible for Brexit should be congratulated (new, introduced by [6$_s$]) [7$_t^M$] Post-Brexit Britain will be economically and politically strong and independent (new, introduced by [7$_s$])		

The metaphor theme which depicts the founding of a nation as giving birth is nothing new, but Farage's ad hoc use of the theme certainly is. The complex target concept is particularly interesting here. Brexit, as a term, is temporally ambiguous: it can refer to Britain pre- and post-Brexit referendum, pre- and post-triggering article 50, pre-and post-leaving the EU. For his reason the source concept of PREGNANCY is so strongly coherent and relevant: It gives order to these different stages in a meaningful way. Through metaphorical utterances, these different stages of birth are exploited to characterise different aspects of the Brexit process. The Brexit referendum is conception, post-referendum Britain is the gestation, triggering article 50 is the birth of Britain as a child, and post-leaving the EU is a strong, independent, grown-up Britain.

The nine-month period between Brexit referendum and the triggering of Article 50 is strengthened ([1$_t^M$]). The evaluative dimension of this restructuring is important. For many "Remainers" the triggering of article 50 was by no means an inevitable outcome of the referendum, and the timing of its triggering was highly controversial. However, as it is reorganised in the restructured target domain, it is a natural and inevitable consequence of the referendum nine months earlier ([2$_t^M$]). Moreover, the metaphor acknowledges that this nine-month process has caused a strain on UK society ([3$_t^M$] and [4$_t^M$]), but that it is ultimately a cause for joy ([5$_t^M$]). Farage and others responsible for bringing about Brexit should be congratulated ([6$_t^M$]). Rather than the pessimistic predictions offered by Remainers, often dismissed by Brexiteers as "Project Fear", Farage predicts a future where Britain will grow to be strong and independent ([7$_t^M$]).

A far more direct attempt to communicate the populist frame is when Farage uses an EU-as-organised-crime metaphor theme. These metaphorical utterances generally position Britain as a victim of violent crime or extorsion. Take, for example, utterances (18), (19) and (20):

(18)   [Strasbourg, 05/04/2017. Farage says:] We believe in national self-determination. Your aim and ambition is to destroy nation state democracy. Gibraltar is clearly a deal-breaker on current terms. With these demands, you have shown yourselves to be vindictive, to be nasty, and all I can say is thank goodness we are leaving. You are behaving like the mafia. You think we are a hostage, we are not, we are free to go, and... I know and I do understand... [Speaker was cut off by president]

In (18) Farage uses the metaphorical simile EU AS MAFIA and the explicit sub-mapping BRITAIN AS HOSTAGE. I do not think it is necessary to outline the full mapping here, as it is quite obvious how the mapping might look and its usefulness in communicating the populist frame. What is interesting is that the president of the parliament cuts Farage off:

[Strasbourg, 05/04/2017. Antonio Tajani, the President of the EU Parliament, says:] On. Farage, io sto garantendo a lei la possibilità di parlare, di dire tutto quello che vuole, però quando si parla di mafia, quando lei dice che il Parlamento si comporta come la mafia, questo per quanto mi riguarda è inaccettabile.

[Mr Farage, I am giving you the opportunity to speak, to say whatever you want, but when you talk about the mafia, when you say that Parliament behaves like the mafia, that is unacceptable as far as I am concerned.]

The president objects to Farage's metaphorical utterance and so Farage changes the source concept to GANGSTERS and extends the metaphor to include a ransom note:

(19) [Strasbourg, 05/04/2017. Farage says:] Mr President, I do understand national sensitivities. I will change it to gangsters. All right? And that is how we are being treated. We are being given a ransom note.

The difference in mappings between MAFIA and GANGSTER are few: MAFIA with its associations of Italian origin, given that the President of Parliament was Italian, would seem to map onto members of his audience with a particularly libellous coherence. GANGSTER keeps much of the desired effect, while avoiding such racially specific attacks. The EU as a whole is positioned as a group of organised criminals, who are attempting to keep Britain (the country) hostage and demanding a ransom from the British people, the settlement sum to be paid by Britain on leaving the EU. These sub-mappings of BRITAIN AS HOSTAGE and SETTLEMENT SUM AS RANSOM are used elsewhere, but as the initial or main metaphorical mapping and where the metaphor of EU AS MAFIA or EU AS GANGSTER is left implicit.

(20) [Strasbourg, 03/10/2017. Farage utters:] But throughout this negotiating process, you have treated us as if we're some kind of a hostage from the start, and unless we pay a ransom, unless we meet all of your demands, then you won't even have an intelligent conversation with us about trade heading on from here.

This is more evidence that a pragmatic analysis of metaphorical language in use is necessary if we want to understand metaphor fully. While we might convincingly posit an underlying conceptual metaphor which underlies all of these examples, perhaps POLITICS IS CRIME, this does not allow us to explain how the utterance of (19) and (20) is deemed acceptable but the utterance of (18) is not.

We could also group the BRITAIN AS HOSTAGE mapping under another metaphor theme present in the corpus, an EU-as-restraint theme. In (21),

(21)   [Strasbourg, 05/04/2017. Farage says:] The ever-charming Mr. Verhofstadt, Parliament's chief negotiator, in his resolution that we are to vote on later today, tells us that we cannot discuss potential trade deals with anybody else in the world until we have left the European Union. That has no basis in Treaty law whatsoever. It is rather like saying you cannot guarantee yourself a dwelling for when you leave prison and I trust the British Government will completely ignore you.

the metaphorical concept is TRADE DEAL AS A DWELLING FOR WHEN YOU LEAVE PRISON. The PRISON in the utterance is obviously mapped onto the EU itself. I analyse this as one complex mapping rather than two independent mappings (TRADE DEAL AS A DWELLING, LEAVING EU AS LEAVING A PRISON) because the mapping of TRADE DEAL AS DWELLING would not result in the same mapping as TRADE DEAL AS A DWELLING FOR WHEN YOU LEAVE PRISON. A dwelling after you leave prison is a short-term necessity, temporary shelter, without which the freed prisoner would have to sleep on the street. That the EU authorities, presumably the jailers, would try to deny the released inmate this is cruel and an abuse of an authority they should not have.

Many different active metaphors communicate the struggle between European peoples in general and European elites:

(22)   [Strasbourg, 02/07/2014. Farage says:] We are the ones who want democracy, we are the ones who want nation states, we are the ones who want a global future for our countries, and do not want to be trapped inside this museum.

Here the European Union is depicted as old or backwards. The metaphorical mapping in itself does not position the EU within a populist frame but Farage uses it to contrast a backwards looking, undemocratic European elite against the democratic, forward-looking Eurosceptic MEPs, the true representatives of democratic nation-states.

(23)   [Strasbourg, 11/02/2015. Farage says:] There is a great game of poker taking place for the future of this currency. On the one hand we have the EU institutions. Now however much my warnings over the years may have upset people, when I said that the EU would crush and kill and destroy nation-state democracy, I think the behaviour by the key players since the Greek elections justifies everything I have said.

In (23), European entities are more clearly positioned as elites in opposition to European peoples. European institutions are depicted as engaged in a game of poker, presumably against nation-states. The game is not just any game of poker, but "a great game", a high-stakes game, and the prize is control over the Euro currency.

In (24), an ad hoc metaphorical concept DEMOCRACY AS A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE is developed through a number of metaphorical utterances.

(24)   [Strasbourg, 20/01/2016. Farage utters:] This EU faces an existential crisis. Indeed, there is an outbreak of a contagious disease. It is not a new one; the Greeks first came across it a couple of thousand years ago [. . .] The diagnosis, by the way, will not be popular in this House: the disease is called democracy. People want to have a say on their future.

Here is another example of how Farage uses metaphor to metarepresent the views of his opponents, an ironic attribution of metaphorical thought that allows him to position his opponents as disdainful and fearful of democratic European peoples (see this thesis, section 7.3.4, for full analysis).

The EU's policies on immigration are also targets. In (25),

(25)   [Brussels, 02/12/2015. Farage says:] Chancellor Merkel took the cork out of a champagne bottle and said anyone could come, and now you are trying to put the cork back in and realising it is not possible.

I analyse the metaphor as IMMIGRATION POLICY AS TAKING CORK OUT OF CHAMPAGNE BOTTLE. The mapping is simple but clear: it depicts EU entities as frivolous and irresponsible in opening Europe to immigration, an action which they now regret.

In this analysis of Farage's use of active metaphorical utterances, several interesting patterns emerge. Firstly, Farage often uses active metaphorical utterances ironically in order to attribute, and tacitly dissociate himself from, thoughts to outgroup entities. Doing this, he can communicate a populist frame by attributing an antagonistic elitist view to the outgroup entity towards ingroup entities. A clear example of this is (2), where the EU are depicted as arrogantly trying to punish a democratically elected leader because he has defied their migrant quotas. By tacitly dissociating himself from these elite thoughts, Farage can position himself as speaking for the pure people. Furthermore, it is a form of

counterframing which gives Farage enormous control on the debate: His opponents might never have held or expressed the view that Farage opposes.

Secondly, we saw how Farage seems to use certain metaphor themes to communicate different populist frames; the politics-as-religion theme seems to be used to describe the Manichean struggle between EU elites and EU peoples, while the politics-as-war theme seems to be used to communicate the Manichean struggle between British elites and British people. However, we also saw that utterances can only be categorised according to these themes in quite a broad way; variation within a theme means that the ad hoc metaphorical concepts involved in specific utterances must be analysed in context.

Finally, my analysis of Farage's active metaphorical utterances shows that he uses language metaphorically for ideological purposes. I have described how many of his active metaphorical utterances perform nationalist-conservative decontestations of concepts at the core of liberalism. It can no longer be taken as a given that novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances are less ideological than conventional conceptual metaphors and their conventional expression.

8.3.2. Pablo Iglesias

Pablo Iglesias's variations of the populist frame come in two forms, although they frequently overlap:

(i)   Framing which positions people against a European elite.

(ii)   Framing which positions people against an international financial elite.

Utterance (26) is a good example of how both (i) and (ii) are communicated:

(26)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] Nuestros pueblos no son menores de edad, ni colonias de ningún fondo de inversiones; no conquistaron ni defendieron su libertad para entregársela a una oligarquía financiera.

[Our peoples are not minors, nor colonies of any investment fund; they did not conquer or defend their freedom to give it to a financial oligarchy.]

As we have seen with Farage, here Iglesias uses metaphor to metarepresent and attribute an elite point-of-view. In this case, however, irony is not used. The dissociation of the attributed thought is explicitly expressed through negation. Taking into account that certain

conceptualisations can be "(…) meta-represented by speaker as being someone else's believed reality" (Chilton, 2004, p. 54), we can hypothesise that this is what happens in cases of negative populist metaphorical utterances. We can view it as echoic denial (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 251), or a use of negation through which Iglesias can "introduce new information in order to deny it" (Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, p. 198).

There are two metaphorical utterances resulting in two metaphorical mappings here: EUROPEAN PEOPLES AS MINORS and EUROPEAN PEOPLES AS COLONIES OF INVESTMENT FUNDS.

Table 8.14. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (26)		
D$_s$: MINORS	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** EUROPEAN PEOPLES
	[1$_s$] Minors are not trusted to make some important decisions about their lives [2$_s$] Minors are not permitted by their guardians to do certain activities [3$_s$] Minors are the legal responsibility of their legal guardians [4$_s$] Minors should do what their legal guardians tell them to do [5$_s$] Minors can be punished by their guardians	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t{}^M$): EUROPEAN PEOPLES AS MINORS		
[1$_t{}^M$] European peoples are not trusted to make important decisions about their lives (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [2$_t{}^M$] European peoples are not permitted by the EU to make democratic decisions and laws (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [3$_t{}^M$] European peoples are the legal responsibility of the EU (new, introduced by [3$_s$]) [4$_t{}^M$] European peoples should do what the EU tells them to do (new, introduced by [4$_s$]) [5$_t{}^M$] Some European peoples are punished by the EU with financial austerity (new, introduced by [5$_s$])		

In this metaphorical mapping, European peoples are depicted as children, with all of the legal and cultural restrictions that are involved. The power imbalance between parent and child is mapped to that between European authorities and peoples: European peoples are not trusted to make their own decisions ([1$_t{}^M$]), are legally restricted from making their own laws and exercising democratic sovereignty ([2$_t{}^M$]), the EU is responsible for taking legal decisions for them ([3$_t{}^M$]), European peoples are obliged to do what EU authorities tell them to do ([4$_t{}^M$]), and European peoples are punished with financial austerity ([5$_t{}^M$]). Iglesias attributes this metaphorical point of view to European entities, and explicitly

negates it, creating the contrast between himself, who represents the peoples of Europe, and an elite who look down on them. In cases like this, a populist speaker attributes a thought to an elite entity by metarepresenting an elite worldview metaphorically reconceptualised within the populist frame. This metaphorical claim is attributed and contested simultaneously by the populist speaker with a negative metaphorical utterance: "Our peoples are not minors".

The second metaphorical mapping EUROPEAN PEOPLES AS COLONIES serves the same function: the attribution of a metaphorical thought and a negation of it.

D_s: COLONY OF INVESTMENT FUNDS	Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:	D_t: EUROPEAN PEOPLES
	[1_s] Colonised people and their lands are controlled politically by a foreign coloniser (investment funds) [2_s] A colony is often captured and held against the will of the native people [3_s] Colonisers extract wealth from their colonies	

Table 8.15. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (26)

Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M):
EUROPEAN PEOPLES AS COLONY OF INVESTMENT FUNDS

[1_t^M] European peoples and their lands are controlled politically by investment funds (new, introduced by [1_s])
[2_t^M] European peoples and lands to be controlled by investment funds, against the will of European peoples (new, introduced by [2_s])
[3_t^M] EU authorities, via EU austerity policies, allow investment funds to extract wealth from some EU countries (strengthened by [3_s]).

In this metaphorical mapping, European elites corruptly facilitate the invasion and colonization of European peoples by investment funds: investment funds control European peoples and lands ([1_t^M]). They do this against the will of the people ([2_t^M]), and this is facilitated by the imposed austerity measures of EU authorities ([3_t^M]). Iglesias weakens target domain constraints which represent the more complex reality of the relationship between each member state and the EU, and the processes by which decisions are made. It is the suppression of these aspects that facilitate the populist frame: The EU elites, extracted from the concept of European peoples, arrogantly view European nation states and peoples as colonies; they accept the political dominance of investment funds, a financial elite, against the will and interests of their own peoples. This is an attack on the social-democratic

decontestation of LIBERTY as the freedom from the worst excesses of capitalism, and the liberal conception of DEMOCRACY where politicians serve the interests of even their most vulnerable citizens. This attack on core liberal concepts is made more explicit in (27), though in this utterance the EU elites are themselves the colonisers:

(27)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] Señorías, la democracia en Europa ha sido víctima de una deriva autoritaria. En la periferia europea la situación es trágica: nuestros países se han convertido casi en protectorados, en nuevas colonias, donde poderes que nadie ha elegido están destruyendo los derechos sociales y amenazando la cohesión social y política de nuestras sociedades.

[Ladies and gentlemen, democracy in Europe has been the victim of an authoritarian drift. On the European periphery the situation is tragic: our countries have become almost protectorate, in new colonies, where powers that no one has chosen are destroying social rights and threatening the social and political cohesion of our societies.]

In (27), it does not seem that the metaphorical thought is attributed to the elites. Rather, the metaphorical thought is Iglesias's own. It is not an attempt at counter framing, as in (26), but a direct use of the metaphorical thought as a diagnostic frame: the problem is that the EU colonises European peoples. In the same speech, Iglesias focuses on the corrupt connections between European elites and international financial interests:

(28)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] No son términos abstractos, Señorías: todos ustedes conocen bien el problema. Es escandalosa la facilidad con la que se mueven aquí los lobbies al servicio de grandes corporaciones, así como las «puertas giratorias» que convierten a los representantes de la ciudadanía en millonarios a sueldo de grandes empresas.

[These are not abstract terms, ladies and gentlemen, you all know the problem well. It is scandalous how easily lobbies move here in the service of large corporations, as well as the "revolving doors" that turn citizen representatives into millionaires on the payroll of large companies.]

The mapping of *puertas giratorias* [revolving doors] is quite limited but it is worth commenting on Iglesias' use of it here. This seems to be a calque from the English expression which is used for the problem of politicians retiring from politics and being put

into lucrative positions in private enterprises, and vice versa. Although there seems to be some degree of conventionalisation of its political use in English, it has not yet been lexicalised to the extent of being included in the dictionary entry. In Spanish, it would seem even less conventionalised, but not uncommon. The fact that it has been put in quotes, seemingly by the transcriber, is an indication of its freshness, its active metaphoricity. The image is of one seeming to leave a building but reappearing moments later as someone entering. The use of this metaphor for a populist is that it merges the two elite entities into one; financial elites become political elites, and political elites become financial elites, though there is a pretence that they are separate.

This corrupt relationship between a political and financial elite is emphasised again, through active metaphor, in the same speech. In (29) the EU is depicted as a reward on retirement rather than a serious position of responsibility.

(29)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] El Parlamento no puede ser un premio de consolación ni una jubilación dorada.
[Parliament cannot be a consolation prize or a golden retirement]

The utterance depicts a position in parliament as a reward for serving the interests of the political/financial elite. Unsuccessful national politicians and retiring capitalists are given lucrative positions in the EU parliament. Among other things, the metaphor weakens constraints regarding the responsibilities that come with holding office, and the democratic processes which influence appointments.

In (30) Iglesias uses one of his most famous and effective metaphorical portrayals of corrupt elites:

(30)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] Hay que decirlo alto y claro. Esta manera de funcionar hurta la soberanía de los pueblos, atenta contra la democracia y convierte a los representantes políticos en casta.
[Let's say it loud and clear. This way of functioning undermines the sovereignty of peoples, undermines democracy and turns political representatives into a caste.]

"La casta" became a political buzzword in Spain during the rise of Iglesias and his *Podemos* party. Iglesias seems to have adopted the metaphor from its use by Beppe Grille and his

Five Star Movement in Italy. In (30) it used in a typically general way, but rather than being applied to a Spanish political class, it is applied to a European political class.

Table 8.16. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (30)		
D$_s$: A CASTE	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$**	**D$_t$:** EUROPEAN POLITICAL CLASS
	[1$_s$] A cultural-socio-economic class in Hindu society [2$_s$] Membership of a caste is hereditary [3$_s$] Members of a caste can be antagonistic towards people who are not in their caste	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): EUROPEAN POLITICAL CLASS AS A CASTE		
[1$_t^M$] EU political class are a socio-economic class in European society (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [2$_t^M$] EU political class position is hereditary (new, introduced by [2$_s$]) [3$_t^M$] EU political class are antagonistic towards people who are not in their class (new, introduced by [3$_s$])		

Though the mapping might be extended further, depending on the audiences' familiarity with the Indian caste system, for the vast majority voters the mapping would resemble that of table 8.16. Rather like Nigel Farage's utterance of (1), the power of this metaphor lies in its depiction of the EU as a strict hierarchical structure. [1$_t^M$] strengthens the conception of the EU political class into a socio-economic one. [2$_t^M$] introduces the idea that the class position is hereditary, an idea that clashes with dominant contemporary conceptions of LIBERTY and the DEVELOPMENT of the INDIVIDUAL: socio-economic mobility through the capitalist system. Constraint [3$_t^M$] introduces the idea that there is conflict between the EU political class and other classes in society, an idea which clashes with the democratic ideal that politicians serve their constituents' best interests. These clashes between the ideals of liberal democracies and the Indian caste system are what give the metaphor such a powerful accusatory effect. It is an accusation of elite corruption, antagonism, and dishonesty.

Iglesias uses other metaphors to highlight or create these discrepancies between the ideals of social democracy and his sordid description of the reality. In (31), in a speech as candidate for presidency of the parliament, he says:

(31)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] Me dirijo a ustedes, señoras y señores diputados al Parlamento Europeo, porque ustedes tienen un contrato de responsabilidad política firmado con sus pueblos.

        [I address you, ladies and gentlemen, to the European Parliament, because you have a political responsibility contract signed with your peoples.]

It is unlikely that Iglesias thinks he is going to sway the EU parliament to elect him as president or to re-examine their way of doing politics. Rather, I think we can interpret this metaphor as appealing to a domestic audience. Politicians, he is saying, have a contract with their voters. Iglesias is a politician who honours this contract. Most of his colleagues, he suggests, do not:

(32)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] Les pido el voto para frenar a la gran coalición que impone la austeridad y el totalitarismo financiero.

        [I ask you to vote to stop the grand coalition that imposes austerity and financial totalitarianism.]

By grand coalition, he means the centre and centre-right parties which hold a majority in the EU parliament. They practise a "financial totalitarianism", an ad hoc metaphorical concept that maps TOTALITARIANISM to EU FINANCIAL POLICY.

Table 8.17. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (32)		
D_s: TOTALITARIANISM	**Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:**	**D_t:** EU FINANCIAL POLICY
	[1_s] Those in power have total control over people's public and private lives [2_s] Those in power violently suppress opposition [3_s] Totalitarian states have been responsible for physical harm and murder against their own citizens	
Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M): EU FINANCIAL POLICY AS TOTALITARIANISM		
[1_t^M] The EU's financial policy of austerity has total control over European peoples' lives and their societies (new, coming from [1_s]) [2_t^M] The EU suppresses those who oppose its financial policies (new, coming from [2_s]) [3_t^M] The EU financial policies have been responsible for physical harm and murder against European citizens (new, coming from [3_s])		

Again, the EU is described as having a strict hierarchical structure which opposes liberal ideological concepts, especially social-democratic decontestations of LIBERTY and DEMOCRACY: they impose a financial policy which controls every aspect of people's lives ([1$_t^M$]), suppress opposition to such policies ([2$_t^M$]), despite the policies having very harmful, even physically harmful, effects on European citizens ([3$_t^M$]).

Iglesias is particularly critical of the EU migration policies at this time. He depicts a cruel European elite who do not care for human rights. In (34) Iglesias quotes from a poem by Julio Herrera:

(33)   [Strasbourg, 12/03/2015. Iglesias says:] *Excuse-moi, monsieur*, no soy ave migratoria / que por capricho abandonó su morada / al arribo de adversas estaciones: / soy un náufrago de un país zozobrado / que un pirata infame hundió en los mares de la miseria.

[*Excuse-moi, Monsieur*, I am not a migratory bird / that on a whim left its dwelling / upon the arrival of adverse seasons: / I am a castaway from an unsettled country / that an infamous pirate plunged into the seas of misery.]

Here, again, metaphorical point of view is being attributed to EU elites with Iglesias negating it. These are complex ad hoc metaphorical concepts: REFUGEE AS MIGRATORY BIRD THAT ON A WHIM LEFT ITS DWELLING UPON THE ARRIVAL OF ADVERSE SEASONS and REFUGEE AS CASTAWAY FROM AN UNSETTLED COUNTRY THAT AN INFAMOUS PIRATE PLUNGED INTO THE SEAS OF MISERY. By placing these two complex mappings into the context of the EU's response to the refugee crisis, Iglesias is representing the voice of people abused by European elites. Iglesias blames the EU and its foreign policy for conditions which bring so many refugees to Europe, and accuses members of the EU parliament as being complicit in their silence:

(34)   [Strasbourg, 06/10/2015. Iglesias says:] Nadie dice aquí que la política exterior europea en los últimos quince años ha contribuido a echar gasolina sobre los conflictos.

[No one here mentions that European foreign policy over the past fifteen years has helped to pour gasoline on conflicts.]

Their lack of solidarity with refugees is a violation of human rights. They have turned Europe into a defensive fortress:

(35)   [Strasbourg, 12/03/2015. Iglesias says:] Y no deberíamos olvidar que los derechos humanos se violan también en Europa y a las puertas de Europa.

[And we should not forget that human rights are also violated in Europe and at the gates of Europe.]

An interesting contribution is when Iglesias is railing against the use of metaphorical language used by others to describe refugees:

(36)   [Strasbourg, 06/10/2015. Iglesias says:] Señoría, es usted europeo y, quizás, abuelos suyos—como abuelos míos—tuvieron la mala suerte de verse obligados a abandonar su país y llamaría basura a todo aquel que se refiriera a su abuelo o al mío como una «plaga» o como una «invasión».

[Your Honour, you are European and, perhaps, your grandfather—as my grandparents—were unlucky enough to be forced to leave your country and I would call garbage anyone who referred to your grandfather or mine as a "plague" or an "invasion".]

Going by my method, I could not count *basura* [rubbish] as an active metaphor, as it seems a conventional way in Spanish to express derision and disrespect of someone you hold to be morally inferior. However, I do wonder if conventionality indicates an absence of online mapping in such evocative cases. Nevertheless, what is interesting here is that Iglesias is explicitly arguing over the metaphorical depictions of people within a populist framing: Those who view the refugees as an invasion are, in reality, showing equal disdain to those European citizens of past generations who had to emigrate. Their attack on an external, otherised people is therefore transformed into an attack on an internalised European people. Moreover, while Iglesias attributes metaphorical utterances to opponents, and dissociates himself from these utterances, he does so without irony. The dissociation is explicit: "I would call garbage anyone who referred... ". However, it is not explicit negation. Rather, it is the evaluative function of "garbage" which communicates his denial.

Iglesias is particularly critical of the EU seemingly sacrificing the interests of European peoples in order to further US geopolitical goals:

(37)   [Strasbourg, 16/09/2014. Iglesias says:] Y la pregunta que nos tenemos que plantear es si asumimos que la política exterior europea va a ser un peón en un tablero de

ajedrez manejado por los Estados Unidos o si vamos a tener la seriedad suficiente como para tener una política exterior propia que no ponga en riesgo a los europeos. [And the question we have to ask ourselves is whether we assume that European foreign policy is going to be a pawn on a chessboard manipulated by the United States or whether we are going to be serious enough to have a foreign policy of our own that does not put Europeans at risk.]

Though the metaphor theme of politics-as-chess is almost cliché, its use in the metaphorical utterance here can be considered active. Though the use of *un peón* [a pawn] on its own might be conventional, the use of *tablero de ajedrez* [chessboard] makes it an extended metaphor, reactivating contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast.

What's more, the metaphor is quite ambiguous in how it is intended to be mapped. Should we assume that the US is the chess player? Or is it the EU that is the chess player and taking illegal directions on how to play from the USA? Much of the ambiguity rests on Iglesias' use of *manejado*. A good translation of this is "manipulated" – keeping the double sense of moving something with your hands or making someone wilfully do what you want them to do. With that double sense, both metaphorical mappings can be justified by the utterance: EU's ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A PAWN MOVED BY THE USA OR EU's ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A PAWN MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER. I am partial to analysing the utterance as utilising the second metaphor because if Iglesias had wanted to communicate the first, it would have been far less ambiguous to use the verb *mover* [to move] instead of *manejar* [manipulate]. Nevertheless, the interpretation of any individual listener depends on many factors including attention, relevance to the individual, and not least, the translation of the utterance into their own language. It is also interesting that the target concept does not seem to be just EU's ROLE IN THE WORLD but, perhaps via metonymy, EUROPEAN PEOPLE. This seems clear when Iglesias says *que no ponga en riesgo a los europeos* in which the people, not the foreign policy, are the pawns.

Table 8.18. Simplified representation of the mapping involved in (37)		
D_s: A PAWN MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER	**Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t**	D_t: EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD
	[1_s] The pawn is the weakest piece on the board [2_s] In chess, it is illegal for a player to follow advice from other sources of information (a person, a computer, etc.) [3_s] Pawns are often risked by the player to capture other opponents' pieces	
Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M): EU'S ROLE IN THE WORLD AS A PAWN MOVED BY A CONTROLLED PLAYER		
[1_t^M] The EU has a weak role in world politics (new, introduced by [1_s]) [2_t^M] The EU illegitimately follows advice from the US (new, introduced by [2_s]) [3_t^M] European peoples are unscrupulously risked by the US in geopolitical conflicts (new, introduced by [3_s])		

In [1_t^M] the EU is depicted as a having a weak role in world politics. They follow instructions from the US [2_t^M], and thereby risk European citizens for the benefit of the US [3_t^M].

This metaphor is a prime example of a conspiratorial populist frame: Different groups of international political and financial elites are colluding together against the interests of their own people. In doing so, they undermine liberal conceptions of DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY and the INDIVIDUAL. It is an active metaphorical utterance communicating a populist frame, and it is an ideological act.

Iglesias' active metaphors were mostly focused on EU elites or international elites, and did not focus on domestic elites. There could be many possible reasons for this: unlike Farage, perhaps Iglesias did not embrace the opportunity to use the EU Parliament as a platform to reach a domestic audience, or perhaps not to the same extent. For example, though Iglesias is known in Spain for the political-class-as-caste metaphor theme, there is only one example of this theme in my corpus and the utterance does not describe domestic Spanish political elites but European political elites as a whole. An interesting area of further research would be to compare Iglesias's domestic speeches of this time to his EU Parliament speeches. Moreover, given that Iglesias was a senior member of a coalition

government, his speeches provide the rare opportunity to compare a European left-wing populist in and out of power.

The most striking aspect of Iglesias's use of active metaphorical language is his use of negation to attribute a metaphorical thought and explicitly dissociate himself from it. Farage used irony, in which the dissociation is implicit. More research is needed into the differences between irony and negation and their combination with active metaphorical utterances. For our purposes, both are useful tools for populists because they may attribute elitist thoughts and utterances to outgroup entities, while positioning the speaker as a voice of the people.

8.3.3. Ashley Fox

Ashley Fox and Iratxe Garcia, representing centre-right and centre-left parties respectively, show low to negligible rates of populism and active metaphor use. Here I will briefly examine how they use active metaphor, in order to examine how active metaphor is used more widely in the European parliament. Ashley Fox comes closest to using metaphor for populist purposes with the following utterances:

(38)　　[Strasbourg, 05/07/2017. Fox says:] We have two Parliaments, one in Strasbourg and one in Brussels, and the endless travelling circus that we perform means that we are held in contempt by our citizens.

(39)　　[Strasbourg, 05/07/2017. Fox says:] Well, I agree with my colleague. We should look to value for money, and the very first place we should cut is this travelling circus to Strasbourg.

In (38) and (39), Fox uses the metaphor EU PARLIAMENT AS A TRAVELLING-CIRCUS. Fox makes the grounds for the metaphorical comparison clear—the movement of Parliament between Strasbourg and Brussels. The concept of CIRCUS as a source concept maps constraints such as silliness, facetiousness and triviality. It is not a populist metaphorical utterance per se as it does not position the EU as elites. However, it is interesting to note that Farage uses this same metaphor when he is talking about the settlement bill the British are being asked to pay before leaving the EU:

(40)   [Strasbourg, 26/10/2016. Farage says:] Either way, it is too much. We are helping to finance this monthly travelling circus to Strasbourg and, worst of all, I have now discovered that in your staff regulations up to 5% of employees every year are allowed to retire five years early and receive full pay and entitlements for five years for doing absolutely nothing. Nowhere else in the world would allow this sort of thing to go on.

In Farage's utterance, the mapping would be much the same as in (38) and (39) but it is used in conjunction with accusations of waist and corruption, all of which is meant to depict the EU's financial demands of Britain as unreasonable. Fox's use of the utterance does not carry this wider accusation of corruption.

Finally, there is one more metaphorical utterance to discuss, one which is somewhere in the grey area between conventional and active:

(41)   [Brussels, 17/09/2015. Fox says:] So my group will vote against this proposal because we do not think that opening the gates of Europe to anyone that can get to the frontier is the right method of helping them.

Here, there is a metaphorical mapping EU BORDERS AS GATES, which seems to describe Europe as a fortress or as a walled city. The Europe-as-a- fortress theme goes back to the second world war where it was used to refer to the parts of Europe occupied by Nazi Germany and their allies. However, the metaphor theme has found new purpose in recent years as the European refugee crisis intensified. Interestingly, Pablo Iglesias also referred to the gates of Europe in the context of the refugee crisis, despite coming from the opposite side of the political spectrum. This can be taken as evidence for a conventional conceptual metaphor EUROPE IS A FORTRESS. If we accept that, then Iglesias and Fox are drawing from this conceptual metaphor more or less subconsciously—if it serves an ideological purpose, it is one that is common to both Iglesias on the Spanish far-left, and Fox on the British centre-right. The mapping of this conventional metaphor must be able to explain both its use to refer to Axis-occupied Europe and European border policies 2014-2019. This, I believe, is a difficult job for any one metaphorical mapping to explain.

Alternatively, we can take it as evidence of a metaphor theme: a loose category for independent mappings, triggered by different metaphorical utterances, in different contexts of utterance and often with different ideological purposes. This is the interpretation preferred in this thesis. Take another utterance of Iglesias's in which he uses this metaphor theme:

(42)   [Strasbourg, 27/10/2015. Iglesias says:] Hoy hablamos, otra vez, de guerra y de desolación a las puertas de Europa, de familias a las que se está respondiendo con alambradas.

[Today we are talking again about war and desolation at the gates of Europe, families to which they are responding with wires.]

Iglesias is using the Europe-as-fortress theme to emphasise the families left suffering outside: The gates become a symbol of the EUs lack of solidarity and indifference to suffering. In Fox's utterance of (41), the gates are expected to function as gates should: They are meant to control who can enter and who cannot. Fox is saying that it is nonsensical to open gates to anyone who wants to enter—that is not what gates are for.

8.3.4. Iratxe García

Iratxe García's populist grading resulted in a very low non-populist score and active metaphor analysis shows a comparatively lower rate of active metaphor use (1.6). García does use metaphor to frame some ideological issues, but she does not do so according to a populist frame. For example, in (43)

(43)   [Strasbourg, 07/10/2015. García says:] Señor Presidente, como hablamos del reconocimiento de las víctimas, yo quiero usar este turno de palabra también para decir que en España, en menos de cuarenta y ocho horas, cuatro mujeres han sido víctimas de violencia de género, asesinadas por el terrorismo machista.

[Mr President, as we are talking about the recognition of victims, I would also like to use this turn of call to say that in Spain, in less than forty-eight hours, four women have been victims of gender-based violence, killed by sexist terrorism.]

the metaphorical concept is DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS TERRORISM. This is a powerful metaphor which highlights the political aspects of domestic violence. It weakens the target domain constraint that, unlike terrorism, victims are known by their murderers and are not

anonymous "message generators" (Schmid, 2011, p. 87). It most definitely engages in ideological work, decontesting the essentially contested concept of POLITICAL VIOLENCE, but it does not help to position a homogenous people in a Manichean struggle against a corrupt elite, and so it does not contribute to a populist frame.

In most of her other metaphors, however, even when they are active they seem borderline conventional:

(44)   [Strasbourg, 09/09/2015. García says:] Es cierto que han sido los egoísmos nacionales los que han puesto piedras en el camino de esa ansiada solución europea para responder a la mayor crisis de refugiados de los últimos años.
[It is true that it has been national selfishness that has laid stones in the path of this long-awaited European solution to respond to the biggest refugee crisis of recent years.]

In (44), it is the utterance of *piedras* [stones] which causes contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast. It gives us the complex ad hoc mapping PROBLEMS REACHING SOLUTION TO REFUGEE CRISIS AS STONES PUT IN PATH BY NATIONAL EGOS. Such a complex ad hoc mapping provides little coherent or relevant mappings beyond the more conventional OBSTACLES IN PATH source domain and would therefore seem be just a more creative (more ad hoc and therefore more active) variation of a conventional metaphorical utterance such as "obstacles in a path". The biggest cognitive difference is that in (44) the egos of nation states are personified and given a malevolent agency.

In (45), García talks about the importance of reaching international agreements on climate change targets:

(45)   [Strasbourg, 09/06/2015. García says:] Pero la hora de la verdad llama con urgencia a nuestra puerta.
[But the hour of truth urgently knocks on our door.]

Here again there is evidence of conventional metaphors (EU IS A HOUSE, TIME IS A PERSON) but the linguistic utterance is unconventional. I would analyse it as IMPORTANT DECISION ABOUT ENVIRONMENT AS THE HOUR OF TRUTH KNOCKING ON THE DOOR OF THE EU. For utterances such as these, on the border between conventionality and active metaphoricity, a pragmatic analysis of the utterance would seem to offer little more than an analysis of the

conventional conceptual metaphors. However, it is interesting that these examples seem to be the least interesting in terms of ideological decontestation.

8.4. Summary

In this chapter, I have investigated populism discourse in the European parliament, and how active metaphorical utterances contribute to that discourse. I have applied a pragmatic theory of metaphor identification and interpretation to quite a large, complex corpus, which in itself, serves as an original contribution to metaphor research.

My research on this corpus has revealed a number of interesting findings. The holistic-grading method revealed that even at their most populist, the populists of the European Parliament, 2014-2019, demonstrate only moderate levels of populist discourse compared to rates of populism observed elsewhere by political scientists (Hawkins et al., 2019).

I observed that populists seem to use active metaphorical utterances considerably more than their non-populist colleagues. By conducting qualitative analysis of the active metaphorical utterances, we began to interrogate why this might be and to discover the differences between populist and non-populist metaphors.

The non-populists not only had a lower rate of active metaphor use, but it seems that their metaphors fulfilled a different function than the populists: Ashley Fox used the EU PARLIAMENT AS TRAVELLING CIRCUS metaphor in order to persuade his colleagues to change the traditions of Parliament. Iratxe García used the metaphor of DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS TERRORISM to highlight a crisis in European societies which needs political action and resources, and which is not taken seriously enough. These uses of metaphor have very real policy objectives.

The populists, on the other hand, rarely, if ever, use metaphor to build support for specific policy objectives. Their metaphors are more likely to offend their parliamentary colleagues than to persuade them. They are metaphors which contribute to a populist frame: Farage uses the metaphor of STRASBOURG PARLIAMENT AS A TEMPLE to ridicule the parliament building, the institution and his fellow MEPs as irrational. Iglesias uses the metaphor of EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS COLONIES OF INVESTMENT FUNDS to accuse his fellow MEPs as betraying their own people on behalf of financial elites. These are metaphors which are meant to polarise their audiences and position them according to a populist frame: virtuous people locked in struggle against a corrupt elite. It is telling that

out of all the metaphorical utterances I have analysed in this corpus, only the populists use populist metaphors and only the non-populists use non-populist metaphors. It needn't be this way: There is no reason why Farage could not have used his metaphorical rhetoric to pursue larger quotas for the English fishing industry. Even when a populist and non-populist seem to use the same metaphor, this difference stands: Both Fox and Farage use the metaphor EU PARLIAMENT IS A TRAVELLING CIRCUS, but the context of the utterance means that the two utterances are used for quite different purposes. Fox uses the metaphor to cajole his colleagues into political action: He campaigned to have the parliament permanently situated in Brussels for his entire EU parliamentary career. Farage, on the other hand, uses the utterance as part of a wider accusation of corruption.

However, the populist frames used by different populists are not the same. This can be seen more clearly when we consider how Iglesias and Farage communicate the populist conception of "people". In many of Farage's metaphors, it is British people who are victimised by the European elites. While he does pick out other European peoples, in particular contexts, as being victimised, they are still otherised as "friends", "neighbours" or potential members of "the Brexit club". In short, Farage's conception of the populist people is infused by his nationalist ideology—where national identity is the salient group identity. Iglesias does not communicate this nationalist interpretation of "the people": His is a more vaguely defined, fuzzy definition, *nuestros pueblos*. However, Iglesias's more inclusive conception of the populist people does not mean it is less populist: It is the extraction and vilification of elite entities and the homogenizing exaltation of the remaining pure people which make it populist. Populism and nationalism do not always coincide.

They also differ in their characterisation of elite entities in their populist frames. While both, at times, depict a corrupt political elite in league with a financial elite, Farage focuses much more on the former and Iglesias on the latter, a difference in emphasis which is revealed in their metaphorical utterances. Farage largely uses metaphor to describe the corrupt, fanatical European political elite and a weak British political elite that facilitates the former's illegitimate control over the British people. For Iglesias, European elites facilitate illegitimate control over European peoples by financial elites or the USA (which, one suspects, symbolises global capitalism in general).

Finally, all of the MEPs use metaphors for different ideological purposes. While Fox and García show a lower rate of active metaphorical use, one could argue that Fox's use of the Europe-as-a-fortress theme is a conservative or nationalist decontestation of the role of the STATE, i.e., to preserve the national identity from outside influence. Similarly,

one could argue that García's utterance of the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS TERRORISM metaphor is a decontestation of the STATE's role in an INDIVIDUAL's family life, a decontestation at odds with more conservative, or at least traditional, decontestations of that relationship.

The populist use of metaphor is more clearly and profoundly ideological, in that they seem to deal with the core concepts of liberalism. At times, these are straightforward decontestations: Farage uses the politics-as-religion theme to perform nationalist decontestations of the INDIVIDUAL and STATE, in order to delegitimise the very idea of a democratic, supranational EU. He uses the politics-as-war metaphors to decontest the concept of DEMOCRACY itself, that any deviation from a hard-Brexit is a betrayal of the homogenised will of the British people.

Iglesias uses active metaphorical utterances to perform social-democratic decontestations of liberal concepts; the corrupt European elite allow investment bankers to colonise European lands, and so fail to safeguard the LIBERTY and DEVELOPMENT of the INDIVIDUAL from the dangers of unrestrained capitalism. The politics-as-chess metaphors are used to depict EU political elites as breaking their contract with the European citizen. They are serving the interests of a globalised capitalist elite, rather than those of European peoples.

My analysis shows that active metaphorical utterances are useful for populists of different ideologies, to construct and communicate their variations of the populist frame. In using language metaphorically, they perform ideological decontestations of the core concepts of liberalism. Perhaps this is why populism has often been seen as the opposite of liberalism (Pappas, 2019), the drunken guest at the dinner party of democracy (Arditi, 2007, p. 78).

An important finding is that there is an attributive use of metaphorical conceptualisations which are negated or ironised. The populist speaker constructs a metaphorical thought or system of thoughts of corruption which is attributed to the elites. Only then, can the populist speaker reject this attributed metaphorical thought or utterance by means of negation (e.g., Iglesias's utterance of *nuestros pueblos no son menores de edad* in [27]) or irony (e.g., Farage's utterance of "you are a sinner" in [2]).

What is clear from my research here is that active metaphorical utterances, and the ad hoc metaphorical concepts which make them possible, can no longer be dismissed as uninteresting or unideological. It is clear that a pragmatic theory of metaphor interpretation and identification is needed in order to reveal the subtleties and variation between metaphorical utterances in politics. Furthermore, despite the fears of Musolff (2012), I have shown that it is quite possible to approach metaphor from a fully pragmatic perspective while conducting fruitful corpus linguistics.

Chapter 9
Populism and Active Metaphor in the US Presidential Elections, 2016[51]

9.1. Introduction

In America, populism goes back to at least he 19th century; President Andrew Jackson positioned himself as speaking for an abused American people against a corrupt financial elite and the contemporary use of the term "populist" is often traced back to an agrarian political movement of the 1890s, The Populist Party (Allcock, 1971).

More recently, populist movements arose after the 2008 financial crash and in reaction to the Obama administration, both on the left with the Occupy Wall Street movement, and on the right with the Tea Party movement. These political forces came to head during the presidential election of 2016, in which Donald Trump was elected 45th President of the United States.

In this chapter, I analyse the main presidential candidates of both the Democrat and Republican parties. First, I assess their speeches for populist discourse and active metaphor use (9.2). Then, I qualitatively analyse the active metaphorical utterances of the three main protagonists, Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, and Hillary Clinton (9.3).

I downloaded a corpus of speeches given by Republican and Democrat candidates during the 2016 presidential elections (Hawkins, 2016) which is available from the Team Populism website (https://populism.byu.edu). It does not have every speech given by every candidate during the party primaries and presidential campaigns, but it has the advantage of each speech having been graded for populism using the holistic-grading method (Hawkins & Silva, 2019, p. 28). Table 9.1, outlines the essential information of the corpus, showing the number of speeches and overall word count of each candidate, as well as the total number of speeches and total word count.

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[51] A version of this chapter has been published in the journal *Intercultural Pragmatics* (Keating, 2021).

Table 9.1. Team Populism's corpus of speeches from the US presidential elections, 2016.		
Candidate	**Speeches**	**Word count[52]**
Donald Trump	22	76,388
Hillary Clinton	21	62,733
Bernie Sanders	5	11,705
Marco Rubio	4	7,206
Ted Cruz	3	6,552
Ben Carson	1	4,052
John Kasich	2	6,990
Total	58	175,626

The discrepancies in the size of some of the sub-corpora was a concern for my qualitative research goals. If, as initial analysis indicated, Bernie Sanders's corpus was indeed the most populist, I felt it needed to be expanded in order to achieve a more meaningful comparison with the Trump and Clinton sub-corpora. Therefore, I searched for the transcripts of Bernie Sanders' speeches and added six more to the Team populism corpus. This expanded corpus is indicated in table 9.2 by the candidate name "Sanders.exp".

9.2. Measuring Populist Discourse and Active Metaphor Use

9.2.1. Rates of Populist Discourse and Active Metaphor Use

Table 9.2 shows the name of the candidate, the date each individual speech, and the populism scores given by each coder to each speech in the corpus. Coder 1 shows my scores and coders 2 and 3 are the original Team Populist coders. Then it gives the number of active metaphorical utterances retrieved from each speech, and the word count (excluding meta data).

Table 9.2. Data retrieved from the US sub-corpora						
Candidate	**Speech**	**Coder 1**	**Coder 2**	**Coder 3**	**Mets**	**Words**
Carson	4/5/15	0.5	0.9	1.3	7	4015
Clinton	13/6/15	0.1	0.6	0.3	19	4687

Clinton	15/3/16	0.2	NO[53]	NO	6	1381
Clinton	26/1/16	0.0	NO	NO	10	4891
Clinton	1/2/16	0.0	0.1	0.2	1	665
Clinton	9/2/16	0.0	NO	NO	8	1270
Clinton	20/2/16	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	1413
Clinton	27/2/16	0.0	NO	NO	8	1699
Clinton	1/3/16	0.1	0.0	0.2	9	1469
Clinton	7/6/16	0.1	NO	NO	7	1675
Clinton	22/6/16	0.2	0.6	0.3	10	5556
Clinton	11/7/16	0.3	0.1	0.1	5	1043
Clinton	13/7/16	0.2	0.2	0.1	9	3332
Clinton	28/7/16	0.1	0.1	0.3	18	5169
Clinton	11/8/16	0.1	0.2	0.4	4	5795
Clinton	25/8/16	0.0	0.0	0.2	6	2841
Clinton	31/8/16	0.1	0.1	0.1	0	4129
Clinton	9/9/16	0.1	0.1	0.1	5	1336
Clinton	3/10/16	0.3	0.3	0.2	7	5069
Clinton	22/10/16	0.2	0.4	0.2	2	4579
Clinton	3/11/16	0.2	0.1	0.1	2	3599
Clinton	9/11/16	0.0	0.1	0.0	2	1177
Cruz	23/3/15	0.3	0.6	0.6	3	2482
Cruz	1/2/16	0.5	1.0	1.1	8	2945
Cruz	20/2/16	0.2	0.6	0.8	1	1058
Kasich	21/7/15	0.0	0.0	0.0	24	5311
Kasich	15/3/16	0.0	0.2	0.0	4	1570
Rubio	13/4/15	0.1	0.1	0.4	4	2031
Rubio	1/2/16	0.2	0.2	0.4	3	1581
Rubio	20/2/16	0.0	NO	NO	1	1115
Rubio	15/3/16	0.1	NO	NO	6	2271
Sanders	26/5/15	1.0	0.75	1.5	5	3413
Sanders.exp	5/1/16	1.3	NO	NO	4	2614
Sanders.exp	2/2/16	0.8	NO	NO	1	1372
Sanders	10/2/16	1.3	1.6	1.6	3	2213
Sanders	20/2/16	1.3	2.0	1.5	0	697
Sanders	1/3/16	1.5	1.5	1.6	0	989

[53] For some speeches, I was unable to confirm the scores assigned to a speech by coders 2 and 3. This is because the coders of the Team Populism dataset were not consistent with their naming conventions or because the scores were absent from the dataset.

Sanders	15/3/16	1.0	NO	NO	1	4236
Sanders.exp	8/6/16	1.0	NO	NO	1	948
Sanders.exp	16/6/16	1.0	NO	NO	2	2757
Sanders.exp	12/7/16	0.3	NO	NO	0	2164
Sanders.exp	25/7/16	0.4	NO	NO	1	2125
Trump	16/6/15	0.1	0.2	0.7	9	6334
Trump	1/2/16	0.0	NO	NO	0	433
Trump	9/2/16	0.5	NO	NO	3	1980
Trump	20/2/16	0.4	0.1	0.9	1	2076
Trump	23/2/16	0.0	NO	NO	0	1109
Trump	1/3/16	0.0	0.0	0.5	1	5351
Trump	15/3/16	0.3	NO	NO	0	2435
Trump	3/5/16	0.4	NO	NO	6	2999
Trump	22/6/16	1.4	1.5	1.3	9	3353
Trump	11/7/16	1.0	0.9	1.0	0	2521
Trump	21/7/16	1.5	0.5	1.4	2	4350
Trump	8/8/16	1.0	0.7	1.4	7	3618
Trump	19/8/16	1.3	1.1	1.5	6	2312
Trump	20/8/16	1.4	1.0	1.5	1	2284
Trump	1/9/16	1.0	1.5	1.2	4	6838
Trump	7/9/16	0.4	0.1	0.4	2	2379
Trump	3/10/16	0.4	0.2	0.1	0	6554
Trump	13/10/16	1.6	1.5	1.7	12	2642
Trump	14/10/16	1.5	1.2	1.3	17	5158
Trump	29/10/16	1.7	1.2	1.4	8	2080
Trump	8/11/16	1.4	1.2	1.3	17	4184
Trump	08/11/16(2)	0.1	0.2	0.4	1	1539

Intercoder reliability tests were carried out on the speeches for which data from all three coders was available. Raw populism scores as well as rounded scores were tested. The raw data received a Krippendorff's alpha (ordinal) of $\alpha = 0.73$ and the rounded data received a score of $\alpha = 0.8$. Therefore, intercoder reliability is more than sufficient to make "tentative conclusions" (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 429). I take this as evidence that the holistic grading method for assessing populism in discourse is sufficiently reliable, and that I adequately trained myself in the rubric to apply it to my own data when working with other coders was not viable (Hawkins & Silva, 2019, p. 32).

I also carried out an intracoder reliability test on approximately 25% of the corpus, roughly 1, 500 words per speaker, with speeches chosen randomly. The raw data received

a Krippendorff's alpha (ordinal) of α = 0.78 and the rounded data received a score of α = 1. Therefore, there was a high level agreement between my first and second rounds of coding for populism.

A Kruskal-Wallis H test was run on coder 1's scores (my scores) in order to determine if there were differences in populism scores between seven groups of speeches (grouped by speaker) showing different rates of populism: Carson's speeches (n = 1), Clinton's speeches (n = 21), Cruz's speeches (n = 3), Kasich's speeches (n = 2), Rubio's speeches (n = 4), Sander's speeches (n = 11) and Trump's speeches (n = 22). Distributions of populist scores were not similar for all speakers, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. The distributions of populist scores were statistically significantly different between speakers, $\chi^2(6) = 32.701$, $p < .001$. This indicates that the differences in populism scores among speakers is highly significant.

Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in populism scores between Clinton and Sanders (p = .000), and between Clinton and Trump (.001), but no other significant differences were observed. These results are illustrated in fig 9.1:

Fig 9.1 Pairwise comparison of populism

Pairwise Comparisons of speech by speaker

Each node shows the sample average rank of speech by speaker.

Given the unavoidably uneven sample sizes in this corpus, and given the fact that only Clinton, Sanders and Trump are analysed in the metaphor analysis section, I performed a second Kruskal-Wallis H test which only included these three groups of speeches. This confirmed that there was statistical difference between Clinton and Trump (p = .000), and Clinton and Sanders (p = .000), but not between Trump and Sanders (p = 1.000).

Table 9.3 displays the number of potentially active metaphorical utterances in the sub-corpus of each candidate, followed by the overall word count of the sub-corpus and the rate of metaphorical utterances per 1000 words.

Table 9.3. Rates of active metaphor use.			
Candidate	**Metaphors**	**Words**	**Met / 1k words**
Carson	7	4,052	1.74
Clinton	139	62,775	2.21
Cruz	12	6,485	1.85
Kasich	28	6,881	4.07
Rubio	14	6,998	2.00
Sanders	18	23,528	0.77
Trump	106	72,529	1.46

An intracoder reliability test was also carried out on metaphor identification, using the same samples tested for reliability for populism. A Krippendorff's alpha (ratio) value of 0.961 was obtained, indicating high reliability.

A Kruskal-Wallis H test was run to determine if there were differences in rates of active metaphor use (normalised to 1000 words) between three groups of speeches: Clinton, Sanders, and Trump. The other speakers were excluded from this analysis because they are not analysed in the qualitative section, and by excluding them I reduced the effects of their more uneven sample sizes and distributions on the results. The distributions of active metaphor use were statistically significantly different between speakers, $\chi^2(2) = 11.102$, p = .004. This indicates that differences in active metaphor use among speakers is significant.

Post-hoc analysis using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons revealed statistically significant difference between Clinton and Sanders (p = .006), and between Clinton and Trump (p = .042), but not between Trump and Sanders (p = .859). The results are illustrated in fig 9.2:

Fig 9.2 Pairwise comparison of metaphor

Pairwise Comparisons of speech by speaker

Trump
24.18

Clinton
35.95

Sanders
18.00

Adj. Sig.
— < 0.05
— >= 0.05

Each node shows the
sample average rank of
speech by speaker.

9.2.2. Discussion of Data

Team Populism provides a framework for interpreting these scores; not populist (0-0.49), somewhat populist (0.5-0.99), populist (1-1.49), and very populist (1.5-2) (Lewis et al., 2019).

Using mean averages for each speaker, we can assign speakers to one of these categories.[54] The mean average of rounded populist scores (to two decimal places) for each candidate and the corresponding interpretation are given in table 9.4.

Table 9.4. Interpretation of populist scores		
Name	**Rounded mean average**	**Interpretation**
Clinton	0.00	Not populist
Sanders	0.91	Somewhat populist
Trump	0.73	Somewhat populist

It might seem surprising that Donald Trump receives a lower populist score (0.73) than Bernie Sanders (0.91). There are many possible explanations for this. An important one is the discrepancy of sub-corpus size. Another reason for this might be the limitations of

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[54] As with the EU corpus, median averages were also calculated but they did not differ enough from the mean average to result in a different categorisation (see section 8.2.2 for discussion on mean and median averages).

assessing contemporary politicians through their speeches when so much of political communication these days is carried out online. Trump, in particular, is famous for communicating to his political base through *Twitter*. In any case, the difference was not found to be statistically significant.

The other candidates received a "not populist" score, though I should note that both Cruz and Rubio displayed some populist aspects and would have received "somewhat populist" according to the scores assigned by coders 2 and 3. For these candidates I think the sub-corpora are too small to convincingly argue one way or the other.

As for active metaphor use, it is surprising that Clinton receives the highest metaphor score at 2.21 metaphors per thousand words, with Trump having a rate of 1.46 and Sanders 0.77. Considering the much smaller corpora size for the other candidates, I do not give much weight to their rate of active metaphor usage. Nevertheless, the quantitative data as a whole shows no correlation between degree of populist discourse and rate of active metaphor use.

Given that populists have a specific frame to construct, one might assume a higher rate for the populists than the non-populists. But, of course, metaphor is a useful tool for communicating a wide range of political frames, not just populist ones.

The data has proposed some interesting questions for qualitative analysis: How do populist uses of active metaphor differ to non-populist uses in the corpus? Why did Hillary Clinton engage in more active metaphorical framing than Donald Trump? Why did Bernie Sanders receive the highest populism score but have the lowest rate of active metaphor use? In the next section I explore these questions, focusing on how Clinton, Sanders and Trump use active metaphors.

9.3. Qualitative Analysis

9.3.1. Donald Trump

Among Trump's many successful slogans during the 2016 campaign ("America First", "Build the Wall", "Lock her [Clinton] up!"), arguably his most successful one was the active metaphor in

(1)   [Michigan, 8/11/2016. Donald Trump says:] I want the entire corrupt Washington establishment to hear our words, our words, when we say, you know what we are

going to say, we are going to win today and we are going to Washington D.C. to drain the swamp.

Of course, this metaphor is not original or unique. The X-as-draining-the-swamp metaphor theme has a long history in American politics. Ironically, it was first coined by socialists where draining the swamp meant changing the capitalist system (Widmer, 2017). It was taken up by Ronald Reagan where it meant reducing the federal government (Kelly, 2016), and it was used by the Bush administration to mean ridding Iraq and Afghanistan of terrorism (Engelhardt, 2004). As an utterance, the utility and flexibility of this metaphor theme resides in how the speaker maps different outgroup entities and problems they cause to the domain of SWAMP. Once a coherent alignment is achieved, an unspecified solution can be explicitly represented as DRAINING. For example, under the Bush administration the target domain could be made explicit as the ad hoc concept COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM. Mapping features from SWAMP allowed them to position leaders of such countries as the mosquitos which spread terrorism (as a disease). The solution of draining the swamp suggests a range of possible solutions including invasion and regime change. In order to explain how Trump used it as part of his 2016 presidential campaign, as opposed to how the Reagan or the Bush administrations used it, we must go beyond the metaphor theme and analyse it as a metaphorical utterance.

Though it may not be original, it is certainly a novel metaphorical concept in the sense that it is not conventional to *think* about Washington DC or the political institutions of the USA as a swamp according to our conceptual system. It is also an active metaphorical utterance: There is a contextual abnormality because we don't conventionally *talk* about Washington DC as a swamp and there is a conceptual contrast when we recognise that Trump uses a conceptualisation of SWAMP to describe WASHINGTON'S POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT. I have expressed the target domain in this way because it is clear that Trump uses "Washington DC" metonymically to talk about Washington's political class and their political institutions. Table 9.5 shows the simplified mapping of relevant features from the source domain and the restructured target domain.

D$_s$: SWAMP	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** WASHINGTON'S POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT
	[1$_s$] Mosquitos living in swamps suck people's blood [2$_s$] Mosquitos living in swamps spread human diseases such as malaria [3$_s$] Dangerous animals hunt in swamps [4$_s$] Draining water from the swamp makes the swamp uninhabitable for dangerous animals and mosquitos	

Table 9.5. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (1).

Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t{}^M$):
WASHINGTON'S POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT AS SWAMP

[1$_t{}^M$] Corrupt politicians in Washington take money illegitimately (strengthened by [1$_s$])
[2$_t{}^M$] Corrupt politicians spread corruption throughout the country (new, introduced by [2$_s$])
[3$_t{}^M$] Corrupt people seek money and power in Washington (strengthened by [3$_s$])
[4$_t{}^M$] Political action (by Trump) will make Washington uninhabitable for corrupt people (new, introduced by [4$_s$])

With [1$_t{}^M$], nothing new is added to the target domain from the source domain but this target domain constraint is strengthened by its alignment with the selected structural constraint, corrupt politicians taking money is strengthened by mosquitos sucking blood. With [2$_t{}^M$], new information is added to the metaphorically restructured target domain, that these corrupt politicians spread their corruption throughout the country, just as mosquitos spread disease. With [3$_t{}^M$], the constraint that corrupt people seek money and power in Washington is strengthened: I analyse this as "people" rather than "politicians" because the Washington establishment also consists of lobbyists, journalists, and others seeking money and power. Mosquitos aligns with politicians because sucking blood aligns with taking money, but swamps are full of other animals (and in popular culture, monsters) and the political establishment in Washington is full of other corrupt people besides the politicians themselves. Trump, by draining the swamp, will make Washington uninhabitable for all of these kinds of people ([4$_t{}^M$]). As a result of this conceptual adjustment, the metaphorical ad hoc concept WASHINGTON'S POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT AS SWAMP is obtained.

The meaning intended by the speaker with his use of "drain" and "swamp" is the transferred provisional meaning that these expressions have in the metaphorically restructured target domain and is only accessible via this metaphorical ad hoc concept.

It might be possible to interpret (1) as simultaneously drawing on some conventional metaphorical concepts, such as THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 172). Black accepted that metaphorical mappings might contain further metaphorical mappings (1954-5, p. 290). It is an interesting proposition that online pragmatic mappings might incorporate ready-made offline mappings. However, CMT alone cannot account for the metaphorical meaning of "drain the swamp" in the utterance of (1).

How does Trump use this metaphorical utterance to communicate the populist frame? This would seem to be a case of diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). Corrupt elites spread corruption throughout the United States (diagnosis). Trump, the only human in this scenario, represents the interests of the American people and offers a solution. Although he doesn't specify how he will do it, he will make Washington uninhabitable for this type of politician (prognosis). The hortative "Drain the swamp!", which became a chant at Trump's rallies, indicates that the American people can only fulfil this Manichean narrative of good versus evil by voting for him (motivation).

Ideologically, the metaphor serves as a decontestation of some of the core and peripheral concepts of liberalism: the relationship between the STATE and the INDIVIDUAL through DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACY, as is often the case with populists, is conceptualised as the will of a unified, homogenised majority (Canovan, 1999, p. 2). Trump, before the election even takes place, makes himself the representative of this homogenised majority ("our words, our words"). He will go to Washington and replace the corrupt political elite, installing rule of the majority, the only true conception of DEMOCRACY.

Trump uses many other active metaphors to depict elite corruption:

(2)   [Florida, 13/10/2016. Trump says:] For those who control the levers of power in Washington, and for the global special interests they partner with, our campaign represents an existential threat.

D$_s$: MANIPULATING A LEVER	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** EXERCISING POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA
	Table 9.6. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (2).		
	[1$_s$] Levers are used to directly control machines [2$_s$] Levers are controlled by single individuals	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t{}^M$): EXERCISING POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA AS MANIPULATING A LEVER		
[1$_t{}^M$] Powers of the executive branch are used to directly control the American State (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [2$_t{}^M$] Powers of the executive branch are controlled by a single class of financial and political elites (new, introduced by [2$_s$])		

"Levers of power" is probably more towards the conventional than the active end of the cline of metaphoricity in language use. As used in this utterance, we can represent the ad hoc metaphorical concept with EXERCISING POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA AS MANIPULATING A LEVER. In the target domain, structural constraints related to the constitutional separation of powers are weakened. Target domain constraints regarding the limitations on the federal government are also weakened: In the USA, governors of individual states have enormous powers. The direct causality emphasised by seeing power as a lever simplifies what is often the messy decision-making process of institutions into a single act ([1$_t{}^M$]) and makes "those who control" directly and uniquely responsible for the political decisions which affect the state ([2$_t{}^M$]). As the solution to this problem, a Trump presidency is an existential threat to this group of elites.

Other metaphors refer to elite entities much more directly. In (3), Trump talks about Bill Clinton's responsibility for job losses because of the NAFTA free-trade agreement with Canada and Mexico, which Bill Clinton signed while president:

(3)   [Indiana, 03/05/2016.Trump says:] And all of the different state – Connecticut. And I've witnessed what it's done really first-hand. And it has been indeed carnage.

Table 9.7. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (3).		
D$_s$: CARNAGE	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** CONSEQUENCES OF NAFTA
	[1$_s$] Carnage is the violent killing or injury of a large number of people (in war) [2$_s$] Carnage is usually the result of a military order given by somebody	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): CONSEQUENCES OF NAFTA AS CARNAGE		
[1$_t^M$] The NAFTA agreement destroyed the jobs of a large number of American people (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [2$_t^M$] The loss of American jobs is the result of Bill Clinton signing the NAFTA agreement (new, introduced by [2$_s$])		

The dictionaries provide the following definitions for "carnage": "when a lot of people are killed and injured, especially in a war" (Pearson, n.d.-a.) and "the violent killing of large numbers of people, especially in war" (Cambridge University Press, n.d.-b.). In this context, it is used to describe the consequences of an international trade agreement (conceptual contrast), an unconventional use (contextual abnormality). Trump depicts the loss of jobs as a violent act of war, which resulted in the loss of many American jobs ([1$_t^M$]), a direct consequence of actions carried out by his exemplars of the corrupt political elite, the Clintons ([2$_t^M$]). The fact that NAFTA was negotiated by the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations is not relevant because it contradicts Trump's manifest intention to blame the Clintons. The benefits of the agreement, such as cheaper consumer goods, are also weakened. This is a contextually sensitive mapping process from the source domain, CARNAGE, to the target domain CONSEQUENCES OF NAFTA, and it is guided by relevance and coherence.

The solution Trump offers is to withdraw the USA from NAFDA or renegotiate the deal, which is exactly what he did on reaching office. This does not come from the metaphorical mapping. Unlike draining the swamp, this metaphorical mapping only describes the problem but does not metaphorically depict a solution. It is a diagnosis of the Clinton's as violent attackers of American people and jobs, communicating the Manichean struggle of good versus evil.

In other metaphors, Trump's expresses a more moderate form of populism. Rather than depicting the elite as outright evil, he depicts them as inept:

(4)   [New York, 16/06/2015. Trump says:] We have all the cards, but we don't know how to use them. We don't even know that we have the cards, because our leaders don't understand the game.

Table 9.8. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (4).		
D$_s$: CARD GAME	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** GLOBAL POLITICS
	[1$_s$] A card game consists of a number of players competing against each other to win [2$_s$] The player has a hand of cards which can give them an advantage or disadvantage [3$_s$] Players need to understand the game to know which hands are winning hands and how to use them	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t{}^M$): GLOBAL POLITICS AS CARD GAME		
[1$_t{}^M$] In global politics, countries compete against each other (strengthened by [1$_s$]) [2$_t{}^M$] The USA has the resources and power to give them an advantage (strengthened by [2$_s$]) [3$_t{}^M$] The Obama administration does not understand the rules and tactics to win at international diplomacy (new, introduced by [3$_s$])		

This metaphorical utterance uses a quite common metaphor theme of politics-as-a-game-of-cards. He extends this into a more unconventional, almost ridiculous, scenario: the leadership, as players, are so inept that they do not realise they have a winning hand. They do not understand the rules and tactics required to win. The source domain CARD GAME is quite generic, but we might assume that most hearers would utilise a conception of poker as a prototype. Regardless, almost every card game can be reduced to the constraints I have outlined here. By mapping this to GLOBAL POLITICS, Trump weakens the aspects in the target domain of countries cooperating to obtain mutual benefit and instead strengthens aspects of competition ([1$_t{}^M$]). Much has already been written about Trump's proclivity to divide the world into winners and losers (D'antonio, 2016). Here global politics is no longer guided by traditions, laws, and diplomacy, but rather by the rules of a game and tactics needed to win. The USA has the resources and power to gain an advantage ([2$_t{}^M$]), but its leaders are too inept to realise it. Rather than depicting the elite as outright evil, Trump depicts them as losers who don't know how to win ([3$_t{}^M$]). The elites are not just corrupt and evil but also stupid.

This ineptitude facilitates the evil of external enemies. (5) is an example of another metaphor theme, globalisation-as-theft:

(5)   [North Carolina, 14/10/2016. Trump says:] We're living through the greatest jobs' theft in the history of the world. Our jobs have been stolen from us and we have people that don't know what they are doing, in particular our leadership.

Table 9.9. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (5).		
D_s: THEFT	**Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:**	D_t: GLOBALISATION
	[1_s] A thief takes the belongings of someone else [2_s] Theft is immoral	
Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M): GLOBALISATION AS THEFT		
[1_t^M] Countries like Mexico, China and Ireland take American jobs (strengthened by [1_s]) [2_t^M] Globalisation is immoral (new, coming from [2_s])		

The metaphorical mapping of GLOBALISATION AS THEFT describes the movement of American manufacturing jobs to other countries as theft by those countries ([$1t^M$]). The most important aspect of this mapping is that it changes the agent of the action from being the American companies to the countries themselves. Furthermore, the potentially positive outcomes of globalisation for the American economy and American customers are suppressed as the mapping evaluates globalism as immoral ([2_t^M]). As Trump makes clear in (5), this theft is facilitated by the incompetence of the country's leadership.

Ironically enough, the ideological decontestations performed by Trump's utterances of (3), (4) and (5) have more in common with social democracy than the usual decontestations of American conservatism. Geopolitics is primarily focused on global trade, and Trump sees America and Americans as being the violently attacked (3), the unwitting loser (4), and the unfairly deceived (5). Trump, as president, would protect Americans from these unpleasant extremes of global capitalism. This is an ideological decontestation far removed from the traditional American conservative ideological stance

on free-market capitalism, the LIBERTY of companies to seek profit by all means available to them and the INDIVIDUAL's fate as almost irrelevant. Yet, while a social democrat might promote regulation of the market and social protections, Trump does not go so far. His solution is to succeed at global trade, to "make America great again" i.e., to be the aggressor, not the aggrieved, the winner, not the loser. It is worth noting that this was not mere rhetoric: In office, Trump implemented protectionist economic policies and renegotiated trade deals in an attempt to rebalance America's trade deficit with a number of countries, going against mainstream American conservative (and progressive) economic thought.

The media, and Trump's relationship with the media, are sometimes depicted as corrupt elite entities via active metaphor:

(6)   [North Carolina, 14/10/2016. Trump says:] Hopefully our great movement powered by everyday citizens will overcome the sickness that is plaguing our politics and our media. And I'll tell you what, our media is indeed sick and it's making our country sick, and we're going to stop it.

Table 9.10. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (6).		
D_s: CONTAGIOUS SICK PERSON	Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:	D_t: MEDIA
	[1_s] A person should be physically well [2_s] A person who is sick is physically not well [3_s] A person who is contagious can pass the disease onto other people [4_s] A contagious person needs to be quarantined, stopped from interacting with others	
Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M): MEDIA AS CONTAGIOUS SICK PERSON		
[1_t^M] The media should be impartial (strengthened by [1_s]) [2_t^M] The media are morally unwell by being biased (new, introduced by [2_s]) [3_t^M] The media are spreading their bias to others (new, introduced by [3_s]) [4_t^M] The media need to be stopped from interacting with the public (new, introduced by [4_s])		

This a good example of a lexicalised metaphor becoming active via extension. The country is suffering from a moral sickness, a plague spread by politics and the media, and the Trump campaign, representing the unified will of "everyday citizens" will overcome it. The ideal

conditions, a healthy person and an impartial media, are aligned ($[1_t^M]$). A problem is diagnosed: The ideal condition is not the reality, the media are morally unwell by virtue of their bias ($[2_t^M]$). This bias is spread to the public, morally corrupting them ($[3_t^M]$) and so the media should be stopped from interacting with the public ($[4_t^M]$). Constraints regarding the media's important role in democracy—holding politicians accountable and keeping voters informed—are weakened and are not retained in the restructured target domain.

In many way, this metaphor functions in the same way as the drain-the-swamp metaphor in (1) in its populist framing. Trump speaks for the people, "the everyday citizens". Any media which criticises Trump is criticising the people and is therefore morally corrupt. The danger is that the sick media, like the mosquitos of the swamp, spread their corruption. They must, therefore, be isolated and replaced by alternative sources of information, such as pro-Trump media or Trump's social media, which serve the people rather than the elite.

Ideologically, the utterance decontests another core concept of liberalism, RATIONALITY. Trump's famous retort of "fake news!" to any and all criticism is another non-metaphorical decontestation of conceptions of RATIONALITY and how we arrive at accepted truth as a society. While the American media has played its own part in undermining its function as an impartial arbiter of facts in American political life, it was not until Trump that "alternative facts" (Smith, 2020) became an acceptable political strategy and that the media's role in democracy came under sustained attack by a sitting American president, who went so far as to label them "enemy of the people" (BBC, 2018).

One way Trump achieves this is by not only describing outgroup as corrupt elites themselves, but by attributing elite ideas and policies to outgroup entities through metaphor:

(7)   [Florida, 13/10/2016. Trump says:] Anyone who challenges their control is deemed a sexist, a racist, a xenophobe and morally deformed.

D$_s$: DEFORMED PEOPLE	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** MORALLY BAD PEOPLE
	[1$_s$] People who are deformed are judged to be physically ugly, repulsive, disfigured [2$_s$] People who are deformed can be rejected by society for not conforming to a physical ideal	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t{}^M$): MORALLY BAD PEOPLE AS DEFORMED PEOPLE		
[1$_t{}^M$] People who challenge elite values are morally repulsive (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [2$_t{}^M$] People who challenge elite values are rejected by elite society (new, introduced by [1$_s$])		

Table 9.11. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (7).

Of course, physical deformity and bad morals have long been associated in the human mind. Nevertheless, if the metaphorical concept involved in the utterance of (7) were a completely conventional and inactive one, the inclusion of "moral" would be redundant. Here Trump positions progressive ideas related to gender, race and immigration as methods used by the elite to establish control. If you disagree with elite values you are deemed morally repulsive ([1$_t{}^M$]) and rejected by elite society, ([2$_t{}^M$]).

In (8), Trump talks about victims of violent crime carried out by immigrants:

(8)   [Cleveland, 21/7/2016. Trump says:] I've met Sarah's beautiful family. But to this Administration, their amazing daughter was just one more American life that wasn't worth protecting. One more child to sacrifice on the altar of open borders.

Table 9.12. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (8).		
D$_s$: ALTAR FOR SACRIFICE IN PAGAN RELIGION	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$**	**D$_t$:** OBAMA'S OPEN BORDERS POLICY
	[1$_s$] A pagan religion believes in false gods [2$_s$] Worshippers of pagan religions are irrational and immoral for worshipping false gods [3$_s$] Some pagan worshippers used altars to practise violent rituals such as sacrificing children to their god(s)	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t$^{M}): ALTAR FOR SACRIFICE IN PAGAN RELIGION AS OBAMA'S OPEN BORDERS POLICY		
[1$_t$^{M}] Obama believes in open borders (strengthened by [1$_s$]) [2$_t$^{M}] Obama is irrational and immoral because of his belief in open borders (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [3$_t$^{M}] Obama endorses violence against American children by immigrants (new, introduced by [2$_s$])		

Progressive policies on immigration are depicted as a pagan religion, the Obama administration serve as priests, and American children are offered as human sacrifices. The target concept as it is represented here is already quite ad hoc, a conceptualisation of Obama's open-border policy. This conception, shared by Trump and his ingroup audience, sees Obama's border policy as lax and ineffectual. In reality, the Obama administration did in fact enforce immigration law quite intensively, albeit focusing on those with criminal records and recent arrivals rather than long-term illegal immigrants who had settled (Wolf, 2019). The fact that some of the target domain constraints are untrue or exaggerated is irrelevant to interpretation and our analysis. The metaphorical mapping diagnoses an irrational belief in open borders by the Obama administration ([1$_t$^{M}] and [2$_t$^{M}]). The administration is made responsible for supposedly reoccurring violence against American children by immigrants ([3$_t$^{M}]).

As polarising discourse, this kind of populist framing is so effective because entities can become part of an outgroup by espousing, or seeming to espouse, a policy or idea that has been framed as elitist. Just as every politician that opposes Trump is part of the swamp, just as every media that criticises him is diseased, anyone that publicly deviates from Trump's political or cultural positions outs themselves as part of the corrupt elite, even as Trump's positions can change from day-to-day. A striking example of this was seen during Trump's efforts to overturn the 2020 election with baseless claims of election-fraud. Trump

suggested that Vice-President Mike Pence, one of Trump's most loyal supporters, could refuse to ratify Joe Biden's victory, an act which the Vice-President, along with legal experts, denied was within his power. At the Capitol Building riot of January 6, 2021, Trump supporters openly made death threats against Mike Pence, among others (Orr, 2021). Pence, by deviating from Trump's position, had outed himself as one of the elites.

Most of Trump's active metaphors characterise the elite, but there are times when he describes himself. In (9) he uses contrasting source domains to depict himself as a Dantesque or possibly a saintly figure:

(9)   [Florida, 13/10/2016. Trump says:] Some people warned me this campaign would be a journey to hell. But they are wrong, it will be a journey to heaven because we will help so many people.

The ambiguity of the utterance makes it difficult, if not impossible, to analyse with any certainty. We can say for certain that there is a basic metaphorical meaning of "journey to hell" depicting presidential campaigning as a bad experience because it involves evil people and "journey to heaven" depicting it as a positive experience because it involves morally pure people. Anything more than this would seem to be only very weakly communicated.

In (10) Trump uses metaphor to construct an unambiguously populist frame:

(10)   [New York, 22/06/2016. Trump says:] On election day, the politicians stand trial before the people. The voters are the jury. Their ballots are the verdict. We don't need or want another Clinton or Obama. Come November, the American people will have a chance to issue a verdict on the politicians that have sacrificed their security, betrayed their prosperity, and sold out their country.

D$_s$: TRIAL	Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:	D$_t$: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
	[1$_s$] During a trial, a judge and/or jury considers evidence on a defendant's moral guilt or innocence [2$_s$] At the end of the trial the jury finds the defendant innocent or guilty [3$_s$] If guilty, the defendant is punished	

Table 9.13. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (10).

Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$):
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AS TRIAL

[1$_t^M$] Voters consider their knowledge and opinions of candidates and judge whether they are fit to become president (strengthened by [1$_s$])
[2$_t^M$] Voters must judge candidates on their moral fitness to be president (strengthened by [1$_s$])
[3$_t^M$] Obama and the Clintons will be found morally unfit by voters (new, coming from [2$_s$])
[4$_t^M$] Obama and the Clintons will be punished (new, coming from [3$_s$])

The Manichean battle between people and elites is made more explicit: Obama and Clinton, representatives of the corrupt elite, are to be put on trial. The election is the opportunity for the American people to deliver justice. They must decide on the moral fitness of candidates to be president ([1$_t^M$] and [2$_t^M$]). Clinton, having worked for the Clinton and Obama administrations, will be found morally unfit ([3$_t^M$]) and they will be punished ([4$_t^M$]). It is also worth noting that the punishment constraint is not mere rhetoric. Trump promised to investigate Hillary for her use of a private server for classified emails, among other alleged crimes. A frequent chant at Trump rallies was to "lock her up!". In an earlier part of the same speech he had said:

> Hillary is not concerned about you or I, she is only concerned about the power the presidency would bring to her. She needs to go to prison to pay for the crimes she has already committed against this country. (Donald Trump, New York, 22/06/2016)

Trump's willingness to incite violence and threaten politically motivated legal punishment against his political opponents has been a hallmark of his entire presidential career, from his election campaign in 2016 to his second impeachment in 2021. These have often motivated his critics to denounce him and his followers as fascist. While this might be debateable, there is no doubt that he follows O'Sullivan's recipe for radical

conservatism: the leader as the mobiliser of the masses via conflict with a political foe, an attempt to resolve the divisive pluralism of modern democracy (O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 297). In populism, Trump found a useful tool for these ends: a discursive frame to polarise audiences into ingroup Americans and outgroup elites, and a Manichean narrative to motivate his supporters. In active metaphorical language, Trump found a way to communicate the frame and perform ideological decontestations; The concept of LIBERTY decontested as the freedom of a forgotten middle-class to progress socially and economically as the dominant majority, the winners rather than the losers of global capitalism; the concept of a RULE-BOUND STATE as corrupt unless serving their homogenised interests; and not least, the concept of RATIONALITY itself as whatever Trump claims it to be.

9.3.2. Bernie Sanders

Out of the three candidates analysed qualitatively, Sanders has the lowest rate of active metaphor use despite having the highest populism score. This may be because Sanders adopted the rhetoric of the Occupy Wall Street movement—the virtuous 99% versus the corrupt 1%— which is metonymic rather than metaphoric. Nevertheless, he does use some active metaphors to construct the populist frame. Whereas in Trump's metaphors, the corrupt elite are more often depicted as the political class, in Sander's metaphors the focus is on the financial elite:

(11)   [Vermont, 26/05/2016. Sanders says:] Wall Street cannot continue to be an island unto itself, gambling trillions in risky financial instruments while expecting the public to bail it out.

Table 9.14. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (11).		
D$_s$: ISLAND	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** WALL STREET
	[1$_s$] An island is a geographically independent landmass	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): WALL STREET AS ISLAND		
[1$_t^M$] Wall Street acts as a financially independent sector of society (strengthened by [1$_s$])		

There is an element of literalisation here—Wall Street is on Manhattan island—and intertextuality— it recalls John Donne's 'No Man is an Island' but also the expression "a law unto itself". In such cases, it can be difficult to isolate the contribution of the metaphorical mapping. Certainly, it includes the constraint of isolation and independence from the rest of American society ([1$_t^M$]).

In other utterances, they are not just a threat to the country's economy but to its democratic system.

(12)   [California, 08/06/2016. Sanders says:] Democracy is not about billionaires buying elections

Table 9.15. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (12).		
D$_s$: FINANCIAL EXCHANGE	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** ELECTIONS
	[1$_s$] Buying involves paying money in exchange for desired goods or services	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): ELECTIONS AS FINANCIAL EXCHANGE		
[1$_t^M$] Billionaire's can pay money in exchange for a desired election result (new, coming from [1$_s$])		

This metaphor simplifies the complicated, and often obscure, mechanisms of political lobbying and campaign finances in the USA by depicting elections as a product that can be

directly bought by elite billionaires ($[1_t^M]$). Here, we have another case of negation, where an active metaphorical utterance attributes a metaphorical thought and negates it.

Hidalgo-Downing (2000) claims that negative utterances are normally used in order to deny the presupposition that the corresponding affirmative is the case. This pre-suppositional nature of negation is exploited by populist speakers in their metaphorical use of language. When the populist speaker uses negative (or ironical) metaphors they presuppose the affirmative metaphorical conceptualisation and attribute the thought including it to the elite so that they can then condemn that conceptualisation as immoral. The populist speaker attacks the ad hoc concept she, herself, has constructed and attributed to the opponent. In this case, Sanders is attributing the view that elections are financial exchanges to the elite billionaires who donate enormous sums to presidential candidates, and to rich presidential candidates who use their own money to fund their campaigns. By negating this metaphorical thought, Sanders condemns it and positions himself as a true democrat. Sanders' campaign is presented as a historic revolution against these corrupt financial elites.

While Sanders does not use many active metaphorical utterances to communicate his populist frame, they are unambiguously social-democratic in their ideological decontestation. Representatives of unrestrained capitalism, be it the gamblers on Wall Street or the billionaire political lobbyists, have undermined the American economy and American democracy, wresting control over them from the American people. As president, he would regulate the financial and lobbying industries, and expand the social welfare system to protect individuals from these corrupt elites. Rather than focusing on the political elite, as Trump does, Sanders focuses on the financial elite. This makes sense as, being a career politician, he would have been more open to accusations of hypocrisy if he had targeted the political class.

9.3.3. Hillary Clinton

Hillary Clinton, the centrist non-populist, does not use active metaphors to construct a populist frame. Yet, she has the highest rate of active metaphors in the corpus.

As we have seen with Trump, she uses metaphor to metarepresent the ideology of her opponent:

(13)   [North Carolina, 11/07/2016. Clinton says:] An America where we build bridges, not walls.

This metaphor uses literalisation (evoking the literal and metaphorical meaning of the vehicle term) to communicate two mappings, UNIFYING PEOPLE AS BUILDING BRIDGES and POLARISING PEOPLE AS BUILDING WALLS. Both are quite simple, even conventional, mappings which are potentially reactivated through juxtaposition and literalisation.

D$_s$: BUILDING BRIDGES	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** UNIFYING PEOPLE
Table 9.16. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (13).		
	[1$_s$] You build bridges to connect two points separated by a gap or space	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t{}^M$): UNIFYING PEOPLE AS BUILDING BRIDGES		
[1$_t{}^M$] Unifying people connects people separated by a lack of empathy or conflicting points of view (strengthened by [1$_s$])		

D$_s$: BUILDING WALLS	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** POLARISING PEOPLE
Table 9.18. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (13).		
	[1$_s$] Walls prevent people from being in physical proximity with each other [2$_s$] Walls are used as a solution to intergroup conflict by separating people	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t{}^M$): POLARISING PEOPLE AS BUILDING WALLS		
[1$_t{}^M$] Polarising people prevents them from having empathy with each other (strengthened by [1$_s$]) [2$_t{}^M$] Polarising people is a solution to intergroup conflict (introduced by [2$_s$])		

Trump's literal and physical boarder wall and the literal separation of Mexican nationals from American nationals becomes the metaphorical division of people from each other empathically, not just Mexican from American but, American from American:

(14)   [New York, 07/06/2016. Clinton says:] Donald Trump is temperamentally unfit to be president and commander-in-chief. And he's not just trying to build a wall between America and Mexico – he's trying to wall off Americans from each other.

In contrast to this, Clinton wants to build bridges, to unify and resolve intergroup conflict. Clinton's juxtaposition of these two mappings serves to contrast her solution to the polarisation of American political life, an increase in empathy, with her representation of Trump's solution, isolating groups from each other. The attribution of the metaphorical thought to Trump is negated via contrasting source domains, rather than negation. Hillary claims to have a better, more American solution to intergroup conflict.

Another example of attributing a metaphorical thought to an opponent is

(15)   [Michigan, 11/08/2016. Clinton says:] And based on what we know from the Trump campaign, he wants America to work for him and his friends, at the expense of everyone else.

Table 9.19. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (15).		
D$_s$: CORPORATION	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** AMERICAN SOCIETY UNDER TRUMP
	[1$_s$] Corporations have a corporate structure [2$_s$] Employees generate profit for the corporation through economic activity [3$_s$] Wealth is primarily distributed among executives and investors [4$_s$] Executives decide how the corporation is run [5$_s$] Executives are responsible for generating profit for investors	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t{}^M$): AMERICAN SOCIETY UNDER TRUMP AS CORPORATION		
[1$_t{}^M$] American society has a corporate structure (new, introduced by [1$_s$]) [2$_t{}^M$] Citizens generate wealth for Trump (new, introduced by [2$_s$]) [3$_t{}^M$] Wealth is primarily distributed among Trump and his friends (new, introduced by [3$_s$]) [4$_t{}^M$] Trump as president decides how the country and its economy is run (strengthened by [4$_s$]) [5$_t{}^M$] Trump as president is responsible for generating profit for himself and his friends (new, introduced by [5$_s$])		

Trump is an exploitative employer who views Americans as employees to be abused. The societal structure of America becomes corporate ([1$_t{}^M$]), citizens generate wealth through labour for Trump and his friends rather than for society as a whole ([2$_t{}^M$]), wealth is

concentrated at the top of the corporate structure rather than distributed fairly ([3$_t^M$]), Trump, as corporate executive, decides how the country and economy is run, rather than influencing these things as president ([4$_t^M$]), and Trump is responsible for generating profit for himself and his friends, rather than the welfare of American society as a whole ([5$_t^M$]).

By using metaphor to attribute views to Trump, and then negating them, Clinton clarifies that she does not see the world in the same way. However, these metaphors say little about her own ideological positions beyond the vague dichotomous opposite. For example, in (13), she depicts Trump as a figure who divides and herself as figure who unifies. This is quite an audacious claim for two reasons. The first is that Clinton is a hugely divisive figure, not only among the American public but among her own party. How much of this is down to an ingrained culture of sexism or due to her own political record and personality is something which is often debated. It is also audacious because the Bill Clinton and Obama administrations both introduced strict measures to deter and deport Mexican immigrants (Blum, 2017). Clinton's utterance of (13) says very little about her own beliefs or policies on immigration. Similarly, while in utterance (15) she makes it clear that she does not see American society as a corporation, she does not communicate her own vison of America, at least not through metaphor.

Clinton's use of active metaphor famously backfired on her when she metaphorically separated Trump supporters into those who were justifiably angry about being left behind by the economy and those who were simply bad people:

(16)   [New York, 09/09/2016. Clinton says:] You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you could put half Trump's supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables. Right?

Arguably, it was the pejorative meaning of "deplorables" which caused the controversy, a term which was taken up with pride by Trump supporters, encouraged by Trump's campaign team. However, one could argue that it was also the metaphorical meaning, the separating of voters into baskets of good and bad, which caused harm to Clinton's image. It seemed to betray an arrogance which fit into Trump's depiction of her as part of the corrupt elite.

But Clinton also used the Trump campaign's metaphors against them:

(17)   [North Carolina, 11/07/2016. Clinton says:] And remember, when my opponent says every time I talk about these issues that I'm playing the woman's card, well, you know what I say – deal me in!

Table 9.20. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (17).		
D$_s$: PLAYING AN ADVANTAGEOUS CARD	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$:**	**D$_t$:** PURSUING FEMINIST POLICIES AS A WOMAN
	[1$_s$] In card games, players compete against each other [2$_s$] Winners are decided based on skill, tactics and luck [3$_s$] Playing a certain card or cards can give you an advantage [4$_s$] Having an advantageous card in your hand is lucky [5$_s$] Relying on luck to win is unfair	
Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$): PURSUING FEMINIST POLICIES AS A WOMAN AS PLAYING AN ADVANTAGEOUS CARD		
[1$_t^M$] In politics, politicians compete against each other (strengthened by [1$_s$]) [2$_t^M$] Winners are decided based on skill, tactics and luck (strengthened by [2$_s$]) [3$_t^M$] As a woman, your gender identity can give you an advantage (new, introduced by [3$_s$]) [4$_t^M$] Having an advantageous gender identity available to you is lucky (new, introduced by [4$_s$]) [5$_t^M$] Relying on luck to win is unfair (new, introduced by [5$_s$])		

"Playing the X card" seems to be a metaphor theme in which engaging in identity politics is seen as having an (unfair) advantage in a game of cards. The origin is unclear but, according to Merriam-Webster online (Merriam-Webster, n.d.-b), similar metaphors have been in circulation for centuries, such as playing a "sure card" (16th century), playing the "race card" (1970s), and playing the "gender card" (1990s). It was not until the presidential election of 2016 that the more directly sexist "woman's card" became established. In dictionaries the meaning of advantage is given but not the negative connotations which often seem to accompany this metaphor, and which were surely meant by Trump and his television surrogates when they brought the metaphor into the 2016 election. In the mapping in table 9.20 I have tried to account for this sense of negative advantage. In both politics and cards, competitors compete against each other ([1$_t^M$]), and contests require a mix of skill, tactics and luck in order to win ([2$_t^M$]). Being a woman in politics, like having

a particularly good card or cards in your hand, gives you an advantage ($[3_t^M]$) but this advantage is achieved only through the luck of being born a woman ($[4_t^M]$), and is, therefore, unfair ($[5_t^M]$). Here, Clinton extends the metaphor PURSUING FEMINIST POLITICS AS PLAYING AN ADVANTAGEOUS CARD, with the card-game expression "deal me in!" drawing attention to the grounds of the mapping while reversing its negative evaluation. She embraces the supposedly unfair advantage that her identity as a woman, and a woman fighting for women's rights, has given her. Her identity and progressive politics are not an unfair advantage, she seems to say, but legitimate, substantive political issues. Here, we have an attributed metaphorical utterance which is denied, but not through explicit negation.

Besides her wit in extending metaphor and using her opponents' metaphors against them, perhaps the most striking aspects of Clinton's active metaphors in comparison with Trump and Sanders is that, although she diagnoses many of the same problems as they do (a forgotten middle class, a broken financial system), her active metaphors mostly resist and counter the populist frame. For example,

(18)   [Ohio, 03/10/2016. Clinton says:] So let's - let's begin by making it clear that for most businesses, America is the most important asset on their balance sheet.

Table 9.21. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (18).		
D_s: MOST IMPORTANT ASSET ON BALANCE SHEET	**Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:**	**D_t:** AMERICAN SOCIETY
	[1_s] An asset is valuable to a company [2_s] Particularly valuable assets are valued and protected over other assets	
Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M): AMERICA AS MOST IMPORTANT ASSET ON BALANCE SHEET		
[1_t^M] American society is important to corporate America (new, introduced by [1_s]) [2_t^M] America and American people are valued and protected over other important factors by American corporations (new, introduced by [2_s])		

Clinton's intention is to attribute the metaphorical thought AMERICA AS MOST IMPORTANT ASSET ON BALANCE SHEET to most American businesses. Here, the metaphorical thought is attributed but there is neither denial (through negation or other means), nor irony. America,

and via metonymy the American people, are valuable to corporate America ($[1_t{}^M]$). Economic value in the context of an asset communicates the more general meaning of importance in the context of the restructured target domain. Moreover, American society is more important than other factors which might be valuable to American corporations ($[2_t{}^M]$). It is only a small minority of businesses who have harmed America when they provoked the 2008 crash. As she makes clear elsewhere, if there is anyone to blame for these rogue businesses, it is the George W. Bush administration:

(19)   [Iowa, 26/01/2016. Clinton says:] George W. Bush slashed taxes on the wealthy and got out of the way of corporations to the extent that the man he put in charge of keeping an eye on Wall Street took a chainsaw to a big stack of regulations and had a great big smile on his face.

Their negligent deregulation is depicted as irrational perhaps psychopathic behaviour. In another metaphor, Republican candidates are diagnosed as having the same mentally damaged ideology of deregulation:

(20)   [New York, 13/06/2015. Clinton says:] They pledge to wipe out tough rules on Wall Street, rather than rein in the banks that are still too risky, courting future failures. In a case that can only be considered mass amnesia.

The mapped constraints of (19) and (20) are simple enough: Deregulation of Wall Street is mentally ill behaviour.

Utterances (18), (19) and (20) offer strong counterframing to the populist framing of both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. The financial elites are not to blame for economic hardship, nor are a globalist political elite, only the irrational political policies of past Republican administrations are to blame. Corporations value America as an asset and cannot be blamed for their actions under lax financial regulation. The conventionalised metaphorical language in (20) "rein in the banks" indicates the lack of agency and responsibility she attributes to these entities.

This is even more pronounced in other examples of her use of active metaphorical language. In some of her active metaphors, the economic experiences of Americans are not, or not only, depicted as caused by deliberate human decisions, as they often are within the populist frame, but as inanimate forces or phenomena:

(21)   [New York, 13/06/2015, Clinton says:] For decades, Americans have been buffeted by powerful currents. Advances in technology and the rise of global trade have created whole new areas of economic activity and opened new markets for our exports, but they have also displaced jobs and undercut wages for millions of Americans.

Table 9.22. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (21).		
D_s: AMERICA BEING BUFFETED BY POWERFUL CURRENTS	**Relevant features mapped from D_s to D_t:**	D_t: GLOBALISATION'S EFFECTS ON AMERICA
	[1_s] Seas and rivers can have powerful currents which arise out of the laws of nature [2_s] These currents naturally buffet ships and people who enter the water [3_s] When currents buffet a ship or person it is scary and dangerous [4_s] When currents buffet a ship or person, people may drown [5_s] The benefits of seafaring to society via trade and exploration outweigh the risks to individuals of being buffeted [6_s] Sailors should try to avoid being buffeted when undertaking a sea voyage	
Contextually restructured target domain (D_t^M): GLOBALISATION'S EFFECTS ON AMERICA AS AMERICA BEING BUFFETED BY POWERFUL CURRENTS		
[1_t^M] Globalisation can be a powerful process and have powerful results which arise naturally out of the laws of the global market (strengthened by [1_s]) [2_t^M] Globalisation has negatively affected American industries and American jobs (strengthened by [2_s]) [3_t^M] When globalisation negatively affects America and Americans it is scary and dangerous (strengthened by [3_s]) [4_t^M] When globalisation negatively affects American and Americans, they may face economic disaster (strengthened by [4_s]) [5_t^M] The benefits of globalisation (trade, cheaper goods) outweigh the risks of being negatively affected (strengthened by [5_s]) [6_t^M] Governments should try to avoid the negative effects of globalisation and pursue the positive effects (strengthened by [6_s])		

Considering Hillary Clinton's involvement in both the Clinton and Obama administrations, the advantages of framing America's economy in this way are obvious.

She highlights the dangers of globalisation as the natural consequences of natural forces ([1ₜ^M]), while downplaying the human agency involved. She acknowledges the negative effects of globalisation, ([2ₜ^M]), fears and risks of globalisation for average Americans ([3ₜ^M] and [4ₜ^M]), but also she highlights the advantages of globalisation to society ([5ₜ^M]), and the importance of the state's role in avoiding globalisations' negative effects ([6ₜ^M]). In many ways, this metaphor seems to serve as a typical social-democratic decontestation of the protective role of the STATE in protecting THE INDIVIDUAL from extreme forms of CAPITALISM. However, it is also quite conservative in its conception of CAPITALISM as a natural, amoral force, something to be feared and respected, something outside human agency.

Here is a similar example. A well-known idiom is extended and negated, and thus, I argue, made active:

(22)   [Michigan, 11/08/2016. Clinton says about the economy:] The tide is not rising fast enough, and it's certainly not lifting all boats.

The economy is depicted as the movement of water, the economic entities are boats. The economy is slow to rise, again this is something outside human agency, and some people are not rising economically at the natural rate of the tide.

Other metaphors frame the causes of inequality as potentially man-made but without attributing agency to any human entity:

(23)   [Philadelphia, 28/07/2016. Clinton says:] Happy for boys and men, too – because when any barrier falls in America, for anyone, it clears the way for everyone. When there are no ceilings, the sky's the limit.

D$_s$: MAN-MADE BARRIERS	**Relevant features mapped from D$_s$ to D$_t$**	**D$_t$:** LIMITS ON SOCIAL-ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT IN AMERICA
	[1$_s$] Man-made barriers are artificial limits on a natural freedom to move forward [2$_s$] Man made barriers can be taken away	

Table 9.23. Simplified representation of mapping involved in (23).

Contextually restructured target domain (D$_t^M$):
LIMITS ON SOCIAL-ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT IN AMERICA AS MAN-MADE BARRIERS

[1$_t^M$] Identity based prejudices are artificial limits on a natural freedom to socially advance (strengthened by [1$_s$])
[2$_t^M$] Identity based prejudices can be taken away (strengthened by [2$_s$])

In (23), the barrier is identified with identity-based prejudice, which is why Clinton carefully emphasises that she is "happy for men and for boys too" – once identity-based prejudice disappears, every individual in society is free to improve their social position ([1$_t^M$]). This weakens a potentially coherent mapping which is not utilised by Clinton: The source domain would seem to demand an agent and purpose for the barrier having been erected. In contemporary American progressive discourse, there is a readily available outgroup entity which could have been used to construct a populist frame here: the elite straight white men who seek to dominate the queer, the female, and the non-white. By explicitly avoiding this mapping, Clinton avoids alienating voters from those demographics. Moreover, the assumption that identity-based prejudice can be taken away by Hillary's political movement is emphasised, ([2$_t^M$]). The possibility that such prejudices might prove resistant to progressive efforts is weakened. Furthermore, by mapping from the barrier to identity-based prejudice, utterance (23) downplays the class-based inequalities which can hinder an individual's progress, and which are intricately related to issues of race, sexuality and gender discrimination in America. The focus on identity-based politics and the downplaying of class-based politics is an ideological act of decontestation, one which targets the liberal core concepts of LIBERTY, THE INDIVIDUAL and THE STATE and are in competition with the social-democratic decontestations of Bernie Sanders and the more idiosyncratic anti-globalist decontestations of Donald Trump. Extended metaphors based on breaking down barriers and shattering glass-ceilings allow Clinton to present the

frustrations that individuals face in society as pre-existing, long-standing obstacles related to salient aspects of identity (race, sexuality, and gender) in American society that are finally beginning to fall, rather than the result of continued economic decisions by financial and political elites.

Clinton's metaphors do serve as ideological decontestations: she decontests LIBERTY as the freedom of an individual, regardless of race, sexuality or gender, to make social-economic progress within a global capitalist market. The market and its fluctuations are neither good nor bad, but simply exist as facts of social and political life, as elemental as the tide. Government and financial entities are meant to work together in order to provide the opportunities and avoid the dangers which America, as a country and a people, are exposed to. There is no inherent conflict between people and elites, their goals and welfare are the one and the same unless driven apart by bad governance.

Such decontestations, being the mainstream decontestations of American liberalism, are perhaps in danger of seeming like vague platitudes, lacking "appeal in particularistic dimensions" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 344). Yet, there are hints in this corpus that even at this early stage of the Trump era, before we even knew that it was the Trump era, the mainstream liberal decontestations were under threat in America, and perhaps because of this, Clinton found active metaphor a useful tool for defending them.

9.4. Summary

This chapter has certainly complicated viable conclusions from the quantitative data observed from my study of populism and metaphor in the European Parliament. In that chapter, there was some correlation, though not causation, between rates of populist discourse and rate of active metaphor use. In this chapter, however, the corelation is reversed. Whereas Trump does use metaphor to construct a populist frame, Sanders uses very little despite his higher populism score. Most interestingly, Clinton, the centrist and non-populist, had the highest rate of active metaphorical use.

Nevertheless, in qualitative analysis it was clear that active metaphorical language plays an important role in how Trump communicated his polarising populist frames and performed the conceptual decontestations which are intrinsic to ideology. Trump depicts a globalist political elite who have committed a sustained assault against the (white, Christian) middle-class, "the silent majority" of American society. In doing so, he attempts to redefine core concepts of American political life to suit the interests of this homogenised,

exclusionary conception of the American people. It would be a mistake, however, to view Trump as creating this radically conservative populist discourse from whole cloth: It was inherited from the Tea Party movement, which grew in force and anger in reaction to the Obama administration.

Sanders, while seemingly more populist than Trump, did not use active metaphorical utterances in the same way. For him, the metonymy of the Occupy movement's "99% versus the 1%" gave him a populist framing which was already current, if not waning, by the election campaign of 2016. Nevertheless, by examining Sanders' active metaphors, we did see important ideological differences between him and Trump: Sanders' ideological decontestations were classically socially-democratic, while Trump communicated an unorthodox radical conservatism, or, arguably, fascism.

The most surprising findings were found in the analysis of Hillary Clinton's active metaphorical language. She uses active metaphor to frame many of the same issues (globalisation, a forgotten middle class) but using mainstream liberal ideological decontestations which seem to counter the populist framing of her opponents.

Perhaps this is why the more mainstream, centrist candidate used more active metaphorical framing. It starts to make sense when you look at research on populist attitudes among voters at that time. Rahn (2019, p. 368) argues that in the America of 2016 there was "a deepening sense among members of the public that existing political arrangements failed to meet their needs". Quite simply, populism was in the air in America in 2016 through political movements that had been gathering steam since the 2008 financial crash. Sanders and Trump, to different extents, relied less on active metaphor to construct a populist frame because the populist frame was already part of many Americans' mindset, expressed by the Occupy Wallstreet movement on the left and the Tea Party movement on the right. Clinton, however, needed ways to reframe the debate away from the populist frame against financial and political elites, given her history and involvement with both. This required not only more active metaphorical framing, but an active ideological decontestations of liberal concepts which had formed the bedrock of American politics for decades: the LIBERTY of the free market and its promise of DEVELOPMENT for the INDIVIDUAL in a pluralist American society. It makes intuitive sense that politicians will use more active metaphors when they need to reframe an issue against dominant, more conventional frames but also perhaps, when dominant, conventional frames are under serious threat from other ideological decontestations. Perhaps when populists cannot draw on established populist frames in their societies, their rate of active metaphor use will be

higher. This is a promising area for further research, which I will discuss further in my concluding chapter.

In this chapter I also found further evidence for an important finding of this thesis: The use of irony and denial for the attribution of metaphorical thoughts and utterances by political speakers to their political opponents. This was not just found in the populist metaphorical utterances, but also in Hillary Clinton's active metaphorical utterances. Furthermore, I discussed examples where metaphorical thoughts were denied without the use of explicit negation, and where metaphorical thoughts were attributed in a positive way, without denial or irony. These examples were only retrievable via a pragmatic approach to corpus linguistics, and these metaphorical effects can only be analysed via a pragmatic analysis of metaphorical utterances.

Conclusion

Chapter 10
Conclusion

10.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the research objectives which I set out in the introduction to this thesis. I summarise the work carried out to reach those aims, the challenges faced, the results I obtained, I suggest some avenues for further research, and I reflect on the extent to which I have been successful in reaching my goals. First, I discuss the specific objectives (10.2), then the general objectives (10.3), and I finish with some concluding remarks (10.4).

10.2. How the Specific Objectives Are Met

10.2.1. Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of this thesis were:

1. To design and compile corpora which would facilitate the investigation of metaphorically used language by populists in the EU Parliament, 2014-2019, and during the presidential election campaign in the USA, 2016.

2. To develop a corpus methodology which would provide qualitative data that could inform pragmatic qualitative analysis

3. To develop a theoretical framework which would facilitate the analysis of ideological content as part of speaker's meaning

4. To evaluate the discourse of potential populists against their non-populist peers, in order to verify to what extent they can be considered populist.

5. To manually annotate a corpus using pragmatic IT's identification criteria for active metaphorical utterances

6. To quantitatively compare populist and non-populist uses of active metaphorical utterances in my corpora

7. To qualitatively compare populist and non-populist uses of active metaphorical utterances for ideological purposes

8. To discuss possible interpretations of the quantitative data in light of the qualitative findings, and thereby generate hypothesis for future research

In this section, I describe how these objectives were met.

10.2.2. Corpus Design

The design of the corpora used in this thesis is quite different from the design of large general corpora such as that of the BNC. The first issue to keep in mind is that one of my main research objectives was to investigate the use of active metaphorical utterances by so-called populists. Populism, as I have discussed in chapter 3, is a contested concept: One man's populist is another man's democrat. For that reason, I put particular importance on investigating the rate of populist discourse in a speaker's sub-corpus before analysing their use of active metaphor. However, this does not mean that I entered into the design of the corpus without making certain assumptions. Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, Nigel Farage and Pablo Iglesias are all widely known as populists, both in the popular media and the academic literature. The other subjects studied in this thesis, Hillary Clinton, Ashley Fox and Iratxe García, were chosen because they are all presumed to be non-populists, and because they each share certain contextual variables with their corresponding populist subject, i.e., language, nationality and political persuasion (on a left-right axis). This means that the corpora were not constructed via random sampling, as is often required by general language corpora. However, the goal of this thesis is not to statistically extrapolate quantitative data on the use of linguistic features from a corpus to a larger population. Rather, the extraction of quantitative data from the corpus is meant to inform a qualitative analysis of how certain populists used metaphor during seismic populist events in the EU and the USA. This qualitative investigation of active metaphorical utterances, though limited in scope to the USA 2016 and the European Parliament, 2014-2019, is representative in that it exhausts the linguistic material available for these populist speakers in particular contexts.

However, this does not signify that conclusions taken from analysis of the corpora cannot be extrapolated to wider datasets. The conclusion that the metaphorical use of language is useful for the communication of populist frames is interesting on a number of theoretical levels. For the study of populism, it gives more weight to the position that populism is best analysed as a discursive frame (Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016) rather than a thin-ideology (Mudde, 2004), and illuminates one of the ways that populist discursive frames are constructed and communicated. For the study of metaphor, it shows that metaphorical uses of language cannot be dismissed as uninteresting and that

a pragmatic analysis of active metaphorical utterances can reveal the communication of ideological content. Even if one does not agree with the position on the metaphorical use of language in this thesis, that there is a qualitative difference in how conventional and non-conventional metaphorical utterances are interpreted, my findings demonstrate that particular metaphorical utterances have particular metaphorical effects which cannot be reduced to more abstract categories of metaphorical thought. Chief among these findings is the attributive use of metaphorical thought and utterances via irony and denial for ideological purposes, findings which were only obtainable via corpus pragmatics.

10.2.3. Corpus Methodology

I claimed in the introduction that the key to corpus-pragmatic research lies in the balancing of vertical and horizontal reading. This is another way of saying that the analyst must be careful that the automated processes of corpus-analysis do not result in a loss of relevant contextual information. Pragmatic qualitative analysis of utterances must be informed by the wider context. The method I devised consists of systematically narrowing the focus of analysis from a large scale corpus at the level of debate or speech to the smaller scale of utterance but ensuring that each utterance can be traced back to the wider context. This also involved carrying out research on the contextual configuration of the corpora (see chapter 6) and doing background research on an utterance-by-utterance basis.

Corpus-pragmatics is, by its nature, more manual than other forms of corpus-linguistics. This often means that corpora are smaller and the scope narrower (Vaughan & Clancy, 2013, p. 70). However, using my method I have successfully managed to extract quantitative data from large and complex corpora (such as the EUP corpus at 37.5 million words) informed by pragmatic theories. While manual coding was unavoidable, automated processes were used to make manual coding as efficient as possible, such as the "macro" program that I wrote to automate the extraction of tagged content.

10.2.4. Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Ideological Content as Part of Speaker's Meaning

A key original contribution of this thesis to the analysis of metaphor in political discourse lies in its unique combination of complimentary theories from pragmatic linguistics, sociology, and political science. This unique theoretical framework is not a case of novelty for novelty's sake; it was driven by a lacuna in the literature, i.e., I needed a method for

analysing both the ideological content and framing processes of metaphorical uses of language. Such a lacuna exists, despite an abundance of literature on metaphor and politics, because analysts frequently make unsupported, reductive assumptions about the nature of metaphor and ideology, and the relationship between them, which have hindered research. More often than not, analysts coming from a linguistics and discourse analysis background view ideology as a kind of subconscious information transfer, either subconscious on behalf of the producer, the receiver, or both (Lakoff, 1995; Goatly, 2007; Charteris-Black 2004, 2005, 2019). Ideology in metaphor is only considered as a transmission of subconscious social and cognitive structures (van Dijk, 1998), and not as something intentionally communicated by speakers and interpreted by intelligent, politically aware hearers (Bougher, 2012, p. 149). Too often, this results in a fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977): The attribution of a psychological disposition, in this case an ideological disposition, based on observed linguistic activity, overlooking contextual factors. This can be most clearly illustrated by Lakoff's claims that American conservatives follow a STRICT FATHER metaphor and American progressives a NURTURING PARENT (Lakoff, 2002, 2006), an argument which has been severely criticised (Pinker, 2006; Gunnell, 2007) as having no basis in cognitive science. This model of the relationship between ideology and metaphor explains why novel metaphorical concepts and active metaphorical utterances are dismissed as minimally ideological: they are deemed to be too conscious (Goatly, 2007).

In the framework I have developed, ideology is not analysed as the subconscious transfer of information. This does not mean that I dismiss every form of subconscious information transfer, or that I deny the merits of a socio-cognitive view of ideology. Rather, under my framework, the issue of consciousness and ideology is irrelevant: Communication is ostensive-inferential (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95). Subconscious cognitive processes are involved in communication, that is uncontroversial, but the communication of speaker's meaning, and the communication of ideological content as part of speaker's meaning, must be inferred by the hearer on the basis of evidence manifestly provided by the speaker.

The pragmatic interaction theory adopted in this thesis (Soria, 1992; Romero & Soria, 1997-8, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming) sees metaphorical thought and metaphorical uses of language as intricately connected. We use language to communicate our conceptions of concepts, often these are conventional conceptions and sometimes these are unconventional conceptions. Metaphorical utterances involve the communication of unconventional conceptions, ad hoc

metaphorical concepts as part of the intended proposition communicated by a speaker. Political ideology, as seen through the theoretical lens of Freeden's morphological approach (Freeden, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2013, 2017), involves the decontestation of political concepts through discourse, i.e., the communication of certain conceptions of political concepts. By uniting these theories, I bring the study of metaphor and ideology back into the realms of linguistic, rather than psychological, analysis: speaker's ostensively-communicate their conceptions of political concepts. Whether they truly hold these ideological positions as psychological beliefs or dispositions is not the purpose of this analysis. The question I ask is "what do they communicate?", not "what do they believe?".

I have developed an original and precise analytical tool for examining the communication of ideology through metaphorically used language. Moreover, by adopting the view of Aslanidis (2016), that populism is best described as a social action frame (Benford & Snow, 2000), I have been able to describe how populists of different ideologies communicate populist frames through metaphor. The three components of my theoretical framework—metaphor, ideology, and frames—are mutually illuminating and theoretically consistent. To my knowledge, there is no other framework which can explain the ideological content of metaphorically used language in political discourse so precisely.

10.2.5. The Discourse of Potential Populists Compared to their Non-Populist Peers

While I am not a political scientist, I have successfully managed to apply the holistic grading method of measuring populism in discourse (Hawkins & Silva, 2019), confirmed via intercoder and intracoder reliability tests (Krippendorff, 2004). It would have been much easier for me as a linguist to assume that certain speakers were populist, and some were not. It would also have been easier to assume that populism is a thin-centred ideology (Mudde, 2004) and avoid the graded measurement required by the discursive frame approach. However, the method I have adopted helps avoid, or at least mitigate, one of the major problems in populism studies: the essentialist and normative aspects which undermine the field (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 94). In doing so, I can be more confident that the conclusions I have come to regarding populist and non-populist uses of metaphor can be used to inform further work on the phenomenon. Given the interdisciplinary nature of both metaphor studies and the study of political discourse, it is important that this thesis can

contribute to the literature of different fields and be used by researchers focused on populism, not only those focused on metaphor.

10.2.6. Corpus Annotation Using Pragmatic IT's Identification Criteria for Active Metaphorical Utterances

To my knowledge, this thesis is the only work which has applied pragmatic IT's identification criteria to large and complex corpora. Other works which have carried out corpus-analysis using metaphor have used criteria of metaphor identification which take few, if any, pragmatic considerations into account (Charteris-Black, 2004, 2005, 2019; Cameron, 2003; Steen et al., 2010).

The identification criteria outlined in pragmatic IT were (a) contextual abnormality and (b) conceptual contrast. I faced some challenges in applying the criteria, most of which stem from the lack of available research regarding the reactivation of otherwise conventional metaphorical language. The lack of research into this issue is not surprising; it requires an acknowledgment that literal uses of metaphor and metaphorical uses of metaphor are qualitatively different. Considering the most-widely adopted of metaphor, CMT, rejects this position, it is no surprise that the issue is under-researched. However, there are some suggestions in the literature such as the discussion of literalisation in Goatly (1997) and Cameron (2003) and the use of simile form in Gentner and Bowdle (2008). I have outlined how extended metaphor might result in reactivation in otherwise conventional metaphorical utterances. I admit that the uncertainty around this issue causes problems for quantitative analysis of metaphorical utterances. However, I would defend my quantitative results based on four facts; (1) I have been explicit on when I consider a metaphorical utterance to be reactivated; (2) my intuition as a native speaker that an utterance feels active, while not conclusive or reliable alone, is certainly a helpful indication for further analysis in more difficult cases; (3) I have excluded cases where intuition indicated activation but further evidence could not be found; (4) the issue is an inevitable result of taking pragmatic considerations into account. If other corpus analysis has not faced this complication, it is because they do not take pragmatic considerations into account and do not adequately consider the differences between conventional metaphorical utterances and non-conventional metaphorical utterances. My thesis highlights the need for further research into this area.

10.2.7. Quantitative Analysis: Populist and Non-populist Uses of Active Metaphorical Utterances in the Corpora

As I have already discussed, the quantitative data extracted from the corpus was meant to inform qualitative research, rather than to prove or disprove a hypothesis. In table 10.1. I show the rates of populist discourse and active metaphor use (normalised to one thousand words) for all of the subjects in the EU corpus, and in table 10.2 the same for subjects in the US corpus (restricted to those subjects who were also analysed in qualitative analysis):

Table 10.1. Rates of populism and active metaphor use in the EU sub-corpora			
Name	**Populism score**	**Interpretation**	**Met/1k words**
Farage	0.65	Somewhat populist	3.57
Fox	0.02	Not populist	0.39
García	0.00	Not populist	1.61
Iglesias	0.5	Somewhat populist	5.94

Table 10.2. Rates of populism and active metaphor use in the US sub-corpora			
Name	**Populism score**	**Interpretation**	**Met/1k words**
Clinton	0.00	Not populist	2.21
Sanders	0.91	Somewhat populist	0.77
Trump	0.73	Somewhat populist	1.46

These results were interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, in the EU results there seems to be a corelation between the rate of populism and active metaphor use. I did not take this as indicating any kind of causal relationship between the variables because metaphor can be useful for framing many non-populist political issues. This is confirmed in the US corpus where there is no corelation between rates of populism and active metaphor use. As a whole, the quantitative data alone does not indicate any relationship that we might extrapolate to any wider data sets. It did, however, raise some interesting questions for qualitative analysis: Why did populists in the EU tend to use more active metaphors? Why did populists in the US not use active metaphors to the same extent? More intriguingly, why did Hillary Clinton, a non-populist, use more active metaphors than her populist counterparts?

10.2.8. Qualitative Analysis: Populist and Non-Populist Uses of Active Metaphorical Utterances for Ideological Purposes

One of the strengths of the framework I developed in this thesis is that it provides tools for the precise analysis of ideological content as part of speaker's meaning in metaphorical

utterances. Using my theoretical framework, the qualitative analysis of active metaphorical utterances can analyse ideological content as part of speaker's meaning. Analysing populist speakers revealed a wide range of communicated ideological content. Farage used the utterance of (1) to communicate the ad hoc metaphorical concept PARLIAMENT BUILDING AS TEMPLE.

(1)   [Strasbourg, 14/09/2016. Farage says:] If you were to think of this building as a temple, Mr Verhofstadt is the high priest, a fanatic [. . .] If you stick to the dogma of saying that for reciprocal tariff-free access to the single market we must maintain the free movement of people, then you will inevitably drive us towards no deal.

This communicates nationalist-conservative ideological positions. DEMOCRACY is decontested as a process of national self-determination. Supra-national democracy, therefore, is a contradiction and the EU's pursuit of political integration is fundamentally irrational and undemocratic. By decontesting DEMOCRACY, he is also decontesting core liberal concepts of LIBERTY, INDIVIDUALISM, DEVELOPMENT, RATIONALITY and the STATE.

Iglesias's active metaphorical utterances communicated social-democratic decontestations of LIBERTY, INDIVIDUALISM, DEVELOPMENT and the STATE. For example, his utterance of (2) communicated a conception of LIBERTY as the freedom of people to live unhindered by the worst excesses of capitalism, and the conception of THE STATE, the EU state or the nation state, as protector of the INDIVIDUAL:

(2)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] Nuestros pueblos no son menores de edad, ni colonias de ningún fondo de inversiones; no conquistaron ni defendieron su libertad para entregársela a una oligarquía financiera.
[Our peoples are not minors, nor colonies of any investment fund; they did not conquer or defend their freedom to give it to a financial oligarchy.]

The non-populists in the EU corpus also used metaphor to communicate ideology; Iratxe García communicated a feminist conception of POLITICAL VIOLENCE with her metaphor of DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS TERRORISM. Fox communicated a conservative conception of the STATE when he bemoans the financial waste of "the traveling circus" from Brussels to Strasbourg. Interestingly, Farage also used this metaphor, also communicating a conservative ideology, but as part of a populist framing of elite

corruption. Contrasts such as this underline the power of my framework to untangle the subtleties between ideology and discourse, rather than conflating them, which is sometimes a problem (van Dijk, 1998, p. 196).

In the US corpus, Trump used active metaphors to communicate a wide range of positions, not all of them consistent with one conventional ideology. For example, in some of his active metaphors he seems to perform a social-democratic decontestation of the LIBERTY of the people to develop free from capitalist, in this case globalist, excesses, and the role of THE STATE as protector. However, this might be an example of what Freeden called the "swivel mirror-image technique" (Freeden, 1996, p. 345), the grammar of conservative ideology which appropriates the values of ideological challengers in order to neutralise their threat. Indeed, Trump does not advocate change to the global capitalist system, but rather that America should dominate it. This is communicated clearly in metaphors such as (3) which communicate a conception of the STATE as facilitating the development of the INDIVIDUAL as the winner of global capitalism:

(3)   [New York, 16/06/2015. Trump says:] We have all the cards, but we don't know how to use them. We don't even know that we have the cards, because our leaders don't understand the game.

Sanders clearly communicates the social-democratic role of the STATE to protect the INDIVIDUAL, and DEMOCRACY, from capitalism:

(4)   [California, 08/06/2016. Sanders says:] Democracy is not about billionaires buying elections.

Hillary Clinton provided some of the most interesting examples of the use of active metaphor to communicate ideology. She, like Sanders, also communicates a protective role for THE STATE against global capitalist excesses. However, in her utterances we can clearly see the difference between the communication of this social-democratic ideology inside and outside of a populist frame:

(5)   [Ohio, 03/10/2016. Clinton says:] So let's - let's begin by making it clear that for most businesses, America is the most important asset on their balance sheet.

For Sanders, financial elites are positioned against the people, and the people need to be protected. For Clinton, financial entities are part of American society, all of whom must be protected from natural market forces:

(6)   [New York, 13/06/2015. Clinton says:] For decades, Americans have been buffeted by powerful currents. Advances in technology and the rise of global trade have created whole new areas of economic activity and opened new markets for our exports, but they have also displaced jobs and undercut wages for millions of Americans.

The ideological decontestations communicated by populists and non-populists alike, often involve the core concepts of liberalism. For populists, the framing of corrupt elites against pure people is already designed to promote affective political polarisation, the distance between followers of different ideological positions or political parties (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 8). Through metaphor, they can also promote ideological political polarisation, the distance between the ideological positions that political agents offer (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 8). One way of promoting both these kinds of polarisation is to attribute metaphorical thoughts to outgroup entities. This can be seen in Farage's ironic extended metaphorical utterances, such as (7),

(7)   [Strasbourg, 20/01/2016. Farage utters:] This EU faces an existential crisis. Indeed, there is an outbreak of a contagious disease. It is not a new one; the Greeks first came across it a couple of thousand years ago [. . .] The diagnosis, by the way, will not be popular in this House: the disease is called democracy.

which I analysed as communicating the ad hoc metaphorical concept MOVEMENTS OF EUROSCEPTIC DEMOCRACY AS A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE. Following the echoic account of irony, (Wilson & Sperber, 2012a, pp. 128-129), as a subtype of attributive use to convey the speaker's own attitude to an attributed thought, rather than to only convey information about the content of that attributed thought, I argue that in (7) Farage attributes a metaphorical view to the EU that describes a conception of DEMOCRACY as a CONTAGIOUS DISEASE and tacitly dissociates himself from it. He decontests DEMOCRACY via nationalist-conservative ideology, as a majoritarianism which only has validity on a national level, and conflates it with Euroscepticism. The metaphorical concept negatively evaluates Farage's

conception of DEMOCRACY as something dangerous and something to be eradicated. This is an elitist, arrogant and antagonistic view of DEMOCRACY which any legitimate democratic institution could not hold. In this way, Farage communicates an ideological decontestation which contributes to both the affective polarising function of populist framing, and ideological political polarisation.

Another example of metarepresentation is Iglesias's use of negation to communicate echoic denial (Wilson, 2000/12, p. 251) in (2). Here, Iglesias uses metaphor and negation in order to "introduce new information in order to deny it" (Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, p. 198). He attributes a metaphorical thought and then explicitly rejects it. Like with Farage's use of irony, the attributed metaphorical thought is elitist, arrogant and antagonistic. The attribution and explicit rejection of the metaphorical thought helps to position the EU as a corrupt political elite who treat their own citizens like children and who conspire with a global financial elite to colonise them. Through negation, Iglesias positions himself as the opposite, the voice of the people rejecting this view of themselves. In this case, ideological polarisation is attempted by attributing certain ideological decontestations to the EU elite: They do not hold a conception of the rule-bound STATE as protecting THE INDIVIDUAL from capitalism, but have a conception of an unrestrained STATE facilitating capitalism's colonisation and control of the INDIVIDUAL. Part of populism's attack on liberal democracy is the attribution of illiberal decontestations of core liberal concepts to their opponents. Populism attacks liberal democracy from within, and active metaphor would seem to be a particularly effective tool for accomplishing this.

I also found examples of metaphor and denial which did not use negation. In (8)

(8)   [New York, 07/06/2016. Clinton says:] Donald Trump is temperamentally unfit to be president and commander-in-chief. And he's not just trying to build a wall between America and Mexico – he's trying to wall off Americans from each other.

Clinton attributes a metaphorical thought to Trump by echoing his literal utterances (his repeated promises to build a physical wall between the US and Mexico). This does not seem to be ironic because it seems more than a tacit dissociation, but nor is it explicit denial through negation. Rather, it seems that denial of Trump's thought is implicitly communicated through linguistic context (through words like "temperamentally unfit') and the mutually manifest assumption that Clinton disagrees with Trump.

I have also found examples where metaphorical thought is attributed, but without any form of denial or dissociation, such as in (5) when Clinton attributes the metaphorical thought AMERICA AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ASSET ON THE BALANCE SHEET to corporate America.

These various uses of metarepresentation and metaphor are an important and original finding of this thesis, and they would not have been found without adopting a corpus-pragmatic method to derive "a representative volume of data, sieved through pragmatics theories" (Romero-Trillo, 2013, p. 1) and a pragmatic theory of metaphorical utterance identification and interpretation with which to analyse the data.

10.2.9. Conclusions and Questions Arising from Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative analysis of subjects' use of active metaphorical utterances allowed me to come to some interesting conclusions. First of all, in both the EUP and US corpora, populists used metaphor to communicate populist frames and non-populists used active metaphor for other objectives, such as to achieve some ideological or policy objective (such as Iratxe García's DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS TERRORISM metaphor). This might seem expected but there is no reason why populists could not use metaphor for other communicative aims. Indeed, seeing as both Farage and Iglesias were designated "somewhat populist" according to the holistic grading score, one might expect them to use metaphors for a variety of reasons, especially given their relatively high rate of active metaphor use (see table 10.1). This indicates the usefulness of metaphor for the communication of populist frames. In the US corpora, this was also the case. Most of Trump and Sanders metaphorical utterances communicated or helped to communicate a populist frame but Clinton's metaphors mostly did not (a few of her metaphorical utterances, such as the utterance which communicated AMERICAN SOCIETY UNDER TRUMP AS CORPORATION might be considered populist). In fact, Clinton's metaphors often countered populist framing.

The quantitative and qualitative analyses combined lead us to a most interesting question: Hillary Clinton showed a higher rate of active metaphorical utterances than her populist counterparts and seemed to use active metaphorical utterances as a counterframing tool against populist frames. Why was this? I have suggested that this might be because populist attitudes were prevalent in America of 2016, based on research conducted in Rahn (2016). My hypothesis for future research is that the rate of active metaphorical utterance use by populist speaker will be higher when populist attitudes are less prevalent among the

voting public. Indeed, preliminary research into the attitudes towards the European Union supports this hypothesis. Using the European Union's Eurobarometer survey data for 2016 (Nancy, 2016), we can see that 53% of European citizens believed that their country being an EU member was a good thing (Nancy, 2016, p. 6), and this held at a reasonable 47% in the UK and 55% in Spain. However, there are also indications that the situation was ripe for populist frames to take hold: "Europeans feel that their voice counts less and less, both at national and at European level" (Nancy, 2016, p. 6). While this is only a brief preliminary look at the data, it does support the conclusion that populist speakers like Farage and Iglesias used more active metaphors than their non-populist counterparts because they needed to construct and communicate populist frames as counterframes against the dominant, neutral or positive frames towards the EU institutions among European citizens, and among citizens in their own countries in particular. In America, given the widespread dissatisfaction with mainstream politics in 2016, (Rahn, 2019), Clinton used more active metaphorical utterances in order to counter the dominant or increasingly dominant frames of Occupy Wall Street on the left, and the Tea Party on the right. This potential relationship between active metaphorical utterances and a counterframing function against dominant frames is an important finding for the study of metaphor in political discourse.

10.3 How the General Objectives are Met

10.3.1. General Objectives

The general objectives of this thesis were:

1. To apply a pragmatic theory of metaphor (pragmatic IT) to political discourse
2. To investigate the use of active metaphorical utterances by potential populists
3. To investigate the use of active metaphorical utterances to communicate ideology

In this section, I describe how these general objectives were met.

10.3.2. A Pragmatic Theory of Metaphor (Pragmatic IT) Applied to Political Discourse

Given the success of my specific objectives, I believe I have successfully applied Romero and Soria's pragmatic IT to political discourse. Moreover, the corpora to which I applied the thesis were large and complex, entailing quite a few challenges in the application of the theory. One challenge was to extract the relevant data from the large EUP corpus, retaining the relevant contextual information, while automating as much of the process as possible in order to make it feasible for a single researcher. In order to meet this challenge, I had to program a macro which extracted manually tagged data from a large number of documents. In effect, I fashioned my own corpus analysis tool.

I faced further challenges in applying Romero and Soria's identification criteria to the naturally occurring examples I found in analysis. Using dictionaries to compare the meaning in the corpus to the lexicalised meanings, I found that some conventional metaphorical senses of words were reactivated in context. Given the limited discussion of this kind of reactivation in the literature and given the somewhat subjective intuition on which it is based, I was faced with choice; I could stick rigidly to my method and reject such utterances as conventional, but potentially exclude important information from qualitative analysis; or I could accept them as active and potentially undermine the quantitative data. I chose the latter. For the purposes of this thesis, quantitative data was meant to inform the qualitative data, rather than statistically prove or disprove a hypothesis. Furthermore, by explicitly outlining the situations under which an utterance was accepted as reactivated, I could take some pre-emptive steps into this interesting borderland between conventional and active metaphorical utterances. Nevertheless, it is an area where I think my framework, and other frameworks, should be refined in future research.

10.3.3. The Use of Active Metaphorical Utterances by Populists

The first vital task in achieving this aim was to distinguish populist from non-populist speakers. Populism, as a political phenomenon and as an object of academic study, is highly contested. For the purposes of this thesis, I decided it was best to approach populism as a social action frame (Benford & Snow, 2000), as suggested by Aslanidis (2016), rather than a thin-centred ideology, as suggested by Mudde (2004).

Approaching populism as a frame allowed me to separate the aspects of the phenomenon which were purely discursive, from those that were ideological. This was an

important theoretical step for two reasons. Firstly, because I could then assess how metaphor contributed to populism and ideology separately, without conflating the two. Secondly, it allowed me to measure populism as matter of degree, to avoid categorising speakers as populist and non-populist based purely on intuition and reputation.

In order to measure a speaker's degree of populism, I turned to the holistic-grading method of Team Populism (Hawkins & Silva, 2019). Ideally, this kind of research would be carried out by a team of researchers in order to arrive at reliable data, backed up by an intercoder reliability test. I was able to compensate for the lack co-researchers by using a corpus of speeches already coded by Team Populism and made available on their website (Hawkins, 2016). By training myself using their anchor texts and coding rubric (Team Populism, 2019), and then carrying out intercoder and intracoder reliability checks (Krippendorff, 2004), I was able to confirm that I was using the method correctly, and that I could confidently apply it to the EUP corpus.

Once I had measured the degree of populist discourse demonstrated by a speaker and applied the identification criteria of pragmatic IT to retrieve quantitative data for active metaphor use, I could then qualitatively analyse metaphorical utterances used by populists and non-populists. My findings indicate that active metaphor is indeed a useful tool for communicating populist frames, but that its use by populists may depend on other factors, such as the prevalence of populist ideas in wider society. Active metaphorical utterances would seem to be useful to populists and non-populists alike when they need to counter more dominant, accepted frames. This counterframing hypothesis needs to be confirmed by future empirical research but it is a hypothesis has directly arisen out of the quantitative and qualitative results of this thesis.

10.3.4. The use of Active Metaphorical Utterances to Communicate Ideology

One of the original aspects of this thesis is its combination of a pragmatic theory of metaphor which deals with the modification and communication of concepts with a theory of political ideology which deals with the contestation and communication of political concepts. This is a unique approach for research into the use of metaphor in political discourse, in its pragmatic approach to metaphor, in its morphological approach to ideology, and in the combination of the two. I believe it is powerful combination which has allowed me to be extremely precise on how ideological content is communicated by metaphorical utterances.

I have shown how both populists and non-populists use metaphor to communicate the decontestations of political concepts. Most importantly, I have been able to separate the communication of populism from the communication of ideology, which reveals interesting differences and similarities in how populists and non-populists use metaphor. One difference is that populists use metaphor primarily to position their opponents according to the populist frame, and often do this by attributing decontestations of political concepts to their opponents, or attributing attitudes towards certain decontestations of political concepts. While non-populists such as Clinton also use metaphor to attribute thoughts to their opponents, this seems to be a way to position political opponents according to specific policy positions (such as financial regulation and immigration) rather than positioning them as part of a corrupt elite class.

10.4. Concluding Remarks

At the outset of this PhD program, I wanted to explore how metaphor was used in polarising discourse. Starting off with a study of terrorism, I later decided that a study of populism would reveal more of the dynamics at play between metaphor and polarisation, and narrowed the scope of the thesis accordingly.

I believe the original theoretical framework developed in this thesis can be used to explore metaphor in other forms of polarising discourse and political discourse in general. The pragmatic approach to metaphor and the morphological approach to ideology could reveal a lot about how terrorist propaganda communicates its own type of polarising discourse. The populist elements of terrorism can be separated from its ideological components, given the framework I have outlined here. The attribution of thoughts to opponents, and the negation or dissociation from those thoughts by the speaker, is likely a feature of all polarising discourse.

Most importantly, I think I have emphasised the importance of pragmatic analysis for the study of metaphor in discourse. Restricting ourselves to abstract cognitive metaphors means that we are often concealing important aspects of how speakers use metaphor in communication. Novel metaphorical concepts, like conventional metaphorical concepts and concepts which are not metaphorical at all, are created ad hoc, modified, communicated, and contested every day in countless combinations and in countless different contexts. In order to investigate this, we must have a pragmatic theory for the identification and interpretation of metaphorically used language, and we must have a

framework for applying it to discourse. This thesis offers such a framework. I have demonstrated that novel metaphorical concepts, and active metaphorical utterances, cannot be considered less ideological than conventional metaphorical utterances.

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Spanish Summary

Resumen en Español

1. Introducción

1.1. Populismo y el Discurso Polarizador

La polarización política es un fenómeno que puede examinarse desde muchos ángulos diferentes. DiMaggio et al. (1996, p. 693) lo definen como un estado, "la medida en que las opiniones sobre una cuestión se oponen en relación con algún máximo teórico"[55], y como un proceso, "el aumento de dicha oposición a lo largo del tiempo". Algunos politólogos han distinguido entre la polarización de las élites y la polarización de las masas (Layman et al., 2006). Sin embargo, a los efectos de esta tesis, es más útil considerar las diferencias entre la polarización política ideológica, "la medida en que los diferentes partidos políticos ofrecen diferentes modelos políticos ideológicamente distantes" (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 8) y la polarización política afectiva, "la medida en que a los partidarios de diferentes partidos políticos les desagrada el otro partido político (y posiblemente sus partidarios)" (Tucker et al. , 2018, p. 8).

El populismo, tal como se entiende en esta tesis, es un marco discursivo que comunica una lucha maniquea entre un pueblo, puro y homogeneizado, y una élite corrupta (Aslanidis, 2016; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Hawkins & Silva, 2019). Un hablante populista, de cualquier posición ideológica, puede encasillar entidades *ingroup* y *outgroup* según estos opuestos polarizados, y por lo tanto contribuir a un discurso de polarización política afectiva, es decir, aumenta la animosidad entre los partidarios de los partidos políticos / posiciones ideológicas. En ese sentido, el discurso populista es polarizador.

Sin embargo, si consideramos que el populismo es un marco discursivo, entonces no es, en sí mismo, una forma de polarización política ideológica. Los marcos populistas pueden ser comunicados por figuras tan diversas como Donald Trump, en la derecha radical de la política estadounidense, y Pablo Iglesias, en la extrema izquierda de la política española.

El argumento de esta tesis es que los nuevos conceptos metafóricos y las proferencias metafóricas son utilizadas por los hablantes populistas para dar cuerpo al marco populista, para darle dientes y garras ideológicas. En esta tesis, la ideología se

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[55] Las traducciones de este resumen son mías.

analiza como la inevitable e irreconciliable "despolemización" (*decontestation*)[56] de conceptos políticos:

> Sólo podemos acceder al mundo político despolemizando las estructuras conceptuales controvertidas que nos permiten dar sentido a ese mundo, y lo hacemos, deliberada o inconscientemente, imponiendo significados específicos a la gama indeterminada de significados que nuestras agrupaciones conceptuales pueden tener. (Freeden, 2006, p. 19)

Mediante la adopción de una teoría de interacción pragmática de la metáfora (en adelante, *TI pragmática*) (Romero & Soria, 1997-8, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, en prensa), puedo explicar cómo las proferencias metafóricas se utilizan para comunicar significados provisionales a través de la construcción de *conceptos metafóricos ad hoc*. Así, las proferencias metafóricas activas pueden ser utilizadas por los populistas para comunicar concepciones de conceptos políticos, despolemizaciones de conceptos políticos, es decir, para comunicar sus posiciones ideológicas y contribuir tanto a la polarización política afectiva como a la polarización política ideológica.

1.2. Metáfora Novedosa (o Metáfora Activa)

Esta tesis adopta una teoría de interacción pragmática de la metáfora, la teoría de Romero y Soria de las proferencias metafóricas o metáforas activas[57] (Romero & Soria, 1997-8,

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[56] Un neologismo de Freeden que se traduce comúnmente de esta manera en español.

[57] Al usar *metáfora activa* estoy recurriendo a la terminología de Black (1954-5). Romero y Soria también se refieren a este tipo de metáforas cuando hablan de las proferencias metafóricas, proferencias cuya interpretación depende de significados no convencionales (no lexicalizados) derivados a través de un proceso de mapeo metafórico entre dominios. En la bibliografía especializada se hablado de las metáforas activas de diversas maneras, muchas de las cuales implican suposiciones o imprecisiones que deseo evitar, por ejemplo, metáforas poéticas (Lakoff & Turner, 1989), metáforas originales (Goatly, 1997, 2007) y metáforas deliberadas (Steen, 2017) y, más ampliamente, metáforas novedosas. Romero y Soria (1997-8) usan el término metáfora novedosa que evita supuestos como el de que todas las metáforas no-convencionales son poéticas, originales o deliberadas. Aunque yo sigo su teoría y yo mismo he usado este término en el título de la tesis, me he decantado por favorecer el uso del término acuñado por Black, *metáfora activa*, para referirme a las proferencias metafóricas y así destacar la diferencia entre las proferencias metafóricas y los conceptos metafóricos novedosos que se construyen online en el proceso de interpretación de dichas proferencias. Una proferencia es metafórica, según Romero y Soria, cuando se activa el mecanismo metafórico para su interpretación, por tanto, no hay proferencias metafóricas literales. Una proferencia metafórica para Romero y Soria es siempre una metáfora activa y por eso, aunque sí puede haber conceptos metafóricos convencionales, el término *metáfora literal* es para ellas (2005a) una contradicción en los términos.

1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, en prensa). Las teorías de la interacción se han desarrollado a partir del trabajo de Max Black (Black, 1954-5, 1977, 1979) que se ocupaba de las proferencias metafóricas nuevas o activas, es decir, las proferencias que procesamos metafóricamente. Viendo la metáfora como un fenómeno cognitivo y lingüístico, Black afirmó que tales metáforas activas podrían ser analizadas como mapeos entre una idea, o sistema de ideas, y otra. Si bien las ideas de Black se han desarrollado en muchas direcciones, su descendencia más influyente es la teoría de la metáfora cognitiva (TMC) (Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003; Lakoff & Turner, 1989), probablemente el enfoque más dominante de la metáfora en los estudios del discurso actual.

La TMC se diferencia de otras teorías de interacción de dos maneras importantes: en primer lugar, la TMC ve la metáfora como un fenómeno principalmente cognitivo y es lingüístico solo de una manera derivada. Por esa razón, el uso metafórico activo de expresiones que a Black le preocupaban se descartan como poco interesantes para ellos: "Las generalizaciones que rigen las expresiones metafóricas poéticas no están en el lenguaje, sino en el pensamiento" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 203). Más bien, la TMC se ocupa de las *metáforas conceptuales convencionales* que se conciben como sistemáticas en el sistema conceptual humano. Las proferencias, literales o metafóricas, han sido descartadas como derivadas, la "manifestación superficial de la metáfora conceptual" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 224). Por ejemplo, expresiones en inglés que podrían interpretarse literalmente a nivel lingüístico como "our relationship isn't going anywhere" [nuestra relación no va a ninguna parte], "we're at a crossroads" [estamos en una encrucijada], y "we're spinning our wheels" [estamos girando nuestras ruedas], son las expresiones lingüísticas superficiales de una metáfora conceptual convencional EL AMOR ES UN VIAJE (Lakoff, 1993, p. 206). Son expresiones literales porque se han vuelto lo suficientemente convencionales como para ser procesadas literalmente a nivel lingüístico, pero son metafóricas a nivel conceptual. Si bien la TMC reconoce la existencia de *nuevos conceptos metafóricos,* que presumiblemente no pueden ser interpretados literalmente (una expresión motivada por un nuevo concepto metafórico no puede ser convencional), la TMC ha tendido a centrarse en conceptos metafóricos convencionales y suele ignorar cualquier fenómeno de nivel lingüístico que pudiera ser el resultado de nuevos conceptos metafóricos, conceptos que contribuyen a la proposición expresada por el hablante.

En segundo lugar, la TMC ve los conceptos metafóricos como mapeos entre conceptos principalmente estáticos en la memoria a largo plazo (Lakoff, 1993, p. 210). Si bien parece que los mapeos se pueden extender en contextos para crear expresiones metafóricas más imaginativas o novedosas en su teoría, hay pocas explicaciones de cómo funciona esto en el discurso porque la TMC no tiene una teoría de la comunicación. A nivel lingüístico, la TMC se centra en expresiones metafóricas descontextualizadas, no en las proferencias metafóricas (*metaphorical utterances*), por lo que hay poco análisis pragmático del significado en su teoría. En resumen, la TMC es un marco valioso para el análisis de los aspectos cognitivos de la metáfora en la memoria a largo plazo, pero tiene poco que ofrecernos sobre los aspectos cognitivos de la construcción del concepto metafórico en la memoria de trabajo, o los efectos contextuales que podrían influir en el significado metafórico en el discurso.

Estos límites de la TMC se han mostrado problemáticos al aplicarse al estudio de ideologías o discursos políticos. La TMC no ofrece criterios de identificación de ejemplos de proferencias metafóricas para distinguir los usos de expresiones que requieren una interpretación literal de los usos de expresiones que requieren una interpretación metafórica, siendo estos últimos los usos que Black pretendía explicar. La TMC tampoco ofrece una explicación clara de cómo el significado metafórico se comunica como parte del significado del hablante. Los investigadores se han visto obligados a cerrar esta brecha entre el concepto metafórico y proferencias metafóricas activas ellos mismos, a través de una variedad de medios. Charteris-Black (2004; 2005), por ejemplo, postula una función pragmática de la metáfora como evaluación implícita, Musolff (2004; 2016) sugiere un escenario metafórico (*metaphor scenario*)*,* y recientemente Steen (2017) ha recurrido a la teoría de interacción (Gentner, 1983; Gentner &Bowdle, 2008) para la interpretación de algunos tipos de proferencias metafóricas activas no convencionales. Algunos marcos han tenido éxito en la aplicación de la TMC al discurso político (Cameron, 2008; Charteris-Black, 2004, 2005, 2019; Musolff, 2004, 2016; Goatly, 2007). Sin embargo, su análisis pragmático es limitado y no se centra en la explicación de cómo el contexto afecta al mapeo metafórico. El enfoque de su trabajo sigue siendo las metáforas conceptuales convencionales que se dice que son parte del sistema cognitivo en la memoria a largo plazo en lugar de centrarse en el proceso dinámico de creación de conceptos metafóricos. En el caso de la teoría de la metáfora deliberada (TMD), Steen (Steen, 2017) ha adoptado una teoría de interacción (Gentner, 1983; Gentner &Bowdle, 2008). Sin embargo, la teoría de la interacción de Gentner también carece de una explicación de los aspectos pragmáticos

de las metáforas. De todos modos, el hecho de que los defensores de TMD hayan comenzado a centrarse en algunos tipos de proferencias metafóricas activas en el discurso político es un avance positivo (Heyvaert et al., 2020; Perrez & Reuchamps, 2014; Perrez et al., 2019; Reijnierse et al., 2018).

La razón principal por la que los estudios de la metáfora en el discurso político se centran principalmente en metáforas conceptuales convencionales y las expresiones metafóricas literales que están motivadas por ellas, en lugar de nuevos conceptos metafóricos y proferencias metafóricas activas, es porque las primeras son vistas como herramientas ideológicas potencialmente poderosas. Desde la TMC se afirma que el sistema metafórico convencional es generalmente inconsciente: "un extenso, y en su mayoría inconsciente, sistema de metáfora que utilizamos de forma automática e irreflexiva para comprender complejidades y abstracciones" (Lakoff, 1992, p. 2). Esto se combina con una visión sociocognitiva de la ideología (van Dijk, 1998) como algo similar a la hegemonía de Antonio Gramsci; algo ubicuo pero inconsciente, propagado y asimilado irreflexivamente a través del discurso. El argumento, más claramente explicitado en Goatly (2007), pero tácitamente asumido en gran parte del análisis de la metáfora en el discurso político, es que los conceptos y las proferencias metafóricas convencionales son más ideológicos porque se activan inconscientemente, mientras que los conceptos metafóricos novedosos y las proferencias metafóricas activas requieren una reflexión más consciente y, por lo tanto, son menos ideológicas:

Cuando nos encontramos con la metáfora original [novedosa] tenemos que hacer mucho más trabajo mental que cuando procesamos una metáfora convencional [. . .] es precisamente porque están convencionalizados que pueden alcanzar el poder de afectar inconscientemente nuestro pensamiento sin que seamos conscientes de ello. (Goatly, 2007, p. 22)

Si bien creo que el estudio de las metáforas convencionales utilizadas por una comunidad de habla conduce a ideas interesantes sobre la ideología a nivel sociológico, no creo que la TMC sea una herramienta adecuada para el estudio de la comunicación de la ideología política en el discurso. Sin una teoría pragmática de la comunicación que tenga en cuenta el significado intencionado por el hablante (Grice, 1957/89, 1967/89; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95), no hay manera de analizar cómo un hablante en particular utiliza una proferencia dada (literal o metafóricamente interpretada) para comunicar contenido

ideológico. Para que los intentos de integrar la TMC y la teoría de la comunicación tengan éxito (Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008), la TMC ya no puede descartar la metáfora como solo derivadamente lingüística: una explicación metafórica alcanzada a través del mapeo metafórico tendría que ser dinámica, sensible al contexto, y explicar el papel de relevancia en su cálculo.

Un mapeo metafórico dinámico y sensible al contexto es descrito por la TI pragmática de Romero y Soria. Al igual que la TI de Black, se centra en metáforas activas, las proferencias que interpretamos metafóricamente. Así como teoría de la Relevancia (TR) de Sperber y Wilson (1986/95) toma la teoría de Grice y la desarrolla en una teoría cognitivo-pragmática plausible de la comunicación, la TI pragmática toma la TI de Black y la desarrolla en una teoría cognitivo-pragmática de la identificación e interpretación de proferencias metafóricas. La interpretación de proferencias metafóricas se describe como la construcción de conceptos metafóricos ad hoc a través de una función de mapeo entre dominios. La función de mapeo, guiada por la relevancia y la coherencia, da como resultado un *lo que se dice metafórico*. Este es un proceso en línea, dinámico en la memoria de trabajo para construir conceptos ad hoc que forman parte de la proposición metafórica expresada intencionada por el hablante.

Un objetivo principal de esta tesis es mostrar cómo la TI pragmática revela el potencial ideológico de nuevos conceptos metafóricos y proferencias metafóricas activas. Mientras que los nuevos conceptos metafóricos y proferencias metafóricas activas han sido descartados bajo la TMC como solo mínimamente ideológicos, porque son más reflexivos o toman más esfuerzo de procesamiento, la TI pragmática describe la interpretación de la proferencia metafórica activa como un proceso generalmente sub-personal (es decir, inconsciente) y sub-proposicional involucrado en la derivación de los significados provisionales de las palabras que se usan metafóricamente. Solo con ese argumento, ya se resiste a la idea de que los conceptos metafóricos novedosos y las proferencias metafóricas activas son menos ideológicos. Sin embargo, el argumento a favor de utilizar la TI pragmática para analizar el discurso político es más fuerte que eso. Describir cómo un lo que se dice metafórico se construye y logra el significado del hablante nos permite examinar cómo el contenido ideológico puede comunicarse intencionalmente por hablantes individuales e cómo se puede inferir por oyentes individuales. En definitiva, la metáfora no es sólo un reflejo inconsciente de la ideología hegemónica sino que puede ser analizada como parte de la comunicación intencional de ideologías políticas en el discurso.

1.3. Objetivos de la Investigación

Una vez aclarado el esquema general del contexto de la investigación, puedo establecer mis objetivos de investigación. Esta investigación es un estudio de método mixto en el que se analizan datos cuantitativos con el fin de informar y enriquecer una etapa de análisis cualitativo. Como tal, en la formación de mis objetivos de investigación, he seguido las recomendaciones sobre el diseño de objetivos de investigación mixta dadas en Tashakkori y Creswell (2007).

Objetivos generales:
1. Aplicar una teoría pragmática de la metáfora (TI pragmática) al discurso político
2. Investigar el uso de proferencias metafóricas activas por parte de potenciales populistas
3. Investigar el uso de proferencias metafóricas activas para comunicar ideología

Estos objetivos generales provocan objetivos más específicos:

1. Diseñar y compilar un corpus que facilite la investigación del lenguaje metafóricamente utilizado por los populistas en el Parlamento de la UE, 2014-2019, y durante la campaña de las elecciones presidenciales en los EE.UU., 2016
2. Desarrollar una metodología de corpus que proporcione datos cualitativos que puedan informar el análisis cualitativo pragmático
3. Desarrollar un marco teórico que facilite el análisis del contenido ideológico como parte del significado del hablante
4. Evaluar el discurso de los populistas potenciales contra sus equivalentes no populistas, con el fin de verificar hasta qué punto pueden ser considerados populistas
5. Para anotar manualmente un corpus utilizando criterios de identificación pragmáticos para proferencias metafóricas activas
6. Comparar cuantitativamente los usos populistas y no populistas de las proferencias metafóricas activas en mis corpus

7. Comparar cualitativamente los usos populistas y no populistas de las proferencias metafóricas activas con fines ideológicos

8. Discutir las posibles interpretaciones de los datos cuantitativos a la luz de los hallazgos cualitativos, y así generar hipótesis para futuras investigaciones

Como he comentado, los conceptos metafóricos novedosos y las declaraciones metafóricas no convencionales a menudo se descartan como poco interesantes y sólo mínimamente ideológicas. Mis conclusiones demostrarán mediante un análisis cualitativo que esas afirmaciones no están justificadas.

2. Marco Teórico

2.1. Enfoque Pragmático de la Identificación e Interpretación Metafórica

Los desarrollos contemporáneos de las TI no niegan las ideas y la importancia del trabajo realizado en la TMC. Sin embargo, existe el reconocimiento de que la TMC es limitada y difiere de las ideas originales de Black en algunos aspectos importantes. Algunas de estas diferencias son una cuestión de enfoque: la TMC se centra en la metáfora en el nivel cognitivo, la TI tiende a centrarse en la metáfora en el nivel lingüístico, mientras que también abraza la defensa de Black del valor cognitivo de la metáfora. Más importante aún son las formas en que difieren teóricamente: la TMC no distingue entre interpretación literal y metafórica en el procesamiento del lenguaje. No existen criterios para la identificación de usos metafóricos del lenguaje, y son reconocen la existencia de procesos activos en el procesamiento de metáforas.

La TI ha abordado durante mucho tiempo estos problemas (Black, 1954-5, 1977; Forceville, 1991, 1996, 1999, 2008, 2020; Gentner, 1981, 1983; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Gentner & Wolf, 2000; Indurkhya, 1986; Keating, 2021; Keating & Soria, 2019; Kittay, 1987; Romero & Soria, 1997-8, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021a, 2021b, en prensa).

Romero y Soria, en particular, han desarrollado un enfoque pragmático de la metáfora que combina ideas clave de la TMC, la TI de Black y otros desarrollos en pragmática y filosofía del lenguaje. La primera forma importante en que se apartan de la TMC es enfatizando la proferencia metafórica como su unidad de análisis. Esto se debe a que las proferencias son "las únicas unidades interpretables" (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p.

9). La TMC analiza conceptos metafóricos y expresiones metafóricas, ambos descontextualizados y, por tanto, inadecuados para el análisis de la interpretación de las metáforas en el uso del lenguaje.

Al tomar la proferencia como su unidad de análisis, la necesidad de distinguir el uso del lenguaje metafórico no literal del literal se vuelve primordial. Para ilustrar lo que podría considerarse literal en la TMC, Lakoff (1993, p. 205) utiliza la famosa expresión de Searle

(1)   El gato está sobre la alfombra (Searle, 1978, p. 208)

Lakoff analiza esta expresión como literal porque no es "comprendida mediante una metáfora conceptual" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 205). Tomándolo como una proferencia, sin embargo, Romero y Soria muestran cómo puede ser metafórica:

(2) [Sarah le pregunta a Marian dónde está su hijo de un año, y ella responde:] Mi gato está sobre la alfombra (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 12)

Claramente, en este contexto, Sarah tendría que tomar la respuesta de Marian como metafórica o como completamente irrelevante para su pregunta. La TMC no tiene el marco teórico adecuado para describir tales situaciones comunicativas porque no distinguen los usos literales del lenguaje de los usos metafóricos del lenguaje, sólo el pensamiento literal del pensamiento metafórico pero la distinción literal/metafórico no se aplica a los pensamientos sino a los usos del lenguaje. Se puede hablar de conceptos convencionales y no-convencionales pero no hay conceptos literales. (1) es una proferencia literal y (2) es una proferencia no literal y metafórica pero la expresión es la misma, la oración "el gato está sobre la alfombra". Mediante el uso de la expresión "gato" en (1), el hablante activa alguna de las concepciones asociadas al concepto convencional GATO mientras que mediante el uso de la expresión "gato" en (2), el hablante activa el mecanismo metafórico para la construcción del concepto no-convencional NIÑO^M o NIÑO COMO GATO.

Romero y Soria (2005a) restablecen esta distinción al enfatizar la diferencia entre significados convencionales y no convencionales. Los significados convencionales son el "almacén de conocimiento establecido de la comunidad" (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 10), "una previsibilidad de uso, formas y significados similar a un código " (Toolan, 1996, p. 9. Citado en Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 10), y el conocimiento de estos significados se

construye a través de la experiencia lingüística y extralingüística. Los significados convencionales contribuyen a los entornos cognitivos mutuos a los que las personas recurren para comunicarse con éxito (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95). Las preferencias literales son aquellas en las que un significado convencional de cada elemento léxico es operativo hasta que el proceso interpretativo ha concluido (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 14).

La metáfora es una de las formas en las que el lenguaje puede romper la estabilidad de estos significados convencionales (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 10). Romero y Soria trazan distinciones entre concepciones, conceptos y dominios. Los conceptos son "los constituyentes de los pensamientos y son estables" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 187). Las concepciones de conceptos son "los significados léxicos de las palabras que las expresan [conceptos] y deben entenderse como una idealización compleja de la comprensión de las palabras cuando se utilizan" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 187). Finalmente, los dominios son "representaciones de una parte de una concepción asociada a un concepto" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 188).

La información que constituye una concepción puede almacenarse en una determinada dirección conceptual de tres maneras: lógica, enciclopédica y léxica (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95, pp. 86-93). El contenido lógico es un conjunto de reglas inferenciales asociadas con el concepto. Por ejemplo, en el caso del concepto GATO, existe una concepción que contiene la regla de inferencia cuya salida es ANIMAL DE CIERTO TIPO (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 188). Una entrada enciclopédica incluye creencias y experiencias asociadas con el concepto, ya sea idiosincrásica o comúnmente sostenida: esto podría ser cualquier cosa, desde el conocimiento científico de los gatos hasta las experiencias personales con los gatos y la apariencia de los gatos (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 188). La entrada léxica es la estructura fonética y las propiedades gramaticales de la palabra "gato" (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 188).

En una preferencia literal, las palabras se utilizan para comunicar la concepción o concepciones convencionales de conceptos. En las preferencias metafóricas, sin embargo, algunas de las palabras se utilizan para comunicar concepciones no convencionales de conceptos (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 191).

Con el uso de "gato" en (2), parte de los significados o concepciones convencionales del concepto GATO reestructura la concepción de NIÑO. Se trata de una reestructuración metafórica provisional de la concepción del concepto; es poco probable que resulte en una reestructuración permanente del concepto NIÑO en el sistema conceptual, ni en el propio sistema conceptual de Sarah, ni en los conceptos convencionales que comparte con su

comunidad de habla. Sin embargo, esta reestructuración metafórica provisional es vital para que la comunicación en (2) tenga éxito.

¿Cómo identifica Sarah que (2) es una proferencia metafórica? Romero y Soria (1997-8, 2005a) sugieren dos criterios de identificación: anormalidad contextual y contraste conceptual. Una anormalidad contextual se percibe cuando una expresión se utiliza en un contexto lingüístico o extralingüístico inusual (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 12). Este podría ser el contexto local de la expresión o el contexto más amplio de la comunicación. En una proferencia de "el hombre es un lobo" se percibe que "lobo" se usa de manera anómala en el contexto lingüístico ya que un hombre no está categorizado como un lobo en el sistema conceptual de los individuos. En (2), Sarah reconoce que "gato" no puede referirse a un animal felino en este contexto situacional y debe tener un significado no convencional. El contraste conceptual se percibe cuando identificamos un concepto como dominio fuente (*source domain*) y otro concepto como dominio meta (*target domain*) (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 12). En (2), Sarah reconoce que el concepto de GATO se está utilizando para describir al de NIÑO y ajusta sus concepciones de ambos en consecuencia. (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 193).

Consideremos otro ejemplo utilizado a menudo por Romero y Soria, una proferencia metafórica que es inequívocamente novedosa o activa. Romero y Soria (2021a, en prensa) analizan una proferencia metafórica extendida que aparece en la película *About a Boy* (Weitz & Weitz, 2002). También cito la información contextual incluida en Romero y Soria (en prensa).

(3) [La escena tiene lugar justo al principio de la película y muestra al protagonista, Will, estando solo en casa y viendo el programa de televisión *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?*[Quién Quiere Ser Millonario?] Cuando el anfitrión pregunta: "¿Quién escribió la frase *no man is an island* [ningún hombre es una isla]? ¿John Donne? ¿John Milton? ¿John F. Kennedy? Jon Bon Jovi?", Will responde: "Jon Bon Jovi; demasiado fácil" y añade:]

En mi opinión todos los hombres son islas.

Y además, es el momento de ser una.

Esta es la era de las islas.

Hace cien años, tenías que depender de otras personas.

Nadie tenía televisión ni CDs ni DVDs ni vídeos…

… Ni cafeteras espresso para el hogar.

En realidad, no tenían ninguna cosa genial.

Mientras que ahora, como ves…

puedes convertirte en una pequeña isla paraíso.

Con las provisiones adecuadas y la actitud correcta…

… puedes ser un imán, tropical, bañado por el sol…

para jóvenes turistas suecas.

(…)

Y me gusta pensar que quizás yo sea esa clase de isla.

Me gusta pensar que soy genial. Me gusta pensar que soy Ibiza.

(*About a Boy*. Citado en Romero & Soria, 2021a, en prensa)

Este es un ejemplo interesante por varias razones, entre otras cosas porque es una forma de construcción de conceptos ad hoc recursivos (Romero & Soria, 2021a). Es decir, mientras que "no man is an island*"* de John Donne toma el concepto estable de ISLA como dominio fuente , este no es el caso de la metáfora extendida de (3) en la que "el dominio fuente ya es un concepto ad hoc representado por una combinación de palabras, como por ejemplo el sintagma nominal complejo 'una isla tropical bañada por el sol y un imán para jóvenes turistas suecas'; o el sintagma anafórico, 'esa clase de isla', señalando al anterior." (Romero & Soria, 2021a). Además, mientras que la proferencia de Donne tiene una conceptualización convencional del HOMBRE para el dominio meta, es decir, la humanidad en general[58], este no es el caso en la proferencia de Will donde el dominio meta es un tipo específico de hombre, un hombre como Will (Romero & Soria, 2021b). Analizan el dominio fuente ad hoc y el dominio meta ad hoc utilizados como entrada en el proceso metafórico como se muestra en la tabla 1 (Romero & Soria, en prensa):

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[58] Por esta razón, más tarde represento el concepto como HUMANO en lugar de HOMBRE

Tabla 1. Representación del dominio fuente y del dominio meta en la interpretación de (3)	
Dominio fuente (D$_s$): ISLA-TIPO IBIZA	**Dominio meta (D$_t$):** HOMBRE-TIPO WILL
D$_s$ = <V$_s$, S$_s$ >	**D$_t$ = <V$_t$, S$_t$>**
V$_s$ = {'Ibiza', 'isla', 'playa', 'bañada por el sol', 'playa', 'turista', 'separada', 'continente', 'España', 'Islas Baleares', 'diversión', 'libertad sexual', etc.}	**V$_t$** = {'hombre', 'joven', 'TV', 'cafetera de espresso', 'independiente', 'soltero', 'prójimo', 'sexo sin matrimonio', etc.}
S$_s$ = [1$_s$] Ibiza es una isla española, un cuerpo de tierra español aislado del continente español por el agua, [2$_s$] Ibiza es una isla bañada por el sol con fantásticas condiciones para disfrutar de la vida, [3$_s$] Ibiza tiene hermosas playas, [4$_s$] Ibiza recibe a menudo a jóvenes turistas en busca de diversión, [5$_s$] En los años sesenta, los extranjeros llegaron a islas españolas como Ibiza y cambiaron el estilo de vida local, [6$_s$] En los años sesenta, Ibiza era un lugar muy atractivo para muchas jóvenes turistas (suecas, danesas, alemanas...) con una aspecto físico y un comportamiento muy diferente al de las mujeres locales (generalmente se les llamaba "las suecas" y se convirtieron en el símbolo de la libertad sexual en España), [7$_s$] Ibiza es un cuerpo de tierra aislado del continente español, pero parte de una cadena de islas, las Islas Baleares, etc.	**S$_t$** = [1$_t$] Un hombre-tipo Will es un ser humano individual independiente de sus semejantes, [2$_t$] Will vive solo en una casa fantástica, [3$_t$] Will tiene muy buenos suministros en casa (TV, DVD, CDs, cafetera de espresso), [4$_t$] Will es libre de tomar decisiones por su cuenta, [5$_t$] La actitud de Will le hace disfrutar de un estilo de vida independiente, etc.

Los términos del dominio fuente como "isla", y "bañada por el sol" se usan aquí de una manera no convencional (anormalidad contextual) para describir una categoría ad hoc de humano varón a la que pertenece Will (contraste conceptual). Los criterios de identificación indican que una proferencia es metafórica y que se necesita una interpretación metafórica; se desencadena un proceso pragmático de asignación (M), de un dominio fuente (D$_s$), a un dominio meta (D$_t$). Este es un proceso activo involucrado en el acto de interpretación, más que un mapeo convencional que se fija en el sistema conceptual. Los dominios son representaciones de partes de las concepciones convencionales de D$_s$ y D$_t$. Consisten en un conjunto de términos, o vocabulario (V) y un conjunto de restricciones estructurales (S). M consiste en (i) una función admisible parcial F de los términos del dominio fuente (V$_s$), a los términos del dominio meta (V$_t$) o los términos de dominio meta potencial y (ii) el subconjunto de restricciones estructurales del dominio fuente (S$_s$) que

son coherentemente transformables a las restricciones estructurales del dominio meta (S_t) (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 195). En el ejemplo, implica (i) una función parcial[59], F, entre términos formados por pares tales como (isla → hombre), (separada → independiente), (continente → semejantes) etc., y (ii) un subconjunto de restricciones estructurales del dominio fuente (S) que se puede transformar coherentemente usando F en información asociada solo con el dominio meta. S es coherente y transformable por F si la unión es verdadera bajo al menos un modelo (Romero & Soria, 2005b, p. 195). En el ejemplo, S está formado por [1_s] - [7_s], restricciones estructurales que incluyen propiedades que no se aplican literalmente al HOMBRE-TIPO WILL. Los términos de dominio fuente obtienen el significado de los términos de dominio meta a los que se aplican en F, lo que significa que se establece en el dominio meta metafóricamente reestructurado. En (3) algunos términos como "isla", "tropical", "bañada por el sol", etc. adquieren un significado metafórico provisional, derivado de una concepción no convencional reestructurada de HOMBRE TIPO WILL. Es un significado provisional que interviene a nivel de constituyentes, es decir, un proceso sub-personal y sub-proposicional (Romero & Soria, 2005a, p. 16). Lo que se dice con (3), *what is said*, es, por lo tanto, metafóricamente dicho. La tabla 2 muestra el dominio meta reestructurado $D_{t'}$, o D_t^M,[60] que proporciona el contexto metafórico necesario para la interpretación de la proferencia (Romero & Soria, en prensa):

Tabla 2. Representación del dominio meta metafóricamente reestructurado involucrado en la interpretación de (3)
Dominio meta reestructurado ($D_{t'}$ or HOMBRE TIPO WILL^M): HOMBRE TIPO WILL COMO ISLA TIPO IBIZA
[$1_{t'}$] Un hombre-tipo-Will es un ser humano individual independiente de sus semejantes.   [$2_{t'}$] Will vive solo en una casa fantástica,   [$3_{t'}$] Will tiene muy buenos suministros en casa (TV, DVD, CDs, cafetera de espresso),   [$4_{t'}$] Un hombre-tipo-Will es libre de tomar decisiones por su cuenta,   [$5_{t'}$] La actitud de Will le hace disfrutar de un estilo de vida muy independiente,   [$6_{t'}$] Un hombre-tipo-Will a menudo recibe visitantes ocasionales en busca de diversión (nuevo que viene de [4_s]),   [$7_{t'}$] Un hombre-tipo-Will es un hombre muy atractivo para las visitantes femeninas ocasionales y atractivas con la actitud adecuada (libertad sexual típica de "las suecas" en España) para disfrutar de sus buenas condiciones con él, pero sin intención de obtener derechos locales permanentes. (nuevo que viene de [6_s])

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[59] F es admisible en el sentido de que conserva los tipos de argumentos y valores de la función según sus entradas léxicas.

[60] Ambas notaciones, $D_{t'}$ y D_t^M, han sido utilizados para el dominio objetivo reestructurado por Romero y Soria en diferentes artículos. He decidido usar D_t^M para mis propios ejemplos en esta tesis, porque siento que facilita la lectura.

El mapeo M para (3) genera una concepción metafóricamente reestructurada, HOMBRE-TIPO WILL COMO ISLA-TIPO IBIZA, caracterizada por las restricciones estructurales de la tabla 2. Con [1_t'] a [5_t'] no se añade nada nuevo al dominio meta desde el dominio fuente, pero parte de la información se ve reforzada y resaltada por las similitudes relacionales que se revelan por su alineación con las características activadas (por la proferencia) en el dominio fuente. Por ejemplo, [1_t] se refuerza mediante la alineación con [1_s], dando como resultado [1_t']. Además, cuando la descripción del dominio meta del dominio fuente agrega información que no está presente en el primero pero que es coherente con él y relevante para el significado metafórico previsto, surgen nuevas propiedades en el dominio fuente como en el caso de [6_t'] y [7_t']. Romero y Soria dejan claro que el mapeo en línea del dominio fuente al dominio meta también permite que algunas restricciones de dominio meta se debiliten en el dominio meta reestructurado, aunque no incluyen un ejemplo en su análisis de (3). Como ejemplo de esto, podemos suponer que un hombre-tipo-Will podría ser considerado inmaduro. De hecho, el tema principal de la película es la evolución de Will hacia un tipo de hombre más maduro que tiene relaciones significativas. Ya tenemos una restricción en ISLA-TIPO IBIZA , restricción [4_s], que podría ser mapeada coherentemente para reforzar una restricción de inmadurez. Sin embargo, la restricción de inmadurez no es relevante para el significado previsto de Will en (3) y, por lo tanto, no se selecciona como parte del dominio meta reestructurado. En la TI pragmática, el fortalecimiento, el debilitamiento y la creación de restricciones es parte del logro del significado proposicional intencionado por el hablante, guiado por la relevancia y la coherencia. Esto nos permite explicar los diferentes efectos metafóricos de las proferencias en el discurso.

2.2. El Populismo Como Marco Discursivo

Como se analiza en Bonikowski y Gidron (2016), los enfoques contemporáneos del populismo se pueden distinguir en tres grandes grupos: el populismo como ideología, el populismo como discurso y el populismo como estrategia política. Cabe señalar desde el principio, sin embargo, que no son necesariamente mutuamente excluyentes y que con frecuencia se cruzan (por ejemplo, en el trabajo de Team Populism; Hawkins et al., 2019).[61]

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[61] *Team Populism* es un grupo de investigación que "reúne a reconocidos académicos de Europa y América para estudiar las causas y consecuencias del populismo [. . .] mediante el estudio de múltiples niveles de análisis, y nos basamos en diferentes herramientas metodológicas, incluyendo experimentos, encuestas y análisis comparativos" (https://populism.byu.edu/).

El enfoque de esta tesis está basado en gran medida en los enfoques discursivos, pero con algunas diferencias importantes, teórica y metodológicamente. Estoy de acuerdo con Aslanidis (2016) en que el enfoque ideológico no es sólido (sus afirmaciones esencialistas son en última instancia infalsificables) pero que sus beneficios metodológicos (una definición que se hace fácilmente operativa y aplicable a estudios de casos dispares) pueden conservarse a través de una definición discursiva mínima. También estoy de acuerdo con su insistencia en que debemos ser cautelosos con los sesgos normativos que pueden socavar el estudio académico del populismo (y la política, en general). También coincido con Aslanidis cuando insiste en que una clara distinción entre discurso e ideología (Aslanidis, 2016): la fusión de los dos, ya sea en el sentido postestructuralista, o bajo el enfoque ideacional superordinado puede fomentar el deslizamiento conceptual y estirar el concepto de populismo hasta que casi no tenga sentido. Sin embargo, estoy de acuerdo con Moffitt en que adoptar un enfoque demasiado minimalista del discurso puede impedir que veamos aspectos importantes de los fenómenos (Moffitt, 2016). Hay que encontrar un equilibrio entre restringir el estudio del discurso populista a las características textuales y ampliar el alcance para incluir las infinitas variables del contexto. Esta es la contribución que la pragmática puede aportar y un enfoque original que esta tesis desarrolla. El resultado es un enfoque pragmático del corpus para el análisis de la metáfora activa en el discurso populista.

En esta tesis sostengo que el contenido comunicado por el hablante a través de las proferencias metafóricas activa*s* contribuye a la construcción de marcos populistas con fines ideológicos. Sin embargo, antes de analizar cómo las proferencias metafóricas activas interactúan con los marcos populistas, debemos definir el marco populista y establecer su presencia en un corpus.

Sigo las definiciones discursivas minimalistas de Aslanidis (2016) y Bonokowski y Gidron (2016) que conceptualizan el populismo como marco, pero lo pongo en práctica a la manera de Hawkins et al. (2019). Aunque Team Populism conceptualiza el populismo como un conjunto de ideas, y no distingue claramente entre ideología y el discurso, se refieren explícitamente al populismo como un marco ideacional (*ideational frame*) (Carlin et al. , 2019, p. 420).

Por lo tanto, siguiendo en gran medida el trabajo de Hawkins et al. (2019), Aslanidis (2016) y Bonikowski y Gidron (2016), analizo el populismo como un marco discursivo que consta de tres características:

(a) una cosmología maniquea y moral

(b) la proclamación de "el pueblo" como una comunidad homogénea y virtuosa;

(c) la representación de "la élite" como una entidad corrupta y egoísta (Carlin et al., 2019, p. 420).

No es necesario que los populistas digan explícitamente "pueblo" o "élites", es suficiente con deben evocarlos y cuando lo hacen, deben hacerlo en el contexto de una lucha maniquea: El pueblo virtuoso contra la élite corrupta. Lo más importante es que las personas sean consideradas como una entidad homogénea.

Este último punto puede parecer obvio y la observación menos controvertida sobre el populismo, pero vale la pena definirlo más a fondo. Es bastante común, casi un cliché en la política estadounidense, hablar de la gente como un grupo moralmente puro. Por ejemplo, en este discurso del Presidente Obama:

Elegí postularme para la Presidencia en este momento de la historia porque creo profundamente que no podemos resolver los desafíos de nuestro tiempo a menos que los resolvamos juntos, a menos que perfeccionemos nuestra unión entendiendo que podemos tener historias diferentes, pero tenemos esperanzas comunes; que puede que no nos veamos igual y que no hayamos venido del mismo lugar, pero todos queremos avanzar en la misma dirección: hacia un futuro mejor para nuestros hijos y nuestros nietos. Esta creencia proviene de mi fe inquebrantable en la decencia y generosidad del pueblo estadounidense. Pero también viene de mi propia historia. (Obama, 2008, 187.2)

En este discurso de Barack Obama, el pueblo estadounidense es homogéneo en su decencia y generosidad. Sin embargo, está claro que con esto no está evocando un marco populista. Para empezar, no hay lucha maniquea con una élite corrupta. Pero, además de eso, su uso colectivo de un pueblo estadounidense moral está calificado por un reconocimiento explícito y una evaluación positiva del pluralismo dentro del colectivo: "podemos tener historias diferentes, pero tenemos esperanzas comunes". Si lo contrastamos con el discurso inaugural de Donald Trump, podemos ver la diferencia claramente:

La ceremonia de hoy, sin embargo, tiene un significado muy especial. Porque hoy no estamos simplemente transfiriendo poder de una administración a otra, o de un partido a otro, sino que estamos transfiriendo poder de Washington, D.C. y devolviéndoselo a ustedes, el pueblo estadounidense. Durante demasiado tiempo, un pequeño grupo en la capital de nuestra nación ha cosechado las recompensas del gobierno, mientras que el pueblo ha asumido el costo. Washington floreció, pero el pueblo no compartió su riqueza. Los políticos prosperaron, pero los puestos de trabajo se fueron y las fábricas cerraron. El establecimiento se protegía a sí mismo, pero no a los ciudadanos de nuestro país. (Trump, 2017)

Aquí, Trump no solo coloca al pueblo homogéneo en oposición a una élite corrupta, sino que excluye a la clase política como parte del pueblo. A esto se refiere Jan Werner Müller cuando dice "los populistas siempre son anti-pluralistas: los populistas afirman que ellos, y sólo ellos, representan al pueblo" (Müller, 2017, p. 20) y que [parafraseando al filósofo francés Claude Lefort] "las personas supuestamente reales primero tienen que ser 'extraídas' de la suma total de ciudadanos reales" (Müller, 2017, p. 20). La gente del marco populista debe basarse en esta exclusión moral del otro, en lugar de la unidad en la diversidad que se ve en el discurso de Obama.

Al adoptar la definición desagregada en tres partes de Team Populism, mi investigación puede contextualizarse mejor dentro de la bibliografía especializada, tanto en cómo se beneficia de la investigación contemporánea como en cómo puede contribuir a ella.

2.3. La Teoría Morfológica de la Ideología

Una de las concepciones más establecidas de la ideología en la ciencia política es la del enfoque morfológico de Freeden (Freeden 1996, 1998, 2006, 2013, 2017). Inspirado por la visión familiar de Wittgenstein de la categorización (Wittgenstein, 1953), la teoría de prototipos (Rosch et al., 1976), así como la investigación lingüística en campos semánticos (Fillmore, 1976), Freeden propone un enfoque morfológico de la ideología.

Para Freeden, las ideologías son "combinaciones de conceptos políticos" (2013, p. 116). Debido a que son políticos, estos conceptos son a menudo conceptos "esencialmente controvertidos" (Gallie, 1955). Las ideologías son intentos de despolemizar estos conceptos; defienden ciertos usos de los conceptos políticos y ciertas relaciones entre los

conceptos políticos, y por lo tanto "construir lo político y navegar a través de él" (Freeden, 2013, p. 115):

> Muestran prácticas verbales e ideacionales de despolemización [. . .] a través de las cuales se confieren al discurso político significados específicos, seleccionados de entre el espectro de concepciones inevitablemente polemizadas y polemizables que un concepto puede y de hecho sostiene. (Freeden, 2013, p. 119)

Aunque la distinción exacta de Freeden entre concepto y concepción no se explica con precisión, parece ver el concepto como la categoría más amplia, polemizada porque cualquiera o todas sus características son polemizables, y la concepción como la interpretación seleccionada de entre las muchas concepciones posibles del concepto. Es decir, un concepto es polemizado en el sentido de que es polemizable, y una concepción es polemizada en el sentido de que es un significado polemizado entre significados polemizados rivales. Esto parece claro en pasajes como:

> En términos concretos, una ideología vinculará una concepción particular de la naturaleza humana, una concepción particular de la estructura social, de la justicia, de la libertad, de la autoridad, etc. "*Esto* es lo que significa la libertad, y *eso* es lo que significa la justicia", afirma [énfasis en el original]. (Freeden, 1996, p. 76)

Es poco probable que este intento de despolemización resulte en una estabilización del concepto: "[el] impulso hacia la finalidad es en última instancia insostenible: está limitado por la inevitable variabilidad de los conceptos esencialmente controvertidos, una variabilidad que, a su vez, está limitada por el impulso a la finalidad" (Freeden, 2013, p. 119). Esta dinámica excluye un enfoque de la ideología como "totalizadora, doctrinaria y dogmática" (Freeden, 2013, p. 126), sino que la ve como algo que "muta, o cambia, va de ruptura en ruptura" (Freeden, 2013, p. 119).

Freeden analiza las ideologías como si tuvieran una estructura con dos ejes: en el primer eje, hace una distinción de tres niveles entre componentes micro-conceptuales, conceptos y concatenaciones macro-conceptuales. En el nivel medio de los conceptos, los grupos de conceptos forman "la anatomía específica de una ideología" (Freeden, 2013, p. 126). Dentro de estos grupos se encuentra el segundo eje de los conceptos centrales, adyacentes y periféricos, donde las ideologías pueden variar a través del tiempo y el espacio (Freeden, 2013, p. 126).

Los conceptos centrales son aquellos que demuestran "durabilidad a largo plazo" (Freeden, 2013, p. 126), y mantienen unida la ideología: "Así, el liberalismo siempre parece contener el concepto de libertad" (Freeden, 2013, p. 126). Sin embargo, las ideologías no están definidas por conceptos centrales únicos o incluso múltiples. La relación entre los conceptos centrales, el peso que se les da, "explica una mutación constante dentro de los límites ideacionales de un núcleo" (Freeden, 2013, p. 127), y esta relación estructural entre los conceptos centrales se ve afectada por los conceptos adyacentes y periféricos.

Los conceptos adyacentes constituyen "el segundo puesto en la omnipresencia y el ancho de los significados que imparten a la ideología" (Freeden, 2013, p. 127). Estos son los conceptos temporales que llevan los conceptos centrales a "un campo semántico más determinante y más rebatido" (Freeden, 2013, p. 127). Así, en el liberalismo, el bienestar, la democracia, y la propiedad "han tirado de la ideología liberal en diferentes direcciones" (Freeden, 2013, p. 128).

Los conceptos periféricos son periféricos en dos sentidos. En primer lugar, son conceptos más marginales y efímeros: "Imperio o elitismo han ido y venido, o se han reducido mucho, en las ideologías liberales, mientras que el localismo y la etnicidad se han unido al círculo exterior de los conceptos liberales" (Freeden, 2013, p. 128). El segundo sentido de periférico aquí se relaciona con la "interfaz entre la disposición conceptual de una ideología y las prácticas sociales, eventos y contingencias que ocurren en su entorno" (Freeden, 2013, p. 128).

En resumen, Freeden (2013) describe siete características importantes del enfoque morfológico:

8. La ideología es una forma ubicua y permanente de pensamiento político. Es, en sí misma, un fenómeno amoral. (Freeden, 2013, p. 116)
9. Las ideologías surgen en todos los niveles de las sociedades humanas. (Freeden, 2013, p. 116)

10. Las ideologías son combinaciones de conceptos políticos que pueden identificarse a través de un análisis del lenguaje político. (Freeden, 2013, p. 116)

11. Además de algunas generalizaciones sobre lo que son y hacen las ideologías, el enfoque morfológico se centra en las microestructuras de diferentes ideologías, los patrones y las variaciones en las combinaciones de conceptos políticos. (Freeden, 2013, p. 116)

12. Las ideologías son competencias discursivas sobre el control del lenguaje político público, control que facilita la toma de decisiones políticas. El enfoque morfológico busca comprender los aspectos de la argumentación ideológica y la presentación involucrados en esto. (Freeden, 2013, p. 117)

13. El estudio de las ideologías implica el análisis del lenguaje político, "textual, oral, y simbólico; y con formas visuales de expresión humana". (Freeden, 2013, p. 117)

14. Las ideologías no son distorsiones de algo verdadero o más real, sino modos reales de pensamiento político ", es decir, que las ideologías son las formas que toma el pensamiento político. (Freeden, 2013, p. 117)

Como ejemplo de esto, consideremos la ideología, o más precisamente, la familia de ideologías, del liberalismo. Freeden llama al liberalismo "la ideología dominante del mundo desarrollado y una de las más incomprendidas" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 329). Es mejor pensarlo como una familia de ideologías, en la que ha habido distintos modos de despolemizar algunos de los conceptos políticos más importantes de la era moderna, haciendo del lenguaje del liberalismo "uno de los recursos usados más a menudo en la vida política contemporánea" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 329)

Si bien esbozar una lista definitiva de conceptos políticos en el centro o periferia de una familia ideológica parecería imposible, Freeden sugiere algunos puntos en común en la estructura conceptual de las formas más dominantes del liberalismo. Los conceptos centrales generalmente incluyen la libertad, el desarrollo, el individualismo, la racionalidad, el interés general, la sociabilidad, y el gobierno limitado por reglas (Freeden, 1996, p. 230). Si bien no podemos definir una ideología liberal basada exclusivamente en cómo se disputan estos conceptos, tal análisis podría sugerir cómo el populismo, como marco discursivo, desempeña un papel en la comunicación de diferentes posiciones liberales o antiliberales.

Tal vez más que cualquier otra ideología, el liberalismo se ajusta a las ideas de Gramsci de hegemonía. Tanto los políticos de izquierda como los de derechas se basan en sus conceptos centrales para justificar la acción política. Consideremos cómo el concepto de estado ha sido despolemizado en variedades liberales: En los Estados Unidos, las despolemizaciones de libertad, individualidad y gobierno restringido por reglas se han utilizado para limitar la acción social por parte del gobierno. En Gran Bretaña, condujo al establecimiento del estado de bienestar (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 335). Ciertamente, después de la segunda guerra mundial, formas muy específicas de liberalismo se convirtieron en "la última fuerza protectora desesperada contra los males de las formas patológicas de la ideología y el poder del Estado" (Freeden & Stears, 2013, p. 336).

Algunos estudiosos del populismo han sugerido que el populismo es lo opuesto al liberalismo (Pappas, 2019). Dadas las dificultades para conceptualizar el populismo como ideología, no creo que sea así. La relación parece más complicada que eso; el populismo apela al liberalismo tanto como lo socava. Es una herramienta iliberal de despolemización, un marco discursivo dirigido exclusivamente a discutir los conceptos liberales centrales; la libertad de un pueblo contra los abusos de una élite; el gobierno directo del pueblo para promover el interés general; la restricción del gobierno en virtud de su voluntad homogeneizada. En otras palabras, ofrece una solución fácil a los choques contemporáneos dentro del liberalismo "donde incluso un mayoritarismo ya iliberal se convierte en algo peor: un punto de vista total, singular y monolítico que arrasa con todos los demás" (Baritono & Freeden, 2018).

3. Corpus y Método

3.1. Pragmática de Corpus: Desafíos

Mi análisis se ajusta al nuevo campo que Romero-Trillo ha denominado "pragmática de corpus". Desde este enfoque se pretende

> tender un puente entre dos formas de ver el lenguaje: la lingüística de corpus como método de análisis principalmente informado por las matemáticas y la estadística con la ayuda de una metodología excelente y meticulosa; y, por otro lado, la pragmática, que se concebía como una metodología indefinida al dar cuenta de la interpretación de la distancia usual entre el dignificado de la oración y el intencionado en la comunicación. (Romero-Trillo, 2013, p. 1)

Este puente entre la lingüística de corpus y la pragmática implica algún ajuste metodológico en ambas direcciones; el análisis de corpus debe volverse más pragmático y el análisis pragmático más impulsado por el corpus. Si bien cada investigador y tema de investigación exigirá ajustes diferentes, una dimensión común del trabajo pragmático de corpus es que se basa en métodos cuantitativos y cualitativos.

En esta tesis, los datos cuantitativos extraídos del corpus no sirven para probar o refutar una hipótesis, como sí lo hace en gran parte de la corpus-lingüística. Más bien, sirve a un propósito de generación de hipótesis, un método para generar datos que puede guiar e informar el análisis cualitativo (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007). Por otro lado, a diferencia de la lingüística pragmática tradicional, esta tesis intenta basar sus conclusiones en el análisis de un "volumen representativo de datos, tamizado a través de teorías pragmáticas" (Romero-Trillo, 2013, p. 1). La originalidad de esta tesis radica en su aplicación de una teoría pragmática de la interpretación de la metáfora al discurso político, y esto implica cerrar las brechas entre la teoría pragmática y la metodología del corpus, entre el análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo, entre la metáfora como pensamiento y su uso en el discurso político.

En esta tesis analizo dos corpus diferentes: el Parlamento Europeo durante el periodo 2014-2019 y las elecciones presidenciales estadounidenses, 2016. Aunque mi método general para analizar cada corpus era el mismo, cada corpus planteaba sus propios desafíos que debían superarse. A continuación, describo las herramientas y algunos de los problemas particulares a los que se enfrentan al analizar estos corpus.

En tabla 3 se describe la información esencial del corpus de los Estados Unidos, mostrando el número de discursos y el número total de palabras de cada candidato, así como el número total de discursos y el recuento total de palabras.

Tabla 3. El corpus de discursos de las elecciones presidenciales de los Estados Unidos, 2016.		
Candidato	**N. de Discursos**	**N. de palabras**
Trump	22	76de388
Clinton	21	62,733
Sanders	11	23,528
Rubio	4	7,206
Cruz	3	6,552
Carson	1	4,052
Kasich	2	6,990
Total	58	175,626

En la tabla 4 se describe la información esencial de el corpus UE, mostrando el número de discursos y el recuento general de palabras del sub-corpus (sub-corpus de sujeto) de cada MEP, así como el número total de discursos y el recuento total de palabras para cada sub-corpus de sujeto.

Tabla 4. Corpus UE		
Corpus	**N. de Discursos**	**N. de palabras**
Debates plenarios 2014-2019	-	37,579,903
Sub-corpus de Farage	63	35,497
Sub-corpus Fox	41	10,773
Sub-corpus de Iglesias	20	5,455
Sub-corpus de García	20	5,761
Sub corpus TOTAL	144	57,486

En su nivel más alto, el corpus UE consistió en cada contribución hablada durante cada debate plenario del 8° Parlamento Europeo, 2014-2019. Teniendo en cuenta que la UE estaba formada entonces por 28 países, representados por 751 diputados al Parlamento Europeo que hablaban 24 lenguas diferentes, se trata de un corpus considerable en tamaño y complejidad. La tabla 5 muestra los diferentes niveles del corpus después de que se extrajeron los datos.

Tabla 5. Niveles del corpus UE		
Nivel	**Unidad de análisis**	**Corpus de ejemplo**
Macro	Debate parlamentario	UE
Meso	Discurso	Sub-corpus de Farage
Micro	Proferencia metafórica	Las proferencias metafóricas de Farage

En otros estudios, podría bastarle al analista con la extracción de los discursos de los candidatos relevantes y la construcción de los corpus del nivel más bajo para los hablantes específicos sin referencia a los niveles más altos (por ejemplo, un análisis de KWIC). Sin embargo, dada la naturaleza pragmática de esta tesis y la naturaleza dialógica de los debates parlamentarios, era necesario retener información contextual relevante que pudiera ser relevante para los cuatro sub-corpus sujetos. Por lo tanto, necesitaba una herramienta de corpus que fuese capaz de encontrar y extraer eficientemente información relevante del corpus a un nivel superior (*macro*) de los debates parlamentarios y conservar el acceso a él en los sub-corpus de nivel medio (*meso*) de los discursos. Además, debido a que mi unidad de análisis en el análisis de metáforas es la proferencia (*utterance*), necesitaba una herramienta para extraer las proferencias de los sub-corpus sujetos de los discursos en un

cuerpo de nivel inferior (*micro*) de proferencias, mientras conservaba el acceso a los discursos en los corpus de nivel medio y superior.

El corpus de EE.UU no era tan complicado. Utilicé un corpus ya hecho de discursos dados por candidatos republicanos y demócratas durante las elecciones presidenciales de 2016, recopilados por *Team Populism* (Hawkins, 2016) y disponibles para los investigadores en su pagina web (https://populism.byu.edu). Debido a que estos eran discursos relativamente aislados, un corpus a nivel superior no era necesario ni posible de compilar, aunque el nivel superior de análisis aún se conservaba haciendo una investigación de fondo sobre temas y referencias que eran relevantes para los discursos. Tabla 6 ilustra la relación entre los niveles de los sub-corpora del corpus estadounidense:

Tabla 6. Niveles del corpus EE.UU		
Nivel	**Unidad de análisis**	**Corpus de ejemplo**
Meso	Discurso	Corpus de Trump
Micro	Proferencias metafóricas	Las proferencias metafóricas de Trump

Decidí usar los programas *Word* y *Excel* de *Microsoft* y construir una herramienta de corpus improvisada. Esto tiene varias ventajas; aunque no son gratuitas, son programas comúnmente disponibles a los que tanto yo como mi supervisor ya teníamos acceso y teníamos experiencia en el uso. Estos programas tenían la mayoría de las características que necesitaba; búsqueda avanzada, etiquetado a través de la función de comentarios y la capacidad de colaborar en línea a través de la nube o simplemente a través de la función de control de cambios. Había otras características avanzadas que también lo hacían ideal: el traductor incorporado sería útil para tratar con los corpus UE multilingües, y sabía que *Excel* se podía usar para el análisis cuantitativo y estadístico si fuera necesario.

Sin embargo, hubo algunos desafíos en el uso de los programas de *Microsoft* como herramientas de análisis de corpus. La función de comentario es útil para etiquetar secciones de texto, pero no hay una forma automática obvia de extraer esas secciones de texto etiquetadas para su posterior análisis. Aunque habría sido posible copiar y pegar manualmente cada sección etiquetada de texto en un archivo separado, esto habría llevado mucho tiempo, dado el tamaño del corpus.

Mi solución fue escribir un pequeño programa para *Word* conocido como "macro", un fragmento de código que se puede utilizar para automatizar procesos en programas de *Microsoft*. Esto fue escrito en el lenguaje de programación *Virtual Basic for Applications*.

La macro abre cada documento en un directorio elegido, los escanea en busca de texto comentado, copia el texto resaltado, así como su comentario o "etiqueta" asociada y algunos metadatos del documento. A continuación, pega estos datos en una tabla en un archivo de *Word* independiente. Además de crear celdas separadas en la tabla para texto y etiqueta, la macro también crea celdas para la persona que realizó el comentario (el codificador) y el nombre de archivo de documento y el número de página desde el que se tomó el comentario.

Ahora puedo explicar exactamente cómo se usaron *Microsoft Word* y *Excel* para extraer y analizar mis datos, usando el corpus UE como ejemplo. En primer lugar, tuve que buscar en el corpus a nivel macro (más de 37,5 millones de palabras) las contribuciones habladas de los cuatro diputados sujetos al Parlamento Europeo. En el caso de Nigel Farage, esto significaba usar la función de búsqueda de *Word* para buscar "Nigel" y "Farage". Cuando se encontraron las contribuciones de Farage, se destacó toda la contribución y se le dio una etiqueta con el comentario "FARAGE". Sin embargo, también quería encontrar referencias a Farage en las contribuciones de otros participantes en el debate; preguntas que le habían hecho, ataques o elogios dirigidos hacia él, o cualquier referencia a él que pudiera ser contextualmente relevante para su contribución. Con el fin de lanzar una red lo más amplia posible, se buscaron una serie de términos utilizando la búsqueda: formas truncadas "Nig" y "Farag" en caso de referencia en un lenguaje con inflexión; "UKIP" con el fin de captar cualquier referencia a él como su líder; "Brexit" y "Brexiteers" en caso de referencia en relación con ese tema. Cuando se encontraron referencias, la contribución del interlocutor de Farage fue destacada y etiquetada con el comentario "INT" seguido del nombre y la afiliación grupal del interlocutor. En los casos en que la contribución del interlocutor fue muy larga, destaqué solo el párrafo o párrafos relevantes para la referencia a Farage. La función de traducción de *Word* fue muy útil aquí para evaluar la relevancia de las contribuciones en idiomas distintos del inglés y el español. Una vez que se procesaron todos los documentos en el corpus de nivel de macro, mi macro personalizada se utilizó para extraer automáticamente el contenido etiquetado en un archivo separado: este archivo se convirtió en mi sub-corpus de Farage.[62] Tabla 7 muestra un ejemplo del aspecto de la información extraída en el sub-corpus:

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[62] Por supuesto, las contribuciones de los interlocutores se descontaron de los sub-corpus en aras del análisis cuantitativo, cuando fue necesario.

Tabla 7. Ejemplo de datos extraídos de corpus a nivel macro a corpus de nivel medio				
67	[. . .] It has been throughout a total failure of leadership. But perhaps more significantly, she hasn't learned or heeded the historical lesson that if you appease bullies, they always come back for more. She has behaved like a leader of a nation defeated in war, and that is why this Withdrawal Agreement looked more like a surrender document and it was smashed to pieces in the House of Commons last night. She of course believed that she'd get some concessions from you today, but it's perfectly clear from what you've said that there are no concessions to come. She is still our Prime Minister, and that of itself is quite remarkable. If she had any sense of honour, she'd be gone by lunchtime today.[. . .]	FARAGE	John Keating	/Users/jk/Desktop/Documents/Europarlcorpus/PlenaryPDFs/2019 sessions/CRE-8-2019-01-16_EN.doc

De izquierda a derecha, las celdas muestran el número de página del documento de nivel de macro, el discurso etiquetado, la etiqueta asociada, el nombre del codificador, y el nombre del documento de nivel de macro.

Una contribución interlocutora siguió la misma estructura (tabla 8):

Tabla 8. Ejemplo de datos de interlocutor extraídos				
72	To Mr Farage, wherever he is, I would say, with all due respect, please be very careful in using the word 'war', because there was indeed a war and, thank God, the British won it. Everybody learned their lesson, but perhaps not Mr Farage.	INT Esteban González Pons (PPE)	John Keating	/Users/jk/Desktop/Documents/Europarlcorpus/PlenaryPDFs/2019sessions/CRE-8-2019-01-16_EN.doc

Cualquier contribución, por sujeto o interlocutor, podría encontrarse fácilmente en el corpus a nivel de macro simplemente abriendo el documento y yendo al número de página (o utilizando la función de búsqueda).

Llevé a cabo dos tareas analíticas cualitativas separadas en los corpus de nivel medio. La primera fue medir el grado de populismo en cada discurso de cada sujeto. Las puntuaciones de populismo producidas durante este análisis simplemente se registraron en una hoja de *Excel* separada para su posterior análisis.

La segunda tarea en este nivel fue etiquetar el sub-corpus para posibles declaraciones metafóricas activas utilizando los criterios de identificación de Romero y Soria. En el extracto de la contribución de Farage anterior, etiqueté cinco posibles

proferencias metafóricas activas; "she hasn't learned or heeded the historical lesson", "She has behaved like a leader of a nation defeated in war", "that is why this Withdrawal Agreement looked more like a surrender document", y "it was smashed to pieces in the House of Commons last night". El etiquetado en este nivel no significaba que una proferencia fuera aceptada como una proferencia metafórica activa en el análisis final. Esas decisiones se tomaron en el siguiente nivel inferior del corpus. Si se encontraron metáforas activas potenciales en las contribuciones de interlocutores, estas fueron etiquetadas también. Aunque no son el foco de la tesis, estas metáforas de los interlocutores podrían haber tenido algún efecto en el uso de la metáfora por parte del hablante, por lo que era importante etiquetarlas. Al igual que con la extracción de datos del macro-corpus al meso-corpus, los datos se pueden rastrear fácilmente desde el nivel inferior hasta el nivel medio a través del nombre del documento y el número de página. Una proferencia en el corpus de nivel inferior se puede rastrear rápidamente a su contexto discursivo en el nivel superior.

3.2. Medición de la Tasa de Populismo

Una de las principales razones por las que elegí usar el corpus fue porque había sido calificado para populismo utilizando el método de calificación holístico (Hawkins & Silva, 2019, p. 28). Noté que una deficiencia en el estudio que había realizado con Belén Soria (Keating & Soria, 2019) era que más o menos habíamos dado por hecho que algunos políticos eran populistas en base a su designación como tales por otros investigadores y por los medios de comunicación. Sin embargo, si estamos tomando el populismo como una forma de discurso, una cuestión de grado, deberíamos ser capaces de medir y comparar el grado de discurso populista utilizado por diferentes actores. El método ideado por el Team Populismo es uno de los pocos métodos disponibles para hacerlo y parece ser el más utilizado (cf. Aslanidis, 2018). Al usar el sistema de *Team Populism*, pude comparar mi propia calificación del corpus con las puntuaciones dadas por los codificadores de *Team Populism*, y por lo tanto llegar a una conclusión más objetiva sobre quién era populista y en qué grado.

La calificación holística es un método cualitativo utilizado para evaluar textos. Se basa en codificadores entrenados que dan una puntuación impresionista general en comparación con los textos de anclaje de ejemplo y en conjunción con una rúbrica de codificación. En el caso de *Team Populism*, se proporciona un libro de códigos en el sitio web (Team Populism, 2019) que se utiliza para entrenar a los codificadores, y con el que

me entrené. Brevemente, a un texto de destino se le asigna una puntuación entre 0 y 2, dependiendo de cómo se compara el texto con los textos de anclaje en relación con la rúbrica de codificación. Se asigna una puntuación de cero a los discursos no populistas, 1 a los discursos que son populistas pero con elementos atenuantes y 2 a los discursos que son claramente populistas (Team Populism, 2019, p. 2).

A los codificadores se les permitió asignar puntuaciones decimales con el entendimiento de que una puntuación de 0,5 o superior se redondearía a 1, y una puntuación de 1,5 o superior se redondearía a 2 (Team Populism, 2019, p. 1).

El equipo de populismo divide el marco ideacional populista en tres elementos desagregados que se evalúan en la calificación:

4. Una cosmología maniquea/moral
5. La proclamación de "el pueblo" como una comunidad homogénea y virtuosa
6. La representación de "la élite" como una entidad corrupta y egoísta

(Carlin et al., 2019, p. 420)

Los tres elementos deben estar presentes para que el discurso sea considerado populista. Por lo tanto, puede que no sea posible considerar una sola proferencia como populista, incluso cuando contribuye al marco populista general del conjunto de proferencias como un todo unitario. En la práctica, esto significa que tenía dos unidades de análisis diferentes; en primer lugar, cada discurso político en su conjunto, que fue calificado como populista; en segundo lugar, dentro del discurso, las proferencias metafóricas activas que potencialmente contribuyen a este marco populista.

Para la etapa de análisis del populismo, clasifiqué el corpus estadounidense antes que el corpus de la UE. Esto se debe a que podría comparar mis puntuaciones con las puntuaciones del codificador del equipo populista del corpus estadounidense, comprobar la fiabilidad entre codificadores y luego proceder a analizar los sub-corpus del Parlamento de la UE con cierto nivel de confianza. Por supuesto, habría sido mejor tener más de un codificador en los corpus del parlamento de la UE, pero no tenía los recursos para ello. Además, *Team Populism* afirma explícitamente que, una vez que un codificador ha sido entrenado, el trabajo de un solo codificador es aceptable (Hawkins & Silva, 2019, p. 32). Con el fin de garantizar una mayor fiabilidad, llevé a cabo pruebas de fiabilidad intracoder tanto en el corpus de la UE como en el de EE.UU.

El uso del método de calificación holística de *Team Populism* contextualiza mi trabajo en el trabajo de politólogos especializados en analizar el discurso populista. La metáfora no es el único aspecto del lenguaje que podría afectar al discurso populista. Al fundamentar mi trabajo en el de los suyos, espero que permita a los estudiosos más allá de los estudios de metáforas construir sobre mi trabajo.

3.3. Medición de la Tasa de Metáforas Activas

La segunda etapa a nivel meso fue leer cada texto y etiquetar posibles metáforas activas. Esto se llevó a cabo de acuerdo con los criterios de identificación de Romero y Soria (1997-8, 2005a) de anormalidad contextual y contraste conceptual. En esta etapa, el etiquetado de metáforas se basa en una aplicación rigurosa pero intuitiva de los criterios de identificación y es necesario un enfoque de "si-en-duda-acéptalo".

Si la identificación de la metáfora debe basarse en las intenciones del hablante, el análisis del discurso de corpus de la metáfora puede beneficiarse de una teoría más informada de la pragmática. En un intento de proporcionar un análisis de las preferencias metafóricas, seguiré los criterios de identificación de TI pragmática de Romero y Soria. Según Soria (1992) y Romero y Soria en todas sus obras posteriores sobre metáfora, las preferencias metafóricas se identifican por un complejo criterio de identificación. Sólo si una anormalidad contextual conduce a la identificación de un dominio como fuente para describir lo que el hablante está hablando (la meta), podemos identificar una preferencia como metafórica. La anormalidad contextual, es descrita por Romero y Soria (2016, p. 157) como "el uso de una expresión en un contexto lingüístico o extralingüístico inusual". Añaden que una anormalidad contextual puede aparecer en dos modos diferentes:

c) Como una rareza entre los términos pronunciados [...].

d) Como una rareza entre la aparición de una expresión en el contexto inusual real y el contexto implícito asociado a un uso normal de esta expresión.

La anormalidad del modo (b) se debe a la incompatibilidad del contexto de la expresión y el contexto convencionalmente asociado a las expresiones pronunciadas.

(Romero & Soria, 2016, p. 157)

La anormalidad contextual es una condición necesaria pero no suficiente para la metáfora, ya que también puede aparecer en proferencias metonímicas como "El sándwich de jamón está esperando su cheque" cuando, en un restaurante, una camarera dice esto en respuesta a un camarero que le pregunta qué tenía que hacer a continuación. La resolución pragmática en metonimia no implica el reconocimiento de una fuente para describir analógicamente in dominio meta y solo si este fuera el caso, la proferencia se consideraría metafórica. La identificación metafórica se alcanza solamente si aparecen tanto la anormalidad contextual como el contraste conceptual. Esta identificación bloquea la interpretación literal y desencadena el mecanismo metafórico: el mapeo del dominio fuente al dominio meta para obtener el ajuste conceptual involucrado en la interpretación de las proferencias metafóricas.

La evidencia dada por el hablante con su proferencia metafórica incluye entre otras cosas la información semántica convencionalmente asociada a expresiones sub-oracionales a partir de las cuales es posible construir el dominio meta reestructurado para obtener los significados provisionales que formarán parte de la proposición metafórica pretendida. Obviamente, ni la identificación ni la interpretación de una proferencia metafórica es posible sin recurrir a las intenciones del hablante.

La **identificación de** las proferencias metafóricas activas**,** siguiendo a Romero y Soria, procederá de la siguiente manera:

5. Lea el "texto/discurso completo" para establecer una comprensión general de modo que se pueda determinar el tema del que habla el hablante (el dominio meta).
6. Determine las unidades léxicas que muestran la anormalidad contextual, el uso inusual del hablante de los términos. Términos que normalmente no pertenecen al dominio meta.
7. Determine si los términos utilizados anormalmente (ya sea en modo a o b) pertenecen a un dominio con propiedades o dimensiones que se pueden correlacionar analógicamente con propiedades o dimensiones del dominio meta.
8. Si es así, la proferencia se identificará como una metáfora activa.

Una vez que estos datos habían sido extraídos a los sub-corpus de nivel micro, las proferencias se analizaban con más detalle y se tomaban decisiones sobre si serían aceptadas como proferencias metafóricas activas o no. Esta etapa es similar a otros métodos como Steen et al. (2010) en los que se utilizan diccionarios como repositorios de los usos lexicalizados más comunes de la metáfora. Steen et al. (2010) recomiendan el uso de diccionarios de aprendizaje avanzado que se basan en grandes corpora. Para mis propósitos, elegí dos diccionarios en línea basados en corpus: *Cambridge English Dictionary Online*[63] y *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online*[64]. Para el español, para el que no parece haber la misma gama de recursos, utilicé la última versión del *Diccionario de la lengua española* de la Real Academia Española, disponible en línea.[65]

Sin embargo, mientras que los métodos de Steen et al. (2010) se centran en encontrar expresiones metafóricas convencionales comparando los sentidos contextuales (convencionales o no convencionales) del vehículo metafórico (la palabra o palabras metafóricamente utilizadas) contra los sentidos "básicos" de esas palabras, mi método se centra en comparar los sentidos contextuales no convencionales de las palabras del vehículo contra los sentidos lexicalizados convencionales. Por lo tanto, en la segunda ronda, las metáforas fueron etiquetadas como activas si el vehículo metafórico no podía ser explicado por los sentidos léxicos en ninguno de los dos diccionarios. Si podían explicarse por un sentido en el diccionario, eran rechazados. Por lo tanto, una proferencia como

(4) [Location unknown, 11/07/2016. Trump says:] This epidemic of violence destroys lives, destroys communities, and destroys opportunity for young Americans. [Esta epidemia de violencia destruye vidas, destruye comunidades y destruye oportunidades para los jóvenes estadounidenses.]

fue rechazada porque el sentido de "a sudden increase in the number of times that something bad happens" [un aumento repentino en el número de veces que algo malo sucede] (Pearson, n.d.-b) explica el uso de "epidemic" en esta proferencia. Una proferencia como

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[63] Cambridge English Dictionary Online (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/).
[64] Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online (https://www.ldoceonline.com).
[65] *Diccionario de la lengua española* (https://www.rae.es).

(5) [Arizona, 29/10/2016. Trump says:] When we win on November 8th, we are going to Washington, D.C. and we are going to drain the swamp. [Cuando ganemos el 8 de noviembre, iremos a Washington, D.C. y vamos a drenar el pantano.]

fue aceptada como activo porque el sentido "land that is always very wet or covered with a layer of water" [tierra que siempre está muy húmeda o cubierta con una capa de agua] (Pearson, n.d.-d) no explica el significado de "swamp" [pantano] en este contexto. En esta etapa, es necesario un enfoque de "si-en-duda-recházalo".

Generalmente se acepta que las distinciones entre los usos metafóricos no convencionales y convencionales del lenguaje son difusas: lo no convencional se vuelve convencional, activo se vuelve léxico, con etapas indistintas en el medio (Cameron, 2003, p. 62; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Goatly, 1997; Nair et al., 1988; Romero & Soria, 1998). El método que he esbozado está diseñado para ordenar y categorizar el lenguaje que es inherentemente resistente a dicha categorización. Las complicaciones surgen cuando las metáforas lexicalizadas se utilizan de maneras que parecen reactivar la interpretación metafórica. Un ejemplo frecuente es la metáfora extendida:

(6) [Arizona, 29/10/2016. Trump says:] Government corruption spreads outward, like a cancer, infecting the whole operation of our government. [La corrupción gubernamental se propaga hacia afuera, como un cáncer, infectando toda la operación de nuestro gobierno.]

En este caso, el significado metafórico de "cancer" [cáncer] puede ser explicado por el diccionario, "a harmful activity that spreads quickly" [una actividad dañina que se propaga rápidamente] (Cambridge University Press, n.d.-a). Sin embargo, la extensión de la metáfora convencional para incluir otros términos del dominio fuente ("spreads" [se propaga], "infecting" [infectando]), así como la coherencia de las restricciones estructurales de GOBIERNO con las de CUERPO INFECTADO, y el uso de la forma de símil (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008, p. 120) probablemente aumentarían tanto la prominencia de la anormalidad contextual como el contraste conceptual de la proferencia y se activaría el mecanismo metafórico. En estos casos, la proferencia se etiquetó como activa.

Sin embargo, otros casos de metáfora extendida no podrían ser etiquetados como activos porque hay evidencia de que la forma extendida en sí es altamente convencional

(incluso probablemente una frase hecha) o que todos los términos de dominio meta utilizados tienen sentidos convencionales para ese tema. Un buen ejemplo de esto es

(7) [North Carolina, 22/06/2016. Clinton says:] Twice now in the past 30 years, a Republican president has caused an economic mess and a Democratic president has had to come in and clean it up. [Dos veces en los últimos 30 años, un presidente republicano ha causado un desastre económico y un presidente demócrata ha tenido que entrar y limpiarlo.]

"Mess" [*desastre*] puede tener el sentido de "a situation that is full of problems" [una situación llena de problemas] (Cambridge University Press, n.d.-d) y el verbo de la frase "clean up for/after somebody" [limpiar por alguien] puede tener el sentido "to remove dirt or problems that someone has made" [eliminar la suciedad o los problemas que alguien ha hecho] (Cambridge University Press, n.d.-c.). Por lo tanto, no he considerado esta metáfora como activa.

Otro factor que puede activar una metáfora lexicalizada es lo que Goatly (1997) y Cameron (2008) llaman *literalización*. Esto ocurre cuando se evocan diferentes sentidos del vehículo, literales y metafóricos, al mismo tiempo. Un ejemplo es

(8) [South Carolina, 27/02/2016. Clinton says:] Instead of building walls, we need to be tearing down barriers. We need to show by everything we do that we really are in this together. [En lugar de construir muros, tenemos que derribar barreras. Tenemos que demostrar con todo lo que hacemos que realmente estamos juntos en esto.]

Además de otros factores como el juego de palabras y un contraste entre diferentes mapeos, el vehículo alude tanto al plan de Trump de construir un muro físico como al significado metafórico convencional de un muro como una desunión entre las personas. El efecto de este tipo de literalización es llamar la atención sobre el contraste conceptual entre un muro como barrera física y como desunión entre personas.

No todos los casos en los que un vehículo metafórico comunica múltiples sentidos se pueden contar como literalización. En la proferencia

(9) [Pennsylvania, 22/10/2016. Clinton says:] Love trumps hate. [El amor triunfa sobre el odio.]

Clinton está utilizando una metáfora lexicalizada basada en el póker, donde una carta triunfa o supera a otra. Aquí, sin embargo, parece que está jugando con el apellido de su oponente Trump y un sentido léxico de "vencer" sin reactivar el contraste conceptual del significado metafórico lexicalizado. Casos como este fueron rechazados.

Es evidente que hay que trabajar mucho más sobre los factores que afectan a la reactivación de metáforas convencionales. Esto solo es posible si reconocemos el lenguaje metafóricamente usado como distinto de las expresiones convencionales basadas en conceptos metafóricos y usadas literalmente.

4. Datos

4.1. Tasas de Populismo y las Proferencias Metafóricas

Las tasas del discurso populista, y la interpretación basada en el marco del *Team Populism*, se muestran en las tablas 9 y 10, para el corpus de la UE y el corpus de los EE.UU, respectivamente.

Tabla 9. Interpretación de los resultados populistas en la UE		
Nombre	**Media**	**Interpretación**
Farage	0.65	Algo populista
Fox	0.02	No populista
García	0.00	No populista
Iglesias	0.50	Algo populista

Tabla 10. Interpretación de los resultados populistas en los EE.UU		
Nombre	**Media**	**Interpretación**
Clinton	0.00	No populista
Sanders	0.91	Algo populista
Trump	0.73	Algo populista

Los resultados de estas pruebas de fiabilidad *intercoder* y *intracoder* se muestran en la tabla 11, y demuestran que la fiabilidad fue alta para el corpus estadounidense y, para el corpus de la UE, más que suficiente para hacer conclusiones provisionales (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 429).

Tabla 11. Pruebas de fiabilidad (populismo)		
Corpus	**Prueba**	**Resultado (alfa de Krippendorff)**
Corpus UE	*Fiabilidad intracoder (populismo)*	$\alpha = 0.75$
Corpus EE.UU	*Fiabilidad intercoder (populismo)*	$\alpha = 0.8$
Corpus EE.UU	*Fiabilidad intracoder (populismo)*	$\alpha = 1$

Kruskal-Wallis H pruebas se llevaron a cabo las puntuaciones populistas. Para el corpus de la UE, las distribuciones de las puntuaciones populistas fueron estadísticamente significativamente diferentes entre los hablantes, $\chi^2(3) = 85.431$, p = .000. El análisis post hoc fue conducido usando el procedimiento de Dunn (1964) con una corrección de Bonferroni para las comparaciones múltiples. Los resultados de estas pruebas para las diferencias estadísticamente significativas en las tasas de populismo en el corpus de la UE se muestran en la tabla 12:

Tabla 12. Post hoc análisis de las tasas de populismo del corpus UE	
Sujetos comparados	**Valor de p**
Farage-Fox	.000
Farage-García	.000
Farage-Iglesias	.455
Iglesias-Fox	.000
Iglesias-García	.001
Fox-García	1.000

En cuanto al corpus estadounidense, la prueba de Kruskal-Wallis H mostró una diferencia estadísticamente significativa entre los hablantes, $\chi^2(6) = 32,701$, p < .001. El análisis post hoc fue conducido usando el procedimiento de Dunn (1964) con una corrección de Bonferroni para las comparaciones múltiples. La tabla 13 muestra los resultados más relevantes de este análisis post hoc de las tasas del populismo en el corpus estadounidense:

Tabla 13. Post hoc análisis de tasas de populismo del corpus EE.UU	
Sujetos comparados	**Valor de p**
Clinton-Trump	.000
Clinton-Sanders	.000
Trump-Sanders	1.000

Estos resultados muestran que puedo estar seguro de comparar el discurso de los presuntos populistas y no populistas: en el corpus EE.UU hay diferencias significativas entre Clinton, no-populista, y Sanders y Trump, los populistas. Sin embargo, no hay diferencias estadísticamente significativas entre los populistas. Del mismo modo, los

resultados para el corpus UE muestran diferencias estadísticamente significativas entre populistas (Farage e Iglesias) y no-populistas (Fox y García), pero no entre distintos populistas o entre distintos no-populistas.

4.2. Tasas de Uso Activo de Metáforas

Las tasas de uso de las proferencias metafóricas activas para el corpus de la UE y el corpus de EE.UU se muestran en tablas 14[66] y 15 respectivamente.

Tabla 14. Tasas de uso activo de metáforas			
Nombre	**Metáforas**	**Corpus N.[67]**	**Tasa/1k palabras**
Farage	121	33,941	3.57
Fox	4	10,326	0.39
García	9	5,593	1.61
Iglesias	31	5,217	5.94

Tabla 15. Tasas de uso de las proferencias metafóricas.			
Nombre	**Metáforas**	**palabras**	**Met / 1k words**
Clinton	139	62,775	2.21
Sanders	18	23,528	0.77
Trump	106	72,529	1.46

Los resultados de las pruebas de fiabilidad intracoder se muestran en la tabla 16. Muestran que la fiabilidad intracoder era elevada tanto para el corpus UE como para el estadounidense.

Tabla 16. Pruebas de fiabilidad (metáforas)		
Corpus	**Prueba**	**Resultado (alfa de Krippendorff)**
Corpus UE	Fiabilidad intracoder (metáfora)	$\alpha = 0.83$
Corpus EE.UU	Fiabilidad intracoder(metáfora)	$\alpha = 0.961$

Se realizó una prueba Kruskal-Wallis H para determinar si había diferencias en las tasas de uso de las proferencias metafóricas (normalizadas a 1000 palabras) entre los cuatro grupos de discursos en el corpus de la UE. Las distribuciones de las proferencias

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[66] Aquí solo se dan los resultados relevantes de Clinton, Sanders y Trump. Para obtener resultados completos, ver sección 9.2.1 de la tesis.
[67] Estos números representan los corpus después de ser despojados de contribuciones interlocutoras y metadatos.

metafóricas fueron significativamente diferentes entre los hablantes desde el punto de vista estadístico, $\chi^2(3) = 29.958$, p < .001.

El análisis post hoc utilizando el procedimiento de Dunn (1964) con una corrección de Bonferroni para comparaciones múltiples se llevó a cabo en el corpus de la UE, y los resultados se muestran en la tabla 17:

Tabla 17. Análisis post hoc del uso proferencias metafóricas en el corpus UE	
Sujetos comparados	**Valor de p**
Farage-Fox	.000
Farage-García	.223
Farage-Iglesias	1.000
Iglesias-Fox	.001
Iglesias-García	.519
Fox-García	.412

Para el corpus EE.UU, se realizó una prueba Kruskal-Wallis H para determinar si había diferencias en las tasas de uso de las proferencias metafóricas (normalizadas a 1000 palabras) entre tres grupos de discursos: Clinton, Sanders y Trump. Los otros hablantes fueron excluidos de este análisis porque no se analizan en la sección cualitativa, y al excluirlos se redujeron los posibles efectos negativos de sus tamaños de muestra y distribuciones más desiguales en los resultados. Las distribuciones de las proferencias metafóricas fueron significativamente diferentes entre los hablantes desde el punto de vista estadístico, $\chi^2(2) = 11,102$, p = .004.

Mediante un análisis post hoc usando el procedimiento de Dunn (1964) con una corrección de Bonferroni para comparaciones múltiples obtuve los siguientes resultados que se muestran en tabla 18:

Tabla 18. Análisis post hoc del uso proferencias metafóricas en el corpus EE.UU.	
Sujetos comparados	**Valor de p**
Clinton-Trump	.042
Clinton-Sanders	.006
Trump-Sanders	.859

Estos resultados para el uso activo de metáforas son menos claros que los resultados para el populismo. En el corpus de la UE, las únicas diferencias estadísticamente significativas son entre Fox y los demás hablantes. Las diferencias entre los populistas no fueron significativas, ni entre los distintos populistas ni entre los populistas y García. Esto significa que no podemos establecer una correlación entre las tasas de uso activo de

metáforas y las tasas de discurso populista. Sin embargo, si atendemos a las tasas normalizadas de uso de metáforas, tenemos que admitir al menos que en el corpus de la UE hay una tendencia a que los populistas utilicen más las proferencias metafóricas activas que los no-populistas. En el corpus estadounidense, sin embargo, la tendencia va en la otra dirección en la que Clinton muestra una tasa de proferencias metafóricas significativamente más alta desde el punto de vista estadístico. Por supuesto, estas tendencias por sí solas no se pueden extrapolar para sacar conclusiones más amplias sobre el discurso populista. Sin embargo, genera algunas preguntas interesantes para un análisis cualitativo adicional: ¿Por qué los populistas en el corpus de la UE parecen haber utilizado más proferencias metafóricas activas que sus contrapartes no populistas? ¿Por qué los hablantes populistas Trump y Sanders tendieron a usar menos proferencias metafóricas activas que la hablante no populista Hillary Clinton? Más importante aún, ¿hay alguna diferencia en la forma en que los populistas y los no-populistas usan proferencias metafóricas?

4.3. Un análisis de Proferencias Metafóricas

Uno de los puntos fuertes del marco que he desarrollado en esta tesis es que proporciona herramientas para el análisis preciso del contenido ideológico como parte del significado del hablante en el uso metafórico de lenguaje. Utilizando mi marco teórico, las proferencias metafóricas activas puede ser analizadas para el contenido ideológico como parte del significado del hablante. El análisis de los hablantes populistas revela una amplia gama de contenidos ideológicos comunicados. Farage usó la expresión de (10) para comunicar el concepto metafórico ad hoc PARLIAMENT BUILDING AS TEMPLE.

(10)　　[Strasbourg, 14/09/2016. Farage says:] If you were to think of this building as a temple, Mr Verhofstadt is the high priest, a fanatic [. . .] If you stick to the dogma of saying that for reciprocal tariff-free access to the single market we must maintain the free movement of people, then you will inevitably drive us towards no deal. [Si tuvieran que pensar en este edificio como un templo, el señor Verhofstadt es el sumo sacerdote, un fanático [. . .] Si nos atenemos al dogma de decir que para que el acceso libre de aranceles al mercado único sea recíproco debemos mantener la libre circulación de personas, entonces inevitablemente nos conducirán hacia un no acuerdo.]

Esto comunica posiciones ideológicas nacionalista-conservadoras. LA DEMOCRACIA se desbribe como un proceso de autodeterminación nacional. La democracia supranacional, por lo tanto, es una contradicción, una secta dogmática. La búsqueda de la integración política por parte de la UE es fundamentalmente irracional y antidemocrática. Al despolemizar la DEMOCRACIA, también están despolemizando los conceptos liberales centrales de LIBERTAD, INDIVIDUALISMO, DESARROLLO, RACIONALIDAD y ESTADO.

Las proferencias metafóricas activas de Iglesias comunican concepciones socialdemócratas de los conceptos de LIBERTAD, INDIVIDUALISMO, DESARROLLO y ESTADO. Por ejemplo, su declaración de (11) comunica una concepción de la LIBERTAD como la libertad de las personas para vivir sin obstáculos por los peores excesos del capitalismo, y la concepción del ESTADO, el estado de la UE o el estado nacional, como protector del INDIVIDUO ante el CAPITALISMO:

(11)   [Strasbourg, 01/07/2014. Iglesias says:] Nuestros pueblos no son menores de edad, ni colonias de ningún fondo de inversiones; no conquistaron ni defendieron su libertad para entregársela a una oligarquía financiera.

Los hablantes no-populistas en el corpus de la UE también utilizan la metáfora para comunicar ideología; Iratxe García comunica una concepción feminista de la VIOLENCIA POLÍTICA con su metáfora de la VIOLENCIA DOMÉSTICA COMO TERRORISMO. Fox comunica una concepción conservadora del ESTADO cuando lamenta el despilfarro financiero del "circo ambulante" de Bruselas a Estrasburgo.

En el corpus de EE.UU, Trump usa metáforas activas para comunicar una amplia gama de posiciones, no todas ellas consistentes con una ideología convencional. Por ejemplo, en algunas de sus metáforas activas parece realizar una despolemización socialdemócrata de la LIBERTAD del pueblo para desarrollarse libre de excesos capitalistas, en este caso globalistas, y del papel del ESTADO como protector. Sin embargo, esto podría ser un ejemplo de lo que Freeden llamó "la técnica de imagen de espejo giratoria" (Freeden, 1996, p. 345), la gramática de la ideología conservadora que se apropia de los valores de los rivales ideológicos para neutralizar su amenaza. De hecho, Trump no aboga por un cambio en el sistema capitalista global, sino más bien por que Estados Unidos lo domine. Esto se comunica claramente en metáforas como (12) que comunican una concepción del ESTADO como facilitador del desarrollo del INDIVIDUO como el ganador del capitalismo global:

(12)   [New York, 16/06/2015. Trump says:] We have all the cards, but we don't know how to use them. We don't even know that we have the cards, because our leaders don't understand the game. [Tenemos todas las cartas, pero no sabemos cómo usarlas. Ni siquiera sabemos que tenemos las cartas, porque nuestros líderes no entienden el juego.]

Sanders comunica claramente el papel socialdemócrata del ESTADO para proteger al INDIVIDUO -y a la DEMOCRACIA- del capitalismo:

(13)   [California, 08/06/2016. Sanders says:] Democracy is not about billionaires buying elections. [La democracia no consiste en que los multimillonarios compren elecciones.]

Hillary Clinton proporcionó algunos de los ejemplos más interesantes del uso de proferencias metafóricas activas para comunicar ideología. Ella, al igual que Sanders, también comunica un papel protector para el ESTADO contra los excesos capitalistas globales. Sin embargo, en sus declaraciones podemos ver claramente la diferencia entre la comunicación de esta ideología socialdemócrata dentro y fuera de un marco populista:

(14)   [Ohio, 03/10/2016. Clinton says:] So let's - let's begin by making it clear that for most businesses, America is the most important asset on their balance sheet. [Así que comencemos por dejar claro que para la mayoría de las empresas, Estados Unidos es el activo más importante en su balance general.]

Para Sanders, las élites financieras se posicionan en contra de la gente, y la gente necesita ser protegida. Para Clinton, las entidades financieras son parte de la sociedad estadounidense, todas las cuales deben ser protegidas de las fuerzas naturales del mercado:

(15)   [New York, 13/06/2015. Clinton says:] For decades, Americans have been buffeted by powerful currents. Advances in technology and the rise of global trade have created whole new areas of economic activity and opened new markets for our exports, but they have also displaced jobs and undercut wages for millions of Americans. [Durante décadas, los estadounidenses han sido golpeados por poderosas corrientes. Los avances en la tecnología y el aumento del comercio mundial han creado áreas completamente nuevas de actividad económica y han abierto nuevos mercados para nuestras

exportaciones, pero también han desplazado empleos y socavado los salarios de millones de estadounidenses.]

Las concepciones ideológicas comunicadas por populistas y no-populistas por igual, a menudo involucran los conceptos centrales del liberalismo. Para los populistas, el marco de las élites corruptas contra el pueblo puro ya está diseñado para promover la polarización política afectiva, la distancia entre los seguidores de diferentes posiciones ideológicas o partidos políticos (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 8). A través de la metáfora, también pueden promover la polarización política ideológica, la distancia entre las posiciones ideológicas que ofrecen los agentes políticos (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 8). Una forma de promover ambos tipos de polarización es atribuir pensamientos metafóricos a entidades de grupo externo. Esto se puede ver en las proferencias metafóricas extendidas irónicas de Farage, como (16),

(16)   [Strasbourg, 20/01/2016. Farage says:] This EU faces an existential crisis. Indeed, there is an outbreak of a contagious disease. It is not a new one; the Greeks first came across it a couple of thousand years ago [. . .] The diagnosis, by the way, will not be popular in this House: the disease is called democracy. [Esta UE se enfrenta a una crisis existencial. De hecho, hay un brote de una enfermedad contagiosa. No es nuevo; los griegos la descubrieron por primera vez hace un par de miles de años [. . .] El diagnóstico, por cierto, no será popular en esta Cámara: la enfermedad se llama democracia.]

en la que se comunica un contenido metaphórico que está determinado, entre otros, por el concepto metafórico ad hoc, LA DEMOCRACIA EUROESCÉPTICA COMO UNA ENFERMEDAD CONTAGIOSA. Siguiendo la teoría ecoica de Wilson y Sperber (2012a, pp. 128-129), la ironía es un subtipo de uso atributivo para transmitir la propia actitud del hablante a un pensamiento atribuido, en lugar de transmitir solo información sobre el contenido de ese pensamiento atribuido. En (16), Farage atribuye una visión metafórica a la UE que describe una concepción de la DEMOCRACIA como una ENFERMEDAD CONTAGIOSA y se disocia tácitamente de ella. Comunica el concepto de DEMOCRACIA a través de la ideología nacionalista-conservadora, como un mayoritarismo que solo tiene validez a nivel nacional, y la confunde con el euroescepticismo. El concepto metafórico presenta una evaluación negativa de la concepción de Farage de la DEMOCRACIA como algo peligroso y algo a

erradicar. Se trata de una visión elitista, arrogante y antagónica de DEMOCRACIA que cualquier institución democrática legítima no podría sostener. De esta manera, Farage comunica una concepción ideológica que contribuye tanto a la función polarizadora afectiva del marco populista, como a la polarización política ideológica.

Otro ejemplo de meta-representación es el uso de Iglesias de la negación para comunicar la negación ecoica (*echoic denial*) (Wilson & Sperber, 2012a, pp. 128-129) en (11). Aquí, Iglesias utiliza la metáfora y la negación para introducir nueva información y negarla (Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, p. 198). Atribuye un pensamiento metafórico y luego lo rechaza explícitamente. Al igual que con el uso de la ironía de Farage, el pensamiento metafórico atribuido es elitista, arrogante y antagónico. La atribución y el rechazo explícito del pensamiento metafórico ayudan a posicionar a la UE como una élite política corrupta que trata a sus propios ciudadanos como niños y que conspira con una élite financiera mundial para colonizarlos. A través de la negación, Iglesias se posiciona como lo contrario, la voz del pueblo rechazando esta visión. En este caso, la polarización ideológica se intenta atribuyendo ciertas concepciones ideológicas a la élite de la UE: no tienen una concepción del ESTADO sujeto a reglas como la protección del INDIVIDUO del capitalismo, sino que tienen una concepción de un ESTADO desenfrenado que facilita la colonización del capitalismo y el control del INDIVIDUO. Parte del ataque del populismo a la democracia liberal es la atribución de concepciones iliberales de conceptos liberales centrales a sus oponentes. El populismo ataca la democracia liberal desde dentro, y la metáfora activa parecería ser una herramienta particularmente efectiva para lograrlo.

También he encontrado ejemplos de meta-representación sin negación explicita. En (17)

(17)   [New York, 07/06/2016. Clinton says:] Donald Trump is temperamentally unfit to be president and commander-in-chief. And he's not just trying to build a wall between America and Mexico – he's trying to wall off Americans from each other. [Donald Trump es temperamentalmente incapaz de ser presidente y comandante en jefe. Y no solo está tratando de construir un muro entre Estados Unidos y México, está tratando de amurallar a unos estadounidenses frente a otros.]

Clinton atribuye un pensamiento metafórico a Trump haciéndose eco de sus proferencias literales (sus repetidas promesas de construir un muro físico entre EE.UU y México). Esto no parece irónico porque parece más que una disociación tácita, pero tampoco es una

negación explícita a través de la negación. Más bien, parece que la negación del pensamiento de Trump se comunica implícitamente a través del contexto lingüístico (a través de palabras como " temperamentally unfit" [temperamentalmente incapaz]) y la suposición mutuamente manifiesta de que Clinton no está de acuerdo con Trump.

En otros ejemplos de meta-representación se atribuye el pensamiento metafórico, pero sin ninguna forma de negación o disociación, como en (14) cuando Clinton atribuye el pensamiento metafórico de AMERICA AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ASSET ON THE BALANCE SHEET a la América corporativa.

5. Conclusiones

5.1. Hallazgos Importantes

El análisis cualitativo del uso de enunciados metafóricos activos por parte de los sujetos me ha permitido llegar a algunas conclusiones interesantes. En primer lugar, tanto en el corpus de la UE como en el de EE.UU., los hablantes populistas utilizan las proferencias metafóricas para comunicar marcos populistas y los hablantes no-populistas utilizan la metáfora activa para otros objetivos, como lograr algún objetivo ideológico o político. Esto podría parecer esperado, pero no hay razón por la que los populistas no puedan usar la metáfora para otros objetivos comunicativos. De hecho, dado que tanto Farage como Iglesias fueron designados como "algo populistas" de acuerdo con la puntuación de calificación holística, uno podría esperar que usaran metáforas por distintas de razones, especialmente dada su tasa relativamente alta de uso de proferencias metafóricas activas. Esto indica la utilidad de la metáfora para la comunicación de marcos populistas. En los corpus estadounidenses, este también es el caso. La mayoría de las declaraciones metafóricas de Trump y Sanders comunican o ayudan a comunicar un marco populista, pero las metáforas de Clinton en su mayoría no lo hacen (algunas de sus proferencias metafóricas, como la proferencia que describe a AMERICA COMO EL ACTIVO MÁS IMPORTANTE EN SU BALANCE GENERAL , podrían considerarse populistas). De hecho, las metáforas de Clinton a menudo se oponen al marco populista.

El análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo combinados nos llevan a una pregunta muy interesante: Hillary Clinton parece usar más proferencias metafóricas activas y las usa como una herramienta de *counterframing*, una forma de reaccionar contra los marcos populistas. ¿Por qué? He sugerido que esto podría deberse a que las actitudes populistas prevalecieron en Estados Unidos de 2016, basadas en una investigación realizada por Rahn

(2016). Una hipótesis para futuras investigaciones podría ser que la tasa de uso de proferencias metafóricas activas por parte de los hablantes populistas será mayor cuando las actitudes populistas sean menos prevalentes entre el público votante. De hecho, una investigación preliminar sobre las actitudes hacia la Unión Europea apoya esta hipótesis. Utilizando los datos de la encuesta del Eurobarómetro de la Unión Europea para 2016 (Nancy, 2016), podemos ver que el 53% de los ciudadanos europeos creían que el hecho de que su país fuera miembro de la UE era algo bueno (Nancy, 2016, p. 6), y esto se mantuvo en un razonable 47% en el Reino Unido y un 55% en España. Sin embargo, también hay indicios de que la situación estaba madura para que los marcos populistas se afianzaran: "Los europeos sienten que su voz cuenta cada vez menos, tanto a nivel nacional como europeo" (Nancy, 2016, p. 6). Si bien esto es solo un breve vistazo preliminar a los datos, apoya la conclusión de que los hablantes populistas como Farage e Iglesias utilizaron más metáforas activas que sus contrapartes no populistas porque necesitaban construir y comunicar marcos populistas como *counterframes* contra los marcos dominantes, neutrales o positivos hacia las instituciones de la UE entre los ciudadanos europeos, y entre los ciudadanos de sus propios países en particular. En Estados Unidos, dada la insatisfacción generalizada con la política convencional en 2016, (Rahn, 2019), Clinton utilizó más proferencias metafóricas activas para contrarrestar los marcos dominantes o cada vez más dominantes de Occupy Wall Street a la izquierda y el Tea Party a la derecha. Esta relación potencial entre las proferencias metafóricas activas y una función de *counterframing* contra marcos dominantes es un hallazgo importante para el estudio de la metáfora en el discurso político.

En el análisis cualitativo detallado de las proferencias metafóricas, he encontrado cómo las formas de meta-representación, como la ironía y la negación, se pueden usar en proferencias metafóricas activas para comunicar el marco populista y el contenido ideológico. Estos diversos usos de la meta-representación y la metáfora son un hallazgo importante y original de esta tesis, y no se habrían encontrado sin la adopción de un método corpus-pragmático para generar datos y hipótesis y una teoría pragmática de la identificación e interpretación de proferencias metafóricas con la que analizar los datos.

5.2. Observaciones Finales

Al comienzo de este programa de doctorado, quería explorar cómo se usaban las proferencias metafóricas en el discurso polarizador. Comenzando con un estudio sobre el

terrorismo, más tarde decidí que un estudio del populismo revelaría más de las dinámicas en juego entre la metáfora y la polarización, y recorté el alcance de la tesis en consecuencia.

Creo que el marco teórico original desarrollado en esta tesis puede ser utilizado para explorar la metáfora en otras formas de discurso polarizador y discurso político en general. El enfoque pragmático de la metáfora y el enfoque morfológico de la ideología podrían revelar mucho sobre cómo la propaganda terrorista comunica su propio tipo de discurso polarizador. Los elementos populistas del terrorismo pueden separarse de sus componentes ideológicos, dado el marco que he esbozado aquí. La atribución de pensamientos a los oponentes, y la negación o disociación de esos pensamientos por parte del hablante, es probablemente una característica de todos los discursos polarizadores.

Y lo que es importante, creo que he hecho hincapié en la importancia del análisis pragmático para el estudio de la metáfora en el discurso. Restringir el análisis al estudio de los conceptos metafóricos convencionales en sus usos literales significa que a menudo estamos ocultando aspectos importantes sobre cómo los hablantes usan la metáfora en la comunicación. Los conceptos metafóricos novedosos, como los conceptos metafóricos convencionales y los conceptos que no son metafóricos en absoluto, se crean ad hoc en la interpretación de proferencias. Se modifican, y se disputan cada día en innumerables combinaciones y en innumerables contextos diferentes para formar parte del contenido comunicado por el hablante. Para investigar esto, debemos tener una teoría pragmática para la identificación e interpretación del lenguaje metafóricamente utilizado, y debemos tener un marco para aplicarlo al discurso. Esta tesis ofrece tal marco. Mi análisis muestra que los conceptos metafóricos novedosos, y las proferencias metafóricas activas, no pueden considerarse solo mínimamente ideológicas.

Appendices

Appendix A: Carson

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Ben Carson's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Carson_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
4/5/15	And we dare not **soil** their efforts by being timid now and not standing up for what we believe.
4/5/15	Not allowing ourselves to be manipulated by people who think that they are the kingmakers, who thi[...] They are not the rulers of thought. We, the people are the rulers of thought in this nation. We get to d[...] have; other people cannot dictate that for us. We never allow anybody to take that right away from us[...]
4/5/15	Not allowing ourselves to be manipulated by people who think that they are the kingmakers, who thi[...] They are not **the rulers of thought**. We, the people are the rulers of thought in this nation. We get to[...] have; other people cannot dictate that for us. We never allow anybody to take that right away from us[...]
4/5/15	Not allowing ourselves to be manipulated by people who think that they are the kingmakers, who thi[...] They are not the rulers of thought. We, the people are the **rulers of thought** in this nation. We get to[...] have; other people cannot dictate that for us. We never allow anybody to take that right away from us[...]
4/5/15	We can't work it when we wrap it in **chains and fetters** of regulations and new regulations that com[...]
4/5/15	And at the same time, the government is leasing over 500 million square feet from the private sector,[...] totally horrendous **when you look under the hood**, you just want to shut it back down. I mean it is t[...]
4/5/15	And at the same time, the government is leasing over 500 million square feet from the private sector,[...] totally horrendous when you look under the hood, you just want to **shut it back down**. I mean it is th[...]

Appendix B: Clinton

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Hillary Clinton's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Clinton_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
13/6/15	And in a place… **with absolutely no ceilings**.
13/6/15	Here, on Roosevelt Island, I believe we have a continuing **rendezvous with destiny**. Each American a
13/6/15	For everyone who's ever been **knocked down**, but refused to be knocked out
13/6/15	For everyone who's ever been knocked down, but **refused to be knocked out**
13/6/15	For decades, Americans have been **buffeted by powerful currents**. Advances in technology and the ri new areas of economic activity and opened new markets for our exports, but they have also displaced j of Americans. The financial industry and many multi-national corporations have created huge wealth f short-term profit and too little on long-term value… too much on complex trading schemes and stock b new businesses, jobs, and fair compensation. Our political system is so paralyzed by gridlock and dysf confidence that anything can actually get done. And they've lost trust in the ability of both governmen
13/6/15	Our next President must work with Congress and every other willing partner across our entire country. **tide** so these currents start working for us more than against us
13/6/15	Our next President must work with Congress and every other willing partner across our entire country. tide so **these currents start working for us more than against us**
13/6/15	Now, there may be some **new voices** in the presidential Republican choir, but they're all singing the sa "Yesterday." You know the one — all our troubles look as though they're here to stay… and we need a in yesterday. And you're lucky I didn't try singing that, too, I'll tell you!
13/6/15	Now, there may be some new voices in the presidential **Republican choir**, but they're all singing the s "Yesterday." You know the one — all our troubles look as though they're here to stay… and we need a in yesterday. And you're lucky I didn't try singing that, too, I'll tell you!
13/6/15	Now, there may be some new voices in the presidential Republican choir, but **they're all singing the s** "Yesterday." You know the one — all our troubles look as though they're here to stay… and we need a in yesterday. And you're lucky I didn't try singing that, too, I'll tell you!
13/6/15	Now, there may be some new voices in the presidential Republican choir, but they're all singing the sa "Yesterday." You know the one — all our troubles look as though they're here to stay… and **we need** in yesterday. And you're lucky I didn't try singing that, too, I'll tell you!
13/6/15	We've **heard this tune befor**e. And we know how it turns out

13/6/15	They pledge to wipe out tough rules on Wall Street, rather than rein in the banks that are still too risky, can only be considered **mass amnesia.**
13/6/15	Fundamentally, they reject what it takes to build an inclusive economy. It takes an inclusive society. W a place for everyone.
13/6/15	Government is never going to have all the answers – but it has to be smarter, simpler, more efficient, a
13/6/15	That means access to advanced technology **so government agencies can more effectively serve their**
13/6/15	The **story** of America is a story of hard-fought, hard-won progress. And it continues today. New chapt women who believe that all of us – not just some, but all – should have the chance to live up to our Go
13/6/15	The story of America is a **story** of hard-fought, hard-won progress. And it continues today. New chapt women who believe that all of us – not just some, but all – should have the chance to live up to our Go
13/6/15	The story of America is a story of hard-fought, hard-won progress. And it continues today. New **chapt** women who believe that all of us – not just some, but all – should have the chance to live up to our Go
26/1/16	OK. So, what do you especially bring to Washington that can make a difference?" He said, "Well, I gu **make it add up again** for the American people." And at the end of eight years, we did.
26/1/16	George W. Bush slashed taxes on the wealthy and got out of the way of corporations to the extent that an eye on Wall Street **took a chainsaw to a big stack of regulations** and had a great big smile on his f
26/1/16	We went into the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression, and when Barack Obama became jobs a month. I don't think President Obama gets the credit he deserves for **digging us out of that big** during their administration
26/1/16	And I want to be the small business president. My dad was a small businessman, so I want to **clear aw** start businesses again
26/1/16	And then along came Karl Rove, you know, the **errand boy** for the billionaires, and he's now running
26/1/16	? Because, you know, my view is when you're **knocked down**, you share the human experience becaus about something. The real question is whether you get back up.
26/1/16	? Because, you know, my view is when you're knocked down, you share the human experience because about something. The real question is whether you get back up.
26/1/16	? Because, you know, my view is when you're knocked down, you share the human experience because something. The real question is whether you **get back up**.

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Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

26/1/16	I said what do they say when you go ask them and you tell them you want to try to pay for something? what the last person told me at the insurance company I visited. He said, we don't insure **burning hous** little girls burning houses.
26/1/16	I said what do they say when you go ask them and you tell them you want to try to pay for something? what the last person told me at the insurance company I visited. He said, we don't insure burning house girls **burning houses.**
1/2/16	I know we can make college affordable and **get student debt off the backs** of young people.
9/2/16	A right-wing organization **took aim at me** and ended up damaging our entire democracy
9/2/16	A right-wing organization took aim at me and **ended up damaging** our entire democracy
9/2/16	We also have **to break through the barriers** of bigotry
9/2/16	We need to **break down those barriers** and build ladders of opportunity for every person
9/2/16	We need to break down those barriers and **build ladders** of opportunity for every person
9/2/16	I know I've had a blessed life, but I also know what it's **like to stumble and fall**.
9/2/16	And we've learned it's not whether you **get knocked down** that matters: It's whether you get back up.
9/2/16	And we've learned it's not whether you get knocked down that matters: It's whether **you get back up**.
20/2/16	We're going t**o build ladders** of opportunity in their place so every American can go as far as your har
27/2/16	: in America, when we stand together, **there is no barrier too big to break**.
27/2/16	And here's why: because together, we can **break down all the barriers** holding our families and our c opportunity and empowerment so every single American can have that chance to live up to his or her C
27/2/16	And here's why: because together, we can break down all the barriers holding our families and our cou **opportunity** and empowerment so every single American can have that chance to live up to his or her
27/2/16	Instead of **building wall**s, we need to be tearing down barriers. We need to show by everything we do
27/2/16	Instead of building walls, we need to be **tearing down barriers**. We need to show by everything we d
27/2/16	The middle class needs **a raise**!
27/2/16	It's a story of a community that's been **knocked down** but refused to be knocked out.
27/2/16	It's a story of a community that's been knocked down but refused to be **knocked out**.
1/3/16	We have to make America whole. We have **to fill in what's been hollowed out**.
1/3/16	We have to make strong the broken places, r**e-stitch the bonds of trust and respect** across our countr

1/3/16	Because you know what? It works. Instead of **building walls** we're going to break down barriers and b
1/3/16	Because you know what? It works. Instead of building walls we're going to **break down barriers** and
1/3/16	**build ladders** of opportunity and empowerment so every American can live up to his or her potential, America live up to its full potential too.
1/3/16	Because the middle class **needs a raise**.
1/3/16	And together we can break down the barriers that face working class families across America, especial and small, Appalachian town th**at have been hollowed out** by lost jobs and lost hope.
1/3/16	It's the story of a community that's **been knocked down** but refused to be knocked out
1/3/16	It's the story of a community that's been knocked down but **refused to be knocked out**
15/3/16	We should be **breaking down barriers**, not building walls.
15/3/16	We should be breaking down barriers, not **building walls**.
15/3/16	, if we **lift each other up** instead of tearing each other down, there's nothing we can't accomplish toge
15/3/16	, if we lift each other up instead of **tearing each other down**, there's nothing we can't accomplish toge
15/3/16	for everyone who has **stumbled** but stood right back up
15/3/16	for everyone who has stumbled but **stood right back up**
7/6/16	and **bridges** are better than walls
7/6/16	and bridges are better than **walls**
7/6/16	Donald Trump is temperamentally unfit to be president and commander-in-chief. And he's not just tryi and Mexico – he's trying to **wall off** Americans from each other.
7/6/16	We're stronger when every family in every community knows they're not on their own, because we ar **a village'** to raise a child – and to build a stronger future for us all.
7/6/16	So yes, yes, there are still **ceilings to break** – for women and men, for all of us.
7/6/16	**Barriers can come down**. Justice and equality can win.
7/6/16	Now you are **writing a new chapter of that stor**y.
22/6/16	We're going to work hard in this election to elect as many Democrats, up and down the ticket, so that l path to the future, **get off this detour** that you've been on
22/6/16	So you see, it's — it's — it is not enough to have an affirmative agenda. We've got to **knock down th**

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22/6/16	We're going to make this economy work for everybody. And it's time we started **building it from the** ... every community, all the way to Washington.
22/6/16	Now, I know there are a lot of businesses thriving here at North Carolina and across our country who s... not costs to cut.
22/6/16	Now, I know there are a lot of businesses thriving here at North Carolina and across our country who s... not **costs to cut.**
22/6/16	And you know, whenever I talk about these family issues, Donald Trump says **I'm playing the woman** ... say, if fighting for childcare, paid leave and equal pay is playing the woman card, then deal me in.
22/6/16	And you know, whenever I talk about these family issues, Donald Trump says I'm playing the woman ... say, if fighting for childcare, paid leave and equal pay is **playing the woman card**, then deal me in.
22/6/16	And you know, whenever I talk about these family issues, Donald Trump says I'm playing the woman ... say, if fighting for childcare, paid leave and equal pay is playing the woman card, then **deal me in.**
22/6/16	We need **to write a new chapter** in the American dream, and it can't be Chapter 11.
22/6/16	we will not only win an election, we will **chart the course** to the future that we want and deserve
13/7/16	Remember, he said, 'A **house** divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot end... free. I do not expect,' he went on, 'The Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the **house** to fall. But I ... will become all one thing or all the other.'
13/7/16	Remember, he said, 'A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot end... free. I do not expect,' he went on, 'The Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the **house** to fall. But I ... will become all one thing or all the other.'
13/7/16	But recent events have left people across America asking hard questions about whether we are still a **h**...
13/7/16	Lincoln understood that threat, too. He deeply believed everyone deserved – in his words – 'a fair chan...
13/7/16	They are real **forces** that families are dealing with up close and personal every day
13/7/16	to every place that's been **hollowed out** when a factory closed or a mine shut down because everyone ...
13/7/16	deserves that 'fair chance in the **race of life**' that President Lincoln described.
13/7/16	There's a great song by the character playing George Washington who sings, '**History's eyes are on u**... today.
13/7/16	If we do this right, and if we have the hard conversations we need to have, we will become stronger sti...

28/7/16	And Bill, that **conversation** we started in the law library 45 years ago is s**till going strong**. It's lasted through good times that filled us with joy, and hard times that tested us. And I've even gotten a few words in along the way.
28/7/16	And Bill, that conversation we started in the law library 45 years ago is still going stron**g**. It's lasted through good times that filled us with joy, and hard times that tested us. And **I've even gotten a few words in** along the way.
28/7/16	And for those of you out there who are just getting to know Tim Kaine – you're soon going to understa **promoting** him: from city council and mayor, to Governor, and now Senator.
28/7/16	We all know **the story.** But we usually focus on how it turned out - and not enough on how close that s all.
28/7/16	We all know the story. But we usually focus on how it turned out - and not enough on how close that **s all.**
28/7/16	20 years ago I wrote a book called "It Takes a **Village**." A lot of people looked at the title and asked, w This is what I mean. None of us can raise a family, build a business, heal a community or lift a country
28/7/16	The family I'm from . . . well, no one had their name on big buildings. My family were builders of a di American families are. They used whatever tools they had – whatever God gave them – and whatever better lives and better futures for their kids.
28/7/16	The family I'm from . . . well, no one had their name on big buildings. My family were builders of a di American families are. They used whatever tools they had – whatever God gave them – and whatever **better lives** and better futures for their kids.
28/7/16	Happy for boys and men, too – because when any **barrier falls** in America, for anyone, it clears the wa ceilings, the sky's the limit.
28/7/16	Happy for boys and men, too – because when any barrier falls in America, for anyone, it **clears the wa** ceilings, the sky's the limit.
28/7/16	Happy for boys and men, too – because when any barrier falls in America, for anyone, it clears the way **ceilings**, the sky's the limit.

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28/7/16	Happy for boys and men, too – because when any barrier falls in America, for anyone, it clears the way for everyone. ceilings, **the sky's the limit**.
28/7/16	Because even more important than the history we make tonight, is the **history we will write** together in the years ahead.
28/7/16	From communities ravaged by addiction to regions **hollowed out** by plant closures. And here's what I believe
28/7/16	We're going to help you balance family and work. And you know what, if fighting for affordable child care and paid leave is playing **the "woman card,"** then Deal Me In!
28/7/16	We're going to help you balance family and work. And you know what, if fighting for affordable child care and paid leave is playing the "woman card," then **Deal Me In!**
28/7/16	And I know it from my own life. More than a few times, I've had to pick myself up and **get back in the**
28/7/16	Let our legacy be about "**planting seeds in a garden** you never get to see."
11/8/16	But corporations should not abandon profitable operations here in the United States to move abroad, just return, CEOs a bigger bonus, and unions **a weaker hand to play**.
11/8/16	The t**ide is not rising fast enough**, and it's certainly not lifting all boats
11/8/16	The tide is not rising fast enough, and it**'s certainly not lifting all boats**
11/8/16	And based on what we know from the Trump campaign, he wants America **to work** for him and his friends
25/8/16	A man with a long history of racial discrimination, who **traffics in dark conspiracy theories** drawn from and the far reaches of the internet, should never run our government or command our military.
25/8/16	His latest **paranoid fever dream** is about my health. All I can say is, Donald, dream on
25/8/16	His latest paranoid fever dream is about my health. All I can say is, Donald, **dream on**
25/8/16	But it's never had the nominee of a major party stoking it, encouraging it, and **giving it a national meg**
25/8/16	The paranoid fringe now calls itself "alt-right." But the hate **burns just as bright**.
25/8/16	And now Trump is trying to **rebrand** himself as well.
9/9/16	It's sort of like **the seventh inning stretch**
9/9/16	You know, I've been saying at events like this lately, I am all that stands between you and the **apocaly**
9/9/16	You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you could **put** half Trump's supporters into what I call **the l**
9/9/16	But **the other basket** — and I know this because I see friends from all over America here — I see frie South Carolina and Texas — as well as, you know, New York and California — but that other basket of

	government has let them down, the economy has let them down, nobody cares about them, nobody wo and their futures, and they're just desperate for change.
9/9/16	But the other basket — and I know this because I see friends from all over America here — I see frien South Carolina and Texas — as well as, you know, New York and California — but **that other basket** the government has let them down, the economy has let them down, nobody cares about them, nobody lives and their futures, and they're just desperate for change.
3/10/16	Now, one thing I know — I'll just say it because I know it's for sure, I hope to be elected president, bu always be **the king**.
3/10/16	So let's — let's begin by making it clear that for most businesses, America is the **most important asse**
3/10/16	Now, you know, my opponent and his chief surrogates like to say I'm **playing the woman card**. And I working families is playing the women's card, you know what, deal me in.
3/10/16	Now, you know, my opponent and his chief surrogates like to say I'm playing the woman card. And I' working families is **playing the women's card**, you know what, deal me in.
3/10/16	Now, you know, my opponent and his chief surrogates like to say I'm playing the woman card. And I' working families is playing the women's card, you know what, **deal me in**.
3/10/16	And we're going to do everything we can to make sure workers are treated like **assets**, not costs
3/10/16	And we're going to do everything we can to make sure workers are treated like assets, not **costs**
22/10/1 6	And there is an inspiring **story being written** by people across America right now. We have just reach Americans are registered to vote in this election.
23/10/1 6	But anger is not a **plan**.
3/11/16	and we will help you pay back the debt you already have so **you can get out from under it.**
3/11/16	I will get up every day in the White House trying to figure out: how can we **knock down the barriers,** people living here in Pasco County can get ahead and stay ahead?
7/11/16	An America where we **build bridges**, not walls.
7/11/16	An America where we build bridges, not **walls**.
7/11/16	And remember, when my opponent says every time I talk about these issues that I'm **playing the wom** – deal me in!

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7/11/16	And remember, when my opponent says every time I talk about these issues that I'm playing the woma **deal me in**!
7/11/16	We have to bridge the divides in this country. As the Bible says, we have to **repair the breaches**.
9/11/16	Now, I — I know — I know we have still not s**hattered that highest and hardest glass ceiling**, but so sooner than we might think right now.
9/11/16	You know, scripture tells us, "Let us not grow weary in doing good, for in **due season, we shall reap** i

Appendix C: Cruz

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Ted Cruz's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Cruz_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
23/3/15	And that the purpose of the Constitution, as Thomas Jefferson put it, is to serve as **chains to bind**
23/3/15	And then the American exceptionalism that has made this nation a clarion voice for freedom in th
23/3/15	We will get back and restore **that shining city on a hill** that is the United States of America.
1/2/16	Tonight, Iowa has proclaimed to the world, **morning** is coming. Morning is coming
1/2/16	Tonight, Iowa has proclaimed to the world, morning is coming. **Morning** is coming
1/2/16	They stand to defend their values and let me tell you, these leaders, day after day, week after wee **glass with knives between their teeth**
1/2/16	Do you want to know what scares the Washington **cartel**?
1/2/16	36 years ago, you welcomed to the Granite State a candidate running for president who was also d establishment and the Washington **cartel**.
1/2/16	Because together, this year, Republicans and the Reagan Democrats can send an unmistakable me landslide that once and for all will drive the liberal elites and the Washington **cartel** into the Poto again.
1/2/16	Because together, this year, Republicans and the Reagan Democrats can send an unmistakable me landslide that once and for all **will drive the liberal elites and the Washington cartel into the P** seen again.
1/2/16	We are going to do this together, as a movement from the people. And I tell you tonight, Iowa has **morning** is coming.
20/2/16	But each time defying expectations and causing the pundits... Indeed, the screaming you hear now Washington **cartel** in full terror that the conservative grassroots are rising up

Appendix D: Farage

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Nigel Farage's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Farage_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
2/7/14	You would have thought it was time to apply the principle 'When in a hole, stop digging' – but no, D
2/7/14	Having lost 26:2 in the last vote in the Council of Ministers, we are going to need to succeed with thi going to need the support of the European Parliament. Are you going to help Britain to end the free m so. Are we going to **win 28-nil** in the Council of Ministers? I do not think so. It is not going to happe we are closer now to exit than ever.
2/7/14	It was the usual **dirge-like**, dull looking-back to a model invented 50 years ago
2/7/14	We are the ones who want democracy, we are the ones who want nation states, we are the ones who v and do not want to be trapped inside this **museum**.
15/7/14	You said at the end of your speech that this is not the time for a revolution. I put it to you that there h has effectively been a **coup d'éta**t on nation state democracies without people realising, without peop them.
16/9/14	This **EU empire**, ever seeking to expand, stated its territorial claim on the Ukraine some years ago.
16/9/14	We directly encouraged the uprising in the Ukraine that led to the toppling of President Yanukovych; reacting; and the moral of the story is: if you **poke the Russian bear with a stick**, do not be surprise
21/10/14	I also enjoyed you saying that the European Union was the first ever **non-imperial empire**, because this project has now become.
16/12/14	But please do not give us 'new'. You were Prime Minister of Luxembourg for 19 years and you head are not. You and this Commission, frankly, ar**e as stale and musty as a corked bottle of wine**.
13/1/15	Mr President, first I would like to give my customary welcome to incoming President of the Europea you. You are perfect. You are like t**he euro record that has got stuck in a groove** – a completely ou Clearly you have learned absolutely nothing from the results of the European elections.
13/1/15	You yourself prove the point. You are the newest Polish émigré, and you have gone from a salary of 000 a year. Congratulations: **you have hit the EU jackpot**.
11/2/15	There is a **great game of poker** taking place for the future of this currency. On the one hand we have much my warnings over the years may have upset people, when I said that the EU would crush and k democracy, I think the behaviour by the key players since the Greek elections justifies everything I h
11/2/15	There is a great game of poker taking place for the future of this currency. On the one hand we have t much my warnings over the years may have upset people, when I said that the EU would **crush** and k democracy, I think the behaviour by the key players since the Greek elections justifies everything I h

11/3/15	We ourselves in the European Union provoked the conflict through our territorial expansionism in U[...] **with a stick** and, unsurprisingly, Putin reacted, and this is now to be used as an opportunity to build a[...]
8/7/15	I feel that the continent is now divided from north to south: there is a **new Berlin Wall** and it is calle[...] been resumed.
7/10/15	France is now severely diminished, trapped inside a currency from which, frankly, it cannot recover a[...] relationship and in Europe is little more now, frankly, than a **pipsqueak.**
27/10/15	This is the modern day implementation of the **Brezhnev doctrine**
2/12/15	Chancellor Merkel **took the cork out of a champagne bottle** and said anyone could come, and now [...] and realising it is not possible.
2/12/15	Chancellor Merkel took the cork out of a champagne bottle and said anyone could come, and now yo[...] and realising it is not possible.
16/12/15	And by any measure, the EU's common asylum policy – albeit **given rocket boosters** by Chancellor [...]
16/12/15	I think we should take that about as seriously as when he banged the table and said he would not pay [...] months ago, and then meekly obliged.
20/1/16	This EU faces an existential crisis. Indeed, there i**s an outbreak of a contagious disease**. It is not a n[...] it a couple of thousand years ago. The virus in its new form began in Denmark in the early 1990s, but[...] hand. There have been a couple o**f** outbreaks in Ireland, but substantial European money again cured [...] 2005, when the contagion swept across the Netherlands and France, frankly has never gone away, an[...] outbreaks of the disease. In Denmark it now looks to be wholly irreversible and, in my own country, [...] establishment denying its existence, a recent opinion poll showed that sufferers may now be actually [...] about your speech, as the Dutch Prime Minister, is that you did not mention the fact that 427 000 of y[...] themselves in public, declared themselves to be carriers, called a referendum for 6 April and encoura[...] suppose it must be embarrassing for you. The diagnosis, by the way, will not be popular in this House: the disease is called democracy. People [...]
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Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

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20/1/16	I also very much doubt that, 50 years after his death, Churchill would approve of the **club** the way it
3/2/16	But there is one more chance for the Prime Minister, because he goes to the European summit in a co **Twist**, he will parade in front of the other leaders and say, 'please can we have some more concessio British prime minister has to do this, but I am certain of one thing: he will not get another thing.
3/2/16	Just look at the substance of this: we have an **emergency brake** on migrant benefits. Wow! It was su benefits for up to four years, so it is hardly an emergency brake. It is more of a handbrake turn.
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3/2/16	Just look at the substance of this: we have an emergency brake on migrant benefits. Wow! It was sup... benefits for up to four years, so it is hardly an emergency brake. It is more of **a handbrake turn**.
3/2/16	Also, the Prime Minister is saying we have got **a red card**. Isn't that wonderful!
24/2/16	This follows a 40-hour summit, where Mr Cameron, doing his modern day impression of **Oliver Twi**... 'Please sir, can I have some more concessions?
24/2/16	. To top that off, Mr Cameron has told us that he will lodge the deal – will lodge the documents – at t... might as well lodge **an old pair of socks**, because the fact of lodging a document there is completely... deposit box.
24/2/16	But of course, we have **an emergency brake**. That has been judged to be a great success but, crucial... legislation that can be voted on by this Parliament.
13/4/16	I am no fan of Mr Putin, but I am equally not very keen on going to war with Mr Putin. It strikes me a... we do? We encouraged the overthrow of a corrupt but democratically-elected leader in Ukraine. We, ... **bear with a stick** and we are surprised when he reacts.
8/6/16	You know, we actually saw the Prime Minister of Greece removed effectively by a **coup d'état** and v... coup d'état and in both cases represented by appointees who were former directors of Goldman Sach...
8/6/16	You know, we actually saw the Prime Minister of Greece removed effectively by a coup d'état and w... **coup d'état** and in both cases represented by appointees who were former directors of Goldman Sach... seeds of your own destruction.
8/6/16	And I hope that on 23 June it is not just **Independence Day** for the United Kingdom. I hope it brings... few years' time we could be sovereign, democratic nation states that work and trade together.
8/6/16	I hope this is the last time I will be speaking in this Parliament from a Member State. I hope that we a... June. **And so I am going out now; I may be some time.**
28/6/16	But I am looking forward next year to celebrating our **independence day** on 23 June.
14/9/16	Indeed, it was the usual **recipe**: more Europe, and in this particular case, more military Europe – a Eu... already in this House people are saying, well, the Americans will not be here anymore and we will ha... military structures
14/9/16	But is pretty clear that the EU is getting on with it, and you have already appointed your **divorce law**...
14/9/16	If you were to think of this building as a **temple**, Mr Verhofstadt is the high priest, a fanatic.
14/9/16	If you were to think of this building as a temple, Mr Verhofstadt is **the high priest,** a fanatic.

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

14/9/16	. You are an EU **nationalist**, and I frankly think that this appointment amounts to pretty much a decla... negotiating process.
14/9/16	. You are an EU nationalist, and I frankly think that this appointment amounts to pretty much a **decla**... negotiating process.
26/10/16	Mr President, so **Mrs Smith goes to Brussels** and is given five minutes to speak at one o'clock in the...
26/10/16	Frankly, the whole thing is a disgrace. It is even worse that it is supported by **quislings** in the British... and Ed Miliband, who are desperate to keep Britain inside this awful single market. Well, I am sorry...
26/10/16	. I want us to get on with it, because this club is very expensive. We are paying in net GBP 30 millio...
26/10/16	Either way, it is too much. We are helping to finance this **monthly travelling circus** to Strasbourg a... that in your staff regulations up to 5% of employees every year are allowed to retire five years early a... for five years for doing absolutely nothing. Nowhere else in the world would allow thissortofthingtog...
26/10/16	The only obstacle appears to be the **high priests** of Euro-federalism in this room today.
14/12/16	As it is Christmas, let's think of those events in terms of **the three wise men bearing their gifts**. Fir... we had the Trump triumph; and then thirdly, of course, the Italian rebellion. It's just that in this case... democracy and the rebirth of the nation state.
14/12/16	As it is Christmas, let's think of those events in terms of the three wise men bearing their gifts. First... we had the Trump triumph; and then thirdly, of course, the Italian rebellion. It's just that in this case... democracy and the rebirth of the nation state.
14/12/16	You know, history is littered with conflicts caused by **empires** that seek to expand, and it's about tim... tomorrow and said: enough.
14/2/17	Mr President, I feel like I am attending a meeting of a **religious sect** here this morning. It is as if the ... Trump, the Italian rejection of the referendum – has completely bypassed you.
5/4/17	Mr President, it may have taken nine months – **a pretty full gestation** – but be in no doubt that last... when the United Kingdom announced that we were going to become an independent, self-governing,... that has been cheered by hundreds of millions of people all over the world.
5/4/17	We have had a little **history lesson** this morning from Mr Verhofstadt, but he made one mistake. In 1... Union; we joined the European Economic Community.
5/4/17	You began by telling us that we have to **pay a bill**: a cool GBP 52 billion, a figure that has clearly be... effectively a form of ransom demand.

5/4/17	You began by telling us that we have to pay a bill: a cool GBP 52 billion, a figure that has clearly bee... effectively a form of **ransom demand**.
5/4/17	What you could have acknowledged is that we put over GBP 200 billion net into this project. We are... building and the rest of the assets and really you should be making us an offer we cannot refuse, to g...
5/4/17	The ever-charming Mr Verhofstadt, Parliament's chief negotiator, in his resolution that we are to vot... cannot discuss potential trade deals with anybody else in the world until we have left the European U... whatsoever. It is rather like saying you cannot **guarantee yourself a dwelling for when you leave p**... Government will completely ignore you.
5/4/17	We believe in national self-determination. Your aim and ambition is to destroy nation state democrac... on current terms. With these demands, you have shown yourselves to be vindictive, to be nasty, and a... leaving. You are behaving like the **mafia**. You think we are a hostage, we are not, we are free to go, a...
5/4/17	We believe in national self-determination. Your aim and ambition is to destroy nation state democrac... on current terms. With these demands, you have shown yourselves to be vindictive, to be nasty, and a... leaving. You are behaving like the mafia. You think we are a **hostage**, we are not, we are free to go, a...
5/4/17	Mr President, I do understand national sensitivities. I will change it to **gangsters**. All right? And that... being given a ransom note.
5/4/17	Mr President, I do understand national sensitivities. I will change it to gangsters. All right? And that ... being given a **ransom note.**
26/4/17	Just as we are seeing in France at the moment, with huge interference in the French presidential elect... Commission now coming out and backing this **godlike creature** called Macron.
26/4/17	You are a **sinner** in their eyes, not just because you want to close down George Soros' propaganda m... university – nothing to do with that
26/4/17	Who knows, you might come and join the Brexit **club**, and then we could fight for a nation of democ... together and put this nonsense behind us.
17/5/17	Mr President, imagine you invited a very important **guest round for dinner**, you had made all the pr... important confidential conversations that needed to be had and you thought everything had gone well... told the outside world that you, the host, were deluded – that you were living in a different galaxy.
17/5/17	Mr President, imagine you invited a very important guest round for dinner, **you had made all the pr**... important confidential conversations that needed to be had and you thought everything had gone well... told the outside world that you, the host, were deluded – that you were living in a different galaxy.

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

17/5/17	Mr President, imagine you invited a very important guest round for dinner, you had made all the prep important confidential conversations that needed to be had and you thought everything had gone well **had told the outside world** that you, the host, were deluded – that you were living in a different gala
17/5/17	Mr President, imagine you invited a very important guest round for dinner, you had made all the prep important confidential conversations that needed to be had and you thought everything had gone well told the outside world that **you, the host, were deluded** – that you were living in a different galaxy.
17/5/17	Mr President, imagine you invited a very important guest round for dinner, you had made all the prep important confidential conversations that needed to be had and you thought everything had gone well told the outside world that you, the host, were deluded – that you were **living in a different galaxy**.
14/6/17	But that has not stopped a **parade** of former prime ministers and of former European Commissioners the British Government to backslide on its commitments.
14/6/17	And she is caught in a bit of a **pincer movement**, because the political class would like us to stay in t single market, but the people have made it perfectly clear they want us to leave both of those things
5/4/17	But throughout this negotiating process, you have treated us as if we're some kind of a **hostage** from unless we meet all of your demands, then you won't even have an intelligent conversation with us ab
5/4/17	But throughout this negotiating process, you have treated us as if we're some kind of a hostage from **ransom**, unless we meet all of your demands, then you won't even have an intelligent conversation w here.
29/11/17	Madam President, let's hear it for Commissioner Oettinger, the German commissioner in charge of th You, sir, are having a very good day. **Christmas has come early** – you must be delighted. The Britis cool EUR 50 billion as part of our exit proceedings, which, when you think about it, is really rather o wasn't just significant politically, it was significant for the European Union budget.
13/12/17	Well, you didn't need to, sir, because you were up against Theresa May, and she was all for making a could, including agreeing a ludicrous **bill** of up to 40 billion sterling for us to have the right to leave, Court of Justice and, in line with that, family reunions that mean, frankly, that open-door immigration continue for years to come, and – almost bizarrely – a commitment for ongoing regulatory alignment
17/1/18	You, of course, worked here as a young man; you're a devotee. In fact, we should call you, I think, a cost to Ireland may be.
28/2/18	And it is the same story in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán quite rightly refuses to accept your ludicrou now cast as the **devil**.

28/2/18	This, for Poland, is the modern-day **Brezhnev doctrine** of limited sovereignty.
18/4/18	Now, I'm not the least bit surprised by the intransigence of Mr Barnier and the EU's negotiating team **empire**, which is coming under sustained assault from voters everywhere, in particular the recent wo
3/5/18	Brexit, I think, is going to prove to be just **the first brick that is knocked out of the wal**l.
3/5/18	Brexit is **the first brick out of the wall.**
3/7/18	Credit is due, I think, to the man on my left, Jean-Claude Juncker, it was he that **opened the doors** ba crossing the Mediterranean. So I think credit really is due to Mr Juncker for this catastrophe.
11/9/18	I am sure that for Hungarians of a certain age today will have brought back many dark memories. Yo bunch of political non-entities get up and point the finger and scream, enjoying themselves with their prosecutor, the commissar that comes from the unelected government, has the audacity to lecture you
11/9/18	I am sure that for Hungarians of a certain age today will have brought back many dark memories. Yo bunch of political non-entities get up and point the finger and scream, enjoying themselves with their **prosecutor**, the commissar that comes from the unelected government, has the audacity to lecture yo
11/9/18	I am sure that for Hungarians of a certain age today will have brought back many dark memories. Yo bunch of political non-entities get up and point the finger and scream, enjoying themselves with their prosecutor, **the commissar** that comes from the unelected government, has the audacity to lecture yo
11/9/18	What is really happening here, Mr Orbán, is that they are just updating the **Brezhnev doctrine** of lim
11/9/18	It is time to be more logical. Come and join the Brexit club. You'll love it.
2/10/18	Your exporters call us **'Treasure Island'**, so many motor cars and so much wine and Belgian chocol
2/10/18	I know the European Commission would not necessarily want this, because they're trying to use the l leaving this club comes at a price, but I do believe it would be possible.
2/10/18	Nobody voted for these guys, and nobody can get rid of these guys, they can do what the hell they lik **club** is authoritarian, taking away voting rights from Hungary, Poland and who knows next.
2/10/18	For a decade here I have noticed that that centralising authoritarian tone began to sound very like the limited sovereignty of individual nation states. I have even talked in the past about the '**Volkerkerke** of nations, and to see the British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt now using that language means that we have shifted this debate.
2/10/18	I have even talked in the past about the 'Volkerkerker', **the old Austro-Hungarian prison of nation** Secretary Jeremy Hunt now using that language means that we have shifted the centre of gravity, we

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

2/10/18	I have even talked in the past about the 'Volkerkerker', the old Austro-Hungarian prison of nations, a… Secretary Jeremy Hunt now using that language means that we have **shifted the centre of gravity**, w…
2/10/18	I know many of you here still think that we're **a hostage** and that you're going to demand some extra…
2/10/18	I know many of you here still think that we're a hostage and that you're going to demand some extra…
24/10/18	The problem, I'm afraid, is that there is a rogue element in these negotiations, a group of people who… **put up an immovable brick wall to stop us from breaking free**, and I regret to say that it isn't you… but actually the British Civil Service and Olly Robbins' team.
13/11/18	And I believe – having heard you today, and listening to senior French politicians over the last coupl… European Union is now indeed a liberation. It's a European Union that we're told is now to become a… Union, an undemocratic European Union, a European Union that seeks to continually expand to the e…
13/11/18	Maybe you should all reread history: the European project was set up to stop German domination. W… **takeover bid**.
16/1/19	She has behaved **like a leader of a nation defeated in war**, and that is why this Withdrawal Agreement looked more like a surrender document and it was smashed to pieces in the House of Com…
16/1/19	She has behaved like a leader of a nation defeated in war, and that is why this Withdrawal Agreement looked more like **a surrender document** and it was smashed to pieces in the House of C…
16/1/19	The British may be a very placid people, very laid back, but I promise you: if they get pushed too far…
13/3/19	I have to say I think the gap now between our political class in the UK and public opinion is **a gaping**… public opinion is hardening.
27/3/19	It is not happening, and we are witnessing a **slow motion** betrayal – perhaps the greatest betrayal of a… our nation – and the reason, of course, is this Withdrawal Treaty
27/3/19	And I'll go back to the First World War: we won the war, but we had the Treaty of Versailles, and **th**… equivalent.
27/3/19	We have a **reparations bill** of GBP 39 billion we have to pay for nothing in return. We have the ann… territory in the shape of Northern Ireland.
27/3/19	We have a reparations bill of GBP 39 billion we have to pay for nothing in return. We have **the ann**… **territory** in the shape of Northern Ireland.
16/4/19	That is where the betrayal is and I do share Members' great sadness about the appalling tragedy of N… burnt down yesterday – something very beautiful has been lost – but something very vital is being los…

	thought the deaths column of The Times newspaper yesterday summed it up rather well: 'UK Democ It was with sad regret that **Democracy died quietly in her sleep** at 11pm, on the 29th March 2019. T and the culprits have yet to be brought to justice. Democracy campaigned for the rule of law, human majority in all her decisions. She will be sorely missed. God have mercy on [our] soul.'
16/4/19	That is where the betrayal is and I do share Members' great sadness about the appalling tragedy of N burnt down yesterday – something very beautiful has been lost – but something very vital is being los thought the deaths column of The Times newspaper yesterday summed it up rather well: 'UK Democ It was with sad regret that Democracy died quietly in her sleep at 11pm, on the 29th March 2019. **Th** and the culprits have yet to be brought to justice. Democracy campaigned for the rule of law, human majority in all her decisions. She will be sorely missed. God have mercy on [our] soul.'
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16/4/19	That is where the betrayal is and I do share Members' great sadness about the appalling tragedy of N burnt down yesterday – something very beautiful has been lost – but something very vital is being los thought the deaths column of The Times newspaper yesterday summed it up rather well: 'UK Democ It was with sad regret that Democracy died quietly in her sleep at 11pm, on the 29th March 2019. The the culprits have yet to **be brought to justice**. Democracy campaigned for the rule of law, human rig majority in all her decisions. She will be sorely missed. God have mercy on [our] soul.'
16/4/19	That is where the betrayal is and I do share Members' great sadness about the appalling tragedy of N burnt down yesterday – something very beautiful has been lost – but something very vital is being los thought the deaths column of The Times newspaper yesterday summed it up rather well: 'UK Democ It was with sad regret that Democracy died quietly in her sleep at 11pm, on the 29th March 2019. The the culprits have yet to be brought to justice. Democracy **campaigned for the rule of law, human ri** majority in all her decisions. She will be sorely missed. God have mercy on [our] soul.'
16/4/19	That is where the betrayal is and I do share Members' great sadness about the appalling tragedy of N burnt down yesterday – something very beautiful has been lost – but something very vital is being los

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	thought the deaths column of The Times newspaper yesterday summed it up rather well: 'UK Democ
	It was with sad regret that Democracy died quietly in her sleep at 11pm, on the 29th March 2019. **Th**
	and **the culprits** have yet to **be brought to justice**. Democracy campaigned for the rule of law, huma
	the majority in all her decisions. She will be sorely missed. God have mercy on [our] soul.'

Appendix E: Fox

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Ashley Fox's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Fox_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
16/9/14	Well, I agree with my colleague. We should look to value for money, and the very first place we should **Strasbourg**.
17/9/15	So my Group will vote against this proposal because we do not think that **opening the gates of Europe** is the right method of helping them.
5/7/17	We have two Parliaments, one in Strasbourg and one in Brussels, and the endless **travelling circus** that contempt by our citizens.
11/2/19	One final point I wish to make is that artificial intelligence does not have **borders**.

Appendix F: García

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Iratxe García's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("García_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
26/11/14	Señor Presidente, no es la lucha contra el cambio climático la que **cae sobre las espaldas** de los c
13/1/15	Cuando se pongan en marcha las reformas habrá que ver, desde la experiencia, si las medidas obli si presentan la dificultad de cómo **ponerle barreras al campo**
9/6/15	Señora Presidenta, señor Comisario, hay que reconocer que la enmienda de Doha ha sido un buen Protocolo de Kioto.
9/6/15	Señora Presidenta, señor Comisario, hay que reconocer que la enmienda de Doha ha sido un buen Protocolo de Kioto.
9/6/15	Pero la hora de la verdad **llama con urgencia a nuestra puert**a.
8/7/15	Aquí no estamos **acreedores** y deudores, aquí estamos socios europeos. Y, si no actuamos como t proyecto de la Unión.
8/7/15	Aquí no estamos acreedores y **deudores**, aquí estamos socios europeos. Y, si no actuamos como t proyecto de la Unión.
9/9/15	Es cierto que han sido **los egoísmos nacionales los que han puesto piedras en el camino** de esa responder a la mayor crisis de refugiados de los últimos años.
7/10/15	Señor Presidente, como hablamos del reconocimiento de las víctimas, yo quiero usar este turno de España, en menos de cuarenta y ocho horas, cuatro mujeres han sido víctimas de violencia de géne machista.

Appendix G: Iglesias

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Pablo Iglesias's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Iglesias_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
1/7/14	La **expropiación** de la soberanía y el sometimiento al gobierno de las élites financieras amenazan el
1/7/14	Nuestros pueblos no son **menores de edad**, ni colonias de ningún fondo de inversiones; no conquista entregársela a una oligarquía financiera.
1/7/14	Nuestros pueblos no son menores de edad, ni **colonias de ningún fondo de inversiones**; no conquist entregársela a una oligarquía financiera.
1/7/14	No son términos abstractos, Señorías: todos ustedes conocen bien el problema. Es escandalosa la faci lobbies al servicio de grandes corporaciones, así como las **«puertas giratorias»** que convierten a los millonarios a sueldo de grandes empresas.
1/7/14	Hay que decirlo alto y claro. Esta manera de funcionar hurta la soberanía de los pueblos, atenta contr representantes políticos en **casta**
1/7/14	Señorías, la democracia en Europa ha sido víctima de una deriva autoritaria. En la periferia europea l se han convertido casi en **protectorados**, en nuevas colonias, donde poderes que nadie ha elegido est y amenazando la cohesión social y política de nuestras sociedades.
1/7/14	Señorías, la democracia en Europa ha sido víctima de una deriva autoritaria. En la periferia europea l se han convertido casi en protectorados, en **nuevas colonias**, donde poderes que nadie ha elegido esta amenazando la cohesión social y política de nuestras sociedades.
1/7/14	La deuda es hoy un mecanismo de mando y **saqueo** a los pueblos del sur.
1/7/14	Pero hay otro camino, hay alternativa a las políticas de empobrecimiento y al **secuestro** de la soberar
1/7/14	Debe demostrar sensibilidad y convertirse en el epicentro de una sacudida democrática en la Unión E deriva autoritaria de la Troika.
1/7/14	El Parlamento no puede ser **un premio de consolación** ni una jubilación dorada.
1/7/14	Señorías, hoy no me dirijo a una Cámara de cinco, de seis o de siete grupos parlamentarios. Tampoco Me dirijo a ustedes, señoras y señores diputados al Parlamento Europeo, porque ustedes tienen **un co firmado** con sus pueblos.
1/7/14	Les pido su voto, consciente de que muchos de ustedes no comparten este **secuestro** de la democracia están sinceramente comprometidos con el bienestar de sus pueblos.
1/7/14	Les pido el voto para frenar a la gran coalición que impone la austeridad y el **totalitarismo** financiero
1/7/14	Los pueblos de Europa hemos pasado por peores situaciones y nos hemos sacudido a los **déspotas**

15/9/14	Yo no tengo ninguna simpatía por el señor Putin, pero creo que la política exterior de la Unión no pu... intereses de los agricultores europeos y que, para bien o para mal, los europeos se merecen una relaci...
16/9/14	Y la pregunta que nos tenemos que plantear es si asumimos que la política exterior europea va a ser **u... manejado por los Estados Unidos** o si vamos a tener la seriedad suficiente como para tener una pol... riesgo a los europeos.
22/10/14	Es lo más radical que van a poder hacer ustedes porque, a la vista de su discurso y a la vista de su do... es como **esperar a Godot**.
12/11/14	Decía Mario Benedetti: «El **suicidio** no redime a un torturador pero algo es algo». La dimisión no re... algo.
12/11/14	Decía Mario Benedetti: «El suicidio no redime a **un torturador** pero algo es algo». La dimisión no r... algo.
17/12/14	El problema no es que haya seres humanos que sean capaces de hacer esto a otros seres humanos: sie... **cumplir las órdenes de sus amos**
12/3/15	«Excuse-moi, monsieur, no soy a**ve migratoria / que por capricho abandonó su morada** / al arrib... náufrago de un país zozobrado / que un pirata infame hundió en los mares de la miseria».
12/3/15	«Excuse-moi, monsieur, no soy ave migratoria / que por capricho abandonó su morada / al arribo de ... **náufrago de un país zozobrado / que un pirata infame hundió en los mares de la miseria**».
12/3/15	Y no deberíamos olvidar que los derechos humanos se violan también en Europa y **a las puerta**s de l...
9/6/15	Señorías, el principal **enemigo** de la igualdad en Europa y en España no solamente es el machismo, s... sociales y de las conquistas de los trabajadores.
9/6/15	Señorías, el principal enemigo de la igualdad en Europa y en España no solamente es el machismo, s... sociales y de las **conquistas** de los trabajadores.
8/7/15	Quiero agradecer desde esta Cámara al pueblo griego, a su Gobierno y a su Primer Ministro por habe... los últimos meses **la bandera** de Europa.
6/10/15	Nadie dice aquí que la política exterior europea en los últimos quince años ha contribuido a **echar ga...**
27/10/15	Efectivamente, ustedes han estado de acuerdo en los elementos fundamentales que han implicado una... estamos pagando y que tiene que ver con la situación de miseria y humillación que están viviendo mi... Europa.
27/10/15	Hoy hablamos, otra vez, de guerra y de desolación a **las puertas de Europ**a, de familias a las que se ...
27/10/15	Dejen de **jugar al ajedrez** con los pueblos del Mediterráneo.

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Appendix H: Kasich

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of John Kasich's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Kasich_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
21/7/15	Or the fear of the **tsunami** of drugs.
21/7/15	But all moms and dads worry that those drugs will **wash away** our own neighborhoods and maybe w
21/7/15	But all moms and dads worry that those drugs will wash away our own neighborhoods and maybe **w**
21/7/15	? Can they **pull the rest of their family members up the ladder**?
21/7/15	I was down there in 2010 after this **earthquake**—economic earthquake hit Wilmington. We had a ca
21/7/15	I was down there in 2010 after this earthquake—**economic earthquake** hit Wilmington. We had a ca
21/7/15	We're going join in and we're going to help them, because it's our job and our mission as human bein them to **lift** them."
21/7/15	And guess what? And in Wilmington today **the sun is coming up**. I told them that the sun would co zenith, but the sun is rising. And the sun is going rise to the zenith in America again. I promise you
21/7/15	And guess what? And in Wilmington today the sun is coming up. I told them that **the sun would co** zenith, but the sun is rising. And the sun is going rise to the zenith in America again. I promise you
21/7/15	And guess what? And in Wilmington today the sun is coming up. I told them that the sun would cor **zenith**, but the sun is rising. And the sun is going rise to the zenith in America again. I promise you
21/7/15	And guess what? And in Wilmington today the sun is coming up. I told them that the sun would cor zenith, but the **sun is rising**. And the sun is going rise to the zenith in America again. I promise you
21/7/15	And guess what? And in Wilmington today the sun is coming up. I told them that the sun would cor zenith, but the sun is rising. And the s**un is going rise to the zenith** in America again. I promise you
21/7/15	Police, firemen, and people like my dad, the mailman, John the Mailman, because we're **the glue**. W together.
21/7/15	Police, firemen, and people like my dad, the mailman, John the Mailman, because we're the glue. W together.
21/7/15	Teach our children resilience. Everybody doesn't get a trophy just for showing up, folks. You know knocked down—and I have been knocked down so many times—but getting knocked down is not the We need to teach our kids, teach our children about resilience and remind ourselves that you're 51 ye going to come back stronger and better. We'll help you
21/7/15	Teach our children resilience. Everybody doesn't get a trophy just for showing up, folks. You know **knocked down**—and I have been knocked down so many times—but getting knocked down is not th We need to teach our kids, teach our children about resilience and remind ourselves that you're 51 ye going to come back stronger and better. We'll help you

21/7/15	Teach our children resilience. Everybody doesn't get a trophy just for showing up, folks. You know knocked down—and I have be**en knocked down** so many times—but getting knocked down is not th We need to teach our kids, teach our children about resilience and remind ourselves that you're 51 ye going to come back stronger and better. We'll help you
21/7/15	Teach our children resilience. Everybody doesn't get a trophy just for showing up, folks. You know knocked down—and I have been knocked down so many times—but getting knocked down is not the We need to teach our kids, teach our children about resilience and remind ourselves that you're 51 ye going to come back stronger and better. We'll help you
21/7/15	The man goes in the military, sits in the **Hanoi Hilton**, is beaten all the time.
21/7/15	And, by the way, if you think that I or anybody who becomes President or a big shot—we don't move have courage and intelligence, but it's all of us in the neighborhoods, in the families, across the count Please, please, please don't lose sight of it
21/7/15	And, folks, as it has been said many times, **the light of a city on a hill cannot be hidden**. The light America is that city and you are that light.
21/7/15	And, folks, as it has been said many times, the light of a city on a hill cannot be hidden. **The light of** America is that city and you are that light.
21/7/15	And, folks, as it has been said many times, the light of a city on a hill cannot be hidden. The light of **America is that city** and you are that light.
21/7/15	And, folks, as it has been said many times, the light of a city on a hill cannot be hidden. The light of America is that city **and you are that light.**
15/3/16	And I don't know whether you can actually serve a meal of words but I would like to go back to thos **can eat their words** about doubting Ohio. Huh?
15/3/16	We get all that. But we put one foot in front of the other, and I want to remind you again tonight that highest office in the land.
15/3/16	We get all that. But we put one foot in front of the other, and I want to remind you again tonight that **highest office** in the land.
15/3/16	I want you continuing to do what we've been doing all over this country. I'm getting ready to rent a **c big sail and we're going to have the wind blow us** to the Rocky Mountains and over the mountains

Appendix I: Rubio

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Marco Rubio's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

   This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Rubio_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
13/4/15	And so our leaders put us at a disadvantage by taxing and borrowing and regulating like **it was 199**
13/4/15	You see, we American are proud of our history, but our country has always been about the future, a **author the greatest chapter yet in the amazing story** of America, but we can't do that by going b. past.
13/4/15	I'm humbled by the realization that America doesn't owe me anything. But I have a **debt** to America
13/4/15	I'm humbled by the realization that America doesn't owe me anything. But I have a debt to America
1/2/16	They told me I needed to wait my turn, that I needed to **wait in line**.
1/2/16	This is no ordinary election. 2016 is not just a choice between two political parties. 2016 is a **refere** identity as a nation and as a people. In America, there are only two ways for us now. We can be eith can be a great nation in decline
1/2/16	This is no ordinary election. 2016 is not just a choice between two political parties. 2016 is a refere identity as a nation and as a people. In America, there are only two ways for us now. We can be eith can be a great nation in decline
20/2/16	Ronald Reagan made us believe that it was **morning** in America again and it was.
15/3/16	Well, America is in a real political storm — a real **tsunami** — and we should have seen this comin
15/3/16	I've battled my whole life against the so-called elites — the people who think that, you know, I nee it wasn't our chance or it wasn't our time
15/3/16	But I blame most of it on our political establishment — a political establishment that for far too lon looked down at conservatives as simple-minded people, looked down at conservatives as simply **bo**
15/3/16	A conservative movement committed to the cause of free enterprise — the only economic model wl anyone falling.
15/3/16	A conservative movement committed to the cause of free enterprise — the only economic model wl **anyone falling**.
15/3/16	. But we also need a new political establishment in our party, not one that looks down on people tha Columbia, not one that tells young people that they need to wait their turn and **wait in line**, and not elections than it is in solving problems or standing by principles.

Appendix J: Sanders

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Bernie Sanders'active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Sanders_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
26/5/15	Politics in a democratic society should not be treated like **a baseball game**, a game show or a soap
26/5/15	Politics in a democratic society should not be treated like a baseball game, **a game show** or a soap
26/5/15	American democracy is not about billionaires being able **to buy** candidates and elections
26/5/15	Politics in a democratic society should not be treated like a baseball game, a game show or **a soap**
26/5/15	Wall Street cannot continue to be **an island unto itself**, gambling trillions in risky financial instrum it out.
5/1/16	That means we have got to end, once and for all, the scheme that is nothing more than a **free insura** of "too big to fail."
5/1/16	Wall Street cannot continue to b**e an island unto itself**, gambling trillions in risky financial instrum that, if their schemes fail, the taxpayers will be there to bail them out.
5/1/16	If a bank is too big to fail, it is too big to exist. When it comes to Wall Street reform that must **be ou**
5/1/16	In my view, Senator Warren, is right. Dodd-Frank should **have broken up** Citigroup and other "too
2/2/16	And what they were protecting is an American democracy of: One person, one vote. Not billionaire
10/2/16	. They're throwing everything at me except the kitchen sink, and I have the feeling that **kitchen sin**
10/2/16	While we must be relentless in combating terrorist who would do us harm, we cannot, and should n
10/2/16	My friends, we must fix our broken immigration system that divides families, and create a path tow people who are living in **the shadows**.
15/3/16	We need to re-think the **so-called war** on drugs.
8/6/16	Democracy is not about billionaires **buying** elections
16/6/16	It is about ending a campaign finance system which is corrupt and allows billionaires **to buy** electi
16/6/16	My hope is that when future historians look back and describe how our country moved forward into and created a government which represents all the people and not just the few, they will note that, t began with the political **revolution** of 2016.
25/7/16	Citizens United is one of the worst Supreme Court decisions in the history of our country. That dec America, like the billionaire Koch brothers......to spend hundreds of millions of dollars **buying** elec American democracy.

Appendix K: Trump

This appendix contains the micro-corpus of Donald Trump's active metaphorical utterances. The table can be read as follows: The first column gives the date of the speech from which the utterance has been taken. The second column displays the utterance and its co-text. Words in bold are the metaphor focus (metaphorically used word or words). This is meant to aid the reader, and to indicate the metaphorical utterance, but is not meant to be strictly accurate technical boundary between metaphor focus and metaphor frame (non-metaphorically used words).

This appendix will not be included in the printed version of the thesis as it will be made available as a digital file ("Trump_Metaphorical_Utterances").

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

Speech	Utterance
16/6/15	And, I can tell, some of the candidates, they went in. They didn't know the air-conditioner didn't w
16/6/15	Well, you need somebody, because politicians are all talk, no action. Nothing's gonna get done. The **the promised land**. They will not.
16/6/15	We need somebody that can take **the brand** of the United States and make it great again. It's not gr
16/6/15	. There's too much— it's like— i**t's like take the New England Patriots and Tom Brady and ha football team**.
16/6/15	We **have all the cards**, but we don't know how to use them. We don't even know that we have the understand the game.
16/6/15	We have all the cards, but we don't know how to use them. We don't even know that **we have the c** understand the game.
16/6/15	We have all the cards, but we don't know how to use them. We don't even know that we have the c understand **the game**.
16/6/15	We could turn off that **spigot** by charging them tax until they behave properly
16/6/15	So Mexico takes a company, a car company that was going to build in Tennessee**, rips it out**.
9/2/16	Does Corey have **a ground gam**e or what?
9/2/16	Boy do we have a **ground game**
9/2/16	You know we learned a lot about **ground games** in one week.
20/2/16	China in particular -- that's the big one -- the greatest abuse of a country that I think I've ever seen f done to us is the greatest single **theft** in the history of the world.
1/3/16	He decided to become **Don Rickles**
3/5/16	We're not going to be **Hilary Clinton**
3/5/16	And I was **witness** to the carnage over the last six weeks especially.
3/5/16	And I was witness to the **carnage** over the last six weeks especially.
3/5/16	And all of the different state – Connecticut. And I've **witnessed** what it's done really firsthand. An
3/5/16	And all of the different state – Connecticut. And I've witnessed what it's done really firsthand. And
3/5/16	You know, I made a speech the other day and I talked about how we're the **policemen** for the world they don't respect us and they don't take care of us and they don't treat us right in many cases.

22/6/16	They totally **own** her, and that will never change
22/6/16	This is not **a rising tide that lifts all boats.**
22/6/16	This is **a wave of globalization** that wipes out our middle class and our jobs
22/6/16	Hillary Clinton has also been the biggest promoter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which will **shi** and give up Congressional power to an international foreign commission.
22/6/16	Iran was being **choked** by sanctions
22/6/16	On election day, the politicians **stand trial** before the people. The voters are the jury. Their ballots another Clinton or Obama.
22/6/16	On election day, the politicians stand trial before the people. The voters are the **jury**. Their ballots another Clinton or Obama.
22/6/16	On election day, the politicians stand trial before the people. The voters are the jury. Their **ballots** another Clinton or Obama.
22/6/16	Massive new factories will come **roaring into** our country – breathing life and hope into our comm
21/7/16	I've met Sarah's beautiful family. But to this Administration, their amazing daughter was just one protecting. One more child to **sacrifice on the altar of open borders**.
21/7/16	America is one of the highest-taxed nations in the world. Reducing taxes will cause new companies **into** our country.
8/8/16	Recently, at a campaign event, Hillary Clinton **short-circuited** again – to use a now famous term – and said she wanted to raise taxes on the middle class.
8/8/16	[Trump] **rode to the rescue**.
8/8/16	In 2015 alone, the Obama Administration unilaterally issued more than 2,000 new regulations – ea consumers, and a **massive lead weight** on the American economy.
8/8/16	It is time to **remove the anchor dragging us down**
8/8/16	Detroit – the Motor City – **will come roaring back**.
8/8/16	The other party has **reached backwards** into the past to choose a nominee from yesterday – who o and the policies of yesterday.
8/8/16	We will put new American metal into **the spine** of this nation

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

19/8/16	Hillary Clinton would rather provide a job to a refugee from overseas than to give that job to unemp... cities like Detroit who have become **refugees** in their own country
19/8/16	She wants to be America's **Angela Merkel**
19/8/16	The group we know today as ISIS was close to being **extinguished**.
19/8/16	Iran was being **choked** by sanctions.
19/8/16	Now, **fast-forward** to present time
19/8/16	No apologies for **unleashing** ISIS
20/8/16	Let's also not forget that Hillary Clinton's disastrous Middle East policies **unleashed** ISIS onto the... Clinton has expressed zero remorse. She will never be able to fix the ISIS problem that her policies...
1/9/16	Countless innocent American lives have been **stolen** because our politicians have failed in their dut... our laws like they have to be enforced.
1/9/16	Countless Americans who have died in recent years would be alive today if not for the open border... administration that causes this horrible, horrible thought process, called **Hillary Clinton**.
1/9/16	We're like the **big bully that keeps getting beat up**. You ever see that? The big bully that keeps ge...
1/9/16	We're like the big bully that keeps getting beat up. You ever see that? The **big bully that keeps get**...
17/9/16	**Fast-forward** to today. What have the decisions of Obama-Clinton produced?
17/9/16	Nothing threatens the integrity of our Democracy more than when government officials **put** their pu...
13/10/16	For those who control the **levers** of power in Washington, and for the global special interests they p... an existential threat.
13/10/16	They have **stripped** these towns **bare,** and raided the wealth for themselves and taken away their jo...
13/10/16	They have stripped these towns bare**,** and **raided** the wealth for themselves and taken away their job...
13/10/16	Anyone who challenges their control is deemed a sexist, a racist, a xenophobe and **morally deform**...
13/10/16	I knew they would **throw** every lie they could at me, and my family, and my loved ones.
13/10/16	I could have enjoyed the benefits of years of successful business for myself and my family, instead... **show** of lies, deceptions and malicious attacks.
13/10/16	Some people warned me this campaign would be a **journey to hell**. But they are wrong, it will be a... help so many people.

13/10/16	Some people warned me this campaign would be a journey to hell. But they are wrong, it will be a j...
	help so many people.
13/10/16	In my former life, I was an insider as much as anybody else – and I know what's like to be an inside...
	leaving their special **club** and revealing to you their great scam. Because I used to be part of the clu...
	doing this for the people, and this movement is just right – and we will take back this country for yo...
13/10/16	In my former life, I was an insider as much as anybody else – and I know what's like to be an inside...
	leaving their special club and revealing to you their great scam. Because I used to be part of the **clu**...
	doing this for the people, and this movement is just right – and we will take back this country for yo...
13/10/16	We will vote to put this corrupt government **cartel** out of business.
13/10/16	Our **Independence Day** is at hand, and it arrives, finally, on November 8th.
14/10/16	The incredible spirit of the people of this state will **power** its recovery, and it's the same spirit that ...
14/10/16	Hopefully our great movement **powered** by everyday citizens will overcome the sickness that is pla...
	And I'll tell you what, our media is indeed sick and its making our country sick, and we're going to...
14/10/16	Hopefully our great movement powered by everyday citizens will overcome **the sickness** that is pla...
	I'll tell you what, our media is indeed sick and its making our country sick, and we're going to stop...
14/10/16	Hopefully our great movement powered by everyday citizens will overcome the sickness that is pla...
	I'll tell you what, our media is indeed **sick** and its making our country sick, and we're going to stop...
14/10/16	Hopefully our great movement powered by everyday citizens will overcome the sickness that is pla...
	I'll tell you what, our media is indeed sick and its making our country **sick**, and we're going to stop...
14/10/16	At the center of our economic revival we'll be fixing our really horrendous, **one-way street**, horribl...
14/10/16	North Carolina's industrial (ph) workers have been **crushed** by Bill Clinton's signing of NAFTA su...
14/10/16	We're living through the greatest jobs **theft** in the history of the world. Our jobs have been stolen f...
	know what they are doing, in particular our leadership.
14/10/16	We're living through the greatest jobs theft in the history of the world. Our jobs have been **stolen** f...
	know what they are doing, in particular our leadership.
14/10/16	If we don't get the deal we want, we leave NAFTA and start over to get a much better, a much mor...
	one-way highway into Mexico, a one-way highway.
14/10/16	If we don't get the deal we want, we leave NAFTA and start over to get a much better, a much mor...
	one-way highway **i**nto Mexico, **a one-way highway**.

Novel Metaphor in Polarising Discourse

14/10/16	And we **have the cards**, we have the cards. We have all the cards.
14/10/16	And we have the cards, we **have the cards**. We have all the cards.
14/10/16	And we have the cards, we have the cards. **We have all the cards**.
14/10/16	Because we're like **the piggy bank that everybody keeps stealing from**. But pretty soon we're no We're going to be the opposite of the piggy bank.
14/10/16	Because we're like the piggy bank that everybody keeps stealing from. But pretty soon we're not g We're going to be the opposite of the piggy bank.
14/10/16	Because we're like the piggy bank that everybody keeps stealing from. But pretty soon we're not g going to be the opposite of **the piggy bank**.
29/10/16	My **Contract** With the American Voter outlines a plan to repeal and replace Obamacare, and I'm as healthcare for every family in Arizona.
29/10/16	Government corruption spreads outward, like a **cancer**, infecting the whole operation of our govern
29/10/16	Government corruption spreads outward, like a cancer, **infecting** the whole operation of our govern
29/10/16	Hillary's corruption is corrosive to the **soul** of our nation, and it must be stopped
29/10/16	My **Contract** With The American Voter begins with a plan to end government corruption.
29/10/16	When we win on November 8th, We Are Going To Washington, D.C. And We Are Going To **DRA
29/10/16	We are living through the greatest jobs **theft** in the history of the world. Hillary's goal is to send mi our country.
29/10/16	and they've **shipped** our jobs and wealth to other countries.
8/11/16	TODAY IS OUR **INDEPENDENCE DAY**.
8/11/16	WE ARE FINALLY GOING **TO CLOSE THE HISTORY BOOKS** ON THE CLINTONS AND CORRUPTION. WE WILL OPEN A BRIGHT NEW CHAPTER, FOCUSED ON YOU, THE AM
8/11/16	WE ARE FINALLY GOING TO CLOSE THE HISTORY BOOKS ON THE CLINTONS AND T CORRUPTION. **WE WILL OPEN A BRIGHT NEW CHAPTER**, FOCUSED ON YOU, THE A
8/11/16	MY **CONTRACT** WITH THE AMERICAN VOTER BEGINS WITH A PLAN TO END GOVER TAKE OUR COUNTRY BACK FROM THE SPECIAL INTERESTS.
8/11/16	I WANT THE ENTIRE CORRUPT WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT TO HEAR OUR WOR YOU KNOW WHAT WE ARE GOING TO SAY, WE ARE GOING TO WIN TODAY AND WE D.C. **TO DRAIN THE SWAMP**. ABSOLUTELY. ABSOLUTELY. YOU PROBABLY HEARD

8/11/16	I WANT THE ENTIRE CORRUPT WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT TO HEAR OUR WOR[...] YOU KNOW WHAT WE ARE GOING TO SAY, WE ARE GOING TO WIN TODAY AND WE[...] D.C. TO DRAIN THE SWAMP. ABSOLUTELY. ABSOLUTELY. YOU PROBABLY HEARD M[...]
8/11/16	AT THE CORE OF **MY CONTRACT** IS MY PLAN TO BRING BACK OUR JOBS, THE TRAD[...] CLINTON FROM NAFTA TO CHINA TO CAREER TO THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP[...] DISASTER.
8/11/16	I HAVE [it has (NAFTA trade agreement)] **RATED [raided] YOUR FACTORIES**, CRUSHED O[...] GUTTED YOUR COMMUNITIES [errors in transcription]
8/11/16	I HAVE [it has (NAFTA trade agreement)] RATED [raided] YOUR FACTORIES, **CRUSHED O[...]** GUTTED YOUR COMMUNITIES [errors in transcription]
8/11/16	I HAVE [it has (NAFTA trade agreement)] RATED [raided] YOUR FACTORIES, CRUSHED OR[...] **GUTTED YOUR COMMUNITIES** [errors in transcription]
8/11/16	WE ARE LIVING THROUGH THE GREATEST JOBS **THEFT** IN THE HISTORY OF THE WO[...] STOLEN LIKE CANDY FROM A BABY
8/11/16	WE ARE LIVING THROUGH THE GREATEST JOBS THEFT IN THE HISTORY OF THE WO[...] **STOLEN** LIKE CANDY FROM A BABY
8/11/16	. IT HAS TO BE A TWO-WAY STREET, FOLKS. **A TWO-WAY STREET**. RIGHT NOW, IT I[...] INTO THESE OTHER COUNTRIES, THEY TAKE OUR MONEY, THEY TAKE OUR JOBS, T[...] THEY BUILD THEIR FACTORIES, WE END UP WITH UNEMPLOYMENT AND DRUGS, TH[...]
8/11/16	. IT HAS TO BE A **TWO-WAY STREET**, FOLKS. A TWO-WAY STREET. RIGHT NOW, IT I[...] INTO THESE OTHER COUNTRIES, THEY TAKE OUR MONEY, THEY TAKE OUR JOBS, T[...] THEY BUILD THEIR FACTORIES, WE END UP WITH UNEMPLOYMENT AND DRUGS, TH[...]
8/11/16	. IT HAS TO BE A TWO-WAY STREET, FOLKS. A TWO-WAY STREET. RIGHT NOW, **IT IS**[...] INTO THESE OTHER COUNTRIES, THEY TAKE OUR MONEY, THEY TAKE OUR JOBS, T[...] THEY BUILD THEIR FACTORIES, WE END UP WITH UNEMPLOYMENT AND DRUGS, TH[...]
8/11/16	THAT WAS LIKE **A GREAT FOOTBALL TEAM PLAYING YOUR LOCAL HIGH SCHO[...]**
8/11/16	BUT RIGHT NOW, IT IS **A ONE-WAY STREET.**
8/11/16(2)	Now it's time for America **to bind the wounds** of division;