Tesis Doctoral

Ranking The World Through Words:

Disagreement, Dogwhistles, and Expressivism

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A Elvira y María José
Os quiero y os admiro.

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Summary

The main aim of this dissertation is to provide an expressivist metasemantic framework that makes sense of a variety of evaluative uses of language. In the first part, we focus on so-called *perspectival expressions*, or rather, on the explicit perspectival use of certain expressions. In the second part, we focus on some of the implicit perspectival uses of certain expressions, those that constitute the phenomenon of *covert dogwhistles*. Evaluative uses of natural language are characterised by being informationally orientational, that is, by conveying nonpropositional content. These expressions, when they are used evaluatively, contribute to the conversational setting with what we will call expressive meaning. However, among them, there are differences both in their syntactic role and in their capacity to provide, in addition to orientational information, locational information—which is propositional in nature (See Charlow 2014, p. 639; Lewis, 1979). The metatheoretical expressivist scaffolding that we propose in this dissertation is compatible with a number of different semantic implementations. It is our contention that the desiderata that we devise and the diversity of the phenomena that we map can only be accounted for if some expressivistic assumptions are preserved.

The debate on perspectival expressions has revolved around the phenomenon of disagreement, being faultless disagreement the most discussed one. In Chapter 2, we argue that faultless disagreement is not the type of disagreement that best guides the debate. If what matters is whether or not the disagreement is

faultless, one would have to define what makes a disagreement faultless. However, any characterisation of faultlessness quickly finds counterexamples. As we see it, "faultless" is an epistemic perspectival expression. As such its application depends on the epistemic standards of the one who evaluates the disagreement as being faultless or not. This implies rejecting the thesis that the existence of faultless disagreements favours some theoretical positions more than others. For us, this role is played by what we call "nonfactual disagreements," within which deep, metalinguistic, and evaluative disagreements can be distinguished. Too much focus on the notion of "faultless" has blurred the discussion on the desiderata imposed by the family of disagreements that involve perspectival expressions. These desiderata can only be met if our theory preserves the specificity of "expressive meaning"—its nonpropositional character, as we will argue.

What is interesting about these expressions is that they enable us to do things for which other expressions are not suitable. Specifically, and this is what we defend throughout this dissertation, they play a different role than describing how things are. Whether some perspectival expressions contribute or not to the propositional content will depend on the kind of predicable that they are. Functions of propositions are not used to talk about the world, and in this sense they do not contribute a component to what is said, they do not provide *locational* information—though in a more general sense, of course they alter the truth-conditions of the sentences that they are part of. They impart instructions on how to evaluate the content under its scope. Functions of concepts and first-order predicables do make a substantive contribution. However, even though some perspectival expressions do not contribute to propositional content while others do, all perspectival expressions have something in common: they have "expressive meaning," they provide *orientational* information. Expressive meaning can be specified as an operation performed by certain expressions on the propositional content under their scope. In this case, those expressions function as *modifiers of the circumstances of evaluation*. Alternatively, they can function as *indicators of how the speaker proposes to rank and proposes to her audience to rank the available possibilities according to a particular order*. As we will see, some predicables accomplish only one of these tasks (they modify evaluation circumstances, or they rank the available possible worlds), and others accomplish both tasks.

As far as we know, this debate has not been explicitly extrapolated to the debate about the nature of dogwhistles in general and covert dogwhistles, in particular. The focus of this research on the second part of the dissertation will be on covert dogwhistles which, because of their singularity, pose a more significant theoretical challenge than overt dogwhistles. The pragmatic devices (presuppositions and implicatures) usually used to explain some forms of communication do not seem to be adequate to explain covert dogwhistles, even if they could account for overt dogwhistles. For this reason, and although a lot could be said about overt dogwhistles, our target is the covert ones. These are implicit evaluations. Evaluations that can be triggered even if what is said is not opently evaluative. Through a covert dogwhistle the speaker presents herself as someone who ranks the possible worlds according to a particular order and mobilises the attitudes of her audience in that same way. It is this act of presenting oneself as someone who ranks possible worlds according to a specific order and at the same time proposes to others to do the same, indicative of the evaluative use of language, that gives the title to this dissertation: *Ranking the World through Words.* It should be noted that despite functioning as first-order predicables, covert dogwhistles only provide expressive meaning, perhaps because of their implicit nature, perhaps for a different reason. They do not provide locational information, contrary to expressions that are explicitly used perspectivelly. Covert dogwhistles constitute, thus, not only a clear instance of the need to account for perspectival expressions in nonpropositional terms, they also pose some challenge to some natural assumptions regarding the correspondence between the syntactic status and the kind of expressive meaning involved.

This dissertation consists of four parts. The first part is the introduction and the last, the conclusions. The second part is divided in three chapters and devoted to the debate on perspectival expressions. The third part focuses on dogwhistles.

In the second and third parts of this dissertation, we present the central ideas. The main aim of Chapter 2 is to set out the desiderata that any theory of perspectival expressions should comply with: *disanalogy*, *disagreement*, and *retraction.* Moreover, we address in detail, following, to a large extent, MacFarlane (2014), the different forms that disagreements can adopt. We argue against the thesis that faultless disagreement is the pivotal phenomenon around which the debate between contextualists, relativists and expressivists should revolve. We defend

that it is nonfactual disagreements in all of their forms (deep disagreement, metalinguistic negotiations and evaluative disagreement) that should be in the middle of the discussion since "faultless" is an epistemic perspectival expression that does not favour any proposal in particular.

Chapter 3 is devoted to discussing some theoretical proposals that we call semantic views. These proposals have in common that they explain disagreements in terms of a conflict at the level of what is said, even when in order to account for disagreements at the level of what is said they make use of non-semantic mechanisms. We focus on indexical and nonindexical contextualisms, López de Sa (2008, 2015)'s presuppositional approach and Sundell (2016)'s proposal. They all have trouble appropriately accommodating the distinction between describing and evaluating. The lack of a coherent explanation of this disanalogy causes all of them to present problems in explaining nonfactual disagreements. Then, each of these proposals faces some objections that have to do with disagreement and retraction, but also others relating to its own internal coherence.

In Chapter 4, we explore other theoretical alternatives that we call non-semantic views. These proposals accept the possibility of disagreements that go beyond what is said. We discuss some proposals that we can call hybrid, either because they try to accommodate some of the assumptions of expressivism, or because they try to improve the more standard versions of indexical contextualism. Before addressing these theories, we introduce the most discussed version of expressivism, Ayer's emotivism (Section 4.3), and analyse one of the most challenging arguments against this kind of expressivism (the Frege-Geach Problem, Section 4.3.1). Within the theories assuming some of the expressivist postulates, we discuss, on the one hand, Barker (2000)'s proposal, according to which perspectival expressions' expressive component comes in the form of conventional implicature. On the other hand, we discuss Strandberg (2012)'s proposal that explains this expressive component in terms of generalised conversational implicatures. The hybrid contextualist proposal we discuss is that of Díaz-León (2017a). According to the author, the attributions of knowledge trigger a generalised conversational implicature with a metalinguistic content: it tells us how we should use the concept KNOW. Another proposal we discussed is the presuppositional approach of Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016). According to the authors, hybrid evaluative expressions trigger an evaluative presupposition. This evaluative presupposition states that something that

satisfies a particular description is good in some sense. These theories have to deal with some objections regarding the three desiderata and some relative to the internal coherence of the same proposal. We analyse these objections in detail. Finally, we outline the expressivist framework that we consider most appropriate to deal with the desiderata established in Chapter 2. This proposal, as we advanced in section 1.1, enriches minimal expressivism as defended by Frápolli and Villanueva (2012), and highlights the type of nonpropositional contribution that characterises the evaluative uses of natural languages and, at the same time, pays attention to the differences between these expressions, both from a syntactic and semantic point of view.

Chapter 5 is devoted to dogwhistles. Specifically, political dogwhistles. In this chapter, we offer some ideas that allow us to go deeper into the phenomenon. First, we analyse the types of audiences that intervene when someone carries out a dogwhistle (see chart 5.1). Secondly, we extend Jennifer Saul (2018)'s taxonomy by introducing some categories that make it a finer analytical instrument (see chart 5.2). We compare covert dogwhistles with other phenomena that a priori are plausible candidates to account for them: presuppositions and implicatures (see table 5.3). We argue that dogwhistles exploit the associations the audience makes with certain expressions. We define these associations by following Toribio (2018). Finally, we try to show, using what we call the *Test of Retraction*, the nonpropositional, and therefore associative, character of covert dogwhistles. Thus, we argue in favour of our expressivist framework as the best candidate to accommodate such phenomena. A proposal capable of explaining the nature of the explicit perspectival use of certain expressions, should also be able to successfully explain the implicit perspectival use of certain expressions, which is what, we defend, occurs in the case of covert dogwhistles. Nevertheless, covert dogwhistles are distinctive first-order predicables. Unlike first-order predicables, when their perspectival use is explicit, covert dogwhistles do not contribute locational information.

In Chapter 6, we briefly summarise what we have done throughout this research and outline the conclusions.

Resumen

El objetivo de esta tesis es proporcionar un marco metasemántico expresivista que dé sentido a la variedad de usos evaluativos del lenguaje. En la primera parte nos centramos en las llamadas "perspectival expressions" (en adelante, *expresiones de perspectiva*), o mejor dicho, en el uso explícitamente "perspectival" (en adelante, *relativo a una perspectiva*) de ciertas expresiones. En la segunda parte, nos centramos en algunos de los usos implícitamente relativos a una perspectiva de ciertas expresiones, aquellos que constituyen el fenómeno de los "covert dogwhistles" (en adelante, silbatos para perros encubiertos). Los usos evaluativos del lenguaje natural se caracterizan por ser informacionalmente orientacionales, es decir, por transmitir contenidos no proposicionales. Estas expresiones, cuando se utilizan de manera evaluativa, contribuyen a la situación conversacional con lo que llamaremos *significado expresivo*. Sin embargo, entre estas expresiones, hay diferencias tanto en su rol sintáctico como en su capacidad para proporcionar, además de información orientacional, información locacional, la cual es de naturaleza proposicional.

El debate sobre las expresiones de perspectiva ha girado en torno al fenómeno del desacuerdo, en concreto, el *desacuerdo sin falta* ha sido el más discutido. En el Capítulo 2, argumentamos que el desacuerdo sin falta no es el tipo de desacuerdo que mejor conduce el debate. Si lo que importa es si el desacuerdo es sin falta o no, uno tendría que definir qué es lo que hace que un desacuerdo sea sin fal-

ta. Sin embargo, cualquier caracterización de "sin falta" encuentra rápidamente contraejemplos. En nuestra opinión, "sin falta" es una expresión epistémica de perspectiva. Como tal, su aplicación depende de los estándares epistémicos de quien evalúa el desacuerdo como con o sin falta. Esto implica rechazar la tesis de que la existencia de los desacuerdos sin falta favorece a unas posiciones teóricas más que a otras. Para nosotros este papel lo juega lo que llamamos "desacuerdos no factuales", dentro de los cuales se pueden distinguir los desacuerdos profundos, los metalingüísticos y los evaluativos. Prestar demasiada atención a la noción de "sin falta" ha desdibujado la discusión sobre los desiderata impuestas por la familia de desacuerdos que involucran expresiones de perspectiva. Estos desiderata solo pueden satisfacerse si nuestra teoría preserva la especificidad del "significado expresivo" —su carácter no proposicional, como argumentaremos.

Lo interesante de los usos evaluativos de ciertas expresiones es que nos permiten hacer cosas para los que no son adecuados otros usos. En concreto, y esto es lo que defendemos a lo largo de esta tesis, usar las expresiones evaluativamente difiere de describir cómo son las cosas. El hecho de que algunas expresiones de perspectiva contribuyan o no al contenido proposicional dependerá del tipo de predicable que sean. Las funciones de proposiciones no se utilizan para hablar del mundo, y en este sentido no aportan un componente a lo que se dice, no proporcionan información locacional, aunque en un sentido más general, por supuesto que alteran las condiciones de verdad de los enunciados de los que forman parte. Imparten instrucciones sobre cómo evaluar el contenido que está bajo su alcance. Las funciones de conceptos y los predicables de primer orden sí hacen una contribución sustantiva. Sin embargo, aunque algunas expresiones de perspectiva no contribuyen al contenido proposicional mientras que otras sí lo hacen, todas las expresiones de perspectiva tienen algo en común: tienen un "significado expresivo", proporcionan información orientacional. El significado expresivo puede especificarse como una operación realizada por ciertas expresiones sobre el contenido proposicional que está bajo su alcance. En este caso, dichas expresiones funcionan como *modificadores de las circunstancias de la evaluación*. Además, estas expresiones pueden funcionar como *indicadores de cómo el hablante propone ordenar y propone a sus oyentes ordenar las posibilidades disponibles de acuerdo con un orden particular*. Como veremos, algunos predicables cumplen solo una de estas tareas (modifican

las circunstancias de la evaluación, o clasifican los mundos posibles disponibles), y otros cumplen ambas tareas.

Por lo que sabemos, este debate no se ha extrapolado explícitamente al debate sobre la naturaleza de los silbatos para perros en general y los silbatos para perros encubiertos, en particular. El foco de esta investigación en la segunda parte de la tesis estará en los silbatos para perros encubiertos que, debido a su singularidad, plantean un desafío más significativo que los silbatos para perros abiertos. Los mecanismos pragmáticos (presuposiciones e implicaturas) que se utilizan normalmente para explicar algunas formas de comunicación no parecen ser adecuados para explicar los silbatos para perros encubiertos, aún cuando puedan explicar los silbatos para perros abiertos. Por esta razón, y aunque hay mucho que decir sobre los silbatos para perros abiertos, nuestro objetivo son los encubiertos. Estos son evaluaciones implícitas. Evaluaciones que pueden desencadenarse incluso si lo que se dice no es abiertamente evaluativo. A través de un silbato de perro encubierto, el hablante se presenta como alguien que ordena los mundos posibles de acuerdo a un orden particular y moviliza las actitudes de su audiencia de la misma manera. Es este acto de presentarse como alguien que ordena los mundos posibles según un orden específico y al mismo tiempo propone a los demás hacer lo mismo, indicativo del uso evaluativo del lenguaje, lo que da título a esta tesis: Ordenar el Mundo a través de las Palabras. Cabe señalar que, a pesar de funcionar como predicables de primer orden, los silbatos para perros encubiertos solo proporcionan significado expresivo, quizás debido a su naturaleza implícita, quizás por una razón diferente. Estos no proporcionan información locacional, al contrario que las expresiones que son usadas explícitamente como relativas a una perspectiva. Los silbatos para perros encubiertos constituyen, por lo tanto, no solo un claro ejemplo de la necesidad de dar cuenta de las expresiones de perspectiva en términos no proposicionales, sino que también plantean un desafío a algunas suposiciones naturales con respecto a la correspondencia entre el estatus sintáctico y el tipo de significado expresivo involucrado en el uso evaluativo de estas expresiones.

Este trabajo consta de cuatro partes. La primera y la última parte constituyen la introducción y las conclusiones, respectivamente, de esta tesis. La segunda parte, que consta de tres capítulos, está dedicada al tradicional debate sobre las expresiones de perspectiva. La tercera se centra en los silbatos para perros políticos

y la conexión entre los silbatos para perros encubiertos y el resto de expresiones usadas evaluativamente.

En la segunda y la tercera parte presentamos las ideas centrales. El objetivo principal del Capítulo 2 es establecer los desiderata que cualquier teoría sobre las expresiones de perspectiva debe cumplir: *disanalogía*, *desacuerdo no factual* y *retractación*. Además, y siguiendo en gran medida a MacFarlane (2014), analizamos en detalle qué son los desacuerdos y qué formas pueden adoptar. Nos oponemos a la tesis de que el desacuerdo sin falta es el fenómeno central en torno al cual debe girar el debate entre contextualistas, relativistas y expresivistas. Defendemos que son los desacuerdos no factuales en todas sus variantes (desacuerdos profundos, negociaciones metalingüísticas y desacuerdos evaluativos) los que deberían estar en el centro de la discusión, ya que "sin falta" es una expresión epistémica de perspectiva que no favorece ninguna propuesta en particular.

El Capítulo 3 está dedicado a discutir algunas propuestas teóricas que llamo propuestas *semánticas*. Estas propuestas tienen en común que explican los desacuerdos en términos de conflicto a nivel de *lo que se dice*. Nos centramos en los contextualismos deícticos y no deícticos, en el enfoque presuposicional de López de Sa (2008, 2015) y en la propuesta de Sundell (2016). Cada una de estas propuestas tiene que lidiar con algunas objeciones que tienen que ver con el desacuerdo y la retractación, pero también con otras relacionados con su propia consistencia interna.

En el Capítulo 4, exploramos otras alternativas teóricas que llamo propuestas no-semánticas. Estas propuestas aceptan la posibilidad de desacuerdos que van más allá de lo que se dice. Discutimos algunas propuestas que podemos llamar híbridas. O bien porque tratan de acomodar algunos de los supuestos del expresivismo, o bien porque tratan de mejorar las versiones más estándar del contextualismo deíctico. Antes de abordar estas teorías, presentamos la versión más discutida del expresivismo, el emotivismo de Ayer (Sección 4.3), y analizamos uno de los argumentos más desafiantes contra este tipo de expresivismo (el Problema Frege-Geach, Sección 4.3.1). De entre las teorías que asumen algunos de los postulados expresivistas, discutimos, por un lado, la propuesta de Barker (2000), según la cual el componente expresivo de las expresiones de perspectiva viene en forma de implicatura convencional. Por otro lado, discutimos la propuesta de Strandberg (2012) que explica este componente expresivo en términos de implicatura conversacional ge-

neralizada. La propuesta contextualista híbrida que discutimos es la de Díaz-León (2017a). Según la autora, las atribuciones de conocimiento desencadenan una implicatura conversacional generalizada con un contenido metalingüístico: nos dice cómo debemos utilizar el concepto SABER. Otra propuesta que discutimos es el enfoque presuposicional de Cepollaro y Stojanovic (2016). Según las autoras, las expresiones evaluativas híbridas desencadenan una presuposición evaluativa. Esta presuposición evaluativa afirma que algo que satisface una descripción particular es bueno en cierto sentido.

Estas teorías tienen que hacer frente a algunas objeciones relativas a los tres desiderata y otras relativas a su propia consistencia interna. Analizamos estas objeciones en detalle. Finalmente, esbozo el marco expresivista que considero más apropiado para tratar los desiderata establecidos en el Capítulo 2. Esta propuesta, tal como avanzamos en el apartado 1.1, toma como punto de partida la propuesta del Expresivismo Mínimo defendida por Frápolli y Villanueva (2012) pero al mismo tiempo ofrece una ampliación de esta.

El Capítulo 5 está dedicado a los silbatos para perros políticos. En este capítulo, aportamos algunas novedades que creo que sirven para profundizar un poco más en el fenómeno. En primer lugar, analizamos los tipos de públicos que intervienen cuando alguien lleva a cabo un silbato para perros político (ver diagrama 5.1). En segundo lugar, y a partir de la taxonomía de Jennifer Saul (2018), introducimos algunas categorías que, en nuestra opinión, hacen de esta taxonomía un instrumento analítico más fino (ver diagrama 5.2). Comparamos los silbatos para perros encubiertos con otros fenómenos que, a priori, son candidatos plausibles para explicarlos: las presuposiciones y las implicaturas (ver tabla 5.3). Sostenemos que los silbatos para perros encubiertos explotan las asociaciones que el público hace con ciertas expresiones. Finalmente, tratamos de mostrar usando lo que llamamos el *Test de la Retractación* el carácter no proposicional, y por lo tanto asociativo, de los silbatos para perros encubiertos. Por lo tanto, abogamos por un marco expresivista como el mejor candidato para acomodar tales fenómenos.

En el Capítulo 6, resumimos brevemente lo que hemos hecho a lo largo de esta investigación y esbozamos las conclusiones.

Part I

General Introduction

1

Introduction

1.1 A General Overview

The main aim of this dissertation is to provide an expressivist metasemantic framework that makes sense of a variety of evaluative uses of language. In the first part, we focus on so-called *perspectival expressions*, or rather, on the explicit perspectival use of certain expressions. In the second part, we focus on some of the implicit perspectival uses of certain expressions, those that constitute the phenomenon of *covert dogwhistles*. Evaluative uses of natural language are characterised by being informationally orientational, that is, by conveying nonpropositional content. These expressions, when they are used evaluatively, contribute to the conversational setting with what we will call expressive meaning. However, among them, there are differences both in their syntactic role and in their capacity to provide, in addition to orientational information, locational information—which is propositional in nature (See Charlow 2014, p. 639; Lewis, 1979). The metatheoretical expressivist scaffolding that we propose in this dissertation is compatible with a number of different semantic implementations. It is our contention that the desiderata that we devise and the diversity of the phenomena that we map can only be accounted for if some expressivistic assumptions are preserved.

Following Zeman (2017), we use the notion "perspectival expressions" to refer to the aspect that predicates of personal taste, aesthetic and morals predicates,

epistemic modals, and some other terms of the same kind have in common. We could make finer distinctions with Williams (1985), for example, between *thin* and *thick* terms, or with Sibley (1974/2001) between *intrinsically evaluative terms*, *descriptive merit-terms*, and *evaluation-added terms*, but given our purpose in this research these distinctions can be set aside. As Zeman points out: "[t]he main characteristic of perspectival expressions is that appeal to a subject's perspective is needed for their semantic interpretation" (Zeman 2017, p. 63).

The debate on perspectival expressions has revolved around the phenomenon of disagreement, being faultless disagreement the most discussed one. In Chapter 2, we argue that faultless disagreement is not the type of disagreement that best guides the debate. If what matters is whether or not the disagreement is faultless, one would have to define what makes a disagreement faultless. However, any characterisation of faultlessness quickly finds counterexamples. Suppose that "faultless" means that the parties make sincere claims that are true with respect to their standards. Think about the following situation: your best friend seriously tells you that SpongeBob SquarePants' theme song is better than Chopin's Nocturne No. 20 in C-sharp minor. You, a trained musicologist, think otherwise and take her to be mistaken although, as a matter of fact, when she hears that song her skin crawls and her eyes light up, and nothing similar happens to her when she hears Chopin's Nocturne. So when she says "SpongeBob theme song is better than Chopin's Nocturne," she says something sincere and true according to her aesthetic standard. Most language users would not consider this situation as an instance of faultless disagreement. As we see it, "faultless" is an epistemic perspectival expression. As such its application depends on the epistemic standards of the one who evaluates the disagreement as being faultless or not. However, in fact, it should not matter. If being faultless is nothing more than saying something true regarding one's own standards this case fully meets this condition. Therefore, this case should clearly work as an instance of faultless disagreement. Rather, as we will see, we will focus on what we call "nonfactual disagreements," within which deep, metalinguistic, and evaluative disagreements can be distinguished. Too much focus on the notion of "faultless" has blurred the discussion on the desiderata imposed by the family of disagreements that involve perspectival expressions. These desiderata can only be met if our theory preserves the specificity of "expressive meaning"—its nonpropositional character, as we will argue.

What is interesting about these expressions is that they enable us to do things for which other expressions are not suitable. Specifically, and this is what we defend throughout this dissertation, they play a different role than describing how things are. Whether some perspectival expressions contribute or not to the propositional content will depend on the kind of predicable that they are. Functions of propositions are not used to talk about the world, and in this sense they do not contribute a component to what is said, they do not provide *locational* information—though in a more general sense, of course they alter the truth-conditions of the sentences that they are part of. They impart instructions on how to evaluate the content under its scope. Functions of concepts and first-order predicables do make a substantive contribution. However, even though some perspectival expressions do not contribute to propositional content while others do, all perspectival expressions have something in common: they have "expressive meaning," they provide *orientational* information. Expressive meaning can be specified as an operation performed by certain expressions on the propositional content under their scope. In this case, those expressions function as *modifiers of the circumstances of evaluation.* Alternatively, they can function as *indicators of how the speaker proposes to rank and proposes to her audience to rank the available possibilities according to a particular order.* As we will see, some predicables accomplish only one of these tasks (they modify evaluation circumstances, or they rank the available possible worlds), and others accomplish both tasks.

As far as we know, this debate has not been explicitly extrapolated to the debate about the nature of dogwhistles in general and covert dogwhistles, in particular. The focus of this research on the second part of the dissertation will be on covert dogwhistles which, because of their singularity, pose a more significant theoretical challenge than overt dogwhistles. The pragmatic devices (presuppositions and implicatures) usually used to explain some forms of communication do not seem to be adequate to explain covert dogwhistles, even if they could account for overt dogwhistles. For this reason, and although a lot could be said about overt dogwhistles, our target is the covert ones. These are implicit evaluations. Evaluations that can be triggered even if what is said is not openly evaluative. Through a covert dogwhistle the speaker presents herself as someone who ranks the possible worlds according to a particular order and mobilises the attitudes of her audience in that same way. It is this act of presenting oneself as someone who ranks possible

worlds according to a specific order and at the same time proposes to others to do the same, indicative of the evaluative use of language, that gives the title to this dissertation: *Ranking the World through Words.* It should be noted that despite functioning as first-order predicables, covert dogwhistles only provide expressive meaning, perhaps because of their implicit nature, perhaps for a different reason. They do not provide locational information, contrary to expressions that are explicitly used perspectivelly. Covert dogwhistles constitute, thus, not only a clear instance of the need to account for perspectival expressions in nonpropositional terms, they also pose some challenge to some natural assumptions regarding the correspondence between the syntactic status and the kind of expressive meaning involved.

1.2 Why a Dissertation on Evaluative Uses of Language?

Language serves many purposes. It is *per se* what its users do with it. We do a wide variety of things with language. We are especially interested in its evaluative uses. Like descriptions, as opposed to commands, evaluations are truth-apt. Like commands, as opposed to descriptions, we do not describe what surrounds us with evaluations. Evaluative uses look like descriptive uses. Although there are expressions that are used by default to evaluate, at first glance, there are no signs that indicate that we are dealing with an evaluation, beyond being recognised as such by competent speakers of a language. Furthermore, to say that they are used by default for specific purposes is precisely to recognise that they can be used for other purposes. A paradigmatic example of an expression used by default to make evaluations is the expression "correct." However, to say that "according to the Spanish current system of traffic rules, driving on the right is correct" is not to evaluate what we think is correct, but to describe what the rules say about it, which can completely differ from what we think is correct or not (Moore, 1903/1922b; Field, 2009).

As noted above, the role of disagreements has been crucial to the discussion of evaluative uses of language. Contextualists, relativists, and expressivists have attempted to explain the functioning of expressions used by default to evaluate

by looking at disagreements.[1] The kind of disagreements to which perspectival expressions may give rise have features that make them distinct from disagreements in which there are no perspectival expressions involved. This matters to us because it calls our attention to the peculiarity of perspectival expressions. Being able to distinguish properly between the kind of things we do when we describe what the world is like and the kind of things we do when we evaluate it also has an impact on the political arena.

1.2.1 The Generation of Disagreements as a Propagandistic Mechanism

Remaining oblivious to the distinction between factual and nonfactual disagreements, and to the different varieties of nonfactual disagreements might not only be a problem of semantic proportions, it might affect our ability to navigate the political scene. Many times, mass media (for instance "Fox News airs significantly more stories that question the existence of human-caused climate change than stories that accept these scientific claims" (Hmielowski et al. 2014, p. 868) and self-anointed independent institutions (for instance the "Discovery Institute" in the United States) promote some alleged experts. These experts disagree with some view over certain issues which interest the public eye (climate change, genetically modified organisms, weapon control, even homosexuality). Sometimes, they try to convince the general public that there is not a consensus among experts about a particular factual issue (although there is such a consensus). In contrast, some other times, they try to convince the public that some issue is something that only experts can solve (even though there is not neutral and purely technical way to solve such an issue).

A theme to which Jason Stanley goes back time and time again in his work on propaganda has to do with the danger of claiming expertise over matters of value, including matters of public policy, with the intention of forcing people to defer to

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[1]For a defense of indexical contextualism see, for instance, Dreier (1990), DeRose (1992), Cohen (1999), Schaffer (2011) and Sundell (2011). In support of nonindexical contextualism see Kölbel (2003, 2004), Lasersohn (2005) and Brogaard (2008b). For an assessor-relativist proposal see MacFarlane (2005, 2014). Expressivist approaches applied to this type of expressions can be found in Gibbard (1990, 2003, 2012), Chrisman (2007, 2012), Field (2009, 2018) and Ridge (2014), among others.

such alleged experts their freedom as responsible and autonomous citizens to pass judgments on such matters (Stanley, 2015, p. 51). Those who belong to privileged groups will employ their epistemic and practical advantage to claim expertise over issues of value, which are in fact beyond the domain of expertise. "They will use their presumed expertise and control of the resources to set the agenda for the media and the schools as methods of applying and conveying their own ideology." (Stanley, 2015, p, 342).

Such claims to expertise can take different forms: for instance, the economic elites may try to settle a value-laden public debate by appealing to scientific facts or statistics. Alternatively, they may attempt to present scientific or technical epistemic authority as a broader kind of practical authority that includes authority over preferences, social and political organisation or life plans. Stanley does not explicitly distinguish between both strategies and yet he offers illuminating ideas about the way the second form may undermine the authority of experts when they should indeed settle public debate: when we feel that self-anointed experts on value jeopardize our autonomy, we may end up not trusting genuine experts when their voices should be heard (Stanley (2015, p. 40) mentions issues such as climate change or the importance of vaccines). In so doing, they present a value-laden debate as a factual one, thereby leaving citizens with no political voice and no possible democratic choice.

Something slightly different can also happen. Those who want to call into question a certain factual consensus view by presenting what is an evaluative disagreement as factual disagreement intend to generate a perception of dissensus in issues in which there is a consensus. They do this by exploiting psychological mechanisms as the identity-protective bias, confirmation bias, etc. As Stanley points out regarding propaganda of climate change: "In the propaganda of climate change, we find oil companies and large agribusiness setting up their own "science" institutes, presenting anti-science policies under the guise of science" (Stanley, 2016, p. 288). This is, therefore, a case of undermining propaganda since "someone who presents subjective values, or self-interested goals, as the embodiment of objective scientific ideals is, therefore, producing paradigm examples of propaganda." (Stanley, 2015, p. 13).

In a nutshell, a "technicist" or "technocratic" society is one that, among other things, blurs the distinction between different kinds of disagreements and, in par-

ticular, between evaluative and factual disagreements. Such form of social and political organisation is one radically at odds of with the pluralistic ideal behind genuine democracy: there is no a priori limit to individuals' preferences and desires. Of course, some preferences and desires are better than others, and public debate aims not only at negotiating policies but also at educating people towards such better values. However, recognising that some collective paths are better than others does not depend on the totalitarian idea that such a thing as the best preferences, desires or values should guide our reflection (see Field, 2009). One could argue that, in fact, any appeal to the best course of action is incompatible with any course of action being better than some other: everything but perfection is equally flawed.[2] Being able to identify, as Stanley does, these propagandistic mechanisms is only possible if a distinction between factual and nonfactual disagreements is both recognised and theoretically substantiated. In this sense, the goal of our disertation is not only a theoretical one, but also a practical one.

1.2.2   More Cases of Propaganda: Dogwhistles

We never wholly escaped the dangers of fascism. Currently, we are living the resurgence of fascist ideology: Trump in the United States, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Salvini in Italy, the irruption of Vox in the Andalusian and Spanish parliaments, etc. When these leaders and parties address to public opinion, they use a straightforward harmful language towards certain ethnic minorities, LGBT collectives, feminism, etc. Fascist speeches are subordinating speech acts. The dangers of these kinds of speech being normalised in democratic societies are already familiar to us.

In this dissertation, we focus on a phenomenon that have been mostly overlooked. Even in moments in which the fire of fascism seems to be extinguished, there is a type of propagandistic mechanism that serve the purpose of keeping its flames alive. This is the speech act of dogwhistling.

Dogwhistles are implicit evaluations. They are speech acts that might not make explicit use of perspectival expressions but, beneath what is said when they are used, their meaning provides some perspective. If this phenomenon catches

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[2]Manuel de Pinedo and I defended the ideas in this section at the 9th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 9) in Munich (21 - 26 August 2017).

our attention for any reason other than its own linguistic nature, it is because we believe that they play an essential role in generating radicalisation at least during election campaigns (although not only). This thesis, indeed, requires a more detailed study, but whether it is true or not, it is part of the my motivation to address this question.

As Stanley (2015) pointed out, in totalitarian regimes, harmful speech need not be hidden. It is part of the coming to power of totalitarian leaders to employ some forms of discourse. However, what about our liberal democracies? The media exert an enormous influence on public opinion. We assume that these media are neutral and truthful, although increasingly less so. However, it seems necessary to have tools that allow us to detect the more subtle mechanisms of manipulation that take place in such democratic societies, being it the intentional confusion of different types of disagreement, as we saw above, or the use of dogwhistles. When democracy declines in quality, fascist policies lie in wait. Neoliberalism fails citizens too much, and more so when citizens demand more social guarantees (as it happens in times of crisis). When neoliberalism fails, fascism takes the form of a democratic party and becomes part of our day-to-day political life. It is vital, therefore, to have tools that allow us to detect and intervene in discursive processes that generate radicalisation that may pose a danger to the fundamental pillars of liberal democracies.

1.3 Why Expressivism?

Expressivism can be a *global* or a *partial* theory of meaning (see Frápolli, 2016). Huw Price (2013)'s is a case of global expressivism.[3] By contrast, classical expressivism in metaethics develops the intuition that there are at least some areas of discourse that are not intended to represent what the world is like. Metaethical expressivism is thus partial. When we use normative or evaluative vocabulary, or rather, when we use certain expressions to make normative or evaluative claims we do not intend to represent the world, but to carry out another type of action. This other type of action is usually associated with the idea of expressing conative mental states, motivational mental states, such as plans, preferences, desires, pro/con

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[3]This kind of expressivism will not be discuss in this dissertation.

attitudes, etc. This is the inherited version of expressivism from metaethics. We can call it *psychologistic expressivism* (Chrisman, 2008).

This inherited version of expressivism contrasts with another form of expressivism that we can already find in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Wittgenstein, 1922/2014; Frápolli and Villanueva, 2012; Villanueva, 2019; Almagro, Navarro-Laespada and Pinedo, 2019). Wittgenstein's expressivism is also local; his picture theory of meaning is complemented with an expressivist conception of logical constants and mental state's ascriptions. The Wittgensteinian understanding of logical constants serves as a starting point for Brandom's logical expressivism (Brandom, 1994, 2000). We can call this type of proposal *inferentialist expressivism* (Chrisman, 2008). Brandom's expressivism does not state that the function of logical constants is to express mental states but to make explicit certain inferential commitments.

Both forms of expressivism are anti-descriptivist. However, there are notable differences between them. Psychologistic expressivism, in its earliest versions, was antirealist and its antidescriptivism was often coupled with the rejection of the truth-aptness of normative and evaluative claims. Inferential expressivism, on the other hand, does not imply *per se* any ontological commitment concerning the existence of normative facts, and its antidescriptivism is moderate. It is not denied that normative or evaluative claims lack truth-value, what is claimed is that the function of certain expressions is not to add a new concept to the propositional content, but that such expressions play a specific conceptual role on propositional contents.

The expressivist framework we use in this dissertation is antidescriptivist in the sense that inferentialist expressivism is antidescriptivist concerning those expressions that function as higher-order predicables. It is antidescriptivist in an even more moderate sense, concerning those expressions that function as first-order predicables, since it defends that these do contribute propositional content (locational information) but also contribute expressive meaning which is nonpropositional in nature. Covert dogwhistles are an exception. They are first-order predicables that do not contribute locational information. Section 4.7.2 will be devoted, among other things, to classifying these expressions according to their syntactic and semantic roles.

1.4   The Plan

This dissertation consists of four parts. The first part is the introduction and the last, the conclusions. The second part is divided in three chapters and devoted to the debate on perspectival expressions. The third part focuses on dogwhistles.

In the second and third parts of this dissertation, we present the central ideas. The main aim of Chapter 2 is to set out the desiderata that any theory of perspectival expressions should comply with: *disanalogy*, *disagreement*, and *retraction*. Moreover, we address in detail, following, to a large extent, MacFarlane (2014), the different forms that disagreements can adopt. We argue against the thesis that faultless disagreement is the pivotal phenomenon around which the debate between contextualists, relativists and expressivists should revolve. We defend that it is nonfactual disagreements in all of their forms (deep disagreement, metalinguistic negotiations and evaluative disagreement) that should be in the middle of the discussion since "faultless" is an epistemic perspectival expression that does not favour any proposal in particular.

Chapter 3 is devoted to discussing some theoretical proposals that we call semantic views. These proposals have in common that they explain disagreements in terms of a conflict at the level of what is said, even when in order to account for disagreements at the level of what is said they make use of non-semantic mechanisms. We focus on indexical and nonindexical contextualisms, López de Sa (2008, 2015)'s presuppositional approach and Sundell (2016)'s proposal. They all have trouble appropriately accommodating the distinction between describing and evaluating. The lack of a coherent explanation of this disanalogy causes all of them to present problems in explaining nonfactual disagreements. Then, each of these proposals faces some objections that have to do with disagreement and retraction, but also others relating to its own internal coherence.

In Chapter 4, we explore other theoretical alternatives that we call non-semantic views. These proposals accept the possibility of disagreements that go beyond what is said. We discuss some proposals that we can call hybrid, either because they try to accommodate some of the assumptions of expressivism, or because they try to improve the more standard versions of indexical contextualism. Before addressing these theories, we introduce the most discussed version of expressivism, Ayer's emotivism (Section 4.3), and analyse one of the most challenging arguments

against this kind of expressivism (the Frege-Geach Problem, Section 4.3.1). Within the theories assuming some of the expressivist postulates, we discuss, on the one hand, Barker (2000)'s proposal, according to which perspectival expressions' expressive component comes in the form of conventional implicature. On the other hand, we discuss Strandberg (2012)'s proposal that explains this expressive component in terms of generalised conversational implicatures. The hybrid contextualist proposal we discuss is that of Díaz-León (2017a). According to the author, the attributions of knowledge trigger a generalised conversational implicature with a metalinguistic content: it tells us how we should use the concept KNOW. Another proposal we discussed is the presuppositional approach of Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016). According to the authors, hybrid evaluative expressions trigger an evaluative presupposition. This evaluative presupposition states that something that satisfies a particular description is good in some sense. These theories have to deal with some objections regarding the three desiderata and some relative to the internal coherence of the same proposal. We analyse these objections in detail. Finally, we outline the expressivist framework that we consider most appropriate to deal with the desiderata established in Chapter 2. This proposal, as we advanced in section 1.1, enriches minimal expressivism as defended by Frápolli and Villanueva (2012), and highlights the type of nonpropositional contribution that characterises the evaluative uses of natural languages and, at the same time, pays attention to the differences between these expressions, both from a syntactic and semantic point of view.

Chapter 5 is devoted to dogwhistles. Specifically, political dogwhistles. In this chapter, we offer some ideas that allow us to go deeper into the phenomenon. First, we analyse the types of audiences that intervene when someone carries out a dogwhistle (see chart 5.1). Secondly, we extend Jennifer Saul (2018)'s taxonomy by introducing some categories that make it a finer analytical instrument (see chart 5.2). We compare covert dogwhistles with other phenomena that a priori are plausible candidates to account for them: presuppositions and implicatures (see table 5.3). We argue that dogwhistles exploit the associations the audience makes with certain expressions. We define these associations by following Toribio (2018). Finally, we try to show, using what we call the *Test of Retraction*, the nonpropositional, and therefore associative, character of covert dogwhistles. Thus, we argue in favour of our expressivist framework as the best candidate to accommodate

such phenomena. A proposal capable of explaining the nature of the explicit perspectival use of certain expressions, should also be able to successfully explain the implicit perspectival use of certain expressions, which is what, we defend, occurs in the case of covert dogwhistles. Nevertheless, covert dogwhistles are distinctive first-order predicables. Unlike first-order predicables, when their perspectival use is explicit, covert dogwhistles do not contribute locational information.

In Chapter 6, we briefly summarise what we have done throughout this research and outline the conclusions.

Part II

Disagreement, Retraction and Perspectival Expressions: Semantics *vs* Non-Semantics views

2

The Challenges of Nonfactual Disagreements and Retraction

2.1 Introduction

Discussions on *perspectival expressions* have revolved around the phenomenon of disagreement, in general, and faultless disagreement, in particular. Contextualists, relativists, and expressivists have pushed forward competing theoretical frameworks to explain what is distinctive about perspectival expressions, and how this phenomenon should be accommodated within a theory.

Faultless disagreement has played a central role in this whole debate. Some authors have argued that faultless disagreement is a kind of disagreement that takes place in contexts where the opposing claims are perspectival. Moreover, the very existence of this phenomenon has been presented as evidence in favour of relativism.

In this chapter, we argue that faultless disagreement does not fit the bill, i.e., it is not the most appropriate phenomenon for determining which philosophical proposal is most compelling. we defend that this role is played by nonfactual disagreement and its different variants. Likewise, we argue that in addition to nonfactual disagreements, retraction is also a pivotal phenomenon to elucidate how perspectival expressions work and, therefore, to test the potential of the different

proposals in competition. The aim of this chapter is not, however, to examine the potential of these theories, but to present the phenomena that will allow the comparison. Comparisons and discussions of the theories will take place in chapters 3 and 4. The aim of this chapter is instead to draw the desiderata that an approach that seeks to explain perspectival expressions must uphold.

This chapter is structured as follows: in section 2.2, we distinguish, on a first approximation, between misunderstandings, or merely verbal disputes, and disagreements. The aim is to pay attention to phenomena that look very similar to disagreements, but which are not real disagreements. In section 2.3, we set out, following MacFarlane, the different senses in which we can say that two or more people disagree. In the next section, section 2.4, we address the phenomenon of faultless disagreement, as it is usually depicted in the literature. In section 2.5, we argue that "faultless" is an epistemic perspectival expression and that, therefore, any theory able to successfully explain the behaviour of perspectival expressions can also accommodate the phenomenon of faultless disagreement. In section 2.6, we emphasise the distinction between factual and nonfactual disagreements. In contrast to the ontological interpretation of the distinction, we articulate a pragmatist interpretation to explain that distinction. Section 2.7 is meant to put forward the three types of nonfactual disagreements that we think that can be distinguished. In 2.8, the speech act of retraction is introduced. As the conclusion of the chapter, three desirata are presented that any theory must accommodate in order to account for the meaning of perspectival expressions.

2.2 Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: Misunderstanding and Genuine Disagreement

In our linguistic practices, we humans do many things; we describe what surrounds us, ask questions in order to broaden our knowledge on topics of interest, express our feelings, give and take orders and a long list of other things. As social beings, we need to align our attitudes, that is, make them compatible, to coordinate our actions with other human beings[4]. As a result of this process of alignment of

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[4]Sometimes, it will not be necessary to align our attitudes. It will be enough to coordinate our actions even if one of the parties has not changed its previous attitude. Imagine Lucia and

attitudes and coordination of actions, we may find ourselves in situations where others are reluctant to accept what we have said or done at some point, that is, we may find ourselves in situations of disagreement. Thus described, it seems that disagreement is necessarily a problem of coordination, but this is not the case. A disagreement can be the result of an exchange of views that do not seek coordination among speakers but simply to make each speaker's view explicit. As we will see in Section 2.7, some disagreements are of this type, disagreements in which speakers do not seek to coordinate with each other or reach an agreement.

At first sight, the most evident symptom that we are facing a case of genuine disagreement is the possible appearance of *explicit markers of disagreement*— locutions such as "no," "I disagree," "that's not true," and so on. However, the mere presence of such locutions will not be sufficient to identify a particular situation as a case of disagreement. This expressions have to be appropriately used; they have to be genuine markers of disagreement. Thus, as a criterion to spot genuine disagreements as opposed to mere misunderstandings, the possible appearance of explicit markers becomes circular. To better illustrate this idea let's consider the following situation:

(1)　*Lucía*: I saw her duck.
　　　Naiara: Nope, it's not a duck, it's a goose.

Let's suppose that Naiara had not realised that her little sister, Lucía, was talking to their grandma on the telephone. The grandma had asked Lucía if her aunt's leg pain had gone. And Lucía had answered with "I saw her duck," implicating that pain had gone. However, when Naiara says: "Nope, it's not a duck, it's a goose," she is talking about her aunt's cute pet. In such case, is Naiara disagreeing with Lucía? She is not, although Naiara's answer might suggest otherwise. The locution "no" uttered by Naiara is a failed attempt to deny the content uttered by Lucía. We are dealing here with a *misunderstanding* or a *merely verbal dispute*[5] (see for instance: Stojanovic 2007; Jenkins 2014). In other words, this is an

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Naiara discussing whether to go to the cinema or the theatre. Suppose Naiara does not like theatre and therefore prefers to go to the cinema. Lucia loves both cinema and theatre, but this time she prefers to go to the theatre. Finally, Lucia and Naiara decide to go to the cinema. Lucía has given in to going to the cinema, but her preference has not changed. She goes to the cinema, but she still thinks they should have gone to the theatre.

[5]According to Jenkins (2014, p. 21, our emphasis), "[p]arties A and B are having a merely verbal dispute iff they are engaged in a sincere prima facie dispute D, but do not disagree over the

instance in which both speakers are talking at cross purposes. As Stojanovic (2007, p. 695) points out: "they failed to realize that their 'disagreement' was merely due to a lack of agreement on what they were talking about." When the two parties notice that they are talking about different things, the dispute defuses. pensarMisunderstanding might take place in contexts in which one of the parties misuses a relevant term or mishears what the other one has said. In short, a misunderstanding is not a real or substantive dispute, but only a dispute whose cause lies in some communicative error committed by at least one of the parties involved.

When do we face a genuine disagreement? Proper disagreement, at first glance, requires the speakers involved to say something incompatible. For instance, it requires the disputing parties *to talk about the same thing*—one party expresses the proposition p through the utterance of sentence S, and the other party expresses q through the utterance of sentence U, and q entails $\neg p$. We can call this characterisation the *Canonical Version of Disagreement* (see e.g., Plunkett and Sundell, 2013, p. 9). For the sake of the argument, let's suppose that the speakers in (1) were talking about the same thing. Let's call this version (1*). In (1*), Naiara and Lucía are talking about their aunt's pet. Thus, their disagreement would be about whether their aunt's pet is a duck or a goose. Naiara has denied the content previously expressed by Lucía, she has denied that their aunt's pet is a duck. In others words, the two claims uttered by the speakers are incompatible since they cannot be simultaneously true. Once the possibility of a misunderstanding have been ruled out, a case of substantive or genuine disagreement can be found. This characterisation of the phenomenon of disagreement, however, is remarkably narrow. In the next section, we delve more deeply into the notion of "disagreement."

2.3   The Boundaries of the Category of Disagreement

In order to achieve a thorough understanding of the phenomenon of disagreement our strategy is to make suitable distinctions that will make it possible to explain

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subject matter(s) of D, and merely present the appearance of doing so owing to *their divergent uses of some relevant portion of language*."

the manifold forms that this phenomenon may adopt. In the preceding section, we have discussed a phenomenon that takes the form of disagreement, but it is not. We have also introduced a first definition of disagreement, but there are many cases of disagreement that fall outside of it. So let's be more accurate from now on. We will discuss, following MacFarlane (2014), the various ways in which we can say that two or more people disagree.

To begin with, let's look at the most basic distinction: *disagreement as a state* and *disagreement as an activity* (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, p. 60-61). 'Disagreement as a state' describes a situation in which two or more people have incompatible attitudes towards a particular issue. For example, one party believes that p and the other one believes that $\neg p$. However, disagreement as a state does not require interaction between the parties. For example, Darwin disagreed with the ancient Egyptians on how living beings appeared on Earth, even though they never actually argued with each other. Disagreement as an activity, on the other hand, requires interaction between the disagreeing parties. (1*) is an example of this. While we will primarily focus on disagreement as a state, we will also address issues that have to do with disagreement as an activity. Mainly, because the dynamics of a communicative interaction allows us to better identify what type of disagreement, if any, is taking place between two or more parties. Disagreement as a state gives us a static picture, which is usually ambiguous in determining the type of disagreement, if any, we face. Two people may seem to harbour two contradictory beliefs, and yet not disagree but are simply using the same expression with two different meanings as may occur in a case of misunderstanding. But this can only be known in the course of a conversation. Last but not least, two conflicting beliefs may be the cause of a disagreement, but without seeing on the ground how the conversation proceeds we would have no way of knowing whether the disagreement is factual, deep, metalinguistic or evaluative. Next, we will see some orthogonal but related distinctions to the difference between disagreement as a state and as an activity.

2.3.1 Disagreement as Noncotenable Attitudes

Following MacFarlane (2014, p. 121-123), two people disagree if one of them cannot coherently adopt the other's attitude without changing their mind, that is,

without giving up their own attitude. In this light, "disagreement" means that the dissenting parties have *noncotenable attitudes*. When attitudes in conflict are cognitive attitudes or beliefs, we have a case of *doxastic noncotenability*. When they are non-cognitive attitudes like desires, preferences, etc., we have *practical noncotenability*. Let's see an example of how noncotenability works. Amy and Andy were talking about the personality of Walter White (Mr White, for short), the fictional character and protagonist of the TV series *Breaking Bad*. After sharing opinions about Mr White, Amy and Andy realise that they agree on what Mr White's character is like (he is cruel, vain, arrogant, and so on). Still, the conversation proceed as follows:

(2)   *Amy*: I love Mr. White.
       Andy: Really? I hate him.

In case (2), Amy cannot adopt Andy's attitude without giving up her own, and the other way around. Disagreement on noncotenable attitudes might have constraints, though. Two attitudes might be noncotenable and still not lead to disagreement, and two attitudes might be cotenable and give rise to a disagreement. These two scenarios are available if, as MacFarlane suggests, the content expressed by a sentence is a *centered proposition*. A centered proposition is a proposition that is true or false with respect to a world and a "centre" (a time t and an individual i or location l). In other words, a proposition is centered if *time*, *individual* and *location* do not take part of the expressed content but of the circumstances of evaluation. As we said, noncotenability does not allow accounting for cases of disagreements in which the parties hold cotenable attitudes, nor does it allow explaining cases in which despite having noncotenable attitudes, the parties in a relevant way do not disagree. An instance of this last scenario is the following one: Alex says, "I want a bacon sandwich," and Susan says, "I want a cheese sandwich." Their attitudes are noncotenable, if one accepts that the propositions expressed by Alex and Susan are centered. However, there is nothing relevant in this situation that makes us think that they disagree. An example of the first type is the following one: Both Alex and Susan want to have a bacon sandwich, but there is only one left, and no one wants to share it. Their attitudes are obviously cotenable, yet they both have to deal with a conflict produced by their having the attitudes that they hold in this particular context.

2.3.2 Disagreement as Preclusion of Joint Satisfaction

We need another notion of disagreement capable of accounting for cases that non-cotenability leaves out if propositions are centered. For that purpose, MacFarlane (2014, p. 123-125) brings in the notion of *preclusion of joint satisfaction*. Disagreement is intended as preclusion of joint satisfaction when disagreeing parties adopt different attitudes which cannot be simultaneously *satisfied*.[6] Disagreement, so understood, amounts to what Stevenson (1963) called *disagreement in attitudes*:

> The difference between the two senses of "disagreement" is essentially this: the first [disagreement in beliefs] involves an opposition of beliefs, both of which cannot be true, and the second [disagreement in attitudes] *involves an opposition of attitudes, both of which cannot be satisfied* (Stevenson, 1963, p. 2, our emphasis.).

To talk about disagreements in which the satisfaction of the speakers' attitudes is precluded, it is necessary, in addition to a difference in the *force* and *content* of the expressed attitudes, to attend to the *context* in which the disagreement takes place. It is the context that determines whether the attitudes of the disputing parties can be satisfied or not. As MacFarlane notes:

> Whether two attitudes are cotenable depends only on their *forces* and their *contents*. But whether they can both be satisfied depends also on the *contexts* in which they occur (for example, on who has them and when) (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 123, our emphasis).

As we have noticed in Stevenson's quotation, disagreement in attitudes occurs when the attitudes of the disputing parties cannot be satisfied. The notion of "attitude" in Stevenson's "disagreement in attitude", as it happens with MacFarlane's version of disagreement in attitude, refers to nondoxastic or noncognitive attitudes. The satisfaction of these attitudes matters insofar as different courses

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[6]As MacFarlane (2014, pp. 124-125) points out, practical noncotenability and preclusion of joint satisfaction can come apart. And that is the expected result for whom consider that expressed proposition by those kinds of claims are centered propositions. However, for whom think that propositions are *non-centered*, the distinction between practical noncotenability and preclusion of joint satisfaction is only notational.

of action might follow from them. These courses of action, which are not only linguistic, may or may not take place simultaneously. When they cannot be carried out simultaneously, i.e., when the satisfaction of two possible courses of action is precluded, we face a situation of disagreement, even though the contents of the utterances made by the speakers may not be in conflict. Now what kind of incompatibility occurs when the attitudes involved are doxastic or cognitive? We already made some progress when we addressed the Canonical Version of Disagreement, and some clues were provided, once again, by Stevenson's quote. In a disagreement in beliefs the conflict is explained by the fact that the assertions involved cannot be simultaneously true.

2.3.3 Disagreement as Preclusion of Joint Accuracy

Consider the following example:

(3)   *Lucía*: I am sitting in front of my laptop (at 6 p.m.)
      Naiara: Nobody was sitting in front of her laptop two hours ago (at 8 p.m.)

The intuition, in this case, is that Lucía and Naiara disagree. Lucía's assertion makes Naiara's assertion false, and the other way around. Lucía can, nevertheless, adopt Naiara's attitude without dropping her own, and vice versa. Their attitudes are thus cotenable. Therefore, this type of disagreement cannot be explained in terms of noncotenability. MacFarlane appeals to the *preclusion of joint accuracy* to explain this type of disagreement. Disagreement in which the accuracy of the speakers' beliefs is precluded takes place when the speech acts of each speaker cannot be both simultaneously *accurate*, that is, they cannot be true as assessed from the same context. "Accuracy" is introduced by MacFarlane in this way: "An attitude or speech act occurring at c_1 is accurate, as assessed from a context c_2, just in case its content is true as used at c_1 and assessed from c_2" (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 127). Thus, an attitude or speech act is accurate if it is true relative to the relevant context. Let's consider another example:

(4)   *Dylan*: Pink Lady apples are tasty.
      Mary: Nope, Pink Lady apples are not tasty.

Case (4) is a disagreement in terms of preclusion of joint accuracy. Both assertions cannot be true concerning the same context. The truth of Dylan's assertion makes Mary's assertion false and vice versa. Moreover, in this case both attitudes are noncotenable since Dylan cannot coherently adopt Mary's attitude without giving up his own attitude, and vice versa. The attitude that Pink Lady are tasty precludes the attitude that Pink Lady are not tasty.[7]

2.3.4 Disagreement as Preclusion of Joint Reflexive Accuracy

Let's consider again case (4). Being "tasty" a perspectival expression, what both speakers assert is true with respect to their own standards of taste. So, they are *reflexively accurate*. According to MacFarlane, "[i]f the accuracy of A's attitudes (*as assessed from A's context*) precludes the accuracy of B's attitudes (*as assessed from B's context*) then A and B disagree" (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 138). Case (4), then, is not a disagreement as preclusion of joint reflexive accuracy, but a disagreement in terms of practical noncotenability and preclusion of joint accuracy. Let's see case (5):

(5) *Dylan*: That bird is a crown.
     Mary: No, it's not a crown

In (5), Dylan and Mary disagree in terms of doxastic noncotenability, preclusion of joint accuracy and preclusion of joint reflexive accuracy. Preclusion of joint reflexive accuracy and preclusion of joint accuracy in cases such as (5), i.e., in cases where no perspectival expressions are involved, overlap because there are no standards involved.

2.4 Faulty and Faultless Disagreement

Once the touchstone of the debate on perspectival expressions has been pinpointed, disagreement as the test or criterion to explore the scope of the competing theories,

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[7]As it was the case with the distinction between practical noncotenability and preclusion of joint satisfaction, the distinction between preclusion of joint accuracy and doxastic noncotenability depend on endorsing a particular view on the centered or non-centered nature of the propositions.

we must deepen our analysis of it by spelling out some features that we have not yet considered. When we witness a situation of disagreement, we are inclined to think that at least one of the disputing parties is wrong. However, we also witness situations of disagreement in which this is not our first intuition. That is, there are situations wherein it seems that none of the parties is definitely mistaken and, still, they do genuinely disagree. In this section, we shall explore the difference between these two scenarios. That is, one in which at least one of the speakers is mistaken, and another one where none of the parties is *in a way* mistaken.[8] Consider the two scenarios just mentioned above:

(6)   Sally and Molly talk about music over coffee. After a while, at a certain point in the conversation, they say:

Sally: Das EFX released their third studio album Hold It Down in 1993.
Molly: No, Hold It Down was released in 1995. In 1993, Das EFX released their second album, Straight Up Sewaside.

(7)   Sally and Molly discuss whether a tax increase to the highest Spanish incomes (those who make a yearly profit over 200,000 €) would be right or wrong:

Sally: Raising taxes on the rich isn't right.
Molly: I disagree, of course raising taxes on the rich is right.

These are indeed two underdeveloped cases of apparent disagreements between Sally and Molly, but they are sufficient to help us illustrate the phenomenon we intend to point out. Even though it seems that both are cases of disagreement, they are, at first glance, importantly different. Case (6), we assume, is a disagreement in which one of the parties has made a mistake, and they can solve the dispute perhaps easily, if they wish to do so. For instance, under normal circumstances, it would be enough to take a look at Wikipedia, or at Das EFX' official website to

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[8]The case choosen to illustrate this second scenario may not satisfy all our readers; some of you may think that you are dealing with a situation in which one of the parties *is* wrong. This interpretation of the case would not, however, be an objection to the thesis that we defend in this chapter, quite the contrary. The fact that our readers disagree on whether to consider this case as a case in which both parties are, in a sense, correct only supports the thesis that what a faultless disagreement is depends on the assessor's perspective.

check who is right or wrong. This is an instance of a *faulty disagreement*. On the contrary, (7) is a case in which speakers' utterances carry *perspectival expressions*, i.e., expressions that make the truth-value of an utterance dependent on an agent's perspective or normative standard (cfr. Field, 2009, p. 250). In this situation, both parties may be right. According to Kölbel (2003), (7) could be an instance of *faultless disagreement*, which can be characterized as follows:

> A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker A, a thinker B, and a proposition (content of judgement) p, such that:
> (a) A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p
> (b) Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault). (Kölbel, 2003, pp. 53–54)

According to Kölbel (2003), (a) tells us when two people, A and B, are disagreeing with each other; (b) says when a disagreement is faultless. There seem to be issues where it makes sense to talk about the plausibility of faultless disagreement. In particular, around personal taste, moral and aesthetic predicates, attributions of knowledge, and the like; domains where perspectival expressions are involved. Kölbel's definition of faultless disagreement is based on the premise that "there is a difference between disputes on objective matters of fact and disputes on non-objective matters of opinion" (Kölbel, 2003, p. 53). That is to say, in certain kinds of disputes on non-objective matters of opinion, like those indicated above, there is no fact of the matter that could settle the dispute. There seems to be a close relationship between nonfactual disagreements and faultless disagreements. It seems that only nonfactual disagreements can be faultless.

According to Stojanovic (2007; 2017), there are two intuitions at the heart of the notion of "faultless disagreement" that clash with our basic intuition about what is a genuine disagreement. On the one hand, the intuition that the two parties involved seem to be right. On the other hand, the idea that the occurrence of markers of disagreement ("no," "I do not agree," and the like) indicates that the parties certainly disagree. These two intuitions, we were saying, apparently conflict with the intuition that underpins the idea of genuine disagreement, namely: that when we face a disagreement at least one of the parties must be wrong. These three intuitions, taken together, are contradictory. The question that arises to deal

with this puzzle is: what does it mean to say that the parties in the dispute are right, that is, what does it exactly mean to say that a disagreement is faultless?

2.5   Two meanings of "faultless," as applied to disagreements

After taking a first look at the faulty/faultless distinction, it is crucial that we dwell a little more on the notion of "faultless" which, as introduced in the previous section, may still turn out to be problematic. A disagreement is faultless provided that none of the disagreeing parties is wrong. That both sides might not be wrong or might be right can mean several things. In this section, we explore what it means to say that the parties involved in disagreement might be right. Mainly, we argue that two senses of "faultless" could be distinguished: an *epistemic* and an *alethic* one. However, the features captured by the two senses of "faultless" are not sufficient *per se* to prompt the intuition that none of the disagreeing parties is wrong. That is, a situation may exhibit properties associated with the two senses of "faultless," and yet we might lack the intuition that the disagreement is faultless. This suggests that something more is needed for someone to assume that a disagreement is error-free. In particular, what we need is a standard or perspective from which to assess those traits that we take to be present in a certain disagreement since, as we argue, "faultless," in its different meanings, is a perspectival expression.

2.5.1   "Faultless" as epistemically warranted

Some of the traits that can prompt the intuition that a disagreement is faultless are epistemic in nature, and have to do with how the disagreeing parties form or justify their beliefs about a particular issue. As a result, by using "faultless" what we mean is that each of the contenders is supported by reasonable, epistemically justified, or warranted beliefs. This is a feature sometimes manifested by factual disagreements, disagreements in which the parties a priori admit the possibility of finding a *fact of the matter* that should tip the balance for one of them. The idea that a factual disagreement can be faultless in this sense has already been noted by MacFarlane (2014): "[t]wo people can hold contradictory but *equally warranted*

beliefs about a perfectly objective subject matter—say, the age of the earth—if one of them has misleading evidence" (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 134, our emphasis). In other words, disagreements can be faultless when the parties involved hold justified or well-founded beliefs, even when one's assertion turns out to be false. Either one of the parties has misleading evidence, as suggested by MacFarlane's quote, or both support two hypotheses that are incompatible with each other but equally consistent with the available evidence, evidence that does not allow ruling out, for the time being, any one of the hypotheses. Both are situations where no one would blame the party that turn out to be wrong for making a mistake, among other reasons, because no one would yet know who the wrong party is. Following MacFarlane (2014, pp. 133-134), we call this epistemic sense 'faultless$_W$' (where the subscript W is for "epistemically warranted").

As we have noted in Section 2.5, the features associated the various meanings of "faultless" are not sufficient to trigger the intuition that a disagreement is faultless. Faultless is a perspectival expression and as such requires the application of the standards of the one who evaluates the disagreement. We can observe that the same situation of disagreement can be perceived as faultless$_W$ or faulty$_W$ by different people in the same context. Consider for a moment the following case: two groups of researchers are discussing the taxonomic status of *Homo floresiensis*. One group supports the hypothesis that it is an original species of hominid, the other one contends that it is a homo sapiens with congenital growth disorders (the case is discussed in detail in De Cruz and De Smedt 2013). The two groups of experts had good reputations. Both hypotheses were well supported by evidence, and neither of them could be definitively corroborated or discarded at the time. It is a case that exhibits the features described by "faultless$_W$." Indeed, some readers may think that this case is an instance of disagreement in which neither party is wrong (the available evidence is compatible with both hypotheses, and, epistemically speaking, both parties may have acted flawlessly). However, other readers may think that it is not an instance of disagreement in which both parties may have acted flawlessly, given that, finally, one of the parties must necessarily be upholding a wrong view. From an epistemic point of view, some assessors may endorse *higher* standards, and other *lower* standards by assessing whether a disagreement is faultless$_W$ or not. That is, the assessor's epistemic standards are essential to determining whether a disagreement is epistemically faultless or not.

If an assessor endorses high standards in a particular context, she will be more demanding in not attributing fault to some of the parties. On the contrary, if the assessor supports lower standards, then she will be less epistemically demanding. The less demanding the standard of the assessor the more likely it is that it will consider a particular disagreement situation as epistemically faultless. By contrast, the higher the standards of the assessor, the less likely it is to consider a situation of disagreement as faultless in an epistemic sense.

2.5.2 "Faultless" as truth relative

The second sense of "faultless" that matters to us, the *alethic sense*, also aims to capture the intuition that in disagreements where perspectival expressions are involved the two parties may be right (we can call it 'faultless$_{TR}$' where the subscript TR is for "truth relative"). Disagreement is faultless$_{TR}$ if the parties have said something true concerning their perspective or normative standards (aesthetic, personal taste, moral, etc.), and what they say conflicts with each other, either because both of them express contradictory contents, or due to a clash of nondoxastic attitudes.

MacFarlane (2014, pp. 133–135) distinguishes, besides the epistemic sense already explored, three more senses of "faultless": "faultless$_T$" (where the subscript T is for "truth"), "faultless$_A$" (where the subscript A is for "accurate") and "faultless$_N$" (where the subscript N is for "not inviolation of constitutive norms governing belief/assertion").

A disagreement is faultess$_T$ when what the parties assert is true concerning the same standard, and they disagree. Given the fact that this is impossible (the same standard cannot be compatible with two contradictory contents), MacFarlane discards "faultless$_T$." If I think fried anemones are delicious and someone I talk to thinks fried anemones are disgusting, I could not meaningfully say to the other party something like, "I disagree, but what you say is true." In other words, if according to my taste fried anemones are delicious, they cannot be disgusting at the same time, and the same applied to my contender.

A disagreement is faultless$_A$ if the statements of the disagreeing parties are accurate (i.e. true to the relevant standard), and their attitudes are noncotenable. Faultless$_A$ diagreement understood in terms of preclusion of joint accuracy

is conceptually impossible. If the attitudes' accuracy were precluded, then they would not be both accurate as faultless$_A$ claim. The example we discussed in Section 2.3.1 is an instance of faultless$_A$ disagreement: Alex says, "I want a bacon sandwich," and Susan says, "I want a cheese sandwich." Their attitudes are noncotenable but accurate. Now, this notion of faultless is not deemed acceptable by any theory. It is necessary to support a particular type of theory so that both disagreeing parties, whose claims carry perspectival expressions, can express accurate attitudes. In particular, we must promote an approach according to which the relevant standard for evaluating the truth or falsity of a perspectival claim is that of the speaker. If this were so, however, it would not make much sense to voice our dissent with someone who makes a perspectival claim contrary to one of ours. If it makes sense for us to disagree with someone, it is precisely because we think that she makes an erroneous judgment, probably becasuse she endorses the wrong standard. Otherwise, we would be equating "This is tasty" with "I like this," or "in my opinion X is wrong" with "X is wrong." And while this sometimes happens, these expressions are not synonymous with each other.

"Faultless$_N$" applies to disagreements in which the parties do not violate the norms of belief or assertion, and the accuracy of the attitude of one party precludes the accuracy of the other's attitude, but does not preclude the reflexive accuracy of the other's attitude, and vice versa. That is, the attitudes of both parties can be reflexively accurate, but their joint accuracy with respect to the relevant context is precluded. This also applies to disagreements in which the parties do not violate the norms of belief or assertion, and their attitudes are noncotenable. Case (4) in Section 2.3.3 is an instance of faultless$_N$ disagreement. Dylan and Mary obey the rules of belief and assertion. Both observe and comply with rules such as the *Reflection Truth Rule*[9] and the *TP Rule*[10] (the latter comes into play with the use of the predicate "is tasty"). The truth of Dylan's assertion makes Mary's assertion false and the other way around. That is, they disagree in terms of preclusion of joint accuracy, but their assertions are reflectively accurate. What each asserts

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[9]According to MacFarlane (2014, p. 103), Reflection Truth Rule states that "[a]n agent is permitted to assert that p at context c_1 only if p is true as used at c_1 and assessed from c_1."

[10]According to MacFarlane (2014, p. 4), TP Rule states that "If you know first-hand how something tastes, call it 'tasty' just in case its flavor is pleasing to you, and 'not tasty' just in case its flavor is not pleasing to you."

is true concerning their respective contexts of use. In this case, moreover, their attitudes are noncotenable.

What we call "faultless$_{TR}$" is meant to be broad enough to encompass Mac-Farlane's "faultless$_A$" and "faultless$_N$." In what follows, we call into question that there is any sense of faultless regarding the truth that can be applied to disagreements. That is, we contest that a disagreement may be faultless either because the attitudes involved are accurate or because no norm of belief or assertion is transgressed. To begin with, we discuss why a situation of disagreement with conflicting perspectival claims cannot be faultless$_A$.[11] In a disagreement such as (4) the assessor will likely say that one of the two parties is wrong, namely, the one whose assertion is incompatible with that of the assessor. The reason for this is that when an assessor is evaluating a perspectival claim what matters is her own standard[12]. It goes without saying that the assessor does not always have to agree with one of the disputing parties—there are contexts where there are more than two options, and the assessor may disagree with both parties while considering both to be wrong. Imagine two speakers discussing a piece of art. One of them argues that Frida Kahlo is the best artist in history. The other one claims that the best artist in history is María Blanchard. The assessor might consider that both are mistaken and that the best artist in history is Tamara Łempicka.

As we have seen, it does not seem to make much sense to apply "faultless$_A$" to disagreements between parties holding contradictory perspectival claims. Now, someone might argue that an assertion like "what you say is false according to my standards, but it is true according to yours" does make sense, and this is what the notion of "faultless$_N$" requires in order to be applied. To recognise that what someone has said is true regarding their standards is trivial. People usually say, with exceptions, what they believe to be true, but from there it does not follow that they are not mistaken. Of course, someone might say that, in cases where claims are perspectival, this recognition is essential since they are claims about issues where there is no single truth (and this is not a minor thesis). However, meaningfully claiming "what you say is false according to my standards, but it is true according to yours" is compatible with thinking that such a person is wrong.

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[11]To avoid the nuances required by assertions containing indexical expressions, we will focus on assertions containing perspectival expressions.

[12]Except for those cases in which one assesses with different standards because the context demands it.

We may think that she should educate her taste, that she should change her moral standards, and so on. And this is compatible with admitting that our opponent said what she had to say given what she knew, the tastes she had, her moral standards, etc. In our view, this would be an epistemic sense of faultlessness. In this context, we are evaluating whether or not the process that our opponent has followed to say what she has said is flawed, a process that, under normal circumstances, we assume is correct, just as, under normal circumstances, we assume that people say what they believe to be true. If this is right, we can say that faultless$_N$ is reducible to the notion of faulltess$_W$ introduced in the previous section.

Therefore, "faultless" is an epistemic perspectival expression and, whether or not a disagreement is faultless, in this epistemic sense, is not enough to adjudicate between theories within the debate about perspectival expressions.

2.6 Factual and Nonfactual Disagreement

The notion of "nonfactual disagreement" has been presented as closely tied to the idea of disagreement in attitudes and faultless disagreement (*See, e.g.*, Stevenson, 1963; Gibbard, 1990, 2003; Kölbel, 2003; Ridge, 2006, 2014). Stevenson's notion of "disagreement in attitudes" is often mentioned as the first attempt to capture the intricacy underlying those situations in which two or more contenders may agree as to what the relevant facts are for the case, yet still, disagree. As we have seen, the notion of "disagreement in attitudes" overlaps what MacFarlane (2014, p. 123) dubs preclusion of joint satisfaction. The notion of "nonfactual disagreement" has also been intimately linked to the notion of "faultless disagreement" (Kölbel, 2003). Since there are no facts to discern which assertion is wrong, nonfactual disagreements were conceived as faultless disagreements. However, to assume that there is such a close relationship between nonfactual disagreements and faultless disagreements is to go both too fast and too far. Taking into account the analysis of the notion of "faultless" above introduced, there does not seem to be a special link between these two phenomena. If "faultless" is an epistemic perspectival expression, any disagreement, whether factual or nonfactual, is susceptible of faultlessness. In what follows, we explore the relationship between disagreement in attitudes and nonfactual disagreement. Let's first begin with the distinction between factual and nonfactual disagreements.

Commonly, the distinction between factual and nonfactual disagreements is made in *ontological* terms: "factual" is whatever carves the world at its joints, i. e., those claims whose truth is not relative to normative standards; "nonfactual" has to do with the opinions of the agents, i.e., those claims that are relative to normative standards. On the one hand, in a factual disagreement the parties are discussing how the world is. Factual claims are presumably objective descriptions of the world, i.e., descriptions of the objects, relations and properties that we can find in it. In a factual disagreement there is an 'objective' way to settle the dispute. On the other hand, in a nonfactual disagreement, the parties make more subjectively tinged assertions, make evaluations about the world whose truth does not depend just on what the world is like. In such disagreements, therefore, no objective fact can settle the dispute between speakers. Let's see how the following two cases differ:

(8)   *Ann*: Clarice is working at the restaurant right now.
      Billy: Nope, Clarice is not working at the restaurant right now. She left her job this morning.

(9)   *Ann*: Clarice is a good worker.
      Billy: No, she isn't.

Case (8) es a typical instance of factual disagreement. Under normal circumstances, Ann and Billy can solve their disagreement about whether Clarise is working by taking a look at the kitchen of the restaurant. This procedure is one, not the only one of course, that both accept as legitimate for resolving disputes of this type. Case (9), on the contrary, is a typical case of nonfactual disagreement. Ann and Billy might settle their disagreement by appealing to facts, providing that they value those facts in the same way. Suppose that Ann says that Clarise is a good worker because she wins the sympathy of all customers, even though she never works overtime, and Billy feels the same way. In this scenario, Ann and Billy agree that Clarise is a good worker. Ann turns to a fact to convince Billy, but it was not this fact alone that constituted the reason for their agreement, but rather this fact being a value-laden fact. In particular, it is a fact evaluated in the same way by Ann and Billy. If, on the other hand, what makes someone a good worker for Billy is that she gets to work early and work overtime whatever the manager needs it, then Clarise might not be a good worker. She is not a good

worker, according to Billy, because she always complains when she is required to work overtime. Ann and Billy, in this current scenario, disagree. There are no more facts that they both value in the same way that would allow them to solve their dispute. Whatever facts matter to everyone to say that someone is a good worker depends on interests, preferences, etc., which they do not share.

To our mind, it is better to understand the factual/nonfactual distinction in a *pragmatist* rather than an ontological way[13]: "factual disagreement" should be understood here as a disagreement in which the parties recognise a priori that there is at least some mechanism or procedure, empirical or formal, that would allow them to solve their discrepancy. Therefore, the expression "factual" in "factual disagreement" has more to do with a tacit agreement of the parties on how to settle their dispute than with an ontological commitment according to which "factual" is what allows carving the world at its joints. A disagreement is nonfactual, then, when the parties do not agree on what mechanisms or procedures would allow them to solve their dispute. This lack of agreement on mechanisms and procedures may be due either to the absence of a background of attitudes such as preferences, plans and pro and con attitudes shared by the disputing parties, or to a lack of agreement on the weight given to each of these attitudes, which could even be shared.

This pragmatist way of distinguishing factual from nonfactual allows accounting for some of the parallels that we can find in factual disagreements and normative disagreements (which are nonfactual by definition). We normally adopt the same kind of attitude when we claim that the Earth revolves around the sun, as when we claim that enslaving children is wrong. That is, we think there is a right attitude towards both issues, which seems to us to be equally clear and unques-

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[13]I owe the way I understand this distinction to María José Frápolli, Manuel de Pinedo and Neftalí Villanueva. This pragmatist understanding of 'factual' can be track down in Frege (1956) and Brandom (1994), among other philosophers.

> 'Facts, facts, facts' cries the scientist if he wants to emphasise the necessity of a firm foundation for science. What is a fact? *A fact is a thought that is true.* (Frege, 1956, p. 307, our emphasis)

> According to the usage endorsed here, *facts are just true claims.* That is, phenomenalistically, *to call something a fact is just to take it to be true.* (Brandom, 1994, p. 327, our emphasis)

tionable. However, it does not follow from this that the semantic considerations of predicates such as "revolving around" and "being good" have to be the same. "Being good" is a perspectival expression. An expression that normally indicates that the sentence is to be evaluated with respect to some normative standards. Perspectival expressions are the type of expressions involved in nonfactual disagreements. From this it does not follow, of course, that whenever there are perspectival expressions involved in the dispute, the disagreement is bound to be nonfactual. As we have seen, the parties can agree on what makes something good, beautiful, and so on. Besides, perspectival expressions can be used to describe rather than to evaluate. For example, if I say, "Enslaving Prisoners of War is wrong according to the Third Geneva Convention" and someone denies it, the discussion is not about whether I evaluate enslaving Prisoners of War as morally wrong—although it could be, but whether the Third Geneva Convention condemns that practice, a practice that might otherwise be acceptable to my interlocutor or to me.

According to the pragmatist interpretation, the factual/nonfactual disagreement distinction is not parallel to the *non-dependent-of-standards/dependent-of-standards* distinction, or in other words it does not correspond to the difference between disagreement with or without perspectival expressions. A disagreement between perspectival claims may be factual as we are using the expression here. Imagine two speakers arguing about whether animals should be treated more fairly. Suppose they both accept that suffering is morally relevant, and therefore both assume that if animals suffered, they should be treated differently. However, both disagree about whether animals suffer. One of them thinks that they do because of the facial expression that we can perceive in them, the other says that this is not reliable proof, that his opponent is humanising the animals's expressions. Imagine that, over the years, scientists show in a way that both speakers accept that animals suffer. Once proven, they both accept that animals should be treated more fairly. Therefore, it is not everytime there are perspectival expressions involved in the conflicting claims that the disagreement will be nonfactual. Now, if the disagreement is nonfactual, then the claims in dispute will contain expressions perspectively used.[14]

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[14]We would like to make it explicit forthwith that although we repeatedly use the label "perspectival expressions" throughout this dissertation, we do not defend that there are expressions that are perspectival in itself, but expressions that are used perspectively.

2.7 Towards a Taxonomy of Nonfactual Disagreements Based on the Dissenting Issue

Having dismissed faultless disagreement as the fundamental phenomenon in determining which theory or family of theories are best positioned to explain the distinctiveness of perspectival expressions, the question that arises is the following: are all disagreement-based arguments doomed, or are there still hopes of finding disagreement-based arguments that will allow favouring a particular theory? It may seem at first glance that a pragmatist characterization of the factual/nonfactual distinction blurs what is peculiar about perspectival expressions. But that would be a hasty conclusion. What is distinctive about perspectival expressions is precisaly that they appear in nonfactual disagreements. A factual disagreement about the age of the earth, for example, may turn into a nonfactual disagreement about the best method to determine the age of the earth. But whenever this happens, then expressions used perspectively make their appearance in the discussion.

In what remains of the section, we present three types of disagreements that by definition are nonfactual, and show that these are the types of disagreements that we should be concerned with when favouring one theory over another. These three varieties of disagreements—*deep disagreements* (DD), *metalinguistic negotiations* (MN), and *evaluative disagreements* (ED)—share some of their constitutive traits and, at the same time, have specific traits that make them both unique and distinguish them from each other. Among their similarities, it should be noted that the three of them are, as we have said, nonfactual disagreements, that is, disagreements in which the parties do not a priori recognise that there is a mechanism or procedure, empirical or factual, to enable them to settle their dispute. Among their differences, it should be pointed out that each of these disagreements has a different goal. Deep disagreements aim to determine what normative principles ought to govern a given context. Metalinguistic negotiations aim to determine how a term ought to be used in a specific context. Furthermore, in such as situations the aim is to reach an agreement between the parties by coordinating the standards involved. Evaluative disagreements aim to determine how we ought to assess a given situation, object, and so on. Sometimes we find ourselves engaged in

this type of disagreements even though we know beforehand that we hold different standards, and its aim is not necessarily to coordinate our respective standards.

2.7.1   Deep Disagreement

Deep disagreements, as they were introduced in the literature (*see, e.g.* Fogelin, 1985; Lynch, 2010; Kappel, 2012; Ranalli, 2018), are disagreements that target whatever epistemic normative principles, or standards, involved in a particular domain. However, since deep disagreements can take place in many discursive domains, such as moral, aesthetic, etc., we should reframe the definition as *a disagreement over which normative principles we should accept in a given context.* We would also like to avoid relying on a heavily theory-laden notion of "normative principles". Following Fogelin (1985), we could talk about *hinge commitments*[15] rather than normative principles, and understand them as those beliefs, preferences, plans, etc., that we take for granted when addressing a given issue. As Fogelin (1985, p. 3) points out, the act of arguing presupposes a common background: "[...] engaging in an argumentative exchange, presupposes a background of shared commitments." Deep disagreements, then, arise in contexts where some of the core commitments that build this shared background are found to be in conflict. This is why deep disagreements are particularly *persistent.* Thus, a disagreement is deep when the parties discuss what these hinge commitments *should be*, which seems to depend on nondoxastic attitudes such as the epistemic, moral, etc., standars of the agents, among other things.

Let's imagine the next scenario:

Holly and Jane are two police officers. They discuss whether waterboarding is a morally justified practice to extract information from a mass murderer who has kidnapped 30 people, and has them locked in an unknown location. They discuss how to proceed prior to the interrogation. Jane suggests waterboarding as a last resort. Holly vehemently refuses to resort to any kind of torture. At that point, the conversation proceeds as follows:

(10)   *Jane*: If we want to save the life of those innocent people, nothing must stop us!

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[15]Ranalli (2018) and Pritchard (2018) use "hinge commitments" instead of "hinge propositions" to leave open the possibility that the hinges are not propositional.

> *Holly*: To act as he acted does not make us better than him!
>
> *Jane*: Yes, if we do serve a higher purpose.
>
> *Holly*: No higher purpose can cancel a bad action!
>
> *Jane*: Certainly not always, but it does in this context.
>
> *Holly*: Nope, never, even in this context.

As we can see, Holly and Jane's discussion is about what moral standard they ought to follow in this context (Jane takes it for granted that there are contexts in which the end justifies the means, and this is one of those contexts. Holly is of the view that there is no context in which the end justifies the means). Their disagreement is not about how we use or ought to use the notion of "torture" or "morally good" or "morally wrong." The parties may fix the meaning of these expressions and yet their disagreement may persist. The discussion of what moral standards it is desirable to accept is not a discussion in which the parties have some interest in how to use certain expressions, but in what normative principles, in this case, moral principles, should guide their action in a given context. They are not discussing whether waterboarding is torture or not; actually, they both agree that waterboarding is a method of torture. As we have said, they discuss what moral standard they ought to endorse, which standard would be the most appropriate in this particular context. And the answer to this question is tied to many other assumptions of the speakers. Moral preferences about what world they want to live in, what is or is not allowed to do in a given situation, etc.

2.7.2 Metalinguistic negotiations

The notion of "metalinguistic negotiations" is especially valuable for clarifying the form that a disagreement may sometimes adopt. Unlike merely verbal disputes or misunderstandings, which are the result of some sort of confusion, affecting at least one the parties, metalinguistic disputes are genuine disagreements about how we use or should use a particular expression in context (Plunkett and Sundell, 2013; Plunkett, 2015). As Plunkett and Sundell point out, this general structure can adopt multiple forms: "It could, on some particular occasion, be a matter of resolving ambiguity, prescisifying a vague term, setting a contextual parameter, or in any other way determining how some antecedently indeterminate matter of meaning should be settled." (Plunkett and Sundell, 2013, p. 3). If what is at issue

is not what the relevant linguistic facts are, but what those facts *should be*, we are dealing with a *metalinguistic negotiation* (Plunkett and Sundell, 2013; Haslanger, 2012[16]; Plunkett, 2015). The kind of questions that guide these discussions constitutes the domain of what Burgess and Plunkett (2013a; 2013b) call "conceptual ethics". "Conceptual ethics" is an expression that allows connecting two crucial aspects in this sort of dispute: on the one hand, given that the meaning of a term is provided by the concept it expresses, metalinguistic negotiations are, therefore, conceptual disputes. On the other hand, "ethics" here is used to stress the normative dimension of these disagreements, which revolve around questions about *how to live* or *what to do*.

A similar variety of this kind of disagreements was already introduced by Stojanovic (2011), who called it "forward-looking disagreements." Forward-looking disagreements are a subtype of metalinguistic negotiations. According to Stojanovic (2011), a forward-looking disagreement is a sort of disagreement whose target is how we ought to use a particular concept, which is, as Stojanovic (2011, p. 11) points out, "under construction." That is, there are concepts whose extensions are "still underdetermined" and, therefore, it is open for discussion whether a particular falls under the scope of such concepts or not. Stojanovic is considering cases in which gradable terms are involved. However, besides including discussions about how to outline the fuzzy boundaries of certain gradable terms to determine what falls or does not fall within their scope, metalinguistic negotiations cover many more cases—cases in which the parties know the limits of the concepts they use, the extensions of the concepts are well defined, but, for example, one of the parties considers that the term used to refer to that concept has a pejorative burden, and the other party does not consider it so, etc. Metalinguistic negotiations also include cases where the boundaries of a concept are clear, but one of the parties may have a particular interest in restricting or extending them.

To appropriately illustrate one instance of this phenomenon, let's examine the following case. Imagine two Spanish magistrates, María and Sara, who are discussing whether joking on Twitter about the car bomb attack suffered by Carrero Blanco, prime minister of the Franco Dictatorship in 1973, ought to be considered

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[16]Haslanger's *ameliorative project* which proposes more than describing the meaning of concepts such as RACE and GENDER, prescribing which concepts of RACE and GENDER we should use for specific purposes, is a project that fits into this way of understanding disputes as metalinguistic negotiations.

"glorification of terrorism" or not. María, a rather conservative magistrate, thinks it should, while Sara, who leans liberal, thinks that it should not. So, they say:

(11)   *María*: Twitting jokes about the car bomb attack perpetrated against Carrero Blanco is "glorification of terrorism."
       Sara: No, twitting this kind of jokes about Carrero Blanco is not "glorification of terrorism" at all.
       María: Actually, what I mean is not that twitting this kind of jokes is "glorification of terrorism," since the law is ambiguous regarding these cases. What I mean is that these jokes ought to be considered "glorification of terrorism," unambiguously.
       Sara: These jokes ought not to be considered "glorification of terrorism." The ambiguity of the law is a problem because it could allow people being accused of glorification of terrorism for twitting such things, which makes no sense at all.

María and Sara keep on arguing. The discussion between them is not a trivial one. The legal consequences of glorifying terrorism might be particularly significant since, in Spain, they imply jail terms. People often discuss how we ought to use a particular term even though they know all the relevant facts relative to the actual uses of that term. As we said, these are not terminological disputes, but substantive ones, whose practical consequences may be especially relevant, as in the case at hand. Of course, metalinguistic negotiations do not present themselves in such explicit terms. Many times, that negotiation to determine what should fall under the scope of a particular concept, where should we put the *threshold* in gradable expressions that allows predicating of x that is an F, or what *dimension* or *scale* is relevant to evaluate an object or situation takes place implicitly.[17] The expression "negotiations" in "metalinguistic negotiations" plays an important role. It indicates that in metalinguistic negotiations the parties seek to coordinate to reach an agreement.

   Someone may insist that deep disagreements are, in fact, metalinguistic negotiations. However, this reductionist thesis is, in our view, misguided. Of course, sometimes a deep disagreement can turn into a metalinguistic negotiation. Shields

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[17]In Section 3.5 of Chapter 3, we will see what the expressions 'threshold', 'dimension' and 'scale' mean when we discuss Sundell (2016)'s proposal.

(2018, p. 2) proposes that we can better understand what deep disagreements are about if we think of them "as disagreements over conflicting understandings of certain concepts." In particular, as disagreements about "how to understand concepts that play a 'constitutive' role for speakers." Following Michael Friedman (2001) and Audrey Yap (2010), Shields (2018) considers that "[a] concept that plays a 'constitutive' role...*helps to define how other key concepts or terms of that inquiry are to be understood* and how further, *less fundamental concepts or terms implicated in that inquiry are therefore also to be understood.*" (Shields, 2018, p. 5, our emphasis). we do not think that every deep disagreement can be explained in terms of metalinguistic negotiations. We think that in the same way that a disagreement can begin being factual and turn into nonfactual, a disagreement can begin being deep and turn into metalinguistic, and vice versa. The target of a disagreement and the way in which the parties approach the discussion may change in the course of a communicational exchange. But this does not make one type of disagreement reducible to another. Moving from one target to another and from one way of approaching it to another, the type of disagreement changes as well. Let's look at an example in which a disagreement begin being deep and turn into metalinguistic, presented by Shields:

> Personhood (PH): Expert legal theorists Peter and Linda have just heard that an animal rights group is arguing before a court that a chimpanzee is being wrongly imprisoned in a research facility—an argument that will require showing that the chimpanzee counts as a person. [...] To be a person, Peter says, is simply to be something that is capable of feeling pain and capable of at least a certain degree of thought. [...] Linda says that if Peter is right [...] we have a moral obligation to protect them in the way we would any other person—by, for example, providing them with health-care. [...] To be a person, she adds, is to be capable of sophisticated, reflective thought and deliberation. Non-human animals are therefore ruled out. Peter says that Linda's view also rules out human beings who have severe cognitive disabilities. She says she is willing to accept this consequence because the alternative is [to] have to intervene in the lives of nonhuman animals in unacceptable ways. (Shields, 2018, p. 4).

This is a case where the parties begin by discussing what rights animals should have, and end by discussing what the expression "person" should mean. However, as has being said, the contrary also may happen; that is, a metalinguistic negotiation can also turn into a deep disagreement. When disputing parties discuss which dimension should take priority when assessing something as "justified," "beautiful" or "right," the disagreement might cease to revolve around what allows us to apply a concept, and might revolve around what normative principle we should adopt. Adopting one normative principle or another may lead us to use, or avoid the usage of, a concept in a given context, but the reasons that one might have to adopt a particular principle do not primarily concern when to use the concept, but how to shape the world according to specific epistemic, aesthetic or moral preferences. Let's consider the following case. Two speakers discuss whether a particular work of art is good or not. One of them, Jessica, says that the picture is good because it is very original and has known to grab the general public's attention. The other one, Kate, says that the picture is not good because it has used very striking colours and is offensive to a particular group. Both use the same dimensions to evaluate the quality of the piece of art ("being original," "to know how to grab the general public's attention," "using striking colours," and "not be offensive"). Kate agrees with Jessica that a work of art that is original and grab the general public's attention is admirable. But there are aspects that matter most to her: first, the type of colours used, and second, its being offensive to disadvantaged groups. These two dimensions weigh more for Kate than they do for Jessica, when judging a work of art. Jessica and Kate give reasons why some dimensions matter more than others in judging art—Jessica and Kate start arguing about what aesthetic norms are desirable when determining the parameters under which aesthetic judgments should be made. Once this happens, the disagreement is no longer metalinguistic, it has become a deep disagreement. The disagreement has turned to the aesthetic norms, commitments, etc., that each party took for granted in determining how to judge art. What matters to them, the target of their dispute, is not primarily how the term "good" should be used, but rather what criteria are best for evaluating art.

2.7.3   Evaluative Disagreement

Evaluative disagreements, or non-straightforwardly factual disagreements, as Field (2009) calls the phenomenon, are a variety of disagreements where, as in the other two types discussed above, the parties involved may agree on all the relevant facts, and still disagree about whether or not something is "right", "good", "wrong", "justified", "tasty", and the like. However, unlike the other two types of disagreements, evaluative disagreements are not primarily about what falls within the scope of a given concept, nor about what normative principle to endorse in a given context. Evaluative disagreements are about the *thing itself*.

When speakers make evaluations they do not intend to say something about their standards, but about the world—an object, a situation, an individual, etc. As Field (2009, pp.251-252) points out, a claim about a particular standard is still a factual claim, "with no evaluative force." What Field has in mind is the classic *Open Question Argument* (Moore 1922b), according to which once one makes standards explicit the evaluative character may disappear, giving rise to a descriptive claim about what a particular norm lisenses. For instance, if someone said "According to the European Animal Protection Laws, animal mistreatment is wrong," another one could reply: "Ok, according to the European Animal Protection Laws, animal mistreatment is wrong, but is it really wrong?" Such a question would not make sense if one had just said in a normal context: "Animal mistreatment is wrong." So, by making an evaluative claim it seems that one is attributing a positive or negative value towards objects or situations, not talking about the standard that she is endorsing.

The disagreement is neither about what standard they should endorse. To think that any disagreement always ends up being about how we should use a term, which results in the coordination of the standards we should use, presupposes an *antiparticularist* understanding of the way we address our discussions with others (Murdoch, 1961/1999a, 1962/1999b; McDowell, 1979; Dancy, 2004; Pinedo, 2007). However, the practice of disagreement is very often about specific issues, not about the standards that we should endorse when evaluating a particular issue. The fact that standards are *concerned* in such nonfactual disagreements does not mean that the discussion *is about* those standards. The distinction between "concern" and "being about," as we see things, becomes relevant at this point (Perry, 1986, p.

147). A difference in the standards endorsed by the disagreeing parties can explain why they disagree, but that is not the same as thinking that the disagreement is about the standards, and not about the thing itself. A disagreement about whether Kase-o's latest album is good or not does not necessarily end up being about the standards that enable us to make certain assessments, but about whether the album is good or not. Speakers do not intend to develop decalogues with aesthetic principles that help us in assessing the quality of an album whenever we discuss music, for example. Speakers usually assess a given album, and only then confront their evaluation with the evaluation of their opponent, often with the sole intention of making of tastes available to others. This proposal is best understood if we think along with Kinzel and Kusch (2018, p. 58) that judgments containing perspectival expressions are *situated*, that is, that such judgements "fix the content of the rules [standard], not rules the content of situated judgements." For this reason, it is odd to make a mistake as to which standard we support with our evaluation, as it usually is our evaluation that sets the content of the standard that we support. Another thing is which standard *we think* we support. There the error is likely.

Imagine two subjects, Luke and Claire, who are discussing people's right to bear weapons. Both speakers live in the same city, they know the full range of data concerning how many people yearly die intentionally or accidentally in their country and, in particular, in their city, etc. Luke and Claire are talking about the Columbine High School massacre that took place in Colorado. At some point in the conversation, they say:

(12)   *Luke*: Letting people bear weapons is wrong!
       Claire: Absolutely not! Letting people bear weapons is not wrong!
       Luke: Yes, it is. Many gun deaths could be avoided if people couldn't carry guns.
       Claire: A lot of innocent people saved their lives because they carried a gun. That people can defend themselves against state violence is good. So, letting people bear weapons is not wrong; it is the right thing to do.
       Luke: That would be the right thing to do in the old West, not under the rule of law. Under a rule of law people bearing weapons is wrong.

They are not discussing whether to bear weapons in their country is lawful or not. They know that, under certain circumstances, it is. They are not discussing

what "wrong" means, or what it ought to mean either. They often agree whether something is wrong or not. They do not argue about what standards they are endorsing either. Evaluative disagreements persist even after making the standards that each party supports explicit. They are not discussing which moral standard is better in this context. In fact, most of the time, people do not know what particular standard they endorse. They simply make evaluations. Of course, people may think and try to make explicit which standard allegedly supports their evaluations, if they are asked to do so. Let's suppose that Claire thinks that her evaluation is supported by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). And Luke unequivocally shows her that she is wrong about what the UDHR states. If what is at issue here is to hold a particular standard, then what Claire likely ought to do is to change her mind and retract. But what Claire would say in all likelihood is: "Well, clearly I didn't precisely know what the Universal Declaration said on the topic. But I still think that bearing weapons is totally right, under the appropriate circumstances." What is at issue here, in this kind of cases, is whether something has a particular value or not, rather than what standards should be endorsed. As we have said before, people do not propose decalogues of principles to follow when they discuss something. The real discussions have, to our mind, a more particularistic nature.

2.8   The Speech Act of Retraction

Disagreeing with someone is an activity that has consequences. One of the consequences, particularly significant of the ongoing discussion, is the possibility of retraction. Retraction is a speech act that takes place when a speaker rejects, in a particular way, an earlier speech act of her own. You may "retract something" or "take something back" when you change your mind, and consider that what you have said, asked, ordered, etc., was wrong in a way. So when a speaker retracts something, she negatively evaluates that prior speech act as inaccurate, mistaken, offensive, and so on. Retraction is, then, a *second-order* speech act (*cf.* Marques, 2018, p. 3336; Caponetto, 2018, p. 6). As MacFarlane points out: "the effect of retracting a speech act is to 'undo' the normative changes effected by the original speech act" (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 108). For instance, if one retracts a previous, felicitous question, the audience is no longer required to answer it. In retracting

an earlier assertion, she avoids having to give explanations to her audience if she acts against the commitments that she acquired when she made it.

A theory about perspectival expressions must account for the phenomenon of retraction. Retraction is a speech act that makes sense only when suitable conditions are met. MacFarlane makes the conditions for retraction explicit by means of the *Retraction Rule*: "An agent in context c_2 is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion of p made at c_1 if p is not true as used at c_1 and assessed from c_2" (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 108)[18]. According to the retraction rule, two contexts are at work—the context in which the speech act took place (c_1), and the context in which the assertion is evaluated (c_2). Retraction is an evaluative speech act that arises when we disapprove of an earlier speech act. Reasons for retracting might be varied. One of them, indeed, is the acknowledgement that one was at fault when one's own speech act took place. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for the speaker who retracts her previous speech act to think that she was at fault. Imagine that a speaker made an assertion according to the evidence available to her back then. Over time, however, new evidence is found, and it makes clear that what she said at the time was false, even though even though she was perfectly right in saying it at the time (see MacFarlane, 2014, p. 110). Besides, we may retract even if the content of our past assertion is not strictly false according to our present standards. As MacFarlane (2014, p. 109) notes, it may be that we want to avoid that another person relies on our own testimony regarding some issue; or it may be that we want to retract a past speech act because we have been "[. . .] unkind, offensive or just callous" (Marques, 2018, p. 3336). Let's consider an example:

(13) Journalist Christopher Hitchens considered that waterboarding as used, among others, by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to extract information from some prisoners accused of belonging to Al Qaeda was not torture. He underwent a test to prove it firsthand. After a few seconds, he retracted and claimed that it was indeed a method of torture.[19]

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[18]Some authors have called into question the mandatory nature of retraction (von Fintel and Gillies 2008; Marques, 2014b; Knobe and Yalcin 2014) but we can put these objections aside.

[19]You can check Christopher Hitchens' statements at the following link: https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/08/hitchens200808

> *Christopher Hitchens_{BW}*: Waterboarding is not torture.
>
> *Christopher Hitchens_{AW}*: Sure, I retract! Believe me, it's torture.

This is a typical case of retraction (well, not all instances of retraction involve the CIA). Hitchens had to retract once he changed his mind. Let's consider a case in which the expression involved is plainly perspectival:

(14)   Peter believes that applying torture methods to prisoners belonging to terrorist groups is morally correct. So, he says:

> *Peter*: Torturing people belonging to terrorist groups is right.

After knowing firsthand the reasons why someone may decide to join a terrorist group, the relevance of the socio-political context, etc., and knowing firsthand the kind of torture these prisoners are subjected to, Pedro changes his mind. He still thinks that terrorism is unjustified, but he no longer holds his opinion regarding the legitimacy of torture from state institutions as a method to extract information from prisoners. So, he affirms:

> *Peter*: I take back what I said, torturing people who belong to terrorist groups is wrong.

To assert that something is right or wrong is to express both contents and commitments that we can retract or undo. We can retract the content expressed through an earlier utterance. By means of this retraction, we can undo the commitments acquired by it. For example, suppose I say that Edinburgh is the capital city of Ireland, and then I realise that Edinburgh is not the capital of Ireland but of Scotland. I retract and thus undo the commitment I had made to buy the plane tickets to go to Edinburgh because I want to know the capital of Ireland. To retract my utterance "Edinburgh is the capital of Ireland" in a given context enables me to undo my commitment to visit Edinburgh. However, we believe that not all the commitments that we undertake can be undone by merely retracting the content of a previous assertion. When we evaluate something, we express our support for a particular set of rules, namely the set of rules that support our perspectival claim. Support for these standards cannot be undone merely by retracting that assertion.

For Wittgenstenian reasons concerning rule-following (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009; Kripke, 1982; McDowell, 1984; Wright, 2001b, 2001c; Finkelstein, 2003; Pinedo, 2004), any course of action can be made to fit with the rule that we support, then, to show our dismissal of the norms that in its moment we expressed to support it is necessarily something more than merely to deny an assertion. When Peter asserts that torturing prisoners belonging to terrorist groups is okay, he is also expressing his endorsement of a particular set of rules—in particular, he expresses the endorsment of the rule "infringing harm to one bad person to save hundreds is right." And it is plausible to think that although he has changed his assessment, he can still support that same standard. Suppose someone asks Peter whether he thinks it is right to inflict harm to one bad person to save hundreds or not. And Peter could answer: "yes, I still think so, but I do not think these people are that bad. I think in a sense they are also victims, so in this case, I do not think it is right to torture them." To retract an evaluation does not imply giving up the standard that enabled that evaluation. Peter needs to do more to show us that he no longer supports those standards if we think that supporting those standards is something Peter should not do. When we retract a factual claim these types of situations do not take place because they are not relative to standards. Something similar happens with the use of slurs. To retract an assertion that contains a slur is something that cannot be done just in the usual way in which we withdraw a factual claim.[20]

2.9 Concluding Remarks

From what has been said so far, we can draw three desiderata that will serve as touchstones in the next two chapters to evaluate different philosophical proposals, and their potential to explain the meaning of perspectival expressions:

> DISANALOGY: A theory on perspectival expressions should coherently explain the difference between describing and evaluating.

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[20]The question of how to voice our disapproval of an assertion containing a slur will be addressed in more detail when we examine the proposal of Cepollaro and Stojanovic in Section 4.6

Nonfactual Disagreement: A theory on perspectival expressions should coherently explain what constitutes a nonfactual disagreement, and the three types of existing nonfactual disagreements.

Retraction: A theory on perspectival expressions should coherently explain cases of retraction. It must explain what content is retractable, and what content is not when the targeted speech act is a perspectival claim.

We have just described three varieties of disagreements which have in common a feature that we consider to be crucial for the debate between contextualists, relativists, and expressivists on perspectival expressions: *they are disagreements that cannot be solved by only appealing to the facts*. That is, disagreements that are nonfactual since the parties do not recognise a priori what mechanism or procedure, empirical or formal, would enable them to settle their dispute. This feature is significant because it tells us something about the nature of the expressions involved in these kinds of disputes. They are expressions used by default for a purpose other than to describe a state of affairs. To explain these phenomena it is necessary, in our opinion, to account convincingly for the distinction between describing and evaluating. For it is in contexts in which we carry out evaluations that such disagreements can take place.

In addition to nonfactual disagreements, the phenomenon of retraction must also be accommodated by a theory that aims at explaining the behaviour of perspectival expressions. A theory able to explain cases of retraction will have to tell us what we can and cannot retract, at least not in the same way as we retract factual claims.

In chapters 3 and 4, we discuss some of the theories that have had the most notable influence on the debate on perspectival expressions. In chapter 3, we set out the theories that explain disagreement by appealing to a conflict at the level of *what is said*, and we expose their intricacies in the light of our three desiderata. In chapter 4, we put forward some theories that explain disagreements at a level different from *what is said*. We raise some of the challenges that these theories have to overcome, and end by proposing a *dynamic expressivism* as the proposal that best accommodates these desiderata.

3

The Debate on Perspectival Expressions: Semantic Views

3.1 Introduction

As we have pointed out, a theory on perspectival expressions has to deal with the three desiderata that were mentioned at the very end of Chapter 2: *disanalogy*, *disagreement* and *retraction*. In the next two chapters, we will explore how the different theoretical proposals have dealt with these desiderata and the virtues and shortcomings they present in explaining them. In this chapter, we pay attention to what we call *semantic views*. In the next chapter, Chapter 4, we focus on *non-semantic views*. This distinction may not be the most obvious one when dealing with this debate, but there are good reasons to justify this decision. The most common distinction in discussions about perspectival expressions, e.g., in metaethics, are between *cognitivist* and *noncognitivist* theories, between *realist* and *antirealist* theories, or between *descriptivist* and *anti-descriptivist* theories. Systematically, the triad cognitivism–descriptivism–realism, on the one hand, as well as the triad noncognitivism–antidescriptivism–antirealism, on the other hand, have gone together. Let me now move on to defining, following Glock (2015, pp. 106–107) to a large extent, each of the terms that comprise both triads:

> **Descriptivism**: Normative statements have the function of describing some aspect of reality. They are truth–apt.
>
> **Realism**: Normative facts exist.
>
> **Cognitivism** or **Representationalism**: Normative statements express believes-like attitudes and, then, provide factual knowledge.
>
> **Antidescriptivism**: (negative thesis) Normative statements have *not* the function of describing some aspect of reality. They are *not* truth–apt. (Positive thesis) Their function is rather to express action-guiding attitudes.
>
> **Antirealism**: (negative thesis) There are not normative facts.
>
> **Noncognitivism** or **Anti-representationalism**: (negative thesis) Normative statements *do not* express believes-like attitudes, then, *do not* provide factual knowledge. (Positive thesis) They express action-guiding attitudes and constitute a different kind of knowledge, if any.

It is often considered that each of the theses that shape descriptivism, realism, and cognitivism respectively are dependent on each other. The same holds for antidescriptivism, antirealism, and noncognitivism. However, each of the theses that comprise each triad is conceptually independent from each other. They, indeed, are theses of a different nature: semantic, metaphysical and epistemic, respectively. Someone might argue that normative assertions, for example, ethical statements, provide some knowledge (cognitivism) but neither describe some aspect of reality (antidescriptivism) nor are there moral properties that such statements represent or describe (antirealism). This is the position that Glock (2015, p. 107) attributes to Kantism. Someone, moreover, might embrace descriptivism without adopting either realism or cognitivism (see, e.g., Mackie's Error Theory, 1977).

Since our aim in the first part of this dissertation is to compare which theories best accommodate the three desiderata, we have divided chapters 3 and 4, designed to present such theories, according to how they approach them. Whether they might explain disagreement by appealing to incompatible content expressed by speakers at the level of *what is said* (Grice, 1975/1989) or whether, on the contrary,

they might use, at least for some types of disagreement, other resources: pragmatic devices such as implicatures and presuppositions or the expressions of noncognitive attitudes.

The distinction between semantics and nonsemantics views are orthogonal to the descriptivist/antidescriptivist, realist/antirealist or cognitivist/noncognitivist distinctions. The theories we discuss are cognitivist since they support that normative utterances provide knowledge about the world. At the same time, they all argue that normative utterances are truth-apt, which is compatible with defending that describing the world is not, at least, the only purpose of this type of assertion. Finally, the realist/antirealist distinction would have forced us to divide the theories according to a less relevant criterion regarding how each theory manages to accommodate the desiderata. The distinction between realist and antirealist theories focuses on features that are not operative for us to discuss the differences between those theories that concern us regarding disagreement, retraction and the disanalogy between describing and evaluating.

3.2 Indexical Contextualism

Is it possible for a person to know that she has seen a zebra crossing the street and that she does not know that she has seen a zebra crossing the street? For the indexical contextualist[21] (Stine 1976; Cohen 1987, 1999; DeRose 1992; Lewis 1996), it is possible to say truly that a person knows a certain thing and that she does not know, in a sense to be specified, the very same thing. Considered in the abstract, this can be shocking, but, as we shall see, the idea behind this statement seems, in many ways, correct. Being able to say truly that someone knows something depends on the context. That is to say, the same knowledge attribution can be true in a particular context, and false in another. Let's see a classic example taken from DeRose (1992):

> *Bank Case A.* My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon.
> We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks.

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[21]Following MacFarlane (2009; 2014), we will use "indexical contextualism" to refer to this sort of theories. Other authors including Dreier (1990) calls it "speaker relativism," authors as Wright (2001a) or Kölbel (2003; 2004) denominate it "indexical relativism," Recanati (2007) calls it "moderate relativism," and Schaffer (2011) uses "meaning perspectivalism" to refer to it.

But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, "Maybe the bank won't be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays." I reply, "No, I know it'll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It's open until noon."

Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, "Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?" Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, "Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure." (DeRose, 1992, p. 913)

What is so different about case A and B so that in the first one Keith tell his wife that he knows the bank is open on Saturdays, and in the second he says he doesn't know? DeRose (1992, p. 915) highlights three important contextual differences between these two scenarios: the first difference has to do with how relevant it is in each situation to be right or wrong. In case B there is a lot at stake, so being right becomes especially relevant. In case A, there is much less at stake, and being right is thus less significant. The second difference concerns Keith's wife introducing, in case B, a possibility that has not been previously mentioned. This possibility (the fact that the bank has been able to change schedules after the last two weeks) weakens the support for Keith's self-attribution (that on a Saturday two weeks ago the bank was open). The third difference is the uptake of that possibility. This

further possibility, now pondered explicitly by Keith, forces him to rule it out if he is going to be able to truly say that he knows that the bank is open on Saturdays.

A theory is *contextualist*, as opposed to *invariantist*, if it considers that this sort of contextual constituents *affect truth–conditions* of knowledge attributions (we thus speak of epistemic contextualism), but also of moral and aesthetic statements, and the like. These contextual factors, following DeRose (1992, p. 918), "may be divided into two groups": *subject factors* and *attributor factors*[22]. The former "are features of the putative knower's situation;" the latter "are features of the speaker's situation." In short, we could say that these factors are the information (including epistemic possibilities) that the attributee or the attributor, respectively, consider and would have to consider as relevant. If one understands that attributor factors are important when making knowledge attributions, then one embraces a contextualist position. If, besides, one considers that "know" is an *indexical* expression, then one is an *indexical epistemic contextualist*. Many authors advocate such approaches:

> Thus, the theory I wish to defend construes "knowledge" as an indexical. As such, one speaker may attribute knowledge to a subject while another speaker denies knowledge to that same subject, without contradiction. (Cohen, 1988, p. 97)

> Attributor factors set a certain standard the putative subject of knowledge must live up to in order to make the knowledge attribution true: They affect *how good an epistemic position the putative knower must be in to count as knowing.* (DeRose, 1992, p. 921, his emphasis.)

As Stanley (2000, p. 430) points out, contextualism is a response to the challenge posed by epistemic skepticism. To defend that "know" is an indexical expression, that is to say, an expression whose content varies from context to context such as "I," "here," or "now" (see for instance Kaplan 1989), allows, in the opinion of the contextualist, to respond to the skeptical argument. Following Chrisman (2007) we can pose the puzzle of the skeptical argument as follows:

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[22]The distinction is due to Goldman (1976, pp. 776–778), although the terms used to refer to each are DeRose's own.

P1: S doesn't know that he's not a brain–in–a–vat,

P2: If S doesn't know that he's not brain–in–a–vat, then S doesn't know that–o [where o is any obvious proposition, knowledge of which we would ordinarily attribute to S],

C: Thus, S doesn't know that–o. (Chrisman, 2007, p. 225)

Statements of the type "S knows that p" or "S does not know that p" have an argument gap that is filled with the standard provided by the *context of utterance* (c_U for short), being it the epistemic standard of the speaker, a group that contains the speaker, etc. Consequently, a statement of the type "S knows that p" is a statement whose truth-conditions are given by the proposition that S's belief that p meets epistemic standards e. According to Brendel (2017, p. 283), there are two main components of the context of utterance in determining the standard: *stakes* and *error-possibilities*. The more there is at stake, the higher the standard is "and, as a consequence, the more difficult it gets for S to meet those standards."(Ibid). The consideration by the knowledge ascriber of a possibility of error concerning p, can also raise the epistemic standard, "and if S is not able to rule out those error-possibilities, the proposition expressed by 'S knows that p' turns out to be false at c_U."(Ibid). Thus, the truth-value of "S knows that p" varies from context to context, depending on which epistemic standards are relevant at the context of utterance. According to this analysis, the contextualist, following Chrisman (2007, p. 226), can assume that the skeptical argument is sound and yet, "deny that C contradicts with the ordinary knowledge claims that seem patently true because they are made in different contexts where the value of e is different."

3.2.1 From Epistemic Indexical Contextualism to Indexical Contextualism Applied to Other Perspectival Expressions

Although indexical contextualism has been a particularly discussed theory when applied to predicates such as "know," the maneuver employed has been adopted to explain other perspectival expressions such as moral (see *e.g.* Dreier 1990), aesthetic (see *e.g.* Baker 2012; Sundell 2016), or personal taste predicates (see *e.g.* Glanzberg 2007; Schaffer 2011). Extrapolation to other domains requires

the introduction of necessary nuances to account for how these expressions work. In spite of the apparent similarities, the behaviour of knowledge attributions and that of expressions belonging to different perspectival domains parts ways significantly. Paying particular attention to these disanalogies is not a central task of this work. It is enough for us to see what it means to apply indexical contextualism to expressions other than "know that."

The main feature that these all contextualist proposals share is that the statements containing perspectival expressions are *context-sensitive.* In other words, such statements can express different contents (propositions) in different contexts of use. The argument gap left by perspectival expressions is filled with the set of norms (epistemic, moral, aesthetic, etc.) that becomes relevant in the context at hand[23]. Let's explore, by way summary, the form that a claim might take in different domains according to the indexical contextualist:

The moral case:

A moral statement such as "Stealing from the needy is wrong" has a content that varies from context to context. In a context in which Lucía has made this statement, the proposition expressed is that stealing is wrong according to the set of N_A moral norms accepted by Lucía.

The Aesthetic case:

A aesthetic statement such as "The *Guernica* is beautiful" has a content that varies from context to context. In a context in which Lucía has made this statement, the proposition expressed is that the *Guernica* is beautiful according to the set of N_A aesthetic norms accepted by Lucía.

The Personal Taste case:

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[23]In metaethics, as Silk (2017, p. 103) notes, how these norms are understood will mark differences between the different indexical contextualist proposals: norms can be understood as *codes practices* (Copp 1995), *standards* (Silk 2016), *ends* (Finlay 2014), or *motivational attitudes* (Harman 1975 and Dreier 1990).

A personal taste statement such as "Gazpacho is tasty" has a content that varies from context to context. In a context in which Lucía has made this statement, the proposition expressed is that Gazpacho is tasty according to the set of N_A taste norms accepted by Lucía.

3.2.2   The dialectical intuitions problem

One of the undesirable consequences of this type of contextualist analysis is that it presents serious difficulties in explaining some of the dialectical intuitions (disagreement, retraction, and reaffirmation) that we have as competent speakers of a language (Chrisman, 2007). Of course, our intuitions are fallible, but the truth is that we are quite good at detecting such situations and dealing with them, so it would be desirable for our theory to be able to accommodate our intuitions rather than question them.

3.2.2.1   Losing the Disagreement

The first of the dialectical intuitions we want to address is that which has to do with disagreement. We have the intuition that when a speaker A says that S knows that p and a speaker B denies that S knows that p, A and B disagree. However, this intuition is difficult to capture if one adopts an indexical contextualist position. If indexical contextualism is correct, the *semantically expressed contents* of A and B might be compatible, and therefore the supposed disagreement between A and B might be only apparent. Let's look at an example:

(15)   A: President Aznar knows that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
       B: I disagree, President Aznar doesn't know that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

   Apparently, A and B disagree. However, if we reproduce (15) based on the semantically expressed content of the speakers, according to the contextualist analysis, the appearance of disagreement fades:

(16)   A: President Aznar knows that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq according to the epistemic standard e_1.

> B: # I disagree, President Aznar doesn't know that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq according to the e_2 epistemic standard.

The propositions expressed by A and B might be compatible: someone can say that President Aznar knows that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq according to e_1 and President Aznar does not know that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq according to e_2, without contradiction. For this reason, B's use of "I disagree" in (16) is odd. The so-called the problem of *lost disagreement* has been pointed out by many authors (See, e.g., Kölbel, 2003; MacFarlane, 2007, 2014; Chrisman, 2007; Baker, 2012; Marques, 2014a, among others).

3.2.2.2 The Challenge of Retraction and Reaffirmation

Consider the following fictional conversation. Suppose it took place in 2012 on Spanish public television:

(17) *Journalist*: Mr. Aznar, on 13 February 2003 you said publicly that, and I quote, "the Iraqi regime has weapons of mass destruction" [...] "you can be sure, and all the people who are watching us can be sure that I am telling them the truth. I know, and everyone knows that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq."

Ex-President Aznar: At the time, everyone thought that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and there have been no weapons of mass destruction. Everyone knows that, and I know that.

Journalist: So, do you take back from saying that you "knew there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq" at the time?

Ex-President Aznar: Yes, of course, what I said was proven false, then I was wrong. I really didn't know that there were weapons of mass destruction.

(17) is a case in which it makes sense for ex-president Aznar to retract a statement he made nine years earlier. What he said has been proven false, and knowing that, is a compelling reason to retract his previous statement, and, given its consequences to apologises to the Spanish people who, even opposing the military

intervention in Iraq, found themselves taking part in it and suffering the effects of a disastrous terrorist attack in 2004.

A semantic theory designed to explain the functioning of perspectival expressions would have to be able to account for cases of retraction. However, indexical contextualism cannot accommodate this phenomenon adequately. Consider the assertions involved in the case of retraction that we have just illustrated:

(18)   *Ex-president Aznar*$_{2003}$: I know there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
        Ex-President Aznar$_{2012}$: I was wrong, I didn't know there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

According to the contextualist, both statements might express compatible contents. So the assertion that Aznar$_{2012}$ used to retract Aznar$_{2003}$'s assertion would produce some oddity:

(19)   *Ex-president Aznar*$_{2003}*$: I know there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq according to e_1.
        Ex-president Aznar$_{2012}*$: # I was wrong, I didn't know there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq according to e_2.

Placing the standards within the expressed proposition makes it difficult to offer both an explanation of the disagreement and retraction. Something similar seems to be happening with reaffirmation. In the next section, we explore a further problem concerning the coherence of indexical contextualism.

3.2.3   The Semantic Error Problem

Following Greenough and Kindermann (2017), the *semantic error problem* that indexical contextualists are confronted with can be introduced as follows[24]:

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[24]Greenough and Kindermann analyse this problem for epistemic contextualism including, therefore, both indexical and nonindexical versions. In this section, we focus on the objections concerning the indexical version.

> [S]peakers just don't seem to recognise that "knows that" is context-sensitive; so, if "knows that" really is context-sensitive, then such speakers are systematically in error about what is said by, or how to evaluate, ordinary uses of "S knows that p." (Greenough & Kindermann, 2017, p. 305)

As Chrisman (2007, p. 232) notes, indexical contextualism attributes a kind of *semantic blindness*[25] not only to ordinary speakers but also to philosophers whose work consists precisely in explaining the semantic and pragmatic dimensions of language in general, and of attributions of knowledge, in particular. One of the intuitions that are undermined by the contextualist analysis, as we have seen, is that of the appearance of disagreement. An exchange like (20) triggers the intuition that the speakers are involved in genuine disagreement. According to the contextualist, this intuition fades away when one understands how the expression "know that" works.

(20)   *Ed*: Tori knows that Víctor will come tomorrow.
       Neme: I disagree, Tori does not know that Víctor will come tomorrow.

The contextualist has to defend that speakers are systematically in error when they face cases of apparent disagreement. (20) superficially seems like a disagreement, but deep down it is nothing more than an exchange of unconnected impressions on the part of the speakers. However, although the problem of the appearance of disagreement has something to do with what we call the question of the attribution of systematic error to speakers, the semantic error problem as such is more specific. The problem has to do with the fact that speakers fail to grasp the supposed relativity exhibited by the expression "know that." While it is clear to most speakers that certain expressions are context-dependent, i.e., their content varies from context to context as with indexical expressions such as "I," "here," "now," "tomorrow," etc., the intuitions of those same speakers go in the

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[25]As Greenough and Kindermann point out, the metaphor of "semantic blindness" is deceived. The visual apparatus of a blind person causes that person to lack information rather than provide her false information. Considering what semantic error is, it is not that speakers of a language lack information about how a particular portion of the language works (which would resemble semantic ignorance more than a semantic error—we will see how they differ further on), but rather that they have false beliefs about how that portion of the language works (Greenough & Kindermann, 2017, endnote nº2 on page 317).

opposite direction with regards to the alleged context-dependence of knowledge attributions. It is worth noting that semantic error is not a case of mere semantic ignorance on the part of the speaker. As Greenough and Kindermann note:

> Semantic error involves more than mere ignorance; it typically involves some false (implicit) belief about some semantic property of an expression. Such a false (implicit) belief will typically be made manifest by some misuse of the expression in question (Greenough and Kindermann, 2017, p. 306).

The following distinctions made by Greenough and Kindermann (2017) allow us to digg deeper into the type of semantic error that indexical contextualism attributes to speakers:

> **Global versus local semantic error**: A speaker makes a local semantic error if she uses the word in ways incompatible with the semantic theory only in specific kinds of use situations (such as the sceptical argument); a speaker makes a global semantic error if she uses the word in ways incompatible with the semantic theory in all kinds of use situations.
>
> **Universal versus individual semantic error**: Semantic error is universal (with respect to a language community) if all (or nearly all) competent speakers of that language community are in error. It is individual (with respect to a language community) if it occurs only in a single competent speaker of the language.
>
> **Systematic vs non-systematic semantic error**: Given a particular kind of use situation (e.g., the sceptical argument), a speaker who always uses the expression in a particular, erroneous way is systematically semantically in error. One who does so only in some instantiations of a given kind of use situation is non-systematically in error (Greenough and Kindermann, 2017, p. 306).

Given these distinctions, we can conclude that the type of semantic error that indexical contextualism attributes to English (Spanish) speakers is *global*, *universal* and *systematic*. This problem is also extrapolated to other domains of language such as moral and aesthetic predicates. Intuitively, in these domains perspectival expressions also do not seem to work as the expressions clearly identified as indexicals.

3.3 Nonindexical Contextualism

Within the family of contextualist theories, we find what MacFarlane (2009) calls "nonindexical contextualism." This type of contextualism, sometimes called "relativism" (though no by MacFarlane), does notr postulates that expressed content varies from context to context, but instead that the truth-value of a proposition that includes a perspectival expression can vary from circumstances to circumstances, while its content remains invariant. As noted Bordonaba and Villanueva (2018, p. 220), both indexical and nonindexical contextualism have been deemed "relativistic" positions (*see, e.g.,* Dreier 1990; 2003; Lasersohn 2005). However, in order to avoid certain misunderstandings it is necessary to stress that the senses of "relativism" according to which these positions are relativistic diverge from one another. While indexical contextualism, on the one hand, would be a variety of *content-relativism*, nonindexical contextualism, on the other hand, would not be an instance of content-relativism, but a sort of *truth-relativism*. However, in this work, and following MacFarlane (2014), we will reserve the label "relativism" for what has been called "assessor relativism," a position that would be a variety of truth-relativism, like nonindexical contextualism, but also a kind of *context-relativism*, as Bordonaba and Villanueva (2018) have pointed out. The three senses of relativism mentioned can be characterized as follows (Bordonaba and Villanueva, 2018, pp. 222–223):

> **Content-relativism**: Different utterances of the same sentence may express different contents in different contexts of use.
>
> **Truth-relativism**: An utterance of a single sentence can have different truth-values in different contexts of use, even though its content remains invariant.

> **Context-relativism**: Unlike truth-relativism according to which a single context (context of use) provides the parameters for determining the truth value of a given proposition, context-relativism holds that the parameters for determining the truth values of a given proposition do not depend on a single context.

Although, as we have just seen, nonindexical contextualism falls under the scope of one of the senses of relativism, we will preserve MacFarlane's "nonindexical contextualism" label. There is, as MacFarlane (2007) has pointed out, a good reason to consider this type of position to be a variety of *contextualism*. The reason is that in both indexical and nonindexical contextualism, it is the *context of use* that provides us with the required ingredients to be able to evaluate the truth or falsity of a proposition. Either by allowing to retrieve the contextual elements necessary to have a truth-conditional content or a whole proposition, or by providing the *circumstances of evaluation* under which we must evaluate the truth or falsity of the proposition. In both cases, we end up with a proposition that can be said to be true or false *simpliciter*.

The concepts "context of use" and "circumstances of evaluation" that we owe to Kaplan (1989) become especially relevant when explaining the differences between indexical and nonindexical contextualism (*see, e.g.,* Kompa 2015). Kaplan distinguishes between the context of use[26]—a possible occasion of use—and the circumstances of evaluation. Once we fix the content of a proposition in a given context of use we can evaluate the proposition in different circumstances of evaluation. Circumstances of evaluation are parameters in virtue of which we provide a truth-value for a given proposition. For nonindexical contextualists, propositions that include perspectival expressions have a truth-value relative to circumstances of evaluation. Beyond the traditional parameters included in the context, such as *world*, *time*, *speaker*, *location*, circumstances of evaluation comprise also *normative standards*, *perspective* or a *judge* parameter. An utterance such as "gazpacho is de-

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[26]A context of use is a sequence of parameters such as a *world*, a *speaker*, an *audience*, a *time* and a *location*. Some of these parameters, such as *time*, have given rise to a debate between *eternalists* and *temporalists*. Eternalists claim that *time* should be considered as a parameter of the context of use, and therefore, its role is to contribute to determining the *intension* of the proposition expressed by the utterance in which it appears. Temporalists, on the other hand, hold that *time* should be considered as a parameter of the circumstances of evaluation that enables us to determine the *extension* of the expressed proposition (see, e.g., MacFarlane 2009).

licious" expresses the content that gazpacho is delicious. Its truth-value, however, depends on the relevant taste standard provided by the context of use. Usually, though not necessarily, the standard of taste of the relevant agent of the context of use. Suppose Lucía likes gazpacho, while it makes Naiara nauseous because of its flavor. When Lucía says "gazpacho is delicious," she expresses the content "gazpacho is delicious." While the utterance that gazpacho is delicious is true as evaluated with Lucía's standards, that very utterance is false as evaluated according to Naiara's standards. But neither Lucía's nor Naiara's standards are part of the content expressed by an utterance containing perspectival expressions.

Like indexical contextualism, nonindexical contextualism is a proposal that many authors have embraced to elucidate the semantic functioning of predicates of personal taste (Kölbel 2003; Lasersohn 2005), ethical predicates (Brogaard 2008b), epistemic predicates (MacFarlane 2005; Brogaard 2008a)[27], etc.

3.3.1 Disagreement or Semantic Competence

Nonindexical contextualism, as a theoretical alternative, has a twofold purpose: on the one hand, it is a proposal meant to account for the intuitions that underlie and motivate indexical contextualism; on the other hand, it seeks to elude the quandaries that indexical contextualism has to face. One of the problems that indexical contextualism has to deal with is the problem of lost disagreement. Can nonindexical contextualism do justice to our intuitions about disagreement? In principle, the answer to this question seems to be in the affirmative. Since, for the nonindexical contextualist, standards are not part of the expressed semantic content, that is, the proposition expressed by utterances that contain perspectival expressions are *perspective-neutral* (not *perspective-specific* as for the indexical contextualists), the disagreement between two speakers uttering seemingly incompatible sentences is duly guaranteed. A case like (15) is easy to accommodate—speakers A and B express incompatible contents and, therefore, they disagree.

Nonindexical contextualists have argued that their proposal allows them to explain a phenomenon that indexical versions of contextualism cannot accommodate. This phenomenon is what has traditionally been called faultless disagreement. As we have argued in Chapter 2, there is no reason to think that "faultless"

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[27]MacFarlane (2005) exposes the position but does not defend it.

is anything other than an epistemic perspectival expression. And, therefore, the existence of faultless disagreements does not serve to motivate any theory about another. However, in what follows, we will explore Stojanovic's objections to non-indexical contextualism even under the assumption that faultless disagreement has the features described by nonindexical contextualists. Stojanovic (2007, p. 696) has examined whether nonindexical contextualism can accommodate the intuition of faultless disagreement and, therefore, has challenged the supposed theoretical advantage of this position concerning indexical contextualism. Stojanovic's critique is twofold: on the one hand, the cases that the nonindexical contextualist uses to favour her proposal are underdeveloped. On the other hand, and once the existence of faultless disagreements has been granted, it is doubtful whether non-indexical contextualism correctly captures the intuitions that competent speakers have regarding predicates of personal taste. The first of the objections demands a greater development of the cases of disagreements, beyond cases in which one speaker affirms something, and another denies it. In this sense, a case such as (21) can give rise to a variety of scenarios:

(21)   *Onionist*: Potato omelette with onion is yummy.
         Separatist: Come on buddy! Are you kidding me? Potato omelette with onion is not yummy at all.

   The dialogue in (21) could continue as in (22):

(22)   *Onionist*: Potato omelette with onion is yummy.
         Separatist: Come on buddy! Are you kidding me? Potato omelette with onion is not yummy at all.
         Onionist: Okay, what I mean is *I like* the potato omelet with onions; that's all.
         Separatist: Okay, and what I mean is *I don't like* it.

In (22), the *onionist* and the *separatist* do not truly disagreed; indeed, (22) is a case in which speakers are talking past each other. However, this is not the only possibility. The dialogue (21) could continue as in (23):

(23)   *Onionist*: Potato omelette with onion is yummy.
         Separatist: Come on buddy! Are you kidding me? Potato omelette with

> onion is not yummy at all.
>
> *Onionist*: What I mean is that *most of the people prefer* potato omelet with onions.
>
> *Separatist*: That's false. *Most people don't prefer* potato omelet with onions.

(23) clearly illustrates a genuine case of disagreement. It is a factual disagreement which concerns the preferences expressed by most of a particular population. That is, it is a disagreement in which one of the parties is objectively wrong and, if they wish, they could solve the dispute to the satisfaction of both parties by surveying to find out what the majority of people think. Dialogues (22) and (23) show that those cases used to encourage nonindexical instead of indexical contextualism are underdeveloped. However, while these two possible scenarios, (22) and (23), are plausible, they do not seem to exhaust all possible developments of such a conversation. When we say of something that it is tasty, we are not always saying that we like it, or that most people like it. "It's tasty," in some of its uses, means something more than just "I like it," otherwise why bother discussing with someone over something is tasty or not? The answer "what most people like" is not satisfactory either. It seems to make sense to say that something is tasty even though most people find it disgusting. Usually, in these cases, we want to assess the object in question, not describe a state of affairs. It is this sort of uses that can be a problem for indexical contextualism, and can favour nonindexical contextualism. Now, is this so? Can this phenomenon be better accommodated by nonindexical contextualism?

Stojanovic (2007, p. 696) questions whether nonindexical contextualism can deal well with this kind of disagreement. Stojanovic's challenge rests on an assumption taken for granted by both indexical and nonindexical contextualists, that she calls *Semantic Competence*.

> Semantic Competence (SC): Speakers of English are semantically competent with predicates of taste: they master their meaning and truth conditions (Stojanovic, 2007, p. 696).

According to Stojanovic (2007, p. 696), the parties have to know how the predicates of personal taste work and what their contribution is to the truth-conditions

so that the disagreement is not "merely a by-product of semantic ignorance." Returning to case (21), both the onionist and the separatist, as competent English speakers, know that to say "X is yummy," is to say something whose truth-value depends as much on how the world is as on the standard of taste of the one who uses the expression "yummy." Both also know that what each one says is true concerning their respective standards, and false according to the standard of the other. Likewise, as Stojanovic (2007, pp. 696-697) notes, both parties know that their utterances (the assertion of one and the denial of the other) are only inconsistent when assess by the same assessor. If each of the utterances is evaluated from the standard of taste of the relevant assessor (the onionist's standard, for the first utterance, and the separatist's, for the second), then they are merely exchanging their preferences. And this is precisely what indexical contextualism predicts.

3.3.2   Retraction, No Solution in Sight

A semantic theory about perspectival expressions, as we saw before, must account for the phenomenon of retraction. That is to say, it must be able to explain at least why there are contexts in which one can retract what she previously said. The nonindexical contextualist claims, as we have seen, that the presence of a perspectival expression in an utterance make us evaluate the truth or falsity of that utterance with respect to the relevant standard in the context of use. Let's think about the next case:

(24) Adri_{1995}: Chorizo and cheese pizza is disgusting.
       Adri_{2019}: I take my words back, chorizo and cheese pizza is delicious.

A typical case of retraction, such as (24), cannot be accommodated satisfactorily in a nonindexical contextualist framework. When Adri_{1995} claimed that chorizo and cheese pizza was disgusting, he did so with respecto to the standard of taste that he had at the time. Then, from a nonindexical point of view, what Adri said was true, from Adri_{2019} 's perspective, since the relevant standard from which to evaluate the truth or falsity of what Adri_{1995} said is that of Adri_{1995}, not that of Adri_{2019}. If a friend, for example, me, were to ask Adri to retract, he could refuse to take back what he said, arguing that it was true with respect to his standards at the time.

This prediction is questionable for at least two reasons. First, if MacFarlane is correct in stating that retraction is mandatory under the appropriate circumstances (MacFarlane, 2014), then nonindexical contextualists cannot explain the compulsory nature of retraction. Secondly, if MacFarlane is wrong, and retraction is not necessary, but only possible, the nonindexical contextualist would still have to incorporate something to her proposal in order to accomodate the data. In brief, she has to explain why there are contexts in which the relevant standard in the context of use, from which the speech act requiring retraction was uttered, is no longer the proper standard for determining the truth or falsity of that speech act at a later stage. It is the possibility of retraction that causes trouble to the nonindexical contextualism, rather than tha mandatory nature that MacFarlane attributes to it.

3.4 Presuppositional Indexical Contextualism

Within the family of theories that explain disagreement in terms of content, we can find theories, such as the one below, that explain disagreement not only in terms of explicitly communicated, but also implicitly communicated content—presuppositions or implicatures. We will begin by presenting López de Sa (2007, 2008, 2015)'s proposal, *presuppositional indexical contextualist relativist*, which following our terminology, we will call *presuppositional indexical contextualism*.

López de Sa's proposal is an attempt to preserve the core tenets of indexical contextualism and, simultaneously, solve one of the significant difficulties this theory has to face, namely, that one speaker felicitously expresses disagreement with another speaker.[28] To do justice to the intuitions behind most of our apparent disagreements, López de Sa appeals to what he calls *presuppositions of commonality*, the assumption that speakers involved in a disagreement share the relevant standard. Presuppositions of commonality are presuppositions "to the effect that the addressee is relevantly like the speaker" (López de Sa, 2008, p. 297). The use of certain predicates triggers the presupposition that the audience shares the rele-

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[28]For López de Sa this is the real problem that the indexical contextualist has to face. The outstanding problem of the lost disagreement, in López de Sa's view, is solved with a flexible notion of disagreement in which the parties may disagree in terms of incompatible nondoxastic attitudes.

vant standards with the speaker—the same sense of humor, in the case of "funny," the same system of moral rules, in the case of "morally good," and so on. In the words of Lopez de Sa:

> (3) (a) For each context c, 'Homer Simpson is funny' has the content that is true (at index i) iff (with respect to i) the speaker of c is amused by Homer.
> (b) 'is funny' triggers the presupposition that the participants in the conversation are similar with respect to humor. (López de Sa, 2008, p. 304)

Following Stalnaker (2002), as López de Sa notes:

> "[a] given *expression* triggers a certain presupposition if an utterance of it would be infelicitous when the presupposition is not part of the common ground of the conversation—unless participants accommodate it by coming to presuppose it on the basis of the fact that the utterance has been produced" (López de Sa, 2008, p. 305).

Presuppositions are there to guarantee that a particular conversational situation makes sense. In other words, only if my audience presupposes that I have a sister, my utterance "I have to pick up my sister from the airport" makes sense. It may be that my audience already knew it, or that it starts assuming it only after hearing my utterance (an audience can *accommodate* a presupposition as a result of hearing an utterance). My utterance cannot become part of the common ground without this presupposition. According to Stalnaker "[i]t is common ground that ϕ [a given presupposition] in a group if all members *accept* (for the purposes of the conversation) that ϕ, and all *believe* that all accept ϕ, and *believe* that all *believe* that all accept ϕ, etc." (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 716). Let's see with an example what happens, according to this presuppositional analysis, in a situation of disagreement:

(25)   *David*: Chris Rock's latest stand-up comedy show was hilarious.
        Mirco: I disagree, it wasn't hilarious at all.

Case (25) is a case of disagreement. If we read it following the analysis proposed by López de Sa, we get that both speakers communicate at least two contents:

(26)   *David*:

   a) Chris Rock's latest stand-up comedy show was hilarious, according to David's sense of humour.

   b) "is hilarious" trigger the presupposition that people involved in the conversation (David and Mirco, among other possible participants) have the same sense of humour.

   Mirco:

   a) I disagree, it wasn't hilarious at all, according to Mirco's sense of humour.

   b) "isn't hilarious" trigger the presupposition that people involved in the conversation (Mirco and David, among other possible participants) have the same sense of humour.

As López de Sa notes:

> According to the approach, ['is hilarious'] triggers a presupposition of commonality to the effect that both [David] and [Mirco] are similar with respect to humour. Thus, in any non-defective conversation where [David] uttered ['Chris Rock's latest stand-up comedy show was hilarious'] and [Mirco] replied ['No, it was not'], it would indeed be common ground that [David] and [Mirco] are relevantly alike, and thus that they are contradicting each other. (López de Sa, 2008, p. 305)

López de Sa intends to explain how a speaker can give voice to her disagreement with another speaker if the expressed propositions work as defended by indexical contextualism. That is, if, on the one hand, when David says "Chris Rock's latest stand-up comedy show was hilarious" what he is actually expressing is "Chris Rock's latest stand-up comedy show was hilarious, according to David's sense of humour," and, on the other hand, what Mirco expresses when he says "I disagree, it wasn't hilarious at all" is "I disagree, it wasn't hilarious at all, according to Mirco's sense of humour," then, the way Mirco voices his disagreement with David is odd. In order for the way in which Mirco expresses his disagreement to be successful within an indexical contextualist framework, López de Sa proposes that the relevant predicates trigger a presupposition of commonality. When this presupposition fails, the utterances of the speakers fail and the expression of disagreement

is not felicitous. Since speakers supposedly presuppose the same thing, namely that speakers participating in the conversation share a similar sense of humour, and this is part of the common ground, they forcefully disagree in (25) because each speaker attributes to the other a belief in a proposition that turns out to be incompatible with their own. The presupposition of commonality is meant to explain why the parties disagree at the level of what they say. When this fails, when the presupposition of commonality is not fulfilled, then the parties do not disagree. The parties just would be claiming that something is funny regarding different standards of humour.

3.4.1   Challenging the Thesis of Presuppositions of Communality

In this section, we raise some objections to López de Sa's proposal regarding how it deals with the desiderata introduced in Chapter 2. However, before we explore how this presuppositionalist approach deals with these desiderata, we first examine some objections presented by Baker (2012) related to the very notion of the presupposition of commonality. These objections are the result of applying three successful tests of presuppositions to the presupposition of commonality to see whether it complies with them or not. The first of the tests is the so-called *Hey, wait a minute!* test (see von Finkel, 2004). An utterance of the sentence like "I'm going to pick up my daughter from school" in a suitable context triggers the presupposition that I have a daughter. Competent speakers do not normally object to not knowing beforehand what I say *via* my utterance, while they might object when seemingly new information is presupposed. Let's see what applying the *Hey, wait a minute!* test would look like in a familiar case:

(27)   A: I'm going to pick up my daughter from school.
      B: # *Hey, wait a minute!* I had no idea you were picking up your daughter from school.
      C: *Hey, wait a minute!* I had no idea you had a daughter.

B's utterance does not seem to make much sense in this conversation. B is not konwing that A is going to pick up her daughter from school is only to be expected given A's utterance. C's utterance does make perfect sense here, though. The

information conveyed, although not asserted, by A is taken for granted, but it is possible that this information was already not part of A' and C's *common ground*. However, that A has a daughter is not-at-issue content; the at-issue content is the content asserted by A. The at-issue content is the contribution that is presented as relevant in the conversation between both speakers. The new information with which A contributes, and which she proposes to add to the common ground. The not-at-issue content is the kind of information conveyed, although not asserted, by the utterance that is expected to enter directly into the common ground (*See, e.g.*, Murray, 2014; Stanley, 2015).

If, as Lopez de Sa points out, there is something like a presupposition of commonality that is triggered when one uses terms like "funny," etc., this alleged presupposition should pass the test. Let's see what happens:

(28) *David*: Chris Rock's latest stand-up comedy show was hilarious.
      Mirco: *Hey, wait a minute!* I had no idea we were alike with respect to our sense of humor.

While it is easy to imagine a context in which David is suggesting that they both have the same sense of humor, this does not seem to be the suggestion that David always makes when he utters a statement such as the one contained in 28. Therefore, the presupposition of commonality does not pass this test.

Let's apply the second test that Baker proposes to see how López de Sa's presupposition deals with it. This second test is known as the "...and what's more..." test. As Baker (2012, p. 118) points out, following Yablo (2006) and von Fintel (2004), if S presupposes ϕ, then it would be infelicitous to follow S up with "...and what's more, ϕ." While ϕ is supposedly part of the common ground, there is no point in presenting it as new information which is what the clause "...and what's more" makes. Let's look at an example:

(29) *Mirco*: # I'm going to pick up my daughter from school. And what's more I have a daughter.
      Let's apply this test to the case at hand, one in which there a perspectival expression is involved.

(30) *David*: Chris Rock's last stand-up comedy show was hilarious. And what's more we are alike with respect to our sense of humor.

(29) is infelicitous. What follows "and what's more..." adds nothing new to what follows from Mirco's assertion. Probably what makes it infelicitous is, as Baker notes, that the second conjunct violates the Gricean maxim of quantity ("Do not make your contribution more informative than is required" (Grice, 1975/1989, p.26))[29]. However, the second conjunct in (30) is informationally ampliative. What follows to "and what's more..." is new information, that is to say, it is information that was not conveyed by David's utterance, so providing it does not violate any of the Gricean maxims.

The third and final test is *the awkward cancellation test* (Baker, 2012, p. 119). The truth of a presupposition is something we take for granted. Its truth is necessary for the speaker's assertion to have truth-conditions. Therefore, the cancellation of the presupposed content produces oddity in the audience; in fact, it makes the speech act that supposedly triggers the presupposition infelicitous. Consider the following case:

(31)   *Mirco*: # I'm going to pick up my daughter from school. Although I have not a daughter.

Cancellation in (31) makes the previous speech act pointless. If an utterance involving a predicate of personal taste or an aesthetic predicate ("is hilarious," "is beautiful," etc.) triggers a presupposition of commonality, as López de Sa holds, the cancellation of the supposed presupposed content should produce oddity in the same sense, and even make the utterance that triggered the presupposition pointless. Let's see if this prediction holds:

(32)   *David*: Chris Rock's latest stand-up comedy show was hilarious. Although we are not alike with respect to our sense of humor.

Cancellation in (32) does not make the speech act that supposedly triggers the presupposition of communality pointless, nor does it make it false. Therefore, it does not seem that David's speech act carries the presupposition that they are alike with respect to their sense of humor.

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[29]More than the maxim of quantity according to which we should provide neither more nor less information than necessary when we make an assertion, in this case, it is the Cooperative Principle that is violated. Rather than not providing the necessary information, what follows the "and what's more" clause does not add any new information.

In adiction to this difficulties concerning the notion of the "presupposition," López de Sa's proposal has other problems that involve disagreement and retraction. The main problem with the assumption that terms like "funny" trigger a presupposition of commonality is that it leaves out of the picture a significant part of the disagreements we usually have: *disagreements in which we know that our standards and those of our opponent are different* (Bordonaba, 2017). If such terms trigger the presupposition that my opponent and I share the same standards, it would be irrational for us to make our assertions because we would know that we would be presupposing something false, and we have already seen what happens to an assertion when presupposional failures occur. Similarly, the presupposition of commonality does not seem to be very helpful in dealing with cases of retraction. In case of retraction, the presupposition would be something like *I have the same sense of humor that I had five years ago*, for example. This is not congruent with how retraction works, since it is precisely because my sense of humor has changed that I want to retract what I said. To be competent in the use of this tipe of expressions should make us aware, if López de Sa is right, that retraction is pointless. Then, although it makes sense to think that many times when we say something, we assume that the other person shares our standards, or will agree with us, this assumption is not always present, nor can it take the form of a presupposition.

3.5   Sundell on Aesthetic Adjectives

Sundell (2016) challenges two postulates usually taken for granted in the debate on perspectival expressions, in general, and in the discussion on predicates of personal taste in particular. The first of these two assumptions is that predicates of personal taste, such as "tasty" or "funny" are semantically evaluative. The second one is that the meaning of these predicates is relativised to an experiencer or standard. According to Sundell (2016, p. 794), both predicates of personal taste and most properly aesthetic adjectives—these two varieties constitute a larger category that Sundell (2016, p. 795) terms "aesthetic adjectives"—are "purely descriptive" in their semantic meaning.

Sundell considers that among aesthetic adjectives are those that are *low-pressure* and those that are *high-pressure*. This distinction aims at showing how normatively demanding we are with our interlocutors when they make an aesthetic claim.

According to Sundell, there are aesthetic claims that are more amenable to be challenged than others. The susceptibility of aesthetic claims to be challenged has to do with the fact that some of these claims make use of expressions that concern the impression that something leaves on the subject, while others make use of expressions whose meaning have to do with how things are regardless of the impression they leave on the subject. Low-pressure aesthetic adjectives are normatively less demanding than high-pressure ones because they are less objective, that is, they have more to do with ourselves than they do with the world. High-pressure ones, on the other hand, have more to do with the world than they do with ourselves, so they have, as Sundell points out, "objective purport". Sundell (2016, p. 797) introduces another relevant distinction, originally due to Zangwill (1995, p. 317), between *verdictive aesthetic expressions* and *substantive aesthetic expressions.*

> Let us call *verdictive* aesthetic judgements those judgements to the effect that things are beautiful or ugly, or that they have or lack aesthetic merit or value [...] However, we also judge that things are dainty, dumpy, graceful, garish, delicate, balanced, warm, passionate, brooding, awkward and sad. Let us call these judgements *substantive* aesthetic judgement (Zangwill, 1995, p. 317).

The distinction between verdictive and substantive aesthetic judgements is meant to capture the lesser or greater generality of aesthetic adjectives. Adjectives within the former category have a lower descriptive component, and therefore are more general, and adjectives within the latter category have higher descriptive content, and are therefore more specific. The low-pressure/high-pressure distinction is orthogonal to the verdictive/substantive distinction. "Tasty," on the one hand, is low-pressure and verdictive, and "beautiful" is high-pressure and verdictive. "Sexy," on the other hand, is low-pressure and substantive, and "bombastic" is high-pressure and substantive.

Following Sundell, aesthetic adjectives fulfil the three characteristics that, according to Kennedy (2007), define gradable adjectives, i.e., adjectives that admit the comparative ("more" or "less" than...) and superlative ("very," "much," "most," etc.) degree: their true-conditions vary with context, there are borderline cases, and they lead to Sorites paradoxes. Thus, as a gradable adjective, an adjective like "tasty" "maps an individual to a degree on some scale" (Sundell, 2016, p.

801). In its positive form, (33) expresses the proposition that the degree on the scale of this baked fish is over some contextually specified threshold.

(33)   This baked fish is tasty.

To attribute a truth-value to a gradable adjective we need to determine a scale, and once the scale is determined we need to determine a threshold. According to McNally and Stojanovic (2017), a dimension is a criterion that allows us to order individuals according to the property described by the adjective. The triad degrees-ordering-dimension constitute, following Kennedy (2007, p. 4), a scale. The threshold allows us to determine whether, on a given scale, the individual to which we attribute a specific property is suitable or not for that property to be attributed, and also allows us to compare which individual has a greater or lesser degree of the property attributed.

According to Sundell (2016, p. 809), *proximity* is the scale for "tasty." He defines "proximity" as follows: "proximity, within the space of possible tastes, to a target taste, where that target taste will typically, though not analytically, corresponds to our idea of what something of the relevant kind should taste like." To say of this baked fish that it is tasty is to say something about how it tastes namely, that its taste looks like the taste this baked fish should have. As Sundell (2016, p. 806), following Kennedy (2007, p. 6), points out, the word "tasty" is *vague* and *indeterminate*. Vagueness is related to the threshold (whether the threshold is fixed or not. Vagueness is the kind of phenomenon that gives rise to Sorites paradoxs). Indeterminacy concerns the scale (the same adjective may involve a full range of different scales). Therefore, what the target taste is will depend on which dish we are tasting. In the case of baked fish, the target taste is different from the spaghetti bolognese target taste.

3.5.1   The Shortcomings of Sundell's Proposal

Throughout this section, we are going to present three objections to Sundell's proposal. The first one is, to our mind, the result from separating the subjective component from the semantic meaning of perspectival expressions such as "tasty." The second and third objections concern the notion of "metalinguistic negotiation." We question whether two contradictory claims of personal taste necessarily

give rise to a metalinguistic negotiation, either because we are not always going to negotiate with our interlocutor in order to coordinate our standards, or because the target of our disagreement will not always revolve around the meaning of the terms used in our claims.

Sundell's proposal discards, as we have seen, two assumptions that are usually present in discussions about perspectival expressions: that such expressions are semantically evaluative and that they are relativised to an experiencer or standard. His explanatory model for perspectival expressions is that of gradable adjectives. In this regard, the sort of disagreements that arise when there are perspectival expressions involved are disagreements about how to fix the threshold when attributing to some object or individual a particular property, or what scale is the most suitable one, when applying the ajective in question to something in a particular context. Possible disagreements are, in this framework, metalinguistic disagreements, either descriptive or normative. The latter as we know are called metalinguistic negotiations.

Before addressing the difficulties presented by Sundell's proposal about the issue of disagreement and retraction, we object to his refusal of the relativity of "tasty" to an experiencer or standard. Sundell, as noted above, decouples the meaning of expressions such as "tasty" from personal taste. In his opinion, this type of expressions is not semanticaly related to an experiencer. Sundell appeals to the distinctions between low and high pressure terms and verdictive and substantive terms to justify why defending that "tasty" is semantically relative to an experiencer needs at least to be thought more carefully. This disassociation between "tasty" and its relativity to an experiencer makes personal taste play no role in the semantics of a word like "tasty." Someone could say that something is tasty without having first-hand knowledge of its flavour because there is something like a standard taste for each type of food that sets, so to speak, the threshold on the proximity scale. This transgresses a rule that seems to be systematically applied in the use of predicates such as tasty, MacFarlane's *TP Rule*. TP Rule states that:

> If you know first-hand how something tastes, call it "tasty" just in case
> its flavor is pleasing to you, and "not tasty" just in case its flavor is
> not pleasing to you (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 4).

We think it is difficult to accommodate this rule if it is not by appealing to the relativity of "tasty" to an experiencer or standard. Of course, there are contexts in which we can say that something is tasty and even recommend it without knowing its flavour. *Exocentric* uses of "tasty" are good examples of what we are saying (see, e.g., Lasersohn, 2005, p. 670; Zeman, 2017, p. 65). However, although exocentric uses do not need to comply with MacFarlane's TP Rule, these uses still exhibit relativity to an experiencer or standard. The problem for Sundell's proposal therefore lies not only in how to explain the *autocentric* uses of "tasty"— those uses of "tasty" that require to comply with the TP Rule—, but also finds problematic the relativity exhibited by the exocentric uses.[30]

Although it is not an issue that Sundell is concerned with in his paper, we can try to figure out how retraction might be explained in Sundell's terms. Foreseeably, retracting a past assertion would have to be something similar to disagreeing with another person. In this case, there would not be much to negotiate, but the way to retract would have to be metalinguistic. In other words, a speaker, say Alex, would retract her past assertion "The Guernica is not beautiful" uttered in 2010 because her concept of BEAUTIFUL is now different from the concept of BEAUTIFUL that she used in 2010. Now, if the concept used in that assertion is different from the concept now handled by the speaker, it is questionable whether one can retract that assertion from 2010. If what the speaker said was that the Guernica is beautiful (insofar as it is a work that has reached the general public) and now she says that it is not (insofar as it is not a very colourful work), it seems that both contents are compatible with each other. Thus, Sundell's proposal would face a challenge similar to indexical contextualism concerning retraction.

The kind of disagreement that can arise from a dispute between two speakers who discuss whether something is tasty or it is not, is metalinguistic. However, metalinguistic negotiations do not exhaust all possible cases of disagreement, as we have seen in Chapter 2. There are disagreements in which speakers do not seem to negotiate at all. Sometimes we enter into discussions with someone to put forward our reasons and deal with possible replies to improve our arguments. Other times,

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[30]Following Lasersohn, (2005, p. 670), we make an autocentric use of 'tasty' when we adopt our own perspective both to say that something is tasty and to evaluate the truth or falsity of an assertion made by another speaker or by ourselves. We use 'tasty' in an exocentric way when we adopt the standards of someone other than ourselves both to assert something and to evaluate the truth or falsity of what is asserted by a third party or by ourselves.

we enter into discussions with no intention of coordinating our standards with those of our opponent, but to convince a part of the audience that listens to us (think, for example, of the presidential debates between representatives of political parties confronting each other in the presidential race). Finally, disagreements are sometimes good learning mechanisms and ways of getting to know other people with whom we argue without the slightest intention of persuading her of anything.

As Marques (2017) points out, metalinguistic negotiations are neither sufficient nor necessary to explain other varieties of nonfactual disagreements. They are not sufficient because the reasons why two contenders may argue for or against what should fall within the scope of a particular concept may be of a non-evaluative nature. They may be, for instance, prudential or procedural reasons (Marques, 2017, p. 46). They are not necessary either, as Marques notes, because two people may disagree about whether something is X and still agree on what the relevant linguistic facts should be concerning X. For example, two speakers might agree that to predicate of a certain food that is tasty, one must comply with the TP Rule (something is tasty if we have first-hand knowledge and it is pleasing to our palate) and yet disagree about whether tuna eyes are tasty or not. In other words, the notion "metalinguistic" in "metalinguistic negotiation" is very liberally applied by its supporters. A metalinguistic negotiation can take place between two speakers who discuss whether something is beautiful or not. Suppose that both parties agree that to say that a work of art is beautiful one has to take into consideration four parameters or dimensions: reach the general public, not be offensive, be figurative and be very colourful. However, each one gives different weights to each dimension, and that explains why for one of them the work is beautiful, while that is not the case for the other. To consider, as the defenders of the metalinguistic proposal do, that the discussion about what weight we should give to each dimension is metalinguistic is, in our opinion, excessively broadening the limits of the concept METALINGUISTIC. It makes sense to think that discussing whether or not a specific dimension should be taken into account when applying a concept such as BEAUTIFUL can be a metalinguistic issue. However, to think that once the dimensions are fixed, the weight we assign to each one is a metalinguistic matter, rather than an aesthetic one, is to lose sight of much of the discussions we have daily about whether something is beautiful or not. Those in which the parties

agree on what concepts we use, and should be used, to talk about something, but disagree about whether or not something is the case.

3.6 Concluding Remarks

The theories we have analysed in this chapter are theories that understand that understand that disagreement is the result of a conflict at the level of *what is said*. At the end of the previous chapter, once the relevance of faultless disagreements for the debate was assessed, we defended that there are three types of disagreements that a theory of perspectival expressions must accommodate: deep disagreements, metalinguistic negotiations, and evaluative disagreements. All three were characterized as nonfactual disagreements, disagreements in which perspectival expressions might occur.

Indexical contextualism in its most naïve version, as we have argued in section 3.2.2.1, has problems accommodating the simplest versions of nonfactual disagreements. Therefore, none of these three types of disagreements can be accommodated by such a proposal. For indexical contextualists, a disagreement is factual (the parties argue about what most people in a given community think), or it is not a disagreement (it has the appearance of disagreement, but the parties are talking past each other or just exchanging preferences). As we have seen in section 3.3.1, something similar happens with a nonindexical version of contextualism, one in which nonfactual disagreements might turn out to be "merely a by-product of semantic ignorance" (Stojanovic, 2007, p. 696). As we have seen, both proposals have also difficulties in coping with the phenomenon of retraction.

López de Sa's proposal is an effort to improve indexical contextualism. However, appealing to the presupposition of commonality to find the conflict lost in situations of disagreement by naïve versions of contextualism is not without problems. Best-case scenario, López de Sa's proposal leaves unexplained situations of disagreement in which the parties engage already assuming that they do not share the same standards. His proposal also finds difficults to deal with retraction.

Sundell's proposal for perspectival expressions poses difficulties in accounting for some nonfactual disagreements. His proposal makes it possible to explain metalinguistic negotiations, but does so at the expense of overgeneralizing and losing sight of other forms of nonfactual disagreements, such as deep and evaluative ones.

As for retraction, Sundell's metalinguistic proposal, as we have seen, faces similar problems to those that indexical contextualism encounters. It is at least doubtful that we can retract an assertion whose content is compatible with the apparent negation of that assertion (the use of a different concept makes the content of the whole current assertion different from that of the past assertion). In other words, the current negation of the past assertion would be infelicitous.

Semantic views have difficulties in accounting for the desiderata of disagreement and retraction, and these problems stem from assuming an explanation of perspectival expressions that provides no satisfactory explanation of their singular semantic feature, their evaluative nature. In the next chapter, we explore some proposals which, in our opinion, are a priori better placed to accommodate our desiderata: nonsemantic views.

4

The Debate on Perspectival Expressions: Non-semantic Views

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we focus on several theories that contend that disagreement can take place at a different level from what is said. Some of these theories, loosely inspired by expressivism, seek to capture the attitudinal-evaluative aspect associated with perspectival claims through implicatures. Others belong to the family of indexical contextualist theories, and invoke the phenomenon of implicatures to avoid the problems to which less sophisticated versions of indexical contextualism have traditionally been exposed. The third type of theories is the presuppositional account of hybrid evaluative expressions. This type of proposal aims at capturing the evaluative component involved in at least some perspectival expressions through an original notion of presupposition. Finally, an expressivist proposal is put forward that takes as its starting point so-called "minimal expressivism." This proposal does not pretend to be a fully developed one. Instead, it is an exploratory proposal that captures what we consider to be the most significant contribution that expressivism brings to this debate while avoiding some of the complaints that are usually made to this position.

In section 4.2, we introduce two stories in order to explain the difference between two distinct sorts of language activities: describing and evaluating. Explaining the existing disanalogy between these two types of activities was the starting point of expressivism. Somehow, hybrid expressivists proposals that we explore in this chapter seek to maintain the virtues that expressivism has shown in dealing with this disanalogy. In section 4.3, we present Ayer's emotivist proposal. This proposal helps us to understand what features are usually associated with expressivism and to put into context those hybrid proposals that are inspired by it. In 4.3.1, without going into any technical details, we tackle one of the main problems that rise against classical expressivism: the Frege-Geach problem. Section 4.4 is devoted to "implicaturist hybrid views". 4.4.1 aims to explain what implicatures are and what features do they have. It is a relevant section to understand the proposals presented in sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. In 4.4.2, we analyse Barker's theory, according to which the expressive component of perspectival expressions is conveyed via conventional implicatures. In section 4.4.3, we examine Strandberg's proposal, that analyses the expressive component in terms of generalised conversational implicatures. In 4.4.4, we explain in some detail Díaz-León's proposal. Díaz-León defends an improved kind of indexical contextualism using the phenomenon of generalised conversational implicature. In this case, however, the implicature involved is not of an expressive nature, but a metalinguistic one. In section 4.5, we raise some objections to implicaturist hybrid views. Section 4.6 aims to analyse the presuppositional approach of Cepollaro and Stojanovic, whose purpose is to account for what they call hybrid evaluative expressions: thick terms and slurs. This section is divided into three sub-sections, the last being a critique of the authors' proposal. In section 4.7, also divided into three sub-sections, we bring forward the proposal of the minimal expressivism, that will serve as the starting point for the expressivist framework that we want to defend in order to conclude this first part of the dissertation. Subsection 4.7.3 shows how this framework is capable of accommodating the desiderata that we established at the end of Chapter 2.

4.2   Two Tales, One Crucial Disanalogy

Let me tell you two short stories:

Story A

Planet Earth is full of people. Among them, there are those who say truths and those who say false things, those who react with fear to an obstacle, those who share their wealth with those who have less economic resources. There are those who are 2 meters high, and those who measure 1 meter. There are blondes, dark-haired people, redheads...Some people play the trumpet, the drums, the double bass, the guitar. There are those who earn their salary by playing football, basketball or singing rap music. There are people who grow weed, and that's forbidden by law. Finally, some people listen to Bertín Osborne although not many compared to the amount of people who listens to Kendrick Lamar.

Story B

Planet Earth is full of exciting and tedious people in equal parts. Among them, there are those who are honest and those who are dishonest, those who are cowards and those who are generous. There are enormous ones like giraffes and small ones like mice. There are beautiful and ugly people...There are fabulous jazz, flamenco and rap musicians. There are some exceptional athletes fulfilling their dream. There are people who grow weed, and these peaceful people like to live outside the law. Finally, some people listen to Bertín Osborne although not many compared to the amount of people who listens to Kendrick Lamar. The latter is a good indicator that the *Twilight of the West* has not yet arrived.

The first story is flat; it lacks the mountains and valleys provided by the sense of humor, moral judgments, etc., which the second has. The first is a description of some of the things that we can find on Earth. The second is also a description, but full of evaluations that reveal the kind of things that matter for good or bad to the storyteller. To eliminate the evaluative vocabulary used in the second text is to cancel an essential portion of what storytelling is, an irretrievable part if we look for an equivalent vocabulary that lacks evaluative force. Moore argued in *Principia Ethica* (1903/1922b) in favour of the irreducibility of the normative and evaluative vocabulary. Normative predicates cannot be reduced to descriptive

predicates without committing the *naturalistic fallacy.* The well-known, though not undisputed, Moore's Open Question Argument highlights this irreducibility in the vein of Hume (1738/2000)'s thought that an "ought" cannot be drawn from an "is". Although we can give a definition of the word "good" in terms of natural properties, when faced with a statement such as "X is pleasant (here pleasant is an example of natural property used to define "good")" there will always be room for the reply "well, X is pleasant, but is X really good?" The Open Question Argument shows, therefore, that normative or evaluative terms are "simple, unanalysable, indefinable," and therefore they cannot be reduced to nonnormative terms (Moore, 1903/1922b, p. 37, § 24).

Descriptions and evaluations are in their surface grammar very similar.[31] Unlike questions or commands, speech acts that might contain an explicit grammatical mark that differentiates them from descriptions (question marks in the first, use of the imperative mood in the second), evaluations do not appear to have such a mark. setting them apart from descriptions. In our opinion, this apparent similarity can generate confusion, and hide a radical difference in our linguistic practices in general, and in situations of disagreement in particular, between the kind of things that we do when we describe a state of affairs and the kind of things that we do when we evaluate a situation. The linguistic counterpart of the naturalistic fallacy is what Austin (1962, p. 3) calls the *descriptivist fallacy.* Natural language, to use the Wittgensteinian metaphor (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, p. 9, § 11), is like a toolbox in which each tool has different functions, so each word, like the tools, can be used for different purposes. The naturalistic fallacy consists in thinking that the main purpose of our words is to describe reality. With language, following Wittgenstein and Austin, we can do many things, including changing reality. To evaluate is, or so we understand in this dissertation, a way to *rank the world through our words, endowing it with a moral, aesthetic, humorous, etc., sense following a certain order.*

Nonfactual disagreement, as it has been usually charactesided, as it was presented in Chapter 2 is a kind of disagreement whose traits we contended, cannot be well captured unless the descriptive/evaluative distinction is assumed in a par-

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[31]As we will see, this similarity is in many cases missing; there are expressions used by default to evaluate that play a particular *syntactic* role that cannot be played by expressions used by default to describe. The former, but not the latter, can be *functions of propositions* (see, e.g., Frápolli and Villanueva, 2012, pp. 471–472).

ticular way. Specifically, one of the defining features of this phenomenon is that *disagreeing parties may have the same beliefs about what the world is like and still disagree about how to evaluate a given situation, what to do at a given moment, and so on.* These disagreements can be about how we should use a term, they can be about what standards we should adopt, and they can be about how things should be. In the latter case, just to be clear, disagreemens are neither about how we should use a particular term nor about what standards we should use. In evaluative disagreements, as we have called them, the parties support normative standards by doing the evaluation they do, but their evaluations are not about the standards, but about the world, about things themselves.[32]

4.3 The Roots of Expressivism: Emotivism

Alfred J. Ayer (1936/1946) and Charles L. Stevenson (1937, 1944, 1963) are the forerunners of what we currently call expressivism. Ayer and Stevenson's proposal is known as *Emotivism*[33].

For emotivists like Ayer, the main function of moral statements is not describing how the world is or representing the reality, but to express feelings. As Ayer notes:

> Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money,"
> I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole
> that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any

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[32]As I have argued in (Torices, 2017), education in values works similarly to emotional education. We learn to evaluate situations, objects and so on, discriminating such situations and objects in evaluative terms. We learn to relate to the world through our social practices and give it evaluative meaning. However, the learning process is not first and foremost a process of applying standards to particular situations—we do not carry a notebook in the back pocket of our trousers with the principles of our community noted down and observing whether or not the world behaves according to those principles—on the contrary. We evaluate particular situations, and from there, once we have acquired the ability to make evaluative discriminations, we can extract, if we need it, general principles that serve to give coherence to our particular evaluations.

[33]Russell (1935/1998, pp- 235–236)'s proposal is also a form of emotivism (see for example Chrisman, 2013). For Russell to make a moral statement like "this is good in itself" amounts to a "I wish everybody to desire this" or "Would that everybody desired this." That is, moral statements are the expression of desires-like attitudes. It resembles, therefore, the position that Stevenson (1937) attributes to Hobbes, but the desire that is expressed through a moral assertion is not individual, as in Hobbes, but collective.

> further statement about it. *I am simply evincing my moral disapproval
> of it* [emphasys added]. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money,"
> in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some
> special exclamation marks. (Ayer, 1936/1946, p. 107).

It should be noted, however, that it is not always the case that a statement containing expressions such as "good" or "wrong" is being used to make moral judgments. There are contexts in which a statement containing such expressions is used to make, for example, sociological judgments, that is, judgments that describe a certain action as morally wrong "to the moral sense of a particular society." (Ayer, 1936/1946, p. 105). Even in its earliest versions, expressivism is presented not as a theory about the nature of certain expressions, but as a theory about a particular use of expressions.

For the emotivists, statements that contain moral expressions such as "good," "wrong," etc., cannot be evaluated as true or false when they are used to make moral judgments. According to Ayer 1936/(1946, p. 7 and ff.), a *proposition* is what a meaningful statement expresses. The principle of verification provides us with the necessary criteria to establish whether or not a statement is meaningful, and therefore, to establish whether or not a statement expresses a proposition. A statement is meaningful if it is *analytically* or *empirically verifiable*[34]. Moral statements, then, are not propositional because they are not analitically or empirically verifiable.

> They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under
> the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same
> reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable—because
> they do not express genuine propositions. (Ayer, 1936/1946, pp. 108–
> 109).

Moral statements have the function of *expressing* the speaker's feelings and *arousing* feelings in the hearer. It is crucial to note that with a moral statement the speaker *expresses* her feelings, she does not *report* that she has certain feelings. The

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[34]Following Ayer 1936/(1946, p. 78) "a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience."

distinction between *expressing* and *reporting* becomes particularly salient since by reporting our feelings we are describing what happens to us and, therefore, expressing a psychological proposition, as Ayer would say[35]. However, as we have seen, for Ayer, moral statements do not express propositions.

Ayer has to face the same critique that affects the *subjectivist* concerning disagreement, specifically the critique that comes from Moore. As Moore points out in his critique of subjectivism:

> If this view be true, then when I judge an action to be wrong, I am merely making a judgment about my own feelings towards it; and when you judge it to be wrong, you are merely making a judgment about yours. And hence the word "wrong" in my mouth, means something entirely different from what it does in yours just as the word "I" in my mouth stands for an entirely different person from what it does in yours—in mine it stands for me, in yours it stands for you (Moore, 1922a, p. 333).

For Ayer (1936/1946, pp. 110), however, this is not a problem at all. To the extent that moral judgments do not express propositions, it makes no sense to speak of strictly moral disagreements. The only moral disagreements are those in which the parties discuss what the standards of a given community are, which is no more than a factual disagreement.

Although for Ayer it is not a problem, it is our contention that there are moral disagreements, and not being able to account for them would lead Ayer to have to assume a sort of theory of error in speakers who tend to argue among themselves about moral issues. Stevenson (1944, 1963) has a way out of this problem. For Stevenson, as we have seen in Chapter 2, there are disagreements in beliefs and disagreements in attitudes. Consequently, although moral statements do not express propositions, we can speak of moral disagreements, i.e., disagreements in non-doxastic attitudes between one who approves, and another who disapproves of a particular action, for instance. The difference between these two types of disagreements or, in our way of speaking, the difference between factual and nonfactual disagreements is significant in assessing some of the theories we will examine in

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[35]This distinction will become more relevant in the later sections of this chapter.

this chapter. Before analysing these theories, we are going to discuss one of the most pressing problems for early versions of expressivism, although the versions presented here do not need to deal with it. We are referring to the Frege-Geach Problem.

4.3.1   The Frege-Geach Problem

The so-called Frege-Geach problem in some of its variants has been discussed over and over again (Geach, 1960, 1965; Searle, 1962; Dreier, 1996; Unwin, 2001; Gibbard, 2003; Schroeder, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Frápolli and Villanueva, 2012; Hom and Schwartz, 2013; Charlow, 2014; Woods, 2017; Horwich, 2005; Ridge, 2006; Wedgwood, 2007; Sinclair, 2009; Yalcin, 2018; among others authors). The aim of this section is by no means to spell out the well-worn history of the Frege-Geach problem. The purpose is to introduce what the problem consists, and to argue how the current versions of expressivism, at least those that will appear in this dissertation, elude the problem.

The Frege-Geach Problem, as Unwin (2001, p. 60) points out, reveals that for expressivism it is "[...] very hard to explain how normative predicates can enter into unasserted contexts, and how complex normative sentences can enter into logical relations." According to the classical expressivist, as we have seen in Section 4.3, a moral statement such as "Smoking in the subway is wrong" is used to express disapproval of (or whatsoever another non-doxastic attitude) a particular action, in this case, that of smoking in the subway. A moral statement, therefore, does not express a proposition. However, with moral statements we can do the kind of things that we do with descriptive assertions: we attribute truth or falsehood to them, we can embed them in more complex statements under the scope of epistemic modals, attributions of knowledge, etc., and they can appear as premises and conclusions of logically valid arguments. As Schroeder (2008c) notes:

> Once we characterize noncognitivist views in this way, moreover, it is
> easy to characterize the crux of the Frege-Geach Problem. It is that
> there is no linguistic evidence whatsoever that the meaning of moral
> terms works differently than that of ordinary descriptive terms. On the
> contrary, everything that you can do syntactically with a descriptive
> predicate like 'green', you can do with a moral predicate like 'wrong',

and when you do those things, they have the same semantic effects (Schroeder, 2008c, p. 704)

Let us see, then, in what sense the expressivist proposal is problematic. Consider the following argument, an instance of *modus ponens*:

(34)   (P1) If killing animals is wrong, then eating meat is wrong
       (P2) Killing animals is wrong,
       (C) So, eating meat is wrong.

The moral predicate "is wrong" as it occurs in (P1) is not used to express disapproval. Someone can perfectly well utter (P1) and approve of killing animals and eating meat. In (P2) and (C), it does seem that "is wrong" is used to manifest disapproval. If expressing disaproval is part of the meaning of (P2) and (C), then, (34) would be exhibiting a *fallacy of equivocation* (Geach, 1960, p. 223). This reading is troubling since the argument is formally flawless, and it does not seem that the predicate "is wrong" is being used in different senses here.

This problem arises from two tenets of emotivism: the first one, the putative conceptual link of two theses traditionally maintained by the first expressivist versions: *nondescriptivism* (expressions of interest to the expressivist are not used to describe what the world is like) and the idea that the utterances in which these expressions occur are not *truth-apt*, that is, they are not apt to be either true or false; the second one, it takes force to explain content (see, e.g., Moreno Zurita 2018). Here we have focused on the version of the Frege-Geach problem that affects this second tenet of emotivism because it is the one that has had the most significant impact. The problem can be summarized, following Wedgwood (2007), like this:

An adequate account of the meaning of normative terms must explain how they can figure, without a shift of meaning, both in statements in which they have largest scope, and embedded in subsentences of complex utterances in which they do not have largest scope (Wedgwood, 2007, p. 43).

Many answers have been proposed to the Frege-Geach problem. We are not going to discuss them in any detail. It will suffice to say that any contemporary

expressivist proposal that assumes, on the one hand, that statements that contain the kind of expressions that justify an expressivist analysis are truth-apt, and that includes a cognitive element along with a non-cognitive factor, can deal well with the objection raised by the Frege-Geach problem. Proponents of *hybrid expressivism* such as *two-tier expressivists* (Gibbard, 2003; Chrisman, 2007, 2012; Bar-On and Chrisman, 2009) or *implicaturist expressivists* and *ecumenical expressivists* (Barker, 2000, 2014; Copp, 2001, 2009; Strandberg, 2012; Ridge, 2006, 2014) and, in a significantly different way, advocates of what we might call *dynamic expressivism* (Yalcin, 2018; Pérez-Carballo, 2014; Pérez-Carballo and Santorio, 2016; Charlow, 2014) have done so.

In the next sections, we will examine some of the proposals inherited from emotivism, particularly, some hybrid expressivist accounts, as well as other pragmatic proposals (non-expressivist but that leave explanatory room to non-cognitive constituents to explain the evaluative) to assess the explanation they provide of the disagreements. The theories chosen are those that, a priori, could provide an adequate explanation of covert dogwhistles. This aspect will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. It seems reasonable to think that dogwhistles, whether overt or covert, are some kind of implicated or presupposed content. For this reason, since these are the philosophically traditional ways of capturing what we can informally call implicitly conveyed information, we intend to show, in the section devoted to explain dogwhistles, that they are neither implicatures nor presuppositions and, therefore, no proposal appealing to this type of mechanism will be appropriate to account for at least some types of dogwhistles, in particular the covert ones.

4.4 Implicaturist Hybrid Views

Fletcher (2014) uses the "Implicaturist Hybrid Views" label to refer to those philosophical proposals that argue that a moral assertion conveys two contents, one of which, the evaluative content, is coveyed via *implicature*[36]. Specifically, through an implicature, the assertion of a moral claim expresses a desire-like attitude. According to Fletcher (2014, p. 173), a theory is hybrid if it embraces at least one of these claims:

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[36]Ridge (2014, p. 87) calls this approaches "Implicative Ecumenical Cognitivism"

(i) moral thought: Moral judgments have belief and desire-like aspects or elements.

(ii) moral language: Moral utterances both ascribe properties and express desire-like attitudes.

The hybrid approaches we are interested in here, therefore, are a kind of hybrid expressivism, according to which, an evaluation is a blend of a cognitive component and expressive ingredients.[37] These expressive elements are captured through pragmatic mechanisms, such as implicatures and presuppositions. In the remainder of this section, we focus on those proposals that have aimed to capture the expressive component that evaluations supposedly present through implicatures.

As we know from Grice (1975/1989), there are two main kinds of implicatures: conventional and conversational. In what remains of this section, we consider two theories according to which the conative component of a moral assertion is conveyed via implicatures, of one kind or another. But before undertaking that task, we set out the fundamental features of each type of implicature.

4.4.1 The Features of Implicatures

Following Fletcher (2014), we compare the two kinds of implicature according to the traits they seem to exhibit. In particular, we briefly examine how they behave concerning *determinacy*, *reinforceability*, *detachability*, *cancelability* and *calculability*.

I now briefly define the features that will allow making comparisons between the different kinds of implicatures:

> *Determinacy*: An implicature is determinate when there are no other possible interpretations of what has been implicated by the speaker consistent with the Cooperative Principle.[38]

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[37]Although the theories that we are going to analyse are proposals whose aim is to examine the moral discourse, what we can call moral evaluations, the type of analysis that they propose could be extrapolated without the need of many adjustments to the study of knowledge attributions, aesthetic evaluations, etc.

[38]The Cooperative Principle is a general tenet that is expected to be observed by participants in a conversation. Grice puts it this way:

Reinforceability: An implicature is reinforceable when making explicit its implicated content is not redundant.

Detachability: An implicature is detachable when the speaker can utter a statement with the same asserted content without triggering such implicature.

Cancelability: An implicature is cancelable when the speaker can deny the implicated content without oddity.

Calculability: An implicature is calculable if one is able to deduce what the speaker has implicated by following what the speaker said, the Cooperative Principle and the Gricean conversational maxims.[39]

Conventional implicatures are propositions suggested by the meaning of some of the expressions involved in a utterance. An utterance as (35) conventionally implicates (36):

(35)   Sam is a politician but honest.

(36)   There is a contrast between being a politician and being honest.

The use of the preposition "but" in (35), because of its conventional meaning, triggers the implicature (36). (36) is highly determinate. Not many interpretations are available of what the speaker meant by (35). It is not reinforceable without redundancy. If after uttering (35), the speaker said something like "Sam is a politician but honest, and what's more there is a contrast between being a politician and being honest," the speaker would be unnecessarily redundant. Since implicature is triggered by the conventional meaning of "but," (36) is detachable. If instead of (35) the speaker uttered (37), the implicature in (36) would not survive. As (38)

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Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice, 1975/1989, p. 26).

[39]The four Gricean maxims are: 1) maxim of Quantity ("Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange"), 2) maxim of Quality ("Try to make your contribution one that is true"), 3) maxim of Relation ("Be relevant") and 4) the maxim of Manner ("Be perspicuous") (Grice, 1975/1989, p. 26–27)

shows, (36) is not cancelable without *oddity*. Finally, (36) is not calculable. Audiences do not need observing the Cooperative Principle to know what the speaker has implcated by uttering (35).

(37)   Sam is politician and honest.

(38)   *Cancellation*: # Although I do not mean that there is a contrast between being a politician and being honest.

Within conversational implicatures we can distinguish between *particularized conversational* and *generalized conversational* implicatures. Conversational implicatures, whether particularized or generalized, can be *reinforceable, non-detachable, cancellable* and *calculable*. However, the generalized but not the particularized are *determinate*.

Imagine the following situation. Two speakers are talking. B does not stop making funny contributions to the conversation. The exchange goes on like this:

(39)   A: B you're a lot of fun!

(40)   B: I am from Cádiz.

With her contribution, B is implicating (41)

(41)   People from Cádiz are very funny.

(41) is reinforceable. The speaker can follow her speech act with "I mean that people from Cádiz are very funny" without it being redundant. (41) is non-detachable. If instead of saying "I am from Cádiz," B would have said "I am 'Gaditan'[40]," this utterance would have carried with the same implicature, "People from Cádiz are very funny." B can cancel (41) without oddity. Let's see the following dialogue:

(42)   *A*: Well, I know people from Cádiz who are not funny at all.

(43)   *B*: Of course, not all people from Cádiz are funny.

(43) is the cancellation of the content implicatured by B. (41) is calculable—from the meaning of the expressions involved, the Cooperative Principle and the Gricean conversational maxims (in this case the maxim of Quantity) and contextual information the implicature can be deduced. Finally, (41) is determinate. Not many

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[40]Suppose for the sake of argument that "Gaditan" is the English translation for "Gaditanos".

interpretations are available that could make sense of B's assertion. (41), therefore, is a generalized conversational implicature.

The difference between particularized and generalized conversational implicatures is that the former are more context-dependent than the latter. For this reason, particularized implicatures are highly indeterminate. As Grice (1975/1989) notes with respect to the particularized conversational implicatures, these make their appearance in:

> [C]ases in which an implicature is carried by saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying that p (Grice, 1975/1989, p. 37)

Generalized implicatures will usually be attached to certain utterances. There may be exceptional situations in which this does not happen, but as a general rule, they will. This explains why Grice (1975/1989, p. 37) points out that sometimes generalized implicatures are confused with conventional implicatures. However, unlike the generalized ones, as we have seen above, the conventional ones are detachable, not reinforceable without redundancy, not cancelable without oddity, and do not need to be calculated since they rely exclusively on the linguistic conventional meaning of certain expressions.

Once the features of each kind of implicature have been presented, we see in the coming sections what variety of implicatures, if any, is able of better accommodating the desire-like attitudes that are allegedly conveyed by moral assertions, aesthetic assertions, personal taste assertions, etc. That is, we will explore, by means of the following tests, whether the expressed desire-like attitude by perspectival claims presents the traits of implicatures that we have just examined.

> (Test 1) Particularized conversational implicatures can be *indeterminate*. Generalized and conventional implicatures cannot be *indeterminate*.

> (Test 2) Conversational implicatures are *nonredundantly reinforceable*. Conventional implicatures are not.

(Test 3) Conversational implicatures are *nondetachable*[41]. Conventional implicatures are detachable.

(Test 4) Conversational implicatures are *cancelable*. Conventional implicatures are not cancelable without oddity.

(Test 5) Conversational implicatures are *calculable*. Conventional implicatures are not calculable. (*Cfr.* Fletcher, 2014, p. 179)

4.4.2 Conveying Desire-like Attitudes Through *Conventional* Implicatures

Barker (2000, 2014) and Copp (2001, 2009), although with some differences between them, propose hybrid theories for moral claims according to which, on the one hand, a descriptive content is conveyed, and, on the other hand, via conventional implicatures, a conative attitude is expressed. In what follows, we will focus primarily on the proposal put forward by Barker (2000).

Barker argues that his proposal is a dual approach to content, one in which a moral assertion of the type "T is good" has, on the one hand, a descriptive, truth-conditional content, which he calls following Blakemore (1987), *explicature*, and, on the other hand, a content of value, an *implicature*, in particular, a conventional implicature. The following quotation summarizes the proposal defended by Barker:

> **Implicature Theory** (**IT**) If U asserts the sentence 'T is good', then U denotes a property F by 'good' and:
>
> (i) U *expresses–as–explicature* the content that T is F;
>
> (ii) U *expresses–as–implicature* the content that U is committed to approval of F–things;
>
> (iii) U conveys that she believes the contents in (i) and (ii);
>
> (iv) U conveys that she approves of T. (Barker, 2000, p. 271)

Let's suppose that the property F that U picks out for "good" is "being pleasant." Suppose also that "T is good" stands for "Sharing with the needy is good." Then Barker's proposal could be made more specific as follows:

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[41]An exception to this normal behaviour is constituted by those implicatures that exploit the maxim of manner

(i)   *U expresses–as–explicature* the content that sharing with the needy is pleasant;

(ii) *U expresses–as–implicature* the content that *U* is committed to approval of pleasant things;

(iii) *U* conveys that she believes the contents in (i) and (ii);

(iv) *U* conveys that she approves of sharing with the needy.

As we saw in section 4.3.1, hybrid proposals in general have not problem at all in dealing with the Frege-Geach problem. According to Barker (2000, p. 273), (i) and (ii) are components of the *locutionary act* and (iii) and (iv) are components of the *illocutionary act.* For this reason, when utterance *U* embeds "T is good" in sentential contexts, (i) and (ii) are performed while (iii) and (iv) are not. In other words, according to Barker, when a moral statement is embedded, for example, as the antecedent of a conditional, the implicated content continues to permeate and, in this way, reasoning such as *modus ponen* would remain valid for this proposal of dual content. Barker proposes to understand logical *correctness* in a more general way, in such a way that it computes truth-conditional content and non-truth-conditional content. This is how Barker defines the new notion of validity:

> An argument of the form $S_1...S_n \vdash R$ is valid iff the combined correctness-conditions for $S_1...S_n$ are not compossible with the non-obtaining of the correctness-conditions for R. (Barker, 2000, p. 274).

Based on this definition, Barker says, an argument like (44)[42] would work as follows:

(44) (a) If promoting a world that overall minimizes pain is goodness, then doing A is good.
      (b) Promoting a world that overall minimizes pain is goodness.
      So (c) Doing A is good.

The antecedent of (a) in (44) carries the implicature that "*U* (and audience) are committed to approval of minimizing overall pain." And the consecuent's dual

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[42]We borrow Barker (2000, p. 274)'s own example.

content carries as implicature that "doing A is an instance of pain minimization." Therefore, both truth-conditional content and implicated content play a signifcant role in explaining validity.

On the issue of disagreement, Barker's proposal allows the implicated content involved to play an essential role. Strictly speaking, and as Finlay (2005, pp. 2–6) notes, in Barker's proposal the asserted content has an argument place in its logical form due to the expression "good" that has to be filled with a natural property provided by "someone's moral perspective" (Barker, 2000, p. 272). Disagreement can come from two sides, from what is said and from what is implicated. Finlay (2005, pp. 7–8), following Barker, calls the first *explicature-based* disagreement ("where W [party who disagrees with U] shares U's F–attitude but disagrees that T has F"), and the second *implature-based* disagreement ("where W doesn't share U's F–attitude"). According to Barker (2000, p. 278), disagreement can be expressed through negation. There would be, then, two forms of negation, explicatured-based or truth-conditional negation, which is the mechanism by which we reject the explicatured content, and the implatured-based or metalinguistic negation, the mechanism by which we show our rejection of the implicatured content.

4.4.3 Conveying Action-guiding Attitudes Through *Conversational* Implicatures

Strandberg (2012)'s proposal differs from Barker (2000)'s in several respects. One of the most noteworthy aspects, although not the only one, is that the kind of implicature that allows capturing the practical character of moral assertions is conversational rather than conventional. Strandberg calls his approach "The Dual Aspect Account." According to this account, a moral statement has a dual content. On the one hand, it expresses, given the conventional meaning of the words used, the belief that an action or individual has some specific moral properties. On the other hand, it expresses, *via* generalized conversational implicature, that the speaker has a certain *action-guiding attitude* concerning the action or individual in question:

> *The Dual Aspect Account (DAA)*: A person S's utterance of a sentence of a type according to which Φing has a certain moral characteristic,

such as "Φing is wrong," conveys two things: (i) The sentence ex-
presses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that Φing has
a moral property. (ii) An utterance of this type of sentence carries a
generalized conversational implicature, *GCI*, to the effect that S has a
certain action-guiding attitude in relation to Φing. (Strandberg, 2012,
p. 101)

According to Strandberg, a conversation about morals has two general pur-
poses. The first purpose of the participants is to communicate their beliefs about
the moral issue at stake. The second one is to influence behavior, dissuade or
persuade others into take certain actions. This second aspect, Strandberg says, is
crucial to explain the *practicality* of moral language, and one of its essential fea-
tures, namely, its regulating function of people's behavior. As Strandberg notes:

We observed that an essential feature of moral language is that it is
practical in a certain sense. We also observed that it is widely accepted
that moral language thereby fulfils the essential function of regulating
people's behaviour (Strandberg, 2012, p. 104).

A moral statement such as "Φing is wrong" implicates, Strandberg says, that
there is a moral reason against Φing. Let's take as an example the following
sentence uttered by Lucía: "it is wrong to bully someone." If we want to make
sense of what Lucía has uttered, it seems that we must assume that Lucía is
against this kind of action (that of bullying someone). If we do not expect such
an attitude from Lucía, her utterance lacks relevance. As we said, one of the
primary purposes of a conversation about morals is to influence the behavior of
others. Since we must assume that Lucía is following the Cooperative Principle
and the conversational maxims, we must conclude that Lucía is implicating that
she is against such an action, before attributing to her the transgression of one of
the maxims, in particular, the maxim of relation.

A person's utterance of a sentence of the type "Φing is wrong" conver-
sationally implicates that she wants that Φing is not performed, since
this assumption is required in order to make her utterance consistent
with the supposition that she (i) adheres to the cooperative principle

and the maxims, especially the maxim of relation; (ii) knows the meaning of the sentence she utters, above all that it entails that there is a moral reason not to Φing; (iii) is aware of the context of the utterance [...] (Strandberg, 2012, p. 106).

The need to influence behavior leads Strandberg to propose that it is generalized conversational implicatures that guarantee in these contexts the observance of the Cooperative Principle and maxims is generalized conversational. Strandberg rejects the possible objection that the maxim of relation can only contribute to the production of particularized conversational implicatures. Whether an utterance is relevant or not depends on the purposes of the conversation and, one might think, the purposes of a conversation shift from context to context. If this is so, then the maxim of relation cannot contribute to the production of generalized conversational implicatures. It would follow, therefore, that the implicature would have to be particularized conversational. However, as we have seen, there may be types of conversations that systematically have the same purpose, and moral conversations are of this type. Strandberg (2012, p. 108) argues that there are sound psychological and social reasons to justify the assumption that "people who utter sentences of the type 'Φing is wrong' generally want that Φing is not performed." The fact that conversations about morals have systematically the same purpose is what allows Strandberg to defend that in such cases the same kind of maxim, the maxim of relation, can be regularly exploited.

Although Strandberg does not address the issue of disagreement, we can reproduce without much difficulty the form of a moral disagreement following Strandberg's proposal. Imagine that two speakers, Naiara and Lucía, have the following exchange:

(45)   Naiara: It's wrong to steal
       Lucía: That's false, it's not wrong to steal

When Naiara says that stealing is wrong she is conveying two different contents: on the one hand, the truth-conditional content that stealing has the property of wrongness, and, on the other hand, the implicatum that she has a negative attitude towards stealing. Lucía, on her part, is conveying, on the one hand, the truth-conditional content that stealing does not have the property of wrongness,

and, on the other hand, the implicatum that she does not have a negative attitude towards stealing. Their disagreement, therefore, is a disagreement in two senses: a disagreement in terms of truth-conditional content and a disagreement in attitudes towards people stealing. However, in practice, both contents are intertwine. Whenever moral judgments are made, both contents are conveyed because, as we have seen, moral judgments are composed of both cognitive and conative, or action-guiding, contents. Moral disagreements involve the confrontation of both truth-conditional content and conative attitudes, and Strandberg's view is therefore suited to explain this dual behaviour.

4.4.4   Implicaturist Indexical Contextualism

In this section, we focus on Díaz-León (2017a)'s proposal to explain the meaning of knowledge attributions[43]. Her proposal can also be seen as a *dual account of content*, one that combines indexical contextualism to explain *what is said* with the notion of implicature to capture the evaluative or normative aspect of knowledge attributions. Properly speaking, Díaz León's proposal does not fall under the label "Hybrid," as Fletcher characterizes it[44], insofar as she does not propose to understand the evaluative component in terms of desire-like attitudes. However, given that it appeals to pragmatic aspects to recover the appearance of disagreement which is lost in the naïve versions of indexical contextualism, and given that the default implicatum of knowledge attributions is normative, it seems appropriate to include the view here amongst other hybrid theories.

As mentioned in section 3.2, indexical contextualism argues that the content of knowledge attributions varies from context to context depending on the epistemic standard of the speaker. An utterance of the kind "S knows that p" conveys the proposition that S knows that p according to the standards of the speaker who utters it. The problems concerning the disagreement that such an analysis entails have already been discussed above. The strategy used in this case by Díaz-León (2017a, p. 71) to avoid these problems is to defend that in addition to that content,

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[43]Esa Díaz-León calls this approach "Attributor contextualism"

[44]Pace Fletcher, Strandberg's proposal should not be considered a hybrid theory either. In Strandberg's proposal, as we have seen, the implicatum is not the *expression* of the speaker's attitudes, but the *report* that the speaker has certain attitudes, which is clearly a cognitive state, not a desire-like attitude.

in a knowledge attribution the speaker communicates information relative to how we *should use* the concept KNOW. This latter content is conveyed via implicature. According to Díaz-León:

> "[...] we are expressing two kinds of contents: first, we are *saying* something about whether S satisfies the standards that are needed in order to know that p, and second, we are *implicating* something about what 'knowledge' means; that is, we are implicating some *metalinguistic* information about whether the term 'knowledge' should be associated with those standards." (Díaz-León, 2017a, p. 71)

Let's go back to Díaz-León's proposal. According to the author, when we attribute knowledge we express, again, two types of content: we *say* that something complies with the epistemic standards of the speaker (attributor), and we *implicate* that the concept KNOW should be used according to such epistemic standards. Díaz-León, though, does not stipulate what kind of implicature, specifically, would be the one that communicates how we should use the concept KNOW. In the remainer of this section, we explore which of the three kind of implicatures introduced in Section 4.4.1 better suits Díaz-León's proposal.

Since every time we make an attribution of knowledge we express implicated content, it seems that the implicature involved in an assertion of the type "S knows that p" cannot be particularized conversational. Particularized implicatures are context-dependent, and only on certain occasions, and given specific contextual parameters will the implicature be carried out[45]. At first glance, the plausible candidates to accommodate the kind of implicature demanded by Díaz-León's proposal are conventional and generalized conversational implicatures.

As we have seen before, conventional implicatures are not cancelable without oddity. Let us, therefore, apply the test of cancelability to check whether or not the content implicated in an attribution of knowledge is cancelable.

(46)   *Lucía*: David knows that the Planet Earth revolves around the sun.
       Asserted content: David knows that the Planet Earth revolves around the sun according to Lucía's epistemic standards.

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[45]Perhaps, there could provide an argument in the vein of Strandberg (2012, p. 108) to justify that the kind of implicature that accompanies attributions of knowledge cannot be particularized.

Implicated content: "Know" should be used according to Lucia's epistemic standards.

Let's imagine that, after saying that David knows that the Planet Earth revolves around the sun, Lucía utters the statement whose content constitutes the cancellation of what was previously implicated:

(47)   *Lucía*: David knows that the Planet Earth revolves around the sun. Although I do not mean that we should use the concept KNOW according to my standards.

Unlike typical cases of conventional implicatures, cases involving expressions such as "but," "even," "then," and so, the cancellation of the supposedly implicated content in (46) if possible at all does not produce the kind of oddity that the cancellation of conventional implicatures produce. This seems to indicate that this kind of content if implicated cannot be conventionally implicated. (46) does not produce the kind of oddity that (38), the cancellation of the conventional implicature that follows from (37), produces.

Conversational implicatures, in general, and generalized ones, in particular, can be calculated from *what is said*, the Cooperative Principle, the Gricean conversational maxims, and some contextual information. It could be said, for the sake of the proposal we are analyzing, that when someone says "S knows that p" she is exploting one of the Gricean maxims, specifically, the maxim of Quantity (make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange). It seems that when a speaker makes a knowledge attribution, for her to be entirely cooperative we need to assume that the speaker is recommending using her epistemic standards (those that enable the speaker to apply the concept KNOW) to the hearer. By making a knowledge attribution it seems, therefore, that the speaker is giving less information than she should. Therefore, the content that is implicated by a knowledge attribution, unlike what happens with the content of a conventional implicature, needs to be calculated.

Finally, another of the defining features of conversational implicatures is that they are non-detachable. The substitution of one word for another synonym in the speech act should not lead to the disappearance of what that speech act implicated, at least the implicature depends on the maxim of mode. In this case, we can use as a synonym for "know" to check the non-detachablility of the implicatum the

expression "justified true belief." Plausibly, if Lucía says "David has the justified true belief that the Planet Earth revolves around the sun," the sentence "KNOW should be used according to Lucia's epistemic standards" would be implicated. This enable us to say that such an implicature is non-detachable. In conclusion, if our analysis is correct, the type of implicature required by Díaz-León's proposal must be a generalized conversational implicature.

This implicaturist analysis would allow the (indexical) contextualist to explain the appearance of disagreement. Let's see how this might be possible through a conversational exchange in which the parties disagree:

(48)   *Lucía*: David knows that the Planet Earth revolves around the sun [according to Lucía's epistemic standards].
Naiara: I disagree, David does not know that the Planet Earth revolves around the sun [according to Naiara's epistemic standards].
Lucía's implicature: KNOW should be used according to Lucia's epistemic standards.
Naiara's implicature: KNOW should be used according to Naiara's epistemic standards.

In (48), Naiara's "I disagree" is used to distance herself also from Lucía's implicature, from the idea that the concept KNOW should be use with respect to Lucía's standard. Since each of the speakers proposes to use the concept KNOW differently, their disagreement turns out to be a metalinguistic negotiation about which of the two proposals is the correct one.

4.5   Objections to Implicaturists Views

One of the core ideas of expressivism, as we have seen, is the distinction between *expressing* and *reporting*. According to the expressivist, to report an attitude is to describe, to inform that one has that attitude. While the original idea of expressivism, what distinguishes it from other positions such as indexical contextualism and classical forms of subjectivism, is that one directly expresses the attitude.[46]

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[46]In Bar-On (2004) and Bar-On and Chrisman (2009), this distinction is differently accommodated using a two-tier hybrid expressivist proposal for self-attributions of mental states for which speaker S-expresses the report of her mental state and A-expresses that mental state.

This is also accompanied by what Nate Charlow (2014, p. 639) calls "nonpropositionalism." That is, what we communicate through the expression of non-cognitive mental states is a non-representational content.

Barker and Strandberg's implaturist proposals seek to capture this practical dimension of the evaluative through linguistic mechanisms such as implicatures. The problem with this type of theory is that implicatures, whether conventional or conversational, are by definition propositional. Implicatures are by definition propositional insofar as they are calculable. To be calculable they have to be propositional because they must be drawn as conclusions from what is said in the reasoning that allows them to be calculated. As such, this mechanism cannot serve to capture the practical dimension of the evaluative, if that dimension is actually nonpropositional. Then, either what is implicated is no more than the speaker's report that she has certain noncognitive attitude, and then these proposals would have to face the same objections that indexical contextualism faces (disagreement lost), or else this expressive content cannot be conveyed via implicature and, therefore, these proposals are, regardless of the technical details, unworkable (the problem of practicality).

Diaz-Leon's proposal deserves special attention. While part of the objection mentioned above applies to a proposal like hers, the loss of disagreement can be overcome. The implicatum in Diaz-Leon's proposal is not the expression of a non-cognitive state of mind, and that can be problematic since the implicata contain a normative expressions such as "ought" or "should." As we have seen in section 4.4.4, Díaz-León's proposal consists of a defence of indexical contextualism reinforced with the notion of generalised conversational implicature. Since this implicature consists in proposing how the concept of KNOW should be used in a particular context, the parties to the dispute disagree insofar as they propose different concepts of KNOW. The resulting kind of disagreement is what we call in Chapter 2, following Plunkett and Sundell (2013), metalinguistic negotiation. Defending the possibility of disagreement and understanding it as a metalinguistic negotiation has a particular advantage over näive indexical contextualism. Indexical contextualist can overcome the problem of the disagreement lost by assuming that the disagreement is a consequence of a clash in attitudes and that it is metalinguistic in nature. Thus, there is at least one way of talking about disagreements for the indexical contextualist that was previously ruled out.

As we said about Sundell's proposal, reducing all possible nonfactual disagreements to metalinguistic negotiations leaves deep disagreements and evaluative disagreements unexplained. Something similar happens with retraction. It does not seem that when one retracts an attribution of knowledge that one made a few years ago, what one retracts is the implicated content rather than the literally expressed content.

It also seems that when speakers implicate something conversationally, they use the asserted content as a vehicle along with other contextual parameters to communicate in a certain way a content different from the one asserted. In doing so, speakers can get rid of specific commitments, and thus, a formula of this type might be preferred to communicate the implicated content rather than to utter it straight away. The speaker can cancel it if the audience does not react appropriately without jeopardising her image, credibility, truthfulness, etc., vis-à-vis the audience. The asserted content would be insufficient in such a context to say of a speaker that she is observing the Cooperative Principle. Without the acknowledgement of the content that the speaker is conveying in addition to what she is saying, the implicated one, the speaker would count as someone irrational who is transgressing the Cooperative Principle or some of the Gricean maxims. However, it does not seem that when someone attributes knowledge, the hearer needs to recognise that the speaker is implicating that we should use the concept KNOW according to specific standards for the speaker to be cooperative. When someone attributes knowledge in a suitable context, there is not sign that what is said is not cooperative enough. Cancellation in cases such as (47) turns out to be Moore-paradoxical. This type of cancellation produces a sensation different from that produced by the cancellation of a conventional implicature (oddity), and the cancellation of a conversational implicature, whose sensation is neither the oddity produced by a conventional implicature, nor does it turn out to be Moore-paradoxical, as the cancellation in (47) seems to be. Rather, the sensation produced by the cancellation of a conversational implicature is that the speaker is not being cooperative.

4.6   Cepollaro and Stojanovic's Presuppositional Account

In contrast to Implicaturist views, Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016) defend what they call a *presuppositional account to hybrid evaluative expressions*. Hybrid evaluative expressions include both *slurs* and *thick terms*, and perhaps some other expressions. A slur is an expression used to derogate members of a particular social group on the grounds of race, gender, social status, sexual orientation, etc., (Croom, 2013; Blakemore, 2015; Cepollaro, 2015).[47]. A thick term is an evaluative term that contains an important descriptive component (Eklund, 2011; Kyle, 2013; Väyrynen, 2016). Some examples of English thick terms are "courageous," "arrogant," "rude," "generous," "lewd," etc. Traditionally, thick terms have been explored together with *thin terms*, the latter being conceived as purely evaluative terms. Some examples of thin terms in Englishare "good," "bad," "wrong," "right," "permissible," "ought," etc.

Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016, p. 459) argue that hybrid evaluative expressions have a particular truth-conditional (descriptive) content, but at the same time trigger an evaluative presupposition. For example, the slur "dago" has roughly the same descriptive content, the same truth conditions, as the expression "Spaniard" or "Portuguese," but "dago" besides referring to people who are look-like Spaniard or Portuguese triggers the presupposition that they are, *qua* Spaniard or Portuguese, bad people. The same applies to a thick term such as "brave." "Brave" has a descriptive content, according to the Oxford Dictionary, something like being "ready to face and endure danger or pain."[48] When someone is said to be brave, these traits are therefore attributed to her, and, furthermore, it is pointed out via presupposition that having these traits is something positive.

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[47]As we are aware that slurs, even when merely mentioned, retain much of their offensive potential, we will just use an example of slur that include us amongst their target, and that it is practically out of use, for instance "dago" (used for Spaniards and other Mediterraneans).

[48]https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/brave

4.6.1 Evaluative Presupposition: Projection and Rejection in Slurs and Thick Terms

Evaluative presuppositions triggered by slurs and thick terms also manifest, on the one hand, *projective* behavior and, on the other hand, the same behavior concerning *rejection* as common presuppositions. Let us see what happens to presupposed content when the trigger appears embedded under the scope of negation, interrogation, the antecedent of a conditional, etc.

(49)   1. Mr. X is a lewd.
       2. Mr. X is not a lewd.
       3. Is Mr. X is a lewd?
       4. If Mr. X is a lewd, then I won't vote for him.
       ϕ: People who are sexually explicit are bad because of being sexually explicit.

The evaluative presupposition projects, i.e., it continues to be triggered even when the expression that generates it appears embedded. The same thing happens if we change "lewd" for some slur.

To the extent that the evaluative content of hybrid evaluative expressions projects when embedded under negation, to show rejection of such content, it is not enough, as Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016, p. 466) note, with mere denial. Let's see what happens when we try to show our rejection of the evaluative content associated with the word "lewd," and how this rejection could be accomplished:

(50)   A: Mr. X is a lewd.
       B_1: No, Mr. X is not a lewd.
       B_2: Mr. X is sexually explicit, but there's nothing bad in this.
       B_3: Mr. X is not a lewd, because there is no such thing.

As shown in 2 in (49), the denial of asserted content does not lead to denial of evaluative content. Therefore, B_1' denial at (50) leaves the presupposed content intact. B_2 is denying presupposed content, i.e. denying that complying with certain features is bad. B_3' denial is, according to Cepollaro and Stojanovic, a metalinguistic denial of the presupposed content.

Showing rejection of the evaluative content triggered by the use of a slur is even more complicated than it is in the case of thick terms. In the first place, if we deny the asserted content while using of the slur, the result is that we deny that X (a person) can be said to be a Y (slur), but the use of Y remains offensive to the target group. When we offend someone using a slur, we humiliate that person and all the people who are members of the group to which the slur attributes some kind of badness. Then, denying someone's assertion without omitting the slur, only says that the person concerned does not belong to that group, but continues to classify membership in that group in a pejorative way. As Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016, pp. 466–467) point out, one of the most common ways of rejecting the evaluative content of a slur is by forbidding or correcting its use. Things like denying asserted content by using the non-pejorative term to refer to the group offended by the slur or directly saying, as Oscar Wilde would do, "the word '...' is not a word of mine" (See Foldy, 1997, quoted in Cepollaro and Stojanovic, 2016) are ways of carrying out this correction. Let's see some examples:

(51)   A: I think that Mr. X is a dago.
       B: You think that Mr. X is a Spaniard.

(52)   A: I heard that one of the most important left-wing politicians in the United States is a dago, isn't that great?
       B: Hey! Don't use that expression when you talk to me!...Indeed, one of the most important left-wing politicians in the United State is hispanic, and yes that is great.

Another way to show rejection of the evaluative content of a slur is, according to Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016, p. 467), making explicit "the derogatory meaning of slurs in pedagogical contexts." This is how B shows its rejection in (53):

(53)   A: I think that Mr. X is a dago.
       B: What you just said was really inappropriate because you are implying that there is something wrong with being Spaniard or Portuguese when there isn't.

4.6.2 The Role of "Good" and "Bad" in the Evaluative Presupposition

In what sense is the presupposition triggered by hybrid evaluative expressions *evaluative*? Let's see how Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016) explain the behavior of purely evaluative expressions, or *all-purpose* evaluative adjectives, as they call them, such as "good" and "bad" are—the sort of expressions involved in the evaluative presupposition. According to authors, expressions such as "good" and "bad" are highly *context-dependent* and *multidimensional*. Determining whether an object, an individual or event in a particular context is good or bad requires taking into consideration dimensions. And this may vary wildly from context to context. Let's see how Cepollaro and Stojanovic exemplify this idea:

> For example, consider the question whether some book is good. First, we contextually disambiguate "good" into meaning something like "good as a book." Second, we pay attention to a variety of criteria [dimensions] that are plausibly relevant to deciding whether a book is good: is it good in terms of its writing style? originality? complexity of the plot? impact on the public? accuracy of content? and so on. (Cepollaro & Stojanovic, 2016, pp. 469–470)

Among the dimensions by which we can say that a book is good are those by which we attribute aesthetic value to the book, those by which we attribute epistemic value, moral value, and so on. To the extent that "good" and "bad" are multidimensional adjectives, knowing that we are evaluating the aesthetic value of the book does not in itself allow us to know which dimension we can use to determine if the book is good, since the aesthetic values of a book can be varied— "its writing style," "originality," "complexity of the plot," etc. In addition to context-dependent and multidimensional, evaluative adjectives are gradable. To determine the truth-value of a statement such as (54) we need, on the one hand, to determine what is the scale (since "rich" is unidimensional in its most literal sense, the scale can only be one: wealth). Once we know the scale, we need to establish the threshold (the amount of money and/or property she own) above which we are willing to say whether or not Mary is rich.

(54)   Mary is rich.

For "good" and "bad" and other multidimensional adjectives to perform this task is more complicated. Multidimensionality and gradability make all-purpose evaluative adjectives highly context-dependent expressions. For this reason, the evaluative presupposition triggered by hybrid evaluative expressions will be, as Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016, p. 472) note, "underspecified in meaning." In the case of thick terms, descriptive content, although multidimensional, may help to partially constrain the meaning of the thin term involved in the evaluative presupposition.

> It is important to keep in mind that neither in the case of "generous" nor in the case of "balanced" is the associated evaluation interpreted along the lines of "good *in all moral respects* because of being willing to give without expecting anything in return" or "good *in all aesthetic respects* because of being harmonious in arrangement." [...] Instead, we should read the evaluative presuppositions along the lines of "good *in this-and-that respect* because of ...," where the context helps figuring out which respects qualify as "this and that respect." (Cepollaro and Stojanovic, 2016, p. 475).

Slurs have a less specific descriptive content than thick terms do. [49] For this reason, the content of the evaluative presupposition associated with slurs, rather than being of the type "good *in this-and-that respect* because of ..." is instead a "bad *in all (or most) respects* because of being (...)." As the authors point out:

> In many cases, the slur will trigger the interpretation "bad in all (or most) respects because of being (...)." This, we think, is one of the reason why slurs are so strongly evaluative and thereby so pernicious (Cepollaro and Stojanovic, 2016, p. 476).

In summary, the proposal of Cepollaro and Stojanovic defends that evaluative hybrid expressions have, on the one hand, a descriptive content, and on the other hand, a presupposed evaluative content. In the case of thick terms, this presupposition can be expressed along these lines: "good *in this-and-that respect*

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[49]There might be some exceptions to this idea, though, slurs whose associated stereotype, either in general or as used in a particular context, contains not only an overall negative take on the group, but also further specified negative features of it.

because of ...". For example, to say that someone is "generous" conveys, on the one hand, the descriptive content "disposed to give without expectations of a compensation" and the presupposed content "good *in this-and-that respect* because of willing to give without expecting compensation." Where "this-and-that respect" may be constrained by some aspect of the descriptive content of the expression "generous," for example, "good economically speaking because of willing to give without expecting compensation." Something similar happens with slurs. To say of someone that he is a "dago," conveys, on the one hand, the content that he is a native Spanish-speaker. Moreover, on the other hand, it conveys the presupposed content that he is "bad in all (or most) respects because of look-like Spaniard or Portuguese." As we said before, this presupposed content can be somewhat more specific depending on the associated stereotype. In those cases, the stereotype being exploited might be more specific, a stereotype associating a negative view to the group "in some respects," rather than "in all (or most) respects."

4.6.2.1   Objections to Cepollaro and Stojanovic's Proposal

The presuppositional approach defended by Cepollaro and Stojanovic is a subtle proposal that focuses on what they call "hybrid evaluative expressions." These expressions have, as we have already seen, both a descriptive and an evaluative component. A special type of presupposition that they call an evaluative presupposition provides the evaluative component. The content of this presupposition is something like *X is good in this-and-that respect* (where "in this-and-that respect" is specified by the descriptive content associated with the thick term, or that associated with the slurring word).

In Cepollaro and Stojanovic's proposal, the evaluative component of a statement containing a thick term such as "generous" triggers the presupposition that people who give to others without expecting anything in return are good in a way. This presupposition is evaluative insofar as it contains an evaluative expression such as "good." But what does "good" mean? Placing the evaluative component at the level of presuppositions does not solve *per se* the question of what it is to evaluate. Presuppositions, as well as implicatures, can be descriptive or evaluative. What distinguishes then an evaluative presupposition from a descriptive one? The

mere presence of the term "good" in the presupposition cannot by itself explain the difference, since there are descriptive statements containing "good" as well.

The answer that the authors provide is that "good" is a multidimensional, gradable, and therefore highly context-dependent expression. However, in our opinion, something is missing in this analysis. Whatever dimensions a speaker takes into consideration to say that something is good, they can be considered as descriptions. Of a car we can say that it is good because "it is fast," "it is safe," "it has an engine with 150 horsepower," "it has tyres that grip the road even when it is wet," and so on. Some dimensions can include other evaluative expressions; we could say that the car is good because "it has an incomparable power" or that "the engine is manufactured by the best brand on the market." The evaluative expressions used in these dimensions could in turn split into more dimensions, those that we use to say that something is "incomparable" or that it is "the best brand" on the market. Throughout this story, however, something is missing that we think is fundamental when we make evaluations, namely, the action-guiding committments that the speaker acquires when she utters an evaluative expression, which are absent from merely descriptive ones. It requires more than describing the features of the object being assessed, what is missing is that which allows us to make a clear contrast between describing what the world is like, and establishing hierarchies according to a certain order within the world. It is difficult for me to make a clear distinction between describing and evaluating without appealing to some expressive ingredient, which is ultimately what allows us to select some dimensions rather than others, and enable us to give more or less weight to each of these dimensions. "Good" is not reducible to any of the dimensions or even to a particular set of dimensions plus information regarding the relative weight of these dimensions. Imagine two people arguing whether the painting in front of them is good or bad. For Álvaro the painting is good because "good" means "to be figurative" and "to be colourful." For Efra the painting is not good because "good" means "not to be offensive" and "to be abstract."

(55)   Álvaro: This painting is good.

(56)   Efra: This painting is not good.

As Gibbard (2003, pp. 23–29) points out, by echoing Moore (1922b)'s *"What at issue?"* argument, Efra cannot give voice to his disagreement by uttering:

(57)   Efra: This painting is offensive and not abstract.

The reason is that while (56) contradicts (55), (57) does not contradict (55). Therefore, (56) and (57) cannot mean the same thing. In other words, Álvaro cannot coherently hold (55) and (56), while he can coherently hold (55) and (57). To account for the disagreement between Álvaro and Efra, we have to appeal to some expressive aspect that allows us to explain why there is a conflict between both of them when they say "this painting is good" and "this painting is not good," even when they take different dimensions into account. This is not, however, a fatal objection to the presuppositional approach. We believe that part of the analysis can be maintained by incorporating an expressive element that makes it possible to capture the difference between describing something and evaluating something.

In part, we think it is the expressive ingredient that allows us to explain why the retraction of evaluative expressions such as slurs requires such specific interventions, if we compare it with the withdrawal of a merely descriptive claim. It seems that not every evaluations can be retracted simply by denying an assertion made in the past.

4.7   Expressivism and Expressive Meaning

In this section, we intend to provide the expressivist framework that we think will account for the desiderata that a theory of perspectival expressions should accommodate. Within perspectival expressions, we can distinguish between those that function as second-order predicables, and those that work as first-order predicables. In section 4.7.1, we explain the position defended by Frápolli and Villanueva (2012, 2018) called minimal expressivism. We conclude that this position allows explaining those perspectival expressions that function as second-order predicables. In section 4.7.2, we set out the limits of minimal expressivism, and lay out how this position could be enriched to account for the expressive meaning involved in perspectival expressions, both second and first order.

4.7.1   Minimal Expressivism

The term "expressivism" designates a family of theories all of which are closely related by some basic commitments and, at the same time, set apart by other

non-fundamental ones. Four theses are usually used to characterise a proposal as expressivist, accroding to Frápolli and Villanueva (2012). A theory can be deemed "expressivist" if it embraces at least two of the four theses below:

> **(1)** *Higher-order functions* (HOF). There are natural-language expressions with the following structural properties: they are non-extensional, non-truth-conditional functions of propositions. At least one of the items of the following list can be analyzed along these lines: belief, knowledge, necessity, possibility, good, bad, right, wrong.
>
> **(2)** *Non-descriptivism* (ND). These terms are not used to describe the way the world is.
>
> **(3)** *Truth-conditional status* (TCS). Expressions containing these terms lack truth conditions, even though they are syntactically correct: they are not 'truth-apt'.
>
> **(4)** *Attitude expressions* (AE). These terms are used to express some attitude A towards a particular piece of content. (Frápolli and Villanueva, 2012, p. 471)

HOF claims that some predicables are functions that do not take objects but whole propositions (or other predicables) as arguments (Williams, 1992). *Functions of propositions* are used to build propositions by taking other propositions as their arguments[50]. These functions of propositions, as a whole, are neither truth-functional, nor truth-conditional, in a sense. They do not alter the content of the propositions that embedded under its scope, they rather set out instructions for its evaluation. Some examples may shed light on this idea:

(58)   Lucía: "It is possible Matt Murdock is Daredevil."

(59)   Naiara: "It is good that Matt Murdock is Daredevil."

(60)   Nef: "Foggy knows that Matt Murdock is Daredevil."

(58), (59) and (60) share, in a sense, the same content. What Lucía says to be possible is what Naiara says to be good, and what Nef claims that Foggy knows.

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[50]Functions of propositions are *second-order* predicables, but not all second-order predicables are functions of propositions. Some of them are functions of functions. Frápolli and Villanueva (2012, pp. 471-472) bring up *standard quantifiers*, some uses of *negation* and *conjunction* and *first-person operators* as instances of the latter.

The embedded proposition does not change because of the presence of the higher-order operator. What do change are the instructions to check whether the claim is true in all three cases the set of possible worlds with respect to which the very same proposition has to be evaluated. In this latter sense, as it seems obvious, (58), (59) and (60) have clearly different contents. In the more specific sense specified above, the one that determines the what is to be evaluated with respect to different sets of circumstances, (58), (59) and (60) share the same content.

Containing operators that lack truth-conditional (descriptive) import, in this sense, does not imply that the whole claim is not truth-apt, though, as it seems to follow from some interpretations of Ayer's . The occurrence of "it is good that," "it is true that," etc., does not block the composition of the embedded proposition's content and its truth-aptness. Neither does it follow from this analysis that expressions that can take propositions instead of objects as arguments cannot also take objects as arguments. What seems to be peculiar about these expressions is that, unlike first-order predicables, they can take other predicables as arguments. This is just a logical-syntactic feature of this type of predicables.

ND points out that perspectival expressions are not used to describe what the world is like, i.e., they are not used to describe objects, to attribute properties to objects or relations between objects. As Frápolli and Villanueva note: "A complete description of the world would not be altered by our talking about good or bad actions, ascriptions of truth, discourse about things that might have been different, people's beliefs, etc." (Frápolli and Villanueva, 2012, pp. 472-473).

ND has been systematically tied to the TCS thesis. TCS submits that sentences containing perspectival expressions are not truth-apt. According to Frápolli and Villanueva:

> if second-order concepts do not describe, and we believe that the content of a complex expression is a function of the content of the parts (the classical Principle of Compositionality), then having a 'gap' introduced by a content-less second-order expression would be equivalent to saying that the entire expression lacks content. (Frápolli and Villanueva, 2012, p. 474)

However, as we have already said, NS does not imply TCS. The fact that a higher-level predicable does not contribute anything to the content of the embedded

proposition does not imply that this expression precludes the whole claim for having a truth-value (the thesis that from TCS follows ND is what the authors call *the myth of the inheritable gap*).

These are three negative theses about what the expressions which concern the expressivist are not, or how they do not work. Many expressivists have gone further and have also provided a positive account of what these expressions are and what their function is. This is what the AE deals with. Expressivists have claimed that if these expressions do not do the job of describing, then they should do the job of expressing some non-doxastic attitude, such as the expression of a feeling, an emotion, the acceptance of norms, and the like. This thesis has historically been linked to ND and TCS, even though they are, as Frápolli and Villanueva (2012, p. 471) point out, logically independent. It is the conjunction of these three theses, Ayer's emotivism as explained in Section 4.3 being a well-established illustration, which has given rise to the Frege-Geach problem that we introduced in Section 4.3.1. A proposal that breaks the supposed link between ND and TCS avoids the Frege-Geach problem understood in these terms.

A proposal is minimally expressivist if it endorses theses HOF and ND, as well as a modification of TCS, that we can call TCI. TCI (truth-conditional irrelevance) states that second-order predicables do not modify the truth-conditions of the expressions that fall under their scope (Frápolli and Villanueva, 2012, p. 478). TCI, these authors claim, necesarily follows from HOF and ND. Minimal expressivism makes it possible to explain those cases in which perspectival expressions behave syntactically as functions of propositions. The role performed by them is to *modify the circumstances of evaluation of the propositions within their scope* (Frápolli and Villanueva, 2018, p. 19).[51] However, there are perspectival expressions that behave syntactically as first-order predicables, and the theses that serve to explain the former do not necessarily allow to account for the latter. Characterizing expressivism in this minimal way is compatible with different explanations

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[51]A proposal similar to that defended by minimal expressivism for second-order predicables can be found in the modal analysis of "ought" supported by Chrisman (2015, 2018). Inspired by some classics such as Kant and Frege and making use of the resources provided by modal logic and formal semantics, Chrisman defends a nondescriptivist proposal of normative concepts such as "ought," according to which, "ought" is a modal operator that "do not function to describe things in reality. [...] does not add descriptive content to the statements in which it figures." (Chrisman, 2018, p. 411)

of what determines the selection of specific circumstances of evaluation associated with some function of proposition or other. This is usually done in terms of the expression of non-cognitive attitudes, but minimal expressivism leaves the door open to non-psychologistic explanations as well.

4.7.2 A Step Forward from Minimal Expressivism

Perspectival expressions, such as some thick terms, also can function as higher-level predicables. Constructions as the following seem grammatically correct[52]:

(61) It is brave that they risk their lives to get their just claims.

(62) It is generous of you to work overtime to pay for your friend's operation.

(63) It is cowardly of you not to want to come.[53]

HOF is met for most thick terms. However, ND does not seem to be met, as we have seen in Section 4.6, by thick terms, as they have been traditionally characterised, since they have descriptive component in addition to an evaluative one. To the extent that thick terms have a descriptive component, they must provide some descriptive content to the statements in which they appear, and they must modify the truth-conditions of these statements. Then, TCI is also not hold for thick terms. There is, therefore, a tension between HOF, on the one hand, and ND and TCI, on the other. We could claim that the distinction between thin and thick terms does not depend upon the former not providing descriptive content while the latter doing so. Alternatively, we could claim that there is no such a distinction. Finally, we could argue that being a higher-level predicable should not be at odds with the fact that in addition to having an expressive meaning, these expressions also provide descriptive content, against HOF.

Minimal expressivism only have the first two options available, since the third one is against HOF. The most moderate of these available options, is one in which

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[52]In Spanish, all thick terms, at least most of them, are susceptible of being used as a second-order predicables by adding something like "por tu parte." The formulation "Es [thick term] por tu parte que" is grammatical. The English equivalent would be "it is [thick term] of you to."

[53]The syntactic structures applied in these cases were scrutinised in the *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/), the *Online OXFORD Collocation Dictionary* (http://www.freecollocation.com), *Reverso Context* (https://context.reverso.net/traduccion/) to check whether or not they were grammatical.

thin and thick terms are distinguished using a criterion different from the distinction between descriptive and evaluative. The most radical option claiming that the distinction between thick and thin terms is meaningless. The aim of the remainder of this section is to explore the moderate path opened to by minimal expressivism. We think this option will allow accommodating the desiderata derived from Chapter 2 to explain perspectival expressions.

The thesis that we tentatively explore in this section starts from minimal expressivism but goes further. Perspectival expressions can function as higher-level predicables or as first-order predicables. When these expressions function as higher-level predicables they only have expressive meaning. That is, these expressions do not modify the content of the proposition embedded under the scope of such operators. They do not provide, following Lewis' (1979) and Charlow (2014)'s terminology, locational information. But they obviously have a function. This expressive function, the kind of information that they provide, is usually twofold: on the one hand, it consists in modifying the circumstances of evaluation and, on the other hand, in ranking the available possible worlds, after making certain partitions in the logical space, according to a particular order. We call this type of information "orientational information" (*see, eg.*, Lewis (1979) and Charlow (2014)). Except for some higher-level predicables such as "it is possible that" or "it is necessary that"—there may be more examples of this type—whose meaning seems to consist only in modifying the circumstances of evaluation, most of the expressions that function as higher-level predicables seem to make this double conversational expressive contribution (for example, "know," "ought," "correct," etc.). Perspectival expressions that function as first-order predicables, on the other hand, seem to have the expressive function of ranking the available possible worlds, after making certain partitions in the logical space, according to a particular order. Only when perspectival expressions function as first-order predicables, they communicate also locational information—they allow, together with the other components of the statement, situating the actual world in a particular region of the logical space (e.g., "tasty" rules out worlds where I do not like the food, etc.). With this characterisation on the table, the distinction between thin and thick terms would be as follows: both types of terms can work in most cases as both first and higher-level predicables. Both thick and thin terms are multidimensional. What dimensions we consider and what weight we assign to each dimension is context-

dependent. The difference between thick and thin terms is that in the first case less context-dependence is involved in determining the dimensions and relative weights thereof than in the second case. This option does not contradict HOF, since HOF applies only to the role that higher-level predicables play. In our expressivist proposal, higher-level predicables, as predicted by Minimal Expressivism, only provide expressive, orientational meaning. Following Frápolli and Villanueva:

> Expressive meaning, in the sense in which we use the label here, only involves the following claim: that the semantic contribution of the terms at stake is not a conceptual ingredient of what is said. (Frápolli and Villanueva, 2018, p. 16)

The idea of expressive meaning is meant to characterise the evaluative character of perspectival expressions, it is not incompatible with defending that in addition to an expressive meaning, some perspectival expressions (those that function as first-order predicables) bring content to the *lekton*[54]. This is somehow the idea behind hybrid forms of expressivisms. Let's first look at an example of what it would be like to apply this analysis to a statement containing a thick term when it works as a higher-level predicable, and when it works as a first-order predicable:

(64)   It is brave that Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez fights the big corporations off.

In line with the expressivist proposal that we have just presented, in (64), "it is brave" works as a higher-level predicable. The propositional content is Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez fights the big corporations off, "it is brave" operates on this content both by modifying the circumstances of evaluation of such content and by proposing to split the logical space and ranking the subsets of possible worlds resulting

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[54]"Lekton" is the term used by Recanati (2007, p. 46) to refer to the permanent content of a sentence. The content deprived of all reference to agent, world, time and place. This content is relative since its truth-value will change depending on what agent, world, time or place we take to evaluate it—the lekton contrasts with another content that Recanati calls the *Austinian proposition*. The Austinian proposition is not relative because it includes all the parameters necessary for such content to be complete and its truth-value to be fully determined. Using Recanati's example, the sentence "It is raining" expresses, in a sense, the same content in each occasion of use. Its truth or falsity will depend on what time and place we take into consideration when evaluating its truth or falsity. This stable content is the lekton. The complete content, or Austinian proposition, will include the relevant time and place in the context of use. If the statement "It is raining" was uttered by Alex on April 14, 2019, in Granada at 17:50, the Austinian proposition will be "It's raining in Granada on April 14, 2019, at 17:50."

from this partition according to a certain order (for instance, by ranking possible worlds in which people who act as AOC are politically preferable to those worlds in which people do not act as AOC). The expressive meaning can be specified as those instructions that tell us how to rank the possible worlds available to speakers in the common ground. When expressions such as "brave" function as higher-level predicables, they do not provide locational information. A case like (64) seems to contain only the locational information that the embedded content provides.

Consider now case (65), a case in which "brave" is a first-order predicable:

(65)   Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is brave.

The hybrid analysis we embrace to explain how first-order predicables work defends that "brave" provides both locational and orientational information. In this case, the orientational information does not consist in indicating how we should evaluate the truth or falsity of the claim in question, but only in making partitions within the logical space and ranking the resulting sets of worlds according to a certain order. The locational information provided by an expression such as "brave" depends on the dimensions we select, which, as we have already said, are context-dependent. The locational content of a statement such as 65, which is given by the dimension we have selected, namely, being ready to face and hard danger or pain, then 65 tells us that the actual world is one in which AOC has that property, and this is what allows us to locate the actual world in the logical space.

We think that it is important that in the remainder of this section we present the parallels and differences between this hybrid character of our proposal and other hybrid expressivist proposals that it looks like. According to some hybrid expressivim (Gibbard 1990, 2003; Chrisman 2007)[55], (65) is not used to describe AOC as having the property of being a brave politician, but to express a complex state of mind consisting of two things: a) the belief that AOC has mental or moral strength to face danger, fear, or difficulty in politics; b) the expression of a conative state of mind by means of which the speaker proposes herself as someone who ranks those worlds in which people are mentally or morally strong to face danger, fear, or difficulty as preferable to those in which people behave oppositely.

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[55]Henceforth, we focus on a version of hybrid expressivism that we previously called two-tier expressivism. Above all, we focus on Gibbard (1990, 2003) and Chrisman (2007)'s proposals.

The expressivist's strategy consists on adopting what Gibbard (1990, 2003, 2012) calls an *oblique* analysis: "[...] whereas a straight analysis of a term offers a synonymous phrase, an expressivist's oblique explanation of a term explains the states of mind that the term serves to help express" (Gibbard, 2012, p. 224). As we have said, we do not use evaluative expressions to describe how our world is, or we do not use them just for that, but to express some non-cognitive attitude towards the world: individuals, actions, and so on.

It is a well-established assumption in contemporary debates that expressivism implies internalism about mental content (see for instance: Chrisman, 2011; Bar-On and Sias, 2013). This means that, according to the expressivist, to express a state of mind is to *voice* the state of mind in which one *is*. There are good reasons to reject this internalism or psychologism commonly associated with expressivism. We can find in Gibbard, as Frápolli and Villanueva point out, non-psychologistic elements that bring Gibbard closer to an inferentialist than to an internalist way of thinking about mental states:

> His [Gibbard] expressivism is not committed to the idea that every time that a speaker uses 'is rational', there is a certain mental state popping in her head. Rather, our evaluations are used to make certain commitments explicit. Expressing a conative state of mind is purporting oneself as an agent of which many other things can be truly predicated. (Frápolli and Villanueva, 2018, p. 18)

To be in a mental state, then, consists in being someone about whom it makes sense to make certain statements, as well as being someone from whom to expect certain courses of action. Gibbard (2003) can be read as saying something close to this, even though the way he speaks reveals that he still accepts a sense of "mental state" in the vein of an internalist interpretation of expressivism. In particular, he says that to express a mental state does not require to be in that mental state, in the sense of having that internal state. All it requires is for the speaker to present herself as someone who's in it: "[w]hen I say he 'expresses' a belief, I don't mean he has that belief. To express a state of mind, as I use the term, is to *purport to have it*, whether or not one does" (Gibbard, 2003, p. 77, our emphasis). For us, however, there is nothing to being in a mental state beyond to purport oneself to have it.

The point of a non-internalist expressivism can be implemented by using Charlow's (2014, p. 639) distinction between *locational* and *orientational* information (Charlow is influenced by Lewis 1979). Locational information, as we have said, allows us to place ourselves and the actual world in the logical space, by reducing the set of possible worlds in which it is possible that we are located. Orientational information, on the other hand, serves other purposes —for instance, making certain partitions on the logical space and ordering the worlds in it. The expressivist thesis can be rendered as stating that the sentences in which the expressivist focuses her attention do not convey locational information when they are higher-order predicables, but orientational information; and convey locational and orientational information when they are first-order predicables.[56] A content is propositional when the information conveyed is locational, that is when it allows us to locate the actual world in the logical space. When the information conveyed does not allow locating the actual world in the logical space, but it allows to carry out partitions of the logical space and make a ranking of those partitions, that information is nonpropositional and is orientational, rather than locational.

As we have seen, many authors have argued in favour of the multidimensional character of evaluative adjectives (*cf.* Sassoon, 2013; McNally and Stojanovic, 2017; Cepollaro and Stojanovic, 2016; Sundell, 2016). Each dimension may be part of the locational information provided by the utterance containing the evaluative expression in question. If a speaker says, "This baked fish is delicious," "delicious" significantly contributes to the locational information associated with the claims. For example, this baked fish has texture X and taste Y. X and Y may, in turn, contain evaluative expressions (e.g., thick terms), these evaluative expressions will provide locational information. And the evaluative component will be in line with the evaluative component of the main claim, the orientational information of the main claim.

The idea that we think it is important to retain is that we need to explain that when we use certain expressions to evaluate we provide content that is not propositional. Our proposal is only exploratory. The crucial point is that expressivism highlights an aspect that is, in our opinion, unavoidable: not everything we do when we make evaluations is to contribute propositional content to what

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[56]As we will see in Chapter 5, section 5.6, covert dogwhistles are an exception to this. Covert dogwhistles are first-order predicables that do not provide locational information.

we say. Only expressivism, in some of its variants, puts this aspect at the heart of the distinction between describing and evaluating. Our proposal is an attempt to uphhold this contribution of expressivism without incurring the problems of inconsistency that other traditional versions have faced.

4.7.3 Disanalogy, Nonfactual Disagreements and Retraction

The expressivist proposal that we have just submitted can deal with the three desiderata that we stipulated in Chapter 2. The first of these desiderata was to give a satisfactory explanation of the disanalogy between describing and evaluating. Specifically, it should explain what we do when we tell stories like Story A and Story B. The expressivist proposal we advocate tells us that making evaluations is about doing things with words other than describing the world. As we have seen, perspectival expressions both when they function as higher-level predicables and when they function as first-order predicables provide expressive meaning. This expressive meaning is what makes our assertions, those containing expressions perspectivelly used, serve to make explicit our commitments to certain courses of actions. Making evaluations, as opposed to describing, is a linguistic action that serves to show to our interlocutors the way in which we perceive our world, providing the personal component (which is not necessarily subjective) that allows the same physical world to be different from agent to agent.

Nonfactual disagreements are, therefore, the kind of disagreement that takes place in contexts in which people make incompatible evaluations or normative claims. It is the result of proposing to rank things according to an order that precludes the order proposed by our contender. Since this ranking of worlds is not propositional in nature, nonfactual disagreements are to be understood, in this expressivist framework, as disagreements in attitudes. Whether it is the target of our disagreement what hinge commitments we should endorse, how we should use a particular expression, or how we evaluate the world around us, the same explanation can work for us. Since the perspectival use of an expression implies that the speaker conveys orientational information, information that is nonpropositional, at least part of what explains the existence of a nonfactual disagreement

is a conflict between nonpropositional or orientational contents. Then, nonfactual disagreements go beyond a disagreement at the level of what is said.

The retraction of a previous speech act implies undoing the commitments acquired at that moment. However, some commitments cannot be undone by merely denying the content of a past assertion. An assertion is related to other assertions, among other things, by the normative standard that enables them. We can support a particular standard, and the denial of that standard cannot be carried out by denying only an assertion that is supposed to be enabled by that standard. The fact that endorsement of those standards is a non-cognitive attitude means that the way we get rid of them cannot simply be to deny a particular claim as it occurs when we retract a factual claim.

4.8   Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, we have put forward several alternative proposals to those presented in the previous chapter. We have examined both their internal consistency and their potential to accommodate the desiderata that any theory on perspectival expressions should meet.

The last sections have been devoted to offering an exploratory expressivist proposal aimed at accommodating the desiderata mentioned above. If what we have said so far goes in the right direction, there is a nonpropositional, nonlocational element that needs to be accommodated if we want to account for the desiderata. In short, this nonpropositional dimension needs to be incorporated if we want to account for the evaluative component of language.

If the contribution of those expressions that are used evaluatively is, among other things, to provide an expressive meaning that is not articulated propositionally, any proposal that attempts to capture the expressive meaning by appealing to implicatures or presuppositions is doomed to failure. Both implicatures and presuppositions can be inferred from what is said. Therefore, the explanation of the expressive meaning cannot be provided by any of the theories that we have analysed in this chapter, from 4.4.2 to 4.6, at least as they are currently defended.

Part III

The Political Turn

5

A Case of Study: Political Dogwhistles

"Today, whenever politicians want to exploit white racist
animus for political gain they need not say the words
Niggers or *Nigras*, as did white southern segregationists.
They now need only mention the word *welfare*."

Neubeck and Cazenave, (2001, p. 3)

5.1   Introduction

Before opening this chapter, we think it is important to devote a few lines to
account for the reasons behind the title of the third part of this dissertation: The
Political Turn.

Many, and increasingly more, philosophers across different disciplines within
the analytic tradition have lately focused on critical societal challenges as the si-
lencing and questioning of the credibility of oppressed groups, the political polari-
sation threatening the stable functioning of democratic societies across the globe,
or the moral and political significance of gender, race or sexual orientation (see
e.g. Ayala, 2015, 2016, 2018; Díaz-León, 2015, 2017b; Fricker, 2007; Haslanger,
2012, 2015; Langton 1993; Madva, 2016; Saul, 2018, 2019; Stanley, 2015).

The political turn in analytic philosophy consists in putting different conceptual and theoretical tools of disciplines traditionally alien to the political dimension such as epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind or metaphysics at the service of social and political change.

Of course, it is not about having a general interest in resisting irrationality, and its political consequences, an interest that we can already detect in many philosophers of the Vienna Circle, and outside of the analytic tradition for the very begining of the discipline. Nor it is about the personal interest of some authors, an interest more or less alien to their philosophical careers (e.g., Dummett on immigration and refugees, Chomsky on American politics, etc.). The aim pursued in what we call the political turn of analytic philosophy has to do with combating specific injustices and using the conceptual tools of each particular discipline to tackle and offer further ways of detecting social injustices. This implies giving even more priority to having good proposals to explain cases in which things do not work well, although this implies having difficulties in accounting for cases in which things work well. Finally, it is not a question of doing political philosophy from a more or less analytic perspective, as Nussbaum or Rawls do, for example. It is about making political philosophy of language, political epistemology or political metaphysics in the sense of putting in the centre of the worries that the discipline cares about the injustices related with each sphere, instead of banal cases unconnected to the social difficulties that disadvantaged groups face (see, e.g. Pinedo and Villanueva, 2018).

Stanley's works on propaganda, Haslanger's ameliorative project to deal with categories such as RACE or GENDER, or Fricker's works on epistemic injustice are, in the sense that interests us, paradigmatic cases of what we call the political turn.

This chapter is part of what we call the political turn in Analytic Philosophy. The aim is to put a traditionally alien discussion in relation to social injustices—the discussion about perspectival expressions an certain common forms of promoting injsutices. At least in the sense that interests us here: what role do some evaluative uses of language in political discourse play. In this chapter, we explore what *political dogwhistles* consist in, which features, in particular, characterises this kind of speech act, etc. But before focusing on dogwhisltes in politics, we analyse the more general phenomenon of dogwhisltes to offer a better understanding of its mechanics.

In 5.2, we present in a general way the phenomenon of dogwhistles. We focus on their origin and their use in the political arena. In section 5.3, we bring forward Saul's taxonomy of dogwhistles. We complete this taxonomy by including a more detailed analysis of the type of audiences involved when a dogwhistle is uttered. In section 5.4, we pay special attention to the political manipulative character of dogwhistles. We defend here that in Saul's taxonomy could be suplemented. Section 5.5 is devoted to introducing the debate between structuralists and individualists around social injustice (we use testimonial injustice as a paradigmatic case). With this we intend, assuming the associative character, and therefore not propositional, of covert dogwhistles, to explain how both dimensions, structuralist and individualist, are necessary to account for and resist dogwhistles. Covert dogwhistles are the centre of our study. Their peculiar nature suggests that traditional mechanisms to explain other kinds of not-at-issue content are not of great help in accounting for this type of dogwhistles. In section 5.6, we argue in favour of the associative character of covert dogwhistles by comparing them with how presuppositions and implicatures work. To accomplish this task, we use what we call *Test of retraction*. The last section is devoted to drawing some consequences from this chapter. In particular, we defend that a proposal about perspectival expressions like the one presented in Chapter 4 is in the right path to explain covert dogwhistles.

5.2   A General Overview of The Speech Act of Dogwhistle

The object of study of this second part of the dissertation is the speech act of dogwhistle, as it is carried out in the political arena. But first of all let's say something about the origin of the expression. According to Witten (2014), Khoo (2017) and Saul (2018), the first recorded appearance of the metaphorical use of the term "Dogwhistles" took place in a published article in The Washington Post, written by Richard Morin on October 16, 1988.

> Subtle changes in question—wording sometimes produce remarkably different results—and sometimes those differences themselves tell you something of considerable interest. [...] Anyway, researchers call this

the "Dog Whistle Effect": Respondents hear something in the question
that researchers do not. (Morin, 1988)

In that article, Morin presented some methodological shortcomings of public opinion polls: sample size, the order in which questions are asked of respondents, and
how words are used in their questions. The so-called *dogwhistle effect* referring
to how respondents interpret the questions they are asked, either by the use of
certain expressions involved or by the order in which they are given to them. In
this way, respondents hear something that researchers miss.

Nowadays, the term draws attention to more concrete political phenomena.
Initially, and partially following Witten (2014, p. 1), "dogwhistle" usually refers
to a political manipulation that some politicians (or ideologically aligned media)
deliberately carry out for political gains[57]. This political manipulation can be
accomplished in at least two ways (Saul, 2018): on the one hand, they address a
message to an audience with at least two possible interpretations. One of these is
coded and affects only a subset of the audience (overt dogwhistles). On the other
hand, they seek to promote negative attitudes in the audience without the audience
being aware of it (covert dogwhistles). As Stanley (2015) points out, dogwhistle
or demagoguery, as he calls it, is a form of propaganda speech act commonly used
in liberal democracies where speeches, that explicitly violate "ideals of liberty and
equality," (p. 52) are strongly rejected by the public. One strategy for undermining
these ideals without immediate rejection is then to do so covertly, either to the
entire audience or to part of it.

Here is a well-known case that might fit in the tentative definition just provided, one which have been introduced in the opening quotation of this chapter:
the racial implications of the term "welfare." According to Neubeck and Cazenave
(2001, p. 3) both U.S. Democrats and Republicans politicians (for example Goldwater, Nixon, Reagan, Duke, and Clinton) have long "forged and exploited the
link between 'race' and 'welfare' to such a degree that the two terms are now politically and culturally inextricable." Many authors have echoed this link between
race and welfare, as well as its possible effects on the political attitudes of both

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[57]Dogwhistles can also be used to promote desirable values in our societies, or they can just
be used for non-political purposes, as Saul (2018) and Witten (2014) have highlighted, but here
we will focus on their politically perverse use as a concealed mechanism, at least to a part of the
electorate, of political manipulation.

African American and White American voters (see e.g. Quadagno, 1994; Gilens, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino, 2002; Hurwitz, 2005). They consistently conclude that the expression "welfare" has racial connotations, mostly, but not only for White American voters, affecting their political attitudes by unconsciously influencing them.

A notable example is the following speech by Ronald Reagan in New Hampshire during the Republican presidential primary in 1976:

> In Chicago, they found a woman who [...] used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans' benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare. Her tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year.

Reagan is describing here a caracter that receives the nickname "welfare queen." His speech apparently has nothing to do with race. Strictly speaking, Reagan is only voicing opposition to specific redistribution programs that, according to him, do not really help the most disadvantaged, but only serve to perpetuate their dependent position and offer opportunities for free-riders to take advantage of the good faith of the taxpayers. However, a common tactic among conservative and liberal American politicians opposing the American Welfare State is to criticise programs such as the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) "for discouraging work and family formation and for rewarding laziness. [They] are really subtly veiled messages about family structures and employment patterns among African Americans." (Quadagno, 1994, p. 117). This is exactly what Reagan appeals to in his speech above. Even without making explicit mention of race, Reagan was targeting African American mothers on welfare. As Neubeck and Cazenave (2001, p. 127) note, "[p]rior to the abolition of AFDC, it remained one of the chief negative controlling images of African-American mothers on welfare that was used by political elites and others who were outspokenly critical of welfare." These assosiations between "welfare" and "African Americans" are based on racial stereotypes such as beliefs that black people are lazy and free-riders.

These stereotypes play an important role in whether or not someone can hear the particularly racial pitch of the whistle. In general, the effectiveness of dog-whisles lies in their ability to promote attitudes in an audience, directing their

actions even without them realising, in this case by changing the voting intentions of part of the constituency.

5.3   Saul's Taxonomy of Political Dogwhistles

Thus far we have argued that dogwhistles are a kind of *deliberate* political manipulation. However, as we will see throughout the following sections, this is not a necessary condition. Following Saul ([2018](#)), dogwhistles can be either *intentional* or *unintentional* depending on whether the speaker carries out the dogwhistle deliberately or not—although one cannot always recognise whether a particular case was intentional. Further, dogwhistles can also be *overt* or *covert* by virtue of whether the target audience realises that a dogwhistle is being addressed to them.

Before moving into the taxonomy drawn by Saul, it is important to introduce some refinements in regards to the types of audiences that are involved when carrying out a dogwhistle for a better understanding of the phenomenon under consideration. Both in the case of *overt dogwhistles* and *covert dogwhistles*, for a dogwhistle to be effective, at least two audiences are needed. The *general audience* that is constituted by all those who hear the speaker's speech, and another, the *target audience* which is a subset of the first one, is formed by those for whom the dogwhistle is expected to have some effect. We call that part of the audience for which the dogwhistle is intended to be ineffective *non-targeted audience*. However, these audiences are not necessarily homogeneous. Within each audience, we can find subgroups of hearers. For overt dogwhistles, on the one hand, in the target audience, we can get those who explicitly hold the ideology to which the speaker appeals. On the other hand, in the non-targeted audience, we can find a) those who ignore the existence of the coded message; b) those who are aware of the coded message even though they are not the intended recipients of it. In the case of *overt dogwhistles* the target audience is aware of being targeted. In the case of covert dogwhistles, on the other hand, the target audience is oblivious to the fact that it is being targeted. Here we have, within the target audience, those who explicitly defend the prejudices that the speakers intend to exploit, even if they do not realise that they are being targeted because of it; those who do not explicitly support those prejudices, but harbour them even if implicitly. Within the non-targeted audience, we can find those who become aware of the covert dogwhistle,

at least after a certain moment. Some, those who do not share the strategy and
can publicly denounce, with or without success, that the speaker is carrying out
this kind of covert appeal. Others, those who share the strategy and might remain
silent. Provided that both target and non-targeted audience are heterogeneous, it
is at least conceptually possible to think that the same dogwhistle can be *overt*
and *covert* at the same time for the different groups within the audience (see chart
5.1).

Figure 5.1: Variety of audiences involved in dogwhistles.

Therefore, once these nuances have been introduced, and following the character-
ization of Jennifer Saul previously presented, we can obtain four ways in which
dogwhistles can be presented in speeches: 1) *overt intentional dogwhistles*, 2) *covert
intentional dogwhistles*, 3) *overt unintentional dogwhistles*, and 4) *covert uninten-
tional dogwhistles*. Let's start with the first category.

5.3.1   Overt Intentional Dogwhisltes

In an overt intentional dogwhistle, the speaker intends to send a two-fold message:
one being sent to the general audience—the uncoded message, and another—the
coded message—being sent to a part of that audience that can recognise this inten-

tion (Witten, 2014). Witten's characterisation of dogwhistles perfectly captures this idea:

> A dogwhistle is a speech act designed, with intent, to allow two plausible interpretations, with one interpretation being a private, coded message targeted for a subset of the general audience, and concealed in such a way that this general audience is unaware of the existence of the second, coded interpretation. (Witten, 2014, p. 3)

Witten (2014, p. 4) provides a fine-grained analysis of how overt intentional dogwhisltes work. According to her, there are ten criteria to be considered in determining whether or not a speech act is a dogwhistle, some of which have already been identified. In terms of the elements that constitute the speech act itself, we can say, following Witten, that a dogwhisle is an intentional speech act with at least "two salient, plausible interpretations." It may be packaged in "a single lexical item, an utterance, or even a series of utterances" (p. 4). This communicative act is composed of the following elements: the *speaker(s)*, the *general message*, "the uncoded, general interpretation of the utterance", the *dogwhistle message*, the coded one, the *general audience* that "includes all possible hearers", and the *target audience* that is a subset of the general audience (p. 7). Members of the target audience are "the intended recipients of a dogwhistle message" (p. 8). Every member of the target audience is also a member of the general audience, but not the other way around.

In terms of the function of a dogwhistle, the speaker must know how to exploit the difference in the "common ground knowledge" of the audiences involved for the speech act to be effective. The target audience shares more common knowledge with the speaker than the general audience does, and therefore the target audience captures a message that goes unnoticed by the non-targeted audience[58] (p. 8). A dogwhistle can be a *failed* or a *successful* speech act depending on whether its message is heard only by the target audience or also by the general audience, being, of course, successful in the first case, and failed in the second (p. 8). When intentional, the dogwhistle must be based on a "compelling reason" that motivates

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[58]Witten does not provide a name to that set of the general audience that the dogwhistle message is not intended for. As we have introduced above, we call this part of the general audience non-targeted audience.

its concealment (p. 8). Witten, following Grice (1975/1989), considers that the contribution made by the speaker has to be *coherent* and *relevant*. Thus, what the speaker utters must "make sense and be in line with the overall messaging intent and identity of the speaker." Lack of coherence or relevance may cause members of the general audience to detect the dogwhistle message, or members of the target audience to lose sight of it, both resulting in a failed dogwhistle (p. 9). Finally, Witten (2014, p. 9) uses a *Conversation Analysis* framework, concluding that to evaluate what a speaker say through an utterance we must consider the hearer's response to that utterance. This procedure is known as the *next-turn proof procedure*.[59]

5.3.1.1 Bush and the *Wonder-working Power*

Politicians, at least in the United States, often employ religious expressions in their speeches to draw the attention of the most faithful voters. It is not just about attracting bigots' votes. It is also about showing one's own religiosity in a way that does not put others off. Through the use of religious expressions, politicians send messages to the religious population that are overlooked by the non-religious or anti-religious sector of the electorate, that might react with no empathy to a politician boasting their religiosity. George W. Bush's speech in the State of Union in 2003 is an example of this. About halfway through the speech, President Bush states:

> For so many in our country—the homeless, the fatherless, the addicted—the need is great. Yet there is power—*wonder-working power*—in the goodness, and idealism, and faith of the American people. (Transcript of Bush's speech in the Washintong Post)

According to Albertson (2015, p. 3), for many, "wonder-working power" means nothing, but for those who are especially familiar with the evangelistic hymn, "There is Power in the Blood," the expression is a precise reference to the power of Jesus. In fact, it is a literal expression of the refrain of the psalm:

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[59]The details of this procedure do not interest us here. These are part of the particular analysis that Witten offers to explain overt dogwhistles. For us, it is enough to characterise the phenomenon in detail.

> There is power, power, *wonder-working power*
> In the blood of the Lamb.
> There is power, power, *wonder-working power*
> In the precious blood of the Lamb.
> (*There is Power in the Blood*, writen by Lewis E. Jones, 1899)

Through the expression "wonder-working power," therefore, George W. Bush was winking at his most fanatical potential constituency. As Saul (2018, p. 362) has pointed out, Bush needed the support of this segment of the population and, at the same time, the support of many other moderate constituents who perceived Christian fundamentalism as radical and dogmatic. For this reason, Bush's speechwriters devised inclusive communication techniques to persuade a diverse electorate whose ideologies might even be exclusive.

As Albertson (2015, p. 7) observes, "[a] successful multivocal communication [She calls dogwhistles *multivocal communication*] occurs because the outgroup is not only oblivious to the more specific content of the reference, they are unaware a reference has even been made." Studies conducted by Albertson (2015) show that explicit or implicit religious messages are persuasive to members of the speaker's ingroup, while for members of the outgroup, explicit messages are not at all persuasive while implicit messages are as persuasive as an analogous discourse without any religious reference can be. Therefore, by using overt intentional dogwhistles, the speaker, in this particular case Bush, achieves his goal: to show complicity with one part of the audience without alienating the other.

5.3.1.2 The *City Upon a Hill*

At a 2008 campaign event, Sarah Palin, the Republican candidate for vice president of the United States, stated:

> And we believe in the promise of this country, in all the opportunities
> that we wish for ourselves, and for each other and for our sons and our
> daughters. And we believe that America is not the problem, America
> is the solution. We may not be a perfect nation, but we do learn from
> our mistakes, and we are that beacon of hope for all who seek equality
> and freedom and opportunity. And we still believe that America is that

shining city on a hill that Ronald Reagan used to speak of. (Palin, 2008)

The idea that America is a *city upon a hill* has its political origin in a speech delivered by President Kennedy in 1961. It was, however, popularised by Reagan's frecuent utterance of the phrase. Yet the phrase originates from Puritan John Winthrop and has a clear religious connotation. In 1630, Winthrop delivered a sermon to passengers of the *Arbella* known as "A Model of Christian Charity." At a key point in his speech, John Winthrop states:

> For we must consider that we shall be as a *city upon a hill*. The eyes
> of all people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God
> in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His
> present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through
> the world. (Winthrop, 1630)

Given the religious background of the expression "city upon a hill," it is reasonable to think that when Palin uses it (but also Kennedy, Reagan and many other Americans politicians), she is sending a coded message to the most religious sector of the audience. Thus, this coded message is an overt intentional dogwhistle. The general message that the less or non-religious audience will hear is that America is an exceptional country whose values must serve as an example to others countries. The target audience, however, will hear that America is sacred land, the embodiment of Christian values themselves. And this difference in what each segment of the population understands is essential because the values that each part of the audience will associate with America are very different, at one point, even contradictory. Thus, the realization of these values by the politician addressing the audience may have a deterrent effect on the public, and therefore may have an undesirable impact (for the politician concerned and her party) on the election results.

As Saul (2018, p. 363) points out[60], there is another possible understanding of what happens in some cases of overt dogwhistles. This second rendering consists of the target audience perceiving that the speaker, in this case, Sarah Palin, is one of them because she speaks the same idiolect as they do. This phenomenon

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[60]Saul does not analyse this particular case. But her analysis is valid for commenting on it.

is similar to when someone talks "in a regional accent," but unlike when someone speaks in a regional accent, the idiolect is recognised, again, only by a part of the general audience.

5.3.2   Cover Intentional Dogwhisltes

As we have seen, sometimes the dogwhistle is recognised as such by that part of the audience to which it is addressed. However, this target audience is often unable to recognise it, even though its political attitudes are affected by it. So what makes it so appealing is its power to mobilise a subset of the audience without their awareness. As Jennifer Saul points out:

> A dogwhistle that people fail to consciously recognize turns out to be a very powerful thing. I will call this a 'covert dogwhistle'. Such an utterance would appear on its face to be innocuous and unrelated to race—lending deniability if confronted with racism accusations. (Saul, 2018, p. 365)

This ability to assemble a part of an audience that does not recognise this intention in the speaker is tremendously useful as a mechanism of political manipulation. Covert dogwhistles play a crucial role in the demagogic character of many of the discourses taking place in liberal democracies. In them, as Stanley (2015) notes, making use of pejorative expressions or speeches that constitute an explicit violation of the fundamental values embodied by those societies can be politically very costly.

This mechanism is widely deployed, at least in the United States, for racial purposes.[61] Many authors have highlighted this point (see e.g. Quadagno, 1994; Gilens, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002; Hurwitz and Peffley, 2005; Haney-López, 2013; Stanley, 2015 and Saul, 2018), although not all of them called it "dogwhisltes"[62]. In what follows, we will focus on what Saul (2018) calls "covert intentional dogwhistles." Terms such as "welfare," "food stamp," and "inner city"

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[61]It would be more accurate to say that dogwhistles used for racial purposes have been the most studied. This does not mean, however, that this is their main application. There have to be many applications to gender, disability, class, etc. Many thanks to Jennifer Saul for raising this question.

[62]Only Haney-López (2013) and Saul (2018) do it.

are used by a significant part of the political elites andthe media to attack African-American citizens surreptitiously.

What motivates these elites and media to attempt to hide the racist nature of their discourses with implicit communication mechanisms such as dogwhistles? According to Mendelberg, (2001, p. 7), what motivates them to conceal their message is "to avoid violating the norm of racial equality." The norm of racial equality translates into the public rejection of very overt discrimination. However, as Saul (2018, p. 364) has stressed, this widespread assumption does not amount to anything like overcoming racism in American society. In fact, the commitment to this social norm, as Mendelberg (2001, p. 92) admits, is minimal, in many cases. Therefore, this norm of racial equality is compatible with different forms of subtle racism, as the growing *colorblindness* ideology [63], which, as Haney-López (2013, p. 79) notes, is tightly connected with the use of racial dogwhistles in public discourse. Colorblindness is the ideal breeding ground for elites to exploit implicit communication mechanisms such as dogwhistles and, in turn, to defend themselves against accusations of racism by playing the victim card.

Thus, dogwhistles, so understood, take advantage of racial—gender, class, etc.—prejudices of the target audience, sometimes explicit although not perceived as such, sometimes implicit. They mobilise these prejudices with the aim of achieving political gain. Analyzing some cases can be helpful in order to better understand the nature of this phenomenon.

5.3.2.1 The *Food Stamp President*

Newt Gingrich, one of the candidates for the Republican Party presidential nomination in 2012, had to deal with the accusations of racism that lot of people levelled at him for calling President Obama "the most successful *food stamp president* in American history." Here is what he literally said in one of his speeches during the campaign:

> Over here you have a policy which, with Reagan and me as speaker,
> created millions of jobs—it's called paychecks. Over [t]here you have

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[63]Colorblindness ideology "[...] laudably envisions an ideal world in which race is no longer relevant to how we perceive or treat each other." (Haney-López, 2013, p. 78). For an analysis of the different types of colorblindness see also Anderson (2017).

> the most successful *food stamp president* in American history, Barack
> Obama. (Newt Gingrich, quoted in Elliott, 2012)

Weeks after his statements, the American civil rights activist Al Sharpton, who
hosts the political talk show *PoliticsNation with Al Sharpton*, interviewed Newt
Gingrich. In the interview, Al Sharpton accuses Gingrich of making a racist use
of language in his criticism of President Obama's social policies, calling Barack
Obama the "food stamp president":

> Mr. Gingrich, [...] I have to ask you this kind of talk, this kind of
> language you use, is it just playing to the right wing, just playing to
> the far-right as David Gregory ask you with racially tinged language?
> Do you still defend now what you said? (Al Sharpton, 2012, MSNBC)

As we did in section 5.3.1.2, let us put Gingrich's words into context to under-
stand why the accusations made against him, in this particular case by Al Sharp-
ton, make sense. Although the data show the opposite, a significant portion of
the White American population thinks that those who benefit most from food
stamps[64] are African Americans[65]. This general misperception serves as a ground
for Gingrich's statements to trigger the implicit biases of that part of the audience
that is unknowingly racist. But, as we said above, there are not only implicit
biases at work here, there are also many explicit racial prejudices that are simply
not seen as such by those who harbor them. As Henry and Sears (2002) note, the
racism of those who believed that African Americans were biologically inferior and
supported segregation, lynching and others forms of racial discrimination is virtu-
ally non-existent in the United States.[66] However, this old-fashioned racism has

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[64]"Food stamps" is the popular term for what is currently known in the United States as the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).

[65]According to survey data from Delaney and Edwards-Levy for HuffPost, in 2018, 59% of
Americans thought that the most significant welfare recipients were either African Americans
or Whites and African Americans alike. However, according to data provided by the same
article, 36.2% of the recipients were white, compared to 25.6% who were African American. In
Al Sharpton's interview with Gingrich, the data that appears are those provided by the U.S.
Census Bureau in 2012. According to this study, 46% of food stamp recipients are White,
compared to 26% who are African American and 20% who are Hispanic.

[66]After Trump's victory in the USA (Bolsonaro in Brazil, Salvini in Italy, successes in favour
of Brexit, Vox winning seats in the Spanish parliament, etc.) racism and sexism (the latter in
the form of antifeminism) return to enjoy a level of tolerance unacceptable to our democracies.
Predictably, the more tolerable racism, sexism, homophobia, etc., becomes, the less necessary it
is to resort to disguised speeches such as dogwhistles.

been replaced by new forms of racism that Henry and Sears (2002) call *symbolic racism*[67]. They characterise it in the following way:

> [A] coherent belief system combining the following ideas: that racial discrimination is no longer a serious obstacle to blacks' prospects for a good life; that blacks' continuing disadvantages are due to their own unwillingness to take responsibility for their lives; and that, as a result, blacks' continuing anger about their own treatment, their demands for better treatment, and the various kinds of special attention given to them are not truly justified. (Henry and Sears, 2002, p. 254)

In such a context, a significant part of Gingrich's audience either endorses symbolic racism or harbors implicit racial biases or both. These attitudes, therefore, are the driving force behind the mobilisation of the conservative vote for racist reasons even when this happens, as we have said, surreptitiously.

5.3.2.2   The *Willie Horton Ad*

In the 1988 presidential election, Republicans launched an active campaign to favor their own candidate George H. W. Bush and attack his opponent, Democrat Michael Dukakis, then governor of Massachusetts. One of the issues that received the most attention in that campaign was that of crime. Republican-related groups—although Republican campaign chairman, James Baker, and other people involved in it, denied that they had anything to do with these groups–released an ad praising Bush's firm stance on combating crime—he supported the death penalty—and criticizing Dukakis' weakness in the face of crime, who opposed the death penalty and supported the granting of weekend passes[68]. The ad briefly tells the story of Willie Horton, a black man sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder in which he, in one of those furloughs, "fled, kidnapping a young couple, stabbing the man and repeatedly raping his girlfriend," as the narrator of the ad tell us. There was no mention of Horton being black during the ad. However, as

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[67]Symbolic racism or racial resentment, as Mendelberg (2001) calls it, are forms of racism that find support and justification in the ideology of colorblindness.

[68]Weekend passes politics allowed first-degree murderers sentenced to life imprisonment without parole to be granted furloughs, in a bid for criminal rehabilitation.

his case is reported, his image appears along with words such as "kidnapping," "stabbing" and "rape."

During a significant part of the election campaign, as Mendelberg (2001, p. 135) notes, no one had linked the ad to the issue of race. It was not until several months later that civil rights activist and Democratic presidential primary candidate Rev. Jesse Jackson blamed Bush's campaign for seeking to fuel racial tension. At first, most media and journalists were skeptical of Jackson's charges (p. 135). The Republicans categorically denied that the issue had anything to do with race. In fact, the Democrats were accused of "playing the race card." However, the data show a clear correlation between the Horton case and the improved Republican election results. During the primary period, as Mendelberg (2001, pp. 3–4) points out, Dukakis was in the polls ahead of Bush. This trend began to change when Bush first mentioned the Horton story in June 1988. The most significant advantage in Bush's polls over Dukakis came in October when the campaign focused vehemently on the Horton case. After the racial nature of Horton's advertisement became explicit, the voting trend began to change somewhat, though not enough for Dukakis to end up winning the presidential election.

The George H. W. Bush campaign, blamed for fuelling racial fears, worked implicitly, exploiting stereotypes and mobilizing the votes of the racial resentful. Currently, most analysts agree that this campaign, despite the Republicans' denials, did intentionally revolve around race[69] and had a significant influence on the election results. In a context in which the majority of the electorate assumes the norm of racial equality, explicitly communicating degrading messages to a segment of the population would be a huge political blunder. For this reason, such messages must be sent covertly. Its success rests precisely on its ability to promote attitudes in the audience that go unnoticed.

5.3.3   Unintentional Dogwhistles

Unintentional dogwhistles can be either overt or covert. Saul (2018) describes them as:

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[69]See Mendelberg (2001, pp. 140 and ff.) for an exhaustive analysis of the connections between the alleged independent group that launched the ad and prominent members of the Republican party.

> Unwitting use of words and/or images that, used intentionally, consti-
> tute an intentional dogwhistle, where this use has the same effect as
> an intentional dogwhistle. (Saul, 2018, p. 368)

As noted above, it is not always a simple matter to know whether a dogwhistle
was intended or not. The difficulty of evidencing that the dogwhistle was intended
is what allows, at least when it is covert, the possible denial by the speaker of the
dogwhistled message, and is what can confer some credibility on her.

As Saul (2018, p. 368) points out, one way to unintentionally reproduce a
dogwhistle is to reproduce the words that trigger the dogwhistle without know-
ing that those words will affect differently the target and the general audiences.
However, presumably, the reproduction by another speaker of the words that trig-
gered the dogwhistle will not always automatically cause the same effect on the
target audience. Therefore, reproducing it does not always imply that the speech
act of dogwhistle is taking place. Who performs the speech act is crucial for it
to have the expected effect on the hearers, and for it to be conceived by them
as the type of speech act that it is. An example can be helpful to understand
better what we mean. In 2016, in a speech delivered at the State of the Union,
then-President Obama said: "Food stamp recipients did not cause the financial
crisis. Recklessness on Wall Street did." As far as we know, no one blamed Obama
for using a language with racial undertones, much less for suggesting something
like "African Americans are free-riders," as some journalists accused Gingrich of
doing. Of course, there is no way Gingrich's and Obama's claims can semantically
refer to the African American population. Instead, it is that Gingrich's speech ac-
tivates certain associations related to the African American population, and that
is undoubtedly what Gingrich is trying to achieve, while Obama's speech is neither
intended nor able to activate these associations. The associations we make when
we hear certain expressions are closely linked to, among other things, the social
and political identity of the speaker.[70]

An example of unintentional dogwhistle is to use expressions from an idiolect
that is only known to a part of the audience. For instance, expressions that are
not explicitly religious for the general audience but for a part of that audience,

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[70]Kukla (2014, p. 445) has stressed the relevance of this point in explaining cases of *discursive injustice*.

those that are particularly religious, are. The speaker may not want to have any particular effect on the target audience using that language. She is merely speaking the way she usually does. So those who are members of the speaker's in-group may detect something in her words that have not been deliberately expressed by her.

As we said in the section 5.3, the same dogwhistle can be overt and covert simultaneously for different subsets of the audience. Let us look at a case of unintentional dogwhistles that, in our opinion, is overt and covert at the same time.

5.3.3.1 Albert Rivera's nationalist speech

In May 2018, the leader of the spanish political party *Ciudadanos* launched, together with other members of his party, the citizen platform *España Ciudadana*. A platform of "free" and "equal" citizens that "must serve to recover the country's self-esteem," launched "so that the citizens may once again believe in their democracy, in their institutions, in Spain [...], but modern, optimistic, democratic, European Spain." At the end of his speech, Rivera said the following:

> When I travel, when I step on this country, in every corner, I don't see reds and blues; I see Spaniards. I don't see, as itusually says, urban people and rural people; I see Spaniards. I don't see youngs or olds; I see Spaniards. I don't see any workers or employers; I see Spaniards. I don't see believers or agnostics; I see Spaniards. (Albert Rivera, May 20, 2018)

With this speech of "neither red nor blue, neither workers nor businessmen, neither believers nor agnostics," Rivera is pointing to the familiar feeling of an important part of the electorate he addresses. It is an electorate that feels comfortable positioned in an intermediate political space between the right and left of the ideological spectrum, at least on a discursive level. For this self-proclaimed "centre" electorate, the words of the Ciudadanos' leader are pure common sense. A looking-glass of a "modern" Spain that is tired of the right and the left, of Franco and the Republic, of oppressive employers and oppressed workers; a Spain that does not have to "ask for forgiveness" for being patriotic. To that part of the electorate, Rivera's words are not at all suspicious.

Nonetheless, a portion of the electorate Rivera is targeting is ultraconservative. An electorate that no one explicitly addresses because to do so would frighten the most moderate and those who are ultraconservative but do not know it, but which both *Partido Popular* and *Ciudadanos* are fighting over.[71] For the most politicized of the target audience, for those who recognize and pride themselves on being ultraconservative, Rivera's speech has a similar tone to that of the founder of the fascist party *Falange Española*, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. For them, the criticism of class discourse as well as the appeal to Spanish nationalism over and above regional differences are the backdrop to both speeches. Let us look back and remember the words of Primo de Rivera:

> The movement we are initiating in Spain is not the copy of any foreign movement. It has learned from fascism what fascism has of the idea of unity, authority, and substitution of the struggles among classes by the idea of cooperation. But it will produce in Spain the specifical results that may be expected in a country of such a long and glorious history, and such a deep personality as our own country is. (Primo de Rivera, January 1935)

In the next paragraphs, we focus specifically on the consciously ultraconservative sector of the target audience. To these ultraconservative ears, Rivera's words are incredibly familiar. This familiarity with the language used by the Ciudadanos' leader serves to mobilize such a vote towards the "orange party." However, some people on social networks, and especially on *Twitter*, argued that Rivera's speech had been inspired by Obama's keynote speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, that comparing Rivera's speech to that of Primo de Rivera is uncalled-for. Let's look at Obama's speech, the one that supposedly inspired Albert Rivera:

> Well, I say to them tonight, there is not a liberal America and a conservative America—there is the United States of America. There is not a black America and a white America and Latino America and

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[71]The unexpected growth of the far-right Vox party is taking its toll on the PP and C's disputing many votes from this part of the electorate thanks, precisely, to a more openly ultraconservative discourse.

> Asian America—there's the United States of America. The pundits like to slice-and-dice our country into Red States and Blue States; Red States for Republicans, Blue States for Democrats. But I've got news for them, too: we worship an awesome God in the Blue States, and we don't like federal agents poking around in our libraries in the Red States. We coach Little League in the Blue States, and, yes, we've got some gay friends in the Red States. There are patriots who opposed the war in Iraq and there are patriots who supported the war in Iraq. (Barack Obama, July 2004)

Indeed, Rivera's and Obama's speech seem to have much in common. However, as the political scientist Roger Senserrich has pointed out in an article entitled Copiar a Obama y sonar como Primo de Rivera, there are fundamental differences between Obama and Rivera that explain why such similar speeches have such a different impact on their respective audiences. On the one hand, the context in which both politicians make their speeches differs widely. For instance, the meaning of patriotism in the USA and Spain is very different. In Spain, the appeal to the homeland, as well as the use of national symbols (flag and anthem), are practically the heritage of the Spanish conservative right. It is the symbolism carried by those who take part in the protests against same-sex marriage, abortion, etc. This is an exclusionary patriotism, according to which being critical of the Crown or being in favour of a referendum in Catalonia to resolve the current situation is unpatriotic. This is why a large part of the more liberal Spanish electorate rejects patriotism. In the United States, however, patriotism is not the exclusive heritage of either Republicans or Democrats. Moreover, the status of each speaker differs and affects the reception of both speeches by their respective audiences. Obama belongs to an underprivileged group whose members have been and continue to be systematically attacked for belonging to such a group. For someone like him to speak of unity turns his discourse into a liberal one that seeks to overcome the racism still latent in American society. Albert Rivera, however, does not belong to an underprivileged group that seeks to have its members treated as equals by Spanish society. When Albert Rivera, who left the Catalan parliament to avoid condemning the Franco dictatorship (due to a suspicious equidistance), speaks of unity, he is talking about unity around values whose interpretation is not shared by everyone.

We will accept as a more straightforward interpretation of the case that, indeed, Rivera was inspired by Obama and did not intend to address codified messages to the more conservative sectors of Spanish society. This would be a paradigmatic case of an unintentional dogwhistle in which a speaker arouses the sympathies of a sector with specific political sensitivities that was not in principle the target of his speech. And we argue, that at least for the more politicized sector, the dogwhistled message is overt because Rivera uses the same idiolect and the same symbols as them.[72]

5.4 Dogwhistles as a Mechanism of Undermining Propaganda

As indicated in the previous sections, a dogwhistle can be used as a mechanism of political manipulation, as a speech act through which a speaker manages to deceive, when it is *overt*, a significant part of the general audience, the non-targeted one, and, when it is *covert*, the entire audience. The concealment of a specific message to a part of the general audience for political purposes makes dogwhistles irretrievable, a harmful instrument of political propaganda.

Political propaganda, as Stanley (2015, p. 52) points out, "is a kind of speech that fundamentally involves political, economic, aesthetic, or rational ideals, mobilized for a political purpose." The speaker can use this type of speech either to show support for or to show a disguised rejection of the values it supposedly promotes. Accordingly, Stanley distinguishes two kinds of political propaganda: *supporting* and *undermining* propaganda. Let's see how Stanley characterizes them:

Supporting Propaganda: A contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to increase the realization of those very ideals by either emotional or other nonrational means.

Undermining Propaganda: A contribution to public discourse that is

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[72]A shorter version of this section was published in Nueva Tribuna on May 27, 2018. Click on the link: Los silbatos para perro y el discurso nacionalista de Rivera

presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that
tends to erode those very ideals. (Stanley, 2015, p. 53)

Given our interest in political dogwhistles, we will focus on undermining propaganda, the kind of propaganda of which some of the political dogwhistles of the sort we are concerned with here are a subset. As Stanley has noted, this variety of propaganda takes the form of a speech apparently in line with the values commonly accepted in liberal democracies, but whose effect, deliberate or not, is to erode these values by promoting hostile attitudes towards them in the target audience. Some dogwhistles can be considered a type of *harmful speech*. According to Maitra and McGowan (2012, p. 4), a harmful statement is not merely an offensive speech act but is a damaging speech act insofar as its use has dangerous consequences in practice: either for the integrity of the members of the group being attacked or for the proper functioning of democratic rules, etc.

Maitra (2012), following Mackinnon (1987, 1993) and Langton (1993), argues that many speeches can be harmful as they are *subordinating* speech acts. That is, insofar as they are speech acts that "rank their targets as inferior, deprive them of rights and powers, and legitimate discriminatory behavior towards them." (2012, p. 95). Imagine a teacher telling his students in a class that "trans students should undergo psychological treatment because they are crazy." This teacher would be carrying out a speech act that is not only offensive but also harmful to trans people. His words could lead cis students to discriminate against trans schoolmates by causing all kinds of physical and psychological harm to them. Given this characterization, we can conceive of dogwhistles as subordinating speech acts insofar as at least through the use of racial dogwhistles the speaker damages the dignity and even the integrity of underprivileged groups. However, what is special about dogwhistles is that this act of subordination is surreptitiously carried out, which makes them, if possible, even more jeopardizing than explicit subordinating acts.

Some dogwhistles, therefore, seem to be speech acts that subordinate specific groups of the population for political purposes, but using language that is apparently innocuous and consistent with the values prevailing in democratic societies. We shall call this kind of dogwhistles, *subordinating dogwhistles*. Cases discussed in sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 are instances of subordinating dogwhistles. Both cases illustrate their offensive and harmful nature. Subordinating dogwhistles, in

particular, are assaults on the African-American community put them in the public eye. A significant portion of public opinion will blame African Americans for being responsible for the violence and abuse of the country's public resources.

Nonetheless, it seems that there are cases of dogwhistles that do not seem to fit well within the category of subordinating dogwhistles. Some paradigmatic instances of dogwhistles rather than subordinating a particular group seem to show support for certain sectors of the electorate. This support is carried out surreptitiously to avoid rejection by another part of the voters. We shall call this kind of dogwhistles *backing dogwhistles*. Backing and subordinating dogwhistles are orthogonal categories to the distinction between overt and covert dogwhistles. Overt backing dogwhistles should not be confused with what Stanley calls supporting propaganda. Overt backing dogwhistles are a kind of undermining propaganda insofar as they are "presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals." Backing dogwhistles, when overt, seem to be speech acts that show support for specific values that are held by one part of the population, but using non-explicit language to avoid alienating that other part of the electorate that advocates opposing values. This variety of dogwhistles erodes the values it apparently endorses but does not do so by ranking a group as inferior, but rather by showing respect for a non-majority usually conservative opinion whose explicit support would split the whole of the electorate it addresses with undesirable electoral results for the speaker. Cases discussed in sections 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2 ilustrate how overt backing dogwhistles work. Although we have not analysed any other kind of cases, it is at least conceptually possible to think that there are also cases of overt subordinating dogwhistles (the use of expression "constitutionalist" could serve as a case of this type, at least in current Spanish political debates) and cases of covert backing dogwhistles (in covert backing cases the uses that make more sense are positive). For example, a government campaign against tobacco could be used the way covert dogwhistles work. Finally, 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 are paradigmatic cases of subordinating covert dogwhistles. The chart below summarises the types of dogwhistles we have just characterised.

Figure 5.2: A taxonomy of Dogwhistles

The different types of dogwhistles, besides working differently when they are overt or covert, can be used for different political purposes: backing or subordinating some social groups. As we have said throughout this dissertation, covert dogwhistles are those, among dogwhistles, that require a special treatement. In the following section, we explore the role of individual and structural feautures in explaining how covert dogwhistles exploit certain associations to promote certain attitudes in a part of the audience.

5.5   Structuralism, Individualism and Covert Dogwhistles

Consider the following situation:

> Several police officers examine the available evidence about who may be the sinister killer who is keeping the entire city on its toes with his crimes. One of them, Lucy, proposes the name of the person she considers the primary suspect. Immediately, one of the male officers says: "Don't talk foolish, Lucy, this is serious! Let's leave the female intuition for another time." (Torices, 2018, p. 77)

This is a standard case of epistemic injustice, in particular, one of testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007): *the phenomenon by which the credibility of a person*

as possessor and provider of knowledge, and therefore able to provide reliable tes-
timony, is reduced in virtue of her belonging to a socially disadvantaged group
(gender, sexual, ethnic minorities, etc.). It is worth clarifying that "testimonial"
must be understood here in a broad sense, as any judgment carried out by the
speaker, either based on opinion or direct witnessing.

To explain the causes of epistemic injustices in general, and testimonial injus-
tices in particular, the positions vary along a continuum that goes from extreme
individualist to extreme structuralist positions (as we will see, "individual" here
refers to internal factors of individuals, while "structural" refers to elements of the
social fabric). Extreme positions claim that either individual or structural causes
are sufficient to account for epistemic injustices.

Extreme individualists maintain that testimonial injustice is only the result
of prejudicially evaluating a speaker's testimony, either due to explicit prejudice
or implicit bias. Like prejudices, implicit biases are evaluations that "involve
associations between social groups and concepts or roles such as 'violent', 'lazy',
[. . .] and so on" (Brownstein and Saul, 2016, pp. 1-2). However, unlike prejudices,
implicit biases "are largely outside of conscious awareness or control" (Ibid. p. 1).
Thus, they are assessed by means of special tasks, such as the *Implicit Attitudes
Test* (see Project Implicit). In this test, a person's reaction time to associate words
and images with specific categories is measured. Spending a longer time in making
some associations reveals the strength of the implicit biases. On an unconscious
level, many of those who take these tests harbour, to varying degrees, biases of a
racist, sexist, classist nature, or all of them. For individualists, the main way to
reduce or end social injustices is the reduction of explicit or implicit prejudice that
sustains such injustices.

In reaction to this sort of individualism, structuralists (Anderson, 2010; Banks
and Ford, 2011; Haslanger, 2015; Ayala and Vasilyeva, 2015) argue that this anal-
ysis is not only incorrect, but also dangerous. It is wrong because the prejudices
or implicit biases are not the causes, but some of the consequences of living in
unfair and unequal societies. It is dangerous as a paradigm because it makes in-
visible the structural nature of the injustices that we must face if we want to make
our societies more egalitarian and fairer. The structural dimension ranges from
institutional aspects and social norms to the material living conditions of people
who are subjected to injustice. As Haslanger (2015) notes, injustice and inequal-

ity in the form of racism or sexism, for example, may continue to exist even in societies free from implicit racial or gender biases and prejudices. Ending these prejudices, therefore, does not mean ending existing injustices and social inequalities which makes the extreme individualistic approach insufficient in itself. For extreme structuralists, the aim of those who seek to combat social injustices must be "the alleviation of substantive inequalities, not the eradication of unconscious bias" (Banks and Ford, 2011, p. 2). However, they also have to cope with criticism from supporters of individualism, who complain from, on one hand, the imprecision with which the structural dimension is sometimes characterised and, on the other hand, the difficulty of adequately combining the structural and the agential (Ayala, 2018).

These two frameworks are incompatible only if it is accepted that each of them is sufficient in itself to understand and solve the problem. However, there are more than enough reasons to reject this exclusionary vision. Moderate positions maintain that both individual and structural factors are necessary to explain injustices (Ayala, 2016). They embrace a framework in which the structural and the individual are interdependent dimensions, both of which are necessary to undertake the social changes necessary to tackle social injustices effectively (Madva, 2016; Saul, 2019). In the remainder of this chapter, we adopt this conciliatory approach to analyse covert dogwhistles.

Following Toribio (2018), implicit biases are *associations*. In particular, for the case at hand, the sort of associations that are exploited by covert dogwhistles.

> The mental structure of associations is taken to be that of a network formed on the basis of the mutual causal activations of the concepts and valences involved. The main characteristic of such networks is that the relation between associated nodes is not predication. Nodes in the network do not decompose into a truth-evaluable propositional structure. (Toribio, 2018, p. 42)

As noted above, when a speaker utters a covert dogwhistle, there is no semantic link between the expression that triggers the dogwhistle and the dogwhistle itself. Rather, the speaker takes advantage of specific associations between those expressions and certain social groups for her own political benefit. The way of promoting certain attitudes amongst the audience is not therefore by making the audience

make certain inferences from one content to another (as defended by Khoo 2017, p. 50), but by exploiting the associations that at least a part of the audience will make while hearing that expression in the lips of the speaker. These associations, as Toribio (2018) has pointed out, do not have a propositional structure. They "are instead the result of reliable, reinforcing connections, as they are typically learnt by exposure" (Ibid.). Unlike inferential transitions, associative transitions are not made based on the content of the associated items. They are acquired "mainly through conditioning and reinforcement" (Toribio, 2018, p. 44).

Implicit biases are a result of living in structurally unjust and unequal societies and also contribute to the perpetuation of such structural injustices and inequalities. At the same time, these implicit biases are reinforced by the injustices and social inequalities in which we live, which in many cases make it possible to justify such biases. All this is the breeding ground for politicians and their allies to use language (and also images) to manage the attitudes of the constituency at will and covertly.

In the next section, we will offer arguments that favour the thesis that dogwhistles are associative and therefore not propositional using what we might call the *Test of Retraction*. We will also see how the proposed analysis of covert dogwhistles fits into the expressivist framework that we have developed throughout this dissertation.

5.6 Presuppositions, Implicatures and Covert Dogwhistles: How They Behave vis-à-vis Retraction.

As we have said, covert dogwhistles are not really about sending a "coded message." Instead, they raise attitudes to salience, so people will act by them without realizing they are being moved towards them. Our key question in what follows is whether covert dogwhistles, either backing or subordinating, constitute a special form of implicit communication, or whether they can be reduced to already existing forms of implicit communication, such as presuppositions or implicatures. To carry out this task, we compare the features of each of the mentioned phenomena and analyse how they behave in the face of retraction. The thesis that we defend

is that covert dogwhistles are first-order predicables, and as such, they convey orientational, nonpropositional information. Their peculiarity, either because they are implicit first-order predicables instead of explicit, or for another reason, is that they do not contribute, unlike explicit first-order perspectival expressions, locational, propositional information. They do not add information that allows those involved in a conversation to situate the actual world in a particular region of the logical space, rather than another.

Let's take Gingrich's case as an example for our analysis. Covert dogwhistles convey a kind of not-at-issue information (Tonhauser, 2012; Stanley, 2015), which is, as we have said, orientational. Commonly, presuppositions and implicatures are conceptual tools used to account for how different kinds of implicit communication or not-at-issue information work. Let's see then whether dogwhistles are reducible to some of them.

In the above quotation, Gingrich's speech apparently suggests something like "African Americans are lazy and freeloader." Even so he can explicitly reject that "African Americans are lazy" without obvious contradiction and without seemingly affecting the meaning of what he said. However, both presuppositions and conventional implicatures cannot be rejected without producing a certain oddity in the hearers, as we have seen in Sections 3.4.1 and 4.4.1, respectively. Besides, presuppositions and conventional implicatures are semantically linked to the meanings of the words in such a way that it is practically impossible for their contents to be aimed only by to selected part of the audience.

On the other hand, conversational implicatures are cancelable (although the price to be paid is to show oneself to the audience as being non cooperative), and can be rejected without affecting the main content asserted. It would perhaps because of this seem plausible to argue that Gingrich exploits conversational rules and contextual factors to influence a subset of his audience sending the conversationally implicated message that "African Americans are lazy." Nevertheless, assuming by using the term "food stamp" Gingrich is suggesting that "African Americans are lazy" is troubling. A notable feature of covert dogwhistles, as we have seen, is their ability to affect a part of the audience without their awareness—that is, without the latter being aware that they are being moved for racist reasons, for instance. In the case of implicatures in general, speaker and hearer engage in a game of mutual recognition of intentions, without which the implicated content

cannot be successfully captured by the hearer. In the case of covert dogwhistles, however, their success rests precisely in the fact that the hearer does not recognize the speaker's intention, yet is still mobilised for specific political purposes. The type of contribution that the speaker makes through a covert dogwhistle seems to produce a certain effect on the audience, rather than to communicate propositionally articulated content. One way to confirm this is by analysing the behaviour of an implicated content and an alleged "dogwhistled content" concerning retraction. Consider the following dialogues, the first is a case of retraction of a conversational implicature and the second is a alleged case of retraction of a covert dogwhistle:

(66)   A: Sam does not like to work.
        B: Well, she is African American.
        (**Implicature**: African Americans are lazy).
        B: Wait, wait! Sorry, I was wrong, not all African Americans are lazy. (**B's retraction**)
        A: Exactly.

(67)   A: Over here you have a policy which, with Reagan and me as speaker, created millions of jobs-it's called paychecks. Over there you have the most successful food stamp president in American history, Barack Obama.
        (**Dogwhistle**: African Americans are lazy)
        B: Well, food stamp recipients are a tiny minority.
        A: # It is true, I was wrong, not all African American are lazy. (**A's retraction**)
        B: Wait, I did not know that your comment in addition to being explicitly classist, was also racist.

As we can see, in case (66) the retraction of B does not produce surprise to A, in case (67), however, the retraction of A does produce surprise to B, because A's retraction in (67) reveals to B something that had previously remained hidden. In fact, as Mendelberg (2001) and Saul (2018) show, when the covert dogwhistle becomes explicit the effect produced begins to change. Therefore, covert dogwhistle cannot be propositional because they lose their persuasive power when translated into a propositionally articulated statement. They cannot be retracted, as other claims, can because they cannot be translated into full propositional sentences. In

this sense, they are *ineffable*. In A's speech act of retraction, he's not properly targeting the content of the dogwhistle, which is, by definition, implicit.[73]

The fact that covert dogwhistles do not contribute with locational, propositional information, seems a priori to run counter our thesis about first-order predicables. However, our proposal aims to capture all the diversity at both the syntactic and semantic levels of evaluative uses of language. Covert dogwhistles, like the other of first-order predicables, have expressive meaning, they make partitions in the logical space and rank the subsets of possible worlds resulting according to a certain order. However, as we have seen, covert dogwhistles do not contribute locational information.

5.7   Concluding Remarks

As we have seen, presuppositions and implicatures are not quite suitable for explaining covert dogwhistles. Presuppositions and conventional implicatures cannot be rejected without affecting the meaning of the utterances that trigger them (not deniability without oddity), and are closely linked to the linguistic meaning of the words uttered (linked to linguistic meaning). However, part of the information conveyed by a covert dogwhistle can be rejected without affecting the meaning of the speech act, and covert dogwhistles exploit associations, rather than linguistic meaning—although they share with conventional implicatures that changing the wording of the expression asserted might remove the implicit content (not interchangeable). Therefore, covert dogwhistles are neither presuppositions nor conventional implicatures. Conversational implicatures, on the other hand, can be rejected, and are the result of exploiting contextual factors, like dogwhistles. However, unlike covert dogwhistles, the success of a conversational implicature depends on the recognition of it by the audience (successful yet unrecognized), and the retraction of the implicated does not produce a kind of surprise in the audience (retraction with oddity). The following table shows these features pointed out.

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	Covert Dogwhistles	Presuppositions	Conventional implicatures	Conversational implicatures
Not interchangeable	✓		✓	
Deniability without oddity	✓			✓
Successful yet unrecognized	✓			
Retraction with oddity	✓			
Linked to linguistic meaning		✓	✓	

Figure 5.3: The features of dogwhistles, implicatures and presuppositions

Regarding to retraction, it can be argued that, in cases of covert dogwhistles, in fact retraction is impossible. In case (67), for example, it can be argued that the speaker A is making explicit something that remained hidden and denying it, rather than retracting it. This can be explained by appealing to the expressivist proposal that we put forward in Chapter 4. Covert dogwhistles do not rule out any of the possibilities considered in a given context (locational information), because they do not convey information which is recognised by the audience, and in this sense they are not propositional. Rather, they rank the relevant possibilities considered (orientational information), putting some closer than others (Charlow, 2014), and this is what produces the effect that mobilises the audience for specific political purposes. Since covert dogwhistles are not propositional, one cannot retract a dogwhistle, strictly speaking, because what characterises a covert dogwhistle is its implicit and unconscious persuasive power.

If what we have said about covert dogwhistles goes in the right track, none of the proposals we have discussed, and challenged in Chapters 3 and 4 seem to be good candidates to explain covert dogwhistles.

Part IV

General Concluding Remarks

6

Concluding Remarks

The main aim of this dissertation was to provide an expressivist metasemantic framework that made sense of a variety of evaluative uses of language. We have called "perspectival expressions" to those expressions that are perspectivelly used, that is, those expressions whose content somehow depends on the perspective relative to the perspective of an agent.

This dissertation was divided into four parts, the second and third being the core parts of it. In Chapter 2, it is defended the thesis that, contrary to what has usually been thought, faultless disagreement should not be conceived as the phenomenon around which the debate on perspectival expressions should revolve. This role, it is argued, is played by a family of disagreements that we call "nonfactual disagreements." The argument presented in this chapter goes through three steps. In the first step, we have presented what disagreements are, what it means to say that two or more parties disagree. To accomplish this task, we have used MacFarlane (2014)'s taxonomy of disagreements. The second step of the argument, a negative one, consisted in defending that "faultless" is an epistemic perspectival expression and that, in this sense, whether or not a disagreement is faultless is not especially relevant from a semantic point of view, given that, in principle, and as MacFarlane (2014) points out, any theory can assume that a disagreement is faultless in its epistemic sense. The third step of the argument, a positive phase, consisted in arguing in favour of so-called nonfactual disagreements. We have presented the three types of disagreements that, in our opinion, constitute the family

of nonfactual disagreements (*deep disagreements*, *metalinguistic negotiations*, and *evaluative disagreements*). This chapter has allowed us to draw as a conclusion which desiderata must be the ones that any theory designed to explain the evaluative use of language must fulfil in order to be effective in that task. The three mentioned desiderata can be summed up as follows:

> DISANALOGY: A theory on perspectival expressions should coherently explain the difference between describing and evaluating.

> NONFACTUAL DISAGREEMENT: A theory on perspectival expressions should coherently explain what constitutes a nonfactual disagreement, and the three types of existing nonfactual disagreements.

> RETRACTION: A theory on perspectival expressions should coherently explain cases of retraction. It must explain what content is retractable, and what content is not when the targeted speech act is a perspectival claim.

That describing and evaluating are different actions is something that every theory accounted for un this dissertation assumes. However, not every theory is able to provide a coherent analysis of it. Many of the proposals that we have analysed in this dissertation, in Chapters 3 and 4, can be conceived as representationalists. Both to describe and to evaluate is to represent a state of affairs, either an objective state of affairs independent of the subject, or a state of affairs relative to a subject. A theoretical framework such as this presents difficulties in appropriately accounting for the disanalogy between describing and evaluating. In particular, they present difficulties in explaining nonfactual disagreements. The existence of nonfactual disagreements seems to indicate that there is a clear difference in the kind of things that we do when we describe something and the kind of things that we do when we make evaluations. Disagreements that result from two incompatible descriptive claims and the kind of disagreements that result from two incompatible evaluative claims are quite different, as we have shown throughout this dissertation. The possibility that retracting a perspectival claim does not necessarily imply giving up the standard that enabled us, at a time t_0, to make an evaluation that we now, at a time t_1, deny is only possible if we conceive perspectival claims as dependent on normative standards and if we assume, following

Wittgenstein, that determining whether something is following or complying with a rule is a normative task.

The theoretical framework that has allowed us to accommodate these desiderata and, at the same time, has provided an explanation of covert dogwhistles has been an expressivist metasemantic framework. Perspectival expressions, or to be more accurate, expressions perspectivelly used enable us to do things with language for which other uses are not suitable. Specifically, and this is what we have defended throughout this dissertation, they serve for something other than describing how things are. Evaluative uses of natural language have been characterised by being informationally orientational, that is, by conveying nonpropositional content. These expressions, when they are used evaluatively, contribute to the conversational setting with what we have called expressive meaning. However, among them, there are differences, both in their syntactic role and in their capacity to provide, in addition to orientational information, locational information—which is propositional in nature (Charlow 2014, p. 639; Lewis, 1979). The metatheoretical expressivist scaffolding that we have proposed in this dissertation is, as we announced in Chapter 1.1, compatible with a number of different semantic implementations. Some expressivistic assumptions, we claim, though, can still be considered necessary conditions for any semantic account that provides an adequate explanation of these desiderata.

According to the expressivist analysis defended here, among perspectival expressions, there is some that function as higher-level predicables, and others that function as first-order predicables. The former only contribute expressive meaning, in other words, they only contribute with orientational information to the conversational setting, the latter, in addition to expressive meaning, substantively contribute to what is said—they contribute, in addition to orientational information, with locational information. As we have said, the first type of information, the orientational one, is nonpropositional in nature, and the second type, the locational one, is propositional in nature. Of those perspectival expressions that function as higher-level predicables, there are expressions whose expressive function is to impart instructions about how the circumstances of evaluation of those claims in which they appear should be modified. However, these seem to be a small part of them. Most of the expressions that function as higher-level predicables have a double expressive function: to modify the circumstances of evaluation,

and to make partitions in the logical space and to rank the subsets of possible worlds resulting according to a certain order. Expressions that function as first-order predicables do not have this double expressive function, they only allow ranking the resulting subsets of possible worlds according to a certain order, and in addition, they contribute providing locational information. An exception to the rule and a further argument in favour of the variety of evaluative uses at both syntactic and semantic levels are covert dogwhistles. These function as implicit first-order predicables, their expressive function like explicit first-order predicables is to make partitions in the logical space and to rank the resulting subsets of possible worlds according to a certain order. However, unlike expressions that explicitly function as first-order predicables, covert dogwhistles do not contribute locational information to the common ground.

As we pointed out at the beginning of this dissertation, paying attention to how to characterise evaluative uses of language is not only important from a semantic point of view, but also from a political point of view. Not being able to appropriately distinguish between factual and nonfactual disagreements leaves us ill-equipped to account for some propagandistic mechanisms. Therefore, we hope that the ideas defended here are not only semantically adequate but also they contribute to making the world a slightly better place.

Observaciones Finales

El objetivo principal de esta tesis fue proporcionar un marco metasemántico expresivista que diera sentido a la variedad de usos evaluativos del lenguaje. Hemos llamado "expresiones de perspectiva" a aquellas expresiones que son relativas a la perspectiva de un agente.

Esta tesis se dividió en cuatro partes. La segunda y la tercera constituyen las partes principales. En el Capítulo 2 se defendió la tesis de que, contrariamente a lo que se ha pensado habitualmente, el desacuerdo sin falta no ha de concebirse como el fenómeno en torno al cual debe girar el debate sobre las expresiones de perspectivas. Este papel, se argumenta, es desempeñado por una familia de desacuerdos que llamamos "desacuerdos no factuales". El argumento presentado en este capítulo pasa por tres fases. En la primera fase, hemos presentado qué son los desacuerdos, qué significa decir que dos o más partes están en desacuerdo. Para lograr esta tarea, hemos utilizado la taxonomía de los desacuerdos de MacFarlane (2014). La segunda fase del argumento, una fase negativa, consistió en mostrar que "sin falta" es una expresión de perspectiva epistémica y que, en este sentido, el hecho de que un desacuerdo sea o no sin falta no es especialmente relevante desde el punto de vista semántico, dado que, en principio, y como señala Mac-Farlane (2014), cualquier teoría puede asumir que un desacuerdo es sin falta en su sentido epistémico. La tercera fase del argumento, una fase positiva, consistió en argumentar a favor de los llamados desacuerdos no factuales. Hemos presenta-

do los tres tipos de desacuerdos que, en nuestra opinión, conforman la familia de los desacuerdos no factuales (los *desacuerdos profundos*, las *negociaciones meta-lingüísticas* y los *desacuerdos evaluativos*). Este capítulo nos ha permitido extraer como conclusión cuáles son los desiderata que cualquier teoría diseñada para explicar el uso evaluativo del lenguaje debe cumplir para ser efectiva en esa tarea. Los tres desiderata mencionados pueden resumirse de la siguiente manera:

> DISANALOGÍA: Una teoría sobre las expresiones de perspectiva debe explicar de forma coherente la diferencia entre describir y evaluar.

> DESACUERDO NO FACTUAL: Una teoría sobre las expresiones de perspectiva debe explicar coherentemente qué constituye un desacuerdo no factual, y los tres tipos de desacuerdos no factuales existentes.

> RETRACTACIÓN: Una teoría sobre las expresiones de perspectiva debe explicar de manera coherente los casos de retractación. Debe explicar qué contenido es retractable y qué contenido no lo es cuando el acto de habla que objeto de retractación es una aseveración de perspectiva.

Que describir y evaluar son acciones diferentes es algo que cualquier teoría asume. Sin embargo, no todas las teorías son capaces de proporcionar un análisis coherente de esta distinción. Muchas de las propuestas que hemos analizado en esta tesis doctoal, en los Capítulos 3 y 4, pueden concebirse como representacionalistas. Tanto describir como evaluar, en este marco, es representar un estado de cosas, ya sea un estado de cosas objetivo, independiente del sujeto o un estado de cosas relativo a un sujeto. Un marco teórico como este presenta dificultades para explicar adecuadamente la disanalogía existente entre describir y evaluar. En concreto, estas propuestas presentan dificultades para explicar los desacuerdos no factuales y toda su variedad. La existencia de desacuerdos no factuales parece indicar que hay una clara diferencia en el tipo de cosas que hacemos cuando describimos algo y en el tipo de cosas que hacemos cuando hacemos evaluaciones. Los desacuerdos que resultan de dos aseveraciones descriptivas incompatibles y el tipo de desacuerdos que resultan de dos aseveraciones evaluativas incompatibles son muy diferentes, como hemos tratado de mostrar a lo largo de esta investigación. La posibilidad de que retractarse de una aseveración de perspectiva no implica, necesariamente, renunciar al estándar que nos habilitó, en un momento t_0, a hacer una evaluación que

ahora, en un momento t_1, negamos, solo es posible si concebimos las aseveraciones de perspectiva como relativas a estándares normativos y si asumimos, siguiendo a Wittgenstein, que seguir o cumplir con una regla o norma es algo normativo.

El marco teórico que nos ha permitido acomodar estos desiderata y, al mismo tiempo, dar una explicación de los silbatos para perros encubiertos ha sido un marco metasemántico expresivista. Las expresiones de perspectiva, o para ser más precisos, los usos evaluativos de dichas expresiones nos permiten hacer cosas con el lenguaje que otros usos del lenguaje no nos permiten. Específicamente, y esto es lo que hemos defendido a lo largo de esta tesis, estos usos sirven para algo más que describir cómo son las cosas. Los usos evaluativos del lenguaje natural se han caracterizado por ser informacionalmente orientacionales, es decir, por transmitir contenidos no proposicionales. Estas expresiones, cuando se utilizan de manera evaluativa, contribuyen a la situación conversacional con lo que hemos llamado *significado expresivo*. Sin embargo, entre ellas hay diferencias tanto en su rol sintáctico como en su capacidad para proporcionar, además de información orientacional, información locacional, la cual es de naturaleza proposicional (Charlow 2014, p. 639; Lewis, 1979). El marco metateórico expresivista que hemos propuesto en esta tesis es compatible con diferentes implementaciones semánticas. Nuestro argumento ha sido que los desiderata que hemos ideado y la diversidad de los fenómenos que hemos esbozado solo podrían explicarse si se preservaran algunas asunciones expresivistas.

De acuerdo con el análisis expresivista que hemos defendido aquí, entre las expresiones de perspectiva hay algunas que funcionan como predicables de orden superior y otras que funcionan como predicables de primer orden. Las primeras solo aportan significado expresivo, es decir, solo aportan información orientacional a la situación conversacional; las segundas, además de significado expresivo, contribuyen substantivamente a lo que se dice, aportan, además de información orientacional, información locacional. Como hemos dicho, el primer tipo de información, la orientacional, es de naturaleza no proposicional, y el segundo tipo, la locacional, es de naturaleza proposicional. De aquellas expresiones de perspectiva que funcionan como predicables de orden superior, hay expresiones cuya función expresiva es impartir instrucciones sobre cómo deben modificarse las circunstancias de evaluación de las aseveraciones en las que aparecen. Sin embargo, estas parecen ser una pequeña parte de ellas. La mayoría de las expresiones que funcionan

como predicables de orden superior tienen una función expresiva doble: modificar las circunstancias de evaluación y hacer particiones en el espacio lógico y ordenar los subconjuntos de mundos posibles resultantes según un orden determinado. Las expresiones que funcionan como predicables de primer orden no tienen esta doble función expresiva, solo permiten hacer particiones en el espacio lógico y ordenar los subconjuntos resultantes de los mundos posibles según un orden determinado, y además contribuyen proporcionanando información locacional. Una excepción a la regla y otro argumento a favor de las variedades de usos evaluativos tanto a nivel sintáctico como semántico, son los silbatos para perros encubiertos. Estos funcionan como predicables implícitos de primer orden, su función expresiva al igual que los predicables explícitos de primer orden es la de hacer particiones en el espacio lógico y ordenar los subconjuntos de los mundos posibles resultantes de acuerdo con un orden determinado. Sin embargo, a diferencia de las expresiones que funcionan explícitamente como predicables de primer orden, los silbatos para perros encubiertos no aportan información locacional.

Como señalamos al principio de esta tesis, prestar atención a cómo caracterizamos los usos evaluativos del lenguaje no solo es importante desde un punto de vista semántico, sino también desde un punto de vista político. No poder distinguir adecuadamente entre desacuerdos factuales y desacuerdos no factuales nos deja peor situados a la hora de dar cuenta de algunos mecanismos propagandísticos. Por lo tanto, esperamos que las ideas que aquí se han defendido no solo sean semánticamente adecuadas, sino que también contribuyan a hacer del mundo un lugar un poco mejor.

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